


NTA UGC NET EXAM STUDY MATERIAL



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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>UNIT 1</b>	Classical Indian: epistemology and metaphysics
<b>UNIT 2</b>	Classical western: Ancient, medieval, and modern: epistemology and metaphysics
<b>UNIT 3</b>	Indian ethics
<b>UNIT 4</b>	Western ethics
<b>UNIT 5</b>	Contemporary Indian philosophy
<b>UNIT 6</b>	Recent western philosophy
<b>UNIT 7</b>	Social and political philosophy: Indian
<b>UNIT 8</b>	Social and political philosophy: western
<b>UNIT 9</b>	Logic
<b>UNIT 10</b>	Applied philosophy

# **UNIT – 1**

**Classical Indian: Epistemology  
And Metaphysics**

## VEDIC CONCEPT OF ṚTA

It is a mode of "Being" because the gods, who are ṛtajāta, provide light, wide space, safety, security, freedom, stability, visions etc., through their association with, and by means of the power of ṛta. It is the foundation for the functions of gods and men through which these entities maintain both their relation with ṛta and the security of the cosmos as well. The sacrifice is identified with ṛta because that rite harnesses the power of ṛta by which men are able to gain the freedom, safety, security etc., which are necessary for the persistent existence in the cosmos. Sacred speech is ṛta because it is the mark of the ṛṣi; this type of speech is the result of an alaukika or supernormal vision of that which is real; Ṛṣi brings his acts and intentions into conformity with ṛta in such a way that he, like gods, is able to sieve upon ṛta as his mode of being. Therefore, ṛta may be regarded as the necessary precondition for the safety, freedom, reliability, truth, law, order of the sat which manifested through the intentions and acts of men and gods. The paper contains three sections. The first section deals with general concept of value, the second section deals with the concept of ṛta, according to the ṚG Veda and the third one deals with the concluding remarks from my own standpoint.

### Definition and Meaning of ṛta

Ṛta is related to all creatures of the universe. Ṛta may be defined as a kind of "force" or "power" which is the necessary precondition for the freedom, safety, security, truth, order, and law of the established cosmos. M. Monier-Williams derives the word "ṛta" from the root √r which means "to go, move, rise, tend upwards, to go towards, meet with, fall upon, reach, obtain, to excite, to erect, to raise." He then gives the meaning of ṛta as "proper, right, fit, apt, suitable, able, brave, honest; fixed or settled order, law, rule, sacred or pious action or custom, divine law, divine truth". (Monier-Williams, 1960: 223) Research on the word "ṛta" has led to a general consensus that it means law, order, and truth. Bergaigne, Roth, Grassmann and Ludders certainly endorse this understanding, and W. Norman Brown seems to accept it without contest.<sup>1</sup> Ṛta, the Eternal Moral Order in different Indian Systems: Indian Philosophy has often been criticized as pessimistic. But after analysis of this statement we shall find that pessimism is not final. Radhakrishnan also points out that pessimism in the Indian systems is only initial and not final.<sup>7</sup> (Radhakrishnan, 1997: 49-50) The outlook which prevents the Indian mind from ending in despair and guarantees its final optimism is what may be described as spiritualism, according to William James "Spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and letting loose of hope.... This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. And those poets, Dante and Wordsworth, who live on the conviction of such an order, owe to that fact the extraordinary tonic and consoling power of their verse." (James, 1995: 106-107) The belief in an 'eternal moral order' in the universe is a common character of the Indian Systems (except the Cārvāka), Vedic and non-Vedic, theistic and atheistic. It dominates the entire history of Indian philosophy. The faith in an order—a law makes for regularity and righteousness and works in the gods, the heavenly bodies and all creatures—pervades poetic imagination of the seers of ṚG-Veda which calls this inviolable moral order ṛta.

The Mīmāṃsā calls this idea apūrva, the law that guarantees the future enjoyment of the fruits of rituals performed now. This idea shapes itself into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of adṛṣṭa, the unseen principle that controls even upon the material atoms and brings about objects and events in accordance with moral principles. Again it gradually forms itself into the general conception of karma, which is accepted by all Indian systems. The law of karma in its different aspects may be regarded as the law of the conservation of moral values, merits and demerits of actions. The law of conservation signifies that there is no loss of the effect of work done (kṛtapraṇāśa) and that there is no happening of events to a person except as the result of his own work (akṛtābhyupagama). The

law of karma is admitted by the six orthodox systems and even the Jainas and the Bauddhas.

## **The Law of Karma**

Generally, the law of karma means that all actions, good or bad, produce their proper consequences in the life of the individual who acts, if they are performed with a desire for the results thereof. This law helps us to explain particular differences in individual beings, which cannot be explained by the familiar circumstances of their lives. In this world we find that men who are born and brought under the similar circumstances differ very much in case of their developments and enjoyments in life. Some persons are happy, some suffers, some wise and some are ignorant. We see that some virtuous men suffer and many wicked persons prosper in this world. How can we explain these differences in our worldly life? We find that some of them are certainly due to various actions done by us in this present life. But many actions cannot be interpreted by reference to the works of this life. In these circumstances, provided some good or bad actions are found to produce certain good or bad effects in the present life, we have every reason to mention that all actions i.e. past, present and future will produce their appropriate results in this or another life of the agent. The law of karma is this general moral law that leads not only to the life and destiny of all individual beings, but even the order and arrangement of the natural world.

## **The Status of Karma**

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the law of karma is under control and the guidance of God who creates the world in accordance with the law. It is regarded that the *adṛṣṭa* (i.e. the stock of merits) and demerits of karmas of the individual self, cannot by itself lead to their proper effects, for it is an unintelligent and unconscious law. It is the Supreme Being or God who controls our *adṛṣṭa* and distributes all the joys and sufferings of our life in accordance with our karma.

Systems like the Jaina, the Bauddha, the Mīmāṃsā and the Sāṃkhya advocate that the law of karma is autonomous and works independently of the will of God. These systems advocate that the source or origin and order of the world may be explained by the law of karma without the presupposition of God.

## **Limited Application of the Law of Karma**

Law of karma has a limited application to the world of actions performed with the influence of the normal passions and desires of our life. All actions, of which the motives are desires for certain gains here or hereafter, are controlled by the law. Disinterested actions (*niṣkāma karma*) do not produce any effect or bondage just as a fried seed does not germinate. Therefore, this law is applicable to the individuals who work with selfish motives and are influenced by the ordinary passions and impulses of life and hanker after worldly desires or gains. The performance of *niṣkāma karma* or disinterested actions do not produce fettering consequences and it also assists us to exhaust and destroy the accumulated (*sañcita*) effects of our past actions performed under the influence of attachment, hatred and infatuation or of interested hopes and fears and accordingly leads to liberation. With the attainment of liberating knowledge, the self rises above the law of karma and lives and acts in the state of freedom. The liberated self acts for the good of mankind i.e. for the *lokasamgraha*. But he is not bound by his karma because he is free from self-interest and all attachment.

## **Fatalism is a Misinterpretation of the Theory of Karma**

The faith in 'an eternal moral order' inspires optimism and leads man to make himself master of his own

destiny. It interprets the present wrongness of an individual as consequence of his own action and hope for a better future through the recent moral and spiritual development of himself. Hence there is every chance or reason for free will and there is a great role of personal endeavor (puruṣakāra) for individual prosperity. So determinism (fatalism) is a misinterpretation of the theory of karma. Destiny (daiva) or fate is obviously the collective force of one's own actions done in past lives. This fate can be overcome by efforts of this life, provided they are sufficiently strong just as the force of old habits of this life can be counteracted by the cultivation of opposite and new habits with firm determination.

## **The Universe as the Moral Stage and Ṛta as the Order of Phenomena**

Closely connected with this law, we may regard the universe as the moral stage, where all living beings get the dress and the part that befit them and are to act well to deserve well in future. After birth an individual gets the body, the senses, the motor organs and the environment in which he finds himself. According to the inviolable law of karma, these are endowments of nature or God. The connection between ṛta and the regular periodic movement of phenomena is indicated at ṚG.Veda. 1.123, which states that the dawns possess the same daily form (sadr̥ṣir adya; v. 8) because they follow the statute of Varuṇa (sacante varuṇasya dhāma; 8), which is the statute of ṛta (ṛtasya dhāma; v. 9). Similarly, in RV 4.51.8, the dawns begin their journey from the dwellings of ṛta (ṛtasya sadasafi.) and, thus, they do not miss the directions (na sarga usaso jarante). Ṛta, as the force which regulates the periodic movements of phenomena, is associated with the twelve-spoke wheel of the year; the wheel is called the "cakrāmṛtasya" (Wheel of ṛta; RV 1.164.11).<sup>3</sup> The regulating and stabilizing power of the ṛta is often effectuated through the rule of Varuṇa. Varuṇa drives the chariot of ṛta (ṛtasya rathyafi; RV 7.66.12); i.e., he rules by means of ṛta. His power of rule is manifested in holding things distinct yet related, and in creating definite spheres of activity. In RV 5.62.1, it is stated that Varuṇa established the ṛta by means of his own law, which means that because his sphere and mode of being is ṛta he brings all of the cosmos into conformity with ṛta. According to the same sūkta, Varuṇa established heaven and earth (pṛthivī/dyu), caused the cows (go; i.e., cows, rays of light, hymns, etc.) to stream forth, caused the plants: (auśadhi) to flourish, and made the rains (vr̥ṣṭi) fall (v. 3). In RV 7.87.1-2, it is said that Varuṇa cut out a pathway for the sun and make great channels for the days to follow. The dynamic nexus of ṛta clearly foreshadows this term's role as the force of order and stability in the cosmos. Ṛta, as the agent of freedom, creates a vast space within which for the cosmos to flourish. Within this vast space it establishes safe routes and pathways upon which individual entities may perform their functions. Thus, ṛta is manifested in the regular order of temporal and special phenomena.

**Ṛta as the Sacrifice:** ṛta is several times identified with the sacrifice (yajña) in the Veda. For instance, the sacrifice is clearly intended in RV 10.179.3 where the rsi (or Rishi) declares: "susrātam manye tad ṛtam naviyafi (well cooked I think, is this new ṛta)". ṛta and yajña are also apparently used to designate the same practice in RV 7.21 which states that Indra is roused by the sacrifice (yajña; v. 1) the gods come to the sacrifice (yajña; v. 2) and that they protect the sacrifice (ṛta; v. 5) from those who are not worthy to participate in it. The term "ṛta" is used to designate the sacrifice because it is the force which makes that rite effective. At RV 1.133.1, the sacrificer is able to purge the cosmos by burning up those demons who are against the god Indra (ubhe punāmi rodasī ṛtena druho dahāmi sam mahīranindrafi). Ṛta as the effective force of the sacrifice is clarified in connection with the god Agni. Agni the luminous god of fire who is the great envoy of the sacrifice was established among men as a friend to work according to the ṛta (RV 3.5.3). Accordingly, he makes the sacrifice agreeable to the gods by taking it to them along the path of ṛta (ṛtasya pathā namasā miyedho devebhyo devatamafi susūdat; RV 10.70.2). At RV 4.3.4, the ṛṣi implores Agni to "Be attentive to this

ourwork, the ṛta, O Agni, we who are the knower of the ṛta (tvam cin na samya agne asya ṛtasya bodhya ṛtacit svadhifi).<sup>4</sup> This injunction is followed by a series of declarations which praise the power of the ṛta: ṛtena hi sma vṛṣabhas cid aktafi pumān agnifi payasā pṛṣthyena. 5 By the ṛta certainly the bull, the male Agni, anoints with milking the mountains (v. 10). ṛtenādrim vyasanabhidantafi sāma aṅgirasō'navanta gobhifi | sunam narafi pari sadannusamavifi svarabhavajjate agnau. By the ṛta the Aṅgirasas, cleaving the mountain, opened it out. They cause their voice to resound with the cows. The heroes happily take their seats on the dawn Light appears after the birth of Agni (v. 11). This sūkta seems to say that ṛta, in the form of the sacrifice, is the fundamental force through which men and gods perform their functions in the cosmos. Those who observe, perform and maintain the ṛta and the yajña, and thereby gain access to the freedom, safety, security, stability, etc. which the sacrifice provides, are signified by several epithets in the Ṛg Veda. Agni gives special wisdom or power (medhā) to the one who is ṛtayat (who keeps the ṛta/sacrifice) in R. V. 5.27.4. All aspects of life are 'sweet' (madhu) for the ṛtayat (RV 1.90.6). Soma gives prosperity/happiness to the ṛtayat (RV 1.91.7). The sacrificer in RV 7.85.4-5, who is able to persuade the Ādityas to promote his welfare, is called ṛtacit (who knows/has intimate contact with the ṛta). The ancient fathers (pitṛ), who were ṛṣis, attained to the abode of light (svar) because they were ṛtasap 6 (who perform the ṛta), ṛtāvāna and ṛtavṛddha in RV 10.154.4.

### **Ṛta as Truth in Speech**

A close conceptual relation between ṛta and sat has been maintained. The meanings of both terms are so intertwined that it is difficult to maintain a rigid distinction between them. Thus, sat is being manifested by the establishment of the cosmos, while ṛta is the mode of being which promotes the freedom, safety security, and stability of the sat. ṛta is also closely aligned with satya—a derivative of sat. According to J. Gonda, the meaning of satya can be grasped in a variety of related ways: (Gonda, 1962: 72) satya ... may be paraphrased by "that what is real, true, essential; being in conformity with belonging to characterized by, sticking to what is really existent, reality, being, to what is verity; being essence of the universe, of nature, of (one's) nature etc.; truthfulness in mind, speech of action." Verbal truth is only one side of the concept which is much more general. A being who is satya acts in accordance with real facts and unshakable norms, with that order and truth on which the cosmos is supposed to be founded; he is true to the validity of his own nature and hence also reliable. Thus on Gonda's terms, it seems reasonable to understand the formal significance of satya as "the principle of conformity to the sat". Satya, when used as an abstract substantive is a principle as fundamental to the cosmos as ṛta. For instance, RV 10.190.1 indicates that ṛta and satya first arose from tapas (fervor/heat) and that the night (rātri) and the ocean were established after these. Similarly, RV 10.85.1 states that satya upholds the earth (satyenottabhitā bhūmifi) while the Ādityas stand secure because of the ṛta (ṛtenādityāstīsthanti). The principle of being in accordance with sat (satya) and the principle of freedom, safety, security and stability (ṛta) appear to be two fundamental preconditions for the existence of the cosmos.

### **Conclusive Remarks**

The concept of ṛta is the synthesis of images of light, wide space, safe pathways, nurturing womb, evil destroying sound etc. The term 'ṛta' is used in the specific sense in the text of the Ṛg Veda. Ṛta is a mode of being because the gods the gods, who are ṛtajāta, provide light, wide space, safety, security, freedom, stability, visions etc., through their association with , and by means of the power of ṛta. ṛta is the basis for the functions of gods and men through which these entities maintain both their relation with ṛta and the security of the cosmos. The sacrifice is identified with ṛta because that rite harnesses the power of ṛta by which men are able to gain the freedom, safety, security etc which are necessary for the persistent existence in the cosmos. Lastly, sacred speech is ṛta because such

speech is the mark of the ṛṣi (this type of speech is the result of an alaukika or supernormal vision of that which is real) who has brought his acts and intentions into conformity with ṛta in such a way that he, like gods, is able to siege upon ṛta as his mode of being. Therefore, ṛta may be regarded as the necessary pre-condition for the safety, freedom, reliability, truth, law, order of the sat which manifested through the intentions and acts of men and gods. If the Vedic literature, which includes Ṛg Veda, is the foundation of Indian thought and ṛta represents a key concept in this foundational literature, then one would expect to find that the ideas expressed in ṛta have had a direct influence on the philosophy of post-Vedic literature. The Bhagavadgītā is concerned with the significance of world order /truth/law and the order of men with the cosmos; so this document would provide a good place for testing the hypothesis that the ideas expressed in ṛta are reflected in post-Vedic philosophy. In this connection we can state that the concept of ṛta will be enriched with the discussion and investigation of the relation between Ṛg Veda and the Bhagavadgītā, and the relation between ṛta and mokṣa (liberation).

## Meaning of Value

The term “value” has different meanings in different contexts. Value is the intrinsic worth of an object. An object of better quality gets higher value. Man has two types of needs. The need for food, clothing and shelter is known as lower or basic needs. Higher needs like the need to pursue truth, goodness, beauty, self-esteem, etc., are called values. Values are inner imperatives which make us seek particular goals. Value is an abstract symbol; it does not appease our hunger. That is to say, “values” by themselves have no value, it is the reality behind them which is important.<sup>1</sup> Generally, a man or woman who has a good moral character, kind, virtuous, helping to others, sympathetic is regarded as a man of high value. He or she may be rich or poor, Brahmin or non-Brahmin or Sudra, but that does not matter. This type of person has a special regard in our society. In a society where majority gives priority to the values will naturally become a value-based society and this is urgently required for better and longer survival of human being in the world.

## Divine Realm

The **Divine Domain** or the **Divine Realm** is of a higher-order realm beyond the SkySpill Continent. It is a great domain that possesses hundreds of millions of years' worth of Legacies, physical training, martial arts, swordsmanship techniques, technical skills, arrays, all of it have been developed and honed to the extreme. It is a world reserved for the strongest of the Martial Way! The **Divine Realm** is an extremely expansive realm that encompasses all 3000 Great Worlds and billions of lower worlds within its domain.

This world had so many masters, so many geniuses, that the world was as wide as the heavens. Once one looked at the entire Divine Realm, there were truly more Ninefall masters than there were dogs, with Divine Lord masters everywhere. That broad and endless world was the Holy Land of all martial arts!

## Ascension

It is also the realm people ascend to from lower realms when they reach a certain boundary, usually the Divine Sea Realm to the Divine Lord Realm. In order for a cultivator to ascend to the Divine Realm they need the help of wardens that is stationed on each world.

Those disciples that ascended from the lower realms were usually the top masters of their own great world and correspondingly arrogant. But compared to the geniuses of the Divine Realm, they were far from being comparable.

But, in extremely rare cases, top elites would emerge from the lower realms. These elites would have limitless potential and have had great lucky chances. The lucky chances they had would be no worse than Empyrean level treasures! These inheritances were mostly the reason they could ascend into a divine dragon in the Divine Realm.

## **Environment**

The environment in the Divine Realm is much more brutal than the lower realms. Here, is the true law of the jungle. Here, strength is not everything, strength is the only thing. Here, the competition is far more intense, and the fate of those who are eliminated is also far more miserable.

Humanity's martial artists, animals' vicious beasts, plants' medicinal herbs, all of these were existences that defied the will of the heavens. They fiercely competed with each other and followed the survival of the fittest. In this extremely brutal competition, the winners would live and the losers would be used for nutrients.

## **Traveling**

The Divine Transformation realm was the boundary one needed to wander the vast Divine Realm by themselves with some semblance of safety. On a faraway tiny planet they could act as an overlord. As for a Divine Lord powerhouse, that was different. They could seek a position in a Holy Land. For instance, in an eighth-grade sect like Carefree Island, they could mix in and become an Elder.

Traveling in the Divine Realm was a great experience to any martial artist, but it was riddled with countless dangers and trials! Not just that, but to travel between great worlds – once the expenses and consumption of spirit ship energy were accounted for – required at least a million violet sun stones.

Moreover, to travel between great worlds required one to be at least a Divine Transformation realm powerhouse. This was because the spaces between the great worlds and within the great worlds were filled with robbers and killers. Murdering someone and stealing all of their possessions was a frequent occurrence. And if one were a beautiful woman, their fate would be extremely miserable. It was likely they would either be sold as a slave whore or used to cultivate and have all of their life essence sucked up.

## **Language**

It is not directly stated but the language that Divine Realm martial artists use is different compared to the languages of lower realms like the Sky Spill Continent. To lower realm mortals, the language of Divine Realm cultivators is akin to the decree of gods.

## **Martial Artists**

The martial artists of the Divine Realm would start cultivating at a young age. They took spirit pills and spirit foods from birth, and what they bathed in were medicinal baths. They lived in palaces and what they wore were array clothes. When they went out they would ride on spirit boats and visit others by passing through transmission arrays. If they wanted to train, they could visit any of the training grounds near their homes.

In the Divine Realm, one needed to be at least a Divine Sea powerhouse to go out and adventure.

Otherwise, one could die countless times. This was because there were far too many Divine Transformation realm powerhouses in the Divine Realm. Even someone whose talent wasn't all that great could still cultivate to the Divine Transformation realm. No matter how talented a Life Destruction genius was, if they ran into some garbage Divine Transformation martial artist, they would still be done for.

## **Wandering Martial Artists**

There were many wandering geniuses that stumbled into great lucky chances and were also very arrogant. Even when facing a World King level influence, they still wouldn't retreat.

They wanted to use the geniuses from the large sects as stepping stones on their martial path. It had to be said that many of these people had experienced some sort of fortuitous event in their lives, and many of them believed that they had the life of an emperor. They didn't think that they were worse than any of these World King Holy Land disciples.

But in the end, a frog in a well was still a frog in a well. Ultimately, they were far from comparing to a disciple of a World King Holy Land, let alone peak geniuses of those Holy Lands!

## **3000 Great Worlds**

Of the 3000 great worlds, every great world had an unimaginable population base and every great world also had over a hundred Holy Land level influences.

The Divine Realm had 3000 great worlds that were called primary worlds. And these were only the 3000 great worlds. Besides the 3000 great worlds there were also medium worlds and small worlds. Even these small worlds had top powerhouses. There were also countless medium and small worlds. Of course, these were only small worlds in comparison to the primary worlds. In truth, these small worlds were all as large as the world the Sky Spill Continent was on, if not larger.

### **First-Order**

- The highest ranked great worlds all had a title, and that was a first-order world also called primary worlds. Out of the 3000 great worlds, only 100 of them were considered first-order worlds.
- Not only were the first-order worlds larger but there were far more masters present on them. Moreover, many first-order worlds were occupied by Emphyreans! This was one of the implicit assessment marks of a first-order world.

### **Second-Order**

- A world like the True Martial World was a great world only inferior to first-order worlds. They were called second-order worlds and there were several hundred of them.

### **Third-Order**

- As for the Crimson Light World and Atlas World, they were considered third-order worlds. There was the greatest number of third-order worlds, over 2000 of them.

## **3600 Great Worlds**

The great worlds of the Divine Realm not only included the primary world, but also the greater space that surrounded it as well as the countless celestial bodies in this space.

The truth was that the so-called Divine Realm 3000 Worlds didn't really mean 3000. '3000' was just an empty term; the true number far surpassed 3000. Here, there were 3600 great worlds recorded, but there were many smaller worlds that weren't counted.

## **Inner Worlds**

In addition, a Divine Lord powerhouse was able to form a divine world within their bodies. This world could hold rivers, lakes, seas, deserts, grasslands, and allsorts of life could be raised within. Then, the master of this world could obtain strength from all the power of faith emanating from their inner world.

For instance, characters like Huo Highdragon and Monarch Sweetfox had divine inner worlds. If the population of this world was added together, that was also a huge number!

It was impossible to measure how vast the Divine Realm was. Even if a World King were to spend a million years wandering the cosmos, they would still find it difficult to explore even a ten thousandth of the Divine Realm.

## **Lower Realms**

Even in the lower realms, where the three thousand boundless universe referred to one billion worlds, even that one billion worlds was just an empty term. In truth, there were far, far more worlds in the lower realms than one billion worlds. The true number was immeasurable. As for the world that the Sky Spill Continent was on, the planet was over a hundred million miles wide, so this was a relatively large world that could be included in one of the billion worlds of the three thousand boundless universe. But, there were far more smaller worlds which only had a diameter of several hundred thousand miles or even several million miles.

These worlds were much smaller than the world of the Sky Spill Continent, thus they were all ignored.

Although these neglected worlds seemed small in comparison, the truth was that these worlds all had a population of several trillion individuals. If one added these innumerable worlds together, the number of lives was immeasurable.

In terms of martial artists' strength, even if all one billion worlds of the three thousands boundless universes were added together, it still couldn't compare to the tiniest corner of the Divine Realm.

## **First Order Great World**

The highest ranked great worlds all had a title, and that was a first-order world. Out of the 3000 great worlds, only 100 of them were considered first-order worlds.

A world like the True Martial World was a great world only inferior to first-order worlds. They were called second-order worlds and there were several hundred of them.

As for the Crimson Light World and Atlas World, they were considered third-order worlds. There was the greatest number of third-order worlds, over 2000 of them.

Not only were the first-order worlds larger but there were far more masters present on them. Moreover, many first-order worlds were occupied by Emphyreans! This was one of the implicit assessment marks of a first-order world.

## **Primary Worlds**

Every great world of the Divine Realm's 3000 great worlds had a central continent called the primary world. This primary world was a landmass of nearly unimaginable breadth, and was also considered the core of a Divine Realm great world. The heaven and earth origin energy here was the richest and the resources bred here were also of the highest quality. The number of people living on a primary world reached an incalculable number, the average strength of the martial artists was higher, and the inheritances they studied were also much better.

Even the common people practiced martial arts. If one walked into the marketplace of mortal nations, they would see Altering Muscle and Bone Forging realm martial artists everywhere. Even Houtian and Xiantian martial artists were relatively common.

If the foundation of people was excellent, then there would naturally be more masters and the sects would also be larger. Almost 90% of the Holy Lands were located on primary worlds.

## **Central Continents**

Within the Divine Realm, Soul World, or universes that the saints resided in, one could often see giant mainlands floating in the vast nothingness of space. These mainlands weren't like bare wooden planks, but were surrounded by layers upon layers of infinite nebulous space. From the outside, they often had the shape of ellipsoid domes, like unbelievably large eggs.

As for the nebulas surrounding these central mainlands, there were innumerable planets that dwelled within, most of them even larger than the Sky Spill Planet. From this, it could be seen just how vast the area of these mainlands was.

The Divine Realm's 3000 great worlds each had at least one such central mainland. And, without a doubt, each one of these central mainlands was the liveliest place of the entire great world. For instance, Immemorial Imperial City was situated in the central mainland of the True Martial Great World.

## **Celestial Stars**

In the universe, every celestial star represented a celestial body, coming in nearly infinite forms and shapes.

These celestial stars were large and small. Some were blazing fire stars, some were massive planets, some were giant meteors, and some were even black holes that were known as the closest existence in the universe to grandmist energy.

There were countless celestial stars, and most of them had extremely poor environments with nearly no heaven and earth origin. These were desolate stars, unsuited for the survival of mortals or martial artists.

But there were some celestial stars with had rich heaven and earth origin energy and were full of life, vibrant, with many mortals living on them. The resources they had couldn't compare with those on the primary world, but they were far superior to those of the lower realms. Amid these stars, Divine Sea masters, Divine Transformation masters, and even Divine Lord masters would emerge. There were even some stars that were developed by martial artists as their personal territories or abodes. These martial artists were often supreme elders of the Divine Realm. They kept themselves secluded from the world. But once they appeared, they would frighten an entire area. Whether it was ancient

or current times, the stars that existed in the skies of a Divine Realm primary world always had martial artists living on them and powerhouses with their own hidden abodes. Naturally, there were countless lucky chances that were passed down through time. On these stars, there were an immeasurable number of rare treasures to obtain. There were caves of ancient vicious beasts and even hidden lairs of God Beasts. If one could fully explore these stars, the wealth they would find would be endless!

Of course, even if a late Divine Lord realm powerhouse were to spend their entire life exploring these stars, they wouldn't even manage to visit 1/100,000 of them.

## **History**

For the last 10 billion years, humanity has been growing increasingly weak and our domains have been constantly encroached upon by the other two races. Now, several heaven domains that belonged to humanity have been occupied. Our fellow humans that live there have been slaughtered or turned into slaves. It's even possible that the only heaven domain still belonging to humanity is our current Divine Realm. Thus, the great war of 3.6 billion years ago concerned the survival of humanity itself. Even though there are differences between the various Empyreans, they are all able to lay down their prejudices and conflicts at the critical moment when their race is in danger and unite together against an external threat.

## **Divine Realm First Martial Meeting**

The Divine Realm First Martial Meeting is a grand event that only occurs every four or five thousand years in the Divine Realm, and that is the First Martial Meeting! It will encompass all geniuses of the Divine Realm's 3000 great worlds!

## **The centrality of the institution of yajña (sacrifice)**

The present paper attempts to discuss the nature and role of Vedic sacrifice in Vedic literature and the ways this topic is expressed by relevant commentators on the subject. Issues of Vedic practices will be discussed along with their purpose, in so taking into account the historical approach to sacrifice (yajna/ agnihotra/ homa/ agnihoma/ havan) and its evolution in time. The period covered is from the earlier era of Vedic literature, known as Samhitas period until the later era dominated by the Upanishads.

Issues of yajna practices in the present days will be addressed along with their relevance. Vedic period of Hinduism starts with the proto-historic Hinduism/ early Vedic period, (until approx. 5th c. B.C.E.) and continues into the classical period (until approx. the 5th c. C.E.) (Hinnells, 1994, pp. 194-196). The early Vedic and classical periods of Hinduism contain four layers of sacred literature namely Samhita (consisting of Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sama Veda and Atharva Veda) Brahmana, Aranyaka and Upanishads. The first two layers are usually referred as Karma Kanda, the section that emphasizes on action, whereas the last two layers are known as Jnana Kanda, the section that emphasizes on knowledge. The later section of Veda is seen as pertinent to the Classical period of Hinduism. Yet, most important of all is the fact that the above division is based mainly on the attitude towards sacrifice (yajna). Although the purpose of practicing yajna remains the same, the way of its performing evolved in time along with various layers of Hinduism.

Yajna in itself is to be seen as the very essence of Veda. From the early times, the ritual was understood to be the link between the human and the Divine and a vehicle towards liberation. By such a link the human could access the Divine and fulfill the very purpose of the human existence,

that being to worship the Divine as the Creator of all things. Yet, in its incipient form yajna practice was in connection with the cyclical natural phenomena particularly the seasons (ritu) and the overall order of things perceived in nature. The place of human beings within the whole system of things was attentively taken into account. In this manner, from empirical observations, the concept of Cosmic Order or Divine Order (rita) developed and the practice of yajna became gradually a rite. Vedic culture (note 1) evolved on the basis of yajna having primarily the purpose to create harmony. This harmony refers mainly to issues of nature and the place of human beings within the environment, but also to the harmony within the human body itself. Deities (gods) as principles of life, natural phenomena or psycho-social tendencies in the human were conceptually created and became instrumental to obtain the harmony looked for by the human. The archetypal and phenomenal, thought and action were integrated into a single reality and self-aware self-determination (Frawley D., p. 40) Yet, the human-Divine link played by the role of yajna was to obtain gods' favours either in the external world or in the internal (psychological) world of practitioners. The goals were to obtain benefits in the forms of good crop, cattle, good weather, progeny, good health, happiness of any kind, etc. Yet, besides the common goals during the entire Vedic period, yajna had specific characteristics pertinent to every Vedic era.

Vedic scriptures point out that sacrifice was essential from the very beginning of creation. Prajapati (Lit. 'lord of creatures'), a god having a major position in the early Veda, was described as the embodiment of sacrifice. In Br., I.2.7 (note 2) Prajapati identifying himself with the universe desires: "May this body of mine be fit for sacrifice" for the purpose of creating the world. Gradually the early Vedic pantheon emerged dominated by the fourfold godhead namely Indra, Agni, Soma and Surya. Extensive hymns were consecrated to these gods as is written in the Rig Veda (Lit. 'Veda of praise'), the most ancient sacred book of Hinduism. As offerings were done to honour somebody, the ritual was performed depending on those goals.

During the early Vedic period there were five great kinds of sacrifices namely brahmayajna, devayajna, pitriyajna, manushyayajna and bhutayajna as sacrifices to Brahman (the highest Reality), to devas, to ancestors, to human beings and to all living creatures respectively. (Satchidananda Murty K., 1993, pp. 85-86). They apply to the two manners of performing sacrifice, either the shrauta rite that was done by Vedic priests according to shruti (i.e. sacred literature of Divine revelation) rules or grihya (domestic) rite performed by a householder man in many cases assisted by his wife (patni). However the shrauta rite is much elaborated, its aims extending far beyond the purpose of a household.

The shrauta rite was particularly attentive to what were the necessary objects and how they have to be used within the sacrificial arena. Particular attention was given to how the actions were to be performed or how the participants had to behave during the time of ritualistic activities. The enclosure (vedi) of the sacrificial ground was systematically arranged in an arena suitable for that specific purpose according to what the ritualistic literature recommended. Some objects used were the woods sticks (arani or idhma) in order to help kindling the sacred fire by friction. Other objects were logs of wood (samidh) as fuel, the offering spoon as sacrificial instrument/ utensil (sruca or agnihotrahavani), the pressing-stone of soma stalks (gravan), the sacrificial vessel (camasa) holding soma and food offering, the list of objects being quite long. Within the vedi there was an area known as antarvedi surrounding the fire-pit (kunda) in which the sacrificial fire (agni) has to burn various offerings. The antarvedi area has to be strewn with sacred grass (kusha) on which water was sprinkled according to specific rules. The sacrifice/ offering/ oblation (agnihoma) was patronized by the Vedic priests (ritvija) (vide intra) in charge with putting into the sacrificial fire

articles consisting of nourishments (annahoma) like milk, clarified butter, cereals, fruits, various powders, vegetables and flowers, etc.

The basic shrauta rite involved the participation of four Vedic priests, each one having specific attributes. They were known as hotri, adhvaryu, udgatri and brahman (brahmin) each priest could have three helpers if necessary. The Vedic priests were all chanting priests. As tradition stipulates, hotri was the priest chanting the hymns of Rig Veda while performing oblation into the fire, adhvaryu was the one chanting the hymns of Yajur Veda while performing adhvara, i.e. his duties before the sacrifice itself. Udgatri priest was the one chanting the Sama Veda hymns, while brahman priest seen as the most learned was the supervisor of the entire ceremony and the one chanting the hymns of Atharva Veda. Yet, the central figure of the sacrifice was seen to be the adhvaryu priest for the fact that he was the one measuring the sacrificial ground, building all that was necessary and preparing the materials to be used like, articles of oblation, utensils, woods and water. He also used to kindle the fire for expected offerings. Thus, the adhvaryu priest's skills to perform correct his duties were of utmost importance for the sacrifice. The very success of yajna was dependant on having the right set-up before the ceremony of chanting and offering could start.

As the scriptures suggest, the ways of performing yajna was different according to the aim in sight by the sacrificer, the one beneficiary of the rite. As sacrifice could be an offering to brahma, deva, pitri, manushya or bhuta, the aims of the sacrifice itself has to be compatible with what was in their power. The shrauta rite was a personal affair between the sacrificer and the unseen Divine forces that could give to the sacrificer his objects of desires. With the completion of yajna ritual, its fruits were expected to materialize after a certain period of time, the power of the sacrifice being seen as transitory. Considering the Vedic periods of time, yajna ritual evolved, in so bringing the transformation of the Vedic ritual itself.

It is on the account of the transformation of the Vedic ritual that the Hindu tradition evolved to retain the concept of yajna in different forms. The change was mainly related to the gradual internalization of the ritual. Thus, from a rite of overt expression of much detail elaboration, the rite evolved around the human being as a central point. The internalization of the sacrifice into the microcosmic world of the human body becomes predominant during the Classical period of Hinduism dominated by Jnana Kanda. This period emphasized on knowledge as the way to obtain the same fruits that could be procured by the shrauta kind of ritual performed during the early period as above described. Thus, during the Aranyaka and especially the Upanishad periods of Vedic times, the elaborated shrauta rite lost its dominance, in so a new kind of approach to yajna taking the front stage.

The important development during the later periods of Veda was that devas (gods) descend in order to become homologous with the psycho-physiological functions of the human body. Hierophany was thus internalized within the human body in the following terms: "The organ of speech (vak) (of the sacrificer) is looked upon as Agni ('fire') (Br.,III.1.3), "the eye (cakshus) of the sacrificer is Aditya ('sun') (Br.,III.1.4) , "the vital force (prana) (of the sacrificer) is looked upon as Vayu ('air') (B4.,III.1.5), "the mind (manas) of the sacrificer is Candra ('moon') (Br.,III.1.6). The Self which was seen as of nature of Hiranyagarbha ('the golden egg') is identified in Br.,II.1.17 as being in the heart. The four Vedic priests were also internalized as Br.,III.1.3-6 points out: "speech is the hotri", "the eye is the adhvaryu", "the breath is the udgatri", "mind is the brahman". Now, the new kind of sacrificer taking the role of imago mundi is no other but the spiritual aspirant himself that strives towards the knowledge (jnana) of Brahman as the highest reality. Not only the external world finds correspondence within the aspirant's internal world, but also his internal world is reflected in the

external world (lokas) of magnifying proportions thus: "the organ of speech (vak) itself is the earth, the mind (manas) is the sky and the vital force (prana) is heaven" (Br.,I.5.4). Yet, the entire interconnectivity of macro and micro universes as seen in the Upanishads does persistently address the issue of spiritual liberation (kaivalya) by the means of knowledge.

Basically, the entire literature of the Upanishads emphasizing on knowledge of reality was conducive to kaivalya as fruit of the new approach towards sacrifice. The essence of the Upanishads are their most relevant conclusions, the four great sayings (Mahavakyas) namely: Tattvamasi, Ahambrahmasmi, Prajnanam Bramna, Ayamatra Brahma (note 3). They summarize the whole philosophical concept, in which the central figure becomes the human being. This shift of centrality is essential in order to understand what happened to the concept of yajna itself.

Not only Brihadaranyaka Upanishad but also other major Upanishads like Ishavasya, Chandogya, Katha, Kena, Aitareya, do emphasize on the knowledge of Brahman as essential to liberation. The transition of the outer yajna towards the inner yajna is suggestively described in Garbha Upanishad one of the minor Upanishads. According to it, the sacrifice could be performed by the sacrificer within one's own body that has all the necessary articles/ items and functions required by yajna of the shrauta rite.

This is how Garbha Upanishad sees the correspondence between the outer yajna and the inner yajna performed with and within the human body: "The mind and the organs of the senses become the sacrificial vessels; karmendriyas (organs of action) are the sacrificial instruments. ... In this (sacrifice), the body is the sacrificial place, the skull of the head is the fire-pit, the hairs are the kusha grass; the mouth is the antarvedi (the raised platform in sacrifice)" (Narayanasvami Aiyar K. 1979, pp.121-122). Furthermore, the above scripture goes into much detail to define the correspondence between the outer form of yajna and human physical body, its function, capacities and any qualitative experience it might have. In a total expression of the inner aspect of yajna, Garbha Upanishad concludes that the importance of the sacrifice becomes paramount: "All who are living (in this world) are the sacrificers. There is none living who does not perform yajna. This body is (created) for yajna, and arises out of yajna and changes according to yajna." (ibid., p. 122). The conclusion is that body and mind become the repositories of qualities that are consistent with the essence of the Upanishads presented in the Mahavakyas (vide supra) towards the attainment of liberation.

In practical terms liberation becomes a total experience of life in which the right mental attitude and knowledge are necessary. This fact is outlined by the concept of sacrifice known as atmarpana ('offering to Atma'). This all-encompassing concept is seen in a broad sense as the conscious attitude of a person to offer one's own actions to the Divine in order to sanctify the ordinary human existence. On these lines, the action of working with the hands becomes mudra, the gesture of praise of the Divine; the act of talking becomes japa, the uttering of sacred formulae; the act of eating becomes yajna, the offering of nutrients to the Divine; the act of breathing becomes agnihotra, the sacrifice/ consumption of the air into the act of breathing, etc.

Thus, it is not surprising that the sexual act of intercourse itself is seen as yajna. This is how Br.,VI.4.3 describes the correspondence of the bodily parts of a woman and the instrumentality of yajna: "Her lower part is the (sacrificial) altar, (her) hairs the (sacrificial) grass, her skin the soma-press. The two labia of the vulva are the fire in the middle." (Radhakrishnan S., 1997, p. 321). Although using a different terminology a much similar approach was developed in great detail in Hinduism by the concept of tantra. It becomes clear indeed that the act of union (yoga) in various forms is central to

the new approach to yajna. On these accounts the practice of yoga in itself, as union with the Divine, could be seen as performing yajna.

As the specialised literature stipulates, the yoga practice as life transforming allows somebody to aspire to the highest state of liberation known under different names, yet one word has become well-known that of jivanmukti. Thus, jivanmukta is that person who attained liberation but still manifests in a human body. Yet, the human body is not an ordinary body anymore, but is now sanctified by the yoga as an act of sacrifice. This is how Eliade (1975, pp. 199-200) writes on the qualitative experience of life as yoga that is much consistent with the idea of imitatio dei: "The ideal of yoga, the state of a jivanmukta, is to live in an 'eternal present', outside time. 'The man liberated in life' no longer possesses a personal consciousness – that is, nourished in his own history – but a witnessing consciousness, which is pure lucidity and spontaneity."

On these lines, relevant classical yoga literature presents the importance of sacrifice for the purpose of liberation. In the well-known Bhagavad Gita work, that is a book of yoga par excellence, one reads (BG, III.9): "The world is bound by action (karma), unless performed for sake of sacrifice (yajna)" (note 4).

Furthermore, "By this (yajna) we nourish the gods and the gods will nourish we; thus by nourishing one another we shall attain the Supreme goal (i.e. liberation)." (BG, III.11). In this manner the wishes of the sacrificer become fulfilled because "...the gods nourished by sacrifice shall bestow on we the enjoyments we desire" (BG, III.12). In an fundamental conclusion, yajna is seen at the basis of the creation itself because "Brahma, the Creator, in the beginning of the world created human beings together with yajna and said: By yajna we shall prosper and yajna shall fulfill all our desires." (BG, III.10).

Considering various forms of yajna and its development in time, as above described, the question of today's relevance of all forms of yajna does arise (note 5). Indeed, nowadays, mainly in India, all forms of yajna are still practiced. The shrauta rite could assemble together thousands of people to attend, each person could take a personal resolution (sankalpa), a wish sent to gods via the offerings in oblation (note 6). Yet, the domestic rite (grihya) is widely practiced in many households following the tradition within that family. Yajna in the form of yoga is popular all over the world.

Concluding this paper is to say that the sacrificial rites were performed from the dawn of Hinduism in various forms and for various purposes. The four layers of Veda outline the practice of yajna rites according to the scriptural literature at that time. The shrauta kind of ritual was very much elaborated and relied of the Vedic priests to perform the ceremony on behalf of the sacrificer. The sacrificial ground has to be set up in a proper manner, having the necessary articles and tools for the priests to start the offering into the fire along with their chanting.

In the last two periods of the Vedic era, the emphasis from the outer mode of offering shifted towards the internalization of the ritual. The gods and their expressions in the outer form of yajna were found to be in the human body itself. The Upanishads particularly point out that whatever manifests as Divine expression in the external world could be found in the internal world of a practitioner of yajna. Various correspondences were made in order to show that the Divine powers or expressions of divinity were present as potentialities in the human being. This approach was very much consistent with the teachings of the Upanishads.

Yajna evolved to be less ritualistic by a total mental attitude of surrender known as atmarpana, the offering of every action to Atma, the Divine. A systematic practical approach to yajna became yoga with its many forms and a good methodological approach towards the issue of freedom, the liberation in a spiritual sense. This form of yajna is better known than any other forms of yajna. I will conclude that the nature and role of Vedic sacrifice in its multiple forms, became integrated at the level of the present religious practices in India. It is tenable to say that by the practice of yoga in many parts of the world, yajna has acquired a worldwide recognition as a valuable spiritual inheritance for mankind.

## **The Concept of Atman or Eternal Soul in Hinduism**

Atman is the immortal aspect of our mortal existence, the individual Self, which is hidden in every object of creation including humans. It is the microcosm which represents the macrocosm in each of us, imparting to us divine qualities and possibilities and providing us with consciousness and the reason to exist and experience the pains and pleasures of earthly life.

Atman is Brahman Itself, the very Self which descends into the elements of Nature through self-projection or manifestation and participates personally in the game of self-induced illusion and pure Delight. However, bound by the senses and limited by the ego, bonds, duality and perceptual knowledge, we, the jivas, do not perceive the truth. We go out, become involved and in the process forget who we are. It is like a person who travels to distant lands under a spell and forgets his roots, identity, and homeland.

When we look around, we rarely look in. When we are deeply involved with the world, we lose self-awareness and become immersed in the task at hand. It is how Nature created our mind and body to keep us bound. "The self-existent Lord pierced the senses to make them turn outward. Thus, we look to the external world and see not the Self within us."

The Self is the silent partner in all our deeds and experiences, the observer and the indweller of all embodied beings. Its nature cannot be adequately explained or described in human language, as it is beyond the senses and the mind. "There the eyes cannot travel, nor speech nor mind. Nor do we know how to explain it to the disciples. It is other than the known and beyond the unknown."

It can only be experienced when all the sensory activity ceases to have an impact on the mind, when the mind itself is freed from the movement of thoughts and sense objects, and the torment of desires, which are the prime cause of all human activity and suffering, and subsides into quietude. The experience of the Self arises "When the mind and the five senses are stilled and when the intellect is stilled... They say that Yoga is complete stillness in which one enters that state of Oneness."

Although it is described as a flame, of the size of the thumb, which is said to exist physically between the eye brows, or psychically in the heart, its exact location is uncertain. It has no physical or mental aspect as such, other than as a mere reflection or an idea in the intelligence of the mind. However, unquestionably He exists, and He only is real. All else is false, or an illusion, which withers away, crushed by the weight of sins, decay of the world, and pressures of time.

We are told, "The adorable one is seated in the heart and rules the breath of life. All the senses pay homage to him. When He breaks out of the body in freedom from the bonds of flesh, what else remains? This Self is Supreme." We are also told, "Above the senses is the mind, above the mind the

intellect, above that is the ego and above the ego is the unmanifested cause. And beyond is Brahman, who is omnipresent and without attributes."

The ego is Atman's poor cousin, the false center, which assumes the lordship and ownership of the mind and body, whereas in actual reality it is a mere reflection, a product of illusion and a mental projection, born out of sensory experiences and the accumulation of memories and thoughts. While the basis of Atman is reality, permanence and Bliss, the nature of ego is illusion, impermanence and suffering.

The ego of a living being is permanently soaked in ignorance and gloom and needs to be rescued from eternal doom and damnation by the indwelling Atman. The ego is a false reflection of it. The Katha Upanishad explains the relative status of the two selves in this manner, "There are two selves, the separate ego and the indivisible Atman. When one rises above I, me and mine, the Atman reveals Itself as the real Self."

The Mundaka Upanishad is more explicit and poetic, "Like two birds perched on the same tree, intimate friends, the ego and the self, dwell in the same body. The former eats the sweet and sour fruits of life, while the latter looks on with detachment."

This symbolism is further expanded in this verse of the Katha Upanishad, "Know the Self as the Lord of the Chariot, body as the chariot itself, buddhi as the charioteer and mind as the reins. The senses are said to be the horses and selfish desires are the roads by which they travel. When the Self is confused with the body, the mind and the senses, they say that he appears to enjoy pleasures and suffer from sorrow."

Although Atman is located in all of us, we cannot know It or understand It adequately with our ordinary awareness. "There, no eye can penetrate, no voice, no mind. Nor do we know how to understand it or preach it." In the Kena Upanishad the teacher explains the difficulty of knowing the Self to the students in the following words, "If we think that we know the Self we know not." And the student admits, "I do not think I know the Self, nor can I say I know Him not."

In the Katha Upanishad, Yama, the Lord of Death explains to Nachiketa, "The Self cannot be known through the study of scriptures, nor through intellect nor through hearing learned discourses. It can be attained only by those whom the Self chooses." He reemphasizes the same point again elsewhere.

In the Kena Upanishad the problem is further explained and the way to reach Atman is also suggested, "The ignorant one thinks that the Self can be known by the intellect, but the enlightened one knows that He is beyond the duality of the knower and the known." Thus, intelligence may give us wisdom and discernment and pave the way, but it cannot give us the experience of pure Self. The idea which is implied or suggested in the Upanishads is that Atman cannot be realized by ordinary consciousness, when the senses are active and when the mind is unstable, and buddhi, intelligence, is under the influence of desires, delusion and duality, which interfere with the process of knowing and the discernment of truth and right knowledge. There cannot be an experience of Atman when there is the gulf of "knowing" between the knower and the known. He who knows It (as an object), knows It not really.

The mind and the senses stand between the two polarities of the knower and the known, or the

subject and object. They prevent the being from knowing and realizing Atman as its very Self. The mind is an imperfect instrument with an inherent inability to understand and discern Atman. "The truth of Self cannot come to him, who has not realized that he is the Self. His intelligence cannot reveal the Self to him, beyond its duality of subject and object."

How does one realize Atman? What is the solution, or the process by which Atman becomes self-evident? The Upanishads are clear. "The self cannot be known by a person who does not restrain himself from unrighteous ways, who does not control his senses and still his mind, and who does not practice meditation or austerity," explains Yama to Nachiketa in the Katha Upanishad. He also adds, "This awakening which we have known comes not through logic and scholarship, but from close association with a realized teacher."

However, mere association with a spiritual master may not be very helpful, unless there is an inner and deep commitment and aspiration to know the transcendental Self. "The Self cannot be known through the study of the scriptures, nor through intellect, nor through learned discourses. The self can be attained by only those whom the Self chooses. Verily to them does the Self reveal Itself." Establishing the connection between the outer and the inner worlds is neither easy nor direct and straightforward. One has to pass through many intermediate states and stages, overcome many obstacles, remove many impurities, silence many noises of the mind and body, suppress undesirable qualities and negative tendencies to reach the final goal.

In the mortal world, the Self is subject to the illusion of states. The Mandukya Upanishad informs us that the self is fourfold:

1. **The wakeful Vaishwanara**, the Universal Male (the ego),
2. **The dreaming Taijasa**, the enjoyer of subtle objects and the Lord of the luminous mind, (the astral),
3. **The mysterious Prajna**, the one who remains in deep sleep and who is the Lord of Wisdom
4. **Atman the eternal**, the incommunicable, the end of phenomena, and verily Brahman himself.

Every day, we go through these four states but we do not know who we truly are as we mistake the ego for the Self. Our minds do not have the purity or the force to know transcendental truths or the deepest truths of our own existence beyond the objective experience. The inward journey is difficult and mysterious, and we are inadequately equipped to discern the presence of the Self within us or its infinite truths. There may still be many profound truths and planes of consciousness between our wakeful and deep sleep states, which we may never know.

However, what can be said about the ultimate experience of knowing the Self? What happens when a seeker reaches there? No one seems to know clearly, or describe adequately what happens when a seeker achieves union with the Self or Brahman. From the experience of others, we understand that the state of self-realization is beyond the faculties of the human mind and cannot adequately be translated into any human language, since words, which belong to the domain of the conditioned mind, do not carry the intensity or the luminosity of transcendental truths. Mysticism itself is a vague field and mystic experiences are even vaguer.

At the same time, we know that there is a palpable secret somewhere in the recesses of our own consciousness. We know it is there because in profound moments we can feel its presence. We know we are different when we are silent and deeply contemplative. Even with all the distractions which the world offers, the delight of the Self cannot be contained forever in the secret caves of the heart.

In the expansive states of the mind, in sublime states and profound moments when we feel connected to the world or Nature, and in moments of great vulnerability when we feel lost or helpless, the joy and the love of the soul gushes forth into our wakeful mind with the thundering sounds of a wild river and wake we up to the truth of the Self.

Thus, the Self who is the eternal witness does not entirely forsake us. If we manage to express the best of human nature, if we have compassion, love, tolerance and equanimity, and if we overcome the demons of our own mind, we will increasingly feel connected to him and see the world with his eyes.

In the journey of knowing the Self, we may also need the grace of God. In the Isa Upanishad we come across a vague reference to it when a seeker prays to Brahman in the following words, suggesting the importance of devotion. "The face of truth is hidden behind a golden lid, O, Pusan, may we remove the lid so that I may see the golden Truth!" When the request is granted and the Truth, which he was seeking, manifests itself, he reaches the indisputable conclusion in a state of bliss and exclaims, "In truth I am Him."

The Self is the ultimate mystery of human life. To know it is the ultimate goal, which a person may be destined to achieve after numerous births by earning great merit. In him the cycle of creation reaches its full circle, when he discovers the Truth that remains hidden behind the golden lid. While people struggle and strive in the mortal world with vague yearnings and unfulfilled desires, a few manage to achieve the almost impossible dream of knowing who they are. And the world worships them.

### **Atma, Atman, the Eternal Soul**

"Our individual soul is the immortal and spiritual body of light that animates life and reincarnates again and again until all necessary karmas are created and resolved and its essential unity with God is fully realized."

"Our soul body was created in the image and likeness of the Primal Soul, but it differs from the Primal Soul in that it is immature. While [God] is unevolutionary perfection, we are in the process of evolving."

### **"Are Souls and World Essentially Good?"**

The intrinsic and real nature of all beings is their soul, which is goodness. All is in perfect balance. There are changes, and they may appear evil, but there is no intrinsic evil. The soul radiates love, is a child of God going through its evolutionary process of growing up into the image and likeness of the Lord. Goodness and mercy, compassion and caring are the intrinsic, inherent or indwelling nature of the soul. Wisdom and pure knowledge, happiness and joy are the intrinsic nature of the soul. Can we believe the soul is anything but goodness, purity and all the refined qualities found within super-consciousness? When God is everywhere, how can there be a place for evil?"

### **Yearning for Divine Self**

"Each one of us is God (Atman). Nobody is deprived of this. When we realize our Infinite Self, we are replete. There is nothing more to desire. But as long as we do not recognize our own Divinity, we have a yearning. It is yearning for our Divine Self but, blinded by the maya ("illusion") of the world, we mistake this yearning as desire for material pleasures."

## The Soul and Its Illusion

Atman or the soul is in reality identical with Paramatman or the Oversoul, which is One, Infinite and Eternal. The soul is, in fact, beyond the gross, subtle and mental worlds, but experiences itself as being limited owing to its identification with the Sharira or gross body, Prana or the subtle body (which is the vehicle of desires and vital forces), and Manas or the mental body (which is the seat of the mind). The soul in its transcendental state is One—Formless, Eternal and Infinite—and yet identifies itself with the phenomenal world of forms, which are many and finite and destructible. This is Maya or the cosmic illusion. The soul and its illusion."

**Avastha** (devanāgarī: avasthā) is a Sanskrit word that means "state," and it is frequently applied to the three (or four) states of consciousness described in Hinduism known as jāgrat (waking state), svapna (dreaming state) and suṣupti (deep sleep state). A fourth state of consciousness is turīya (literally, "the fourth"), which is normally regarded as a spiritual state of pure consciousness.

### Jagrat

In Indian philosophy *jāgrat* is the waking state of consciousness, with external, sensual, experience. In this state the same universe with its laws is presented to all.

H. P. Blavatsky defined it as follows: Jagrata (Sk.). The waking state of consciousness. When mentioned in Yoga philosophy, Jagrata-avastha is the waking condition, one of the four states of Pranava in ascetic practices, as used by the Yogis.

### Sushupti

In Indian philosophy *suṣupti* is the dreamless state of deep sleep, where there are no objects of which to be conscious.

H. P. Blavatsky defined it as follows: Sushupti Avasthā (Sk.). Deep sleep; one of the four aspects of Prānava. The Sushupti, or causal state [is] produced by, and through Karanopadhi, or what we call Buddhi.

### Turiya

In Indian philosophy *turīya* is a state where there is union with Brahman.

H. P. Blavatsky defined it as follows: Turīya (Sk.). A state of the deepest trance—the fourth state of the Tāraka Rāja Yoga, one that corresponds with Âtmâ, and on this earth with dreamless sleep—a causal condition. Turīya Avasthā (Sk.). Almost a Nirvânic state in Samâdhi, which is itself a beatific state of the contemplative Yoga beyond this plane. A condition of the higher Triad, quite distinct (though still inseparable) from the conditions of Jagrat (waking), Svapna (dreaming), and Sushupti (sleeping).

### Svapna

In Indian philosophy *svapna* is the dreaming state of consciousness, with internal mental experience, where everyone fashions his or her own world.

H. P. Blavatsky defined it as follows: Svapna (Sk.). A trance or dreamy condition Clairvoyance. Svapna Avasthā (Sk.). A dreaming state; one of the four aspects of Prānava; a Yoga practice.

## **Swapna Theory**

Ayurveda is a science that is completely based on its eternal and consistent principles and concepts. Even with the changing era and modernization these principles have stood their ground. The literature on some of these concepts shows significant similarity with the other oriental ancient texts like the Vedas, Puranas, Darshanas, and so on. In fact for a detailed understanding of the principles propounded in the Ayurvedic texts, the Acaryas have also advised the study of these texts. But what if the principles and concepts elaborated in these texts are obscure and mystic? What if these concepts seem to be jaded with mythology giving them a very unscientific and illogical outlook? Could they still be considered worthy of studying, to understand and explore the scientific aspect of Ayurvedic principles?

One such concept that has been shrouded with myth and philosophy and is hardly applied and evaluated on a scientific basis is 'Swapna' or dreams. The description of Swapna is found abundantly in the ancient oriental classics, specifically the Atharva Veda, Upanishadas, Puranas, Darshanas, and Ayurveda. However, with the exception of Ayurveda, its description in the other texts seems to be more philosophical. A detailed analysis of these descriptions, however, leaves a lingering thought that there could be a strong scientific indication behind this mask of mythology.

### **Aims and objectives:**

The present study was aimed for compilation of the description of Swapna (dreams) in the Indian classics and an in-depth evaluation of these concepts.

### **Materials and Methods**

- Classical texts of Ayurveda and the allied Indian sciences were scanned for references regarding dreams.
- These references were compiled, analyzed, and discussed for a thorough and in-depth understanding of the concept of Swapna.

### **Conceptual review**

The literature available could be divided into that of the Vedas, Upanishadas, Puranas, Darshanas, and Ayurvedic scriptures.

#### **Vedas**

The earliest Indian reference to dreams is in the Rg Veda (4000 or 6000 BC). In this text a nightmare is described; Rg-Veda also explains the waking dream, which is mentioned as an evil that wishes to visit one's enemies. Yet another verse tells of an incubus who bewitches a sleeping woman in her dream. References regarding Swapna are also available in the Sama Veda.

The significance of the content of the dream was particularly the subject of the sixty-eighth appendix of the Atharva Veda, composed in 1500 BC. This text organized dreams with reference to the objective, waking world – for example, according to the physical temperament of the dreamer (i.e., the Doshika dominance in the Prakriti of the person), the time of the night the dream took place, and so forth, which was very much in synchronization with the description of Swapna available in the Ayurvedic texts.

#### **Upanishadas**

By the time of the Upanishadas (700 BC) the question of the reality of dreams was approached in a more systematic way. The Mandukya Upanishada spoke of four states of the Atman; waking, that is, Jagrta, dreaming (Swapna), dreamless sleep (Supta), and the supernatural, transcendent fourth state, (Turiya) the identity with ParmAtman. Other Upanishadas including the Manduka, Katha, Brahma, Taitiryopanishada, Yogasara, Kenopanishada, Paingala, and so on added certain significant details to the outline of these four states mentioned earlier, to emphasize the importance of the soul and to understand its Karma better.

Mandukyopanishada has further given the nomenclature for the Atma in each of these stages; Jagrta, where the soul is called Vaisvanara, is the soul in wakefulness, and it enjoys gross things. Swapna, where the soul is Taijasa, sunk into its own light in the state of the dream, where it enjoys subtle things. Sushupta, where the soul Prajña, that is, it inspires man even while he has fallen into deep sleep and he enjoys mere bliss. Lastly Turiya, wherein the soul is called Atma; it is the pure self-conscious soul constituting the four dimensions of metaphysics and enjoys nothing but its own state and is tranquil in its singleness.

As per the description in the Mandukyopanishada, the Taijasa or Swapnawastha is inwardly cognitive, having seven limbs, 19 mouths, enjoying the exquisite (Pravivikta Bhujā).

The Upanishadas articulate two perspectives on dreams. The first maintains that dreams are merely expressions of inner desires. The second closely resembles the Chinese belief of the soul leaving the body and being guided until awakened. It was also thought that if the sleeper was awakened abruptly, the soul might not return to the body quickly enough and the sleeper could die.

Brihadaranyaka sees no distinction between the Atma and the objects seen in the dream and states that the spirit serves as a light for itself. It states that the Atma itself takes the form of the objects in the Swapna. In this process when the Buddhi is initiated toward seeing the dream, the form taken by the Buddhi is also adopted by the Atma, as it along with Buddhi initiates toward the dream.

In Prashnopanishada, Maharshi Pippalada states that in the Swapnawastha, the JivAtma along with the Manas and Suksma Indriyas experiences its glory.

Whatever was seen, heard, and experienced by it in the past births, is again seen, heard, and experienced by it in the dream state.

Descriptions of dreams signifying omens are also elaborately available in the Upanishadas. Chhandogya Upanishada mentions that if rites are performed for the fulfillment of a wish, the seeing of a woman in the dream at such a time is an omen of success.

In the Brahma Vaivartya Purana also Shubha Swapna are described. It is enumerated here that seeing of Brahmins, God like men, merchants, Gods guiding the path, the sun, a Sanyasin, a Brahmacharya, cows, fire, Gurus, elephants, lions, white horses, and so on, implies a good omen.

## **Puranas**

The Hindu Epics and Puranas also incorporated into their narratives many of the traditional dreams analyzed in other philosophical and medical texts.

In Valmiki's Ramayana, when Sita had been stolen by the demon Ravana and is being held captive on the island of Lanka, the ogress Trijata has such a dream that symbolized the defeat of Ravana at

the hands of Rama. Likewise the dreams of Bharata symbolizing the death of his father and that seen by Lord Hanumana also are described in detail.

In the Mahabharata the Swapna of the Kurus signifying their defeat at the hands of the Pandavas is described.

## **Darshanas**

All Astika as well as Astika Nastika Darshanas describe dreams. However, the Nastika Darshana, Charvaka do not contribute in this aspect.

Kanada defines dream-cognition as the consciousness produced by a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (Manas), in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience, like recollection.

Although, Prasastapada describes Swapna as, "Swapnas are such sensations which are experienced only from the Manas, which are similar to those experienced by the external sense organs in the sleeping state when the external sense organs are inactive and the functions of the Manas are also declined, that is, it is in a Pralinawastha".

He further states three causes of Swapna; first Samskarapatava, which includes those objects or people in the environment, experienced during the day. Second, those dreams seen due to Dhatudusti, that is, the dreams which are seen due to the Doshika dominance in the Prakrti of the person. They are again divided into three according to the Vata, Pitta, and Kapha Prakrti. Finally the Adrishta dreams, which arise from an unseen agency, due to Dharmadharmas. The phenomenon of Swapnantika Jñana 'dream-end cognitions', or dreams within dreams are also described here.

## **The commentators**

of Vaisheshika Darshana namely, Prashastapada, Shridhara, Shamkara Misra, Shiv aditya, and others, also recognize the central origin of dreams, similar to the original author. Although they hold that certain dreams are produced by organic disorders within the body, they do not recognize the origin of dreams from the external sense-organs. Thus the Vaisheshikas and the ancient Naiyayikas generally advocate the presentative (i.e., that they are direct and immediate presentations of a definite and determinate character) theory of dreams.

The commentators Nyaya, Bhasarvajna, and Keshavamisra described the dream consciousness to be a kind of false recollection. Jayanta Bhatta seems to regard them as recollections of a past experience, whereas, Jagadisha adds that they are also due to the merit and demerits of his actions as well as intra-organic disorders.

Patanjali in the Yoga Darshana, also gives the description of Swapna when describing Prasanna Chitta Sthairyopaya. Texts like Yoga Vasishtha denote the whole universe to be a Swapna. It states that as the objects that are seen in the dream lie in our Hridaya, similarly the objects of the universe lie in the Hridaya of Brahma who is watching this big dream, that is, the universe, which is as false as the object seen in the dream.

The commentators on Yoga Darshana also state that the Sakshi or Atma keeps a watch over the dream, arousing mechanism, initiating, and inhibiting it.

In the Yogika physiology, these Manovaha Srotas are called the Manovaha Nadis. These are described by Dr. B.N. Seal, as "A generic name for the channels, along with centrally initiated presentations (as in dreaming or hallucination) that come to the sixth lobe of the Manaschakra." Here Dr. B.N. Seal further states according to the writers on Yoga and Tantras that, "The Manovaha Nadi is the channel of communication of the Jiva with the Manaschakra at the base of the brain. It has been stated that the sensory currents are brought to the sensory ganglia along different nerves of the special senses. However, this is not sufficient for them to rise to the level of discriminative consciousness (Savikalpajana). A communication must now be established between the Jiva (in the Sahasrara Cakra, upper cerebrum) and the sensory currents received at the Manas, and this is done by means of the Manovaha Nadi. When the sensations are centrally initiated, as in dreams and hallucinations, a special Nadi (Swapnavaha Nadi), which appears to be only a branch of the Manovaha Nadi, serves as the channel of communication from the Jiva (soul) to the Manas." These Manovaha Nadis are termed as Swapnavaha Nadis by Shamkara Misra.

In Yogvasishtha again, detailed descriptions of dreams that are seen due to Shlesma Atma, that is, when the Atma enters the channels which are filled with Shlesma and Rasadi, Annarasa are available. Furthermore, dreams that are caused due to all three Doshas (Sannipata) and activated by Vayu are also described in Yogvasishtha. These dreams seem to be more destructive and represent a more disturbed psyche.

Again descriptions of dreams wherein the Annarasa is vitiated by Mani, Mantra, Aushadha, and so on, are also seen in the above-mentioned text. This cosmic mind acts in the cosmic world in a similar manner as the individual Manas acts in the personal life of an individual. The seven stages of the cosmic mind are described in Yogvasishtha, two of which are Swapna Jagara and Jagrta Swapna.

The Mimamsakas also recognize the representative character of dreams. Kumarila Bhatta, Parthasarathimisra, and so forth, support this theory. Prabhakara regards the presentative character of dreams, but adds the theory of obscuration of memory (Smritipramosha).

Literature on the Advaita Vedanta also describes dreams, but shows difference in opinions as compared to the Nyaya Vaisesika and their explanation of dream cognition.

Vedanta Darshana also accepts the terminology 'Taijasa' for the Rajayukta Atma, which experiences the dream. Here particularly the Taijasa experiences mental states dependant on the predisposition left by the waking experiences. In this state the soul fashions its own world in the imagining of the dreams.

Shamkara has also commented on the representative theory of dreams in Shamkara Bhashya. Accepting this theory he states Swapna exists according to the nature of recollection. However, his follower Dharmarajadhvarindra, advocates the presentative theory.

The Bauddha texts also carry descriptions of the several significant dreams seen by Lord Gautam Buddha before his enlightenment, and these were corroborated by the dreams of his father and wife on the night before his departure from the palace. Again the descriptions of the dreams of Emperor Ashoka in relation to his son Kunala, also feature in the later Buddhist texts.

The interpretation of dreams to enlighten a king was a recurrent Buddhist motif. In a Kashmiri text that contains many dream adventures, a Buddhist monk interprets a king's dream in order to convert

him. Another Buddhist treatise “The questions of King Milinda” also gives an elaborate explanation of Swapna.

### **Ayurvedic texts**

The Brihatrayi, that is, Charaka Samhita, Sushruta Samhita, and Ashtanga Samgraha, along with Astanga Hridaya has mentioned Swapna. Even as each treatise has mentioned its importance as the Purvarupa, Rupam and as Arishta Lakshanas; Susruta has described specific dreams denoting the sex of the unborn child; and along with both the Vagbhatas has mentioned it for assessing the Doshika Prakrti. Charakacharya who has given an in-depth description of the Purusha or Atma, has also described Swapna as its Linga. He also states that the absence of Vaikrita Swapna is an indication of health, similar to the description among the Vikaropashamana Lakshanas, according to Sushruta. Swapnas have also been described by the other Acharyas like Sushruta and Sharangdhara, as an omen, that is, Su-Swapna and Duh-Swapna, hinting toward recovery or the Vyadhi Utpatti or deathstage, respectively. The regimen followed in case of a Duh-Swapna is also described.

Other books of the same time period like Bhela and Harita Samhita have also given the description of Swapna, especially in the context of Prakrti, Purvarupa, and Arista Lakshana. In fact in the Harita Samhita a whole chapter ‘Swapnadhyaya’ is devoted to the description of dreams.

A considerable description of Swapna, specifically in the mother, denoted the health of the child, is also seen in the Kasyapa Samhita. In the other texts like Bhavaprakasha, Swapna is described in the Garbhaprakarana, signifying the gender of the fetus, in relation to Prakriti and so on. In Madhava Nidana the description of Swapna is only pertaining to the Purvarupa of Rajayakshma.

### **Observations**

1. The concept of Swapna is elaborately explained in the Indian classics.
2. The description of Swapna is more pronounced in the Vedic, Upaniṣadic, and Darshanic literature, as well as in the Ayurvedic literature of the Samhita Kala. Later the description of Swapna in the Ayurvedic and the allied texts decreased and very less description is found in the texts other than the Brhatrayi and Laghutrayi.
3. Although this literature in the ancient classics was written thousands of years ago, it seems to be scientific in explanation even when compared to modern science, if analyzed and interpreted in depth.
4. The description of Swapna in various texts differs in terms of the outlook or the angle of analysis on the part of the intellectual scholars. Hence the description of Swapna is observed to be in accordance with the theory propounded by the scholars of that Darshanas. For example Vedanta described the world as an illusion as if in a dream, Vaiseshika exhibited the Pañchabhautika influence by stating the Dhatudushti Janya Swapna, and the like.
5. The listing of dreams as Rupa, Purvarupa, Arishta, Su-Swapna, Duh-Swapna, and so on, however, at times, seems to be lacking in logical explanation.

### **Discussion**

In the Indian as well as the western ancient traditions, the available theories of Swapna are entwined with religion and mythology; wherein, they are considered to be premonitions or messages sent by God. However, these theories, if evaluated scientifically, show a strong hint of psychotherapy, which had only been modified to easily convince the less educated god-fearing people.

The social condition at that time may have been such that science enveloped in religion and mythology was accepted better than science in its bare form.

The Vedas, Upanishadas, and Puranas elaborated tales of dreams related to the Gods and renowned men to underline the importance of dreams, especially as premonitions. All the same, dreams were ably used to prove the existence of metaphysical subjects like Atma or the illusionary aspect of the materialistic world, to the common man. Its somatic relevance was also equally highlighted, as in the AtharvaVeda, where dreams are described according to their Doshika dominancy.

The descriptions of the Dosika dreams of the Atharvaveda or Yogavasishtha is similar to that in Ayurveda. However, the physiology described by Yogavasishtha that of the Atma entering the Vatika and so on, Dosika Srotas due to which dreams are seen, seem to be a bit different to the other texts. Ayurveda emphasizes on the Atma, Manas, and the Manovaha Srotas. Acarya Caraka has stated that the Srotas through which the Manas and Dosha travel are the same and all-pervading in the Chetana Sharira, that is, in the presence of Atma. The vitiated Doṣa hence tends to block the Manovaha Srotas. In the living body, the conjunction of the Atma and Manas is inevitable, hence in the Swapnawastha the Manas loses association with the external Indriyas and bonds with the Atma. Here it seems that Manas is only replaced by Atma in the Yogavasishtha, as they both lie in close association.

The Vedas, which mainly focus on the social ethics, values, norms, and spirituality, probably meant to portray the futility of seeing a day dream, by engaging in which the person only wastes time, hence it is described as an evil.

From the above it can be inferred that the description in the Atharva Veda was primarily concerned with the subjective symbolism of dreams, or rather, with the objective results of subjective contents. Although ancient, its approach and description about dreams in relation to Doshas and the like, are very similar to the later medical texts of Ayurveda and are in synchronization with the physiological Gunas and Karmas of the Doshas.

The impact of the physical constituents of the body and the effect of the Ahara and the Vihara on dreams is highlighted by Yogavasishtha. It has described the dreams caused due to the impact of the Ahara Rasa vitiated by Mani, Mantra, and Aushadha. It also underlines the impact of the Shabda Tanmatra on the Panchabhautika Sharira, which is a principle, which acts not only in the pathology, but also in treatment modalities like Sattvavajaya and Daivavyapashraya. The stages of the Atman described by the Mandukyopanisada including Swapna, not only represents the condition of the Atman, but of the person as a whole. The person exists in these four stages itself, throughout the sustenance of Ayu; and the other three factors, that is, Sarira, Sattva, and Indriya also play a role in the causation of three of these stages, except Turiya.

The importance given to the Atman in the process of dreaming by the ancient texts is similar to the opinions of the modern psychiatrists like Velappand and Carl Jung, who identified dreams as an interaction between the unconscious and the conscious. They also assert together that the unconscious is the dominant force of the dream.

These omens depict good or bad and their interpretation changes in the Ayurvedic as well as other ancient texts, with change of tradition, culture, and place. It is actually the combination of natural

symbols, cultural restrictions, and the values of the author of the texts, which determines whether a particular dream will be interpreted as portending good or evil for the dreamer. For example, the texts on Ayurveda are primarily health-oriented and those of the Buddhist and philosophical texts are primarily Moksha oriented. To an impressive degree, they agree on what people dream about, but they often differ about whether the dream portends good or evil. The Puranas especially derive interpretations based on the situation of the dreamer.

The descriptions of dreams as good and bad omens may be the manifestation of the mental status of the person, but on the whole do not show much relevance or any scientific reasoning behind the specifications of these omens. It could probably be a list of dreams, which were seen in an exhaustive mass survey.

The Charvaka has not described Swapna as elaborately as in the other Darshanas, probably because only Pratyaksha Pramana is accepted by them; whereas, Swapna cognition and analysis requires Anumana Pramana.

The description of dreams in the Buddhist texts reflect the actual Buddhist practice, other sources corroborate the tradition that Buddhists converted many Indian kings by a combination of public debate, private counseling, and a kind of primitive psychoanalysis, of which interpretation of dreams played a major part.

## Conclusions

The descriptions of Swapna in the ancient texts including Ayurveda reflect an in-depth and methodical study. Some of the conclusions derived by the Acharyas in relation to Swapna, especially the listing of dreams according to omens and so on, seem to be derived from the analysis of physiology and pathology or a mass survey. The descriptions are given a mythological presentation only to be easily accepted by people of all intellectual gradients. Further in-depth evaluation of these descriptions could open more doors to the understanding of the physiology, pathology, and the utility of dreams.

## Cārvāka

**Charvaka**, also called **Lokayata (Sanskrit: "Worldly Ones")**, a philosophical Indian school of materialists who rejected the notion of an afterworld, karma, liberation (moksha), the authority of the sacred scriptures, the Vedas, and the immortality of the self. Of the recognized means of knowledge (pramana), the Charvaka recognized only direct perception (anubhava). Sources critical of the school depict its followers as hedonists advocating a policy of total opportunism; they are often described as addressing princes, whom they urged to act exclusively in their own self-interest, thus providing the intellectual climate in which a text such as Kautilya's Arthashastra ("The Science of Material Gain") could be written.

Although Charvaka doctrine had disappeared by the end of the medieval period, its one-time importance is confirmed by the lengthy attempts to refute it found in both Buddhist and orthodox Hindu philosophical texts, which also constitute the main sources for knowledge of the doctrine.

## Classification of Pramāṇa

Every system of Indian philosophy accepts pramāṇa as a valid knowledge. But there is a difference of opinion among all the systems about the numbers of pramāṇa. The Cārvākas accept only perception as pramāṇa. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas accept perception and inference as

pramāṇas. The Sāṃkhya and the Yogas recognize perception, inference and verbal testimony as pramāṇas. The Naiyāyikas recognize perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas adds presumption to perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and the Advaita Vedāntins accept six pramāṇas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and nonapprehension.

But the Jainas do not agree with the above classification. They recognize only two pramāṇas, viz., (i) pratyakṣa-pramāṇa and (ii) parokṣa-pramāṇa. All other pramāṇas come under these two types of pramāṇas. Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is of two kinds, viz., (a) sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and (b) mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa. Sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa is of two kinds, viz., (i) sensuous and (ii) non-sensuous. It has four stages, viz., (i) avagraha, (ii) ṭhā, (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāraṇā which actually come under mati- jñāna. Mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa is of three kinds, viz., (i) avadhi, (ii) manafiparyāya and (iii) kevala. Parokṣa-pramāṇa is divided into five categories which are caused by pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. Its five categories are—smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama. Now in the following lines, these two kinds of pramāṇas i.e. pratyakṣapramāṇa and parokṣa-pramāṇa and their divisions are discussed in details:

### **(a) Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa:**

The Jainas hold that the word pratyakṣa is derived from the word akṣa. Here akṣa means the self or jiva which knows all the objects in space.

Māṇikyanandi defines pratyakṣa or perception as clear or distinct (viśadam) knowledge. Prabhācandra points out that whatever knowledge is not clear, that is not called pratyakṣa, just as, inference is not clear, so, it is not pratyakṣa. So, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa means clear knowledge.

But what is this clarity of knowledge. Māṇikyanandi says that clarity means the apprehension of an object without the mediation of any other cognition or the apprehension of the objects as possessed of its distinctive character. Thus, clarity of knowledge means that knowledge which does not require any other knowledge in order to manifest its object. So, perception means clear knowledge. Inference is not clear knowledge, because it is based on the other knowledge like the vyāptijñāna. But perception is clear, because it is not based on any kind of other knowledge for manifesting its object.

Some arguments are also put by the opponents that the definition of clarity of knowledge is not true, because in perceptual knowledge like ṭhā, etc., there is found mediation of avagraha etc., and so, it cannot be called clear in the above sense. Prabhācandra replies that this argument is not tenable because avagraha etc. are produced by the operation of different sense-organs and as such they are not required for ṭhā etc. This implies that avagraha etc. are independent knowledge and do not depend on the mediation of any other knowledge. Hence, the definition of pratyakṣa as clear knowledge stands proved.

Prabhācandra, however, argues that perception does not arise from the sense- object contact. If it arises from the sense object contact, then there would be no omniscience. Secondly, if perception arises from the sense object contact, then there is no contact between the sense-organ and pleasure pain etc. because, pleasure and pain etc. are known by itself. So, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa means only the clarity of knowledge.

By this definition of perception, Prabhācandra rejects the Buddhist point of view. The Buddhists hold that when there is cognition of fire immediately after seeing smoke, then there is the vyāptijñāna in

the form of that, which has smoke, must have fire. This vyāptijñāna, though aspaṣṭa is regarded as pratyakṣa. But Prabhācandra points out that these are not perceptions, because these are aspaṣṭajñānas, whereas perception means only clear knowledge. It may be asked here what is apprehended in the knowledge of fire which arises from suddenly seeing the smoke? Is it sāmānya, i.e., generality or is it viśeṣa, i.e., a particular fire? If the knowledge is sāmānya, then that cannot be pratyakṣa, because according to the Buddhists sāmānya is not an object of perception. If the knowledge is viśeṣa, i.e., the knowledge of fire is not universal of fire but a particular fire, then there would not arise any doubt in the mind of the cogniser who apprehends the particular fire that whether this fire is from grass or from leaves? When one perceives nearby fire then one does not have any doubt. If any kind of doubt arises in case of nearby fire, then the knowledge which arises either from śabda or from a mark also will be doubtful. Then the Buddhist point of view that the knowledge of particular fire which arises from word or from a mark does not have any doubt will be fallacious. So, by seeing smoke, the knowledge of fire is not perception; it is only inferential knowledge. If one knows all smokes and all fires clearly, then nothing would be left for inference. Hence, inference will become useless. But, one cannot clearly know the knowledge of smoke and fire. So, vyāptijñāna is not perception. Thus, if the knowledge is not clear, then it is not perception.

The Buddhists, however, argue that if unclear knowledge is not perception, then this vagueness (aspaṣṭatā) will be the quality of either knowledge or object. If vagueness is the quality of knowledge, then how the object of knowledge is called vague? Vagueness of one thing cannot be attributed to another thing, because that will lead to over-pervasion. If vagueness is the quality of the object, then how can this vagueness be found in vyāptijñāna? The same difficulty arises also in the cause of clearness (spaṣṭatā). So, by vagueness and clearness of the object, one cannot know the knowledge as vague and clear. Prabhācandra replies here that clearness and vagueness are the qualities of knowledge and not of the object. Moreover, the Jainas maintain that clearness and vagueness depend on the destruction of the āvaraṇa or the veil. The destructions of spaṣṭajñānāvaraṇakarma and aspaṣṭajñānāvaraṇakarma are the causes of clarity and unclarity of knowledge. That means the knowledge which is clear is known as pratyakṣa and which is unclear is known as parokṣa.

### **Types of Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa:**

Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is divided into two categories, viz., (i) sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and (ii) mukhya-pratyakṣa. Now, the detail account of sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa and mukhya-pratyakṣa are given in the following:

#### **(i) Sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa:**

According to Māṇikyanandi, sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa or empirical perception means that clear knowledge which is caused by sense-organs and mind and which is partial. Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra says that the word saṃvyavahāra means right and uncontradicted action either of the nature of pravṛtti or nivṛtti. The knowledge which is the cause of such vyavahāra or action is known as saṃvyavahāra. The perception which has the necessity of this saṃvyavahāra is known as sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa.

From the definition of sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa, it is clear that it is divided into two categories, viz., arising from indriya (sense-organ) and arising from anindriya (mind). Indriyas or sense-organs are sub-divided into two categories, viz., dravyendriya and bhāvendriya. Dravyendriya are made of matter (pudgala) which possess qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch and which have been transformed into definite shapes like eye, ear etc. Bhāvendriya is of the nature of consciousness. It is of two kinds, viz., labdhi and upayoga. Labdhi means the power of the sense-organ due to which

the object is apprehended after the veils of karman is destroyed. If there is no labdhi, then the sense-organ cannot apprehend the object. Upayoga means the activity of consciousness of the self towards the object. If there is no upayoga, then the object cannot be apprehended. Thus, labdhi and upayoga are the special properties of bhāvendriya. Anindriya or mind is also divided into two categories, viz., dravyamana and bhāvamana. Hence, the clear knowledge which arises from indriya and anindriya is partial and it is called sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa.

Some opponents hold that the sense-organ and mind are not only the causes of sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa, but also the self, the object and light are the causes thereof. Rejecting this Prabhācandra says that the self is not only the cause of sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa but of parokṣa-pramāṇa also. As here the extraordinary cause of pratyakṣa is accepted, so the self is not mentioned here, self being a general cause of other pramāṇas also. Regarding object and light the sūtra clearly states that objects and light cannot be the cause of cognition, being objects of knowledge like darkness. Darkness is the pratibandhaka or obstruction of knowledge due to which it is not the cause of knowledge, but the object of knowledge. So, the self, the object and light are not the causes of knowledge.

The opponents ask Prabhācandra, what is the harm if the object and light are accepted as the causes of knowledge, though they are the objects of knowledge? Then Prabhācandra replies that if the object and light are accepted as the causes of knowledge, then they would not be the objects of knowledge at the same time; just as the eye, which is a cause of knowledge and not its object at the same time. The opponents argue that by an inference it is proved that the object and light are the causes of knowledge, because knowledge is the effect of the object and light. Because, there is a relation of anvaya-vyatireka (concomitance) between knowledge and object or light. When there is an anvaya-vyatireka relation between the two things, then those two things are known together as cause and effect; just like fire and smoke. Fire is the cause of smoke, because smoke is related by the relation of anvaya-vyatireka with fire. In the same way, knowledge is related by the relation of anvaya-vyatireka with the object and light.

This anvaya-vyatireka is not a fallacious hetu, because if there are object and light, then there would be knowledge; but if there is no object and light, then there would be no knowledge. So, the object and light are the cause of knowledge, because knowledge is the effect of object and light. But Prabhācandra rejects this view. He says that knowledge is not the effect of object and light, because there is no relation of anvaya-vyatireka between them. As for example, when there is knowledge of snake in a rope, then there is not found the object of knowledge, i.e., snake, yet there is knowledge. In this example, knowledge is not the effect of object, because the object itself is absent. Again, the light is also not the effect of knowledge, because there is no relation of anvaya-vyatireka between them. As for example, nocturnal animals can see in darkness. Though there is no light, yet there is knowledge. Some kinds of perceptual knowledge are also possible in darkness, just as knowledge of taste. So, the object and light are not the causes of knowledge, because knowledge is possible in the absence of both object and light. Therefore, the object and light are not the causes of sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa. The sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa is caused by the sense-organs and mind.

The Jainas further hold that the sense-organ and mind are the instruments by which sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa is known. That means, the knowledge of sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa arise through the sense-organs and mind. The nature of the knowledge of sāmvyavahārikapratyakṣa is analyzed in term of its stages. It has four stages, viz., (i) avagraha, (ii) īhā, (iii) avāya and (iv) dhāraṇā. These four stages actually come under mati-jñāna. Among these four stages, avagraha is the first stage of

knowledge through which one catches the general features of an object after the contact of the object with the sense-organ and mind. For an example, in the stage of avagraha, a man is known simply as a man. It is divided into two types, viz., (a) vyañjanāvagraha and (b) arthāvagraha. The next stage is called īhā which means one has a desire to have the definite and specific knowledge of the object known by avagraha. As for instance, in avagraha, one knows a man simply as a man, while in the stage of īhā, he wants to know what kind of man he is, i.e., to which country he belongs etc. The third stage is called avāya which means the determinate and specific knowledge about an object. For an example, in the stage of avāya, one can get a clear knowledge about a man to be belonging to a particular place by observing some nature. The last stage, i.e., dhāraṇā means the condition of memory of the object by previous knowledge. It is because of dhāraṇā that a thing which is perceived at an earlier time is remembered at a later time. Hence, these four stages arise one after another. These four stages which arise one after another are not totally different, because the succeeding stage comes after the preceding one.

### (ii) Mukhya-pratyakṣa:

According to Prabhācandra, mukhya or pāramārthikapratyakṣa or transcendental perception means that knowledge which arises in the self directly without the help of the sense-organ and mind. It arises when the obstruction of the karmans are destroyed. In the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra it is said, mukhya-pratyakṣa is that absolutely clear, non-sensuous and infinite knowledge in which all the obstructions or veils are removed completely by some special conditions (sāmagrīviśeṣa). Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra says that special conditions are right faith, direct cognition, space, time etc. Among these, right faith is the internal condition, while cognition, space, time etc. are the external conditions. When all of these conditions are found as favorable, then the karmans are removed completely. After the destruction or subsidence of all the veils of karmans, there arises mukhya-pratyakṣa. Thus, after the destruction of the āvaraṇas of avadhijñāna, manafiparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna, the resulting avadhijñāna, manafiparyāyajñāna and kevalajñāna arise. Hence, when all the veils are removed the knowledge of mukhya-pratyakṣa is known clearly.

The proof for mukhya-pratyakṣa is forwarded by Prabhācandra in the form of an inference. Thus, wherever there is clear and true knowledge, there is the destruction of all veils, just as in the case of perception of trees, which are being enveloped by clouds of mist or dust. When all kinds of dust or mist are removed the tree can be clearly perceived. So, mukhya-pratyakṣa means clear and true knowledge.

Mukhya-pratyakṣa is non-sensuous because it does not depend on mind and sense-organs. As it does not depend on mind and sense-organ it is free from all impurity. Hence, it is non-sensuous (atīndriya), perfect and infinite. Whatever knowledge is not non-sensuous, that knowledge is not independent, because it is dependent on sense-organ and mind, just like our ordinary knowledge of perception, i.e., sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa which is caused by the sense-organ and mind. So, if a knowledge is not non-sensuous then that knowledge is also not mukhya.

The Jainas further hold that there are three types of mukhya-pratyakṣa, viz., (i) avadhijñāna, (ii) manafiparyāyajñāna and (iii) kevalajñāna. Firstly, it is divided into two kinds, viz., (i) sakala-pratyakṣa and (ii) vikala-pratyakṣa. Under these two kinds of pratyakṣa, avadhi, manafiparyāya and kevala come. Vikalapratyakṣa means partial knowledge. It is of two kinds, viz., avadhijñāna and manafiparyāyajñāna, while sakala-pratyakṣa means the complete knowledge. Kevalajñāna comes under this pratyakṣa. Firstly, avadhijñāna means that kind of knowledge which arises after its own veil is destroyed or subsided. Avadhijñāna is non-sensuous. It is the knowledge of limited objects

having some particular form of dravya, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva. It arises in the self without the help of the sense organs and mind. It apprehends very fine objects, such as atoms.

So, avadhi means that kind of knowledge by which one can apprehend the objects of limited form without the help of sense-organs and mind. It is of two kinds, viz., bhāvapratyaya which belongs to the gods and (b) guṇa-pratyaya which belongs to man and other beings. Manafiparyāyajñāna means the clear and definite knowledge of the thoughts of past, present and future of another's mind without the help of the sense-organ and mind. It arises after the destruction or subsidence of its own āvaraṇa. It is of two kinds, viz., ṛjumati and vipulamati. Kevalajñāna means pure, perfect and infinite knowledge. By this knowledge, one apprehends all the substances and all their qualities directly without the help of the sense-organs and mind. This knowledge arises by the destruction of its own veil (kevalajñānāvaraṇa).

After that the self attains kevalajñāna. So, kevalajñāna is pure knowledge by which one can apprehend the true knowledge of all the objects. Hence, all of these three jñāna arise without the help of the sense-organs and mind.

### **Parokṣa-pramāṇa:**

Māṇikyanandi, defines parokṣa-pramāṇa as that which is other than pratyakṣa-pramāṇa. Prabhācandra explains parokṣa-pramāṇa or indirect knowledge as unclear knowledge. That means, it is not known clearly. By an inference it is proved that the knowledge of parokṣa-pramāṇa is unclear, because it is indirect.

Whatever knowledge is not unclear, that knowledge is also not indirect, just like the knowledge of mukhya-pratyakṣa and sāmvyavahārika-pratyakṣa. So, these are not indirect. Hence, parokṣa-pramāṇa means unclear knowledge. Its five categories are—smṛti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama.

### **(i) Smṛti-parokṣa-pramāṇa:**

Māṇikyanandi defines that the knowledge of an object which is known by earlier retention or dhāraṇā is called smṛti or recollection. It arises due to the awakening of the disposition (saṃskāra) and takes the form of "it is that". That means, recollection is the revival state of disposition of the previous perception of an object. An example of recollection is "That is Devadatta". Explaining this sūtra, Prabhācandra points out that whatever knowledge determines the real nature of an object, that knowledge is a valid pramāṇa. Just as perception, which determines the real nature of an object and so is a valid pramāṇa, in the same way, recollection also determines the real nature of an object perceived in the past. Hence, it is a valid pramāṇa. Prabhācandra also says that if smṛti is not a valid pramāṇa, then anumāna is also not a valid pramāṇa. Because anumāna is known by the recollection of vyapti-jñana. So, smṛti is a valid pramāṇa.

### **(ii) Pratyabhijñāna-parokṣa-pramāṇa:**

In the Parīkṣāmukhasūtra pratyabhijñāna or recognition is defined as that knowledge which is produced by the combination of perception and recollection.

It apprehends an object in the form: "this is that", "this is like that", "this is different from that", "this is correlated to that" etc. The examples are: this is that Devadatta"; "gavaya is like a cow"; "a buffalo is different from a cow"; "that thing in the distance is the tree" etc. From this, it is clear that recognition apprehends the knowledge of an object of identity, similarity, difference, correlation etc.

According to Prabhācandra, recognition is a distinct kind of valid knowledge, though it is produced by the combination of perception and recollection.

Recollection cannot apprehend an object of past and present simultaneously. It can only know past object. In the same way, perception apprehends only the object of present time and not of past. The knowledge of the object of past and present can be known simultaneously only by pratyabhijñāna. That means, pratyabhijñāna apprehends a present perceived object which is known in the past; as for example, "this is that Devadatta". In this example, by perception only "this" part is known, while by recollection only "that", by recognition the whole, i.e., "this is that" can be cognized. Hence, recognition means the knowledge of an object which is known jointly by perception and smṛti, i.e., recognition knows past and present objects simultaneously. So, it is a distinct kind of valid pramāṇa. He also says that upamāna-pramāṇa is included in recognition.

It is not treated as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. Because in case of upamāna also there is the combination of the knowledge of similarity and oneness and as such this is not different from recognition. So, pratyabhijñāna-pramāṇa is a distinct kind of pramāṇa.

### **(iii) Tarka-parokṣa-pramāṇa:**

Māṇikyanandi says that tarka or uha (reasoning) means the knowledge of universal concomitance or vyapti-jñāna between two things, i.e., the middle-term and the major-term in the past, present and future, which is caused by observation (upalambha) and non-observation (anupalambha) in relation to one another. It is not based upon frequent observation or infrequent observation, but it depends on the destruction and subsidence of one's karman. Observation takes the form thus: if there is the existence of major-term (sādhyā), then there is the existence of middle-term (sādhana or hetu). Non-observation points to the knowledge that when there is non-existence major-term, the middle-term also cannot exist. That means, tarka-pramāṇa arises in the form: "if this is, then that is", "if this is not, then that is not". As for instance, if there is smoke (sādhana) then there is fire (sādhyā); while if there is no fire (sādhyā), then there is no smoke (sādhana). So, tarka means vyāpti-jñāna.

Prabhācandra points out that vyāpti means inseparable relation (avinābhāva- sambandha) of sādhyā and sādhana and its knowledge is called tarkapramāṇa, which is a distinct kind of valid pramāṇa. By an inference, Prabhācandra proves that tarka is a valid kind of pramāṇa, because it is the anugrahaka (supporter) of other pramāṇa. Whatever knowledge is the anugrahaka of other pramāṇa, that knowledge is a valid pramāṇa; just like, the anugrahaka of āgama is pratyakṣa or anumāna. So, tarka is a valid kind of pramāṇa.

Other Jaina philosophers also say that tarka is a distinct kind of pramāṇa, because the knowledge of vyāpti is known by tarka-pramāṇa, it is not known by perception; because perception knows only the present object. It also cannot be obtained by inference, because without vyāpti-jñāna inference is not being possible. Therefore, reasoning or tarka is a separate means of valid knowledge.

### **(iv) Anumāna-parokṣa-pramāṇa:**

Inference or anumāna-pramāṇa means the knowledge of sādhyā or probandum or major term which is derived from sādhana or probans or middle term. That means, anumāna means that kind of knowledge which arises from hetu or sādhana. As for example, fire is inferred from smoke. Here, smoke is the middle-term or sādhana and fire is the major-term or sādhyā.

A sādhana or hetu is ascertained from its being inseparably related with the sādhyā. The knowledge of this inseparable relation or avinābhāva-sambandha of sādhyā and sādhana is called vyāpti; which is derived from tarka. Vyāpti is the main feature of anumāna. So, inference is based on universal concomitance or vyāpti-jñāna of the middle-term with the major-term.

Anumāna-pramāṇa is of two types, viz., (i) svārthānumāna and (ii) parārthānumāna. Svārthānumāna means that kind of knowledge of sādhyā which is arising from sādhana by one's own-self. That means, svārthānumāna is the knowledge of probandum which is caused by the recollection of the relationship and the knowledge of the proban by one's own-self. As for example, when one person has perceived the smoke (sādhana) in the mountain (pakṣa) and has also recollected the vyāpti-jñāna that wherever there is smoke, there is fire (sādhyā); then on the basis of that relation he says that "the mountain contains fire". Here, three parts are necessary to know svārthānumāna, viz., sādhyā, sādhana and pakṣa. Sādhyā, pakṣa and hetu are the main basis of inference. Sādhyā or major-term is that which has to be proved. Pakṣa or minor-term is that where one has to prove the sādhyā. Hetu or middle-term is that by which one has to prove the sādhyā, because there is a relation of vyāpti between hetu and sādhyā. As for example: "All the places of smoke are the places of fire. The mountain has smoke. Therefore, the mountain has fire". In the above example—sādhyā is fire, pakṣa is mountain and hetu is smoke. Parārthānumāna means that cognition resulting from a statement that refers to the knowledge of svārthānumāna. In other words, it is the knowledge of the probandum or sādhyā derived from the communication made by another person. As for instance, if a person knows the vyāpti-jñāna between sādhyā and sādhana of fire and smoke that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, he derives the knowledge that the mountain contains fire seeing smoke in the fire. From the statement of this cognition, if another person cognizes the knowledge of the sādhyā from the sādhana, then it is called parārthānumāna. Like the svārthānumāna, parārthānumāna has two parts, viz., (i) pakṣa (here it means pratijñā)—e.g., the hill is fiery and (ii) hetu—e.g., because it is smoky. But the Naiyāyikas accept five numbers of parārthānumāna. These are: (i) pakṣa or pratijñā—the hill is possessed of fire; (ii) hetu—because it is possessed of smoke; (iii) dṛṣṭānta—whatever is possessed of smoke, that is possessed of fire, like a kitchen; (iv) upanaya—the hill is possessed of smoke and (v) nigamana—therefore, the hill is possessed of fire. Of these five numbers pratijñā is āgama (tenet). Hetu is the anumāna proper, because the tenet or sādhyā can be inferred only through this hetu. Dṛṣṭānta is pratyakṣa, i.e., it is based on perception. Upanaya is upamāna because it is based on the similarity between the dṛṣṭānta and sādhyā. Nigamana is the result or conclusion that all these four are applicable to one thing only. So, parārthānumāna is known by these five avayavas. But Prabhācandra does not subscribe to this view of the Naiyāyikas and says that parārthānumāna consists only of two parts, viz., pakṣa or pratijñā and hetu. The example is not necessary for the recollection of vyāpti; because the recollection of vyāpti is known by the relation of sādhyā and sādhana. Like dṛṣṭānta, upanaya and nigamana are also not necessary, because all kinds of doubts or errors are destroyed by the knowledge of inseparable relation or vyāpti-jñāna of sādhyā and sādhana. So, for intelligent person, inference is known by the two parts, i.e., pakṣa and hetu. However, the Sūtrakāra makes some concession to the Naiyāyikas here and says that though anumāna consists of only two parts, yet the example (dṛṣṭānta), the application (upanaya) and the conclusion (nigamana) can be included in inference to convince persons of dull intellect who want to know the truth of an inference. This is done only in context of instruction and not for argumentation.

The example or dṛṣṭānta is that in which the middle term is perceived to be accompanied by the major term. The example is of two kinds, viz., (i) anvaya and (ii) vyatireka. That is called anvaya-dṛṣṭānta where the sādhana is pervaded by the sādhyā. Thus wherever there is smoke, there is fire,

as in the kitchen is an example of anvaya-dṛṣṭānta. That is called vyatireka-dṛṣṭānta where the absence of sādhanā is demonstrated wherever sādhyā is absent. Thus wherever there is the absence of fire, there is the absence of smoke, e.g., a lake. The application or upanaya is reassertion of the presence of the middle-term in the minor-term in which the presence of the major-term is to be proved. The conclusion or nigamāna is reassertion of the presence of the major-term in the minor-term. So, for dull intelligent persons, parārthānumāna consists of five parts: (i) The hill is fiery—pratiñāvacana; (ii) because the hill is smoky—hetuvacana; (iii) whatever is smoky is fiery, e.g., the kitchen—dṛṣṭāntavacana; (iv) the hill is smoky—upanayavacana and (v) therefore, the hill is fiery—nigamanavacana.

The Jainas hold that like the anumāna, hetu or sādhanā is of two types, viz., (i) upalabdhi-hetu and (ii) anupalabdhi-hetu, which are both positive and negative. The former is divided into two types, viz., (i) aviruddhopalabdhi-hetu which is positive, i.e., it proves something positive and (ii) viruddhopalabdhi-hetu which is negative, i.e., it proves something negative. Aviruddhopalabdhi-hetu is sub-divided into six categories, viz., (a) aviruddhavyāpyopalabdhi-hetu; aviruddhakāryopalabdhi-hetu; (c) aviruddhakāraṇopalabdhi-hetu; (d) aviruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi-hetu; (e) aviruddhottaracaropalabdhi-hetu and (f) aviruddhasahacaropalabdhi-hetu. Like aviruddhopalabdhi-hetu, viruddhopalabdhi-hetu is also of six kinds, viz., (a) viruddhavyāpyopalabdhi-hetu; (b) viruddhakāryopalabdhi-hetu; (c) viruddhakāraṇopalabdhi-hetu; (d) viruddhapūrvacaropalabdhi-hetu; (e) viruddhottaracaropalabdhi-hetu and (f) viruddhasahacaropalabdhi-hetu.

The later hetu, i.e., anupalabdhi-hetu is also of two types, viz., (i) aviruddhānupalabdhi-hetu which is negative, i.e., it proves something negative and (ii) viruddhānupalabdhi-hetu which is positive, i.e., it proves something positive. Again, aviruddhānupalabdhi-hetu is sub-divided into seven categories, viz., (a) aviruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi-hetu; (b) aviruddhavyāpakānupalabdhi-hetu; (c) aviruddhakāryānupalabdhi-hetu; (d) aviruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi-hetu; (e) aviruddhapūrvacarānupalabdhi-hetu; (f) aviruddhottaracarānupalabdhi-hetu and (g) aviruddhasahacarānupalabdhi-hetu. The later viruddhānupalabdhi-hetu is sub-divided into three categories, viz., (a) viruddhakāryānupalabdhi-hetu; (b) viruddhakāraṇānupalabdhi-hetu and (c) viruddhasvabhāvānupalabdhi-hetu. Hetu or sādhanā means that which exists in the presence of sādhyā, but without the existence of sādhyā, the existence of sādhanā will not be possible. By this nature of tathopapatti and anyathānupapatti, the hetu is known.

So, hetu means that which is related with sādhyā by the inseparable relation. A question may arise here thus: what is the nature of this inseparable relation or avinābhāva? Avinābhāva means the constant regularity of sahabhāva, i.e., simultaneous accompaniment and kramabhāva, i.e., consecutive occurrence. Sahabhāva or yugapad events are those which are the co-products of the same set of causal conditions, such as colour and taste of a fruit; or which are related as vyāpya (middle-term) and vyāpaka (major term), such as śiśāmpā or aśoka tree and vṛkṣa. Kramabhāva events are those which are found in the successive occurrence of preceding and succeeding things, such as the appearance of the star Kṛttikā after Śakaṭa; or which are related as effect and cause, such as smoke and fire.

Sādhyā or major-term is to be inferred by the hetu or middle-term. Sādhyā means that which is neither known, i.e., asiddha nor contradicted, i.e., abādhita and desirable, i.e., iṣṭa. The epithet of “neither known” excludes those objects which come under doubt. The epithet of “not contradicted” has been given here to avoid the acceptance of that object as sādhyā, which is contradictory to direct perception etc. The epithet of “desirable” is given to prove that an undesirable thing cannot be an

sādhya. So, sādhya is that which has the characteristics of asiddha, abādhita and iṣṭa. From the point of view of universal concomitance, dharma itself is sādhya, because otherwise it cannot be established; whereas from the point of view of inference, dharmī together with dharma is sādhya. Dharmī is also called pakṣa. Pakṣa or dharmī is the object which is qualified to be proved by the quality of dharma. Though these two dharma and dharmī are related with sādhya, yet dharma is related with sādhya in universal concomitance, because otherwise it cannot be related with sādhya by avinābhāva relation.

### **Hetvābhāsa:**

Among the five properties of anumāna, hetu is the most important, because if hetu is not proper, then the process of anumāna will not be possible.

Faulty hetu will lead to faulty anumāna. Faulty or fallacious hetu is called hetvābhāsa. It has been mentioned that a false inference occurs due to the fault of hetu. That means, hetvābhāsa is that which appears to be as hetu but does not possess the characteristics of a hetu. There are four types of hetvābhāsa, viz., (a) asiddha, (b) viruddha, (c) anaikāntika and (d) akiñcitkara.

(a) **Asiddha-hetvābhāsa:** That hetu is called asiddha which is devoid of existence or certainty. It is of two types, viz., svarupāsiddha-hetvābhāsa and sandigdhasiddha-hetvābhāsa. Svarupāsiddha-hetvābhāsa means that which does not have existence. It means the hetu which is not proved by its very nature. The example here is: sound is changeable, because it is perceived by the eyes. Here 'perceivable by the eyes' is absent by nature in case of śabda. Sandigdhasiddha-hetvābhāsa means that hetu whose certainty is not proved. As for example, to a less intelligent person: there is fire here, as there is smoke. Here it is Sandigdha because the person confuses smoke with fog.

(b) **Viruddha-hetvābhāsa:** The hetu which is concomitant with opposite of the sādhya is called viruddha. As for example, śabda is not changeable, i.e., eternal, because it is produced. Here the sādhya is non-changeableness of śabda, while the hetu is kṛtakatva (produced). Now the hetu kṛtakatva has inseparable connection with changeableness which is opposite of the sādhya here.

(c) **Anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa:** The hetu whose existence in the vipakṣa also is not contradicted is called anaikāntika. Here two terms, viz., sapakṣa and vipakṣa are to be explained. A sapakṣa is that where the co-existence of hetu and sādhya is already established. A vipakṣa is that where the non-existence of the sādhya is already established. Hence, a true hetu cannot exist in a vipakṣa. Anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa is of two kinds, viz., niścitaṅgī and śaṅkitaṅgī. Niścitaṅgī is that whose existence in the vipakṣa is certain. As for example sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable, just like ghaṭa. Here the hetu prameyatva exists in ākāśa also which is eternal. Śaṅkitaṅgī means whose existence in the vipakṣa is doubtful, e.g., the person under discussion is not an omniscient, because he is a speaker. Here the quality of being a speaker is not contradicted by the quality of being an omniscient person.

(d) **Akiñcitkara-hetvābhāsa:** The hetu which is applied to prove a sādhya that is already proved by other pramāṇas like perception etc. As for example, sound is audible, because it is śabda. This hetu does not prove the sādhya, i.e., śrāvaṇatva, because that is established by perception itself. Prabhacāndra has merely explained the sutras dealing with hetvābhāsa, refraining from adding anything of his own. However, he has added some sub-varieties of asiddha-hetvābhāsa and anaikāntika-hetvābhāsa.

### (e) Āgama-parokṣa-pramāṇa:

The last division of parokṣa-pramāṇa is āgama. It is also known as śabda-pramāṇa. The knowledge which is produced by the word of a reliable person is called āgama-pramāṇa. He who possesses right knowledge and makes a right-judgment is said to be reliable or āpta. A reliable person is one who knows the real nature of the things and also expresses his ideas correctly. He cannot tell alie. Āgama-pramāṇa is of two types, viz., (i) laukika and (ii) śāstraḥ. Laukika-āgama-pramāṇa means that kind of knowledge which is derived from the words of reliable persons. Śāstraḥ-āgama-pramāṇa means that kind of knowledge which is known from the scriptures, i.e. the records of the truth by the omniscient beings.

## ANUMANA - INFERENCE

Vaisesika recognises only two Pramanas- perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal testimony to inference. But Nyaya system recognises all the four Pramanas namely perception, inference, verbal testimony, and comparison.

According to Nyaya philosophy, The term anumana literally means after knowledge i.e., knowledge that follows other knowledge. It is mediate and indirect and are arranged through the medium of some mark which is called 'hetu' and bears the relation of invariable concomitance with the observed feature. The basis of the inference is invariable concomitance. The invariable relation between the hetu and the sadhya is called Vyapti. The knowledge of the qualities of the 'pakṣa' through the 'hetu' is called paramarsa. Hence inference or anumana is said to be knowledge gained through paramarsa, or in other words, the knowledge of the presence of sadhya in the pakṣa through the hetu, which is in the quality of pakṣa and is invariably related by Vyapti.

This may be explained with the help of the typical example of inference, the presence of fire on the perception of smoke. When one sees smoke on distant hill one remembers one's experience of the universal concomitance (Vyapti) between smoke and fire and concludes that there is fire on the distant hill. The character which is inferred (fire) is called sadhya; the mark on the strength of which the character is inferred is the hetu (smoke); the subject where the character is inferred is pakṣa (hill). The three terms corresponds to the major, minor and the minor terms in the Aristotelian syllogism. The following is a typical nyaya syllogism.

1. This hill has fire (pratijna),
2. Because it has smoke (hetu),
3. Whatever has smoke has fire e.g. an oven (udaharana),
4. This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire (upanaya),
5. Therefore this hill has fire (nigamana).

The first, the pratijna, is the logical statement which is to be proved. The second is hetu or reason which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition. The third is udaharana which the universal concomitance together with example. The fourth is upanaya or application of the universal concomitance to the present case. The fifth is nigamana or conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five members of Indian syllogism are called Avayavas.

**Linga paramarsa:** The Nyaya syllogism has five terms. Among them, middle term works as a bridge between the major and the minor terms. Therefore, the middle term has main responsibility to prove a syllogism valid or invalid. How a middle term is related to major term is lingaparamarsha. There are five characteristics of a middle term-

1. It must be present in the minor term (pakṣadharmata); e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.
2. It must be present in all positive instances in which the major term is present; e.g., smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists. (sapakṣasattva).
3. It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist. (vipakṣasattva).
4. It must be non-incompatible with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire (abadhita).
5. It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., 'the fact of being caused' should not be used to prove the 'eternality' of sound (aviruddha).

**Hetvabhasa:**-In Indian logic a fallacy is called hetvabhasa. It means that middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. All fallacies are material fallacies. We have mentioned the five characteristics of a valid middle term. When these are violated, we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognised.

1. Assiddha or sadhyasama- This is the fallacy of unproved middle.
2. Savyabhicara- this is the fallacy of irregular middle.
3. Satpratipaksa- here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term.
4. Badhita- It is the non-inferentially contradicted middle.
5. Viruddha- It is the contradictory middle.

According to Jainas, Tarka, Logic is the knowledge of Vyapti between pakṣa and sadhya. It depends upon the perception whether two things exist together or not in past, present, and future. Vyapti is of two kinds- Anavaya Vyapti and Vyatireka Vyapti. In the former the concomitance of two things is established. In the latter Vyapti is shown in the absence. 'where there is fire, there is smoke' is an example of Anavaya Vyapti. On the other hand, 'where there is no fire, there is smoke', exemplifies Vyatireka Vyapti. The relationship of universal accompaniment- gradual or concurrent- exists in Vyapti. This relationship is ascertained by logic (Tarka). Inference (anumana)- It is the knowledge of sadhya with the help of hetu. This inference is either svarthanumana or pararthanumana. The former is the grasp for one's own self. Hence it needs no amplification. For example, the frequent visibility of fire under smoke together suffices to convince us of their concomitance. Afterwards, when we see smoke, we infer the existence of fire also with the help of Vyapti, which is already known to us. It is, svarthanumana. In the place of smoke is pakṣa, smoke is pakṣa dharma. In svarthanumana both Vyapti and pakṣa dharma are essential. Pararthanumana is used for convincing others. So it must be more systematised and vivid. It is five-fold. In five fold Pararthanumana an inference is drawn in five sentences. These sentences are called the propositions (avayava) of inference, e.g.,

- (a) Pratijna- The hill is fiery,
- (b) Hetu- because of smoke,
- (c) Drstanta- Wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as in the kitchen,
- (e) Upanaya- The smoke, which does not exist without fire (Vyaptivisistdhum) is in the hill,
- (f) Nigamana- Therefore the hill is fiery.

Inference is twofold- (1) Svarthanumana- inference for one's own sake and (2) Pararthanumana- inference for the sake of others. The former is not expressed in the form of a syllogistic argument. The latter is a syllogism which helps to direct the mind of the listener to think in the required manner.

The validity of inference is rejected by Carvakas. Inference is said to be a mere leap into the dark. We proceed here from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be accidentally true. A general proposition may be true in unperceived cases. But there is no guarantee that it will hold true in even in unperceived cases. Deductive inferences is vitiated by the fallacy of *petitio principii*. It is merely an argument in circle since the conclusion is already contained in the major premise, the validity of which is not proved. Inductive inference undertakes to prove the validity of the major premise of deductive inference. But induction too is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. In order to distinguish true induction from simple enumeration, it is pointed out that the former, unlike the latter, is based on casual relationship which means invariable association or *Vyapti*. *Vyapti*, therefore is the nerve of all inference. But the Carvaka challenges this universal and invariable relationship of concomitance and regards it a mere guess work. Perception does not prove this *Vyapti*. Nor can it be proved by inference, for inference itself is said to presuppose its validity. Testimony too cannot prove it, for testimony itself is not a valid means knowledge. Secondly, if testimony proves *Vyapti*, inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would be able to infer anything by himself. Hence inference cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge. Induction is uncertain and deduction s argument in a circle. The logicians therefore find themselves stuck up in mud of inference.

The Carvaka position has been vehemently criticised by all systems of Indian philosophy all of which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference. To refuse the validity of inference from the empirical standpoint is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproof are made possible by inference. The Carvaka view that perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. Carvaka Can understand others only through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas not being material objects cannot be perceived but can only be inferred.

For Vaibhashikars, inference is of two types: *Svartha* (for the self) and *parartha* (for others). In the former the *linga* is inferential, i. e., in the inference there is fire on the hill, the hill is *linga* and the fire is inferential. In it the *linga* remains in self side (*svapaksa*), just as the kitchen. The *linga* does not remain in the oppositeside (*vipaksa*), e.g., a pool of water, etc. According to Sautrantikas they are subject to inference. There are four causes of knowledge.

- (1) *Alamban*—It is the cause of external objects like jug etc, because the form of the knowledge and born due to it.
- (2) *Samanantara*—This is so called because it is only after the previous mental stage that the following stage attains consciousness.
- (3) *Adhipat*—The senses have been called as the *Adhipati Pratyaya* of the knowledge. It is the normative cause. Without the senses there can be no external knowledge even after the presence of the first two causes.
- (4) *Sahkari Pratyaya*—these are the subsidiary conditions necessary for knowledge, e.g., light, form, etc. Without which knowledge becomes almost impossible.

The knowledge of the external objects becomes possible due to the above mentioned four causes or conditions. The Sautrantikas do not admit that the external objects have no existence and all knowledge is in the consciousness. Nor do they believe like the Vaibhasikas that we know anything

by direct perception. As opposed to Vaibhasikas, the Sautrantikas maintain that we have no direct perception of the external objects but only the knowledge of their appearance. It is by the distinction in these appearances which are the basis of the knowledge. Hence they are in the mind itself, though the things which they represent as external objects are not known by their perception, but by the inference based upon the mental modifications aroused by them. This view is known as Bahyanumeyavad. It is representationalism or indirect realism.

Vijnanavadins believe that all things external to mind are mental modifications. Thus the knowledge of the external things is impossible. Hence the thing which appears to be external; should be taken as a mental concept. It can be questioned here that if the object is a mere concept of the mind why does it not appear, disappear, and change as desired. To this the Vijnanavadins reply that the mind is a mere stream in which the past experiences remain in the form of expression and whenever there is favourable condition for a certain impression the same impression manifests and results into knowledge. From the multiple point of view Vijnanavadins admit two types of knowledge - Grahana and Adhyavasaya.

Grahana is indirect and Adhyavasaya direct inference. The Vijnanavadins believe that the proof of things depends on something else. (Paratah Pramanyavada).

They made two distinctions in the empirical truth – Paratatra and Pari-kalpa.

Generally, there are varieties of inference recognised. The first is syllogistic inference which is based on perception. The second corresponds to analogical reasoning in modern logic. Such inference is called samanyatodrsta. For e.g., From the observed fact that an effect like a jar requires for its production, an agent like potter, it is concluded that the world also should have been brought into existence by a competent being God.

## **SABDA - TESTIMONY**

Sabda is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (aptavakya) and consists in understanding its meaning. It is based on the words of trustworthy persons, human or divine. A person is trustworthy if he knows the truth and conveys it correctly. Sabda is interpreted as aptavacana. Testimony is valid if the source is reliable. It may come not only from the scriptures, but also from persons who are trustworthy (apta). Testimony is of two kinds- Vaidika and secular (laukika). The vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God. Secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error and so not infallible.

For the Jainas, sabda pramana is called Agama. It is the knowledge of a thing through the words of reliable people. A person who knows things in their true form and expresses his views correctly, is reliable and apta. He is free from prejudice. His words benefit the object which they are seeking to express. Agama is of two kinds- Laukik and Alaukik.

According to Advaita, God is the author of Veda in a special sense. It is not His work in the literal sense. Like everything else, Veda also disappears at the end of the cycle and God repeats it at the beginning of the next cycle. So far as its substance is concerned, it is independent of God, i.e., Apuruscya. According to Nyaya, God is the sole author of Veda and according to Mimamsa, Vedas are self-existent. In Advaita, we find a midway position between these two systems.

According to Ramanuja, all knowledge points to a complex or qualified object. Knowledge never

reveals anything as nirguna. According to Ramanuja, nirgunadoes not mean having no qualities at all but the absence of evil qualities. With respect to sabda , there are two points to be noted-

- (1) all sections of the Veda are equally important. There is no need to distinguish between the ritual portion and the knowledge portion as is done by Sankara.
- (2) Ramanuja gives much importance to the Agamas as to the Veda and to the Upanishads.

According to the Nyāya Philosophy, sabda (verbal testimony) is the fourth and last valid source of knowledge. 'Sabda' literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentence. But all verbal knowledge is not valid. Thus, Nyāyikas expressed that sabda is a pramāna of valid verbal testimony.

Sabda is the instructive assertion of a reliable person. Now a question probably comes to our mind, i.e. who is a reliable person? A reliable person may be a risi, mlechha, arya who is an expert in certain matter and is willing to communicate his/her experience of it.

Example:

Suppose that a lady came to the side of a river to cross the river and can't ascertain depth of water in the river. In this case, she asked a fisherman who is fishing there that 'can I cross the river?' Since the fisherman is a local person over there and has no enmity with her replied that we can cross the river easily. Here, the word of the fisherman man is to be accepted as a means of right knowledge called verbal testimony.

## Types of Sabda

These are two different kinds of Sabda.

1. Drustārtha
2. Adrustārtha
3. Laukika
4. Alaukika

The former classification is made on the basis of objects of meaning and the later classification is based on the origin of words. Sabda deals with perceptible objects called drstārta, e.g. table is brown, grows is green etc. A sabda deals with imperceptible object is called 'adrsta', e.g. Duty is god, Truth is noble, etc.

Laukika sabda is known as secular whereas alaukika sabda is known as divine or vaidika. The Vedas are spoken by god. This vaidika testimony is divine and perfect. According to Nyāyikas, since human beings are not perfect only the words of trustworthy person can be considered as laukika sabda.

The verbal testimony is defined as that 'sentence in which the relation among the meaning of words, that is the object of its intention, is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge'. According to Advaita, the purport of the scriptures is Attributeless Brahman (Nirguna Brahman) which is known by scrutinizing the intention of scriptures based on six indicatory marks, they are, Introduction-Conclusion (upakrama-upasamhara), Repetition (abhyasa), Uniqueness (apurvata), Result (phala), Eulogy (arthavada) and Logical presentation (upapatti). A word can reveal its meaning in the primary sense and in cases where primary sense is unfitting, they are known by their secondary sense. Deriving the meaning of a word through its secondary implication is of three kinds, namely, Exclusive (jahallakshana), Inclusive (ajahallakshana) and Exclusive-Inclusive

(jahalajahallakshana). The identity statements (mahavakya), according to Advaita, reveals the identity meaning by the application of exclusive-inclusive implication.

According to the Mimamsa philosophy, testimony is a reliable statement uttered by a trust worthy person similar to Nyaya Philosophy. It is stated that a sentence consists of a group of words, and a word is considered as an entity which has the power to express some meaning. Testimony is a valid knowledge, which is derived from word or sentence. But all words or sentences can't be treated as testimony because all verbal expressions are not necessarily regarded as valid knowledge.

So, on the account of Mimansikas, sabda must be based on the verbal assertion of a trust worthy person who knows the truth and desires to speak the truth for the guidance of others. Verbal testimony is used as meaningful words or sentences.

The mere combination of letters or the words don't provide a valid knowledge. Therefore, words and sentences must be used in a specific sense whose meaning will be clear, as a result, it would be treated as a valid pramana.

### **COMPARISON (UPAMANA)**

It is knowledge derived from similarity. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. According to the Nyāya Philosophy, comparison (upamāna) is the third source of valid knowledge. The expression 'upamāna', is derived from two words, 'upa' and 'māna'. The word 'upa' means similarity or 'sādrusya' and the word 'māna' means 'cognition'. Thus, generally speaking, upamāna as a source of knowledge is derived from the similarity between two things/objects. It is a source of knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation (what the word refers to).

Example of Upamāna:

A person does not know what a 'squirrel' is? S(he) is told by a forester that it is a small animal like rat, but it has a long furry tail and strips on its body. After some period of time, when s(he) sees such an animal in the forest, s(he) knows that it is a squirrel.

There are four steps involved in acquiring knowledge of an object in comparison (upamāna).

- First: We have an authoritative statement that a word denotes objects of a certain description.
- Second: When one observes any such objects she/he has the knowledge that it answers to the given description.
- Third: There is a recollection of the descriptive statement received from authority.
- Four/Finally: There is the resulting knowledge that, this kind of objects are denoted by the word is same.

Here, it is important to note that Buddhism (Buddhist philosophy) does not accept comparison as an independent source of valid knowledge. On their account, comparison can be reduced to perception and testimony. The Sāmkhya and the Vaisesika Philosophy believe that comparison can be reduced to inference.

Upamana is a pramana recognized by the Mimansikas as similar to Nyayikas' views. In upamana, knowledge of an object is determined by comparing it from other similar kinds of objects. Thus roughly it is treated as analogy. For example, assume a situation where a man has not seen a gavaya or a wild cow and doesn't know what it is. A forester told him that a wild cow is an animal like a

country cow but she is more furious and has big horn in her forehead. In a later period becomes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow by comparing the descriptions made by the forester. This knowledge is possible due to the upamana or comparison. Thus, upamana is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object it denotes by that name.

### **ARTHAPATHI (PRESUMPTION)**

According to Kumarila Bhatta, valid knowledge is that which provides the experience of an unknown object, that which is not contradicted by other knowledge and which is free from other defects. The Mimamsakas uphold svatah pramanya vada or self validity of knowledge. Knowledge is valid by itself. The conditions of freedom from defects and non-contradiction being satisfied, all knowledge arises as self-valid. Coherence and self-consistency is the nature of valid knowledge. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as Pramana or means of knowledge. Jaimini admits three Pramanas- perception, inference and testimony. Prabhakara adds two more – comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non-apprehension.

Prabhakara and Kumarila both, admit Arthapathi as an independent means of valid knowledge. Through this Pramana we discover a fact as a result of a contradiction between two facts already known to be well established. A common example is- Devadutta does not take his food during day time. Yet he is quite strong and fat. We presume that he must be taking food at night. The assumption of Devadutta eating at night is a postulation. We have never seen him eating his food at night. Hence the knowledge gained by postulation is not perception. This kind of knowledge is a peculiar or unique kind of knowledge and it has to be considered separately. But some Indian logicians bring this Pramana under inference-disjunctive inference.

All fat persons who do not eat during day are persons who eat during night. Devadutta is a fat person what does not eat during day Therefore Devadutta is a fat person who eats during night.

### **POSTULATION (ARTHAPATI)**

This is a unique source of valid knowledge upheld by the Mimamsikas. In other words, the Mimamsikas expressed arthapathi as a valid method of cognition. The expression “arthapathi” is a combination of two words namely ‘artha’ and ‘apatti’.

The term artha means fact and apatti means ‘kalpana’ which is understood as ‘supposition’ in English. Thus, etymologically speaking, arthapathi is that knowledge which resolves the conflict between two facts. It entails a presupposition which solves the problem that occurred between two facts.

Arthapathi is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts. When a known fact can't be accounted without another fact, we have to postulate the existence of third fact. The valid and justified knowledge of the third fact is known as arthapathi.

For example, Devadatta is a fat man by fasting in the day. In this proposition we find two facts. One, Devadatta is a human being alive and he is fat. Second, he is not eating in day time. In order to resolve this conflict, i.e. how a person will be fat and not eating anything in day time, we postulate the existence of third fact, i.e. he must be eating in the night. Another example, “John is living and who is not in home”. The problem observed here is how John alive and is not found in his home. To resolve this conflict, we postulate the fact, i.e. he may be staying in a rented house outside his home. Thus, postulation or presumption is a valid source of knowledge.

It is presumption of an explanatory fact (upapadaka) from knowledge of the thing to be explained (upapadya). The knowledge of the thing to be explained is the instrument, and the knowledge of the explanatory fact is the result. This is explained by the well-known example of 'Devadatta'. Devadatta does not eat during the day time, he is fat, these are known facts. If one does not postulate that 'Devadatta eats at night' the seen fact remains unexplained. Postulation, according to Advaita, also proves falsity of the world. The scriptural statement 'the knower of self transcends sorrow' reveals falsity of world by application of postulation. Here, the word 'sorrow' indicates bondage which can be removed by self-knowledge, since the statement says 'knower of self'; if the falsity of bondage is not postulated then removal of bondage by knowledge cannot be said. Hence, bondage or world as false is known by postulation. In postulation, we presume something present elsewhere; there cannot be anything else to arrive at Brahman by postulation.

### **ANUPALABDHI (NON-APPREHENSION)**

Anupalabdhi is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of object. Kumarila admits this but Prabhakara rejects it. It is related to the category of abhava. For e.g., an umbrella which is expected to be seen in a particular corner of a room is not seen there. We know about the non-existence of the umbrella through a separate Pramana, anupalabdhi. Nyaya, though it accepts non-existence as a category has no separate Pramana to understand it. According to them, the non-existence of an object can be known by perception itself as in the case of perceiving the bare floor. But according to Mimamsa since there is no sense object contact, we require a new Pramana to know the non-existence of an object. This is a unique feature of Mimamsa epistemology.

This is an independent source of valid knowledge subscribed by the Mimamsa Philosophy. Non-apprehension is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of an object. An object doesn't exist in a particular place and a particular time. But it exists elsewhere. To perceive the non-existence of that particular object in a given situation/place is known as anupalabdhi.

For example, 'there is no book on the table'. Here, an individual does not perceive the book directly through his/her sense organs. But the knowledge of the absence or non-existence of the book on the table arises because of the non-perception of the perceivable object. The absence of an object from the situation in which it should be available is said to be its non-existence. And, to possess the knowledge of non-existence of objects in an existence form is called as anupalabdhi.

The means of valid knowledge known as non-apprehension is the extraordinary cause of that apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowledge as an instrument. A thing can be known by non-apprehension which has the capacity to be apprehended at a different time. For instance, one can understand the absence of a pot in a place, since pot as an object is apprehended previously or at a later period. Here, non-existence of a thing is known and Brahman being ever-existent (Sat) it is never available for non-apprehension.

### **Consciousness as epi-phenomenon**

"Conscious will is a symptom, not a cause; its roots... are invisible to it... material" George Santayana, *The Realm of Matter* (1930) "A disgrace... more awful than dualism" (Ted Honderich, *Philosopher – A Kind of Life*, 2001, pp.247, 278); "a dreaded relic" (Daniel C. Dennett, *Brainchildren*, 1998, p.65). These are just some of the epithets thrown at any position doubting the potency of conscious will. After all, don't we clearly consciously decide to do something, and then do it? Our conscious will certainly seems to be the cause of our subsequent actions. Yet this piece of common sense is

denied by epiphenomenalism, one of the classic theories in the philosophy of mind.

Spanish/American philosopher and essayist George Santayana (1863-1952), however, saw conscious will as only a symptom – the expression of the underlying activity of the brain. Consciousness is a phenomenon arising from and ‘sitting above’ the brain’s action – an epiphenomenon. Consciousness is caused by, but not itself the cause of, the changes effected by the brain.

There is a clear statement of epiphenomenalism towards the end of Thomas H. Huxley’s address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in Belfast, 1874: “all states of consciousness in us, as in [brutes], are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain-substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is [itself] the cause of change in the motion of the matter [brain] of the organism.”

(T.H. Huxley, On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata) I believe neuroscience is steadily accumulating detailed evidence to justify Huxley’s foresight – especially the close associations seen between scanned images of brain events and subjective experiences. Making straightforward extrapolations from ideas implicit in current brain science, we can extract two propositions which may be considered the two equally-important axioms of epiphenomenalism, and which together formulate it: Axiom 1. Every conscious state is determined by a simultaneous brain state. Axiom 2. Every brain state evolves solely in accordance with physical law.

Axiom 1 asserts that all the contents of a conscious state, however complex, are what they are because of the state of the brain. This is not to be thought of as an instance of ‘efficient causation’ in the Aristotelian sense – where the cause precedes the effect – but rather, of Aristotle’s ‘material causation’, where the effect, in this case, the experience, appears simultaneous with its material cause, in this case, the state of the brain.

Axiom 1’s hypothesis of psychoneural correlation was stated by the physicist John Tyndall in 1868 (for more information see my piece ‘John Tyndall’s Materialist Philosophy’ in Ethical Record, Vol 109, 4, 2004). The correlation is many-one, in that many slight variations in brain state could produce the conscious mind state – it is unlikely that the numerous differences at the smallest physical levels, within atoms, would make any difference to brain behaviour, and so what we consciously experience.

Axiom 2 asserts that nothing will take place in the brain which is not in conformity with the laws of physics, which Tyndall again supposed. This axiom is now sometimes referred to as ‘the causal closure of the physical’. It excludes the intervention into the physical realm of any non-physical entity (eg, a soul) and implies that the cause of each brain state is in practice the prior physical state of the brain. Axiom 2 is valid whether physics concludes that causality is deterministic (each state of the universe, that is, of everything in it, being the necessary consequence of its immediately previous state), or whether it confirms the indeterminism in current quantum theory. Quantum randomness is probably too small-scale to cause arbitrary change to the groups of neural switches on which brain action depends, so the brain is de facto deterministic.

In asserting that consciousness is dependent upon the brain, epiphenomenalism is a natural outcome of the materialist tradition in philosophy. Although by adding consciousness it specifies two attributes of matter, it is misleading to classify it as a form of dualism, because it doesn’t propose two entities with independent existence, nor two sources of efficacy.

Matter's two properties or attributes are therefore:

a) Physical: the unified entity of space-time matter which constitutes the substance of the universe. Physical science, including chemistry and neuroscience, is charged with discovering the nature of the physical world and the laws it follows. Since the time of Galileo, no physics textbook has needed to include consciousness in the equations it expounds; current neuroscience would not be satisfied to take a 'thought' or a 'sensation' as the efficient cause of a brain event: it seeks instead for the neural (physical) process underlying them.

b) Conscious: an attribute which occurs automatically in human and possibly in animal brains when a certain (presently unspecifiable) neural organisation is established. When this occurs, the conscious content is immediately and certainly known to its subjects – and solely to them, because its content is nothing other than their subjectivity. Consciousness is real but not 'substantial' in the philosophically technical sense, as it cannot exist alone, that is, without that small portion of the space-time-matter world in the brain with which it is co-extensive.

Although correlatable with brain states, the contents of conscious awareness – all sensations, feelings and thoughts, including self-consciousness – are not, as many physicalists' claim, identical to brain substance: "consciousness is not cells" is how Ted Honderich puts it. Theorists who do assert a 'mind-brain identity' hope thereby both to dissipate the mystery of consciousness by asserting that it just is the physical brain, and thus guarantee consciousness a causal role. Epiphenomenalism denies this identity, asserting that the physical brain alone is responsible for the consciousness it generates, and for subsequent brain events. Mind-brain identity theorists maintain that consciousness is causal by analogy with the causal role of the temperature of a gas, which can be mathematically proved to be identical to its atoms' average kinetic energy. Indeed, solid butter is caused to melt by raising its temperature, which turns out to be identical to the process of increasing the kinetic energy of its atoms, but no means are available to prove that consciousness is necessarily identical to neural events. Thus unlike identity theorists, epiphenomenalists can conceive of the logical possibility (in another world) of creatures physically identical to us but lacking sentience: zombies.

## **Animal Choices**

Unlike a plant, an animal can move about, and therefore has to incorporate a mechanism for making decisions about which way to go. A fly may spot a drop of water, alight near it to take a sip, and then fly off. Unless the Jains are right, insects are not conscious (that is, they can react to the world, but they have no contents of consciousness: there is nothing it is like to be a fly). Nevertheless, we find it quite easy to be anthropomorphic about them. We can say the fly was thirsty, it saw the water, chose to alight because it desired a sip, and took off satisfied. We have spattered the account with conscious intentions, while knowing that neurologists could give a purely physiological account of how the fly accomplished its objective without invoking 'insect conscious purpose' or 'fly freewill'.

If we see this account of the fly's behaviour as reflecting the pattern of human projects, while realising that it was brain physiology that did the work, we risk becoming an epiphenomenalist. Of course human reasoning is considerably more complex than the fly's, comparing many more factors whose strength we vaguely feel.

The epiphenomenalist sees the process of voluntary action as follows:

a	.....	b	.....	c	stream of conscious states: epiphenom ena
↑		↑		↑	
A	⇒	B	⇒	C	brain states [⇒ = physical cause, such that A causes B, etc]
0	.....	2	.....	4	seconds

Thus a brain state A, having received a nerve signal that one's throat is dry, gives rise to a simultaneous conscious experience a, the sensation of dryness, coupled with the desire to drink water. A unconsciously initiates (⇒) activity that evolves into brain state B, which gives rise to b, the satisfactory feeling produced when succeeding in one's freely chosen aim, lifting a glass to drink. Hitting no impediment in raising the glass and sipping the water, B evolves into C, the brain state resulting from a fresh signal from the throat. C gives rise to c, the sensation of having slaked one's thirst.

Note that the subjective experience of carrying out a decision to drink (a..b..c) is perfectly compatible with that decision's physical correlates (A ⇒ B ⇒ C) being an integral part of the physical world's causality. (The brain's interaction with the rest of the world has been omitted for simplicity.) It's plausible, but an error, to think that any intention or volition enters as a link in the chain of physical causation – that a physical brain event causes a conscious event, which then causes a further physical event, as if we had A ⇒ a ⇒ B. But as Huxley said, "the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act." (Collected Essays Vol.I, 1894). The author of the Bhagavad Gita seems to share that insight: All things are everywhere by Nature wrought In interaction of Nature's qualities.

The fool, cheated by self, thinks, "This I did" And "That I wrought". If the two Axioms are true, our undoubted effect on the world is not accomplished by a conscious self or 'free will' acting by magically originating a sequence of brain events. The I that thinks (in 'cogito ergo sum') is therefore perhaps best regarded as the label our brain's language programme uses when it refers to itself, and not, as Descartes supposed, an independent source of change in the brain. We are causal agents in the world by virtue of being physical beings. Our nervous system has evolved to manage our practical animal needs without our consciously knowing the details. We can work to achieve the future conscious states we desire and diminish the undesirable states. To this end, adapting Friedrich Engels, we shall find that the 'knowledge of necessity', ie, knowledge of the physical laws operating in the world, is a condition of our success.

Epiphenomenalists proclaim the supreme importance of consciousness while accepting its total impotence.

### Some Objections to Epiphenomenalism

1. We have free will, showing that consciousness exerts control over brain activity. The term 'free will' is unfortunately used in two distinct senses, leading to interminable wrangles. I will refer to them as the Primary and Secondary senses.

The Primary Sense: Free will in the libertarian sense alleges we possess a special faculty, the 'will', capable of initiating actions from various alternatives. No doubt there is in the brain (or mind) a

continual jostling for dominance amongst the contenders. Presumably, the role of the 'free' will is to choose between the alternatives and select one action. On what basis is this done? Unless by pure chance (which the libertarians dislike because they discern, rightly, that this eliminates moral responsibility from the act), how can this act of will not automatically select whatever is the strongest motive at that moment, or the argument with the greatest weight? How can it fail to be determined by what one has become and wants at that moment? Perhaps the libertarian pictures free will as a homunculus with free will whose free will is itself a smaller homunculus with free will whose... In fact, the Russian doll 'solution'.

Because the libertarian doctrine of free will rejects both the possible physical processes for events or thoughts – the causal/deterministic, and its negation, the random/indeterministic – it is beyond the realm of logic to which even the gods (say the theologians) are confined. Libertarian free will is bogus. The neuroscientist Benjamin Libet conducted experiments demonstrating that the brain prepares unconsciously what we are going to think and will before we consciously think and will it. He believed that at the penultimate moment, consciousness could veto any decision – thereby, he said, demonstrating free will in action. However, determinism has never meant our opinions cannot change; and according to Axiom 1, any such 'second thoughts' will also have been generated by their fluctuating neural basis. Such thoughts are thus an example of the secondary, but more common, sense of the term 'free will': The Secondary Sense of free will is compatible with determinism. An epiphenomenalist contends that those who claim that free will is compatible with determinism are using the term 'free will' simply as a description of the conscious sensation of choosing accompanying a successful voluntary act. But to be effectively realised, the sensation of free choice a..b..c requires the determinism of  $A \Rightarrow B \Rightarrow C$ .

The sensation of acting freely, according to one's own desire, is of course highly valued – unlike the sensation of being coerced. The cashier who hands cash to an armed robber can credibly say, "I acted under duress and not of my own free will." He wants the court to understand the reason for his behaviour, and giving this explanation implies that his behaviour must be seen as determined by it – that is, viewed deterministically.

In dealing with the robber, and wanting to condemn anti-social actions, the law has found it expedient to employ the doctrine of free will in the primary sense: "The robber could have acted otherwise – he misused his free will, and deserves retribution." But everyone's current brain state is the inevitable result of its history of that person's interactions with the world, including every benign and malign influence, so it's clear the robber could not have done otherwise. Now, although every past event and past human action could not have been other than it was, the expression of our approval or disapproval of them affects future actions, and is necessary for progress. As society comes to appreciate this, it may realise (with reluctance, perhaps) that retributive punishment is unjustified because retrospective. Justifiable sanctions, such as the deprivation of liberty, should always involve attempts at reform, directed to the future – to their prospective effect on the individuals concerned.

2. Epiphenomenalism implies fatalism. This is a mistake. Yes 'what will be, will be' – but this tautology contains no information about the future. No one is privy to a 'Flash Forward' (the name of a TV series where people get a glimpse of their future). We can afford to be optimistic, since the future is unknown to us.

3. Surely mental contents cause actions? It seems right to say "I shall visit the dentist because I have

toothache,” assigning a conscious experience, the ache, as the cause of a physical action, going to the dentist.

For the epiphenomenalist, the word ‘toothache’ functions as a label in our language for that group of neural processes which are the cause not only of the ache, but which also initiate the process of visiting the dentist. These neural processes are the real cause of the behaviour. The label ‘toothache’, like a good computer file name, aids communication. We shall continue to say “because I have toothache” just as we still say “the sun rose” because these statements still convey our meaning – but not the objective truth.

4. Epiphenomenalism is self-refuting, because if the brain is driven by the inhuman forces of physics, any conclusion it reaches, eg ‘epiphenomenalism is true’, is unreliable, since good conclusions are the result of thought.

By applying Axiom 1, we can see that what appears in our consciousness as the compelling reasons for a particular conclusion corresponds with what at the neural level is the cause of those reasons and that conclusion. Just as a computer’s chess programme necessarily obeys the laws of physics as it derives lawful chess moves, so brains, driven by physics, can exhibit logical reasoning, if educated correctly.

5. Consciousness would not have evolved unless it were advantageous to living organisms. Consciousness must have survival value. It must have been specially selected for, and so must have specific biological effects.

We can have no direct indication of animal consciousness. Other humans are presumed conscious because they are members of one’s own species – bats are not. We therefore have no sure ground for assuming, as we are wont to do, that an animal does what it does because of its possession of consciousness. If a species becomes successful in the Darwinian sense, we have no right to assume that it was guided by pleasure and pain experiences – only by appetitive and aversive reactions. We continue to refer to the alleged causal powers of pain even when we know it is not a cause, for example in the case of a reflex action. That pain is not the cause of the action which ends it was pointed out by Shadworth Hodgson in 1870.

A change in the architecture of an animal’s nervous system resulting from a spontaneous variation in its DNA may increase its relative fitness, giving it a selective advantage. If the new architecture happens to produce consciousness as an epiphenomenon, then consciousness will automatically be passed down the generations without having to be coded for explicitly. If consciousness increases in quality and variety as brains increase in complexity, and animals with complex brains are more likely to survive, then a sufficient condition for the evolution of consciousness will have been satisfied. Not that nature cares for what we may consider its finest product – dolphins may experience sensations beyond our imagination, but living in their evolutionary cul-de-sac the sea, gives them no opportunity to explore sophisticated intellectual realms; and large-brained Neanderthals became extinct in the last ice age.

6. If humans were not conscious this article would not have been written, not least because brains would not have needed to create words for the components of consciousness, nor the word ‘consciousness’. This article’s very existence demonstrates the causal efficacy of consciousness. The formation of the abstract noun ‘consciousness’ requires the prior existence in language of such

nouns as 'colour', 'sound', 'taste', 'feeling' etc. These in turn, arise from their constituents, eg particular colours such as green, particular tastes such as bitter, etc. For the epiphenomenalist, a word such as 'red' labels not only the sensation but also that sensation's neural basis, and the word earns its keep by performing a useful function in the brain's economy.

The brain's language system could evolve words labelling neural entities whether or not they are experienced as sensation. Thus zombies – physically human replicas without sentience (which, by Axiom 1, cannot exist in this universe) – would invent sensation words. They could say they'd 'seen a red light' whenever their non-conscious brains detected photons of a certain energy, even though they never experienced red. Similarly, our sensation of redness is not required for us to speak of 'seeing red'. This applies to all sensations and the abstract nouns based on them: no sensation is necessary for the brain's reference to its neural correlates.

The word 'consciousness', the collective noun for the totality of sensory and emotional experience, may be culturally important. Ideologies and cults can be built around concepts (eg 'god'), and wars can be fought for them. Once the word 'consciousness' exists, consciousness gets treated in our language as if it has causal powers, but like phlogiston, the fictitious fuel, it has none. Consciousness of one's 'self' is a further instance of the brain's ability to create concepts (see the Gita above). Yet the power of a concept derives from its human patrons. Its impact on our thinking is not proof that it can move matter. Thus all the detritus left by our talk of 'consciousness', and even of 'self-consciousness', is no more evidence of their causal effect than a library of books on fairies is evidence of fairy activity.

7. Epiphenomenalism cannot explain how the brain generates consciousness. True, but at least it acknowledges a problem other philosophies of mind don't. Eliminativists deny the existence of the contents of consciousness; physicalists award consciousness a dubious identity with neurons to grant it a spurious efficacy; and Cartesian dualists, heedless that it cannot survive a whiff of ether, readily (but unjustifiably) accord consciousness immortality ... In 1868 the epiphenomenalist and Alpine climber John Tyndall anticipated what in 1995 David Chalmers was to call the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Tyndall saw an "intellectually impassable chasm" existing between the physics of the brain and the corresponding states of consciousness, even if all the details about both were known: "If we knew that a right-handed spiral motion of molecules of the brain was associated with the feeling of love, and a left-handed spiral motion with the feeling of hate, the question Why? would remain as unanswerable as before." ('Scientific Materialism' in *Fragments of Science* Vol II, 1889.) Neuroscience has not yet even solved Chalmers' 'easy' problem, which is specific knowledge of the above-mentioned associations. If we eventually reach that stage and arrive at the edge of the chasm of the hard problem, will we have the intellect to find it passable?

## Jainism

Jainism is an ancient religion from India that teaches that the way to liberation and bliss is to live lives of harmlessness and renunciation.

The essence of Jainism is concern for the welfare of every being in the **universe** and for the health of the universe itself.

- Jains believe that animals and plants, as well as human beings, contain living souls. Each of these souls is considered of equal value and should be treated with respect and compassion.
- Jains are strict vegetarians and live in a way that minimises their use of the **world's resources**.

- Jains believe in **reincarnation** and seek to attain ultimate liberation - which means escaping the continuous cycle of birth, death and rebirth so that their immortal soul lives for ever in a state of bliss.
- Liberation is achieved by eliminating all **karma from the soul**.
- Jainism is a religion of self-help.
- There are no **gods** or spiritual beings that will help human beings.
- The three guiding principles of Jainism, the '**three jewels**', are right belief, right knowledge and right conduct.
- The supreme principle of Jain living is non violence (**ahimsa**).
- This is one of the **5 mahavratas** (the 5 great vows). The other mahavratas are non-attachment to possessions, not lying, not stealing, and **sexual restraint** (with celibacy as the ideal).
- **Mahavira** is regarded as the man who gave Jainism its present-day form.
- The texts containing the teachings of Mahavira are called the **Agamas**.
- Jains are divided into **two major sects**; the Digambara (meaning "sky clad") sect and the Svetambara (meaning "white clad") sect.
- Jainism has no priests. Its professional religious people are **monks and nuns**, who lead strict and ascetic lives.

Most Jains live in India, and according to the 2001 Census of India there are around 4.2 million living there. However, the Oxford Handbook of Global Religions, published in 2006, suggests that census figures may provide lower than the true number of followers as many Jains identify themselves as Hindu. The Handbook also states that there are around 25,000 Jains in Britain.

## Concept of reality Reality: Preamble

Looking at the colorful and different forms of existences in the universe, it is natural to be inquisitive about the form and nature of reality i.e. their ultimate source of origin. Is it one entity with its manifold modifications or manifestations or the reality itself is manifold. Therefore all philosophers and philosophies start their enquiry about self and the universe around, with first understanding the reality (**sat**) and its nature. They soon came up with two related alternatives namely:

1. The problem of change - Is changing real?
2. The problem of one and many - Is reality one or many?

The views of western and Indian philosophers are discussed in a separate paper on Jain views of reality with reference to western philosophers.

## Indian philosophers

Like the western philosophers, we find Indian philosophers also made similar statements, e.g.: Śaṅkara's Advait-Vedānta presents the thesis of unchanging, eternal, and conscious and one reality - **Brahm**. For him change, plurality and all worldly things are illusory.

- On the other hand Buddhists consider change as real. (Only Nāgārjuna like Śaṅkara denies the reality of worldly things. Other schools of Buddhism<sup>[6]</sup> do not deny worldly things)
- Sāṅkhya<sup>[45]</sup> believes in duality of existence. They talk of Puruṣa<sup>[35]</sup> (sentient) and Prakṛti<sup>[31]</sup> (insentient)
- Nyāya<sup>[27]</sup> talk of multiplicity of existences like air, water, fire and earth as different forms of insentient besides soul<sup>[40]</sup> being sentient.

Jain philosophers and spiritual leaders accept existence of all beings as real and multiple with broad grouping as sentient and insentient beings. Basic considerations about their views on reality are based on the following:

- It accepts permanence, change, multiplicity and identity or similarity simultaneously because in our experience we always find particularity and universality or generality simultaneously.
- They look at an explanation that is free of fallacy of partial view of reality as any generalization about reality on the basis of single characteristic suffers from the ekāntika doṣa<sup>[11]</sup> (mono-ism).
- It is therefore based on the doctrine of multiplicity of viewpoints (Anekāntavāda<sup>[3]</sup>). Hence the reality should be viewed both from permanence viewpoint (substance) as well as momentary (mode) viewpoint also.
- It therefore considers both permanence as well as change as real. So they consider reality as permanence with change.

### **Nature of Reality in Jainism<sup>[18]</sup>**

The nature and characteristics of reality (sat) are given by the three sutras from Tattvāratha sutra<sup>[44]</sup> Jain ācārya Umā Svāmi Sat dravyalakṣaṇam Utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktaṅ sat Guṇaparyavavad dravayam.

This means that **substance (dravya<sup>[12]</sup>)** is the indicator or representation of reality; sat is with origination, destruction and permanence simultaneously and substance is with modes and attributes. These will be discussed further in section while discussing the characteristics of substance later on. Basically Jains talk of duality of existence / reality namely:

- Living beings (jīva<sup>[20]</sup>)
- Non-living beings (ajīva<sup>[2]</sup>).

### **Need to know the nature and form of substance/dravya<sup>[12]</sup>.**

As per Jain philosophy, this cosmos (loka<sup>[24]</sup>) is another name of an amalgam of infinite substances. Therefore to know this cosmos, it is essential that we understand properly the concept and nature of substance (dravya<sup>[12]</sup>). Without knowing the nature of substance, we cannot understand the characteristics of any entity properly / correctly. As the cosmos is said to be an amalgam of infinite substances, knowledge of the nature of substance will help us understand the entire process of origination, destruction and changes taking place in the cosmos better. One of the Jain ācārya has gone to the extent of saying the foundation of all worldly or spiritual knowledge is the knowledge of the dravya<sup>[12]</sup> itself.

Ācārya Nemi<sup>[25]</sup> Candra<sup>[7]</sup> Siddhānta Deva<sup>[9]</sup>, in the first gāthā (verse) of his text Dravya<sup>[12]</sup> Saṅgraha, given below, says that the main reason of our worshipping the Jain preceptors (Jinendra<sup>[19]</sup> Deva<sup>[9]</sup>) is that they gave us the true description of the substances like jīva<sup>[20]</sup> (living beings).

Jīvamajīvaṅ davvaṅ jīṇavaravasahaṇa jeṇa nidditthaṅ, Devīṇdaviṇdavaṇdaṅ vaṇde taṅ savvadā sistrā.

### **Meaning:**

We pay our homage by bending our heads to Jinendra<sup>[19]</sup> Ṛṣabha Deva<sup>[9]</sup>, who has given us the sermons of jīva<sup>[20]</sup> (living beings) and ajīva<sup>[2]</sup> (non living beings) and who is adored by the entire community of heavenly gods, Thus without having the knowledge of dravya<sup>[12]</sup>, how can any body<sup>[5]</sup> know correctly the supreme soul<sup>[40]</sup> (Jinendra<sup>[19]</sup> Deva<sup>[9]</sup>). If one does not know the true nature of the

supreme soul<sup>[40]</sup>, how can one worship them properly and with all obeisances? Therefore, one of the most respected ācāryas today, Kunda Kunda says that the main reason to destroying delusion is to know the substance, its attributes and modes as given in the following verse.

Jo jāṇadi arihaṅgaṅ davvatta guṇatta pajjayattehiṅ, So jāṇadi appāṇaṅ moho khalu jādi tassa layaṅ

### **Meaning:**

One who knows the supreme soul<sup>[40]</sup> by its substance, modes and attributes, knows his-self and destroys the delusion in the process. We therefore infer that the knowledge of substance, its modes and attributes enable us to have the correct knowledge of soul<sup>[40]</sup> and supreme soul<sup>[40]</sup> thereby destroying delusion, the root cause of all our problems. Hence it is not only important but also essential to have full knowledge of the nature and concept of substance.

### **Characteristics of substance / dravya.**

Dravya<sup>[12]</sup> is a definitive term of Jain philosophy<sup>[17]</sup> that in general represents an entity or an object. This is why Jain ācārya Umā Svāmi (2nd century AD) writes: Sat dravyalakṣaṇam i.e. dravya<sup>[12]</sup>/substance is the characteristics/indicator of reality (existent). What is real is substance. Now the question arises what is reality/sat? He then proceeds to say the following in this regard: Utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktaṅ sat i.e. reality is with origination - destruction and permanence. As per Jain philosophy<sup>[17]</sup>, all objects / entities in this cosmos, whether sentient or insentient, are with origination-destruction-permanence characteristics i.e. substance/dravya is with origination - destruction and permanence simultaneously. New form of an entity is called its origination; giving up its old state is called destruction and the continuation of the nature of the substance is permanence; e.g. destruction of the state of milk results in origination of the state curd and the continuation of its being dairy product i.e. a by-product of cow (go-rasa) for use by us continues its existence.

This way each and every entity in this cosmos goes through origination- destruction-permanence continuously at every moment. Hence all these entities are termed as substance and are real /sat. Besides reality /existent, another characteristic in Jain philosophy<sup>[17]</sup> of substance is that it is always with attributes and modes (paryāya<sup>[29]</sup>) as given by Umā Svāmi in the following sutra<sup>[44]</sup>. Guṇaparyayavad dravyam.

Those parts of the substance, which co-exists with it, are called attributes (guṇa<sup>[15]</sup>) and those that occur serially (krama) are called modes (paryāya). There is no entity in this cosmos, which is not always accompanied with attributes and modes. Knowledge, intuition, happiness etc are the attributes of living beings while mind-based knowledge, verbal testimony etc are the modes of knowledge. Similarly form, taste, odour and touch are the attributes of matter (pudgala) and black / white /yellow etc are the modes of attribute colour.

Thus we conclude that dravya is what is real and real is with origination-destruction and permanence or with attributes and modes.

Jain texts use the word dravya primarily to represent substance. However we also find the terms like object (artha), thing (padārtha), object of knowledge (jñeya or prameya<sup>[32]</sup>) etc. 'aryate gamyate parichidyate vā eti artha fi' i.e. the entity cognized is the object. Similarly all other terms used are

with the object of acquiring knowledge about them. Dravya is also called existent (vastu) as 'vasanti guṇāfi yasmin tat vastu' or an entity in which attributes exist is called substance.

### Number / quantity of dravyas.

There are infinite substances in this cosmos which can all be classified in six categories namely:

Jīva:	Living being
Pudgala:	Matter / Mattergy
Dharma:	Principle of motion
Adharm:	Principle of rest
Ākāśa:	Space
Kāla:	Time

It is significant to know that most of the philosophies of the world talk of Mono-ism or advaitvāda i.e. only one type of existence and everything emanating from it. But Jain philosophy talks of duality of existence / reality i.e. it propagates Duopoly of existence of living and non-living beings. Jains say that both living beings as well as non-living beings are existent and hence eternal truth and not imaginary or pseudo-reality. Similarly knowledge and object of knowledge, eternal and temporary, soul and supreme soul etc are all existent and real.

We shall briefly discuss each of these now. Jain literature however discuss at length the nature of living beings and matter as these are primary substance types which are helpful in following the path of spiritual purification and attaining emancipation.

#### A. Jīva or living beings.

An entity with consciousness<sup>[8]</sup> and its manifestation as knowledge and intuition etc are found is termed as living being. From absolute viewpoint, living beings do not possess attributes like taste, touch, odour or colour and hence are non-concrete. While existing in the cosmos as empirical living being, it lives/ exists due to its capabilities of breathe, sense organs, life span and overall energy while as pure soul<sup>[40]</sup>, it exists at the summit of the cosmos and exists/ lives forever with its attributes of knowledge, intuition and bliss.

Ācārya Nemi Candra Siddhānta Deva, in his text Dravya Saṅgraha, has in a lucid manner explained the true nature of jīva<sup>[20]</sup> based on its nine special characteristics as given below:

##### i. Jīvatva

An entity which lives, as per absolute viewpoint with the force and capability of its consciousness and as per practical viewpoint with its four forces / capabilities of breathe, life span, sensual organs and its energy, is called to have jīvatva or is called jīva.

##### ii. Upyogamaya or able to manifest

Here upyoga means primarily manifestation of consciousness<sup>[8]</sup> into intuition (darśanopyoga) and knowledge (jñānaopyoga). There are further sub divisions of these two manifestations of consciousness that we do not discuss at this stage. However it is to be understood that this manifestation of consciousness<sup>[8]</sup> is the primary or main characteristic of jīva<sup>[20]</sup> in Jain philosophy<sup>[17]</sup> e.g. the verses ‘upyogo lakṣaṇam’ and ‘cetanālakṣaṇo jīva<sup>[20]</sup>fi’ indicate this concept clearly.

### **iii. Amūrtika - non-concrete**

Jīva<sup>[20]</sup> by its nature is non-concrete and attributes like touch, taste, colour and odour are not associated with it.

### **iv. Kartā or Doer/ Agent**

From absolute viewpoint, it is the doer of its nature and from practical viewpoint it is the doer of its matter karmas.

### **v. Svadehaparimāṇa or is of the size of the body<sup>[5]</sup> it owns.**

Jīva<sup>[20]</sup> expands or contracts in shape and size according to the body<sup>[5]</sup> it lives in at different times. When it is liberated of all its kāmika impurities, it is of the size and shape slightly less than the last body it owned.

### **vi. Bhoktā or enjoyer**

From absolute viewpoint, it is the enjoyer of its nature and from practical viewpoint it is the enjoyer of its matter karmas.

### **vii. Saṅsāraṣṭha or exists in this cosmos.**

From the beginning-less time, it exists in this cosmos at different places and destinies.

### **viii. Siddha or Pure soul**

When it is fully free from all the kāmika impurities, then it attains the status of siddha (one who attained its objective) or mukta (free from bondages). It stays in this status forever and is omniscient<sup>[28]</sup>, detached and in a state of bliss. It does not get born again in any other form (no reincarnation).

### **ix. Urghvagamana or to move upwards**

Like the flame of a fire, its nature is to always move straight up but due to kāmika bondage it appears to moving in different directions.

## **B. Pudgala<sup>[34]</sup> or matter**

Pudgala<sup>[34]</sup> is a substance type that is concrete i.e. with touch, taste, smell and color attributes. It is active like jīva. However unlike jīva, its activity is not purposive to spontaneously result in its manifestation of its nature. It is thus affected to a large extent by jīva<sup>[20]</sup> and is capable of greatly affecting jīva<sup>[20]</sup>, due to its omnipresence. It is a major component of empirical soul<sup>[40]</sup> and almost all knowledge acquired by empirical soul<sup>[40]</sup> is through the use of matter as a means or the medium. Tattvārtha sūtra<sup>[44]</sup> (V.19-21) describes the benefits and uses of pudgala<sup>[34]</sup> for jīva<sup>[20]</sup> (śārīravādmamanafiprāṇāpānāpudgalānām, sukḥdukhajīvitamaraṇopagrahāśca, parasparagrahojīvānām).

Thus matter is of immense use to the jīva. Identification of empirical soul and its activities are all due to matter associated with it. Even acquisition of knowledge by jīva to rid / dissociate itself of matter is matter. Spoken words, activities of mind, body and speech, thoughts are all matter.

The entire universe and its contents are perceptible due to matter only as it is the only concrete substance. Its basic or distinguishing characteristics are to join with or dissociate from other matter (of same type or different) or to be attracted to jīva and be of use to it. The word pudgala a definitive term of Jain philosophy is a union of pud (to complete or combine) + gala (to separate) i.e. fusion

and fission. Thus matter particles can combine to form lumps/ aggregate (skandha) or the lumps can break to form smaller lumps and continue the process to reach the last stage i.e. parmāṇu which is the smallest part which cannot be further subdivided. Some characteristics of matter are: Matter in its primitive form is of just one type i.e. parmāṇū. It is the basis of all matter and energy. Both energy and matter can be interchanged. Light, Heat and other forms of energy are thus matter. Light is a skandha of matter. Its speed is said to be 186000 miles per second by Einstein<sup>[14]</sup>. Parmāṇu, as per Jains can travel at the highest speed of 14 rajjus per samaya. Ācārya Amrita Candra in Tattvāratha Sāra says that the parmāṇu has a natural tendency to move downwards versus of jīva<sup>[20]</sup> to move upwards.

Matter is of two types namely lump (skandha<sup>[39]</sup>) and parmāṇu. Lump is a collection of parmāṇus and is perceptible. Lump /aggregate is further classified as of six types namely fine-fine, fine, fine-coarse, coarse-fine, coarse, coarse-coarse. Parmāṇu even though with perceptible qualities cannot be perceived by

senses and is classified as absolute (non divisible) and real like atom to give molecules. Skandha is further classified in six categories as follows:

<b>Gross-gross:</b>	Lump, which can be broken in parts and the parts, cannot be lumped together again e.g. wood, stone.
<b>Gross:</b>	Lumps, which cannot be broken in parts but divided and can be mixed together again e.g. milk, water etc.
<b>Gross-subtle:</b>	Those which can be seen but cannot be touched or held e.g. shade, light etc.
<b>Subtle-gross:</b>	Those which cannot be seen but cognized by some other sense organs e.g. words, sound, heat, odour etc.
<b>Subtle:</b>	Cannot be cognized by any sense organ directly like karma <sup>[21]</sup> particles.
<b>Subtle-subtle:</b>	Even smaller e.g. lumps of two or three parmāṇus.

- Matter has eight types (4 pairs of existent-non existent attributes) of touches (2 out of 4 present at a time in any parmāṇu), 5 colors, 5 tastes and two smell types. Thus a total of 200 different types of aggregate (i.e. of different characteristics) can be formed. Science has to date found 102 types of basic elements.
- Matter types which are of use to jīva are called clusters/vargaṇās and are of eight types namely kārmaṇ, luminous (Tejas), gross body (Āudārika), protean body (Vaikriyika), conveyance body (Āhāraka), mind material (Mano vargaṇā), speech material (Bhāśa vargaṇā) and breathe material (śwāsocchāsa vargaṇās). Gross bodies, protean bodies and conveyance bodies are three types of matter endowed with associability. All vargaṇās are respectively used by jīva<sup>[20]</sup> to have kārmaṇ, tejus (electric), physical and protean/celestial (for hellish and heaven beings) bodies, āhāraka or knowledge body<sup>[5]</sup> for ascetics of higher order and remaining vargaṇās for mind, speech, body<sup>[5]</sup> and breathe.
- Parmāṇu is the smallest and indivisible part of aggregate. It cannot be destroyed even by the sharpest and most lethal arm / fire or water. It is without space points, besides its own one

space<sup>[41]</sup> point<sup>[42]</sup>. It is slightly concrete and slightly non concrete.

- Parmāṇu, which is the basic part of matter has special characteristics and is defined as the smallest indivisible part of matter. It is like a dimensionless and mass-less geometric point that has existence but almost no size and weight. It travels in a straight line if unobstructed otherwise it can travel in any direction including in waveform but under the influence of other entities.
- Parmāṇu in normal state occupies one space point but in special conditions, one space<sup>[41]</sup> point<sup>[42]</sup> can have almost infinite parmāṇus in it. Scientists have proved that specific gravity of matter in nebulae is approx  $10^{-24}$  while some stars are said to be composed of matter which is 2000 times denser than gold. Parmāṇu can have one each color, smell, taste and two touch (hot or cold and hard or soft) qualities. As per Einstein's theory of relativity,  $e = mc^2$ , matter can be converted into energy. So a parmāṇu can have almost infinite speed as parmāṇu which is almost mass-less and can travel 14 rajjus (i.e. the whole universe) or  $1.4 * 10^{21}$  miles per samaya at its fastest speed while its normal speed is one space point (pradeśa) in one samaya<sup>[36]</sup>. (smallest unit of measure of time).
- Bonding of parmāṇus is only due to the dry (arid) and cohesive (smooth) attributes present in different proportions. This is similar to positive and negative charges of protons and electrons. The remaining five substance types are non-concrete and cannot be cognized by our sense organs directly. Word, Bondage, subtle, gross, darkness, shadow, light, heat etc. are the modes of matter.

According to Jainism consciousness or awareness is the essential quality of each individual soul. By itself a soul does not require any external means to gain knowledge because knowledge is inherent in its essential nature and by that it has omniscience or the all knowing awareness without the need to depend upon perception or cognition.

Knowledge does not arise because of perception or mental activity. It exists in itself, whether we know or not and whether we perceive things or not. In other words the world is real, not an illusion. However, in a state of bondage such knowledge becomes covered by the impurity of karma and remains inaccessible to the souls. Thereby the souls lose their omniscience temporarily and rely upon limited means and intermediate sources such as the mind and the senses to gain knowledge and make sense of their experiences and existence.

In this condition beings gain the knowledge of the world sequentially first through perceptions and then through intelligence. Perceptions help them to acquire the generalities of the objects perceived, while intelligence helps them to gain specific details of each of them. These methods are not foolproof since they are prone to errors.

In beings this process of knowing happens in five different ways. Of them the first three are imperfect and prone to error, while the last two are perfect and convey the truth without error. These five means or instruments of knowledge are explained below.

## Means of Knowledge

1. **Mati:** Mati is mind. Mati jnana is the knowledge of the mind, usually gained through our senses, memory, remembrance, cognition, and deductive reasoning. It is something which we know with the help of our mind and its various faculties. From a soul's perspective, this is indirect knowledge derived through the agency of the mind and its faculties (senses).
2. **Sruthi:** When we learn something from other sources, other people or beings, through our observation of signs, symbols or words, we call it sruthignana or the knowledge of sruthi or hearing.

This type of knowledge is gained through association (labdhi), attention (bhavana), understanding (upayoga) and naya or varied interpretations of the meaning of things (naya). This is indirect knowledge obtained through description, authority, study, hearing and listening.

3. **Avadhi:** We gain this type of knowledge not through physical means such as the senses or the mind, but through our psychic abilities, or through clairvoyance and intuitive awareness, by overcoming the limitations of time and space. It is beyond the boundaries of our ordinary awareness and faculties and not generally available to everyone. This is direct knowledge.

4. **Mahaparyaya:** This knowledge is gained by reading the minds and thoughts of others. It is also direct knowledge obtained from others through extra sensory perception such as telepathy or mind reading. Mahaparyaya is facilitated when an individual attains or nears the state of perfection. In that state his own ego becomes silent and dormant. Thereby he is able to enter into any consciousness at will and experience oneness with it.

5. **Kevala:** It is the highest knowledge gained when we transcend our ordinary self and attain perfection or aloneness (kaivalya). Hence only a Jina or Kevalin has access to it, and through him others may learn it as shruti. By itself this knowledge does not require any outward agency for its transmission because it is always there, in the consciousness of the soul which flowers full in an enlightened Jina, unattached, unlimited and without any constraint of time and space, duality and objectivity. Since it is transcendental, it cannot be conveyed or expressed adequately to the satisfaction of others. However, it can be obtained omnisciently in a state of perfection, when the soul becomes liberated from the bondage to the cycle of births and deaths.

## **Direct and indirect knowledge**

As we stated already, the first two are indirect means of knowledge (paroksha) since we have to depend upon an external and intermediate source such as the senses or the mind to know it, while the other three are direct, where we do not have to depend upon an external or intermediate source in the field of objectivity to know it. We gain it directly (pratyaksha) and immediately by coming into contact with it and hence more reliable and useful in liberation. The knowledge gained through the senses is also considered in some classifications as direct (pratyaksha). However, the senses are vulnerable to desires and delusion, we cannot entirely depend upon it. Perceptual knowledge also arises in four different ways, through visual sensations, non-visual sensations, extra-sensory perception and through unified perception without duality by becoming absorbed in the knowledge itself.

Of the three, the first three are not considered valid knowledge because they are prone to errors and create doubt (samsaya), confusion and delusion, while the last two are valid and error free. Their source is from the higher realms inhabited by perfect beings who personify wisdom and can never be wrong. Invalid knowledge arising from the first three is also prone to faulty logic, mistaken notions (viparayana) and wrong knowledge (anadhyavasaya) arising from carelessness or indifference.

## **Perception and discerning knowledge**

The essential nature of jiva is consciousness or chaitanya, which is made up of both perception (darsana) and discerning knowledge (jnana). The former is more general (samanya) and superficial and the latter more specific and detailed (visesa) in providing the souls with knowledge. From perception arises simple apprehension or grasping of the generalities (samanya) of the objects perceived without their particularities (visesa), while from intelligence comes discerning wisdom in which there is the grasping of both particularities and generalities, with the ability to discriminate between one object and another. Jain philosophers identify five stages to perception (darsana).

**Vyanjanagraha** in which a stimulus activates the senses and brings them into primary contact with the object.

**Arthavagraha** in which the mind becomes involved with the senses and cognition is activated whereby one becomes vaguely aware of the object.

**Iha** in which the mind is brought to here and now and begins to pay attention to the particularities of the object whereby a distinct idea of the object is formed in the mind.

**Avaya** in which the mind compares the present experience with the previous experiences of similar kind stored in the mind and integrates it into the memories retaining its distinction such as time, place and context.

**Dharana** in which the memory or the impression of the experience is firmly held in the mind whereby it may be recalled and retrieved later.

## **Knowing and Knowledge**

Jainas hold that while through perception one becomes aware of the objects present in the perceptual world, the objects in themselves are extra mental realities and exist in their own space and time. In other words, the world and its objects are not mere mental illusions or constructs created by our thoughts, desires and perceptions but are real in themselves. They do not change by our knowing or not knowing, and they exist by themselves. So also the knowledge of the object. It exists whether we know it or not. Knowledge is thus independent of perceptions and in itself an absolute reality. While ordinary beings may access it through perceptions and sense organs, it can be accessed without these intermediaries by overcoming the obstacles that interfere with the awareness of such knowledge.

Since the knowledge of the object is not dependent upon perceptions alone, a jiva does not have to depend upon his senses or perception to know it. In an ordinary being, perception (darsana) precedes knowledge (jnana) while in a perfect being, knowledge arises without perception because knowledge is inherent in the being, but remains covered by the impurities of karma. These impurities are of two kinds, those that clog the perception (darsanavaraniya karmas) and those that clog the conceptual knowledge (jnanavaraniya karmas). Because of them we become selective in our perceptions, knowledge and understanding, choosing what is immediately useful and necessary and ignoring the rest. When they are removed, knowledge reveals itself to the being and the being develops omniscience or all knowing awareness encompassing the knowledge of all things, past, present and future. The knowledge of the perfect being is free not only from the impurities we have mentioned before but also from the three mental errors, namely doubt (samsaya), delusion (vimoha) and perversion (vibrahama).

## **Knowledge and perspective**

Another peculiarity of Jainism with regard to perception and knowledge is the theory of standpoints. It recognizes two types of knowledge: standard knowledge (pramana) and relative knowledge (naya). Standard knowledge is the knowledge of the thing in itself without the involvement of perceptions and relationships.

Relative knowledge is the knowledge arising in relationship to the object when it is viewed from a particular standpoint. Relative knowledge depends upon the way we perceive an object and

conceptualize it. It is a limited view of the object.

Hence from that particular view it may hold good, but not necessarily from others. To say that a particular viewpoint is correct does not mean that other viewpoints are wrong. These different viewpoints may represent a particular aspect of the object, but not the totality of the object. At times they may be contradictory and confusing. One cannot know an object truly by solely relying upon a few standpoints. To know the truth of anything one has to consider all the possible standpoints. This is known as the theory of standpoints.

## Nayas

The nayas are classified in various ways. Their number also varies from one to seven. A well-known system identifies seven nayas, which are listed below. When considered independently each of them leads to fallacies (abhasas). Of them four are related to the objects and the meaning and three to words.

1. **Naigamanaya** relates to the end purpose or general purpose of a thing or activity. For example the end or purpose of the sun is to sustain life and provide energy. According to another interpretation naigamanaya relates to a general and non-distinguishing reference to an object without calling attention to its particulars, in such statement as "people live here," without specifying who or what.
2. **Samgrahanaya** relates to the common features or the specific class or category features of an object. The class by itself does not represent the object but it helps us to distinguish it for a specific purpose rather than its general purpose.
3. **Vyavaharanaya** relates to the empirical knowledge or practical exposure to the object whereby we become experientially familiar with it as a whole and in specific detail.
4. **Rjusutranaya** relate to the empirical knowledge in relation to a specific point of time or the present moment without any reference to its identity or continuity as if we have perceived it never before and never after.
5. **Sabdanaya** relates to the verbal viewpoint or the knowledge arising from the specific name, or names by which the object is known. An object may be known by different names or synonyms. Each name evokes in us specific knowledge and the relation between a name and its specific meaning may often give rise to fallacies about the object.
6. **Samabhirudhanaya** relates to the knowledge arising from the root words that give rise to names.
7. **Evambhutanaya** relates to the specific functional aspect of an object in a specific condition. An object may have many aspects in different conditions and each may refer to a specific functional state of the same object.

## Syadavada or Saptabhangi

Closely related to or rather a derivative of the nayavada is the theory of standpoints known as Syadavada, which is often referred to as Saptabhangi, or the doctrine of "May be" according to which one may either affirm or negate a proposition in seven ways. Each approach is called a bhanga (mode, strand or predication) or vada (argument or opinion). This is based upon the profound realization that there is no absolute or universal position on any truth but only conditional and relative possibilities of affirmation or negation. There are many alternatives to understand the indeterminate and many-sided reality and it can be grasped fully only when we consider these various approaches or possibilities that represent it in its totality, and examine each standpoint in detail together with the various strands of truth that go into its making. Thus, "in a certain sense," we can either affirm or negate a thing or its attributes at least in seven different ways or points of view, namely is (asti), is

not (nasti), is and is not, is inexpressible (avyaktaya, is and is inexpressible, is not and is inexpressible, is not and is inexpressible. We are not stating the Syadavada theory in further detail here as we have explained it elsewhere.

## **Buddhism**

Buddhism originated in India, but inspired the world for centuries before the great decline happened, which the Buddha himself predicted during his lifetime as the inevitable consequence of all things that are impermanent. It is debatable how far the Buddha deviated from the tenets of Vedic religion which his parents practiced. However, it is true that his leadership and organizational skills and the dedication of his early disciples played a significant role in the formation and progress of Buddhism in ancient India as a distinct tradition.

Buddhism differs from Brahmanism mainly with regard to the nature of soul and creation, but in several other aspects concurs with its doctrines such as karma, rebirth, self-purification, liberation, and renunciation. It is mainly an ascetic or renunciant tradition with few provisions for the lay followers to prepare for monastic life through successive stages of mental preparation and detachment.

Buddhism is very much relevant today as it was two thousand years ago. The practice of Buddhism provides insightful solutions to the vexing problems of humanity such as violence, stress and suffering. Buddhism is essentially a religion of the mind rather than the spirit. It is grounded in reality, and its practices and solutions are verifiable and repeatable. The Buddha taught the world the best

way to realize the Four Noble Truths through meditation and mindfulness techniques and by following the painless Eightfold Path. In this section on Buddhism, we bring to you comprehensive information on Buddhism, Buddhist philosophy and practice based upon the techniques and teachings of the Buddha himself. Both advanced practitioners and lay followers of Buddhism can benefit from the information provided here on various aspects of Buddhism and its main beliefs and practices

## **The Four Noble Truths**

The Four Noble Truths comprise the essence of Buddha's teachings, though they leave much left unexplained. They are the truth of suffering, the truth of the cause of suffering, the truth of the end of suffering, and the truth of the path that leads to the end of suffering. More simply put, suffering exists; it has a cause; it has an end; and it has a cause to bring about its end. The notion of suffering is not intended to convey a negative world view, but rather, a pragmatic perspective that deals with the world as it is, and attempts to rectify it. The concept of pleasure is not denied, but acknowledged as fleeting. Pursuit of pleasure can only continue what is ultimately an unquenchable thirst. The same logic belies an understanding of happiness. In the end, only aging, sickness, and death are certain and unavoidable.

The Four Noble Truths are a contingency plan for dealing with the suffering humanity faces -- suffering of a physical kind, or of a mental nature. The First Truth identifies the presence of suffering. The Second Truth, on the other hand, seeks to determine the cause of suffering. In Buddhism, desire and ignorance lie at the root of suffering. By desire, Buddhists refer to craving pleasure, material goods, and immortality, all of which are wants that can never be satisfied. As a result, desiring them can only bring suffering. Ignorance, in comparison, relates to not seeing the world as it actually is. Without the capacity for mental concentration and insight, Buddhism explains, one's mind is left

undeveloped, unable to grasp the true nature of things. Vices, such as greed, envy, hatred and anger, derive from this ignorance.

The Third Noble Truth, the truth of the end of suffering, has dual meaning, suggesting either the end of suffering in this life, on earth, or in the spiritual life, through achieving Nirvana. When one has achieved Nirvana, which is a transcendent state free from suffering and our worldly cycle of birth and rebirth, spiritual enlightenment has been reached. The Fourth Noble truth charts the method for attaining the end of suffering, known to Buddhists as the Noble Eightfold Path. The steps of the Noble Eightfold Path are Right Understanding, Right Thought, Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration. Moreover, there are three themes into which the Path is divided: good moral conduct (Understanding, Thought, Speech); meditation and mental development (Action, Livelihood, Effort), and wisdom or insight (Mindfulness and Concentration).

## **Karma**

Contrary to what is accepted in contemporary society, the Buddhist interpretation of karma does not refer to preordained fate. Karma refers to good or bad actions a person takes during her lifetime. Good actions, which involve either the absence of bad actions, or actual positive acts, such as generosity, righteousness, and meditation, bring about happiness in the long run. Bad actions, such as lying, stealing or killing, bring about unhappiness in the long run. The weight that actions carry is determined by five conditions: frequent, repetitive action; determined, intentional action; action performed without regret; action against extraordinary persons; and action toward those who have helped one in the past. Finally, there is also neutral karma, which derives from acts such as breathing, eating or sleeping. Neutral karma has no benefits or costs.

## **The Cycle of Rebirth**

Karma plays out in the Buddhism cycle of rebirth. There are six separate planes into which any living being can be reborn -- three fortunate realms, and three unfortunate realms. Those with favorable, positive karma are reborn into one of the fortunate realms: the realm of demigods, the realm of gods, and the realm of men. While the demigods and gods enjoy gratification unknown to men, they also suffer unceasing jealousy and envy.

The realm of man is considered the highest realm of rebirth. Humanity lacks some of the extravagances of the demigods and gods, but is also free from their relentless conflict. Similarly, while inhabitants of the three unfortunate realms -- of animals, ghosts and hell -- suffer untold suffering, the suffering of the realm of man is far less. The realm of man also offers one other aspect lacking in the other five planes, an opportunity to achieve enlightenment, or Nirvana. Given the sheer number of living things, to be born human is to Buddhists a precious chance at spiritual bliss, a rarity that one should not forsake.

## **Distinction between Brahmiṇic and Śramiṇic traditions**

### **KEY POINTS**

- Sramana was an ancient Indian religious movement with origins in the Vedic religion. However, it took a divergent path, rejecting Vedic Hindu ritualism and the authority of the Brahmins—the traditional priests of the Hindu religion.
- Sramanas were those who practiced an ascetic, or strict and self-denying, lifestyle in pursuit of spiritual liberation. They are commonly known as monks.

- The Sramana movement gave rise to Jainism and Buddhism.

## **TERMS**

### **Sramana**

An ancient Indian religious movement that began as an offshoot of the Vedic religion and focused on ascetic lifestyle and principles.

### **Brahmin**

A member of a caste in Vedic Hinduism, consisting of priests and teachers who are held as intermediaries between deities and followers, and who are considered the protectors of the sacred learning found in the Vedas.

### **Sramanas**

Sramana followers who renounced married and domestic life, and adopted an ascetic path. The Sramanas rejected the authority of the Brahmins.

### **Vedic Religion**

The historical predecessor of modern Hinduism. The Vedas are the oldest scriptures in the Hindu religion.

### **Ascetic**

A person who practices severe self-discipline and abstention from worldly pleasures as a way of seeking spiritual enlightenment and freedom.

Sramana was an ancient Indian religious movement that began as an offshoot of the Vedic religion and gave rise to other similar but varying movements, including Buddhism and Jainism. Sramana, meaning “seeker,” was a tradition that began around 800-600 BCE when new philosophical groups, who believed in a more austere path to spiritual freedom, rejected the authority of the Brahmins (the priests of Vedic Hinduism). Modern Hinduism can be regarded as a combination of Vedic and Sramana traditions; it is substantially influenced by both.

## **Vedic Roots**

The Vedic Religion was the historical predecessor of modern Hinduism. The Vedic Period refers to the time period from approximately 1750-500 BCE, during which Indo-Aryans settled into northern India, bringing with them specific religious traditions. Most history of this period is derived from the Vedas, the oldest scriptures in the Hindu religion. Vedas, meaning “knowledge,” were composed by the Aryans in Vedic Sanskrit between 1500 and 500 BCE, in the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent.

There are four Indo-Aryan Vedas: the Rig Veda contains hymns about their mythology; the Sama Veda consists mainly of hymns about religious rituals; the Yajur Veda contains instructions for religious rituals; and the Atharva Veda consists of spells against enemies, sorcerers, and diseases. (Depending on the source consulted, these are spelled, for example, either Rig Veda or Rigveda.)

## **Sramana Origins**

Several Sramana movements are known to have existed in India before the 6th century BCE. Sramana existed in parallel to, but separate from, Vedic Hinduism. The dominant Vedic ritualism

contrasted with the beliefs of the Sramanas followers who renounced married and domestic life and adopted an ascetic path, one of severe self-discipline and abstention from all indulgence, in order to achieve spiritual liberation. The Sramanas rejected the authority of the Brahmins, who were considered the protectors of the sacred learning found in the Vedas.



Emaciated Fasting Buddha. Buddha practiced severe asceticism before his enlightenment and recommended a non-ascetic middle way.

Brahmin is a caste, or social group, in Vedic Hinduism consisting of priests and teachers who are held as intermediaries between deities and followers. Brahmins are traditionally responsible for religious rituals in temples, and for reciting hymns and prayers during rite of passage rituals, such as weddings.

In India, Sramana originally referred to any ascetic, recluse, or religious practitioner who renounced secular life and society in order to focus solely on finding religious truth. Sramana evolved in India over two phases: the Paccekabuddha, the tradition of the individual ascetic, the “lone Buddha” who leaves the world behind; and the Savaka, the phase of disciples, or those who gather together as a community, such as a sect of monks.

## **Sramana Traditions**

A “tradition” is a belief or behavior passed down within a group or society, with symbolic meaning or special significance. Sramana traditions drew upon established Brahmin concepts to formulate their own doctrines.

The Sramana traditions subscribe to diverse philosophies, and at times significantly disagree with each other, as well as with orthodox Hinduism and its six schools of Hindu philosophy. The differences range from a belief that every individual has a soul, to the assertion that there is no soul.

In terms of lifestyle, Sramana traditions include a wide range of beliefs that can vary, from vegetarianism to meat eating, and from family life to extreme asceticism denying all worldly pleasures.

The varied Sramana movements arose in the same circles of ancient India that led to the development of Yogic practices, which include the Hindu philosophy of following a course of physical and mental discipline in order to attain liberation from the material world, and a union between the self and a supreme being or principle.

The Sramana traditions drove the so-called Hindu synthesis after the Vedic period, which spread to southern Indian and parts of Southeast Asia. As it spread, this new Hinduism assimilated popular non-Vedic gods and other traditions from local cultures, as well as the integrated societal divisions, called the caste system.

Sramaṇa traditions later gave rise to Yoga, Jainism, Buddhism, and some schools of Hinduism. They also led to popular concepts in all major Indian religions, such as saṃsāra, the cycle of birth and death, and moksha, liberation from that cycle.

## **Pratīyasamutpāda**

Pratīyasamutpada means something in Buddhism, Pali, Hinduism, Sanskrit. If we want to know the exact meaning, history, etymology or English translation of this term then check out the descriptions on this page. Add our comment or reference to a book if we want to contribute to this summary article.

Pratīyasamutpāda refers to the twelve factor “conditional origination” as defined in the Dharma-saṃgraha (section 42):

1. avidyā (ignorance),
2. saṃskāra (volitions),
3. vijñāna (consciousness),
4. nāmarūpa (name and bodily-form),
5. ṣaḍāyatana (the six sense spheres),
6. sparśa (contact),
7. vedanā (feeling),
8. tṛṣṇā (craving),
9. upādāna (attachment),
10. bhava (continuity),
11. jāti (birth),
12. jarāmaraṇa (old age and death).

The Dharma-saṃgraha (Dharmasaṅgraha) is an extensive glossary of Buddhist technical terms in Sanskrit (eg., pratīya-samutpāda). The work is attributed to Nagarjuna who lived around the 2nd century A.D.

The doctrine of pratīyasamutpada, often translated as "dependent arising," is an important part of Buddhist phenomenology and, some argue, metaphysics.

Common to all schools of Buddhism, it states that phenomena arise together in a mutually

interdependent web of cause and effect. It is variously rendered into English as "dependent origination", "conditioned genesis", "dependent co arising", "interdependent arising", or "contingency".

Pratītyasamutpāda or Pratītyasamutpādavāda refers to a division of Asatkāryavāda: one of the philosophical systems regarding the cause and effect relation prevalent in Ancient India.—The Buddhists also do not accept the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. Hence, they are also asatkāryavādins. The Buddhist theory is known as Pratītyasamutpāda-vāda. The term means that the emergence of something after the presence of something else. The Buddhists hold that causation means the succession of two events, of which the former is the cause and the latter is the effect. They hold that a thing can never change into another thing, because a thing is what it is (svalakṣaṇa).<sup>39</sup> Causation, according to them, is dependent origination. There being some event, another event is sure to follow. It is generally believed that the cause continues to exist in the effect. But the Buddhists uphold that the effect is produced only after the cause is destroyed. According to them, the sprout (i.e., the effect) arises only after the destruction of the seed (i.e., the cause).<sup>40</sup> Thus, the Buddhists are also asatkāryavādins.

## Schools of Buddhism Vaibhashika

**Sarvastivada**, (Sanskrit: "Doctrine That All Is Real") also called **Vaibhashika**, a school of early Buddhism. A fundamental concept in Buddhist metaphysics is the assumption of the existence of dharmas, cosmic factors and events that combine momentarily under the influence of a person's past deeds to form a person's life flux, which he considers his personality and career. Differences arose among the various early Buddhist schools concerning the ontological reality of these dharmas. While, like all Buddhists, the Sarvastivadins consider everything empirical to be impermanent, they maintain that the dharma factors are eternally existing realities. The dharmas are thought to function momentarily, producing the empirical phenomena of the world, which is illusory, but to exist outside the empirical world. In contrast, the Sautrantikas (those for whom the sutras, or the scriptures, are authoritative) maintained that the dharma factors are not eternal but momentary, and the only actually existing dharmas are the ones presently functioning. The Sarvastivada school is also known as the Vaibhashika because of the c. 2nd-century-CE commentary Mahāvibhāṣā ("Great Elucidation"). This text itself was commented upon by the important 4th- or 5th-century Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa*, prior to his conversion to the Mahayana tradition of Buddhism. Thus, elements of the Sarvastivada school came to influence Mahayana thought.

## Yogachara

**Yogachara**, (Sanskrit: "Practice of Yoga [Union]") also called **Vijñānavāda** ("**Doctrine of Consciousness**") or **Vijñaptimātra** ("**Consciousness Only**"), an influential idealistic school of Mahayana Buddhism. Yogachara attacked both the complete realism of Theravada Buddhism and the provisional practical realism of the Madhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism. The name of the school is derived from the title of an important 4th- or 5th-century text of the school, the *Yogacharabhūmi-shāstra* ("The Science of the Stages of Yoga Practice").

Another name for the school, Vijñānavāda, is more descriptive of its philosophical position, which is that the reality a human being perceives does not exist, any more than do the images called up by a monk in meditation. Only the consciousness that one has of the momentary interconnected events (dharmas) that make up the cosmic flux can be said to exist. Consciousness, however, also clearly discerns in these so-called unreal events consistent patterns of continuity and regularity; in order to

explain this order in which only chaos really could prevail, the school developed the tenet of the *alaya-vijnana*, or “storehouse consciousness.” Sense perceptions are ordered as coherent and regular by a store of consciousness, of which one is consciously unaware. Sense impressions produce certain configurations (*samskaras*) in this unconscious that “perfume” later impressions so that they appear consistent and regular. Each being possesses this storage consciousness, which thus becomes a kind of collective consciousness that orders human perceptions of the world, though this world does not exist. This doctrine was cheerfully attacked by the adherents of the *Madhyamika* (“Middle Way”) school of Mahayana Buddhism, who pointed out the obvious logical difficulties of such a tenet.

Apart from human consciousness, another principle was accepted as real, the so-called suchness (*tathata*), which was the equivalent of the void (*shunya*) of the *Madhyamika* school. The school emerged in India about the 2nd century CE but had its period of greatest productivity in the 4th century, during the time of Asanga and Vasubandhu. Following them, the school divided into two branches, the *Agamanusarino Vijnanavadinah* (“Vijnanavada School of the Scriptural Tradition”) and the *Nyayanusarino Vijnanavadinah* (“Vijnanavada School of the Logical Tradition”), the latter subschool postulating the views of the logician Dignaga (c. 480–540 CE) and his successor, Dharmakirti (c. 600–660 CE).

The teachings of the Yogachara school were introduced into China by the 7th-century monk-traveler Xuanzang and formed the basis of the Faxiang school founded by Xuanzang’s pupil Kueiji. Because of its idealistic content it is also called *Weishi* (“Consciousness Only”).

Transmitted to Japan, as *Hossō*, sometime after 654, the Yogachara school split into two branches, the Northern and the Southern. During the 8th century it enjoyed a period of political influence and produced such celebrated priests as *Gembō* and *Dōkyō*. In modern times the school retained the important temples of *Horyū*, *Yakushi*, and *Kōfuku*, all located in or near Nara and all treasure-houses of Japanese religious art.

## **Mādhyamika**

**Mādhyamika**, (Sanskrit: “Intermediate”), important school in the *Mahāyāna* (“Great Vehicle”) Buddhist tradition. Its name derives from its having sought a middle position between the realism of the *Sarvāstivāda* (“Doctrine That All Is Real”) school and the idealism of the *Yogācāra* (“Mind Only”) school. The most renowned *Mādhyamika* thinker was *Nāgārjuna* (2nd century AD), who developed the doctrine that all is void (*śūnyavāda*). The three authoritative texts of the school are the *Mādhyamika-śāstra* (Sanskrit: “Treatise of the Middle Way”) and the *Dvādasā-dvāra-śāstra* (“Twelve Gates Treatise”) by *Nāgārjuna* and the *Śataka-śāstra* (“One Hundred Verses Treatise”), attributed to his pupil *Āryadeva*.

Buddhism in general assumed that the world is a cosmic flux of momentary interconnected events (*dharmas*), however the reality of these events might be viewed. *Nāgārjuna* sought to demonstrate that the flux itself could not be held to be real, nor could the consciousness perceiving it, as it itself is part of this flux. If this world of constant change is not real, neither can the serial transmigration be real, nor its opposite, nirvana. Transmigration and nirvana being equally unreal, they are one and the same. In the final analysis, reality can only be attributed to something entirely different from all that is known, which must therefore have no identifiable predicates and can only be styled the void (*sunyata*).

Mādhyamika thinkers thus strongly emphasize the mutations of human consciousness to grasp the reality of that which is ultimately real beyond anyduality. The world of duality could be assigned a practical reality of vyavahāra (“discourse and process”), but, once the ultimate meaning (paramārtha) of the void is grasped, this reality falls away. These ideals influenced Hindu thinkers, principally Gauḍapāda (7th century) and Śaṅkara (usually dated AD 788–820); the latter is therefore called a crypto-Mādhyamika by hisadversaries.

The basic Mādhyamika texts were translated into Chinese by Kumārajiva in the 5th century, and the teachings were further systematized (as the San-lun, or Three Treatises, school) in the 6th–7th century by Chi-tsang. The school spread to Korea and was first transmitted to Japan, as Sanron, in 625 by the Korean monk Ekwan.

## **Sautrāntika**

**Sautrāntika**, ancient school of Buddhism that emerged in India about the 2nd century BC as an offshoot of the Sarvāstivāda (“All-Is-Real Doctrine”). The school is so called because of its reliance on the sutras, or words of the Buddha, and its rejection of the authority of the Abhidharma, a part of the canon.

The Sautrāntikas maintained that though events (dharmas) have only momentary existence, there is a transmigrating substratum of consciousness that contains within it seeds of goodness that are in every person. The Sautrāntika sometimes is characterized as a transitional school that led to the development of the Mahāyāna tradition, and many of its views influenced later Yogācāra thought. Buddhism was transmitted into Tibet mainly during the 7th to 10th centuries.

Notable early teachers were the illustrious 8th-century Tantric master Padmasambhava and the more orthodox Mahayana teacher Shantirakshita. With the arrival from India in 1042 of the great teacher Atisha, a reform movement was initiated, and within a century the major sects of Tibetan Buddhism had emerged. The Dge-lugs-pa, or One of the Virtuous System, commonly known as the Yellow Hats, the order of the Dalai and the Panchen Lamas, was the politically predominant Tibetan sect from the 17th century until 1959, when the hierocratic government of the Dalai Lama was abolished by the People’s Republic of China.

By the 14th century the Tibetans had succeeded in translating all available Buddhist literature in India and Tibet; many Sanskrit texts that have since been lost in the country of their origin are known only from their Tibetan translations. The Tibetan canon is divided into the Bka’-’gyur, or “Translation of the Word,” consisting of the supposedly canonical texts, and the Bstan-’gyur, or “Transmitted Word,” consisting of commentaries by Indian masters.

In the second half of the 20th century Tibetan Buddhism spread to the West, particularly after the subjugation of Tibet to Chinese Communist rule sent many refugees, including highly regarded “reincarnated lamas,” or tulkus, out of their homeland. Tibetan religious groups in the West include both communities of refugees and those consisting largely of Westerners drawn to the Tibetan tradition.

## **Nyaya**

**Nyaya**, (Sanskrit: “Rule” or “Method”) one of the six systems (darshans) of Indian philosophy, important for its analysis of logic and epistemology. The major contribution of the Nyaya system is its working out in profound detail the means of knowledge known as inference.

Like the other systems, Nyaya is both philosophical and religious. Its ultimate concern is to bring an end to human suffering, which results from ignorance of reality. Liberation is brought about through right knowledge. Nyaya is thus concerned with the means of right knowledge.

In its metaphysics, Nyaya is allied to the Vaisheshika system, and the two schools were often combined from about the 10th century. Its principal text is the Nyaya-sutras, ascribed to Gautama (c. 2nd century BCE).

The Nyaya system—from Gautama through his important early commentator Vatsyayana (c. 450 CE) until Udayanacharya (Udayana; 10th century)—became qualified as the Old Nyaya (Prachina-Nyaya) in the 11th century when a new school of Nyaya (Navya-Nyaya, or “New Nyaya”) arose in Bengal. The best-known philosopher of the Navya-Nyaya, and the founder of the modern school of Indian logic, was Gangesha (13th century).

The Nyaya school holds that there are four valid means of knowledge: perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), comparison (upamana), and sound, or testimony (shabda). Invalid knowledge involves memory, doubt, error, and hypothetical argument.

The Nyaya theory of causation defines a cause as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect. In its emphasis on sequence—an effect does not preexist in its cause—the Nyaya theory is at variance with the Samkhya- Yoga and Vedantist views, but it is not unlike modern Western inductive logic in this respect.

Three kinds of causes are distinguished: inherent or material cause (the substance out of which an effect is produced), non-inherent cause (which helps in the production of a cause), and efficient cause (the power that helps the material cause produce the effect). God is not the material cause of the universe, since atoms and souls are also eternal, but is rather the efficient cause.

## **Pramā**

Pramā literally means ‘the knowledge’. Technicalities of Treatises Philosophical treatises often use four technical terms:

1. Pramā - The correct knowledge that is got through the pramāṇas is ‘pramā’.
2. Pramāṇa - The means of knowledge that gives us its correct understanding is ‘pramāṇa’.
3. Prameya - An object that has to be known is ‘prameya’.
4. Pramātṛ - The person who knows it thus is the pramātṛ.

For instance, a pot is ‘prameya’. The eye that sees it and the process of seeing is ‘pramāṇa’. The knowledge got that it is a mud pot of small size, black in color, containing water, is ‘pramā’.

### Classification of Pramā

Pramā is the true knowledge which is not negated by later perceptions. If negated, like seeing a snake in a rope in insufficient light and then discovering it in bright light that it is a rope, it is only a bhrama. Sometimes, false knowledge is called apramā and three more varieties of it are predicated:

1. Smṛti - insufficient memory
2. Sanśaya - doubt

### 3. Tarka - false logic

#### **Pramāṇas**

Pramāṇas literally means 'those which measure,' 'valid means of knowledge'. All the six darśanas accept certain basic sources or means of knowledge known as 'pramāṇas' upon which they further develop their theories. These pramāṇas vary from a minimum of three to a maximum of six. They are as follows.

#### **Classification of Pramāṇas Pratyakṣa**

Pratyakṣa means a direct or immediate perception having two stages of development. As soon as the sense-organ comes into contact with the sense-object, there is a general awareness of it, as something existing. This is called nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa. In the next stage, all the details will be noted in the light of past experience which is savikalpa-pratyakṣa.

#### **Anumāna**

Anumāna means inference. It gives us the knowledge of a thing indirectly, when we see some liṅga or sign invariably connected with the original. For instance, by seeing smoke on a yonder hill, we can infer that there is fire there, even though we do not see it directly, since it is known from previous observations and experience that smoke is invariably associated with fire.

#### **Upamāna**

Upamāna means comparison which is another source of knowledge. On seeing a rat, one recalls that it is like the mouse he had seen earlier. He then comes to know that the remembered mouse is like the perceived rat. This type of knowledge comes through upamāna.

#### **Śabda**

It means verbal testimony. The Mīmāṃsā Darśana pays the greatest attention to this since it has to justify the undisputed authority of the Vedas. The words of a reliable person are believed to be true.

This is called āptavākya. However, the Verbal testimony is of two types:

1. Pauruṣeya - personal, same as āptavākya
2. Apauruṣeya – impersonal

The Apauruṣeya denotes the Vedas since they were not created by any human agency. The Vedas are supremely authoritative since they are the 'Book of

Commandments' and also give us authentic knowledge of the unseen and the unknown truths. Again, their main purport and purpose lies in propagating sacrificial rites. The Vedas are eternal, not as the printed Book nor as the orally transmitted mantras but as the eternal teachings contained in them. These teachings are conveyed through the ṛṣis or sages in every age. Since the Vedas are mainly concerned with giving commands about the yāgas or sacrificial rites and other associated rituals, only those sentences containing such commands as expressed through the verbs couched in 'vidhīṅ' and other forms should be taken as authoritative and the rest as aids to it. Such verbs have an innate power of urging the hearer to do the sacrifice. This is called 'bhāvanā'. The urge contained in the Vedic words is known as 'śābdi- bhāvanā'. On hearing it, the person who hears it, gets the urge to perform it. This secondary urge is named 'ārthībhāvanā'. All this depends upon the correct understanding and interpretation of the Vedic sentences. For this, the Mīmāṃsā gives six steps:

1. Upakrama - beginning
2. Upasanhāra - concluding
3. Abhyāsa - repetition for the sake of emphasis
4. Apurvātā - not being known earlier by any other means
5. Phala - utility
6. Arthavāda - mere eulogy
7. Upapatti - logic and reasoning

Once the correct meaning is thus ascertained, the command may be implemented.

### **Arthāpatti**

Arthāpatti means postulation or presumption. It is the necessary supposition of an unperceived fact which alone can explain an anomaly satisfactorily. For instance, if a person is noticed to be getting fat even though he does not eat during the day, it can safely be presumed that he is secretly eating at night!

Knowledge obtained by arthāpatti is distinctive since it cannot be got by any other means.

### **Anupalabdhi**

Anupalabdhi means non-perception. It has also been accepted as a source of knowledge since it gives the immediate cognition of the non-existence of an object. If it is found that a jar which had been kept on a table earlier is not perceived now, its non-existence is cognized.

### **Conception of God**

The current essay tries to present the concept of God in Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The exposition will be mainly focused on the critical review of arguments given in support of existence of God which are thoroughly described in Udayanāchārya's Nyāyakusumāñjali (10 century CE).

Nyāya is one of the six orthodox or āstika schools of Hindu philosophy. The Nyāya school of philosophy is based on Nyāya Sūtras (2<sup>nd</sup> century B.C.), which were written by Gautama. Nyāya accepts four sources of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Early Naiyāyikas wrote very little about God, i.e., Īśvara (literally, the Supreme Lord). In Nyāya sūtras also we don't find any clear mentioning about God. Later Nyāya philosophers rendered God as the Paramātmān.

"The attributes of Jīva are also the attributes of God, so Jīva and God are both the same that is Ātman" But the attributes of Jīva are limited but in the case of God they are perpetual.

Jīva is tied with bondage and liberation but the God is always emancipated. Jīvātmās are many but God is one.

And there came the Navya-Naiyāyikas, the concept of those about God was quite different than the old school Naiyāyikas. They consider God as: The instrumental cause of the world, the Authority which distributes fruits to Jīvātmās according to their deeds, and who gives sermons of Vedas at the time of creation of this world.

Later Bauddhās in India had become from agnostic to strictly atheistic. As a reaction, the later

Naiyāyikas entered into disputes with the Bauddhās and tried to prove the existence of God through logic. They made this question a challenge to their own existence. At times Nyāya philosophers tried to prove the existence of God through Śabda pramāṇa, but Śabda pramāṇa was not acceptable to the Bauddhās, so Udayana took the uphill task to prove the existence of God and also His attributes through inference because inference or anumāna was acceptable to his opponents.

Udayana was born in a Brahmin family in Maṇaroṇī at the bank of Kamalā river. Udayana comes eighth in the history of Bauddha-Naiyāyika debate. Same as the old Naiyāyikas he also had to face the arguments of Bauddha and Jaina critics. To answer them he composed Nyāyavārtikatātparyāḍīkāparīśuddhi, Nyāyakusumāñjali and Ātmatattvaviveka. The latter is also known as Bauddhādhikāra and Bauddhadhikkāra.

Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali is perhaps the most important text in the context of Īśvarasiddhi in which he has vindicated theism in a very efficient manner. It was composed mainly to refute claims of Īśvarabhangakārikā of Kalyāṇarakīta.

Udayana compressed his arguments in cryptic kārikās, most of which are not understandable without his auto-commentary, because the basic text of Nyāyakusumāñjali is hard enough to comprehend. It is divided into five stāvakas in which he has refuted five objections against existence of God. However in view of the word limitation, we will be focusing on the eight main arguments which he has given in the fifth stāvaka of Nyāyakusumāñjali. But first of all, Udayana said that all followers of all the schools in principle or in practice believe in God:

Now, although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the (four well known) ends of man they may desire: thus the followers of the Upanīśadas worship it as the very knower, the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise, those of Patañjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or desert, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings, the Mahāpāśupatās as the Independent one, undefiled by Vedic or secular violations, the Śaivās as Śiva, the Vaiṇavās as Puruṣottama, the followers of the Purāṇas as the great Father (Brahmā), the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice, the Saugatās as the Omniscient, the Jainās as the Unobstructed, the Mīmāṃsākās as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped, the Cārvākas as Him who is established by the conventions of the world, the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him, why farther detail whom even the artisans themselves worship as the great artisan Viśvakarmā?

Then also Nyāyacarceyamīśasya mananavyapadeśabhāk |Upāsanaiva kriyate śrava<sup>a</sup>antarāgatāĒ ||  
Now Udayana in his Nyāyakusumāñjali lists the objection of the Sāṅkhya in the fifth stāvaka of his book:

### **Tatsādhakapramā<sup>a</sup>ābhāvāt**

It means in the opinion of the followers of Sāṅkhya school "there is lack of any evidence to prove the existence of God".

Then Udayanāchārya refutes this objection by saying this famous verse – Kāryāyojana dhṛityādeĒ padāt pratyayataĒ śruteĒ |

Vākyāt sa,kyāviśeīacca sādhyo viśvavidavyayaĒ ||

An eternal omniscient Being is established on the grounds of products, concrete activity, sustaining

effort, etc. (destruction), introduction of empirical usages, infallibility, śruti, sentences thereof, and particular number.

It means the Supreme Īśvara's existence can be decisively proved by the above mentioned eight arguments. Now we shall discuss the all the eight arguments separately in detail.

Kāryatvāt (literally "From effect"): This is causal argument to prove the existence of God. This universe is an effect same as the pot. As we know that a pot cannot be there without potter who is the creator of the pot, so the universe must have an intelligent creator that is Īśvara. The attribute of creation consists of upādānagocara, aparokīajnāna, cikirīā and kĀti, where upādānagocara is related to material cause, aparokīajnāna is knowledge through perception and cikirīā is the will to create the world. So through this argument the existence of God is evident.

Āyojanāt (literally "From combination"): In the beginning of universe the combination of atoms into dyads is an action same as the actions which we do, so it must be preceded by a conscious being, that being God. Atoms are inactive and properties are unphysical. So it must be God who creates the world with his will by causing the atoms to join. Self-combination of inanimate and lifeless things is not possible; otherwise atoms would only combine at random, creating chaos.

There is to be seen the hand of a wise organizer behind the systematic grouping of the ultimate atoms into dyads and molecules. That final organizer is God. Also man cannot be who causes the atoms to join despite being conscious because the creation of world is not yet done and atoms are not joined, so there is no question of existence of man.

DhĀiti (literally "From support"): This is the first part of the third argument. Just as a material thing falls off without a support, similarly, God is the supporter and bearer of this world, without which the world would not have remained integrated. For example just like a piece of grass being carried by a bird in the sky in its beak does not fall on the ground, this world is integrated and well placed in this universe because it is the God who holds it. This universe is hence superintended within God, which proves his existence.

DhĀtyādeĀ: DhĀti and ĀdeĀ = DrityādeĀ Here the term ādi is important. Ādi means destruction. This universe is destructible same as the cloth. But as the cloth never tears up on its own, this universe is also not annihilated by itself. To destruct it there must be a conscious entity that is Īśvara. This is the final part of the third argument.

Padāt (literally "From word"): As we cannot know anything till we are taught by somebody, also at the time of creation it is the God who teaches us all the knowledge (science, art, etc.), any mortal man is not capable of doing that.

Moreover, every word has the capability to represent a certain object. It is the will of God that a thing should be represented by a certain word. Similarly, no knowledge can come to us of the different things here unless there is a source of this knowledge. The origin of all knowledge should be omniscient and, consequently, omnipotent. Such a being is not to be seen in this universe, and so it must be outside it. This being is God.

PratyataĀ (literally from faith): Here in the fifth argument the Nyāya theory of parataĀ prāmāya comes into action. The Hindu holy scriptures, the Vedas, are regarded as the source of eternal

knowledge. Their knowledge is free from fallacies and is widely believed as a source of proof. Their authors cannot be human beings because human knowledge is limited. They cannot obtain knowledge of past, present, and future, and in depth knowledge of mind. Hence, only God can be the creator of the Vedas. Hence, his existence is proved from his being the author of the Vedas, which he revealed to various sages over a period of time.

ŚruteĒ (literally "From scriptures"): Śruti, e.g., the Vedas extol God and talk about his existence. "He is the lord of all subjects, omniscient, and knower of one's internal feelings; He is the creator, cause and destroyer of the world", say the Śruti. Śruti is regarded as a source of proofs by Naiyāyikas. Moreover, Vedas are paureseya same as the Āyurveda. It means as we know that Āyurveda is preached by someone, so Śruti being Veda same as Āyurveda must have its author. That author must be God and nobody else. Hence, the existence of God is proved.

Vākyāt (literally "From precepts"): Veda must have been produced by a person because it has the nature of "sentences," same as the sentences of Mahābhārata which we consider to be created by Vedavyāsa. Again the sentences of the Vedas were produced by a person because they have the nature of sentences, just as the sentences of beings like us. That person must have been God. This is the seventh argument for the existence of God.

Sa,ḥyāviśeīāt (literally "From the specialty of numbers"): The cause of the size of dyads (dvaya<sup>a</sup>uka) is the number 'two' (dviṭvasa,ḥyā) belonging to two atoms; and two and the higher numbers are all products resulting from the enumerative cognition (apekīābuddhi) of the person who counts. At the beginning of creation, it is the omniscient God to whom such enumerative cognition can be attributed to and nothing else because at the time of creation man was not present, so the objection of this enumerative cognition belonging to man cannot be raised. In other words, the size of a dyad or a molecule depends on the number of the atoms that constitute it. This requisite number of the atoms that form a particular compound could not have been originally the object of the perception of any human being; so its contemplator must be God. This is the eighth and the final argument in support of the existence of God given by Udayanāchārya in his Nyāyakusumāñjali.

So, we can say that in his treatise, Udayana has exerted to prove the existence of God through pure reason. By his book he was able to decisively defeat the Buddhists in the debate that lasted for centuries and perhaps millennia and he has this credit to his name because afterwards no other heterodox philosopher came forward to refute his claims. His efficiency is that he used only the evidences (pramā<sup>a</sup>ās) and examples which were acceptable to all. Scholars such as Sir Oliver and Flint have accepted the causal argument of Udayana as very important one and refuted the arguments of Armstrong and John Stuart Mill who have claimed the creation of this world as the result of random conjunction of atoms.

Classical Indian Philosophy accepts perception (pratyakṣa), or perceptual experience, as the primary means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Perception (pratyakṣa) is etymologically rooted in the sense-faculty or the sense-organ (akṣa) and can be translated as sensory awareness, while pramāṇa, on the other hand, is derived from knowledge (pramā) and, literally means 'the instrument in the act of knowing'. However, the standard interpretation of perception accepted by classical Indian philosophers, barring the Buddhists and the Vedāntins, is that it is a cognition arising within the self—the knowing subject—from mental operations following a sense-object contact. It, therefore, is neither an instrument in the act of knowing, nor a mere sensory awareness. Definitions of perception from various classical Indian philosophy schools are given in section 2 below.

The same is true of concepts. There is no one agreed notion or definition of concept understood as the meaning of a general term in Classical Indian Philosophy. Rather, we have a variety of views ranging from robust realism about concepts as real properties, essences or universals to extreme nominalism which admits only of unique particulars with versions of conceptualism in between. The robust realist position is defended by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools, the nominalist by the Buddhist schools and the conceptualist by the Vedāntins and Jainas. I will not be discussing the conceptualist position or their arguments here because ultimately this position ends up collapsing into a version of realism or nominalism.

## **Vaisheshika**

**Vaisheshika**, (Sanskrit: “Particular”) one of the six systems (darshans) of Indian philosophy, significant for its naturalism, a feature that is not characteristic of most Indian thought. The Sanskrit philosopher Kanada Kashyapa (2nd–3rd century CE?) expounded its theories and is credited with founding the school. Important later commentaries were written by Prashastapada, Udayanacharya, and Shridhara.

After a period of independence, the Vaisheshika school fused entirely with the Nyaya school, a process that was completed in the 11th century. Thereafter the combined school was referred to as Nyaya-Vaisheshika.

The Vaisheshika school attempts to identify, inventory, and classify the entities and their relations that present themselves to human perceptions. It lists six categories of being (padarthas), to which was later added a seventh. These are:

1. Dravya, or substance, the substratum that exists independently of all other categories, and the material cause of all compound things produced from it. Dravyas are nine in number: earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, spirit, and mind.
2. Guna, or quality, which in turn is subdivided into 24 species.
3. Karma, or action. Both guna and karma inhere within dravya and cannot exist independently of it.
4. Samanya, or genus, which denotes characteristic similarities that allow two or more objects to be classed together.
5. Vishesha, or specific difference, which singles out an individual of that class.
6. Samavaya, or inherence, which indicates things inseparably connected.

To these six was later added abhava, nonexistence or absence. Though negative in content, the impression it makes is positive; one has a perception of an absence where one misses something. Four such absences are recognized: previous absence, as of a new product; later absence, as of a destroyed object; total absence, as of colour in the wind; and reciprocal absence, as of a jar and a cloth, neither of which is the other.

The Vaisheshika system holds that the smallest, indivisible, indestructible part of the world is an atom (anu). All physical things are a combination of the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air. Inactive and motionless in themselves, the atoms are put into motion by God’s will, through the unseen forces of moral merit and demerit.

## **Padārtha**

Padārtha .—A padārtha is what is knowable and nameable—i.e the ultimate of intellectual analysis.

Padārtha has its nearest equivalent in English in 'Category'. The categories are the objects of right knowledge. This means that right knowledge fulfils its function in comprehending these categories.

Vaiśeṣika: According to the Vaisheshika school, all things which exist, which can be cognised, and which can be named are padārthas (literal meaning: the meaning of a word), the objects of experience.

All objects of experience can be classified into six categories,

1. dravya (substance),
2. guṇa (quality),
3. karma (activity),
4. sāmānya (generality),
5. viśeṣa (particularity)
6. and samavāya (inherence).

Later Vaiśeṣikas (Śrīdhara and Udayana and Śivāditya) added one more category abhava (non-existence).

### **Asatkāryavāda**

Asatkāryavāda literally means 'the theory of non-existent effect'. The relationship between a cause (like clay) and its effect (like the pot) has provided enough material for discussion in philosophy. Several theories have been advocated in which this relationship has been sought to be explained. 'Asatkāryavāda' is the theory that has been put forward by the schools of Buddhism and Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas. When the pot, the effect, is produced from clay, its cause, two explanations are possible. The effect, which already existed in its cause in a subtle form, was manifested when favorable circumstances were created; because a real effect cannot be produced from an unreal or non-existing cause. This theory is called 'asatkāryavāda' and is advocated generally by the Sāṅkhya system.

The other explanation is that the effect, which is something new, is produced as a result of the efforts of the potter and his implements, even though it did not exist earlier. If the clay and the pot were not different from each other, we should have used the same name for both and they should have served the same purpose. But this is not so. Hence according to this view, a real effect ('kārya') is produced from the cause though it did not exist earlier (hence unreal or 'asat') in that cause. Therefore it is named as 'asatkāryavāda.'

### **Kāraṇa**

Kāraṇa literally means 'that by which something is accomplished'. Philosophical systems have highlighted the problem of kāraṇa or cause and kārya or effect and their mutual relationship. Kāraṇa or cause is of various kinds:

- **Upādānakāraṇa** is the material cause like the clay for a pot.
- **Nimittakāraṇa** is the efficient cause like the potter's wheel, stick and the potter for the pot.
- **Samavāyikāraṇa** is the inherent cause and the threads are for the cloth out of which it is woven.

Other examples for samavāyikāraṇa are the existence of a part in a whole. It is a quality in a qualified object or movement in a moving object.

- **Asamavāyikāraṇa** is the non-inherent cause like the color of the threads which causes the color of the cloth after it is woven. Color is related to the threads directly and indirectly to the cloth.
- **Mulakaraṇa** is the original cause of the universe, i.e., Brahman or God.

## Samkhya

**Samkhya**, (Sanskrit: “Enumeration” or “Number”) also spelled **Sankhya**, one of the six systems (darshans) of Indian philosophy. Samkhya adopts a consistent dualism of matter (prakriti) and the eternal spirit (purusha). The two are originally separate, but in the course of evolution purusha mistakenly identifies itself with aspects of prakriti. Right knowledge consists of the ability of purusha to distinguish itself from prakriti.

Although many references to the system are given in earlier texts, Samkhya received its classical form and expression in the Samkhya-karikas (“Stanzas of Samkhya”) by the philosopher Ishvarakrishna (c. 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE). Vijnanabhikshu wrote an important treatise on the system in the 16th century.

The Samkhya school assumes the existence of two bodies, a temporal body and a body of “subtle” matter that persists after biological death. When the former body has perished, the latter migrates to another temporal body. The body of subtle matter consists of the higher functions of buddhi (“consciousness”), ahamkara (“I-consciousness”), manas (“mind as coordinator of sense impressions”), and prana (“breath,” the principle of vitality).

Samkhya posits the existence of an infinite number of similar but separate purushas, none superior to any other. Because purusha and prakriti are sufficient to explain the universe, the existence of a god is not hypothesized.

The purusha is ubiquitous, all-conscious, all-pervasive, motionless, unchangeable, immaterial, and without desire. Prakriti is the universal and subtle nature that is determined only by time and space. The chain of evolution begins when purusha impinges on prakriti, much as a magnet draws iron shavings to itself. The purusha, which before was pure consciousness without an object, becomes focused on prakriti, and out of this is evolved buddhi (“spiritual awareness”). Next to evolve is the individualized ego consciousness (ahamkara, “I-consciousness”), which imposes upon the purusha the misapprehension that the ego is the basis of the purusha’s subjective existence.

The ahamkara further divides into the five gross elements (space, air, fire, water, earth), the five fine elements (sound, touch, sight, taste, smell), the five organs of perception (with which to hear, touch, see, taste, smell), the five organs of activity (with which to speak, grasp, move, procreate, evacuate), and mind (as coordinator of sense impressions; manas). The universe is the result of the combinations and permutations of these various principles, to which the purusha is added.

Largely outside the above system stands that of the three primal qualities of matter that are called gunas (“qualities”). They make up the prakriti but are further important principally as physiopsychological factors. The first is tamas (“darkness”), which is obscurity, ignorance, and inertia; the second is rajas (“passion”), which is energy, emotion, and expansiveness; and the highest is sattva (“goodness”), which is illumination, enlightening knowledge, and lightness. To these correspond personality types: to tamas, that of the ignorant and lazy person; to rajas, that of the impulsive and passionate person; to sattva, that of the enlightened and serene person.

## Satkāryavāda

Satkāryavāda literally means 'the theory of the effect really existing previously in the cause'.

Satkāryavāda refers to one of the philosophical systems regarding the cause and effect relation prevalent in Ancient India.—Satkāryavāda is upheld by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Advaita Vedānta philosophers. According to Satkāryavāda the effect already exists in the cause in a potential condition. So, it is not basically new creation and different from the material cause. But effect is only an explicit manifestation of that which are contained in its material cause.

For example, a pot is not different from the clay, a cloth is not different from the threads.

There are two divisions of Satkāryavāda— a) Pariṇāmavāda and b) Vivartavāda. They are called to be Pariṇāmavādins, who believe that the effect is a real transformation of its cause, but who believe that the effect is unreal, they are Vivartavādins. Sāṃkhya-Yoga's view is known as Prakṛti-Pariṇāmavāda, Rāmānuja's view is known as Brahma-Pariṇāmavāda, Śaṅkara is Vivartavādin. It is the Sāṃkhya who have actually established the theory satkāryavāda by different arguments. Īśvaraḥ has discussed the theory of satkāryavāda in his Sāṃkhyakārikā. He gives five arguments to prove this theory. The five arguments are discussed here as follows:

1. asadakaraṇād,
2. upādāna-grahaṇāt,
3. sarvasambhavābhāvāt,
4. śaktasya-śakyakaraṇāt,
5. kāraṇabhāvāt.

Since a real effect cannot come out of an unreal cause, this theory put forward by the Sāṃkhya philosophy argues that the effect must have pre-existed in the cause, in a subtle form before manifestation. This is satkāryavāda. This theory is also called ārambhavāda and pariṇāmavāda. Satkāryavāda is a hypothesis according to which the effect pre-exists in a potential state. The causal process involves a modification of a stable underlying reality. The effect is not produced as a reality that is distinct from its underlying cause. It is a specific rearrangement of that causal substrate.


The Sāṃkhya system is based on the principle of Satkāryavāda. The effect pre-exists in the cause here. Cause and effect are seen as temporal aspects of the same thing. It is considered as theory of existent causes. The effect lies latent in the cause which in turn seeds the next effect. It maintains that effect is real.

Before its manifestation it is present in the cause in a potential form. According to Satkāryavāda principle the cause is hidden inside the effect. This effect exists due to several reasons-

1. what is nonexistent cannot be produced;
2. for producing a specific material cause is resorted to;
3. everything cannot be produced;
4. a specific material cause is capable of producing a specific product along with that effect;
5. there is a particular cause for a particular effect.

Adi Sankarācharya found Satkāryavāda as a useful tool against the doctrine of Annica or momentariness. Two branches of Satkāryavāda are vivartavāda and pariṇāmavāda.

## Prakṛti and its evolutes



**We don't have to know much:** As we read through the descriptions below, please keep in mind that it really does not take a tremendous amount of understanding of these subjects to begin doing the self-awareness and meditation practices.

If we understand the general principle of systematically shifting awareness inward through the evolutes, then the process of meditation can truly be directed towards Self-realization, and not merely relaxation designed for stress management (as useful as that might be). The subtler and subtler practices and insights will come with practice, built on the foundation of simple

understanding. With practice, the principles of Purusha and the evolutes of Prakriti become ever more clear.

**Real and Unreal:** Sankhya philosophy views anything that is subject to change, death, decay or decomposition as being "unreal" rather than "real." This does not mean that the objects are not there in front of us. Rather, they are not ultimately "real" in that their form keeps morphing from this to that to the other. What is considered "real" is that final substratum which never changes, cannot die, and cannot possibly decay or decompose. It is the direct experience of that "absolute reality" which is being sought.

**Something evolves out of something:** Ornaments can be said to evolve out of metal. Pots can be said to evolve out of clay. Our world is filled with objects.

Objects are made of compounds. Compounds are made of molecules. Molecules are made of atoms. Atoms are made of particles. Particles are made of a subtler substratum. While one evolves out of the other, all of these levels of reality coexist and interact with one another.

**Humans are also multi-leveled:** So too, is the construction of the human being. We are multi-leveled beings, with the next level emerging out of the previous, while those levels still coexist and interact with one another (see the charts).

While the human is made of physical material, we are also constructed of subtler levels of reality, which are products of the unmanifest, primordial essence called Prakriti in Sanskrit.

**Familiar human evolutes:** We are all familiar with the process by which our quiet mind has a memory arise, which triggers emotions, causing chains of thoughts to emerge from that, and to then further emerge into actions and speech. Each of these is a process of one level of functioning emerging or evolving out of the previous, while each of those levels still exists on its own.

In this way, the actions and speech (which emerged from mind) still coexist with the whole of the conscious mind, as well as with the whole domain of the unconscious mind, and also with the still, silent center of pure consciousness (whatever we might call this consciousness, or however we might individually perceive it). All of these coexist, while one leads to the next, with the grosser emerging from the subtler. So it is with all the levels of Prakriti.

**Evolutes of Prakriti:** Similarly, our whole being, in the spiritual sense, is multi-leveled, with the next stage emerging or evolving from the previous. This is the subject of Prakriti, which can be loosely described as unmanifest, primordial matter (which is subtler than the gross realm of quantum physics). This Prakriti ("matter") is infused with pure consciousness, which is called Purusha. Here, however, we are not just talking about the evolutes of chains of thought and emotions, but also the evolutes of the instruments by which we think and emot. This is taking us to the core of our being.

**Experiencing consciousness alone:** Yoga has been described as a process of realizing the direct experience of consciousness (Purusha) as independent of all levels of false identity (manifestations of Prakriti). These false identities are all seen as evolutes of the primordial stuff or matter (Prakriti) from which they emerge. Purusha (consciousness) is actually at all times independent of the interplay, but has become falsely identified with all of this.

**Retracing our way back:** The reason this is important is that the process of enlightenment (or awakening) is one of reversing the process, of tracing our way back through the stages of evolutes. The chart above shows the evolutes, and the chart below shows the journey of tracing our way back to consciousness alone, which is the meditation process of systematically withdrawing consciousness from the evolutes.

**Sankhya-Yoga:** What we now call "Yoga" or "Raja Yoga" has also been called "Sankhya-Yoga," since the practical Yoga methods rest on the philosophical foundation of Sankhya, which is represented in the chart above. This is a widelyheld view of the relationship between Sankhya and Yoga (See also the article entitled Six Schools of Indian Philosophy). Some may not agree with this perspective, but that is a matter for the scholars to debate. Sankhya is thus the foundation for the Yoga described by Patanjali in the Yoga Sutras.

**To debate or not debate:** Some intellectuals will also debate furiously and endlessly about whether the ultimate nature of reality is dualistic or non-dualistic. Some will say that Purusha (as consciousness) and Prakriti (as matter) are eternally separate, and therefore, ultimate reality is dualistic. Others will argue that the two are ultimately seen to be one and the same, and ultimate reality is non-dualistic. However, the seeker of direct experience through the practices of Yoga need not enter these debates intensely. While there may be some value in reflecting on these principles, and maybe even forming a provisional opinion, what is far more important is to understand and actually do the practices. (See also the article, Dualism and Non-Dualism)

**This is very practical:** Here, in this article, the evolutes of Prakriti are being presented as practical information for the modern seeker who is not a scholar or philosopher, but is a seeker trying to gain a basic understanding that will facilitate personal meditation practices. By having a working knowledge of the evolutes of Prakriti, the journey of moving attention in the reverse direction (involution) makes much more sense.

**Universal principles:** It is most important to note that the principles here are also contained in many other systems, although they may not be explained or used in precisely the same way. For example, the concepts of mind and senses, gross and subtle elements, and ego and intelligence, are universal principles. These are also included, for example, in Vedanta and Tantra as well, and also many other traditions. This is not said to force all of the many traditions into one box, but to help allow us to seek and see the underlying reality that is trying to be explained and reached through the practical application of the practices.

**Uncovering false identities:** The practices have to do with systematically uncovering the many false identities we have taken on by Purusha (consciousness) commingling with Prakriti (matter) (Yoga Sutra 1.2). By starting with the gross levels (Yoga Sutras 2.1-2.9) of these false identities, and gradually discerning deeper and deeper (Yoga Sutras 2.10-2.11), our true nature will ultimately be revealed through direct experience (Yoga Sutras and particularly Yoga Sutra 3.56).

**Descriptions of the Evolutes of Prakriti:** Following are some brief descriptions of the evolutes of Prakriti, which are in the two tables shown in this article. The most important principles are that of Purusha and Prakriti, which are consciousness and primordial matter. Everything else emerges from Prakriti, and then is infused with Purusha. So, for example, all the levels of manifestation of the human (gross and subtle) are Prakriti, but have life due to the infusion of Purusha. One of the easiest ways to grasp this process of evolving and infusing, as well as arising from and receding into Prakriti,

is to scroll down and read about the way the senses operate. The other evolutes arise and recede in a similar way.

**Purusha:** Of the two companion principles, Purusha is consciousness that is untainted, ever-pure. It is self-existent, standing alone from other identities of individuality; conscious being-ness; the principle of spiritual energy.

**Prakriti:** The other of the two companion principles, Prakriti is the unconscious, unmanifest, subtlest of the material aspect of energy. It is the primordial state of matter, even prior to matter as we know it in the physical sense. Prakriti manifests as the three gunas and the other evolutes.

**Mahat or Buddhi:** This is the purest, finest spark of individuation of Prakriti (primordial matter). It is very first of the evolutes of Prakriti. It is individuation, but yet, without characteristics. Buddhi is the word, which applies to the individual person, while mahat refers to the universal aspect of this process.

**Ahamkara:** This is the process of ego, by which consciousness can start to (incorrectly) take on false identities. Here, the word ego is used not to mean the actual qualities such brother or sister, or loving or cruel, but the capacity itself to take on the countless identities.

**Gunas:** Prakriti (primordial "matter") has three characteristics or attributes of lightness (sattvas), activity (rajas), and stability (tamas). These three combine and combine so as to form the various aspects of mind, senses, and the five elements: earth, water, fire, air, and space.

**Mind:** Mind (manas) is the instrument, which is the driving force behind actions, speech, and the thinking process. It is also the recipient of the sensory input. It is useful to know that, here, mind is being used in this more limited way, rather than the whole of the inner process called antahkarana, which includes manas, ahamkara, buddhi, chitta, along with the senses and the five elements.

**Senses/Instruments:** The five senses and five instruments of expression are likened doors of a building. Five are entrance doors, and five are exit doors. These ten indriyas are evolutes of mind. One way to understand this process of the senses being evolutes of mind is to notice what happens when we fall asleep, into dreamless sleep. What happens to our senses, our ability to perceive through those senses? They seem to go away, yet they return after sleep. Where did they go? It is in that sense that we might say the senses are still there, but that they have receded back into the field of mind from which they arose in the first place.


This same process of arising and receding happens not only with the senses, but all of the evolutes of Prakriti.

Also, if the senses arise from and recede into the field of mind, then it is also easy to see that during times when the senses are operating, they are also infused with mind, the next subtler level of Prakriti. In other words, senses without mind operating through them simply do not work. The idea of senses operating without mind infusing them seems rather silly, in fact. It is that simplicity that is in the whole concept of Prakriti manifesting outward, and the process of meditation retracing that process inward.

**Elements:** A further outpouring of Prakriti is when it bursts forth as the equivalent of space, as

experienced in the subtle (non-physical) realm. From, and within that emerges air (thinness, lightness, airiness), then fire (energy), then water (flow, fluidity), then earth (solidity, form). When these five elements are in the subtle realm, they are known as tanmatras. When they further come outward, manifesting into the physical world, they are known as bhutas. From these, all of the many objects of the external world are composed.

**Senses experiencing the Elements:** Notice that the Senses and Instruments of action (Indriyas) emerge out of unmanifest matter, or Prakriti. Notice that the five Elements also emerge out of Prakriti. Thus, one set of evolutes (Senses and Instruments of action) are relating to another set of evolutes (the five Elements in the form of many objects). This is one way of explaining the mechanics of how it can be that all is one can appear to be multiplicity.



## CONCEPT OF PRAKRITI AND PURUṢA

In Hinduism, God is generally regarded as the creator, preserver, destroyer and also the ruler of the universe, who controls everything in the world. But Indian seers with close observation and deep reflection found that there are many phenomenon of nature, such as sunrise, sunset, seasons, tides and phases of the moon etc. - all of which occur with predictable regularity. There has been no evidence of interference by supernatural beings. Accordingly, two distinct but related and

complementary aspects of God, viz., Puruṣa and Prakṛti are found. Of them, Puruṣa is person or self or spirit and possesses intelligence and feelings, while Prakṛti is impersonal or jaḍa or inert and devoid of both intelligence and feelings. Both, Prakṛti and Puruṣa are regarded as the two basic principles essential for the creation of the universe. They participate, regulate and implement the universal creation process.

The dictionary meaning of the term prakṛti is the nature, natural form, natural condition or state of anything. In philosophy, it means nature, the original source of the material world, consisting of the three essential qualities, viz., sattva, rajas and tamas. Another meaning is the personified will of the Supreme Spirit in the creation identified with māyā or illusion. The term puruṣa means a male being, mankind, an officer, agent or a member or representative of a generation. It also means the soul or the Supreme Being, God (soul of the universe). In philosophy, the word puruṣa means the soul, as distinguished from Prakṛti it is passive and the looker-on of the Prakṛti.

The concept of Puruṣa and Prakṛti are available in the Vedas, Upaniṣads, the epics and Purāṇas also. The term puruṣa is traced first in the Puruṣasūkta<sup>3</sup> of the Ṛgveda. According to this hymn, Puruṣa is embodied spirit or 'man' personified and regarded as the soul and original source of the universe, the personal and life giving principle in all animated beings. It is said to have thousand that is innumerable heads, eyes and feet, as being one with all created life. In the Ṛgveda, the Prakṛti is known as nature. The boneless or unsubstantial is Prakṛti, nature, the original source of the substantial that is the material and visible world. The Nāsadīyasūkta<sup>4</sup> seems to be the earliest mention of the eternal co-existence of a spiritual principle of reality and an unspiritual principle of unreality, i.e. the Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The word prakṛti is also called māyā, which can be found in its primitive meanings in the Ṛgveda. In the Ṛgveda, the term māyā is used in the sense of illusion or appearance.

In the Upaniṣads and later texts of Hindu philosophy, the concept of Puruṣa moved away from the Vedic definition of Puruṣa and was no longer a person, cosmic man or entity. Instead, the concept flowered into a more complex abstraction in the Upaniṣads. The meaning evolved to an abstract essence of self, spirit and universal principle that is eternal, indestructible, without forms and all pervasive. In the Upaniṣads, the concept of Puruṣa is explained with the concept of Prakṛti. The Prakṛti is often used in the Upaniṣads as synonym for avidyā or māyā.<sup>8</sup> The Upaniṣads mention that the universe is envisioned as a combination of perceivable, material reality and non-perceivable, non-material laws and principles of nature. Material reality of Prakṛti is everything that has changed, can change and is subject to cause and effect. Puruṣa is the universal principle that is unchanging, uncaused but is present everywhere and the reason of the changes of Prakṛti.

In the Purāṇic tradition, Puruṣa is regarded as the Highest God and Prakṛti is female goddess, and both are responsible for creation of the universe. The Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa mentions that as he fills (āpūrayati) all the bodies with (his) grace, he is known to be Puruṣa. Again, due to his reposing in the town, i.e. body (puriṣatvāt) or due to the firm conviction of having a town (purapratyayikafi) in his case or as he sleeps in the town, he is called Puruṣa. The word prakṛti is generally accepted as the main source for the creation of the universe. According to the Brahmavaivartapurāṇa,<sup>13</sup> the word pra denotes excellence and kṛti means creation. Thus, the goddess who is excellent in creation is known as Prakṛti.

In the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas, the concept of Prakṛti and Puruṣa are discussed mostly in accordance to Vedānta philosophy than the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy. According to them, Prakṛti

and Puruṣa are nothing but two forms of the Supreme deity who is identified with one of the principal gods as per to the sectarian character of the work. Now, the concept of Prakṛti and Puruṣa as reflected in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy and the Sāttvikapurāṇas will be discussed.

### **PRAKṚTI AND PURUṢA IN THE SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY:**

It has already been mentioned that the Sāṃkhya system is known as a dualistic system, because it advocates the dualism of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. According to this system, the world has been explained only with the reference to Prakṛti and Puruṣa, described as two distinct and independent principles. Of them, Puruṣa means the self and Prakṛti is the ultimate ground out of which the world evolves. The Sāṃkhya does not establish the existence of God, because according to them, Prakṛti and Puruṣa are sufficient to explain this universe.

### **NATURE OF PRAKṚTI IN SĀMĀKHYA:**

The word prakṛti literally means the nature. It is, according to Hinduism, the basic nature of intelligence by which the universe exists and functions. In the Sāṃkhya system, it is explained as Mūla. It is the Mūla-Prakṛti (root evolvent) because it is the root of all other evolves, while it has no root of its own.<sup>14</sup> If Prakṛti has a cause, then this cause will have another as its cause and it will lead to infinite regress.

Prakṛti is known by various names, such as – Pradhāna, avyakta, anumāna, brahma, kṣetra, akṣara, māyā, brāhmī, vidyā, śakti etc.<sup>16</sup> As the uncaused root cause, it is called Prakṛti; as the first principle of this universe, it is called Pradhāna; as the unmanifested state of all effects, it is known as avyakta; as the extremely subtle and imperceptible thing which is only inferred from its products, it is called anumāna; as the unintelligent and unconscious principle, it is called jaḍa; and as the ever active unlimited power, it is called śakti. The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes Prakṛti as – ahetumat (uncaused), nityam (eternal), vyāpī (all-pervading), niṣkriyam (immobile), ekam (one), anāśritam (unsupported), aliṅgam (non-mergent), niravayavam (partless), svatantram (independent), avyaktam (unmanifest), triguṇam (constituted of the three guṇas), avivekī (indistinguishable), viśayafi (objective), sāmānyam (common), acetanam (non-intelligent) and prasavadharmī (prolific).

In other words, Prakṛti is uncaused; it is eternal and all-pervading. It is immobile only in the sense that in the avyakta state, there is no manifestation of products like mahat, ahaṃkāra etc. Motion and changes take place also in this equilibrated state. Further, Prakṛti is one and is nothing but the unity of the three guṇas in the state of potentiality and incoherence. Being the cause of all it supports all, but it is not supported by anything else. It is aliṅga for it does not serve as the middle term to prove the existence of any other category. Prakṛti is partless also, since in this state, the production of different evolutes, does not commence. It is independent, non-manifested and unconscious, and also the objective ground of all cognitions. Again, as such, it is not limited to individual consciousness, but enters into the knowledge of all.

In the Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra, it is stated that Prakṛti is constituted by the three guṇas, viz., sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakṛti is the unity of sattva, rajas and tamas held in a state of equilibrium. The three guṇas are not the qualities as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system says; they are the ultimate elements in the constitution of Prakṛti. Hence Prakṛti is not beyond the guṇas. The Sāṃkhyasūtra mentions that Prakṛti has two functions – sāmāya (equilibrium) and vaiśamāya (disturbance).<sup>19</sup> When the three guṇas are held together in a state of equilibrium (sāmāyāvasthā), there is no action. This is

the natural condition of Prakṛti. When a disturbance (vaiṣamya) arises in the equilibrium state of the guṇas, then starts the process of creation.

The most important characteristic of Prakṛti is that it is out and out productive. It undergoes changes. It changes into forms and categories. Hence, movement or becoming is also another inconvertible principle of experience and this principle is Prakṛti or Pradhāna. Prakṛti has two movements: anuloma (forward) and pratiloma (backward). In its forward movement Prakṛti becomes the generating agent of all sargas (evolutes), while in the backward movement, it retraces the stages through which it is developed.

The Sāṃkhya gives rational justification for postulating an avyakta Prakṛti as the inexhaustive source of the manifest world. Īśvarakṛṣṇa advances in his kārikā the following **arguments for the existence of Prakṛti** - because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, because of separation between cause and its product; and because of the merging of the whole world of effects.

1. The world-objects are all finite. The difficulty in presupposing a finite cause of the world-objects involves the unending process of finding a finite first cause. If the first cause happens to be finite in character, it would always be dependent on something and hence cannot be independent and complete. Logically it follows, then, that something finite cannot be the first cause and that the infinite Prakṛti can only be the first cause of the material world.
2. All the individual objects share at least three common characteristics (derived from the three guṇas), like the tendency to manifest, the activity or force that will make the manifestation possible, and the obstacle on the way to such manifestation. Thus all objects contain the three guṇas, and this common feature points to a common source that contains the three guṇas.
3. It is well-known that effects evolve due to efficiency of the cause; for, no effect can ever arise from an inefficient cause. This efficiency is latent in the cause and is no other than the existent effect in its unmanifest condition. Thus, on the hypothesis that effect already exists in its cause, the existence of any other form of causal efficiency other than the latent form at the unmanifest effect, cannot be proved in the cause. The difference between sand and sesamum seed which is the material cause of oil, lies in the fact that it is only in the sesamum seed that oil exists in its unmanifest state and not in the sand.
4. An effect arises from its cause, and is again resolved into the cause at the moment it is dissolved. The effect is the manifestation of the cause into which it is re-absorbed at the moment of destruction. The empirical universe is the manifestation of Prakṛti.
5. The perfect order and harmony in the world of objects imply that everything is governed by a single principle, just as the different branches of a tree belong to the same tree. As the main trunk of the tree gets divided into several branches, so the single material cause, i.e. Prakṛti gets divided and sub-divided, thus leading to increasing differentiation.

### **NATURE OF PURUṢA IN SĀMĀKHYA:**

According to the Sāṃkhya, Puruṣa is a pure spirit and entirely different from Prakṛti and its evolutes. Thus, the Puruṣa is beyond the three guṇas also. As it is pure, Puruṣa is free from merits, demerits, pleasure, pain, delusion, attachment, aversion, desire etc. The Puruṣa in its real nature is beyond of all empirical attributes. Puruṣa is unchangeable and immutable. It is eternal in the sense that it is not affected by the change of time, and that it is an uncaused ultimate principle. It is independent and is not supported by anything else. The Sāṃkhya holds that the Puruṣa is of the nature of pure consciousness. Consciousness is not a product of elements, since it is not present in the body,

intellect etc.<sup>23</sup> Again, it is not a mode or attribute of the Puruṣa as some philosophers like the Naiyāyikas opine, but it is the very essence of it. The Puruṣa should not be regarded as blissful consciousness also, because bliss and consciousness, being two different entities, cannot be essence of the same reality. Further, bliss is but another name of pleasure which belongs to Prakṛti and as such cannot be the essence of the Puruṣa.

As the nature of pure consciousness, the Puruṣa is sadāprakāśasvarūpa or always self-manifested.<sup>25</sup> It is different from all the elements of the world of objects. It is different from matter or the material body, the senses, the mind and the intellect. Puruṣa is different from matter, because the latter is the known, while the former is the knower. It is different from the senses, since the latter are the instruments of the knowing, while the former is the subject thereof. It is different from the mind; because the mind is active and composed of guṇas, while the Puruṣa is inactive and devoid of guṇas. Puruṣa is different from buddhi or intellect, since the latter is unconscious, but the former is conscious. Though the Puruṣa is different from all these elements, it holds together all the different stages of an individual and illuminates the whole sphere of thought and feelings.

According to Sāṃkhya, the Puruṣa is incapable of movement and on attaining release it does not go anywhere.<sup>27</sup> The Puruṣa is not of limited magnitude or madhyama-parimāṇa. Neither it can be atomic in size, because an atomic self cannot account for the fact of our cognition throughout the whole body. Hence, the Puruṣa should be regarded as of unlimited size or vibhu-parimāṇa, i.e. all pervasive.

Puruṣa is also called pumān. The Sāṃkhyakārikā describes Puruṣa or pumān as atriguṇa, viveki, cetana, aprasavadharmī etc. and all these characteristics reveal that Puruṣa and Prakṛti are diametrically opposite.<sup>29</sup> However, both are equally free and fundamental; and both lie at the root of the world. The fundamental point regarding the point of Puruṣa is that it is always the subject of knowledge and never an object of it.

The author of Sāṃkhyakārikā mentions the five characteristics of the Puruṣa. These are – sākṣitvam (witness), kaivalyam (solitary), mādhyaṣṭham (neutral), draṣṭṛtvam (seer) and akartṛbhāvafi (non-doer).<sup>30</sup> According to the Sāṃkhya system, Puruṣa is like a light. All the products of Prakṛti can be seen by the light of the self. Puruṣa is self-manifested. With the help of the light of Puruṣa, Prakṛti and its products are manifested. But all the activities belonging to Prakṛti and its products, not belongs to the Puruṣa because of its inactivity. Though not kartā, the Puruṣa is bhoktā or enjoyer. Actually enjoyment is also not natural to the self; it is ascribed to the empirical self, because of abhimāna or the egoistic sense which, on its part, is born of aviveka or non-discrimination.<sup>31</sup> When true knowledge arises all the attributes like pleasure, pain, agency, enjoyment etc. wither away, only pure consciousness remains. In its real nature, the Puruṣa is eternally free and perfect. Hence, bondage and liberation, birth and death, pleasure and pain – all belong to Prakṛti, not to Puruṣa. Puruṣa is never bound nor is he release nor does he migrate.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers have advanced a number of **arguments for the existence of Puruṣa**. These arguments are presented in different forms by different Sāṃkhya writers. For the purpose of authentic presentation, we shall take up these arguments as presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his kārikā. These arguments are as follows –

The Puruṣa exists because – (i) the aggregate is for another's sake, (ii) of the absence of three guṇas and other properties, (iii) there must be some controller, there must be some enjoyer and (v) of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude.

The first argument suggests that all the composite objects (saṁghātas) are for another (parārthatvāt). Here the word para or another is to be understood in an absolute sense, i.e. it must be non composite in character. It is meant for some non composite being, which is no other than Puruṣa. Both the commentators, Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati Miśra talk about the analogy of bed and its user, while commenting on this argument.<sup>34</sup> In the language of Gauḍapāda – “In like manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding props, cotton, coverlet and pillows, is for another use, not for its own and its several component parts render no mutual service; hence it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed and for whose sake it was made. So this world, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another’s use; or there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of intellect and the rest, has been produced.”

The second argument says that Puruṣa must exist because it is reverse of that which has the three attributes and the rest. All the knowable has three elements involved in it, first the element of sattva, by which we have the intelligence staff causing all manifestations; second the element of rajas, which is always causing transformations and the third is the tamas, which is the mass which serves the potentiality for the rajas to actualize. Now such a Prakṛti, composed of these three elements, cannot be a seer itself. For the seer must be always the same, unchangeable, actionless entity - the ever-present constant factor in all stages of our consciousness.

The third argument suggests just like a chariot which is controlled by a charioteer, so also the triṣṭātmikā Prakṛti requires an adhiṣṭhāna, i.e. Puruṣa. Gauḍapāda suggests that chariot can function only in so far as it is controlled and run by a charioteer. Pradhāna functions only when it is controlled by the Puruṣa.<sup>35</sup>

The fourth argument (bhoktṛbhāvāt) attempts to establish Puruṣa as an enjoyer. This is substantially the same as the first proposition. Gauḍapāda, thus, has joined them together by a common interpretation. The difference is that the first argument refers to an arrangement of utility and implies that it has been made for someone use, while the fourth argument indicates ownership or possession and therefore a possessor, as an estate implies an owner. Vācaspati has explained the bhoktṛbhāva of Puruṣa in the sense of draṣṭṛbhāva, whereas Vijñānabhikṣu has interpreted bhoktṛbhāva of Puruṣa in the sense of enjoyment through reflection.<sup>36</sup>

The fifth argument kaivalyārtham pravṛtti seeks to prove the existence of Puruṣa on the basis of the observed facts of the world. It says that because there is a tendency in all scriptures and among all the intelligent persons towards freedom, there must be something beyond the great principle and the rest; and this is the spirit.<sup>37</sup> The whole creation of this world is marching towards freedom which belongs to the Puruṣa.

Thus, all these arguments which are advanced by the Sāṁkhya philosophers do prove the existence of Puruṣa as consciousness and illumination.

The Sāṁkhya system believes in the plurality of the Puruṣa. According to them, the self or Puruṣa is not one, but many and it is different in different organisms. Further reasons are adduced by the Sāṁkhya philosophers for the plurality of the Puruṣas. The arguments are as follows – (i) from the individual allotment of birth, death and the instruments, (ii) from the simultaneity of activities and (iii) from the diverse modifications due to the three guṇas.<sup>38</sup> In this way, the Sāṁkhya have established the plurality of the Puruṣa on logical ground. They hold that in their fundamental form

these Puruṣas are the same but they are many in number. Their essence is consciousness, which is the same in all the Puruṣas.

## **RELATION BETWEEN PRAKṚTI AND PURUṢA IN SĀMĀKHYA:**

It is already stated that Prakṛti evolves the world of objects when it comes into relation with the Puruṣa. The evolution of the world has its starting point in the contact between the Puruṣa and Prakṛti. However, the relation between these two is the most perplexing point of the Sāṃkhya system. The Sāṃkhya holds that though Prakṛti and Puruṣa are quite opposite natures, there is harmony between these two realities. In their view, there can be no evolution unless these two realities are somehow related to each other. According to Sāṃkhya, the contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is not an ordinary kind of conjunction. The said contact means that the Prakṛti is influenced simply by the presence of Puruṣa, just as our body is sometimes moved by the presence of a thought or a piece of iron is moved by a piece of magnet.<sup>39</sup> Prakṛti is unconscious and active, while Puruṣa is conscious but inactive. But through the union or contact between these two, the unconscious Prakṛti appears as if it is conscious and similarly the neutral Puruṣa appears as if it were the agent.<sup>40</sup> However, the evolution of the world cannot be due to the Puruṣa alone, for its inactivity; nor can it be due to Prakṛti alone, because it is unconscious. Hence for the evolution of the world, the activity of Prakṛti must be guided by the intelligence of the Puruṣa. In this context the question arises as how can these two different realities co-operate to serve their respective purposes? In reply, Sāṃkhya philosophers say that though distinct from each other, Prakṛti and Puruṣa can co-operate for the evolution purposes, just as a lame man and a blind man can co-operate with each other and came out of the forest.<sup>41</sup> The Puruṣa is compared to a lame man and Prakṛti is compared to a blind man. Just as a lame man guides a blind man, so the Puruṣa guides Prakṛti. Prakṛti is blind and unconscious and evolves the manifold world under the guidance of the Puruṣas to realize their ends. When Prakṛti acts, the Puruṣa experiences the fruits, since the activity of Prakṛti is interested for the experience of Puruṣa.<sup>42</sup> Prakṛti requires the presence of the Puruṣa in order to be known or appreciated by it, and the Puruṣa requires the help of Prakṛti in order to discriminate itself from the latter and thereby attain liberation.<sup>43</sup> In reality, the Puruṣa is neither bound nor released nor transmigrates from one to another individuals. Prakṛti, in the form of mind, egoism, subtle essences and the sense-organs, is bound, released and transmigrated. The Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that Prakṛti though unconscious, has an immanent teleology because of which it acts for fulfilling the needs of the Puruṣa, just as unconscious milk flows for the nourishment of the calf.<sup>44</sup> When a particular Puruṣa is liberated, Prakṛti stops its activities with reference to that Puruṣa, like an actress who desists from dancing when the spectators are satisfied.<sup>45</sup> When the Puruṣa apprehends its distinction from Prakṛti through knowledge, it becomes completely fulfilled, and then Prakṛti stops its creative acts from it. When Prakṛti stops its acts, then Puruṣa abides in its intrinsic nature, realizes its innate purity, and remains as indifferent seer. And when the Puruṣa recognizes its distinction from the ever-evolving and dissolving world of Prakṛti, the latter ceases to operate towards it.<sup>46</sup> The evolution of Prakṛti is due to their non-discrimination, not the mere presence of the Puruṣa. This non-discrimination brings about a temporary union between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

However, the union is not real, because it dissolves on the rise of true knowledge. According to the Sāṃkhya system, *aviveka* is the cause of conjunction between the Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The conjunction is not real change, because no new properties are produced in the Puruṣa. The relation between these two is sometimes viewed as that of the enjoyer and the enjoyable.

## **Proof for the Existence of Puruṣa**

Puruṣa is not perceived yet the Sāṃkhya forwards different arguments for proving the existence of Puruṣa. Sāṃkhyakārikā advocates several arguments to establish the existence of Puruṣa on the some important grounds.

Anima Sengupta states that spirit exists as distinct from matter since (a) collection serves the purpose of something other than them; (b) since the other must be the reverse of what is composed of these three constituents (c) since, there must be control of collocations. (d) since, there must be an enjoyer and (e) since, there is activity for the purpose of release from threefold misery' Sāṃkhyakārikā advocates several arguments as follows (i)

### **i. Saṃghātaparārthatvāt**

All compound objects exist for the sake of the Puruṣa. The body, the senses, the mind and the intellect are all means to realize the end of the Puruṣa. The three guṇas, the Prakṛti, the subtle body – all are said to serve the purpose of Puruṣa. Prakṛti evolves itself in order to serve the Puruṣa's end. From the existence of assemblage things of the world, the existence of Puruṣa is inferred. He is the self, must exist, to enjoy or to realize that he is happy or unhappy.

The first argument says that any assemblage of material objects which are created on account of the use of some other than itself. Like a bed which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cords, cotton, coverlet and pillows, is for another's use not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service. So it can be said that there is person who sleeps upon the bed and for which use it was made. So this body which is an assemblage of the five elements is for another use, or there is Puruṣa for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of an aggregate of intellect and the rest has been produced. Therefore, there must be an entity in order to enjoy the creations of Prakṛti. The body, the sense, the mind and the intellect are all means to realize the end of the soul. 'The three guṇas, the Prakṛti, the subtle body, all are meant to serve the purpose of Puruṣa'.

Prakṛti is unconscious so cannot make use of compound objects. There must be a conscious principle that is being served by the three guṇas, the Prakṛti and the subtle body. Evolution is teleological and purposive. This teleological evolution must help Puruṣa to release itself from bondage. So Puruṣa must exist.

### **ii) Trigūṇādiviparyayāt**

All material objects of the world are composed of three guṇas. These are sattva, rajas and tamas. They presuppose the existence of Puruṣa. Puruṣa is the witness of the three guṇas and is himself beyond them. The three guṇas imply the conception of a nistraigūṇya – that which is beyond them. Hence Puruṣa must exist.

### **iii) Adhiṣṭhānāt**

Puruṣa is pure conscious and is capable of synthesizing and creating a harmony among all our experiences. All material objects of this world are inactive. They are unconscious. These things cannot act without the help of a conscious being. There must be a conscious being by whom unconscious become active. It is impossible to move all worldly objects without the co-ordination of a conscious being. Puruṣa is the foundation (adhiṣṭhāna), the fundamental postulate of all empirical knowledge. Hence, Puruṣa must exist. In the words of Gauḍapāda just as a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses similarly the Puruṣa guides the body in every step.

### **iv) Bhokṛtṛbhāvāt**

There must be a enjoyer to enjoy the products of Prakṛti, because Prakṛti is non-intelligent. Non-intelligent Prakṛti cannot enjoy its own products. In the words of Vācaspati Miśra the enjoyable great principle and the rest are meaningless without any observer.

There must be an intelligent principle to account the enjoyment of the objects of experience in the form of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are felt by each one as agreeable and disagreeable respectively. But feelings can not be agreeable or disagreeable to the mahat or buddhi and other products, as that would involve the anomaly of things operating upon them, as the buddhi etc., are composed of pleasure, pain and delusion. Therefore, there must be something else and that must be the spirit.

It is understood that all the material objects of the world exist for the sake of Puruṣa who is the foundation of all material objects. Hence, Puruṣa must exist. Anima Sengupta states that the first four arguments seek to prove the existence of the soul on the ground that as the controller and enjoyer of the world of composite things, some intelligent being must be recognized to exist and that this intelligent being must be the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. This whole process, therefore, is not moving and developing aimlessly, there is the eternal principle of pure, eternal which through inactive, yet through reflection, co-ordinates, synthesis and gives meaning to our worldly experience. These arguments, therefore, may be regarded as teleological in the sense that they refer to the spirit as the central purpose of this world of change and mutation.

#### **v) Kaivalyārtham Pravr̥tteḥ**

The last argument for the existence of Puruṣa is ontological and scriptural. All scriptures prescribe the way of release for misery as kaivalya. Kaivalyam means liberation or emancipation from the bondage of three guṇas. When jīva feels that he is under the influence of the three guṇas and tries to liberate himself from three guṇas, the strive for release presupposes a being which is devoid of pleasure, pain and delusion. This is Puruṣa. Hence, there must be Puruṣa as the striving force of liberation. Anima Sengupta states that the last argument seeks to prove the existence of Puruṣa on the basis of the observed facts of the world. In this world, we find that the world of creation is marching towards freedom which seems to be its supreme goal. So, we are led to believe that there must be bound souls which are to be made free and through this process of world creation. In other words, the world is marching towards the freedom of these souls.

#### **Plurality of Puruṣa**

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, Puruṣa is not one, there is the multiplicity of Puruṣas. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in his Sāṃkhyakārikā states about the plurality of Self (Puruṣa). The plurality of Self follows from the distributive nature of the incidence of birth and death and of the endowment of the instruments of cognition, action etc.

Except the Advaita Vedānta, all other darśanas believe in the plurality of selves. Vācaspati Miśra supports that the birth of Puruṣa consists in its connection with a new set of body, sense organs, mind etc., formed of a composite particular nature. It does not mean modification, since it is essentially unchangeable. In the same way also death consists of the giving up the body and the rest. It cannot mean destruction as Puruṣa is unchangeable and eternal. The sense organs are thirteen, beginning with the great principle. The definite adjustment of their body etc., is connected with only one Puruṣa. If the Puruṣa were one and the same in all body, then on the birth of one all would be born and on the death of one, all would die.

Gauḍapāda remarks if there were one soul, then when one were born, all would be born, when one will die, all would die, if there is any defect in the vital instruments of one, such as deafness, blindness, dumbness mutilation, or lameness, then all would be blind, deaf, dumb but this is not seen and therefore multiplicity of soul is demonstrated.

Anima Sengupta states that we can not say that there is one spirit only and that this one spirit appeals as many due to the imposition of different upādhis on it. In the case of space, limited by a chair, the chair can be removed and the portion of space can be saved from limitation by such a removal of its upādhi. Even then there is the possibility of that this same portions of space may, again, be limited by the imposition of some other thing on it. So if one spirit is recognized, bondage and liberation, limitation and freedom will become absurd and meaningless.

The next argument in support of plurality of selves is related to the activity of the selves. Though activity is a function of the internal organs, yet it is here attributed to the spirit. Hence, it is argued that if the self were one, the activity of man would lead to the same activity in all other men.

Again, the Sāṃkhya argues that the self must be many because there is diversity due to the three attributes. Some persons have the abundance of sattva e.g., the gods. Others again abound in the rajas, e.g., human beings and some others again have tamas in abundance, e.g., animals. This diversity due to the distribution of the guṇas in various entities could not be explained if the spirit were one and the same in all.

So the Puruṣa is not one, but many. Hence, different arguments are advocated by Sāṃkhya to show the plurality of Puruṣa.

### **Conclusion**

Sāṃkhya admits Puruṣa is infinite, unchangeable, all pervasive and eternal. Puruṣa is different in each body, having their different organs and actions and separate birth and death. Puruṣa is the knower. It is the seer and an experiencer. It is pure and free. It is wisdom which is pure and absolute. The self is neither the mind, body nor the intellect. It is consciousness itself. It is formless, all pervading and eternal.

### **Atheism and Hinduism**

"Atheism is a necessary protest against the wickedness of the churches and the narrowness of the creeds. God uses it as stone to smash these soiled card-houses." In Hinduism the belief in the nonexistence of God is a perspective or a distortion which arises from ignorance and delusion, or the play of Maya. It is viewed not as a blasphemy against God but as a missed opportunity to worship him and attain liberation.

Of the numerous schools of thought that gained prominence during the epic period as a reaction against the excessive ritualism and empty dogmatism of vedic religion or perhaps the increasing rigidity of caste system, one school of thought attracts the attention of present day scholars not only for its radical approach to the problems of blind belief but also for its similarities with the modern day rationalism and materialism of the west. It was the lokayata school of thought, believed to have been founded by Charvaka, whose history is shrouded in great mystery and myth.

The world lokayata was used to refer to the person who believed in the reality of this world and the physical existence of man and of other beings on earth and nothing else. 'Loka' means the world and

'lokyata' means he who is centered around or relies upon this world only. The lokayatas believed in the existence of this world only, neither in heaven nor in hell, neither in vice nor virtue. They accepted only that reality which they could subjectively perceive and interact with, not in any imaginary world or some kind of ideal world. Practical and down to the earth, they believed in the existence of four elements only, namely the earth, water, fire, and air instead of the five elements of the vedic scriptures of which space or ether was the fifth element.

The Charvaka system of thought believed neither in God nor in the after life of man. Their doctrines are traced to an ancient scripture called the Charvaka Dharma probably written by an author of the name of Charvaka. Reference to the Charvakas or the Lokayatas was found in some ancient Hindu and Buddhist Scriptures such as the Prabhodha Chandrodya, an allegorical play in which a character sums up the beliefs of this school, and also the epics, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata.

One of the chief protagonists of this school existed during the time of the Buddha and his name was Ajita Kesakamabali. He recognized only four elements and declared that a combination of these four elements produced certain vitality called life, which is very much in tune with the modern theories of creation of life on earth. At the time of death these four elements would return to their respective sources, earth to earth, air to air and so on. There was no mystery of life beyond this. " When the body dies both fool and wise alike are cut off and perish. They do not survive after death."

According to the Charvakas there was no soul. Death was the end of all existence. The body itself was Atman and enjoyment of this life in the bodily form should be the chief purpose of life. Whatever was within the field of perception was true and it alone existed. Anything beyond the senses was false, a mere illusion or self induced delusion. Inference by itself could not be the basis of truth and therefore it was invalid. We should not depend upon the experience of others to know the truth. We should not base our belief upon the teachings of others as long as they were not confirmed by our own personal experience. Subjective experience was therefore the basis of all truth and of one's conduct in this world.

The Charvakas did not accept the Vedas, nor the vedic rites prescribed by the Vedas. They contended that one should not practice these religious rites, whose results no one could verify with certainty. They did not believe in karma or the concept of sacrifice. What was the use of sacrificing something today, in the hope of getting some future benefit whose arrival was never certain? Earthly enjoyment was the highest ideal and it should not be sacrificed in the hope of some better after life. Since matter was the only thing that was perceivable by the senses, matter alone was real. Intelligence was also a form of matter, like the body, because it was produced by the modification of the four elements and was destroyed the way the body was destroyed when these elements were dissolved. The physical self alone was real and the mind and the body were part of this physical self.

Two interpretations are given for the word Charvaka. According to one interpretation, the word 'char' means 'charming and alluring and the word 'vak' means speech. Probably the Charvakas were good orators and their words were instantly appealing to the audience as they appealed to the senses directly and required no blind faith to sustain themselves. According to another interpretation, the word 'charva' means grinding and chewing and the word 'Charvaka' means he who grinds both vice and virtue. The Charvakas are also known as Brihaspatayas because it is believed that Brihaspathi was the author of this doctrine. Another sect which was close to the lokayatas in their thinking was the sect of the kapalikas, who believed in the practice of sex and gory rituals to gain siddhis or spiritual powers. Probably the Charvaka school must have provided some background from which

the later schools of Tantricism emerged both in Hinduism and Buddhism as a way of compromise between materialism and spiritualism.

The disbelief and atheism of ancient India is summed up in the following lines from the Savradarshana Samgraha.

"There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world, Nor do the actions of the four castes, etc., produce any real effect. The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes, Were made by Nature as the livelihood or those destitute of knowledge and manliness."

The Charvaka school of thinking had many drawbacks. Its chief weakness was its excessive reliance upon subjective experience and upon sensory perceptions, as the basis of truth. These two are not perfect and reliable instruments of truth and they would not always guarantee complete wisdom. The Charvakas ignore the fundamental fact that our perceptions can be very misleading and that they are colored by our own prejudices, fears, anxieties, expectations, desires, thoughts and most important of all by our own ignorance. They also fail to explain the role of Nature, the rationale for good social conduct or the need for social harmony. The Charvakas provide very simplistic solutions to the complex problems of pain and suffering, and fall short of providing lasting solutions to the real problems of human life and society. In short they fail to explain such human needs and aspirations that are not purely physical or mental but spiritual, and the importance of such morals and social values in human life that distinguishes us from the world of the animals.

## **Yoga**

Yoga poses are great to strengthen and relax the body, however there's a lot more to Yoga than that. Derived from the Sanskrit word 'yuj' which means 'to unite or integrate', yoga is a 5,000-year-old Indian body of knowledge. Yoga is all about harmonizing the body with the mind and breath through the means of various breathing exercises, yoga poses (asanas) and meditation.

## **Concept of citta and chitta**

There is a lot of confusion among people, and even scholars as to what citta is, which is also spelled as chitta. Roughly speaking citta or chitta means consciousness.

The Yogasutras begins with the declaration that the purpose of yoga is cessation of the citta vrittis, or the modifications (vrittis) that arise in the citta. The scripture identifies five types of modifications which are responsible for the restless state of citta. Until these are subsided fully through the practice of the eightfold yoga and the cultivation of sattva through self-transformation, one cannot achieve stability, equanimity and self-absorption. Everything in life, including knowledge, ignorance, imagination, even sleep cause disturbances in our consciousness. We become disturbed for all the right reasons as well as wrong reasons.

Mental disturbance, whether it is caused by good things in life or bad things in life, is disturbance only, which will eventually harm us physically, mentally and spiritually. We cannot escape from life. Hence we cannot escape from these sources of modifications also. We cannot change this world. We cannot also run away from it. The best way to deal with the sources of our misery, therefore, is to change the way we respond to them and deal with them. This is possible only when we establish a center of stability within ourselves. Yoga helps us to find that center of stability or create it with austere effort. It helps us become a master of the world in us rather than a victim of the world.

in which we live.

Yoga is not a mumbo jumbo scheme to lure us into spiritual life and make we think about God or put ourselves completely under the hypnotic gaze of a strangely attired guru who is all out to rob us of our sanity. When yoga was introduced in the USA in the eighteenth century, a lot of people actually thought so about yoga with this mindset. Some even filed court cases, alleging that yoga caused people to lose their minds. It is true yoga makes us lose our mind, but in a positive way. It helps us lose our monkey mind that is restless and find peace and balance with a new awareness that is not of this world. Yoga makes us strong mentally and stand on our own feet with a stable mind as we navigate through the circus we call Samsara or the phenomenal world.

Citta is loosely translated as the mind. However, citta is not just mind alone. The mind goes by another name, manas. According to our beliefs, manas is not the creator of thoughts or the source of thoughts. It is rather a receptacle of thoughts and emotions. Thoughts arise from desires and desires arise because of the repeated activities of the senses, in which the ego (anava) or the self-sense becomes involved by forming attachments with the sense objects.

Citta is not confined to the mind alone. It is rather the whole mind and body awareness pervading the mind, the ego, the intelligence, the senses, the organs of action, the nervous system, and various types of breathes. Citta is a kind of energy field, made up of the three gunas, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas, having the ability to reflect the objects internally in the consciousness that are perceived through the senses. In other words, citta is a recording mechanism. It records everything that happens to us and creates in the process thoughts, desires, memories, sensations, feelings, emotions, attachments, aversion, habitual thought patterns, and latent impressions. All these keep the citta in a state of flux and do not permit it to stabilize. As long as citta is in turmoil, there is no peace and balance. Desires, attachment, attraction and aversion to the pairs of opposites are chiefly responsible for this turmoil, which results in various kinds of mental and physical afflictions, which we collectively group under the generic term suffering.

Ashtanga yoga says we can stabilize the citta by cultivating sattva or inner purity. When citta is pure with sattva, then it loses its grossness, becomes very subtle and allows the light of the Self to shine through in our internal organ, especially our intelligence, whereby we learn to discriminate between good and bad, cultivate detachment, dispassion, sameness and self-absorption. A truly refined person is one whose citta is pure like the sun, shining brilliantly with the effulgence of purity that is similar to that of the soul. When we become as pure as our soul, we become a divine person, God Himself. In that state, God speaks through us, lives in us and becomes one with us. Yoga is one well known and established vehicle which can bring God to us or take us to God. It is the bridge across the vast chasm that exists between our world and the world of the immortals.

Much of our effort to control our minds fails because we focus upon only one aspect of our awareness. If we want complete results, if we want to truly experience peace and inner stability, we have to concentrate upon our whole body and mind awareness. We have to devise a holistic system whereby we manage to transform ourselves completely, not in parts or superficially but fully and comprehensively. It is precisely for this reason, classical yoga recommends not one but eight methods of inner purification. The rules and restraints (yamas and niyamas) and the withdrawal of the senses help us to cultivate detachment, and purify our organs of action, organs of perception and speech. The breath control practices help us to purify and regulate breath (prana).

Concentration and meditation help us to stabilize our minds and the internal organs. In self-absorption we integrate all these efforts to reach a culminating point in the state of self-absorption. In this state the mind remains in deep sleep and only the state of "I am I am" remains. This goes by many names and it has different states too. Some call it nirvikalpa samadhi. Some call it dharma megha samadhi. It is interesting that a grave is also called a samadhi and we can understand why it is so. Many people find freedom from citta vrittis only upon death! Thus, practically everyone who dies goes into samadhi.

Citta is thus not just mind. It has a physical aspect and a subtle aspect. It is total mind and body awareness. The sum total of what we feel and experience in our waking, dreaming and sleeping states. It is our ethereal body, which carries within itself our latent impressions and our karmic fruit. Upon the death of an individual, a part of the citta becomes attached to the soul and goes to the other world. One achieves freedom from births and rebirths only when one's citta is so pure that it burns away all the latent impressions and arrests the formation of karma.

### **The Purpose of yoga and the nature of citta**

The purpose of yoga is to prevent the modifications or afflictions of the citta. These modifications arise because of the outgoing nature of the senses and our desire for sense objects. The citta which the Yoga speaks about is not the same as the mind we know in the modern science. Manas is perhaps a more appropriate word for it, although there are some serious fundamental differences between the two. For example the mind in Hinduism is a receptacle that does not create thoughts. It rather receives various thought forms from the universal consciousness according to its receptivity and transmits them back into it according to its intentions and inclination.

The citta, which yoga refers, is a complex internal mechanism, chiefly responsible for our perception, cognition, memory and intelligence. It is not a product of electric impulses or brain mechanism, but a luminous substance made up of fine particles of energy and consciousness. It is difficult to translate the word citta into English because of the complexity of its structure and functions. Each living being is permeated with the substance of citta not just in its head region but its entire body and also around it. The citta serves as the substratum or support for other agencies of a living being, namely intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), senses (indriyas), ego (aham) and the five elements (mahabhutas). Together they are often called the internal organ (antahkarana).

Although it is difficult to translate the word "citta" into English we may loosely translate it as dynamic consciousness formed by the association of the cit (pure consciousness) with shakti (pure energy). The citta constitutes the waters of life from which further creation comes forth. It should not be mistaken as an extension of the brain because it has the ability to travel long distances at unimaginable speeds and interact with the objects it perceives through the senses and replicates them exactly in itself. In other words the citta is not just a perceiving mechanism but an interactive mechanism in which it acts both as the perceiver and the replicator of the things perceived. All the three qualities or gunas, namely sattva, rajas and tamas are present in it. Sattva plays an important role by providing it the luminosity to perceive things clearly, while the other two keep it in different states of activity and inertia.

The citta has different states (bhumis) which arise in a being according to its level of evolution. It has the ability to expand or contract, depending upon the type of being and its state of evolution. It has a working component called karyacitta, which dies with the being and a causative component called karana citta which survives death and becomes a blueprint for the next life of the soul. The

citta is susceptible to five different types of modifications or whirls known as citta vrittis caused by different types of perception, namely correct perception, wrong perception, imagination, sleep and memory. The purpose of yoga is to control the whirls and stabilize the citta so that one is able to perceive things clearly and find one's own essence hidden in everything. This is accomplished through progressive stages of purification in which the quality of sattva in the consciousness is increased while rajas and tamas are proportionately reduced or suppressed.

### **The two way process of perception**

Modern science affirms that perception is an inward process. That is, outside objects make their impressions upon the mind through the senses. Various schools of Hinduism do not think so. They believe that perception is mostly an outward process. The senses are called agents of Indra (Indriyas) because they serve their master (Indra represented by the mind in the human body) as his workhorses or spies. They go out to gather information about the objects they grasp and feed it to the mind. While the senses are moving among the objects the citta also moves with them replicating the objects grasped by the senses internally in itself. This replication is responsible for the modifications (vrittis) of the citta resulting in both perception and cognition.

The citta functions like a multi dimensional copier and recorder with an ability to absorb itself in the object of its concentration and become that which it concentrates upon. Thus perception is not just a reflective process but a truly creative and bidirectional process in which the world is internalized in the citta and the citta is externalized in the world. The citta does not always reflect and recreate the objects of the world faithfully. It depends upon whether the perception has taken place correctly or incorrectly.

Patanjali describes the mirroring as the modifications of the citta (citta vrittis). He identifies five types of modifications arising from five types of perception, namely right perception, (pramana), wrong perception (viparyaya), imagination (vikalpa), unconscious perception (nidra) and perception influenced by memory (smriti). The citta is attached to the body, but it has the ability to extend itself freely wherever the senses can go. It actually keeps wandering all the time in the objective world following the senses and their activities. This outward movement of the citta and the senses give rise to suffering, restlessness, attachment and the like, which yoga aims to resolve through various means.

### **The problem of suffering and its solution**

Classical yoga holds that our suffering (klesa) arises from two sources: from our present actions and from the latent impressions (samskaras) that are stored in our consciousness. Suffering is present in every aspect of our existence because of the instability and impermanence that is weaved into it and the objects we interact with which in themselves are impermanent and destructible. Even the seemingly happy moments are laced with a shadow of suffering. Our lives vacillate between the extremities of suffering and happiness, despair and hope and many similar pairs of opposites with which we are familiar.

According to the Yogasutra, for a discerning yogi (vivekin) everything appears to be suffering, because of the evolving and transforming nature of the things of the world, the ever changing composition of the qualities of Nature (gunas) and the modifications arising in the citta due to various kinds of perception. Ordinary people with untrained minds, may not even notice the suffering underlying what we consider normal and daily routine, because a great deal of our suffering happens in the unconscious and subconscious layers of our consciousness. But a discerning yogi finds it

everywhere and knows its true significance.

## **Dukha**

Dukha is another word used in yoga to denote suffering. Dukha means bad (du) axle hole (kha). Etymologically dukha means any suffering that arises from the various apertures and weaknesses present in the body and the mind. Indian schools of philosophy recognize three forms of human suffering:

- suffering caused by oneself,
- suffering caused by others and
- suffering caused by gods.

Each person creates suffering for himself through his own egoism, ignorance, vices, weaknesses, desires, thinking and actions. This is suffering caused by oneself. Some times suffering is brought upon us by other people, such as our friends, colleagues, acquaintances, family members, strangers and government authorities and creatures like poisonous snakes, insects, dogs, tigers, lions and elephants. This is suffering caused by others. Finally, we also suffer from the actions of gods when they intervene in our lives in the form of fate, planetary influences, unforeseen obstructions, accidents, death and natural calamities. When in His unbound love God bestows favors upon evil characters like Ravana everyone suffers.

## **Desires as the root cause of our suffering**

Long ago our ancient thinkers identified desires as the root of our suffering. Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism are unanimous on this point, although they differ in their interpretation of its nature and cure. According to classical yoga, desires arise from the activity of the senses and the outgoing nature of citta, which result in passion (raga). Passion leads to the preponderance of rajas and rajas which lead to the five common problems of human existence, namely sexual desire (kama), anger (krodha), pride (mada), matsarya (envy) and greed (lobha). They in turn give rise to ignorance (avidya), delusion (moha) egoism (asmita) and bondage to the cycle of births and deaths.

Since the citta and the senses are primarily responsible for our suffering, a person can alleviate his suffering by withdrawing them from the objects and moving them in the direction of his inner self inwardly. The eightfold practice of yoga and the self-purification that arises from it in the form of increase in the quality of sattva results in equanimity, which is the foundation to achieve more stable states (bhumi) of citta and experience self-absorption (samadhi).

Establishing equanimity in the citta, however, is not an easy process. Distractions (citta vikshepas) arise in the consciousness in the form of suffering and mental disturbances, as a yogi strives to control his mind and body. Sometimes it leads to more acute problems like sickness, mental turmoil, negative thoughts, nightmares and the like, which require the intervention of his guru or a divinity. Except for a few blessed souls who have achieved progress on the path of yoga in their previous lives, many who practice yoga have to be perseverant, follow years of discipline and practice (abhyasa) intense methods of self-purification to change the habitual modes of their minds and bodies to become stabilized in themselves. For them Patanjali prescribes:

- study (svadhyaya),
- discrimination (viveka),
- devotion to self (Isvara),

- detachment (vairagya), self-purification and
- constant muttering (japa) of the sound Aum (pranava).

Even after all this effort their suffering may not cease, because the latent impressions (samskaras) present in their cittas have to work themselves out in their own time and space.

## **Patañjali's Theory of Pramāṇa**

Pramana, in the yoga sutra, refers to those mental modifications (vrttis) which are based on correct information or knowledge. In other words, when our thoughts correspond to reality, the mental modifications fall into the category of pramana. Let us first understand what we mean by right knowledge in the first place.

The theory of knowledge is called epistemology. In Indian Philosophy, when true knowledge of reality is revealed, it is "prama" (valid knowledge), and when the revelation of reality is false it is called 'aprama' (invalid knowledge). Right knowledge means perceiving an object as it is. The cognition of the object is the same as the reality of the object. We could also simply say that it is the knowledge of "that as that".

Different schools of Indian Philosophy have different opinions regarding what exactly should be accepted as valid knowledge, and what the different sources, or means, for valid knowledge are. Samkhya Philosophy and Patanjali's raja yoga which is largely based on Samkhya accepts three means to valid knowledge. Nyaya Philosophy mentions four, Buddhism two, and the Charvaka school only one means to valid knowledge. Let us look a bit closer at the three different means to valid knowledge as per Patanjali.

As per the Yoga Philosophy there are three ways of gaining correct knowledge:

- 1) Perception (pratyaksha)
- 2) Inference (anumana)
- 3) Testimony (agamah)

Each of these three ways are equally valid, and can provide us correct information. However, if more than one source to knowledge is accessible to us, they must be in agreement with each other.

Pratyaksha pramana refers to direct perception or a direct experience of something. A yoga practitioner should seek direct experiences of the truth through the method of yoga practice. In our everyday lives and during early stages of yoga practice we gain experiences of worldly affairs through the sense organs. As the yoga practice advances we can gain spiritual experiences during deep states of meditation when the senses are withdrawn from the external world.

Anumana pramana refers to inference. According to Samkhya and Yoga anumana is based on the modification of citta, brought about by the relation that exists in objects of homogeneous nature and does not exist in the objects of heterogeneous nature.

This sounds a bit complicated but what it really means is this: If we see smoke, we accept that somewhere there is a fire that has caused the smoke. There is a relation between the object of smoke and fire. We have not actually directly perceived the fire, but we have been able to come to the conclusion of a fire through a closely related event or object that we perceived (smoke).

The third means to correct knowledge is *agamah*, which can be called testimony in English. In simple words, it means "something that another trustworthy person has said". The various schools of Indian Philosophy which consider *agama* as a valid source of correct knowledge argue that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly. Hence we must rely on scriptures and gurus, to gain a sufficient amount of knowledge during our lifetime.



Note that direct perception (*pratyaksha pramana*) is a part of the other two means to valid knowledge as well. In the case of inference and the example I have given above, we have a direct experience of the smoke that we can see, even though we don't have a direct experience of the fire. The object that we infer something from, in this case the smoke, is called "*hetu*" in Indian Philosophy. Direct perception is also part of *agamah pramana* because it involves someone else having had a direct experience of something previously. Hence, *pratyaksha* - direct perception - is always involved either directly or indirectly in the process of gaining correct knowledge.

## The Five Vrittis

Generally we can consider the *vrittis* as types of thoughts but they are broader than that. There are five main fluctuations that affect our outer consciousness:

1. Correct knowledge (*pramana*)
2. Incorrect knowledge (*viparyaya*)
3. Imagination or fantasy (*vikalpa*)
4. Sleep (*nidra*)
5. Memory (*smrti*)

We all are subject to these five turnings in our minds, and they are not necessarily bad. Correct knowledge can help us do the right thing at the right time. But we can also do the right thing for the wrong reason; even incorrect knowledge can be helpful at times. The truth is, these fluctuations can be good or bad. Even right knowledge can be used in a harmful way. We have often seen things done with the best of intentions turn out drastically wrong. It is not that these *vrittis* are good or bad that makes them worthy of study, it is their effect upon the state of our mind that is of interest. These turnings of the mind obscure the view of our real self and need to be calmed. Like the surface of a mountain lake on a clear moonlit night (our mind) when still, reflects perfectly the full moon (reality). But with even a small ripple, caused by a *vritti*, the moon's appearance is distorted. The *vrittis* are the whirlings of the mind.

Yin yogis, like all practitioners of modern yoga, can gain from understanding the Yoga Sutra's model of *citta* and the *vrittis*. Knowing that these five *vrittis* are operating during our practice, and during our life, can help we increase our ability to calm them. Being aware that the mind moves in notable,

observational ways gives us a way to understand what is arising. Knowing that the vrittis exist gives us the opportunity to watch for them.

## **The role of God in Yoga**

Yoga is a practical philosophy. It teaches us to take responsibility for our actions and offers an entirely different understanding of God than do the religionists. Because the goal of yoga is to attain perfect freedom from the binding forces of our personalities as well as from the forces of nature, it places God in that realm of perfect consciousness which is not governed by anything other than itself. Yoga defines God as a special Purusha, a supreme soul, which was not, is not, and will never be affected by afflictions, vehicles of afflictions, karma, and the fruits of karma. All other souls at some time in the past, present, or future somehow fall under the sway of karma and the attendant afflictions of ignorance, egoism, attachment, aversion, and fear of death. According to yoga, this supreme soul is the only spiritual preceptor of all teachers who were ever born, for God is beyond origin and end. In addition to perfect freedom, unrestricted power of will, creativity, and eternity, in God also lies the “unsurpassed seed of omniscience.”

### **Yoga defines God as a special Purusha, a supreme soul, which was not, is not, and will never be affected by afflictions, vehicles of afflictions, karma, and the fruits of karma.**

This particular notion of God, described in the Yoga Sutra, highlights three intrinsic characteristics: perfect freedom from and transcendence of all karmas and afflictions; the role of primordial spiritual master, the eternal guide of all living beings; and omniscience, perfect knowledge of everything. These three characteristics clearly indicate where the interest of the yogis lies. Yogis strive to attain freedom from the bondage of karma and afflictions, such as ignorance, ego, attachment, and the host of miseries—anger, hatred, jealousy, greed, desire—that originate from these afflictions. The yogis realize that once we are caught in this apparently unending cycle of confusion, attachment, desire, and so on, our vision becomes clouded and it is hard to disentangle ourselves. Only one who was never entangled in the first place can help us free ourselves. Similarly, only one who is already free can help guide us in attaining freedom from the long chain of karma and the fruits of karma. According to yogis, the Supreme Purusha is very special; God is not bound like ordinary souls. Ordinary souls are those that experience a sense of incompleteness, lack of freedom, and lack of perfect knowledge, and thus have an inherent urge to be absorbed in God.

### **Then does yoga teach us to be totally dependent on God? If so, how can we be responsible for our actions?**

Yoga does not teach us to lean on God or to use God as an escape. Rather, it teaches us to make the best use of all the resources we have received as a gift from above to unfold our human potential to its fullest. It diligently introduces the idea of the teacher within because, according to the yogis, God alone is the true primordial master. We cannot expect this primordial master within to take care of our mundane needs, but in the form of inner inspiration, inner guidance, motivation, enthusiasm, courage, and determination, God—the inner teacher—helps us think, speak, and act in a manner which enables us to attain freedom from our karmic bonds.

In no way does yoga make us dependent on God. On the contrary, a yogi would say that God helps us gain freedom from the deluding forces of the world. Once a person knows the liberating force of the omniscient God, who dwells eternally within each of us, this realization naturally manifests in the form of love and faith. This, in turn, makes it possible to surrender ourselves to God. This natural unfolding of surrender is not an act of helplessness but one of clear understanding between us and the omniscient Divine Being, who constantly guides us along the path. We do not need to make

an effort to surrender ourselves to God; rather, the spontaneous wave of gratitude toward that inner guide creates a mental climate of self-surrender. We then need to continue working with ourselves while remaining aware of the fact that anything we do is due to the guidance of the true teacher—God. In this way, we are able to take full responsibility for our present actions without feeding our egos by telling ourselves, “I’m wise and capable of doing what I’m supposed to do without being dependent on anyone else.” We also take full responsibility for our previous karmic deeds, doing our best to undergo karmic purification. Upon realizing that even with intense effort we can hardly even scratch the surface of our previous karmas, without any conflict or hesitation we automatically surrender ourselves to God and attain freedom.

**I don’t have any sense of receiving inner inspiration or guidance from within, although this is where the process of surrender we describe seems to start.** That’s correct—it begins with inner inspiration. We receive inner inspiration in its truest sense only after we have gained access to the inner realm, where the Divine Being dwells in Her full glory. Spiritual practice is the way to gain access to that realm. This requires effort. Passively waiting for the Divine Grace to illuminate our inner core is futile. Grace is already there. We have to work hard to remove the factors that are blocking it. Through yogic exercises, pranayama, meditation, contemplation, prayer, and selfless service we attenuate the veil that blocks the flow of inner inspiration and guidance. The thinner the veil, the easier it is to perceive this inner inspiration. With that recognition, the process of surrender naturally unfolds.

**Grace is already there. We have to work hard to remove the factors that are blocking it.**

**We said that yogis conceptualize God the way they do because of their concern with attaining freedom from the bondage of karma and the afflictions of ignorance, ego, etc. that lead to misery. Does this concept of God have anything to do with truth or the reality of an actual God?**

Because of the touchy nature of the subject, yogis and yoga texts generally avoid discussing God. Patanjali’s Yoga Sutra, the main text of yoga, brings up this topic within the context of working with the mind and its modifications. Yogis are fully aware that Truth is God and that God is infinite and indescribable. Therefore, any description of God is bound to be incomplete. Moreover, each of the followers of the many religions and sects on the face of the Earth have their preferred notions of God. Any description that conflicts with those notions will offend and anger.

According to the experience of the yogis, if our hearts are purified and our minds are one-pointed we’ll gain an intuitive understanding of God, which is infinitely clearer and more encompassing than our intellectual understanding. This is the reason they place such emphasis on the techniques that lead to purification and one-pointedness. That is also why when Patanjali discusses God, he does so within the narrow frame of how God can help us attain freedom from those elements which disturb our minds and pollute our hearts. Out of the countless powers and characteristics that are intrinsic to God Patanjali mentions only omniscience, eternal freedom from all karmas, and the fact that God is the primordial spiritual teacher. According to yogis, God exists as the Absolute Truth and it is due to this existence that everything else can exist. But the totality of God consciousness cannot be captured in words.

The early Buddhist thinkers emphasised the unitary nature of the mind. The Sarvastivadins in order to explain the unity of the mind described the mind as a ground or base which they called **Cittabhumi**. They rejected the realm of unconsciousness, *alaya-vijnana*, postulated by the Yogacarins of Mahayana Buddhism who believed that from the realm of unconsciousness arose

the conscious mind and the objects. But the Sarvastivadins recognised five types of Cittabhumi from which psychological phenomenon arose.

Citta i.e. the mind, that alongside Manas, Buddhi and Ahamkara is an internal organ, whose function is recollection, constituted by three Gunas viz Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, reflects the self in accordance with any one of its modified states, vritti, which are Pramāṇa with its three kinds of cognition – perception, inference and verbal testimony, Vikalpa which is mere verbal idea caused by meaningless words, Viparyaya which is knowledge of things as they are not, Nidra or dreamless sleep and Smṛti or memory. These reflections result in the self being afflicted by Klesas – Avidya (wrong or false knowledge), Asmita (false notion or perception), Raga (attachment), Dveṣa (aversion), and Abhinivesha (fear of death). Thus, the mind may remain in five different levels which mental levels or functions or stages, five in number, are known as Cittabhumi. These five stages of the mind, as defined by Vyasa, are:-

- Kṣipta or distracted. The distracted mind being overpowered by Rajas is extremely unsteady unable to concentrate or decide, and is the source of pleasure or pain.
- Mudha or infatuated. The infatuated mind being overpowered by Tamas succumbs to commit unrighteous acts influenced by violent emotions.
- Vikṣipta or occasionally steady. The occasionally steady mind, unsteady for most part, influenced by Sattva is able to withdraw itself from painful objects and become fixed on pleasurable objects.
- Ekagra or one-pointed. The one-pointed mind influenced by pure Sattva is able to withdraw from all objects i.e. totally introverted, to remain focussed on one object.
- Niruddha or restrained. The restrained mind also influenced by pure Sattva arrests all mental functions i.e. there is complete suspension of all mental modes and sub-conscious dispositions.

The first three afore-mentioned stages of mind are unfit for concentration for they are attended by mental modes. Yoga is not possible in these conditions. Ordinary people live on the level of Kṣipta or Mudha.

The last two mentioned stages are conducive to yoga and for Samadhi. Ekagra stage is also called Sampramata yoga in which the mind assumes the form of the object itself. Niruddha stage is known as Samprajñata yoga or Samadhi in which nothing is known or thought of by the mind. In the Yoga system Buddhi (intellect), Ahamkara (ego) and Indriyas (senses) are often called Citta.

## **Purva Mimamsa**

The first major orthodox philosophical system to develop was Purva Mimamsa. The other one to follow was the Uttar Mimamsa. The orthodox systems accept the authority of the Vedas.

The Sanskrit word 'mimamsa' means a 'revered thought'. The word is originated from the root 'man' which refers to 'thinking' or 'investigating'. The word 'mimamsa' suggests "probing and acquiring knowledge" or "critical review and investigation of the Vedas".

Each of the Vedas is considered to be composed of four parts: The Samhitas, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. The first two parts are generally focused on the rituals and they form the Karma-kanda portion of the Vedas. The later two parts form the Jñāna-kanda (concerned with knowledge) portion of the Vedas.

Purva-Mimamsa is based on the earlier (Purva = earlier) parts of the Vedas. Uttar-Mimamsa is based on the later (Uttar = later) parts of the Vedas.

Purva-Mimamsa is also known as Karma Mimamsa since it deals with the Karmic actions of rituals and sacrifices. Uttar-Mimamsa is also known as Brahman Mimamsa since it is concerned with the knowledge of Reality. In popular terms, Purva-Mimamsa is known simply as Mimamsa and Uttar-Mimamsa as Vedanta.

Jaimini is credited as the chief proponent of the Mimamsa system. His glorious work is Mimamsa-Sutra written around the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century A.D. Mimamsa-Sutra is the largest of all the philosophical Sutras. Divided into 12 chapters, it is a collection of nearly 2500 aphorisms which are extremely difficult to comprehend.

Earlier scholars wrote commentaries on Mimamsa-Sutra. Unfortunately they are lost with the passage of time. The earliest available commentary is Sabarasvamin's Sabara-bhasya, which is still the authoritative basis of all subsequent works on Mimamsa. Renowned scholars Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara independently wrote their commentaries on Sabara-bhasya. Prabhakara was a student of Kumarila Bhatta. However, they differed, to some degree, on the interpretation of Sabara-bhasya and wrote separate commentaries. (Mandan Mishra, the erudite scholar, was a follower of Kumarila Bhatta. He also wrote a commentary, but at a later stage he changed his thinking and became a disciple of Shamkaracharya.)

This system rightly accepts the Vedas as the eternal source of 'revealed truth.' Thus though it differs from the earlier four philosophical systems (Vaisheshika, Nyaya, Samkhya, Yoga which neither accept nor reject the authority of the Vedas), a great chunk of Mimamsa philosophy is derived from the Vaisheshika-Nyaya duo.

Mimamsa system attaches a lot of importance to the Verbal testimony which is essentially the Vedic testimony. Jaimini accepts the 'Word' or the 'Shabda' as the only means of knowledge. The 'word' or the 'Shabda' is necessarily the Vedic word, according to Jaimini. This system strongly contends that the Vedas are not authored by an individual. Since they are 'self-revealed' or 'apaurusheya', they manifest their own validity.

The system is a pluralistic realist. It endorses the reality of the world as well as that of the individual souls. The soul is accepted as an eternal and infinite substance. Consciousness is an accidental attribute of the soul. The soul is distinct from the body, the senses and the mind. Though Kumarila Bhatta and Prabhakara differ on issues like the self, the soul and its attribute. The earlier mimamsakas do not give much importance to the deities. Hence they do not endorse God as the creator of the universe. But later mimamsakas show a bent towards theism.

This system has a profound faith in the Vedas. The system supports the law of karma. It believes in the Unseen Power or 'apurva'. Apart from accepting the heaven and the hell, the system supports the theory of liberation.

## **The Vedanta**

The Vedanta essentially refers to the philosophy pronounced in the Upanishads, the final parts of the Vedas. In a broad sense, the Vedanta covers the fundamental philosophy enunciated by the Prasthantrayi – the Upanishads, the Brahma-Sutra and the Bhagavad Gita.

The Brahma-Sutra (Vedanta-Sutra) and the Bhagavad Gita are based on the philosophy of the Upanishads. The Vedanta offers the sublime knowledge in its most exalted form. The knowledge may be relative or absolute. Relative knowledge pertains to the senses and the intellect. It is concerned with the physical world and worldly objects. But the Vedanta transcends beyond the realms of relative knowledge. It leads a seeker to transcendental knowledge and finally to absolute knowledge.

The Brahma-Sutra is also referred to as Vedanta-Sutra or Uttar-Mimamsa-Sutra. The Brahma-Sutra has 555 sutras. Most of them are aphoristic. Being cryptic, they are almost unintelligible at first sight and need elaborate explanation by an expert. Hence, a number of commentaries were written to interpret them.

Shamkaracharya, Ramanujacharya and Madhavacharya wrote commentaries on the Brahma-Sutra. This led to the rise of three schools of the Vedanta as mentioned earlier.

They were: **Shamkaracharya's Advaita Vedanta, Ramanujacharya's Vishishtadvaita Vedanta and Madhavacharya's Dvaita Vedanta.**

Though the three schools differ on several counts, the underlying basic concepts of the Vedanta are similar. We shall study only the basic Vedanta concepts here.

All the three schools of the Vedanta present three categories of 'realities'. The first category is the Jagat or the Universe.

The second category is the Jiva (individual) or the atma (Atman or the soul) that lives in the jagat or the world.

The third category is the Brahman, the substratum behind the Jagat and all the Jivas. The Brahman is the Supreme Being and governs the destiny of the Jagat and the Jivas. The Vedanta philosophy is focused on the Jagat (the universe), the Jiva (individual soul) and the Brahman (the Supreme Being). Brahman is the repository of all knowledge and power. Jivas, out of ignorance, gets trapped in the Jagat. Attached to the physical world and driven by passions and desires, they are tempted to act with selfish, mundane motives. They remain chained to ceaseless actions (karma). As a result, they subject themselves to countless births in various forms. Their transmigration from this birth (life) to the next depends on the karma (the quality of action). Moksha or mukti (liberation) is the goal of life. This philosophy, in general, is accepted by all the three schools.

These are the basic concepts common to all three schools of the Vedanta. Now let us see how they differ.

Dvaita means dualism. This system believes that the Brahman and the Jiva are two different entities. This system believes that the God, the soul and the Universe are three separate realities. God governs the world. The soul in its ignorance remains attached to the physical world. By developing faith and devotion in God, he can seek God's mercy and then the soul may migrate to the Heaven above. Such a jiva may attain Mukti. Thus he may liberate himself from the cycle of life and death and live with God forever in the Heaven.

Vishishtadvaita literally means “qualified non-dualism”. Ramanujacharya stresses that God alone exists. He says that Brahman is God. He is not formless. The Cosmos and the Jivas form his body. When the Jiva (soul) realizes that he is a part of Paramatman (God), the soul is liberated. With self-realization and liberation the soul enjoys infinite consciousness and eternal bliss of God. Advaita literally means non-dualism. This system contends that the Brahman and the atman (individual soul) are not different entities. Brahman is the Ultimate, Supreme Reality. Brahman is beyond names and forms. Brahman can not be described in words. Brahman is Sat-Chit-Ananda. Brahman and atman are not different realities. They are identical. They are the eternal, all-pervading realities underlying all existence.

## The Basic Concepts of Advaita Vedanta

The Advaita Vedanta focuses on the following basic concepts: Brahman, atman, vidya (knowledge), avidya(ignorance), maya, karma and moksha.

1. Brahman is the Ultimate, Supreme Reality. Brahman is eternal. Brahman is beyond words. It is beyond names and forms. Brahman can not be perceived nor could it be described by words. It is beyond senses and intellect. It is indefinable. However, if at all it has to be described; Brahman can be considered as Pure Consciousness.

In Vedanta philosophy, the svaroop of Brahman is referred to as Sachchidananda. Brahman is Sachchidananda i.e. **Sat-Chitta-Ananda**(Pure Existence-Pure Consciousness-Pure Bliss). Brahman is eternal, immutable, inexpressible and unthinkable pure-existence, but it is not the cause or the creator of the universe.

2. Atman is the inmost Self or Spirit of man but different from the ‘empirical ego’. Atman is the fundamental, ultimate, eternal, immutable pure consciousness. Thus, it appears that Brahman is the ultimate reality behind all world-objects and Atman is pure spirit in all beings. Truly speaking, both Brahman and Atman are not different realities. They are identical. For practical purposes, they are referred to separately, which they are not. They are the eternal, all-pervading realities underlying all existence. They are two different ‘labels’ for one and the same reality behind all the objects, all matter, all beings of the universe.
3. Maya is the unique power (shakti) of Brahman. Maya is trigunatmika; it has three gunas or attributes. But Shuddha Brahman is nirguna and is free from attributes. Shuddha Nirguna Brahman alone is the Supreme Reality. When Nirguna Brahman comes to acquiesce Maya and acknowledges the gunas of maya, it is known as Saguna Brahman. Saguna Brahman is God, the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. Saguna Brahman is Ishvara or a ‘personal god.’ Man worships gods in different forms and names.
4. Brahman manifests itself in the world with the help of Maya. The world and the world objects come into existence due to the power of maya. Maya and its creation is termed illusory. It does not mean that the world is not real. Unreality and illusion are different. An illusion may not be an unreality for an illusion is grounded in reality. Reality is that which exists on its own. Maya is dependent on Brahman. Maya has created the world of appearances. So the world is illusion. But this does not mean at all that the world is non-existent. The Advaita Vedanta, with the help of the famous “rope–snake” illustration, maintains that ‘it is neither ultimately real, nor wholly unreal, illusory and non-existent.’

5. Avidya (ignorance) has its seat in the human intellect. Avidya means not only absence of knowledge, but also erroneous knowledge. A man trapped in Avidya does not know what is real and thinks that the appearances are real. An individual identifies himself with empirical self. He equates his existence with the physical body. Under the influence of Maya and Avidya, he dissociates himself from the Ultimate Reality. When the man acquires knowledge, the duality of the self and Brahman disappears. He realizes that the self is really one with Brahman. This realization of the self puts an end to the ignorance (avidya).
6. Moksha is freedom from bondage of ignorance. Man suffers in the grip of incessant desires and ignorance. Upon realization of the self, one becomes free from the shackles of desires, aspirations, passions, karma and avidya. This is Moksha (kaivalya) or liberation. Moksha is to be attained here and now during this life-span only.
7. Knowledge and truth are of two kinds: the lower one and the higher one. The lower, conventional knowledge and truth is referred to as vyavavahrika satya. It is a product of the senses and the intellect. The higher one is referred to as paramarthika satya. It is absolute. It is beyond words, thoughts, perception or conception. It is in no way, related to the senses and the intellect. It is non-perceptual and non-conceptual. It is a product of sublime intuition and "divine vision". The higher knowledge and truth brings about radical transformation in an individual so it is soteriological.
8. Advaita Vedanta recognizes the six pramanas (sources and criteria of valid knowledge) on the basis of the Mimamsa school of Kumarila Bhatta. They are as follows:
  - a. Perception (pratyaksha)
  - b. Inference (anumana)
  - c. Testimony (shabda)
  - d. Comparison (upamana)
  - e. Postulation (arthapatti)
  - f. Non-cognition (anupalabdhi)

## **Pramanyavada**

Pramanyavada, Pramana means the means of accumulating or achieving a valid knowledge and valid knowledge is known as Prama. Now, Pramanyavada means a theory of validity; that means, whenever we cognize an object, we cognize because of some other factors responsible. Factors means, intrinsic factor as well as the extrinsic factors; extrinsic factors means, there is a light minimum distance etcetera and the object is not hiding, it is presented before us and intrinsic means, all our memory should function well, we are not caught with jaundice disease, we are in a healthy climate condition, we are healthy and also we behave like an ordinary human being, we are equally fit to cognize an object. Therefore, they are saying that whenever there is cognition, it deals with both internal condition as well as the external condition.

What Naiyaikas intrinsic is means that, the effect exist in its material cause prior to its production and what extrinsic means, the effect after production is different from the cause. There are two types of concept here, further they said that, the knowledge is valid or invalid sometimes it depends on the conditional situation, sometimes it depends on the external condition, sometimes it depend on the internal conditions, because there are many situations. Since a person is affected with the jaundice disease, everything appears to him or she is yellow; however, the nature of that object is not

yellow, the attribute yellowness may not be finding to that object and henceforth, the knowledge he or she has to that particular object and with a particular name cannot be considered as a valid knowledge. In the same way, there are many kinds of external conditions, matters when we cognize an object. If it is a dark room, a human being though he is a normal human being cannot see anything in the dark.

So, whatever knowledge he has in that room on a particular object, that may not be a valid knowledge, because we need a sufficient light to cognize that object and also we need a minimum distance to cognize that object. If an object is placed in a long distance, we cannot claim that object with a particular name because we need a particular distance to cognize an object and we cognize all its features, which we also need to be a confirmative to that object. Therefore, they said that the validity and invalidity depends on the internal and external conditions also. There are two types of Pramanyavada, one is Svatah Pramanyavada and another is Paratah Pramanyavada. What is Svatah Pramanyavada means, the knowledge will be valid or invalid depends on say internal condition or intrinsic factors.

### **What is Paratah Pramanyavada?**

Paratah Pramanyavada means the knowledge which is a valid or invalid depends on the external conditions. If the external conditions are good then, the knowledge will be valid, though some other parameters have to be there. The subject, object, the instrument and the means of cognizing that object, apart from all these, we have say, internal and external conditions required.

So, there are two types of Pramanyavada that we can see, one is Svatah Pramanyavada another is paratah Pramanyavada and different schools have the different opinion on this two Pramanyavada. There are many times people claim that the knowledge will be invalid, it may be depends upon again intrinsic factor as well as extrinsic factor. The invalid knowledge is known as apramanya, the invalid knowledge is known as apramanyavada, whereas valid knowledge is called Pramanyavada, because valid knowledge Prama and the means through which we get the valid knowledge is Pramana.

Therefore, they are saying that any knowledge we have called Pramanyavada, the particular means through particular Pramana, we gain a knowledge known as Prama. So, here we find, there are four kinds of knowledge, Naiyaikas are talking about. One is Svatah Pramanyavada, another is Svatah apramanyavada, the third one is paratah Pramanyavada and the fourth one is paratah apramanyavada.

### **What is Svatah Pramanyavada means?**

The validity of the knowledge is depends on internal conditions or intrinsic condition. Svatah apramanyavada means the invalidity of knowledge depends on the internal conditions or intrinsic nature. The third one paratah Pramanyavada; that means, a knowledge is valid depends on the external condition and the fourth one is paratah apramanyavada, what it means? The knowledge is invalid depends on the external condition. Now, we will see what are the schools, what are the systems prescribed how knowledge can be valid and how knowledge can be decided, whether based on internal or external condition, whether the valid knowledge can be an intrinsic or extrinsic and what are the system's opinions.

Here, I will just read it for our help. This theory, theory means Pramanyavada, this theory expresses about when the knowledge will be true and when it will be false. Svatah Pramanyavada it is constituted and determined by intrinsic condition it is self-evident; it is intrinsic because the effect

is found in the cause. Paratah apramanyavada on the other hand, it is constituted and ascertained by extrinsic conditions, it is extrinsic because the effects is different from cause, the effect is anew phenomenon which is not found in the cause.

So, now we can know, what is intrinsic and extrinsic according to Nyaya philosophy and how they mean, when they speaks about Pramanyavada. Basically, their aim is to identify the knowledge we have, whether the knowledge is a valid or invalid. If at all valid, under which condition it is valid, if it is invalid, why it is invalid and under which condition it is invalid. Now, let us discuss schoolsopinion, different system have their given their own opinion to consider whether knowledge will be valid or invalid depends on whether intrinsic or extrinsic factors.

Now, schools opinion if you can see that, the Nyaya as a realist philosopher, they said that paratah Pramanyavada. What they mean is that, the knowledge is valid or invalid depends on the extrinsic factor, validity and invalidity of knowledge are extrinsic. Contracting to this view, samkhya philosophy or samkhya system claim that, Svatah Pramanyavada; that means, the validity and invalidity of knowledge are intrinsic here Svatah is stands for intrinsic and Pramanyavada is validity or invalidity knowledge.

Buddhism, buddhism has given two view on Pramanyavada, first they say that, Svatah apramanyavada. That means, a knowledge will be invalid which it dependson its intrinsic nature, a knowledge is to be invalid which depends on the intrinsic nature and paratah Pramanyavada means a knowledge is to be valid depends on its extrinsic factors or extrinsic in nature.

Therefore, Buddhism has a two opinion the knowledge will be invalid depends on intrinsic factors and the knowledge will be valid it depends on external factors. The fourth schools you know vedantins as well as mimansikas, combinedly they argued that Svatah Pramanyavada and paratah apramanyavada; that means, knowledge will be valid, when it is supported by the internal conditions or intrinsic conditions and knowledge will be invalid, when it is supported by the extrinsic condition.

## **The Meaning and Concept of Sruthi in Hinduism**

Sruthi or Sruti means that which is or was heard. Sru means to hear. Iti meanthus. Sruti means thus heard. In a general sense, sruti means anything that you hear from others, including a rumor or news. Srutam is the object of hearing. Srotha means the audience, or those who hear a speech. In a religious or spiritual sense, sruti means the knowledge which was heard by revelation. It includes the knowledge heard from God, a divine being, a spiritual teacher or an enlightened person.

The Vedas are considered sruthi because they were believed to have been originally heard from Brahma by the Vedic seers who then transmitted it to their successors and pioneered a tradition that continued for several generations. Until two hundred years ago, the Vedas were transmitted only orally by teachers to a student. Thus, sruthi means that which is heard from God or from a guru. Since the knowledge of the Vedas is gained by hearing, they are also known as anusravaor that which has been heard.

Although this is the general meaning and there are several texts which trace their origin to Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva or other divinities, for reasons not clear to us only the Vedas are considered sruthi and the rest are considered smriti or smriti, meaning the memorial texts. Examples of Smriti texts are the Dharmashastras, the Sutra literature, the Vedangas, several bhashyas, gitas, gathas, itihisas, tantras and Puranas. They may contain divine teachings, as in case of the Bhagavadgita. However,


they are not considered sruthi.

The Vedas are four namely the Rigveda, the Samaveda, the Yajurveda and the Atharvaveda. They contain thousands of hymns which are mostly invocations to various gods. Each Veda is further divided into Samhita, Brahmana, Aranyaka and Upanishad. Knowledge of the first two is useful to perform Vedic rituals and sacrifices while that of the last two is useful in spiritual and contemplative practices.

Since the knowledge of the Vedas is considered divine in origin, they are used as verbal testimony (sabda pramana) to establish truths that cannot be easily ascertained with the help of the senses, the mind or human intelligence. For example, we do not know the nature of Brahman, who is beyond the mind and the senses, invisible and beyond our grasp. How can we know him who is indescribably, indefinable, unknown, invisible and infinite? He may be known in transcendental states of self-absorption. However, how can we be sure that what we have experienced is indeed the state of Brahman or the Self? It is by studying the Vedas, especially the Upanishads, and comparing our experience to the knowledge of Brahman which they declare to be true. The same knowledge can be used to strengthen our faith or beliefs about God and existence, which cannot be validated by other means.

## Classification of śruti-vākyas

### Classification of Major Scriptures



Introduction In the Mimamsa system of interpretation, the raw material to which its rules applied, consisted mainly of Vedic texts. But once the system was evolved it was utilised for the interpretation of material contained in works relating to other branches of learning, including law. 1 It is the method

oMimansa, rather than the matter to which it was applied, that seems to have invested it with a certain attraction. Its method is sound and its subject matter is of positive nature and, as has been said, in most cases, its reasoning is convincing.

## **Vedic texts as classified by Jaimini**

Jaimini, the founder of Purva Mimansa, has classified the texts of the Vedas\* into

- (1) Vidhi,
- (2) Nishedha,
- (3) Arthavada,
- (4) Namadheya, and
- (5) Mantra.

- A Vidhi is an obligatory text. It is positive in character.
- A Nishedha (also called Pratishedha) is an obligatory text, but it is negative in character.
- An Arthavada is a non-obligatory text, connected with a particular Vidhi. It is not a command or prohibition in itself, but is, rather, explanatory of the reason for another (substantive) command or prohibition, or illustrates it or explains its benefit.
- A Namadheya is in the nature of a general definition and is not connected with any particular command or prohibition.
- A Mantra is a peculiar class of texts, occurring only in the Vedas and need not be considered for the present purpose.

While the first two classes of texts mentioned above are substantive in nature (positive or negative), the next two are not substantive. In this manner, the first two can be distinguished from the third and the fourth. The third (Arthavada) is connected with some particular Vidhi, thus distinct from the fourth (Namadheya), which is in the nature of a general definition having a bearing upon the general scope of the subject.

An Arthavada is not allowed to control the meaning or force of a Vidhi, but can facilitate the understanding of a Vidhi and is thus its concomitant." work is the study of duty (Dharma). And he explains that duty is a purpose which is inculcated by the command. The "command" spoken of, is intended to refer to the passage of the scripture in which it is mentioned.<sup>1</sup> The "duty" spoken of here, necessarily leads us to the question of sanctions. To stress the element of sanction (which is not explicit, though it is implicit in a command), writers on Mimansa have adopted a definition of Vidhi in these terms<sup>2</sup> "Aprapta parpako Vidhi". Translated into English, it means, "A Vidhi is that which puts one in a position which ordinarily one is not apt to get into". What is meant is, that the command indicates the necessity of a compelling power. The command - "Maintain your forsaken wife", - for example - urges the doing of something which the man would not otherwise do.

### **Nishedha Conversely,**

Nishedha is explained<sup>3</sup> as a prohibition against ragaprapti- doing something by the impulse of some particular passion is prohibited. The classical illustration of a Nishedha in Mimansa literature is - "Na Kalanjam Bhakshayet" (Do not eat Kalanja, i.e. fermented food).

### **Other examples are –**

- (a) "Na hinsyeta" (Do not injure another).
- (b) "Nanritam Vadeta" (Do not utter untruth).

All these are regarded as absolute prohibitions.

### **The relevance of Vidhi**

The reason why scholars of Mimamsa concentrated on Vidhi (injunction) may be explained at this stage. The main object of the persons engaged in this discipline was to interpret the Vedic texts. For this purpose, it became necessary to distinguish between what was mandatory and what was not. The object was to secure the correct performance of sacrificial ceremonies.<sup>6</sup> Since the content of these ceremonies is fixed by the injunctions (Vidhi) of the Veda, the Mimamsa propounds rules which enable the scholar to recognise a true injunction and to determine its sense and significance. It has been pointed out that one reason why these rules were extended to the interpretation of legal doctrines was that the regulation of disputes was presented by the authors of the Dharmashastra as if it were a sacrificial act and hence the rules thereof must be scrupulously observed under pain of sin.

### **Arthavada**

For the purpose mentioned in the preceding discussion, it became also necessary to distinguish between a Vidhi and Arthavada. The former is a positive injunction, while the latter is only an explanation for it. An Arthavada does not express the will of the law maker, unlike the Vidhi. It is only an observation in the nature of a commentary, "just as if the law maker descended from his position as such, and condescended to point out the merit of the law laid down, from the point of view of the ordinary run of people".

If a thing is a requisite part and parcel of a Vidhi - what is called the *angangi* relation with the Vidhi - then it is itself of an authoritative character. But an Arthavada, according to the conservative theory, does not have an authoritative character, but only explains something else which has such a character. No doubt, according to the view of some writers, some Vidhis themselves create a liking for the command and such injunctive texts might not have any Arthavada texts relating to them. But, by and large, when a Vidhi has an Arthavada text related to it, it is assumed that the Vidhi-vakya does the work of only enjoining the act, while the task of creating a liking for the act is performed by the Arthavada. "The Vidhi has an expectancy for the Arthavada. The Vidhi and the Arthavada together form one sentence, so that the Vidhi has an expectancy for the Arthavada".

### **Namadheya**

In the Mimamsa learning, one also finds the expression *Namadheya*. This is distinct from the injunction. It is regarded as an independent clause. It is not in the nature of a gloss on a Vidhi. "It is a statement made by the law maker in his character as such, and is in this sense authoritative; but it simply states what is what. Such a statement does not directly bear upon any particular Vidhi. By defining things, it serves to elucidate the main purpose of the Vedic law".

### **Classification of Vidhi**

For practical purposes, it became necessary to think of various classifications of Vidhis. Some of the modern studies of ancient Hindu Law, in fact, offer a detailed discussion of such classifications. This became necessary because the primary object of the Mimamsa system was the study of the injunction and the system had to determine and examine the different forms under which the injunction could present itself in the Vedic texts; and, accordingly, it undertook to define their respective scopes of application.

Thus, "beside the primary injunction pure and simple (utpatti-vidhi), it distinguished also the injunction of application (viniyoga-vidhi) which fixes the relation between the principal rite and a subsidiary action; the injunction of employment (prayoga-vidhi) which fixes the order in which the different parts of the rite should be performed; the injunction of qualification (adhikara-vidhi) which fixes the conditions required if the doer of the action is to obtain the fruits of the ritual he has put into effect; the restrictive injunction (niyama-vidhi) which submits the doing of the act to determined conditions, excluding others which are equally possible; and the injunction of exclusive specification (parisankhya-vidhi) which operates as a prohibition, and so forth.

"These subtle distinctions furnish the shastric interpreter with readyformed means to analyse and classify the precepts of the smriti and to define their nature and significance rigorously."

### **Practical application of the distinctions**

The distinction between an obligatory text and mere gloss had practical consequences in many cases. If a text is a Vidhi, then it is mandatory. But if it is an Arthavada, then it is not. The controversy about adoption of an only son provides an example.

Vasistha (XV.3) prescribed that one should neither receive nor give in adoption an only son. "For (he should stay) to continue the line of his ancestors". The question may arise whether the consideration of the continuance of the line of ancestors is to be taken as a mere gloss or whether it is to be read as part of the main prohibition against the adoption of an only son. If it is read with the main prohibition, then the adoption of an only son, though it may be a sin on the part of the father, would not be invalid. This, in fact, was the view taken in Anglo-Hindu law after some debate. However, some of the writers on Hindu law treated the prohibition in question as an absolute one. Thus, Vijnanesvara (Mit., on Yaj., 11.129-133), Nandapandita (Datta/fca-mimansa IV. 1.6), the author of the Dattakachandrika (1.27) and Nilakantha (Vyav. may., IV.v.9,16) pronounce in favour of absolute prohibition.

### **Basis of classification of Vidhis**

Two main bases of classification of Vidhis are met within the Mimansa literature. The first is on the basis of the degree of obligatory force of the Vidhi, while the second is on the basis of the purpose thereof.

With reference to the degree of the obligatory force (in regard to positive injunctions), Jaimini classifies them into Vidhi proper, Niyama and Parisankhya. If a benefit to be derived from a Vidhi is not at all possible of being attained by other means, then it is mandatory. If such benefit can be partly attained by complying with the Vidhi and partly by other means, then it is imperfect and not absolute. If the benefit can be wholly attained by other means (though it can also be attained by following the Vidhi), then the Vidhi is a mere recital or statement of the benefit without any real obligatory force.<sup>2</sup> The later commentator Kumarila Bhat explains the distinction in these words:- "A Vidhi tends to secure what is otherwise not attainable at all." "A Niyama tends to secure what is partially otherwise attainable."

"A Parisankhya consists in a statement or recital as to a benefit which is commonly attainable in its entirety, either by acting according to the statement or by other means."

Sarkar has expressed the effect of the above, in the language of the modern law, in the following

form:-

- "A Vidhi is a perfect (imperative) command.
- ANiyama is an imperfect (directory) rule.
- A Parisankhya is a monitory precept."

Thus, the direction "Take a goodly meal after the fasting on the 11th day of the moon", is regarded as a Niyama, implying that the meal is to be taken unless one has a good reason for abstaining from it. In contrast, the direction "The flesh of animals whose feet are divided into five nails is eatable", is an example of Parisankhya. It only means that one may eat such flesh and not that one shall eat it.

## **Dharma Classification**

**Dharma** is broadly classified into two groups – general or universal (samanyadharmas) and special or particular (visheshadharmas). In the category of samanyadharmas, all the basic values which generally never change with space and time are included. Here, the divisions of caste, creed, occupation, nationality, gender, race and other distinctions are not decisive. What we would call as human values today – values like truth, non-violence, freedom from greed, purity of thought, word and action, self-control, etc. are prescribed as universally applicable dharmic features by great thinkers and champions of sanatana dharma.

Manu, in his treatise Manusmriti goes to the extent of defining the features of dharma in terms of values like self-possession, forbearance, bodily discipline, non-theft, purity of body and mind, sense-control, intellectual efficiency, wisdom or knowledge (awareness), truth and non-anger and declares that they are the characteristics of dharma (Manusmriti 6.92).

Visheshadharmas are essentially spatiotemporal in nature and include among others such things as varna dharma (duties of different social sectors), ashrama dharma (duties of individuals at different stages of their life), raja dharma (duties of political authority), apaddharma (alternative duties and exemptions during odd and critical times), etc. This list itself tells us that these were a few relevant in some space-time frame. The challenges facing us today may be different and might demand different policies. All these new policies will find a definite place in the broad phrase of dharma. Even specific concepts like varna and ashrama can be redefined to suit the times. Such corrections have been constantly going on in the annals of sanatana dharma. In fact, that is one of the secrets of its relevance and sublime dynamism.

Without a compassionate understanding and wise execution of different dharmas coming under the categories of both samanya and vishesha, none can prescribe anything or describe anything in sanatana dharma. There is a subhashita (wise saying) in Sanskrit according to which the wicked should become good and the good should get peace. The peaceful one should get liberated from the clutches of ignorance, which only makes him wrongly identified with this ego and the materialistic world and such a liberated soul should aid others in the path of liberation. Thus, in our cultural context, constant accountability here and now, verily verifiable by one and all is the essential qualification of a true dharmic person. Those who are not up to this find no place in the world of values since they are essentially meant for practice and not preaching. In the words of Adi Shankara, samanyadharmas is not merely a human-made convenience (purushatantra), but is a self-realized universal conformity (vastutantra). Values are like music and painting which mean little when they are described in words. It is only by practice that one derives the sustained, self-enriching joy that these values bring.

Even samanyadharmas, such as truth, non-violence and others must be understood in the light of sacchidananda and the purusharthas. For example, truth which normally means verbal sincerity, or non-violence, which normally means not hurting others can take different connotations in different situations. A doctor uttering a lie to save his patient from a rude shock or a sincere police officer uttering a lie to catch hold of a crook who is trying to escape from law or a doctor operating on a patient shedding his blood or a teacher turning harsh to teach a lesson to his arrogant student cannot be considered as cases of violation of truth or non-violence. In all these and such similar cases, we naturally think about the intentions of the persons and the results of their acts. In this respect, sanatana dharma upholds the acts of persons who are selfless and self-realized and try to do the end good even if the chosen means is not "just" due to the restrictions imposed by situations. Here, one can remember a telling situation from the Mahabharata (Karna parva) where Krishna tries to forge affection between Yudhishthira and Arjuna, who were on a row regarding the issue of maintaining their oaths. Krishna pacifies the two brothers' heated arguments over the nature of truth and declares that that which is really good at the cosmic level is the bed rock of it: yad bhutahitamantantam tat satyamiti dharana. This should be our real interest in the pursuit of values in general and fundamental values in particular.

## **Viśiṣṭādvaita**

Vishishtadvaita is one of the most popular schools of the Vedanta school of Hindu philosophy. Vedanta literally means the end of the Vedas. Vishishtadvaita (literally "Advaita with uniqueness; qualifications") is a non-dualistic school of Vedanta philosophy. It is non-dualism of the qualified whole, in which Brahman alone exists, but is characterized by multiplicity. It can be described as qualified monism or qualified non-dualism or attributive monism. It is a school of Vedanta philosophy which believes in all diversity subsuming to an underlying unity.

Ramanuja, the 11–12th century philosopher and the main proponent of Vishishtadvaita philosophy contends that the Prasthanatrayi ("The three courses"), namely the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Brahma Sutras are to be interpreted in a way that shows this unity in diversity, for any other way would violate their consistency. Vedanta Desika defines Vishishtadvaita using the statement, Aśeṣa Chit-Achit Prakāśam Brahmaikameva Tatvam: Brahman, as qualified by the sentient and insentient modes (or attributes), is the only reality.

Among the well-known philosophical systems, the Vedānta system which is also called as the 'Vedānta Darśana' has carved out an eminent place for itself. It is based mainly on the prasthānatraya

1. The Upaniṣads
2. The Brahmasutras
3. The Bhagavadgītā

In course of time, this system has branched off into three main streams:

1. Advaita
2. Viśiṣṭādvaita
3. Dvaita

The **Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta Darśana**, is not the creation of Rāmānuja as many believe, but actually it is a much older scripture than him. The twelve Ālvārs like Nammālvār, Kulaśekhara, Āṇḍāl and the Ācāryas like Nāthamuni, Yāmuna and Rāmānuja evolved the system out of the more ancient

teachings contained in theprasthānatraya and gave it a definite shape. However, Rāmānuja was its best exponent. The pioneering and stupendous work he has turned out in the cause ofthis system justifies in its being sometimes called as ‘Rāmānuja Darśana’.

The demise of Rāmānuja was followed by a period of sectarian split among his followers generally called as ‘Srīvaiṣṇavas’ which ultimately ended in a permanentdivision of their ranks into two sects of:

1. Vaḍagalais - They are the followers of Northern school.
2. Teṅgalais - They are the followers of Southern school.

The two sects developed separate sets of works, separate lineage of gurus or teachers and separate traditions in many matters of practical importance. Theapostolic successors of Rāmānuja who were responsible for establishing the system on a firm foundation, were as follows:

1. Vedānta Deśika
2. Pillai Lokācārya
3. Māṇavāla Māmuni

## **Jiva**

**Jiva**, (Sanskrit: “living substance”) in Indian philosophy and religion, and particularly in Jainism and Hinduism, a living sentient substance akin to an individual soul.

In the Jain tradition, jivas are opposed to ajivas, or “nonliving substances.” Jivas are understood as being eternal and infinite in number and are not the same as the bodies that they inhabit. In a pure state (mukta-jiva), they rise to the top of the universe, where they reside with other perfected beings and are never againreborn. Most jivas are, however, bound to samsara (rebirth in mundane earthly existence), because they are covered with karmas—fine particulate substances that accumulate on the jiva (in the same way that dust particles accumulate on oil) on account of both actions and emotions.

Jivas are categorized according to the number of sense organs possessed by thebodies that they inhabit. Humans, gods, and demons possess the five sense organs plus intellect. Lesser beings have between two and five sense organs.

Clusters of minute beings, called nigodas, belong to the lowest class of jivas, which possess only the sense of touch and undergo such common functions asrespiration and metabolism but have little hope of ever progressing to a higherspiritual or bodily state. The whole space of the world is packed with nigodas. They are the source of souls that take the place of the infinitesimally small number that have been able to attain moksha, release from samsara.

Many Hindu thinkers employ the term jiva to designate the soul or self that is subject to reincarnation. Since many Hindu schools of thought do not regard selfhood as intrinsically plural, however, they typically understand these individual jivas to be parts, aspects, or derivatives of the atman, the universal selfthat is in turn identical to brahman, or absolute reality. In this usage, jiva is short for jiva-atman, an individual living being.

## **Differences between Bhakti & Prapatti**

Bhakti is the path of devotion. It is meditating towards the lord, longing for his union, lamenting on his separation, doing as much service as possible to his pleasure. Karma and gnana are ancillaries for bhakti. Bhakti is a "upAya" - "means" to reach our Lord. Bhakti is sAdhya upAya - achieved by our efforts or even known as pravritti marga - endeavouring in action. Bhakti as a upAya is known as sAdhana.

Prapatti - is "absolute surrender" to the lotus feet of Sriman Narayana. In other words having faith that Sriman narayana's lotus feet is the upAya (means). Prapatti also known as nyAsa or saraNAgati is siddha upAya - ie "means" that is pre existing and not achieved by our efforts (unlike bhakti). This is so because the lotus feet is not achieved or created by our efforts. It is already existing and ever waiting to respond. This is nivritti marga - abstaining from action - abstaining from doing anything as means for liberation other than requesting and accepting the Lord as the means. Reference for Bhakti - manmanA bhava.gItA 9th chapter last sloka. Reference for prapatti - tvamEva upAyabhUtO mE bhava iti prArthanA mati: saraNAgati:. For easier understanding let us draw a chart differentiating bhakti and prapatti.

## **Bhakti Prapatti**

1. sAdhya upAyamsiddha upAyam.
2. pravritti margamnivritti margam
3. Only a select few can practice - those who are eligible for Vedas. Anyone including animals can surrender.
4. Gives mOksha after burning out the prArabdha karmas which might take many births. Gives mOksha at the end of that birth in which one surrenders.
5. to bear fruit, one has to meditate towards the Lord till the last moment. Once surrendered there is no need to think of him in the death bed. (there is a need for antimasmrti)(no need for antimasmrti)
6. expects karma and gnana as ancillaries (anga) to bear fruit. Does not expect anything as it is the will of the Lord
7. Bhakti is acit (non sentient) prapatti is absolutely cit (sentient) as it is the Lord himself.
8. expects some other than itself to give the fruit (Lord has to give) Itself gives the fruit (as prapatti is Lord's will which itself gives the fruit)
9. Atma swarUpa viruddham - not a right mean considering the absolute slavery Atma swarUpa anugunam - the right mean considering the absolute slavery nature of jIva. As bhakti casts some independence on him which is not Atma's nature of jIva. No independence on the jIva.
10. Not a fitting means for the great fruit mOksha which we get, as this is acit fitting means for the great fruit mOksha which we get, as this is cit.

Interestingly, a bhakta also performs prapatti and a surrenderer also practices Bhakti. Why so ?

To practice Bhakti, one has to be cleansed of all his papa karmas. Since our papas are countless, the prayascittams are also countless, which is almost impossible considering our finite life and knowledge. So in lieu of prayascittams a bhakta performs prapatti. The fruit for this surrender is cleaning the karmas. Then on Bhakti is born and further leads to liberation. This is called anga prapatti (ancillary to Bhakti).

A surrenderer after performing prapatti has to spend his life time in the service of his master. To generate more interest, to sing His glory, to chant His divine names and to enjoy His nearness, the

surrenderer uses Bhakti as a medium. Bhakti here is used as a means to enjoy and experience the Lord. Not as a means for liberation.

For a bhakta, Bhakti is the means for liberation but prapatti is ancillary for clearing karmas. For a prapanna, Lord's feet is the means for liberation, but Bhakti helps in furtherance of his service.

Bhakti is a mixture of action and meditation. Prapatti is a pure state of mind. A prapanna possesses the following : makes up his mind to do what pleases His master, not to do what displeases His master, absolute faith that He would protect, to seek Him alone as the protector, reveal his inability and meekness, and lastly submit oneself. Bhakti is easy to conceive and understand but difficult to practice, prapatti is easy to do but difficult to conceive understand or digest as a concept.

A hagiology for prapatti : Once Swamy ParAsara bhatta along with his disciple was going through a forest . He had to stay that day at a hunter's place. In the evening the hunter returned and was looking very hungry. Bhattar enquired whether he could not hunt any animal or bird that day. Hunter replied : "O knowledgeable ! I caught a small rabbit and was returning home happily. The mother of that rabbit saw this and stood before me with pleading eyes. I felt pity and let the small rabbit go. So I am hungry". Bhattar on hearing this fell unconscious. After a while he got up and said "neither the mother rabbit knew saraNagati sastram, (it did not chant dvayam, it did not say nivEdayata mAm kshipram like vibhIshana), nor the hunter knew the characteristics of a protector, (does not know sarva dharman parityajya mAmEkam saraNamvraja or abhayam sarvabhUtEbhyO dadAmi). Nevertheless without a word being uttered a prapatti has borne fruit here. " So it is not words or actions that matter in prapatti, but the mental make up- the pleading gesture - feeling of a destitute - absolute faith on Him that is important.

### **Pariṇāmavāda (Theory of real transformation)**

Closely related to Bhedābheda Vedānta's ontology is its theory of causality. Bhedābheda Vedāntins subscribe to the theory of Pariṇāmavāda, which states that the phenomenal world is a real transformation (pariṇāma) of the material cause of the world. They share this theory with the Sāṅkhya school of philosophy, as well as with most other schools of Vedānta. The major difference between the Vedāntic theory of Pariṇāmavāda and the Sāṅkhya's Pariṇāmavāda is the understanding of what constitutes the material cause of the world. For Sāṅkhya, primordial nature (prakṛti) transforms itself into the phenomenal world. The principle of primordial nature is completely insentient, and the process of transformation that creates the world is a blind, automatic process. For Bhedābheda Vedāntins, Brahman is both the material and efficient cause of the universe. Brahman, unlike the Sāṅkhya's prakṛti, is sentient. Yet both the sentient (individual souls) and insentient (physical things) have their origin in Brahman, according to Bhedābheda Vedāntins. In spite of their apparent proximity to the Sāṅkhya school on the issue of causality, early Bhedābheda thinkers such as Bhāskara took pains to critique the Sāṅkhya notion of prakṛti, accusing it of being both contrary to scripture and contrary to logic. A few later Bhedābheda thinkers took a softer line on Sāṅkhya. The most notable of these was Vijñānabhikṣu (16thc.), who argued for the ultimate unity of Sāṅkhya and Bhedābheda Vedānta doctrines.

### **khyāti**

Though the word khyāti literally means knowledge, it is often used as a technical term indicating a theory that purports to explain erroneous perception or illusion. Such a perception, though a fact of experience, defies all attempts at explaining it. When the snake is seen in a rope in insufficient light, or silver in nacre in moonlight, it is difficult to say how exactly it happens.

The various schools of Indian philosophy have dealt with this problem and have given different explanations of it. These explanations naturally vary according to their epistemological and metaphysical views. Each school has also tried to defend its position and refute the theories of others.

The main points of controversy are concerned with the nature of the illusory object and how it is caused.

The seven such khyātis or theories will now be dealt with in the alphabetical order:

1. **Akhyāti** ('non-apprehension'): This is the theory propounded by the Mīmāṃsā school of Prabhākara. 'Viveka-akhyāti-vāda' is another name for the same. According to this view, it is the akhyāti or non-apprehension of the difference between the memory-image of silver and nacre the percept, that is responsible for the illusion of silver in the nacre.
2. **Anirvacanīyakhyāti** ('apprehension of the indefinable'): According to this theory advocated by the Advaita Vedānta, the illusory object like silver is an instantaneous and apparent creation of ajñāna or ignorance associated with the substratum like nacre. Since the silver is perceived, it is not *asat* or unreal like the son of the barren woman. Since it is sublated by the later, correct, perception of nacre, it is not *sat* or real either. Nor can it be both *sat* and *asat* simultaneously which is contradictory. Hence it should be described as *anirvacanīya*, indefinable. The theory itself which holds the illusory object as *anirvacanīya*, is known as *anirvacanīya-khyāti*.
3. **Anyathākhyāti** ('misapprehension'): This theory also called 'viparītakhyāti,' is put forward by the Nyāya school, the school of Indian logic. Nacre is apprehended as *anyathā*, as something else. This misapprehension is caused by defective eyesight or insufficient light. The reflection of the nacre in moonlight due to its similarity to silver, brings on the memories of silver perceived earlier. The silver of memory, of a past experience, is superimposed on the nacre, or the present experience. Though both objects are real, the mistake consists in superimposing one upon the other, forgetting the time and place factors.
4. **Asat-khyāti** ('apprehension of the non-existent'): The nihilistic school of Buddhism, called the Mādhyamika school, propounds the theory that nothing really exists. In illusory perception, an *asat* or a non-existent like silver is apprehended as existent. Hence the name 'asat-khyāti', apprehending what does not really exist. Really speaking, even the nacre is unreal or non-existent. Hence both—the object of illusion and its substratum—are non-existent!
5. **Ātma-khyāti** ('apprehension of the subjective cognition'): As against the nihilism of the Mādhyamika school, subjective idealism of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism affirms the existence of internal ideas but denies external objects. Externalization of the internal cognitions is the real mistake in all perceptions whether 'normal' or 'illusory'. The silver as well as nacre is an internal idea only. This theory of illusion is known as *ātma-khyāti*.
6. **Sadasat-khyāti** ('apprehension of the real-unreal'): This theory is propounded by the Sāṅkhya school of Kapila. In the illusory perception 'This is silver', the cognition of 'this' is real since the object nacre is present to the organ of vision. But, the cognition of 'silver' is unreal since it is not present to the organ of vision. Hence it is a case of apprehending the *sad-asat*, or real-unreal.
7. **Sat-khyāti** ('apprehension of the real'): What is perceived as real, must have its basis in a real object. If silver is perceived in the nacre, it must be present there, however small may be the quantity. This is possible since the fundamental components of both nacre and silver (viz., the five elements of earth, water and so on) are the same. The perception is false only in the sense that the silver does not serve any practical purpose. This is the view of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school

of Vedānta propagated by Rāmānuja, called sat- kyāti.

## **Dvaita**

**Dvaita**, (Sanskrit: “Dualism”) an important school in Vedanta, one of the six philosophical systems (darshans) of Indian philosophy. Its founder was Madhva, also called Anandatirtha (c. 1199–1278), who came from the area of modern Karnataka state, where he still has many followers. Already during his lifetime, Madhva was regarded by his followers as an incarnation of the wind god Vayu, who was sent to earth by the god Vishnu to save the good, after the powers of evil had sent the philosopher Shankara, an important proponent of the Advaita (“Nondualist”) school, whose teaching of monism ran counter to Madhva’s.

In his expositions, Madhva shows the influence of the Nyaya philosophical school. He maintains that Vishnu is the supreme God, thus identifying the brahman, or absolute reality, of the Upanishads with a personal god, as Ramanuja (c. 1050– 1137) had done before him. There are in Madhva’s system three eternal, ontological orders: that of God, that of soul, and that of inanimate nature. The existence of God is demonstrable by logical proof, though only scripture teaches his nature. He is the epitome of all perfections and possesses a nonmaterial body, which consists of saccidananda (being, spirit, and bliss). God is the efficient cause of the universe, but Madhva denies that he is the material cause, for God cannot have created the world by splitting himself nor in any other way, since that militates against the doctrine that God is unalterable; in addition, it is blasphemous to accept that a perfect God changes himself into an imperfect world.

The individual souls are countless in number and are of atomic proportions. They are a “portion” of God and exist completely by the grace of God; in their actions they are totally subject to God. It is God too that allows the soul, to a limited extent, freedom of action in a way commensurate with one’s past acts (karma).

Ignorance, which for Madhva as for many other Indian philosophers means mistaken knowledge (ajnana), can be removed or corrected by means of devotion (bhakti), the deep mutual emotional attachment between a devotee and a personal god. Devotion can be attained in various ways: by solitary study of the scriptures, by performing one’s duty without self-interest, or by practical acts. That devotion is accompanied by an intuitive insight into God’s nature, or it may be a special kind of knowledge. Bhakti may itself become a goal; the devotee’s adoration of Vishnu is more important than the release (moksha) that ensues from it.

The present-day following of Dvaita has as its centre a monastery at Udipi, in Karnataka state, which was founded by Madhva himself and has continued under an uninterrupted series of abbots.

## **Rejection of nirguṇa brahmaṇ and māya, bheda and sāksi, bhakti Nirguṇa**

**Nirguṇa**, (Sanskrit: “distinctionless”), concept of primary importance in the orthodox Hindu philosophy of Vedānta, raising the question of whether the supreme being, Brahman, is to be characterized as without qualities (nirguṇa) or as possessing qualities (saguṇa).

The Advaita (Nondualist) school of Vedānta assumes on the basis of selected passages of the Upaniṣads that Brahman is beyond all polarity and therefore cannot be characterized in the normal terms of human discursive thought. This being the case, Brahman cannot possess qualities that distinguish it from all other magnitudes, as Brahman is not a magnitude but is all.

The fundamental text of this tenet is the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad definition of Brahman as neti-neti (“not this! not that!” 2.3.6). The scriptural texts that ascribe qualities to Brahman, leading to the conception of a qualified Brahman (saguṇa) are, according to the Advaita school, merely preparatory aids to meditations.

Others, notably the theistic schools of Vedānta (for example, Viśiṣṭādvaita), argue that God (Brahman) is possessed of all perfections and that the scriptural passages denying qualities deny only imperfect ones.

## **Maya**

**Maya**, (Sanskrit: “magic” or “illusion”) a fundamental concept in Hindu philosophy, notably in the Advaita (Nondualist) school of Vedānta. Maya originally denoted the magic power with which a god can make human beings believe in what turns out to be an illusion. By extension, it later came to mean the powerful force that creates the cosmic illusion that the phenomenal world is real.

For the Nondualists, maya is thus that cosmic force that presents the infinite Brahman (the supreme being) as the finite phenomenal world. Maya is reflected on the individual level by human ignorance (ajñāna) of the real nature of the self, which is mistaken for the empirical ego but which is in reality identical with brahman.

The Dvaita or “dualist” school of Hindu Vedānta philosophy originated in 13th-century South India with Sri Madhvācārya (Madhva). Madhva, who considered himself an avatara of the wind-god Vāyu, argued that a body of canonical texts called the “Vedānta” or “end of the Veda” taught the fundamental difference between the individual self or atman and the ultimate reality, brahman.

According to Madhva there are two orders of reality: 1. svatantra, independent reality, which consists of Brahman alone and 2. paratantra, dependent reality, which consists of jivas (souls) and jada (lifeless objects). Although dependent reality would not exist apart from brahman’s will, this very dependence creates a fundamental distinction between brahman and all else, implying a dualist view. By interpreting the Vedānta materials (especially the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgīta and the Brahmasūtras) along these lines, Madhva deliberately challenged the non-dualist reading in which the atman was identified with brahman. Madhva argued that the scriptures could not teach the identity of all beings because this would contradict ordinary perception, which tells us that we are different both from one another and from God. Madhva and his followers call their system tattvavada, “the realist viewpoint”.

### **1. Madhva and Sankara**

The main tenet of Madhva’s Dvaita Vedānta is that the Vedic tradition teaches a fundamental difference between the human soul or atman and the ultimate reality, brahman. This is markedly different from the earlier Advaita Vedānta, which Madhva often vociferously attacked. Sankara’s Advaita or “non-dualist” Vedānta (9th century) argued that the atman is completely identical with brahman. According to Sankara, the atman experiences a false sense of plurality and individuality when under the influence of the delusive power of maya.

While maya has the ambiguous ontological status of being neither real nor unreal, the only true reality is brahman. A soul becomes liberated from the cycle of rebirth (punar-janma) by realizing that its very experience of samsara is an illusion; its true identity is the singular objectless consciousness that constitutes pure being or brahman.

## 2. Madhva and Ramanuja

While Ramanuja's system of Visistadvaita Vedanta or "qualified non-dualism" modifies Sankara's position on the soul's identity with brahman, Madhva also rejected it. Ramanuja assumes a plurality of individual souls whose identity remains intact even after liberation but maintains that the souls share the essential nature of brahma. The souls are eternal particles issuing from brahman, who as their source retains its transcendence. Ramanuja maintains Visnu's distinct difference from the human soul and his supremacy as creator and redeemer. Ramanuja identifies brahman with Visnu, holding that brahman is saguna, i.e. possesses attributes, in contrast to Sankara's attributeless or "nirguna" brahman.

## 3. Dvaita Vedanta

Like Ramanuja, Madhva identifies brahman with Visnu. However, he argues that any system that allows for any identification of the atman with brahman undermines Visnu's supremacy, compromises His status, and strips devotional acts of their meaning. Madhva's insistence on the modal distinction between the atman and brahman, wherein the former is inalterably dependent upon—and therefore, fundamentally different from—the latter, insures Visnu-as-brahman's complete and utter transcendence of the human soul. For Madhva, this view alone makes devotion [bhakti] an essential component of religious belief and practice. Attaining Visnu's grace is the soul's only hope of achieving liberation [moksa] from the cycle of rebirth (samsara).

Like Ramanuja, Madhva opposes Sankara's conception of Brahman as nirguna or without qualities and as a pure self-consciousness. Madhva views Visnu as preeminent above all other deities on the basis of His unique characteristics. This emphasis on Visnu's particular collocation of attributes that renders Him distinct from all other gods, human souls, and the material world reveals another critical component of Madhva's philosophy which is his acceptance of an ontological plurality as a fundamental facet of being. Indeed, Madhva rejects the notion that brahman is the only truly existent entity (tattva) and he maintains that, even though living beings and inert matter are dependent upon Brahman, such dependence differentiates them from Him and makes them discrete entities (tattvas). Thus, reality in Madhva's system consists of three basic elements: God, the souls (jivasi), and insentient matter (jada).

Madhva's pluralistic ontology is founded on his realist epistemology, which in turn affects his Vedic hermeneutics. He argues that God and the human soul are separate because our daily experience of separateness from God and of plurality in general is presented to us as an undeniable fact, fundamental to our knowledge of all things. Madhva's emphasis on the validity of experience as a means of knowledge is intended to refute the nondualist position that the differences we experience in daily life are ultimately a shared illusion with the ambiguous ontological status of being neither real nor unreal. In Madhva's view, Advaita's denial of the innate validity of knowledge acquired through sense perception completely undermines our ability to know anything since we must always question the content of our knowledge. This questioning would encompass our knowledge of the sacred canon, which is accessible to us only through our ability to perceive it and to draw inferences from it. Madhva argues that perception and inference must be innately valid and the reality they present us with must be actually and ultimately real since such a position is the only one that allows us to know the content of the Vedas. The Vedas alone are responsible for teaching us about the nature of the self and brahman.

This aspect of Madhva's realist epistemology is important not only because it bolsters Madhva's

claim that the atman and brahman are permanently distinct as revealed to us by experience, but because it means that the sacred texts must be read in consonance with the data we receive from our everyday experience, even though the Vedas present us with knowledge of a supra-sensible realm. Madhva argues that the Vedas cannot teach non-difference between the atman and brahman or a lack of true plurality since this would directly contradict our experience. In Madhva's view the sacred texts teach pancabheda, the five-fold difference between 1. Visnu and jivas 2. Visnu and jada 3. jiva and jada 4. one jiva and another and 5. one form of jada and another.

Madhva's belief in the innate difference of one soul from another led to some interesting doctrines in his system. He believed in a hierarchy of jivas, based upon their innate configurations of virtues (gunas) and faults (dosas). For example, Visnu is supreme because He possesses all qualities in their most fulfilled and perfect form. Furthermore, because Madhva believed that souls possess innate characteristics and capacities, he also maintained that they were predestined to achieve certain ends. This perspective put Madhva at odds with traditional Hindu views of the karma theory wherein differences in social and religious status are explained via past moral or immoral acts. For Madhva, each individual being possesses an innate moral propensity and karma is merely the mechanism by which a given soul is propelled towards his or her destiny.

#### **4. Canonical Sources**

Madhva's attempts to locate his controversial views in the canonical Vedanta texts often proved difficult. He is perhaps most famous for his idiosyncratic rendering of the Chandogya Upanisad's statement *tat tvam asi* or "you (the atman) are that (brahman)." By carrying over the 'a' from the preceding word, Madhva rendered the phrase *atat tvam asi* or "you are not that." Some scholars have speculated on "foreign," particularly Christian, influences on Madhva's thought but current scholarly consensus maintains that political and social changes in Madhva's region prompted a new approach to old religious convictions.

Madhva's Dvaita Vedanta is recognized as one of the three major schools of Vedanta (besides Sankara's Advaita and Ramanuja's Visistadvaita Vedanta). It has been further developed by such major figures as Jayatirtha (1356-1388) and Vyasaraya (1478-1589) and is kept alive by a still flourishing community [Madhvasampradaya] in India with its main center at Udipi (Karnataka).

### **Bhedabheda**

**Bhedabheda**, Sanskrit **Bhedābheda** ("Identity and Difference"), an important branch of Vedanta, a system of Indian philosophy. Its principal author was Bhaskara, probably a younger contemporary of the great 8th-century-CE thinker Shankara of the Advaita (nondualist) school. The mainstay of Bhaskara's philosophy was the conviction that acts and knowledge are not mutually exclusive but, rather, mutually reinforcing. In contrast, Shankara held that ultimately only total resignation and withdrawal from acts are necessary to attain release (moksha) from rebirth (samsara). Against that view, Bhaskara upheld the doctrine of the "cumulative effect of acts and knowledge" (jnana-karma-samuccaya) and declared that a person should withdraw only after an active life in which he fulfilled his obligations. On the important issue of the relationship between brahman (the Absolute) and the world, Bhaskara taught that the two are identical; if, he said, brahman is the substantial cause of the world, then the world itself is real. Difference occurs when certain limiting conditions (upadhis) are imposed on brahman.

### **Sākṣī**

In Hindu philosophy, **Sakshi**, also **Sākṣī** or **Shakshi**, "witness," refers to the 'Pure Awareness' that

witnesses the world but does not get affected or involved. Sakshi is beyond time, space and the triad of experiencer, experiencing and experienced; sakshi witnesses all thoughts, words and deeds without interfering with them or being affected by them, other than sakshi there is nothing else in the entire universe.

Sākṣī means 'observer', 'eyewitness' or the 'Supreme Being', is the Atman, the unchangeable eternal Reality, Pure Consciousness and knowledge. It is the timeless Being which witnesses all this ceaseless flow and change in the world of thought and things, the 'Witness' or the higher 'Ego', the faculty which perceives the individual personality.

It lends its shine (Chitchhaya) to the "ego" part of the subtle body, which consists of the everchanging Mind, the decision making Intellect, the Memory & the Illusory Ego. Mind (manas), Ego (ahankara) and Sakshi, all perform different functions but that difference of functions does not mean difference in nature or essence.

## **Bhakti**

**Bhakti**, (Sanskrit: "devotion") in Hinduism, a movement emphasizing the mutual intense emotional attachment and love of a devotee toward a personal god and of the god for the devotee. According to the Bhagavadgita, a Hindu religious text, the path of bhakti, or bhakti-marga, is superior to the two other religious approaches, the path of knowledge (jnana) and the path of ritual and good works (karma).

Bhakti arose in South India in the 7th to 10th centuries in poems that the Alvars and the Nayanars composed in Tamil to the gods Vishnu and Shiva, respectively. Drawing on earlier Tamil secular traditions of erotic poetry as well as royal traditions, bhakti poets applied to the god what would usually be said of an absent lover or of a king. Bhakti soon spread to North India, appearing most notably in the 10th-century Sanskrit text the Bhagavata-purana. Muslim ideas of surrender to God may have influenced Hindu ideas of bhakti from the start, and later poet-saints such as Kabir (1440–1518) introduced Sufi (mystical) elements from Islam.

Each of the major divinities of Hinduism—Vishnu, Shiva, and the various forms of the Goddess—have distinct devotional traditions. Vishnu-bhakti is based on Vishnu's avatars (incarnations), particularly Krishna and Rama. Devotion to Shiva is associated with his frequent manifestations on earth—in which he can appear as anyone, even a tribal hunter, a Dalit (formerly called an untouchable), or a Muslim. Devotion to the goddesses is more regional and local, expressed in temples and in festivals devoted to Durga, Kali, Shitala (goddess of smallpox), Lakshmi (goddess of good fortune), and many others.

Many, but not all, bhakti movements were open to people of both genders and all castes. Devotional practices included reciting the name of the god or goddess, singing hymns in praise of the deity, wearing or carrying identifying emblems, and undertaking pilgrimages to sacred places associated with the deity. Devotees also offered daily sacrifices—for some, animal sacrifices; for others, vegetarian sacrifices of fruit and flowers—in the home or temple. After the group ritual at the temple, the priest would distribute bits of the deity's leftover food (called prasada, the word for "grace"). Seeing—and being seen by—the god or goddess (darshan) was an essential part of the ritual.

During the medieval period (12th to mid-18th century), different local traditions explored the various possible relationships between the worshipper and the deity. In Bengal the love of God was

considered analogous to the sentiments involved in human relationships, such as those felt by a servant toward his master, a friend toward a friend, a parent toward a child, a child toward a parent, and a woman toward her beloved. In South India passionate, often erotic, poems to Shiva and Vishnu (particularly to Krishna) were composed in Tamil and other Dravidian languages, such as Kannada, Telugu, and Malayalam.

In the 16th century Tulsidas's Hindi retelling of the Rama legend in the Ramcharitmanas ("Sacred Lake of the Acts of Rama") focused on the sentiment of friendship and loyalty. Many of those poems continue to be recited and sung, often at all-night celebrations.

## **Dvaitadvaita**

Nimbarka lived shortly after Ramanuja. Nimbarka advocates the doctrine of dualistic monism (dvaitadvaitavada) He insists on difference as well as non-difference or identity (bheda-bheda) between Brahman and the individual souls and the world.

He advocates the relation of identity-in-difference between them. He, like Bhaskara, advocates the doctrine of transformation of Brahman into the world (brahmaparipamavada).

### **Brahman:**

Brahman is the greatest, Supreme Person (purusottama) possessed of infinite, inconceivable, natural essences, qualities, and powers. He is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent.

He is possessed of infinite excellent qualities. He is free from all taint of imperfections. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world of conscious souls (cit) and unconscious matter (acit). He is absolutely free and independent controller of all finite agents, and dispenser of the fruits of their actions.

He has infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, and infinite will and power. He is infinite (bhuma). He is self-subsistent and absolute. He has transcendental bliss and immortality. He is imperishable (aksara). He is the ground of all effects in the past, the present, and the future. He is the support of the world. He is the cause of its stability and harmony. He is of the nature of eternal manifestation.

He is transcendent as well as immanent. He transcends the world. He is immanent in the world. He is knowable through the Vedas only. He is the final goal of human attainment. He is the supreme end of the individual souls. They share in the bliss of God. He is the inner controller (antaryamin) of the world and the souls. He is the knower and controller of all things and beings.

Brahman is the material cause and the efficient cause of the world. He transforms himself into the world by his own extraordinary power without any accessory conditions, even as milk is transformed into curd without any accessory conditions. God, who is omniscient and omnipotent, transforms himself into the world by his own power and will with his essential nature (svarupa) unmodified (avyakrta).

He is unmodified in his essential nature and modified in his inessential nature. It may be urged that if God be the material cause of the world, he, being devoid of parts, becomes entirely transformed into the world, and that if he partly transforms himself into the world, he ceases to be partless. But the Sruti says: "Brahman willed to become many; he created the world (sat) out of himself and yet remained transcendent (tyat), even as a spider spins out a web out of itself."

The omnipotent Supreme Lord can create the world out of himself, and yet remain transcendent. The inconceivable creative power in God is the cause of the world. It is real. It is the will of God. It is not indefinable Maya of Samkara, which is neither real nor unreal. The world which is the transformation of Brahman is real. It is not a false appearance as Samkara holds.

Effect is non-different from cause. It is not absolutely different from cause. When cause is perceived, effect is perceived. Effect is a transformation of cause. Hence, effect is non-different from cause. The effect that happens subsequently, pre-exists in the cause. If the effect were non-existent in the cause, then sprouts of barley would be produced from fire. The effect is the unfoldment of the cause, even as an unrolled cloth is the unfoldment of a folded cloth.

Vital airs are inhaled and exhaled. So the effect is implicit in the cause, and becomes explicit when it assumes the form of the effect. The world pre-exists in Brahman in an implicit condition, and becomes explicit after creation. Cause and effect are partly different and partly non-different from the world. Brahman is transformed into the world, which is non-different from him. Brahman is the inner controller of the world.

So there is no absolute identity between them. Brahman is both different and non-different from the world of unconscious matter and conscious souls, even as the sea is different and non-different from its waves, and the sun is different and non-different from its rays.

The world including formed and unformed existence, material things and spiritual beings, exists in its cause, Brahman, is the relation of identity-in-different. God is related to the world as a snake is related to its coiled form. God remains unmodified in his essential nature, and only undergoes modification through his conscious energy (cit-sakti) and unconscious energy (acit-sakti).

This doctrine resembles Vallabha's doctrine of immutable transformation (avikrtaparinama). God transcends his three natures as the world, souls, and even as God. In his pure and transcendent nature he is absolutely unaffected by changes and mutations of the world of phenomena. As noumenon he is immutable; as phenomenon he undergoes mutations. In his esoteric and essential nature he is immutable; in his exoteric and phenomenal nature he is mutable.

### **The Jiva:**

The individual soul (jiva) is not born. It is eternal. Its birth and death are due to its connection with and separation from its body. It is the knower or ego which possesses the essential quality of knowledge.

The relation of the soul to knowledge is that of the qualified (dharmin) to its quality (dharma). There is identity-in-difference between them. The soul and knowledge, though non-distinct from each other, are related to each other as substance and attribute. The soul is an enjoyer.

It feels pleasure and pain, which are the fruitions of merits and demerits. It is an active agent. It has the power of doing right and wrong actions. Its activity is controlled by God. It strives to share in the infinite bliss of God. It is atomic.

But it can experience pleasure and pain through its entire body. Its seat is in the heart. It has experience through its whole body, even as the light of a lamp illumines the whole room. It is a part of Brahman. It is both different and non-different from him.

There is great difference between a soul and Brahman. The soul is subject to joys and sorrows (bhoktr). It experiences the fruits of its actions. But Brahman does not experience fruits of actions (abhokt). Brahman is the worshipped while the soul is the worshipper.

Brahman is known by the soul which is the knower. The soul strives to receive the infinite bliss of God who is the giver of bliss. Brahman is the inner controller of the soul which is controlled by him. So Brahman and the soul are different from each other. But they are not absolutely different from each other. The soul is a part of Brahman. It is identical with him in-essence. Its natural knowledge and bliss are covered by nescience (avidya) which is removed by the grace of God.

The liberated soul acquires absolute equality with God, being purged of merits and demerits and becoming immaculate, But it does not lose its integrity in him.

Brahman is not defiled by the limitations and imperfections of the souls, though he regulates their different states, waking, dream, sleep, and intuitive state. Their natural will-power is eclipsed by the superior will of God who guides them in all matters according to their past deeds.

Their bondage and release are due to the will of God. He is absolutely pure in spite of his connection with their impurities. He is the inner controller of all; yet he does not undergo any limitation. Though he is omnipresent, he does not suffer from the limitations of the souls. Even as light reveals objects covered by darkness, so God reveals everything, but is not affected by it. He abides in the souls, but is not affected by their changes.

He is not infected with their impurities. Brahman is both different from and identical with souls, even as the sun is both different from and identical with its rays for the sun and its rays are both light.

### **Nimbarka and Bhaskara:**

Nimbarka, like Bhaskara, believes in the transformation of Brahman into the world (brahmaparinama). He recognizes, like him, the relation of identity-in-difference (bhedabheda) between Brahman and the individual souls.

But Bhaskara emphasizes identity between them, their difference being due to limiting conditions (upadhi). Nimbarka stresses both identity and difference between them. His doctrine is dualistic non-dualism (dvaitadvaitavada) which stresses identity-in-difference (bhedabheda) between God and the soul and the world.

Nimbarka condemns both monistic absolutism and dualism, and reconciles the identity texts with the difference texts in his doctrine of dualistic monism. The world and the souls are different from Brahman because they have real and distinct existence dependent upon him. They are non-different from Brahman because they cannot exist apart from him.

'Tat tvam asi', or 'That thou art' means that individual soul (tvam) is both different and non-different from Brahman (tat). There is non-difference or identity between them in their essential nature. There is difference between them because they are related to each other as part and whole, the controlled and the controller, and the worshipper and the worshipped.

### **Nimbarka and Ramanuja:**

Ramanuja recognizes internal difference (svagatabheda) within Brahman. He regards Brahman as the qualified (visejya) substance whose attributes (visejapa) or modes (prakara) are the unconscious world of matter (acit) and conscious souls (cit). Matter and soul are adjectives of the divine substance.

They co-inhere in Brahman. Their co-inherence in Brahman shows their substantial identity. They constitute the body of Brahman who is the soul. They are inseparably related to each other like body and soul. There is inseparable relation (aprthaksiddhi) between them.

Ramanuja stresses identity or unity more than difference. But Nimbarka emphasizes identity as well as difference. The world is the transformation of the conscious energies (cit-sakti) and the unconscious energies (acit-sakti) of Brahman.

The individual souls are parts of Brahman. The world and souls are real and substantial; they are not mere adjectives of Brahman. He is immanent in them as their inner controller. But he transcends them, and is not affected by their changes and mutations. He is immutable in his essential nature.

## **DvaitAdvaita**

Achaarya Nimbarka (14th century CE?) is said to be the founder of this school of Vedanta which presents another variation of the bhedaabheda. Nimbarka was a Brahmin from Andhra and his school is identified as the Sanakasampradhaya of Vaishnavism. The works attributed to him are Vedantapaarjatasaurabha - a short commentary on the Brahma Sutras, Dashashloki, Shri Krishna Stavaraaja and Madhvamukavardhana.

Shrinivasa comments on Nimbarka's bhashyam in his Vedantakaustubha, on which Keshava Kashmiri has written his Kaustubhaprabhaa. Purushottama has written commentaries on Dashashloki and Stavaraaja called Vedaantaratanmanjushaa and Shrutyantasuradruma respectively. Maadhava Mukunda's Para-paksha-giri-vajra engages in polemics against Advaita.

## **IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE**

Nimbarka revives the bhedaabheda of earlier Vedantins like Ashmarathya, Bhartrprapancha, Bhaskara and Yadhava Prakasha. He is also heavily indebted to Ramanuja from whom he seems to have borrowed wholesale, making significant enhancements and modifications here and there.

Nimbarka rejects Ramanuja's conception of souls and matter as qualities of God. The function of quality is either to differentiate a thing from other things or to make the object better known. Matter and souls as the qualities of God serve no such purpose. As there's nothing other than God what can they distinguish him from? Nor can they throw light on his true nature as they do not form his essence. Nimbarka also disputes Ramanuja's view that matter and souls constitute the body of God. It is wrong to distinguish between the body and soul of God. If so, then God being the soul would experience all the miseries and imperfections of the body. One part of God cannot present eternity and perfection, while the other part presents transience and imperfection.

Matter and souls are therefore not the body of God, but his powers. So the truth is not identity qualified by difference, but identity and difference. Both identity and difference are separately and equally real.

God, souls and matter are all real, but the last two are absolutely dependent on God. The relation between God and universe is one of identity and difference. The universe cannot be absolutely

identical with God, for then God himself will be bound and experience all the imperfections and miseries of samsaara. The universe cannot be absolutely different from God either - for then it would constitute a limit to God and he could not be its all pervading inner ruler and controller. Matter and souls do not have an independent existence of God and hence are not different from him. But since there are dependent and limited, they are different from God who is independent and unlimited. Even as the rays of the Sun and the Sun are both distinct and non-distinct, so is the relationship between the soul and God. In "tat tvam asi", 'tat' refers to the all pervading Brahman, 'tvam' refers to the dependant soul and 'asi' refers to the relation of differencecum non-difference between them.

## **GOD, MATTER AND SOULS**

Krishna is the highest Brahman who by his very nature is free from all defects and is filled with all perfections. He manifests himself in the four Vyuhas and in incarnations. He is the ruler of the universe and Radha is his consort. Souls and matter are his powers. He is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. He is the efficient cause because as the Lord of karma and the inner ruler of souls, he brings about creation in order to enable the souls reap the fruits of their karma. He is the material cause because creation means the manifestation of his powers of chit and achit. Creation is a real transformation (parinaama) of his powers.

Souls are essentially of the nature of knowledge (jnanasvarupa) and also form the substratum of knowledge. Quite like the Sun which is of the nature of light as well as substratum of light which is its attribute, the relation between soul and knowledge is like the one between the qualified and qualification - identity as well as difference. The soul which is atomic in size is the real knower, agent and enjoyer. It is dependent on God who pervades, supports and controls it from within. Though the soul is eternal, still it suffers the misery of samsara due to its embodiment which itself is due to karma and avidhya. Bhakti to God results in knowledge which brings about liberation.

### **The Inanimate is of three kinds :**


1. Apraakrta is the super matter out of which the divine body is made.
2. Praakrta which is derived from prakriti with its three gunas - sattva, rajas and tamas and
3. Kaala or time.

## **Shuddadvaita**

**Shuddadvaita** (Sanskrit: śuddhādvaita "pure non-dualism") is the "purely non-dual" philosophy propounded by Vallabhacharya (1479-1531 CE), the founding philosopher and guru of the Vallabha sampradāya ("tradition of Vallabha") or Puṣṭimārga ("The path of grace"), a Hindu Vaishnava tradition focused on the worship of Krishna. Vallabhacharya's pure form (nondualist) philosophy is different from Advaita. The Shrinathji temple at Nathdwara, and compositions of eight poets (aṣṭachap), including Sur, are central to the worship by the followers of the sect.

## The Concept of Avikṛta-Parinamavāda

- According to Vallabha, the universe is not a vivarta (or an appearance). The theory of universe being a vivarta is accepted by Sankara's Advaita Vedānta philosophy.
- Vallabha says, universe is a real manifestation and not an unreal manifestation of Brahman.
- At the same time, it is also not a Parinama. (The concept of Parinama-vāda is accepted by Nimbarka, Ramanuja, etc.)
- Vallabha says, it is not a parinama because the manifestation of universe does not bring out any change or transformation in Brahman.
- Therefore, the universe is a natural emanation from Brahman which does not cause any notion of change in him.
- This concept is called, Avikṛta-Parinamavāda.
- According to Vallabha, the cause and effect, the substance and its attributes are identical in nature. This relation is called the relation of Identity or *tadatmya*.
- Brahman is both the material cause or the inherent cause and the efficient cause.
- Hence, Brahman manifests himself as the universe without undergoing any change.



**Pariṇāmavāda** literally means 'the theory of change of state'.

### **Pariṇāmavāda as per Brahmasutras**

According to the Brahmasutras, this world has its origin in Brahman. It is sustained by It and is dissolved back into It. Evolution of this world from Brahman is explained by the different schools of Vedānta in different ways.

### **Pariṇāmavāda as per Advaita Vedānta**

Advaita Vedānta of Saṅkara considers this world as a 'vivarta,' a mere appearance, Viśiṣṭādvaita

Vedānta of Rāmānuja accepts 'pariṇaria' or change for Brahman. This change may be a change of form like that of clay being shaped into a pot or of state, like milk becoming curds. Rāmānuja accepts the latter and hence his view is known as 'pariṇāmavāda,' or 'Brahmapariṇāmavāda'.

## Vedanta

Vedanta in a literal sense is "End of the Vedas" which basically refers to the appendix to the Vedic hymns and in a deeper sense, mastering the end goal or purpose of the Vedas. While it was used to refer to Upanishads in the early period, later on during the medieval period, it came to mean the interpretation of the Upanishads. While there are many schools of the Vedanta, all of them seek to answer the basic question, the relation between the Atman (Inner Self or Soul) and Brahman and that between Brahman and the World. It is the various answers to these questions that have come to form some of the more well known schools.

These schools have certain basic concepts

- Brahman is the supreme cause of the entire universe and is eternal and all encompassing.
- All actions are subordinate to knowledge and devotion.
- Bondage is subject to Samsara, the eternal cycle of death and rebirth.
- And deliverance from the cycle of Samsara is true liberation.

Now going by the classification we have the following schools

**Advaita-** This is the oldest school of Vedanta, and it states that Brahman is the only reality and the world is illusory (Maya). Ignorance of the reality is what causes suffering, and liberation can be obtained only by true knowledge of Brahman. It states that both the individual self (Atman) and Brahman are the same, and knowing this difference causes liberation

**Dvaita-** This was propounded by Madhvacharya and is also called as Tatvavada-the Philosophy of Reality. It considers Brahman and Atman as two different entities, and Bhakti as the route to eternal salvation.

**Bhedabheda-** As the name suggests it looks at the concept of difference (Bheda) and non-difference (Abheda). This school states that the jivatma (individual self) is both different as well as similar to the ultimate reality Brahman. In a way this combines both the teachings of Dvaita (which states Individual Self and Brahman are different) and Advaita (which states that both Individual self and Brahman are one and the same). This school was particularly popular during the medieval era, with thinkers like Ramanuja (who pioneered Vishishtadvaita), Nimbarka (founded Dvaitadvaita), Vallabha (Shuddadvaita) and Chaitanya Mahaprabhu (founder of Gaudiya Vaishnavism).

**Vishishtadvaita-** Literally meaning the Unique Advaita, this was pioneered by Ramanuja during the 11th century. While it accepts Brahman as the unified whole, it states he is characterized by multiple forms. In a sense it believes that all diversity is subsumed to a unified whole. Its philosophy is summed up as Aśeṣa Chit-Achit Prakāram Brahmaikameva Tatvam meaning Brahman as qualified by sentient modes (the ability to feel and sense) and insentient modes (inability to feel or sense) is the only reality.

**Dvaitadvaita-** Propounded by Nimbarka, it states that the Brahman is the highest reality, the controller of all. And is also the cause of creation of the Universe. The Chit or Jiva, the individual soul is which possesses both the knowledge and is knowledge itself. In a way similar to the sun which is both light

as well as the source from which all light comes. Achit or Jagat is basically of 3 sorts- Prakrta (derived from basic matter), Apkarta is that which is non Prakrta and Kala. It states that Brahman or Isvara, is the highest reality and both Chit, Achit are dependent on him.

**Shuddadavaita-** Pure non dualistic form of philosophy, propounded by Vallabhacharya. As per this, both God and the individual self are the same, and not different. However it differs from Shankara's Advaita, in that considers the individual self as part of God who is the whole. It also states Maya is not unreal, unlike Advaita, but a manifestation of God's power.

**Achintya Bheda Abheda-** This was enunciated by Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, the founder of the Gaudinya Vaishnavism. It combines both the views points of the Advaita and Dvaita schools. It states that while the individual self is linked with Brahman, yet it is not the same as him. It states that the individual self is only a part of the Supreme Lord. In a sense it breaks away from the rather rigid definitions of Dvaita and Advaita.

# MCQs

1. The systems which accept the authority of Vedas are called
  - a. Orthodox
  - b. Heterodox
  - c. Theistic
  - d. Atheistic
2. Which among the following is a Heterodox System
  - a. Purvamimamsa
  - b. Nyaya
  - c. Charvaka
  - d. Yoga
3. Which among the following is a Heterodox System
  - a. Advaita Vedanta
  - b. Buddhism
  - c. Nyaya
  - d. Yoga
4. Which among the following is a Heterodox System
  - a. Yoga
  - b. Charvaka
  - c. Nyaya
  - d. Advaita Vedanta
5. Which among the following is an Orthodox System
  - a. Jainism
  - b. Nyaya
  - c. Buddhism
  - d. Charvaka
6. Which among the following is an Orthodox System
  - a. Advaita Vedanta
  - b. Buddhism
  - c. Jainism
  - d. Charvaka

7. Which among the following is a Orthodox System
- Jainism
  - Buddhism
  - Charvaka
  - Yoga
8. Which among the following is a Orthodox System
- Charvaka
  - Jainism
  - Vaiseshika
  - Buddhism
9. Which among the following is a Orthodox System
- Samkhya
  - Charvaka
  - Buddhism
  - Jainism
10. Which among the following is a Orthodox System
- Charvaka
  - Purvamimamsa
  - Buddhism
  - Jainism
11. 'SarvaDarsanaSamgraha' is written by
- Jaimini
  - Madhavacharya
  - Vatsyayanad.
  - Kanada
12. Charvaka Philosophy is
- Materialistic
  - Spiritualistic
  - Both
  - None
13. Charvaka believes----- as the only reality
- Self
  - God
  - Brahman
  - Matter
14. Which among the following is not accepted by Charvaka
- Earth

- b. Air
- c. Water
- d. Ether

15. The only pramana accepted by Charvaka is

- a. Perception
- b. Inference
- c. Comparison
- d. Verbal testimony

16. Which among the following is not come under purushartha

- a. Artha
- b. Kama
- c. Karma
- d. Moksha

17. Which among the following is a material goal in the social life of man

- a. Dharmab
- b. Karma
- c. Moksha
- d. Kama

18. Which among the following is a material goal in the social life of man

- a. Moksha
- b. Artha
- c. Satchitananda
- d. Dharma

19. Which among the following is a spiritual goal in the social life of man

- a. Artha
- b. Kama
- c. Moksha
- d. None of the above

20. Which among the following is a spiritual goal in the social life of man

- a. Kama
- b. Dharma
- c. Artha
- d. Karma

21. Which system of Indian Philosophy is considered as Indian Hedonism

- a. Nyaya
- b. Yoga
- c. Advaita Vedanta

d. Charvaka

22. According to Charvaka , the Ultimate goal in the life of man is

- a. Self-Realization
- b. Pleasure
- c. Dharma
- d. Moksha

23. 'Eat, Drink and be Merry' is the Slogan of

- a. Dvaita
- b. PurvaMimamsa
- c. Charvaka
- d. VisishtAdvaita

24. The founder of Buddhism is

- a. Kanada
- b. Vatsyayana
- c. Buddha
- d. Jaimini

25. Buddha's 'four noble truths' is known as

- a. Mahavrata
- b. Anuvrata
- c. Dukha Saha
- d. Arya Satya

26. According to Buddha the cause of suffering is

- a. Wisdom
- b. Ignorance
- c. Pleasure
- d. Courage

27. Which among the following is not come under 'Four Noble Truths' of Buddha

- a. SarvamDukha
- b. Dukha Karana
- c. DukhamSaha
- d. DukhaNirodha

28. According to Buddha, 'Dukha' leads man towards

- a. Moksha
- b. Pain & Rebirth
- c. Enjoyment
- d. Success

29. Buddha's theory of causation is known as

- a. Arambha vada
- b. PratityaSamutpada
- c. .Parinamavada
- d. Brahma parinamavada

30. Links in 'Bhava Chakra ' is called

- a. Nidhana
- b. Nirvana
- c. Skanda
- d. Kshanika

31. How many Nidhanas are there in 'Bhava Chakra according to Budha

- a. 10
- b. 15
- c. 13
- d. 12

32. Which among the following is nota Nidhana

- a. Vijnana
- b. Vedana
- c. Samjna
- d. Samskara

33. According to Buddha, Cessationfrom sufferings is

- a. Vedana
- b. Nirvana
- c. Jathi
- d. Upadana

34. Buddha illustrated 'Impermanency of the World andmomentary existence of objects'through his theory of

- a. Anatmavada
- b. Syadvada
- c. Anekandavada
- d. Kshanikavada

35. Path of Liberation according toBuddha is called

- a. Nishkama Karma
- b. Yoga
- c. Ashanga marga
- d. Saptabhanginaya

36. Which among the following is notcome under Ashtanga marga

- a. Right faith
- b. Right devotion

- c. Right thought
- d. Right concentration

37. 'Ashtanga marga' is also known as

- a. Madhamika marga
- b. Ashtanga Yoga
- c. Both
- d. None

38. Kshanikavada is put forwarded by

- a. Kanada
- b. Buddha
- c. Rishabha deva
- d. Jaimini

39. No- Soul theory is also known as

- a. Anatmavada
- b. Atmavada
- c. Syadvada
- d. Anekandavada

40. Which one of the following is nota skanda

- a. Vijnana
- b. Vedana.
- c. Upadana
- d. Samskara

41. Cluster of five factors whichconstitute Soul is called

- a. Nidhana
- b. Nirvana
- c. Upadana
- d. Skanda

42. The Scripture of Buddhism iscalled

- a. Skanda
- b. Triratna
- c. Tripitika
- d. Nidhana

43. Which one among the following isnot a scripture of Buddhism

- a. Vinaya pitika
- b. Buddha pitika
- c. Abhidamapitika
- d. Sutta pitika

44. Which one among the following is a sect of Buddhism
- Mahayana
  - Swethambhara
  - Digambhara
  - Avadhuta
45. The meaning of the term 'Hinayana' is
- Great vessel
  - Little vessel
  - Proximate vessel
  - Remote vessel
46. Poems written by Buddhist nuns are called
- Theragadha
  - Therigadha
  - Mahagadhad
  - Swarnagadha
47. In the 'Causal Wheel' Vedana arises out of
- Sparsa
  - Trishna
  - Upadana
  - Bhava
48. In the 'Causal Wheel' Trishna arises from
- Sparsa
  - Vedana
  - Upadana
  - Bhava
49. In the 'Causal Wheel' 'Samskara' arises from
- Sparsa
  - Vedana
  - Ajnana
  - Bhava
50. In the 'Causal Wheel', Consciousness arises from
- Sparsa
  - Vedana
  - Upadana
  - Samskara
51. In the 'Causal Wheel' Name and form arise from
- Ignorance
  - Desire

- c. Consciousness
- d. Sensation

52. In the 'Causal Wheel' 'Upadana' arises from

- a. Sparsa
- b. Vedana
- c. Ajnana
- d. Trishna

53. In the 'Causal Wheel' 'Bhava' arises from

- a. Upadana
- b. Vedana
- c. Ajnana
- d. Trishna

54. In the 'Causal Wheel' 'Jathi' arises from

- a. Upadana
- b. Vedana
- c. Ajnana
- d. Bhava

55. In Bhava Chakra, each Nidhana is

- a. Independent in origination
- b. Dependent in origination
- c. Both
- d. None

56. In the 'Causal Wheel' 'Old age and death' arises from

- a. Ignorance
- b. Desire
- c. Consciousness
- d. Birth & rebirth

57. Buddha's 'Eight Fold Path' is also known as

- a. Ashtanga marga
- b. Ashtanga Yoga
- c. Syadvada
- d. Nidhan

58. According to Buddha, Soul constitute a cluster of

- a. 10 factors
- b. 8 factors
- c. 5 factors
- d. 2 factors

59. Which one of the following is nota skanda

- a. Rupa
- b. Samjna
- c. Jathi
- d. Samskara

60. The founder of Jainism is

- a. Rishabha Deva
- b. Buddha
- c. Jaimini
- d. Vardhamana Mahaveera

61. The famous prophet who had propagated Jaina Philosophy is

- a. Rishabha Deva
- b. Buddha
- c. Jaimini
- d. Vardhamana Mahaveera

62. The word 'Jaina' came from the word

- a. Jiva
- b. Ajiva
- c. Jina
- d. Jathi

63. According to Jainism 'Jiva' is

- a. Matter
- b. Soul
- c. God
- d. None of the above

64. 'Jiva', in its purest form is called

- a. Jivanmukta
- b. Mukta
- c. Baddha
- d. Bandha

65. The Bounded Soul according to Jainism is called

- a. Mukta
- b. Bandha
- c. Baddha
- d. None of these

66. How many types of Ajivas are there according to Jaina Philosophy

- a. 3
- b. 5

- c. 7
- d. 9

67. Which among the following is not Ajiva

- a. Pudgala
- b. Dharma
- c. Karma
- d. Kala

68. Which among the following is Ajiva

- a. Pudgala
- b. Karma
- c. Abhava
- d. Samavaya

69. The substance which can undergo integration and disintegration is called

- a. Dharma
- b. Pudgala
- c. Adharma
- d. Kala

70. According to Jainism, Matter is made up of

- a. Light
- b. soul
- c. atom
- d. gas

71. The minutest particle of matter which can not be further divided is called

- a. Atom
- b. Soul
- c. Mind
- d. Space

72. Which among the following is not a feature of Time according to Jainism

- a. Eternal
- b. Infinite
- c. Immaterial
- d. Perceptible

73. The filled space according to Jainism is called

- a. Past
- b. Lokaakasa/Alokaakasa
- c. Present
- d. Future

74. The Empty space according to Jainism is called

- a. Lokaakasa
- b. Alokaakasa
- c. Present
- d. Future

75. In which space growing objects are present according to Jainism

- a. Lokaakasa
- b. Alokaakasa
- c. Both
- d. None of these

76. In which space movement of objects is not possible according to Jainism

- a. Lokaakasa
- b. Alokaakasa
- c. Both
- d. None of these

77. The principle of motion according to Jainism is

- a. Pudgala
- b. Kala
- c. Dharma
- d. Adharma

78. The principle of rest according to Jainism is

- a. Pudgala
- b. Kala
- c. Dharma
- d. Adharma

79. Jaina Philosophy is

- a. Realistic
- b. Idealistic
- c. Both
- d. None

80. Jaina theory of Reality is called

- a. Syad vada
- b. Kshanikavada
- c. Anekandavada
- d. Anatmavada

81. Jaina theory of knowledge is called

- a. Syad vada
- b. Kshanikavada

- c. Anekandavada
- d. Anatmavada

82. The word 'Syad' means

- a. Many
- b. One
- c. Complex
- d. Probable

83. According to Jainism how many probable judgements which leads to relative knowledge is

- a. 5
- b. 7
- c. 9
- d. 11

84. Probable judgements which lead to relative knowledge according to Jainism is called

- a. Pratiyasamutpada
- b. Saptabhanginaya
- c. Ashtanga marga
- d. Madhyamika marga

85. Which among the following is not come under Saptabhanginaya

- a. Syad Asti
- b. Syad Nasti
- c. Syad Asteya
- d. Syad Avakthavyam

86. The concept of 'Triratna' is the contribution of

- a. Charvaka
- b. Jainism
- c. Buddhism
- d. Nyaya

87. Which among the following is not a sect of Jainism

- a. Svetambara
- b. Hinayana
- c. Mahayana
- d. Bodhisatva

88. Which among the following is a sect of Jainism

- a. Svetambara
- b. Digambara
- c. Both
- d. None

89. The liberated Soul according to Jaina Philosophy is called

- a. Sarvajna
- b. Sarvatman
- c. Sarvasaktan
- d. Sarvavyapi

90. Which among the following is not a quality of Mukta

- a. Infinite Power
- b. Infinite Bliss
- c. Infinite Life
- d. Infinite Knowledge

91. Which among the following is not a way towards salvation according to Jainism

- a. Samyak Jnana
- b. Samyak Buddhi
- c. Samyak Darsana
- d. Samyak Charitra

92. Which among the following is not come under 'Triratna

- a. Samyak Jnana
- b. Samyak Dhyana
- c. Samyak Darsana
- d. Samyak Charitra

93. Nyaya System is

- a. Orthodox
- b. Heterodox
- c. Both
- d. None

94. Vaisesika System is

- a. Orthodox
- b. Heterodox
- c. Both
- d. None

95. The Term 'Nyaya' means

- a. Nayam
- b. Number
- c. Argumentation
- d. Particularity

96. The Term 'Vaisesika' means

- a. Vishayam
- b. Number
- c. Argumentation
- d. Particularity

97. Which one among the following is called 'Indian Logic'

- a. Nyaya
- b. Vaisesika
- c. Sankhya
- d. Yoga

98. Who among the following is the founder of Nyaya System

- a. Pathanjali
- b. Jaimini
- c. Gautama
- d. Kanada

99. Who among the following is the founder of Vaisesika System

- a. Pathanjali
- b. Jaimini
- c. Gautama
- d. Kanada

100. Who is the author of 'NyayaSutra'

- a. Vatsyayana
- b. Prasasthpada
- c. Kapila
- d. Gautama

101. Who wrote 'Nyaya Bhashya'

- a. Vatsyayana
- b. Prasasthpada
- c. Kapila
- d. Gautama

102. Who among the following is the author of 'VaisesikaSutra'

- a. Kanada
- b. Jaimini
- c. Vijnana Bhikshu
- d. Kapila

103. Who wrote 'VaisesikaBhashya'

- a. Iswara Krishna
- b. Vatsyayana
- c. Prabhakara

d. Prasasthapada

104. Which among the following is not a characteristic feature of NyayaVaiseshikasyste

- a. Realistic
- b. Pluralistic
- c. Both
- d. Dualistic

105. Means of Valid Knowledge is

- a. Prama
- b. Pramatha
- c. Prameya
- d. Pramana

106. Which among the following Pramanas is not accepted by Nyaya

- a. Prathyaksha
- b. Arthapatti
- c. Anumana
- d. Upamana

107. Direct and immediate knowledge obtained through the contact between object and sense organs is

- a. Perception
- b. Inference
- c. Verbal testimony
- d. Comparison

108. The first stage of Perception is called

- a. NirvikalpakaPrathyaksha
- b. SavikalpakaPrathyaksha
- c. LaukikaPrathyaksha
- d. AlukikaPrathyaksha

109. The second stage of Perception is called

- a. NirvikalpakaPrathyaksha
- b. SavikalpakaPrathyaksha
- c. LaukikaPrathyaksha
- d. AlukikaPrathyaksha

110. Perception within the limits of sense organs is called

- a. NirvikalpakaPrathyaksha
- b. SavikalpakaPrathyaksha
- c. LaukikaPrathyaksha
- d. AlukikaPrathyaksha

111. Perception beyond the limits of sense organs is called

- a. Nirvikalpaka Prathyaksha
- b. Savikalpaka Prathyaksha
- c. Laukika Prathyaksha
- d. Alaukika Prathyaksha

112. Mediate and indirect knowledge obtained through previous perception is called

- a. Perception
- b. Inference
- c. Verbal testimony
- d. Comparison

113. Establishment of Universal relation between two inseparable objects is called

- a. Hetu
- b. Udaharana
- c. Vyapti
- d. Nigamana

114. The first step in the Nyaya Syllogism is called

- a. Hetu
- b. Vyapti
- c. Nigamana
- d. Pratijna

115. Which among the following is not a step in Nyaya Syllogism

- a. Pratinjna
- b. Udaharana
- c. Samanya
- d. Nigamana

116. How many steps are there in Nyaya Syllogism

- a. 3
- b. 5
- c. 7
- d. 8

117. Valid knowledge obtained through the utterances of a trustworthy person is called

- a. Prathyaksha
- b. Anumana
- c. Sabda
- d. Upamana

118. Which among the following is regarded as Sabdapramana by Nyaya

- a. Bhagavad Gita
- b. Veda
- c. Mahabharata
- d. Purana

119. Mediate and indirect knowledge derived from the similarity between two objects is

- a. Perception
- b. Inference
- c. Verbal testimony
- d. Comparison

120. According to Vaiseshika objects of valid knowledge is called

- a. Pramana
- b. Padartha
- c. Prameya
- d. Pramatha

121. How many categories are there according to Vaiseshika

- a. 4
- b. 6
- c. 7
- d. 8

122. Which one among the following is not a category of Vaiseshika's System

- a. Samanya
- b. Samavaya
- c. Vishesha
- d. Samhita

123. According to Vaiseshika, material cause of this Universe is

- a. Guna
- b. Dravya
- c. Karma
- d. Abhava

124. How many substances are there according to Vaiseshika

- a. 9
- b. 5
- c. 7
- d. 10

125. Which among the following is not a substance

- a. Time
- b. Space
- c. Dharma

d. Mind

126. Which among the following is atomic in structure

- a. Self
- b. Mind
- c. Karma
- d. Guna

127. Which one among the following is not atomic in nature

- a. Earth
- b. Air
- c. Water
- d. Ether

128. Which among the following is a spiritual substance

- a. Karma
- b. Samanya
- c. Self
- d. Samavaya

129. According to Vaisesika, the seat of knowledge is

- a. Mind
- b. body
- c. Action
- d. Self

130. According to Vaisesika, there are \_\_\_\_\_ qualities

- a. 50
- b. 25
- c. 24
- d. 23

131. How many types of actions are there according to Vaisesika

- a. 5
- b. 6
- c. 7
- d. 8

132. Which among the following is not a type of action according to Vaisesika

- a. Upward movement
- b. Expansion
- c. Locomotion
- d. Forward movement

133. The generic feature commonly present in all members of a class is called

- a. Samavaya
- b. Samanya
- c. Vishesha
- d. Upadhana

134. The unique feature present in each object of a particular class is called

- a. Samavaya
- b. Samanya
- c. Vishesha
- d. Upadhana

135. The intimate and eternal relation between two objects is called

- a. Samavaya
- b. Samanya
- c. Vishesha
- d. Upadhana

136. Non-existence of an object in a particular time and space is called

- a. Upamana
- b. Sparsa
- c. Abhava
- d. Dravya

137. Which one of the following is not an Abhava

- a. PragAbhava
- b. AnyonyaAbhava
- c. AnatmaAbhava
- d. AtyanthaAbhava

138. Non-existence of an object before its construction is called

- a. PragAbhava
- b. AnnyonnyaAbhava
- c. PratvamsaAbhava
- d. Antynthaabhava

139. Non-existence of an object after its destruction is called

- a. PragAbhava
- b. PratvamsaAbhava
- c. AnnyonnyaAbhava
- d. Antynthaabhava

140. Non-existence of an object in another object is called

- a. PragAbhava
- b. AnyonyaAbhava
- c. PratvamsaAbhava

d. Antynthaabhava

141. Absolute non existence is called

- a. PragAbhava
- b. AnyonyaAbhava
- c. PratvamsaAbhava
- d. Antynthaabhava

142. Paramanuvada is the contribution of

- a. Vaiseshika
- b. Samkhya
- c. Yoga
- d. Charvaka

143. The founder of Paramanuvada is

- a. Gautama
- b. Kanada
- c. Pathanjali
- d. Jaimini

144. Which one of the following is not an element of 'Panchabhuta'

- a. Earth
- b. Ether
- c. Water
- d. Light

145. According to Vaiseshika , atoms are structures

- a. Circular
- b. Hexagonal
- c. Globular
- d. Cylindrical

146. Two atoms combined together to form

- a. Triratna
- b. Triad
- c. Diad
- d. Triangle

147. Three Diads combined together to form

- a. Triratna
- b. Triad
- c. Diad
- d. Triangle

148. How many atoms are there in a Triad

- a. 3
- b. 6
- c. 9
- d. 12

149. Asatkaryavada is the theory of causation of

- a. Nyaya Vaisesika
- b. Purvamimamsa
- c. Samkhya Yoga
- d. Uttara mimamsa

150. The founder of Samkhya system is

- a. Jaimini
- b. Kapila
- c. Madhva
- d. Ramanuja

151. The author of Samkhya Sutra is

- a. Kapila
- b. Gautama
- c. Kanada
- d. Vatsyayana

152. The commentary of Samkhya Sutra was written by

- a. Prasasthapada
- b. Vatsyayana
- c. Iswara Krishna
- d. Vijnana Bikshu

153. The term 'Yoga' means

- a. Calculation
- b. Argumentation
- c. Uniqueness
- d. Union with the Absolute

154. The founder of Yoga system is

- a. Gautama
- b. Pathanjali
- c. Kanada
- d. Kapila

155. The author of Yoga Sutra is

- a. Gautama
- b. Pathanjali
- c. Kanada

d. Kapila

156. The commentary of Yoga Sutrawas written by

- a. VijnanaBikshu
- b. Vatsyayana
- c. Iswara Krishna
- d. Jaimini

157. According to Samkhya , the material cause of this Universe is

- a. Prakriti
- b. Purusha
- c. Jiva
- d. Dharma

158. Prakriti is

- a. Many
- b. One
- c. Two
- d. Three

159. Prakriti is

- a. Passive
- b. Active
- c. Both
- d. None

160. Which among the following isnot a constituent of Prakriti

- a. Sattva
- b. Rajas
- c. Tamas
- d. Tejas

161. The disturbance in the equilibrium of gunasin Prakriti iscalled

- a. Samyoga
- b. Salokya
- c. Gunakshobha
- d. Gunakopa

162. Purusha is

- a. Matter
- b. Mind
- c. Self
- d. Man

163. How many Purushas are there according to Samkhya

- a. A. two
- b. Three
- c. Many
- d. Five

164. Which among the following is a characteristic feature of Purusha

- a. Unconscious
- b. Active
- c. Self - luminous
- d. Complex

165. What is the cause of evolution of Prakriti

- a. Presence of Purusha
- b. Presence of Karma
- c. Presence of Dravya
- d. Presence of Atmosphere

166. The first evolute of Prakriti is

- a. Jnanendriya
- b. Karmendriya
- c. Manas
- d. Mahat

167. Which among the following is not a Jnanendriya

- a. Sense of taste
- b. Sense of touch
- c. sense of Speech
- d. Sense of sight

168. Which among the following is not a Karmendriya

- a. Sense of speech
- b. Sense of prehension
- c. Sense of excretion
- d. Sense of smell

169. The evolutes formed from Ahamkara in Psychological branch are

- a. Mind
- b. 5 Sense organs
- c. 5 Motor organs
- d. All these

170. The evolutes formed from Ahamkara in Physical branch are

- a. 5 Subtle elements
- b. 5 Gross elements

- c. Both
- d. None of these

171. Which one among the following is not a Subtle element

- a. Essence of smell
- b. Essence of hearing
- c. Essence of colour
- d. Essence of taste

172. Which among the following is not a gross element

- a. Earth
- b. Air
- c. Water
- d. Colour

173. Five gross elements together known as

- a. PanchaBheta
- b. PanchaBhuta
- c. Pancha tantra
- d. Panchasarira

174. According to Samkhya theory of evolution, how many evolutes are formed from Prakriti

- a. 13
- b. 23
- c. 33
- d. 43

175. Ashtanga Yoga was prescribed by

- a. Jaimini
- b. Kapila
- c. Pathanjali
- d. Kumarila Bhatta

176. The first step of Ashtanga Yoga is

- a. Yama
- b. Niyama
- c. Asana
- d. Pranayama

177. Yama consists of

- a. 8 principles
- b. 5 principles
- c. 10 principles
- d. 7 principles

178. Niyama consists of

- a. 8 principles
- b. 5 principles
- c. 10 principles
- d. 7 principles

179. Which among the following is not a principle of Yama

- a. Saucha
- b. Asteya
- c. Satya
- d. Aparigraha

180. Which among the following is not a principle of Yama

- a. Saucha
- b. Asteya
- c. Santhosha
- d. Tapas

181. The skill to keep his body in a steady position for a long time is called

- a. Yama
- b. Pranayama
- c. Asana
- d. Dhyana

182. Control of breath is called

- a. Pranayama
- b. Dharana
- c. Dhyana
- d. Samadhi

183. The last step of Ashtanga Yoga is

- a. Asana
- b. Dharana
- c. Dhyana
- d. Samadhi

184. Samkhya theory of causation is called

- a. Arambhavada
- b. Parinamavada
- c. Syad vada
- d. Kshanikavada

185. The author of Mimamsa Sutra is

- a. Jaimini
- b. Kanada
- c. Kapila
- d. Sri Sankaracharya

186. Daily duties according to Purvamimamsa is called

- a. Nitya karma
- b. Naimittika Karma
- c. Kamy Karma
- d. None of these

187. Occasional duties according to Purvamimamsa is called

- a. Nitya karma
- b. Naimittika Karma
- c. Kamy Karma
- d. None of these

188. Optional duties according to Purvamimamsa is called

- a. Nitya karma
- b. Naimittika Karma
- c. Kamy Karma
- d. None of these

189. The unseen potency of Soul according to Purvamimamsa is called

- a. Apavarga
- b. Apurva
- c. Upadhana
- d. Sadyatana

190. Advaita Vedanta is the contribution of

- a. Jaimini
- b. Sri Sankaracharya
- c. Kanada
- d. Kapila

191. The power of Illusion is called

- a. Brahman
- b. Atman
- c. Maya
- d. Iswara

192. Prathibhasika level of Reality belongs to

- a. Waking stage
- b. Dreaming stage

- c. Both
- d. None of these

193. Vyavaharika level of reality belongs to

- a. Waking stage
- b. Dreaming stage
- c. both
- d. None of these

194. Visishtadvaita is the contribution of

- a. Kanada
- b. Ramanuja
- c. Sri Sankaracharya
- d. Kapila

195. The relation of Brahman with Jiva and Jagat is called

- a. Sayujya
- b. Salokya
- c. Samipiya
- d. Apradhah Siddhi

196. The founder of Dvaita is

- a. Madhva
- b. Ramanuja
- c. Sri Sankaracharya
- d. Jaimini

197. Which among the following is not come under Panchabheta

- a. Difference between God and Soul
- b. Difference between Soul and Matter
- c. Difference between God and Man
- d. Difference between God and Soul

198. Madhvacharya consider God as

- a. Brahman
- b. Narayana
- c. Siva
- d. Devi

199. Before creation, World is present in Brahman as

- a. Purusha
- b. Prakriti
- c. Soul

d. God

200. Cosmic view of Brahman is advocated by

- a. Madhva
- b. Sankara
- c. Ramanuja
- d. Pathanjali

1. b 2. a 3. c 4. b 5. b 6. b 7. a 8. d 9. c  
10. a 11. b 12. b 13. a 14. d 15. d 16. a  
17. c 18. d 19. b 20. c 21. b 22. d 23. b  
24. c 25. c 26. d 27. b 28. c 29. b 30. b  
31. a 32. d 33. c 34. b 35. d 36. c 37. b  
38. a 39. b 40. a 41. c 42. d 43. c 44. b  
45. a 46. b 47. b 48. a 49. b 50. b 51. d  
52. c 53. d 54. a 55. d 56. c 57. d 58. a  
59. c 60. c 61. a 62. d 63. c 64. b 65. b  
66. c 67. b 68. c 69. a 70. b 71. c 72. a  
73. d 74. b 75. c 76. a 77. b 78. c 79. d  
80. a 81. c 82. a 83. d 84. d 85. b 86. c  
87. b 88. a 89. c 90. a 91. c 92. b 93. b  
94. a 95. a 96. c 97. d 98. a 99. c 100.  
d 101. d 102. a 103. a 104. d 105. d  
106. d 107. b 108. a 109. a 110. b  
111. c 112. d 113. b 114. c 115. d 116.  
c 117. b 118. c 119. b 120. d 121. b  
122. c 123. d 124. b 125. a 126. c 127.  
b 128. d 129. c 130. d 131. c 132. a  
133. d 134. b 135. c 136. a 137. c 138.  
c 139. a 140. b 141. b 142. d 143. a  
144. b 145. d 146. c 147. c 148. b 149.  
b 150. a 151. b 152. a 153. c 154. d  
155. b 156. b 157. a 158. a 159. b  
160. b 161. d 162. d 163. c 164. c 165.  
c 166. a 167. d 168. c 169. d 170. d  
171. c 172. b 173. d 174. b 175. b 176.  
c 177. a 178. b 179. b 180. a 181. b  
182. c 183. a 184. d 185. b 186. a 187.  
a 188. b 189. c 190. b 191. b 192. c  
193. b 194. a 195. b 196. d 197. a  
198. c 199. b 200. C

201. Which of the following Vedic literature where the Varna system was discussed?

- a. Rigveda
- b. Samaveda
- c. Yajurveda
- d. Atharvaveda

Ans: A

Explanation: Ninth Mandal of Rigveda contains hymns called Purusha Sukta from where Varna system was discussed. Hence, A is the correct option.

202. Which of the following Vedic literature contains Gayatri Mantra?

- a. Rigveda
- b. Samaveda
- c. Yajurveda
- d. Atharvaveda

Ans: A

Explanation: Third Mandal of Rigveda contains the Gayatri Mantra which was compiled in the praise of sun god Savitri. Hence, A is the correct option.

203. Which of the following is incorrectly matched:

- a. Rigveda- Hotra or Hotri
- b. Samaveda - Udgatri
- c. Yajurveda - Adhvaryu
- d. All the above

Ans: D

Explanation: Rishi who were experts in Rigveda were called hotra or hotri. Udgatri was the experts of Samaveda. Adhvaryu was the experts of the knowledge of Yajurveda. Indian medicinal science i.e. Ayurveda has its origin from Atharvaveda. Hence, D is the correct option.

204. Which of the following Vedic literature is the collection of sacrificial formulae?

- a. Rigveda
- b. Samaveda
- c. Yajurveda
- d. Atharvaveda

Ans: D

Explanation: The Atharvaveda is composed in Vedic Sanskrit, and it is a collection of 730 hymns with about 6,000 mantras, divided into 20 books. It is the collection of sacrificial formulae which were written both in prose and poetry. Hence, D is the correct option.

205. Which of the following statement (s) is/are related to the Aranyakas?

- a. Written in forests for the hermits and students of the Vedas.
- b. Initiated a changeover from materialistic religion to spiritual religion. Hence, they formed a tradition that culminates in the Upanishads.
- c. Both A and B
- d. Neither A nor B

Ans: C

Explanation: The Aranyakas were written in forests and are concluding parts of the Brahmanas. They are like a bridge between Vedas cum Brahmanas and Upanishads. They don't lay much emphasis on rites, ritual and sacrifices, but have philosophy and mysticism. So they have moral science and philosophy. Hence, C is the correct option.

206. Which of the following are correctly matched

- a. Shiksha - Phonetics of Science of Pronunciation
- b. Kalpa - Rituals and ceremonies

c. Nirukta - Etymology (Origin of words)

d. All the above are correctly matched

Ans: D

Explanation: The Vedanga are six auxiliary disciplines in Vedic culture are as:

207. Which of the following Vedic literature refers to the 'to sit near the feet of'?

a. Vedangas

b. Upanishads

c. Aranyakas

d. Brahmanas

Ans: B

Explanation: The Upanishads are a collection of texts of religious and philosophical nature, written in India. Etymologically, the name Upanishad is composed of the terms upa (near) and shad (to sit), meaning something like "sitting down near". Hence, B is the correct option.

208. Which of the following Vedic literature contains details about the meanings of Vedic hymns, their applications, and stories of their origins?

a. Vedangas

b. Upanishads

c. Aranyakas

d. Brahmanas

Ans: D

Explanation: The Brahmanas are the prose texts which explain the hymns in the Vedas, give explanation and applications and related stories of their origin. Hence, D is the correct option.

209. Which of the following is not correctly matched?

a. Aitareya or Kaushitaki Brahmanas-Yajurveda

b. Tandya and Jaiminiya Brahmanas-Samveda

c. Taittiriya and Shatpatha Brahmanas- Yajurveda

d. Gopath Brahmanas- Atharvaveda

Ans: A

Explanation: The Brahmanas are the prose texts which explain the hymns in the Vedas, give explanation and applications and related stories of their origin. They also have some stories related to the certain persons related to the Vedic Text. Aitareya or Kaushitaki Brahmanas were allotted to the Rigveda for detailing. Tandya and Jaiminiya Brahmanas to Samveda for detailing. Taittiriya and Shatpatha Brahmanas to Yajurveda for detailing. Gopath Brahmanas to the Atharvaveda for detailing. Hence, A is the correct option.

210. Rama was

a. A prince

b. A priest

c. A sage

d. A philosopher

Answer: a. A prince.

211. The word karma refers to

a. Bad things that happen

- b. The fruit of action
- c. The result of previous mistakes
- d. Action

Answer: d. Action.

212. Brahman is

- a. The God of Time
- b. The God of Creation
- c. The all-pervasive one supreme consciousness
- d. A priest

Answer: c. The all-pervasive one supreme consciousness.

213. In the Purusha Sukta, from the head of the Cosmic man emerged

- a. The agriculturalists and artisans
- b. Brahmins
- c. Warriors and kings
- d. Servants

Answer: b. *Brahmins*.

214. The word Dalit means

- a. "the leaders"
- b. "the seers"
- c. "hairy ones"
- d. "the oppressed"

Answer: d. "the oppressed".

215. Which of the following is not one of the Four Ends of Life for Hindus?

- a. Renunciation
- b. Fulfillment of desire
- c. Acquiring wealth
- d. Fulfillment of duty In the Ramayana

Answer: a. Renunciation.

216. Rama went to the forest for fourteen years\_\_\_\_\_.

- a. To kill demons
- b. To protect sages
- c. Because he was banished
- d. To serve the gods Hindus will perform their own last rites while still living a.

Answer: c. Because he was banished.

217. When they take sannyasi vows and become a monk

- b. When they are widowed
- c. As an act of worship for Yama, Lord of the Dead
- d. To act as a guide to help a deceased loved one cross over to a favorable rebirth

Answer: a. When they take *sannyasi* vows and become a monk.

218. Scholars date the earliest parts of the Vedas to

- a. 900 b.c.e.
- b. 1200 b.c.e.
- c. 1500 b.c.e.
- d. 1700 b.c.e.

Answer: c 1500

219. In the Bhagavad Gita, taking up the path of devotion one

- a. Offers up the fruits of one's action to God
- b. Performs worship three times a day
- c. Recites the names of Krishna
- d. Studies the scriptures with a love in one's heart

Answer: a. Offers up the fruits of one's action to God.

220. The arati ritual involves

- a. Fanning the icon with yak tail fans
- b. Bathing the icon in auspicious substances
- c. Carrying the icon in procession
- d. Waving lamps before the icon

Answer: d. Waving lamps before the icon.

221. The Hindu holiday that encourages mischief and mayhem is called

- a. Holi
- b. Diwali
- c. Navaratri
- d. Vijaya Dashami

Answer: a. Holi.

222. The Indus Valley civilization reached its peak of development around

- a. 2300 b.c.e.
- b. 1700 b.c.e.
- c. 1500 b.c.e.
- d. 1200 b.c.e.

Answer: a. 2300 b.c.e..

223. The most important of the ancient Vedic gods, such as Indra and Agni,

- a. Play no part in later Hindu mythology
- b. Continue in later Hindu myth but have a subordinate status
- c. Are conquered by the later Hindu gods
- d. Continue to dominate the Hindu pantheon today

Answer: b. Continue in later Hindu myth but have a subordinate status.

225. The funerary practice of Zoroastrians involve

- a. Exposing the corpse atop a tower to feed birds of prey
- b. Burial in an earthen pot

- c. Burial at sea
- d. Cremation in a large clay oven

Answer: a. Exposing the corpse atop a tower to feed birds of prey.

226. The term "Sanskritization" describes when

- a. Sacred texts in the regional language are translated into Sanskrit
- b. Ancient government policies insisted that only Sanskrit be spoken
- c. Alternate religious ideologies are appropriated and adopted into Hinduism
- d. Sanskrit-language speakers displaced Dravidian-language speakers

Answer: c. Alternate religious ideologies are appropriated and adopted into Hinduism.

227. Dayananda Saraswati (1824–1883)

- a. Rejected caste in both its forms of varna and jati
- b. Rejected the epics and puranas as eroding the purity of the Vedas
- c. Founded the Ramakrishna Math
- d. All of the above

Answer: b. Rejected the epics and *puranas* as eroding the purity of the *Vedas*.

228. Gandhi referred to the untouchables as

- a. Harijans
- b. Dalits
- c. Great souls
- d. Freedom fighters

Answer: a. *Harijans*.

229. Hindu teachings on karma and reincarnation were first presented in the

- a. Vedas
- b. Brahmanas
- c. Upanishads
- d. Bhagavad Gita

Answer: c. *Upanishads*.

230. Shiva was originally

- a. A wild and frightening deity
- b. A god of ascetics
- c. Associated with healing and disease
- d. All of the above

Answer: a. A wild and frightening deity

231. Which of the following School challenges the authority of the Vedas as well as the hegemony of the Brahman priests?

- a. Charvaka Philosophy of Materialism
- b. Ajivika School
- c. Purva Mimamsa

d. Vedanta

Ans: A

232. Which School is originally called Sanatana Dharma?

- a. Nastika School
- b. Astika School
- c. Both of the above
- d. None of the above

Ans: B

233. Which of the following statement(s) is/are correct explanation of the term "Jiva"?

- a. It is that state in which puruṣa is bonded to prakṛti in some form.
- b. To realize the puruṣa distinct from prakṛti.
- c. It is immutable, eternal and conscious by its very nature.
- d. It evolves from subtle to gross, and manifests the visible world.

Ans: A

234. Select the correct statement (s) related to the Yoga

- I. Yoga accepts the twenty five principles of Sankhya school along with Isvara or God as the twenty-sixth. So it is more theistic.
- II. Yoga gives the practical steps to realize the puruṣa distinct from prakṛti.
- III. Yoga system was founded by Hiranyagarbha and later systematized and propagated by the sage Patanjali.

Code:

- a. Only I
- b. Only II
- c. Both I & II
- d. I, II & III

Ans: D

235. Consider the following statement (s) is/are related to the Nyaya School

- I. Its methodology is based on a system of logic that has subsequently been adopted by the majority of the Indian schools, in much the same way as Aristotelian logic has influenced Western philosophy.
- II. The goal is to quiet one's mind and achieve kaivalya (solitariness or detachment).

Which of the above statement (s) is/are correct?

- a. Only I
- b. Only II
- c. Both I & II
- d. Neither I nor II

Ans: A

236. Which of the following School accepted perception and inference as sources of valid knowledge?

- a. Nyaya School
- b. Vaisheshika
- c. Both A & B

d. None of the above

Ans: B

237. Which of the following School is known as Lokayata. a term means Naturalist(Sanskrit) or Worldly (Pali)?

a. Ajivika School

b. Astika School

c. Charvaka school

d. None of the above

Ans: C

238. The four main divisions of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and\_\_\_\_\_.

a. bioethics

b. logic

c. aesthetics

d. categorical logic

Answer: b. logic.

239. The study of reality in the broadest sense, an inquiry into the elemental nature of the universe and the things in it, is known as\_\_\_\_\_.

a. metaphysics

b. epistemology

c. quantum physics

d. axiology

Answer: a. metaphysics.

240. Questions like "What is knowledge?" and "What is truth?" are mainstays in the branch of philosophy known as\_\_\_\_\_.

a. logic

b. metaphysics

c. epistemology

d. aesthetics

Answer: c. epistemology.

241. Who postulated "Religion began as early humans responded to the forces of nature (the sun, moon, tides, winds, etc.) by personifying them and attaching myths and rituals to them"?

a. Max Muller

b. Sigmund Freud

c. Ninian Smart

d. Peter Berger

Answer: a. Max Muller.

242. Which of these scholars advocated that religion should be examined by how it handles certain archetypal notions such as the profane and sacred?

a. Ninian Smart

- b. Mircea Eliade
- c. Emile Durkheim
- d. Paul Tillich

Answer:b

243. The visions of the Prophet Muhammad, the conversion of Paul, and the enlightenment of the Buddha are all examples of which dimension of religion?

- a. the mythic/narrative dimension
- b. the practical/ritual dimension
- c. the experiential/emotional dimension
- d. the doctrinal/philosophical dimension

Answer: c. the experiential/emotional dimension.

244. Which of these religious traditions teaches the supreme importance of harmony in the family, community, and state?

- a. Confucianism
- b. Judaism
- c. Hinduism
- d. Christianity

Answer:b

245. Who argued that "Religion arose from the early human's attempts to control nature through magic"?

- a. Karl Marx
- b. James Frazer
- c. Sigmund Freud
- d. Max Muller

Answer:b

246. Who theorized religion in this way: "People have imagined religion by projecting human desires, needs, or attributes onto imaginary deities"?

- a. Karl Marx
- b. Paul Tillich
- c. Ludwig Feuerbach
- d. Karl Barthes

Answer:c

247. Which of these is not one of the definitions for religion listed in the textbook?

- a. belief in Spiritual Beings
- b. what the individual does with his own solitariness
- c. that which is of ultimate concern
- d. belief in God

Answer:d

248. Merlin Stone did not base her claims about ancient religion on which of these?

- a. archeological evidence
- b. gods and goddesses of the oldest living religious tradition, Hinduism, in India
- c. ancient Sumerian text
- d. Wiccan traditions

Answer: d

249. Which scholar proclaimed religion is "the opium of the people"?

- a. Sigmund Freud
- b. Emile Durkheim
- c. Karl Marx
- d. Merlin Stone

Answer: c

250. Which of these best describes the noetic quality?

- a. love
- b. time
- c. knowledge
- d. emotion

Answer: c

251. William James studied which aspect of religion?

- a. religious experience
- b. religious symbolism
- c. religious myths
- d. religious rituals

Answer: a

252. The best method used by scholars to compare religions is to find

- a. similar symbols in each tradition that connote different meanings.
- b. the most similarities between two traditions and ignore the differences.
- c. common creation stories.
- d. dynamic equivalents between traditions.

Answer: d

253. Stories that are recognized by the relevant body of the faithful are considered

- a. myths.
- b. folklore.
- c. beliefs.
- d. canonical.

Answer: a

254. Which of these religious traditions teaches the supreme importance of harmony in the family, community, and state?

- a. Confucianism
- b. Judaism
- c. Hinduism
- d. Christianity

Answer: a

255. Which of these is a way to study and write about religion that is considered a religious endeavor?

- a. theology
- b. moral philosophy
- c. religious studies
- d. biblical criticism

Answer: a

256. The material dimension includes which one of these?

- a. natural features of the world
- b. the doctrines of believers
- c. the act of meditation
- d. myths of creation

Answer: a. natural features of the world.

257. The Hindu Trinity does not include which of these gods?

- a. Brahma
- b. Vishnu
- c. Shiva
- d. Ganesh

Answer: d. Ganesh.

258. The belief that everything (both living and inanimate) is animated by spirits is called

- a. Holy Ghost.
- b. Wicca.
- c. Animism.
- d. nature religion.

Answer: c. Animism..

259. Which of these is not one of these seven dimensions of religion?

- a. the practical dimension
- b. the emotional dimension
- c. the divine dimension
- d. the mythic dimension

Answer: c. the divine dimension.

260. The academic study of religion, called religious studies,

- a. remains neutral regarding the truth or justification of religious claims.

- b. makes claims about the veracity of each religion's ritual practices.
- c. is the same thing as theology.
- d. advocates for a secular society.

Answer: a. remains neutral regarding the truth or justification of religious claims..

261. Reasons for the spread of Buddhism included basic ideas of the Mahayan Buddhism?

1. Simplicity of religion.
2. Special appeal for the downtrodden.
3. Missionary spirit of the religion.
4. Use of local language
5. Reinforcement of vedic spirit by philosophers.

Select the correct answer from the codes given below:

- a. 1, 2 and 3
- b. 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2, 3, 4 and 5

Correct Answer: C

Solution :Reason for the spread of Buddhism were as following –

1. Simplicity of Religion.
2. Special appeals for downtrodden.
3. Missionary spirit of the religion.
4. Use of local language.

262. Who among the following was associated with formulation of the

- a. Nagarjuna
- b. Kashyapa Matanga
- c. Menander
- d. Kanishka

Answer: A

Solution :The fathers of the Mahayana were considered to be Nagarjuna, who lived between the first and second centuries of our era and founded what is known as the Madhyamika philosophy or philosophy of the Middle Way and Maitreyanatha who lived in the third century of our era. Maitreyanatha's philosophy was developed in the fourth century by two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandhu and was known as Yogacara or Vijñānavada philosophy.

263. Which of the following statements is/ are correct? [2014-II]

1. Early Buddhist literature is generally composed of the canonical text.
2. The Buddhist schools classify their canonical literature as

Select the correct answer using the code given below:

- a. 1 only
- b. 2 only
- c. Both 1 and 2
- d. Neither 1 nor 2

Answer: C

Solution :Canonical texts are those that are linked to Gautama Buddha in one way or another. Canonical texts comprise three different kind of texts - the sutras (discourses), vinaya (discipline) and abhidharma (analytical texts), together they are called the Three Baskets' or Tipitaka (in Pali language) and Tripitaka (in Sanskrit).

264. In Buddhism, what does Patimokkha stand for? [2008-II]

- a. A description of Mahayana Buddhism
- b. A description of Hinayana Buddhism
- c. The rules of the Sangha
- d. The questions of King Menander

Answer: C

Solution :Pathnokkha stands for the rules of the Sangha. Buddha Dhamma and Sangha are the three Jewels of Buddhism.

265. The is/are at the heart of Buddha's system of teachings about the true nature of reality and how to live correctly to transcend it.

- a. Three Jewels
- b. Sixfold Path
- c. Four Baskets
- d. Four Noble Truths

Answer: d. Four Noble Truths.

266. Which of these is not included in the Four Noble Truths?

- a. Life is suffering
- b. To banish suffering, banish desires.
- c. Suffering is caused by desires.
- d. Suffering is the righteous path.

Answer: d. Four Noble Truths.

267. Which of these is the Second Noble Truth?

- a. The cause of suffering is selfish desire for things that we can never truly obtain.
- b. Life is suffering.
- c. Suffering is caused by karma accumulated before rebirth.
- d. The Eightfold Path is (pauses to google Eightfold Path) the heart of Buddhist practice.

Answer: d. Suffering is the righteous path..

268. Generally \_\_\_\_\_ holds that nirvana is attained through personal effort, with little or no help from Buddhas, bodhisattvas, or teachers.

- a. Mahayana
- b. Zen
- c. Theravada
- d. Koan

Answer: a. The cause of suffering is selfish desire for things that we can never truly obtain..

269. Which of these terms denotes Buddhism's core teachings systematized in the Four Noble

Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path?

- a. samsara
- b. dharma
- c. moksha
- d. yoga

Answer: b. dharma.

270. Who propounds organic relation between man and society ?

- a. Hegel
- b. Aristotle
- c. Mill
- d. Bentham

Answer: (A)

271. Who says that 'Act as a member of Kingdom of ends' ?

- a. Aristotle
- b. Spinoza
- c. Mill
- d. Kant

Answer: (D)

272. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than to be a pig satisfied, it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than to be a fool satisfied,' is a statement of

- a. Kant
- b. Hume
- c. Mill
- d. Bentham

Answer: (C)

273. Who among the following Philosophers has propounded the concept of 'Pure Being' ?

- a. Pythagoras
- b. Democritus
- c. Heraclitus
- d. Parmenides

Answer: (D)

274. Which one of the following theories of error is maintained by Rāmānuja ?

- a. Satkhyāti
- b. Asatkhyāti
- c. Atmakhyāti
- d. Anirvachniya khyāti

Answer: (A)

275. Which one of the following is known as moderate Bauddha (Pracchanna Bauddha) ?

- a. Mahāvira
- b. Sāmkhya

c.Shankara  
d Cārvāka  
Answer:(C)

276. 'Jin' is associated with

- a. Buddhism
- b. Jainism
- c. Sikhism
- d Islam

Answer:(B)

277. Prajñyā, Sila and Samādhi are the key concepts of

- a. Hinduism
- b. Jainism
- c. Buddhism
- d. None of the above

Answer:(C)

278. Who introduced internal sanction in morality ?

- a. Bentham
- b. Mill
- c. Sidgwick
- d Hume

Answer:(B)

279. A Hypothesis is scientifically valuable if it is

- a. opposed to established scientific law
- b. opposed to religious belief
- c. in agreement with a religious belief
- d. verifiable

Answer:(D)

280. What is meant by 'Pancalabdhi' ?

- a. Uplabdhi, Mahālabdhi, Kāranalabdhi, Mocanalabdhi, Anuplabdhi
- b. Kshyopśamlabdhi, Viśuddhilabdhi, Deśanālabdhi, Prāyogyalabdhi, Karanalabdhi
- c. Labhālabdhi, Deśanālabdhi, Krpālabdhi, Samvaralabdhi, Nirjarālabdhi
- d. None of these

Answer:(B)

281. Which one of the following correctly represents the status of soul according to Ramanuja ?

- a. There is unqualified identity between soul and God.
- b. God and soul are two separate entities.
- c. Soul is same as the body.
- d. The relation between soul and God is that of parts and whole.

Answer:(D)

282. Which one of the following is true of Buddhism ?

- a. Nirvana can be achieved only in this life.
- b. Nirvana can be achieved only in the life after death.
- c. Nirvana can be achieved both in this life and life after death.
- d. Nirvana can be achieved by the grace of the Tathagat.

Answer:(C)

283. Who takes into Consideration the length and breadth in Ethics ?

- a. Mill
- b. Spinoza
- c. Spencer
- d. Moore

Answer:(C)

284. What type of Sattā is ascribable to Brahman ?

- a. Vyāvaharika
- b. Paramārthika
- c. Both Vyāvaharika & Paramārthika
- d. Prātibhāsika

Answer:(B)

285. In which Āshrama Vyāvasthā, a person leaves for the jungle in order to pray to God and practice Yoga ?

- a. Brahmacharya
- b. Gārhastha
- c. Vānaprastha
- d. Sanyāsa

Answer:(C)

286. The two sentences labelled as Assertion (A) and Reason (R) are given below. Mark the correct code according to these :

Assertion (A) : According to Mimāmsā Vedas are eternal. Reason (R) : According to Mimāmsā words are eternal.

Codes :

- a. Both (A) and (R) are true and (R) provides correct explanation to (A).
- b. Both (A) and (R) are true, but (R) does not provide correct explanation to (A).
- c. (A) is true, (R) is false and (R) does not provide correct explanation to (A).
- d. (A) is false, (R) is true and (R) provides correct explanation to (A).

Answer:(A)

287. Match List – I with List – II and mark the correct option :

List – I

List – II

- a. Purusārtha                      i. Varna
- b. Brahmavihāra                ii. Musavādā

- c. Pancaśila                      iii. Mokśa  
 d. Vaiśya                          iv. Karunā

Codes :

a b c d

- a. i ii iii iv  
 b. iii iv ii i  
 c. iv ii i iii  
 d. iii i ii iv

Answer:(B)

288. Consider the following statements in the context of Bentham and mark the correct code :

1. Greatest happiness of the greatest number.
2. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters pain and pleasure.
3. Community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons.

Codes :

- a. 1 and 2 are true.  
 b. 1 and 3 are true.  
 c. only 1 is true.  
 d. 1, 2 and 3 are true.

Answer:(D)

289. 'Enlightened Anarchy' means

- a. Lawlessness  
 b. Non-existence of the state  
 c. Lawlessness of the intellectuals  
 d. Imperialism

Answer:(C)

290. The view that 'Jātī' is as much real as the Vyakti is held by

- a. The Nyāya school  
 b. The Bauddha school  
 c. The Cārvāka school  
 d. The Advaita Vedanta school

Answer:(A)

291. Which one of the following statements does not truly reflect Gandhi's Philosophy of life ?

- a. Hate the sin but not the sinner.  
 b. Non-violence is an active moral fight against wickedness.  
 c. Both of the options given above are true.  
 d. Neither (A) is true nor (B).

Answer:(D)

292. According to Gandhiji, the goal of constructive programme is

- a. Providing economic relief to the unemployed

- b. Distributing some wages to spinners and weavers
- c. Creating a non-violent society
- d. None of the above

Answer:(C)

293. Sarvadharmā Samabhava :according to Gandhi means

- a. There is the unity of all religions
- b. All religions are to be treated equally
- c. All religions should be synthesised
- d. All religions teach moral values.

Answer:(B)

294. Right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are known as \_\_\_ in Jaina ethics that shine is a good life.

- a. Triratna
- b. Triguna
- c. Trijñāna
- d. None of these

Answer:(A)

295. According to Gandhi, trusteeship means

- a. Bread-Labour
- b. Swadeshi
- c. Possessing wealth and its distribution to the needy
- d. Greediness

Answer:(C)

296. Arrange the following concepts in which they appeared. Use the code given below :

- I. Paitya Samutpada
- II. Nirvana
- III. First Noble Truth
- IV. Eight fold path (Dukh Nirodh Marg)

Codes :

- a. I, II, III, IV
- b. IV, III, II, I
- c. III, I, II, IV
- d. II, III, I, IV

Answer:(C)

297. The philosophy of Satyagraha is originally ascribed to

- a. Ruskin
- b. Mahatma Gandhi
- c. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
- d. Koutilya

Answer:(B)

298. The word Ahinsā was first used in the following Indian text :

- a. Bhagavad Gita
- b. Chandogya Upanishad
- c. Ramayana
- d. Rigveda

Answer:(B)

299. Religion according to Gandhi is :

- a. Justice
- b. Prayer
- c. Moral Principle
- d. Freedom

Answer:(C)

300. "We do not want mass production but we want production for the masses" advocated by

- a. Marx
- b. Gandhi
- c. Nehru
- d. Amartya Sen

Answer:(B)

301. Match List – I and List – II and select the code correctly matched :

List – I

List – II

- a. Advait Vedanta      i. Nimbark
- b. Vishista dvaitvada    ii. Shankar
- c. Dvaitvada            iii. Ramanuja
- d. Dvaitadvaitvada    iv. Madhva

Codes :

a b c d

- a.    iii ii i iv
- b.    ii iii iv i
- c.    iv ii iii i
- d.    i ii iii iv

Answer:(B)

302. Which of the following statements are associated with Gandhiji's concept of truth ?

- 1. Truth is an ontological category.
- 2. Truth is an ethical category.
- 3. Truth is only a property of statement.

Select the correct answer from the codes given below :

Codes :

- a. 1, 2 and 3
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 2 and 3
- d. 1 and 3

Answer:(B)

303. Samavāyikārana of the world according to the Vaiśeṣikas is

- a. Īśvara
- b. Paramānu-Sa yoga
- c. Dvyanuka .
- d. Paramānu

Answer:(D)

304. Pārmārthika Sattā may be refuted by

- a. Vyavahārika Sattā
- b. Prātibhasika Sattā
- c. Both (A) and (B)
- d. None of the above

Answer:(D)

305. Which one of the following pairs is not correctly matched ?

- a. The doctrine of Monads – Leibnitz
- b. The Doctrine of Modes – Spinoza
- c. Berkeley's Philosophy – Solipsism
- d. Distinction between 'Knowledge concerning relation of Ideas' and 'Knowledge concerning matter of fact' – Kant

Answer:(D)

306. The view that "God alone is real and other finite things are suppressed or annulled in the existence of God" is called

- a. Theism
- b. Pantheism
- c. Animism
- d. Deism

Answer:(B)

307. Mark the option which is not correct in the context of Hegel's philosophy

- a. Idea of God ≠ Highest universal
- b. Real is Rational.
- c. Pure Being = non being
- d. The Ultimate Reality can be explained in forms of causality.

Answer:(D)

308. Who propounds that God is appearance ?

- a. Spinoza

- b. Descartes
- c. Hume
- d. Bradley

Answer:(D)

309. Who says that 'Non- Contradiction is the criterion of Reality' ?

- a. Hegel
- b. Plato
- c. Bradley
- d. None of the above

Answer:(C)

310. Mark the group, that is the most suitable to Nietzsche's Philosophy' ?

- a. Sense-data, Protocol Statement, Epoché, Tragedy
- b. Crisis, Superman, attack on Christianity, Evolution
- c. Supermind, Tragedy, Epoché, Speech act
- d. Crisis, Tragedy, Protocol statement, attack on Christianity

Answer:(B)

311. Mark the statement which is not true :

- a. Subjective idealism results in Solipsism.
- b. Conceptualism is a theory given to explain universal
- c. Causality is a ground of Induction
- d. Kant ascribes space and time as 'a-priori' concepts

Answer:(D)

312. Who tells – "Knowledge is primarily of a definite object and is to be distinguished from the awareness of the indefinite."

- a. Ambedkar
- b. Radhakrishnan
- c. K.C. Bhattacharya
- d. Tagore

Answer:(C)

313. Given below are two sets List – I and List – II. List – I consists of the propounders and List – II of the doctrines. Consider them and select the correctly matched code :

List – I      List – II

- a. Sankara      i. Prapatti
- b. Rāmānuja    ii. Śūnyatā
- c. Madhva      iii. Jivanmukti
- d. Nagarjuna    iv. Ānandatāratamya

Codes :

a b c d

- a. i ii iii iv
- b. iii i iv ii
- c. ii i iii iv
- d. i iii ii iv

Answer:(B)

314. Spinoza explained the relation between mind and body by the help of

- a. Inter-actionism
- b. Parallelism
- c. Pre-established harmony
- d. Identity-in-difference

Answer:(B)

315. In Buddhist Philosophy Avinābhāva relation is based on

- a. Identity, Negation, Co-existence
- b. Identity, Causality, Negation
- c. Causality, Negation, Co-existence
- d. Causality, Identity, Co-existence

Answer:(B)

316. In the following inference there is fallacy of : 'Sky flower is fragrant because it has floweriness in it'

- a. Anekāntika
- b. Satpratipak a
- c. Bādhita
- d. Aśsayāsiddhā

Answer:(D)

317. Read the following arguments and select the fallacy in it, using the code given below :

Argument : "All Hindus are Aryans. No Persians are Hindus. No Persians are Aryans". Codes :

- a. Fallacy of Illicit Major
- b. Fallacy of Illicit Minor
- c. Fallacy of Four Terms
- d. Fallacy of Undistributed Middle

Answer:(A)

318. In the context of laws of thought mark the best combination of the laws as given below :

Laws :

- I. Law of Identity
- II. Law of Contradiction
- III. Law of Excluded Middle
- IV. Law of Sufficient Reason

Combinations :

- a. I and II are correct.

- b. III and IV are correct.
- c. I, II and IV are correct.
- d. I, II, III and IV are correct.

Answer:(D)

319. Match List – I with List – II and select the right answer using the code, given below :

List – I    List – II

- a. AAA    i. Ferio
- b. All    ii. Celarent
- c. EAE    iii. Darii
- d. EIO    iv. Barbara

Codes :

a b c d

- a. iii v iv i
- b. iii iv i ii
- c. iv iii ii i
- d. v iv i iii

Answer:(C)

320. Which of the following statements are true with regard to phenomenology ?

- a. Phenomenologist's is not concerned with particular facts as such.
- b. The subject matter of Phenomenology is the ideal meanings and universal relations with which the ego is confronted in its experience.
- c. Only (A) (as above said) is true and (B) is false.
- d. Both (A) and (B) (as above said) are true.

Answer:(D)

321. The objects of phenomenological inquiry are

- a. External objects
- b. Intentional objects
- c. Extensional objects
- d. Ideal objects

Answer:(B)

322. Given below are two statements, one labelled as Assertion (A), and Reason

(R) : Assertion (A) : According to Quine, the verificationist theory has

taken language in a very piecemeal fashion.

Reason (R) : It therefore has resulted in a sort of reductionism.

In the context of the above two statements, which of the following is incorrect ?

Code :

- a. Both (A) and (R) are true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A).
- b. Both (A) and (R) are true but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A).
- c. (A) is true, but (R) is false.

d. (A) is false, but (R) is true

Answer:(A)

323. Match List – I with List – II and select the correct answer code from below :

List – I            List – II

- |                    |                    |                 |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| a. On the logic of | i. Gadamer         | social sciences |
| b. Being and       | ii. Habermas       | time            |
| c. Philosophical   | iii. Heidegger     | Hermeneutics    |
| d. Hermeneutics    | iv. Schleiermacher | and Criticism   |

Codes :

a b c d

a. ii iii i iv

b. iv iii i ii

c. i iii iv ii

d. ii iii iv i

Answer:(A)

324. Match the List – I with List – II choose correct answer from the code given below :

List – I            List – II (Authors) (Books)

- |                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| a. G.E. Moore   | i. Foundations of the metaphysics of Morals |
| b. Kant         | ii. Right and the good                      |
| c. F.H. Bradley | iii. Principia Ethica                       |
| d. W.D. Ross    | iv. Ethical studies                         |

Codes :

a b c d

a. iv i iii ii

b. iii i iv ii

c. i ii iv iii

d. ii i iii iv

Answer:(B)

325. When 'A' proposition is true, E and I propositions are

- a. False and true
- b. True and false
- c. False and doubtful
- d. True and doubtful

Answer:(A)

326. Social rights which form a part of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) address covers which of the following aspects ?

- a. Education
- b. Food

- c. Employment
- d. All of the above

Answer:(D)

327. Which position is held by the Naiyāyikas regarding the relation between pada and padārtha (vrthi) ?

- a. Śakti and Laksanā
- b. Gauni and Vyañjanā
- c. Śakti, Laksanā and Vyañjanā
- d. Vyañjanā, Gauni and Laksana

Answer:(A)

328. Which of the following Vedic literature where the Varna system was discussed?

- a. Rigveda
- b. Samaveda
- c. Yajurveda
- d. Atharvaveda

Ans: A

Explanation: Ninth Mandal of Rigveda contains hymns called Purusha Sukta from where Varna system was discussed. Hence, A is the correct option.

329. Which of the following Vedic literature contains Gayatri Mantra?

- a. Rigveda
- b. Samaveda
- c. Yajurveda
- d. Atharvaveda

Ans: A

Explanation: Third Mandal of Rigveda contains the Gayatri Mantra which was compiled in the praise of sun god Savitri. Hence, A is the correct option.

330. Which of the following is incorrectly matched:

- a. Rigveda- Hotra or Hotri
- b. Samaveda - Udgatri
- c. Yajurveda - Adhvaryu
- d. All the above

Ans: D

Explanation: Rishi who were experts in Rigveda were called hotra or hotri. Udgatri was the experts of Samaveda. Adhvaryu was the experts of the knowledge of Yajurveda. Indian medicinal science i.e. Ayurveda has its origin from Atharvaveda. Hence, D is the correct option.

331. Which of the following Vedic literature is the collection of sacrificial formulae?

- a. Rigveda
- b. Samaveda
- c. Yajurveda

d. Atharvaveda

Ans: D

Explanation: The Atharvaveda is composed in Vedic Sanskrit, and it is a collection of 730 hymns with about 6,000 mantras, divided into 20 books. It is the collection of sacrificial formulae which were written both in prose and poetry. Hence, D is the correct option.

332. Which of the following statement (s) is/are related to the Aranyakas?

- a. Written in forests for the hermits and students of the Vedas.
- b. Initiated a changeover from materialistic religion to spiritual religion. Hence, they formed a tradition that culminates in the Upanishads.
- c. Both A and B
- d. Neither A nor B

Ans: C

Explanation: The Aranyakas were written in forests and are concluding parts of the Brahmanas. They are like a bridge between Vedas cum Brahmanas and Upanishads. They don't lay much emphasis on rites, ritual and sacrifices, but have philosophy and mysticism. So they have moral science and philosophy. Hence, C is the correct option.

333. Which of the following are correctly matched

- a. Shiksha - Phonetics of Science of Pronunciation
- b. Kalpa - Rituals and ceremonies
- c. Nirukta - Etymology (Origin of words)
- d. All the above are correctly matched

Ans: D

Explanation: The Vedanga are six auxiliary disciplines in Vedic culture are as:

- (A) Shiksha- Phonetics of Science of Pronunciation
- (B) Kalpa- Rituals and ceremonies
- (C) Vyakarana - Grammar
- (D) Nirukta – Etymology (Origin of words)
- (E) Chhanda – Metrics, rules of poetic composition
- (F) Jyotisha- Astronomy Hence, D is the correct option.

334. Which of the following Vedic literature refers to the 'to sit near the feet of'?

- a. Vedangas
- b. Upanishads
- c. Aranyakas
- d. Brahmanas

Ans: B

Explanation: The Upanishads are a collection of texts of religious and philosophical nature, written in India. Etymologically, the name Upanishad is composed of the terms upa (near) and shad (to sit), meaning something like "sitting down near". Hence, B is the correct option.

335. Which of the following Vedic literature contains details about the meanings of Vedic hymns, their applications, and stories of their origins?

- a. Vedangas

- b. Upanishads
- c. Aranyakas
- d. Brahamanas

Ans: D

Explanation: The Brahamanas are the prose texts which explain the hymns in the Vedas, give explanation and applications and related stories of their origin. Hence, D is the correct option.

336. Which of the following is not correctly matched?

- a. Aitareya or Kaushitaki Brahamnas-Yejurveda
- b. Tandya and Jaiminiya Brahamans-Samveda
- c. Taittiriya and Shatpatha Brahamans- Yajurveda
- d. Gopath Brahamans- Atharvaveda

Ans: A

Explanation: The Brahamanas are the prose texts which explain the hymns in the Vedas, give explanation and applications and related stories of their origin. They also have some stories related to the certain persons related to the Vedic Text. Aitareya or Kaushitaki Brahamnas were allotted to the Rigveda for detailing. Tandya and Jaiminiya Brahamans to Samveda for detailing. Taittiriya and Shatpatha Brahamans to Yajurveda for detailing. Gopath Brahamans to the Atharvaveda for detailing. Hence, A is the correct option.

337. Rama was

- a. A prince
- b. A priest
- c. A sage
- d. A philosopher

Answer: a. A prince.

338. The word karma refers to

- a. Bad things that happen
- b. The fruit of action
- c. The result of previous mistakes
- d. Action

Answer: d. Action.

339. Brahman is

- a. The God of Time
- b. The God of Creation
- c. The all-pervasive one supreme consciousness
- d. A priest

Answer: c. The all-pervasive one supreme consciousness.

340. In the Purusha Sukta, from the head of the Cosmic man emerged

- a. The agriculturalists and artisans
- b. Brahmins

- c. Warriors and kings
- d. Servants

Answer: b. *Brahmins*.

341. The word Dalit means

- a. "the leaders"
- b. "the seers"
- c. "hairy ones"
- d. "the oppressed"

Answer: d. "the oppressed".

342. Which of the following is not one of the Four Ends of Life for Hindus?

- a. Renunciation
- b. Fulfillment of desire
- c. Acquiring wealth
- d. Fulfillment of duty In the Ramayana

Answer: a. Renunciation.

343. Rama went to the forest for fourteen years\_\_\_\_\_.

- a. To kill demons
- b. To protect sages
- c. Because he was banished
- d. To serve the gods Hindus will perform their own last rites while still living a.

Answer: c. Because he was banished.

## **UNIT – 2**

**Classical Western: Ancient,  
Medieval, And Modern:  
Epistemology And Metaphysics**

## **Presocratic Philosophy INTRODUCTION**

The story of philosophy in Western civilization begins in ancient Greece, which produced three of the world's greatest thinkers, namely, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. While it would be nice to start our study with Socrates, the first prominent figure in the history of philosophy, the fact is that Socrates did not create his views from thin air. Rather, he was the outgrowth of a remarkably fertile philosophical environment within Greece that had been germinating for a couple centuries. We call this early period Presocratic philosophy, that is, philosophy before Socrates, and well over 100 philosophers actively contributed to its accomplishments.

### **Beyond Mythology**

Even before the Presocratic philosophers came on the scene, religious mythology was already setting the conceptual stage for philosophical speculation. Religion, then as now, was a powerful social force in shaping views of human nature and the cosmos. According to the Greeks, the gods bring about natural disasters, make demands on human conduct, and determine our place in the afterlife. Two Greek mythologists in particular developed an especially sophisticated religious world-life view. The first is Homer (fl. c. 750 BCE), the famed author of the epic tales the Iliad and the Odyssey, which chronicle the adventures of a hero named Odysseus. Throughout his journeys to the underworld and other parts of the mythological universe, Odysseus regularly encounters gods and strange creatures, sometimes appeasing them, other times battling them. Second is Hesiod (fl. c. 700 BCE), author of the Theogony, a work that describes the origins of hundreds of deities from a common pair of ancestors at the beginning of the world.

Two aspects of their mythology deserves mention for their impact on early philosophy. First, their cosmologies do not attribute the creation of the world to the work of the gods. While Zeus is the supreme god, he is not described as the creator. Homer takes the universe as a given, and Hesiod describes its origins as follows:

First Chaos was created, then wide-bosomed Earth, the eternal unshaken foundation of the immortal gods who inhabit the snowy peaks of Olympus or the gloomy Tartarus within the depths of the wide-pathed Earth. Love then arose, most beautiful among the immortal gods, which who loosens the limbs and overcomes the mind and wise counsels of all gods and mortal men.

[Hesiod, Theogony]

According to Hesiod, first there is emptiness, then earth, and only then do the gods appear. And, when the gods do appear on the scene, they behave in a disorderly way, and often bend the operations of nature according to their whims. This all leaves much room for speculation about how the physical cosmos emerged, what it was composed of, and what gives it order. The explanations offered by the first philosophers were not only philosophical, but, by the standards of their time, they were also scientific. Thus, the first philosophers were also the first scientists, and, in fact, many had practical interests in mathematics, astronomy and biology. Second, Homer illustrates how the gods watch over human activity, judge our behavior and impose their wishes on us and the natural world as they saw fit, often in arbitrary ways. It is this aspect of mythology that the first philosophers most resisted and instead stressed the rational unity of things. In a sense, they attempted to move beyond mythology to offer a more scientific account of both physical nature and human nature.

## Issues of the Presocratics

Over a period of 200 years, the Presocratic philosophers focused on three key issues. First is the problem of the one and the many, that is, explaining how one basic thing can be the source of many varied things. The world contains an enormous variety of objects, some living, others inanimate; some solid, others liquid. It seems reasonable to suppose that all things come from a common source or type of stuff. Identifying that common source, though, is the challenge. Second is the problem of change and constancy, that is, explaining how things remain constant as they change over time. Not only are there many kinds of things in the world, but each one is subject to change. Living things like trees grow old and die; inanimate objects like rocks weather away and change their form. As things go through changes, there's still something about them that enables them to retain their identity. Third is the problem of relativism, namely, determining whether principles are absolute or created by people. Suppose that I arrive at some reasonable explanation of how the world operates. Is that explanation true just for me, or have I discovered something more universal that must be true for everyone? While some truths might appear to be independent of me, identifying those truths is a challenge.

The theories of the Presocratic philosophers were daring, sometimes to the point of being bizarre. Being the first ones to venture into the uncharted territories of both philosophy and science, they explored virtually any explanation of things that seemed reasonable, and because of this there is a richness and diversity to their views that we have not since seen. This makes it all the more unfortunate that none of the books authored by the Presocratic philosophers have survived intact. All that we have are some summaries and scattered sentences from their works that are quoted by later writers such as Plato and Aristotle. From these quotation fragments, we are left to reconstruct their original views. Sometimes a clear image emerges; other times, as we will see, it's a matter of guesswork.

## B. MILESIANS

The first known philosophers of ancient Greece were from a city-state called Miletus. Located on the west coast of what is now the peninsula of Turkey (then called Anatolia), Miletus was a thriving seaport, and part of a region of cities called Ionia. As a hub of sea trade, residents of Miletus were in contact with surrounding cultures and as such were influenced by many of their views, particularly theories of astronomy that came from civilizations to the east of Greece. The three first philosophers from Miletus were Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, all of whom attempted to answer the question "What is the common stuff from which everything is composed?"

### Thales: Water

The very first among the Milesian philosophers was Thales (c. 625-545 BCE) who held that water is the basic stuff of all things. Thales himself didn't write anything, and what we know of him comes from later sources. He was famed for his expertise in astronomy and geometry, and, according to one story, he successfully predicted an eclipse of the sun in the year 585 BCE. There are colorful stories about his life, such as the following which describes how he fell into a well: A witty maid-servant saw Thales tumbling into a well and said that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven that he could not see what was before his feet. This is applicable to all philosophers. The philosopher is unacquainted with the world; he hardly knows whether his neighbor is a man or an animal. For he is always searching into the essence of man, and enquiring what such a nature ought to do or suffer different from any other. [Plato, Theaetetus]

The event very likely never took place, and, in fact, this story represents a common stereotype about philosophers both then and now: they are so absorbed in their speculations that they don't pay attention to where they're walking. Another common stereotype of philosophers is that their skills have very little realworld application, and such a criticism was also allegedly raised against Thales. As the story goes, though, Thales proves them wrong by making a bundle of money investing in olive oil: People detested Thales for his poverty, as if the study of philosophy was useless. However, it is reported that, through his skill in astronomy, he perceived that there would be a large harvest of olives that year. Then, while it was still winter, and having obtained a little money, he put deposits on all the olive oil businesses that were in Miletus and Chios. He obtained them at a low price, since there was no one to bid against him. When the season came for making oil, many people wanted the rights, and he sold them all at once for whatever terms he pleased.

Raising a large sum of money by that means, he convinced everyone that it was easy for philosophers to be rich if they chose it, but that that was not what they aimed at. In this manner is Thales said to have shown his wisdom. [Aristotle, Politics, 1.11] The details of Thales' philosophy are as sketchy as those of his life. The best account is from Aristotle, who notes that all of the first philosophers attempted to discover the underlying stuff of all things, but they disagreed about what that particular stuff was. The Greeks already held to the view that there were four basic elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water. From these, Thales selected water as the primary stuff of nature, and Aristotle speculates about why Thales chose water specifically: Thales, the founder of this type of philosophy, said the principle is water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water). Perhaps he got this notion from seeing that the nutrition of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that from which they come to be is a principle of all things). Perhaps he also got his notion from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the nature of moist things. [Ibid.]

As Aristotle explains, moisture seems to be an essential element in all living things. Water also seems like a reasonable choice since it's at a middle state between earth and air insofar as some moist substances can evaporate and turn into air, and others solidify and turn to slime or earth.

Even if we understand Thales' reasoning for why he selected water as the primary substance, there is still some haziness about what it means for water to be the source of all things. On the one hand, it could mean that the world originated from water, a view that had been around in mythology for a long time. On the other, it could mean that the world is still made of water, and things as they are now are composed of water as their primary stuff. This second interpretation of Thales is the more common one, and the one that constitutes Thales' legitimate claim to fame. It seems like an easy thing to identify a single element like water as the primary stuff of all things. But it is a very sophisticated move to abandoned mythological foundations of the natural world in favor of physical explanations, and this is precisely what Thales did.

### **Anaximenes: Air**

The third of the founding philosophers from Miletus was Anaximenes (c. 585-525 BCE), who held that condensed and expanded air is the source of everything. He was a student of Anaximander and, like his teacher, he wrote a book with only a sentence or two surviving. The most notable fragment is this, which stresses the central role of air in conception of reality: "Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air surround the whole world." We find a more

complete account of his view of air in the following summary from an early philosopher: Anaximenes of Miletus, who had been an associate of Anaximander, said, like him, that the underlying substance was one and infinite. He did not, however, say it was indeterminate, like Anaximander, but determinate; for he said it was Air. It differs in different substances in virtue of its rarefaction and condensation. In its thinnest state it comes to be. Being condensed it becomes wind, then cloud, and when still further condensed it becomes water, then earth, then stones, and the rest of things comes to be out of these. [Theophrastus]

On Anaximenes' view, then, physical objects differ only in how condensed the air is in a given space: stuff is airy when less compressed and solid when more compressed. When air begins to be compressed, it condenses into wind, then cloud, then water, then earth, then stones, and everything else that we see comes from these. The importance of this is that Anaximenes was the first to suggest that reality could be measured. We could at least in theory say that a certain amount of pressure exerted on an area of air will result in it attaining a specific level of solidity. This provides a more scientific account of reality, particularly in comparison to Anaximander's theory which removed ultimate reality from the realm of what we can perceive. Many philosophers after Anaximenes adopted this compression and expansion view of how elements change.

## **C. IONIANS**

Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes started a philosophical trend in their geographical region of Ionia, and, from neighboring cities, they were joined by two other philosophers, namely, Heraclitus and Pythagoras. Together, these five philosophers are sometimes seen as forming a distinct Ionian school of philosophy.

### **Pythagoras: Numbers**

According to tradition, famed mathematician and philosopher Pythagoras (c.570– c.497 BCE) held that numbers and mathematical relations underlie reality. Born on the Greek island of Samos, part of the Ionian region along the Turkish peninsula, as a young man Pythagoras spent much time studying religious practices throughout the Mediterranean area, and in time formed a colony of followers. He himself wrote nothing, and it is difficult to isolate the historical Pythagoras from the more glorified account of him present by Pythagorean followers who flourished for almost 1,000 years after him. Plato and Aristotle credit him with establishing only a way of life, whereas later Pythagoreans present him as being the originator of ancient Greek philosophy as a whole.

The Pythagorean school itself was a remarkable institution, and the level of reverence that Pythagoras's followers had for him rose to a cult-like status, as we see here: Pythagoras is said to have been a man of the most dignified appearance, and his disciples adopted an opinion about him that he was Apollo who had come from [the mythical realm of] Hyperborea. It is said, that once when he was stripped naked, he was seen to have a golden thigh. There were many people who affirmed that, when he was crossing the river Nessus, the river called him by his name. [Diogenes, Lives, "Pythagoras"]

His students also believed that his teachings were prophecies of the gods. There were two groups of followers within the Pythagorean school. First there was the privileged inner circle of followers, called the "mathematicians," who could study with him in person. Second, there was an outer circle, called the "listeners", who couldn't see Pythagoras directly but only received summaries of

his views and listened to him from behind a curtain. The Pythagoreans also had a list of rules to follow, and some of the more metaphorical ones are these:

- Don't stir the fire with a knife (don't stir the passions or the pride of the powerful).
- Don't step over the beam of a balance (don't overstep the boundaries of justice).
- Don't sit down on your bushel (have the same concern for today and the future, where a bushel is the day's ration).
- Don't eat your heart (don't waste your life over troubles and pains).
- Don't turn around when you go abroad (when reaching death, look beyond the pleasures of this life).
- Don't urinate facing the sun (be modest).

Other sayings were intended literally, such as "abstain from eating beans", which Pythagoras believed were sacred. As Pythagoras' fame spread, legend has it that no fewer than 600 scholars would try to visit him each day, "and if any of them had ever been permitted to see him, they wrote about it to their friends as if they had gained some great advantage." Pythagoras died, as the story goes, while visiting a friend's home for dinner; the house was set fire by his enemies who feared that he would grow in power, take control of the city, and become a tyrant. He fled into a nearby field, but, stopped as soon as he saw beans growing there and refused to step on them. His pursuers thus caught and killed him.

Today Pythagoras's name is associated with the Pythagorean theorem, and, as legend has it, when he discovered it he sacrificed 100 cattle to the gods. Tradition also credits him with influencing the systematic approach to geometry that was later formalized by Euclid. For Pythagoras, though, mathematics was at the center of his philosophy insofar as he believed that mathematical relations govern all things. In fact, he considered numbers themselves to be sacred. Everything is related to mathematics and, through mathematics, everything can be predicted and measured in rhythmic patterns. Two types of mathematical ratios were especially important for Pythagoras: the Tetractys and musical harmony.

The Tetractys is a mystical symbol involving ten points arranged in four rows: one, two, three, and four points in each row respectively:

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The four rows represent earth, air, fire and water, and various combinations of the points generate important numbers and ratios. The Tetractys is similar to the aesthetic principle of the more well-known "Golden Ratio" that was developed later by Euclid and Renaissance artists. With both the Tetractys and the Golden Ratio, objects that contain special proportions have a natural beauty or balance to them such as, for example, a window opening that is three feet wide and four feet tall, where three and four are the bottom two rows of the Tetractys. The reverence that Pythagoras had for the Tetractys is seen in an oath uttered by his followers: "I swear by him who communicated the Tetractys, from which all our wisdom springs, and which contains perennial nature's fountain, cause, and root" (Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras).

For Pythagoras, the cosmos itself is arranged in ratios connected to the Tetractys, and, as described below, music is a perfect example of how ratio and harmonious structure are interrelated:

The tetractys is a certain number, which being composed of the four first numbers produces the most perfect number, ten. For one and two and three and four come to ten. This number is the first tetractys, and is called the source of ever flowing nature. This is because, according to them, the entire cosmos is organized according to harmony, and harmony is a system of three intervals: the fourth, the fifth, and the octave. The proportions of these three intervals are found in the aforementioned four numbers. [Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, 7.94-95]

Musicians, particularly players of stringed instruments, will instantly recognize the mathematical basis of the three harmonic intervals mentioned above. More precisely they are these: Musical 4th: interval of 4:3 (e.g., divide a string at the 1/4 mark) Musical 5th: interval of 3:2 (e.g. divide a string at the 1/3 mark) Musical octave: interval of 2:1 (e.g., divide a string at the 1/2 mark) Like other Presocratic philosophers, Pythagoras also had theories about most everything, including how the cosmos was originally formed and then developed. The following passage describes Pythagoras' view of the cyclical nature of the cosmos: Pythagoras declared that the soul is immortal, then that it changes into other kinds of animals. In addition, the things that happen recur at certain intervals, and nothing is absolutely new. Also, all things that come to be alive must be thought akin. Pythagoras seems to have been the first to introduce these opinions into Greece. [Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras*, 19]

There are two cyclical aspects of the cosmos alluded to in the above. The first is what we now call reincarnation: upon the death of my body, my soul continues to live by migrating to the body of a newborn baby, and when that body dies I move on to another. The second is that the events in the cosmos itself repeat after certain periods of time. Both of these are ideas found in Hindu thought, which Pythagoras might have come in contact with during his travels.

Among his most notable pieces of wisdom is his comparison of life to what takes place at Olympic games. There are, he argues, three types of lives that we see among people at the games. The lowest is the merchant who seeks to make money by selling to the swarm of visitors. Next is the athlete who participates in the games to win a prize. The highest, though, is the spectator who observes the events, which is a metaphor for the philosopher who surveys the world and reflects on it.

## **Heraclitus: Change and the Logos**

Heraclitus (c. 540–c. 480 BCE) argued that an ever-changing world around us is held together through a unifying principle that he called the logos. Heraclitus was born into an aristocratic family from the Ionian city of Ephesus, not far from the city of Miletus where Greek philosophy first began. As he grew in fame, he also became disliked by his fellow citizens for his superior tone and gained the nickname "the obscure" for his use of riddles. Self-taught, he claimed that he investigated everything there was to know and learned everything by himself. His book *On Nature* was supposedly composed in an intentionally obscure style so that only those who were wise would understand it, thereby protecting himself from ridicule by the common people. Legend has it that the great Persian king Darius requested that Heraclitus travel to his palace to clarify the obscurities within the book. Heraclitus refused, saying that he had no interest in receiving such a

royal honor and was content to live modestly. Progressively withdrawing from society, he spent his last years living in the mountains, eating grasses and plants. Becoming sick with edema, he returned to the city to find a cure. But when he approached physicians with his problem, he presented it in the form of a riddle, which they couldn't understand. Attempting to cure himself, he covered his body with cow dung which brought on his death.

The traditional understanding of Heraclitus's obscure philosophy is that it has two main themes, one of which is a problem that he poses, and the other is his solution to the problem. The problem is that everything in the world is continually changing. Things grow then decay, they are created but then disintegrate. The most permanent things we see like mountains or stone monuments wear down with time. As things change, they exhibit opposing tendencies: "Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the dry is moistened." He famously makes this point with the analogy of stepping into a river: "You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you. It scatters and it gathers; it advances and retires."

Constant change, then, is the problem. What, though, is the solution? According to Heraclitus, there is a unifying plan that underlies the coherence of all natural changes and harmonizes their opposing tendencies. He dubbed this the logos, the Greek word meaning "plan" or "formula". In this passage he describes the difficulty people have in recognizing and understanding the logos: Though this Logos is true always, yet people are as unable to understand it both when they hear it for the first time and when they have heard it at all again. For, though all things come into being in accordance with the Logos, people seem as if they had no experience of it. [Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians]

For Heraclitus, then, as things in the world go through change, exhibiting their opposing characteristics, the logos gives them their unity. Even though the flowing river is constantly changing by scattering and gathering, the logos gives it structure so that we can recognize it as a river, rather than merely a series of haphazard and opposing events.

Heraclitus identified the ordering structure of the logos with one of the four elements, namely fire. He describes the cosmic role of fire here:

The ordered universe, which is the same for all, was not made by one of the gods or by humans. Rather, it always was, is now, and forever will be an ever-living fire, ignited in measure, and extinguished in measure. [Clement, Miscellanies]

Fire not only gives structure to the world, but it is also the primary stuff from which everything is made. In this way he follows in the footsteps of Thales and his fellow philosophers from Ionia who grounded the unity of things in a specific element. Similar to Anaximenes' theory, Heraclitus held that things take on a different form based on how expanded or compressed fire is. When more compressed, it becomes water, and, when even more compressed, earth.

## **D.ELEATICS**

The most radical philosophical theory among the early Greeks was proposed by a group of philosophers from the city of Elea, a Greek colony on the south-west coast of Italy. They are thus referred to as Eleatic philosophers in honor of their hometown. The leader among the Eleatic

philosophers was a man named Parmenides, who argued that our everyday perceptions of the world are completely wrong, and all reality is the One, that is, a single, undifferentiated and unchanging thing. We will look at three Eleatic philosophers who are associated with this view: Xenophanes who first suggested it, Parmenides who developed it, and Zeno who defended it.

## **Parmenides: The One**

Parmenides (b. 510 BCE) was born into a wealthy family in the city of Elea, and his only known writing is a book titled *On Nature* that he composed in poetic verse as allegedly conveyed to him by the goddess Persephone. In a nutshell, Parmenides argues that only one unchanging thing exists, and it is an indivisible spherical-shaped thing, like a toy marble, which he calls “the One”. It might appear that the world consists of countless different things—me, you, the chair I’m sitting on, the dog barking down the street. According to Parmenides, though, this is all just an illusion, and I can’t trust my common sense; the truth is that only the One exists.

Why would he offer an account of the world that is so contrary to commonsense? The answer is not entirely clear. While Parmenides and his followers were the only major thinkers in Western civilization at that time to offer this view, it has close similarities with some Eastern philosophical views, particularly within Hinduism. Within Eastern philosophical traditions the proof of “the One” is based on mystical experience. When you enter a mystical state of enlightenment through meditation, you will experience the oneness of everything and see that the world of multiplicity and change around us is an illusion. Maybe Parmenides was inspired by this kind of a mystical experience, but we know so little about his life and background that there is no way of telling.

Regardless of what inspired him, he offers a proof of his theory of “the One,” which requires serious attention. He begins arguing that there are just two paths of inquiry: the path of assertion in which you maintain that something is, and the path of denial in which you maintain that something is not. If we think about these two paths, we’ll see that the path of denial is nonsense: you cannot know what is not, and you can’t even express it. He makes this point here: There are only two ways of inquiry that can be thought of. [Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus*]

The first, namely, that it is (and that it is impossible for it not to be), is the way of belief, for truth is its companion. The other way of inquiry, namely, that it is not (and cannot be), is a path that none can learn at all. For you cannot know what is not, nor can you express it. [Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*]

That leaves us with the remaining path of assertion: the only meaningful way of inquiry is to assert that something is, as he maintains as follows: It is the same thing that can be thought and that can be. What can be spoken and thought must be; for it is possible for it to be, but impossible for nothing to be. . . . One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that it is. In this path are very many signs that “what is” is uncreated and indestructible; it is complete, immovable, and without end. [Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*]

His point is that we can say anything that we want about reality, so long as we don’t use the word “not”, since that would involve the path of denial. Establishing the path of assertion is only preliminary. The next step is to draw out the implications of asserting only that something is. The result is that we arrive at the qualities of the One, namely, that it is eternal, indivisible, unmoving,

and round.

The first implication of the path of assertion, then, is that whatever exists must be eternal, that is, uncreated and indestructible. If we say that a thing came into existence or will go out of existence, like a bicycle, then this would require saying that the bicycle “is not” before it was manufactured and “is not” after it is melted down for scrap metal. But that would take us down the path of denial since we’d be using the term “not” twice, and thus uttering nonsense. He writes, [The One is eternal], for how can “what is” be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, then it is not. Nor is it, if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of. [Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics] The second implication of the path of assertion is that whatever exists is indivisible. For, if we say that a bicycle has parts, then we maintain one of its parts are here where the handlebar is, but not there where the seat is. Again, we use the word “not” which takes us down the impossible path of denial. Parmenides writes, [The One] is not divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is. For this reason it is wholly continuous; for what is, is in contact with what is. [Ibid]

Third, whatever exists is unmoving, since movement requires us to say, for example, that the bicycle is now in this location, but not in that location. Again this takes us down the path of denial. He writes, It is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And thus it remains constant in its place; for hard necessity keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. For this reason it is not permitted to “what is” to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything. [Ibid]

Finally, whatever exists is round. If it had any other shape, then one part would be greater, and another part smaller, for example, the wheel of a bicycle is larger than the pedal. This, though, would require us to say that one part is not like the other part, yet again taking us down the path of denial. Compare that to a perfect sphere where any place you point to on it will be identical in shape to any other. He writes, “Since it has a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass of a rounded sphere, equally poised from the center in every direction; for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another.”

According to Parmenides, then, what we can say about reality is that it is an eternal, single, unmoving, and round thing, which is the One. This strangely means that no other object exists, like a bicycle, which comes into existence, or has parts, or moves, or is non-spherical. That is, there are no bicycles, rocks, trees or people: the entirety of the cosmos consists of the One.

### **Anaxagoras: Mind and the Divisibility of Material Ingredients**

Anaxagoras (500–428 BCE) held that the world is comprised of infinitely divisible portions of ingredients (seeds) that are set in motion by a cosmic Mind. Anaxagoras was born into a wealthy family from the Ionian city Clazomenae (near Miletus), and eventually abandoned his inheritance to devote himself to philosophy. He was a student of Anaximenes (the third of the founding philosophers from Miletus). For around 20 years he lived and taught in the city of Athens. While there, he stated that the sun was just a mass of burning iron, and not a divine being as mythologists claimed. For this act of irreligion he was sentenced to death, although he was

ultimately punished with exile. When he first heard of his sentence by the Athenian court, he said "Nature has long since condemned both them and me." After relocating to a new city, the citizens there held him in high regard and upon his death put the following inscription on his tomb: "Here lies Anaxagoras, who reached for truth, the farthest bounds in heavenly speculations."

Being a pluralist like Empedocles, Anaxagoras also held that the cosmos is composed of many material ingredients, and not just a single one. Also like Empedocles, he held that all of the ingredients swirl around in a cosmic blender, and create individual things like rocks and trees as they move around. Here, though, is where his similarities with Empedocles end. There are five major themes to Anaxagoras's philosophy, the first of which is that the material ingredients of the cosmos exist in a completely vacuumless environment (that is, a plenum—a term that means the opposite of vacuum). While today we assume that material things float in empty space, Anaxagoras denied this, maintaining that all the material stuff swirling around in the cosmic blender is packed solid, with no empty areas. The second feature of his theory is that things are infinitely divisible. That is, if you take a material thing and divide it in half, then that part in half, you can keep doing this on to infinity. He makes his point here: All things were together, infinite both in amount and in smallness, for the small, too, was infinite. And because all things were together, nothing was distinguishable on account of its smallness; for air and aether covered all things, both being infinite, for these are the most important [ingredients] in the total mixture both in number and in size. [Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's Physics]

Related to this is the third feature of his theory that there are worlds within worlds. Deep within the tiny elements of our world, there are miniature worlds composed of even tinier elements. These worlds are much like ours and contain animals people, farms and cities.

The fourth feature of this view is encapsulated in his statement that "A portion of everything is in everything". For the sake of clarity, let's suppose that there are four main material ingredients in the cosmic mix, namely earth, air, fire and water (Anaxagoras' surviving writings do not contain a clear list of elements). Let's say that the rock in my front yard is composed of 97% earth, 1% air, 1% fire, and 1% water. No matter how small of a piece of the rock I examine, it will contain the same portions of these four material ingredients. In each piece I examine, earth will predominate, and thus give it its characteristic of rock-like solidity. Similarly, a glass of wine might contain 97% water, 1% earth, 1% air, and 1% fire, and so too with every microscopic drop of wine that I examine. Anaxagoras describes his view of portions here: Since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything. Nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves. They must be now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. In all things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off. [Ibid]

Thus, within the giant cosmic blender, portions of all the material ingredients are spread throughout the mix, and the variety of things that we see in the world around us is already contained within the primordial mix. This, according to Anaxagoras, helps explain how things change. When a piece of wood disintegrates into earth, the elements of earth were already embedded within it. When the wood ignites into fire, the fire was already embedded within it. In some passages, Anaxagoras uses the term "seeds" to express this notion of the ingredient portions that are within everything.

The fifth main feature of his theory is that Mind is the external force that accounts for all the motion, growth and change that occurs within the material ingredients. Mind is the motor that causes the giant blender to churn the mixture of stuff. He writes, "All things were mixed up together; then Mind came and arranged them all in distinct order." Mind for Anaxagoras performs much the same function that Love and Strife perform for Empedocles. He describes its function in the following: Mind has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. Mind had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. It began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. All the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Mind. [Ibid]

In the above, Anaxagoras maintains that Mind begins by making swirls within small areas of the mix, and this slowly passes to larger areas.

In short, the primary function of Mind is to initiate motion within the cosmic mix of material ingredients. To that extent, it functions as a force of physics. But is it anything more than this? Anaxagoras also seems to suggest that Mind has a partly divine function; but to the extent that it is divine, it is not an anthropomorphized god like Zeus or some other divine being of religious devotion. While we may like to know more about the kind of thing this Mind is, Anaxagoras does not provide the details. In fact, Aristotle criticizes Anaxagoras for inventing the notion of Mind as an artificial crutch to prop up his theory. Aristotle writes, "When Anaxagoras cannot explain why something is necessarily as it is, he drags in Mind, but otherwise he will use anything rather than Mind to explain a particular phenomenon" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 985a18).

In any case, with his two-pronged theory of (1) material stuff and (2) Mind, Anaxagoras holds the honor of being the first matter/spirit dualist in Western philosophy. That is, according to Anaxagoras's dualism, there are two radically distinct types of things in the cosmos, matter and Mind, each of which performs its unique role in creating the universe and all that it contains.

## **F. ATOMISTS**

The next important advance in Presocratic philosophy was a theory called Atomism. While most of the previous theories about the universe that we've examined so far have been rather strange, Atomism is different in that its essential features are the ones that we hold today. Its central thesis is that the world is composed of indivisible particles called atoms that exist within empty space. Everything contained in the universe, then, results from the clumping together of these atomic particles. It is tempting to think that the originators of this theory had a special insight into the nature of the physical world, but the reality is that it was just a lucky guess. There was no scientific equipment at the time that could prove or disprove any proposed theory of the cosmos. The Presocratic philosophers were all insatiably curious about the nature of things and stretched their imaginations to the farthest limits, proposing every conceivable explanation. With such a diversity of ideas being explored, one was bound to get it right, and it turned out to be Atomism. However, it took over 2,000 years for civilization to realize this, and when physicists of the twentieth-century finally discovered what they believed was the tiniest particle of matter, they named it the atom, in honor of this Presocratic theory.

Two Presocratic philosophers are associated with the theory of Atomism: Leucippus, who proposed the theory, and his student Democritus who systematized it. Very little is known about

Leucippus' life, but he is reported to have been a student of Zeno, and may have come from the city of Elea, home of both Parmenides and Zeno. He wrote a work called *The Great World System*, none of which survives in itself, although its contents may have been incorporated into the writings of Democritus, who we do know much more about. Democritus (460-350 BCE) was from the Greek coastal city of Abdera (now in modern-day Greece). Born into a wealthy family, he was tutored by Persian astronomers, and, after his father's death, traveled extensively learning what he could. At some point he became a student of Leucippus as well as the Pythagoreans and perhaps also of Anaxagoras. He secluded himself from the public, but nonetheless became famous for his knowledge of natural phenomena and the ability to predict the weather. One story reports that he met with Socrates in Athens, without revealing to Socrates who he was. A prolific writer, he composed dozens of works in the areas of ethics, physics, astronomy, mathematics, and music, none of which, unfortunately, survive. His lasting fame in philosophy, though, is his development of Leucippus' atomism.

### **Atoms in the Void**

The central notion of atomism is that the universe is composed of an infinite number of atoms that are dispersed throughout an infinite vacuum of empty space (or "void"), with no beginning in time. This is the exact opposite of Anaxagoras's position in two important ways. First, Anaxagoras argued that matter was infinitely divisible. That is, if you take a rock, break it in half, then that in half, and so on, you will never arrive at a smallest piece. You could in theory keep splitting that thing in half forever. Atomism denies this: if you keep breaking apart the rock, eventually you'll arrive at a tiny component, an atom, that cannot be broken down any further into smaller pieces. Second, Anaxagoras argued that the cosmos is a vacuumless plenum: it contains no empty space and even the tiniest area is jam-packed with material stuff. Atomism also denies this: atoms exist in a vacuum of empty space. Their reasoning is that if there was no empty space, then things would be so squeezed together they couldn't move.

According to Leucippus and Democritus, the atoms themselves have several features. Each atom is of the same substance, colorless, uncreated, indestructible, unalterable, homogeneous, solid, and indivisible. Their shapes and sizes have infinite variations, and they are spread throughout the universe. They are also continually moving, or at least vibrating, within the vacuum of empty space. While in motion, they collide with each other, and, when they do, sometimes they rebound, other times they join together and form compound bodies that we are able to perceive through our senses. An early philosopher describes this view of the atomists here: Substances are unlimited in multitude and atomic ... and scattered in the void. When they approach one another or collide or become entangled, the compounds appear as water or fire or as a plant or a human. But all things are atoms, which he calls forms; there is nothing else. [Plutarch, *Against Colotes*]

Differences in objects result from changes in the shape, arrangement, density, and position of the atoms.

### **The Mind as Material**

It's one thing to account for the composition of rocks and other inanimate objects in terms of material atoms clumped together. However, Leucippus and Democritus argue that everything in the universe is composed of the material stuff of atoms, including conscious human beings; there are no non-physical spirits or souls, or gods. In philosophy this is a position called materialism, that is, only material things exist, and the challenge of materialism is to explain how conscious

thought in humans can be a purely material thing. Throughout much of history, philosophers argued that this was impossible, and that human thought could only take place in a non-physical soul or spirit. After all, conscious thoughts do not seem to be the kinds of things that take up physical space. They are not like three-dimensional rocks and trees. But the atomists argued that conscious thoughts are indeed material, very much like rocks and trees.

While minds are material, they are rather unique material things, and the Atomists explained them with two special kinds of atoms: fire-atoms and image-particles. First, human minds are composed of fire-atoms that are distributed throughout the human body; think of them as a type of perceptual tissue, sort of like the role that today we give neurons. Second, all visible objects emit tiny image-particles which fly off in all directions. (The concept of the image-particle is often translated "idols" from the Greek word *eidola* which Democritus used). With the thickness of only one atom, the image-particles preserve the shape of the original object. A rock, for example, continually sheds image-particles, which have the shape of the rock itself. I mentally perceive the rock, then, when the image-particles strike my eye and excite my fire-atoms. One early philosopher describes this aspect of the atomist theory here: [Leucippus and Democritus] attributed sight to certain image-particles, of the same shape as the object, which were continually streaming off from the objects of sight and impacting the eye. [Alexander, *On the Senses*]

The mental act of thinking is a more focused form of perception. Some places in my body that contain fire-atoms are so densely compressed that image-particles excite motion in them as they pass through them; hence, thought arises.

In addition to explaining human thought, another challenge of materialism is explaining the nature of divine beings such as God that are traditionally thought to be non-material spirits. The atomists had a physical explanation of these too. Some image-particles are very large, and appear in the shape of humans, which we perceive in our dreams. An early philosopher provides this summary of Democritus's view of the gods: Democritus says that certain image-particles of atoms approach humans, and of them some cause good and others evil... These are large and immense, and difficult to destroy though not indestructible. They indicate the future in advance to people when they are seen to emit voices. As a result people of ancient times, upon perceiving the appearances of these things, supposed that they are a god, though there is no other god aside from these having an indestructible nature. [Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, 9.19]

The gods, then, are not spiritual beings that reside on Mount Olympus: they are only strange image-particles that excite our imaginations. This essentially amounts to a denial of the existence of God, which is a rather controversial side effect of atomism's materialism.

Another controversial side effect of materialism is a view called determinism: all events are determined according to the strict laws that govern the operations of material things. Since, according to materialism, human beings are composed only of material stuff, then all human actions are also determined, hence there is no free will. We see this in the following statements about Democritus by two early philosophers, [Democritus held that] everything that happens, happens of necessity. Motion is the cause of the production of everything, and he calls this necessity. [Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, "Democritus"]

Democritus, the author of the Atomic Philosophy, preferred admitting the necessity of fate to depriving indivisible bodies of their natural motions. [Cicero, *On Fate*, 10]

According to atomism, then, all human actions are determined by the laws that govern the movement of atoms. We noted already how atomism foreshadowed the general makeup of the universe held by modern physicists. Similarly, their commitment to materialism and determinism foreshadows views that dominate contemporary philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, in its time it was just one of many Presocratic theories battling with its rivals for attention.

## The Ionian Philosophers

Ionia was the name given to the island realm in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey. It has the distinction of being the birthplace of Western science and philosophy. Rather than relying on supernatural explanations for the appearance of the **Sun, Moon, planets** and **stars**, the philosophers attempted to understand nature and looked for laws that described its behaviour. The recorded history of Greek philosophy actually began in Miletus, on the coast of Turkey (Asia Minor). Here, in the 6th century BC, **Thales, Anaximander** and **Anaximenes** developed their ideas about the **Universe**. This trio of early scientists were materialists: they believed that the Earth and everything else in the Universe was made from a material (rather than spiritual) substance. However, their opinions differed as to what this substance was. Thales believed it was water, Anaximander asserted it was 'the Infinite' and Anaximenes proposed that it was air.

Pythagoras (560-480 BC) studied under Thales before traveling to Egypt and Mesopotamia, ultimately establishing his own school of philosophy in Croton(southern Italy).

Following on from the Milesian school were 5th century BC philosophers such as the Eleatic School (**Xenophanes**, Parmenides, Zeno), the later Ionians (**Heraclitus**, Empedocles and Anaxagoras) and the Atomists (Leucippus and Democritus). The **Ionian philosophers** are also referred to as pre-Socratic philosophers, as much of their work was completed before the time of Socrates (469-399 BC).

**Note:** most of what we know about the Presocratics in general and so the Ionians comes from Aristotle. Although Plato frequently mentions them, it is usually in passing. Aristotle is the first source to attempt systematic exposition of their doctrines. One Aristotelian account is that contained in METAPHYSICS I, Chs. 4ff. Aristotle's primary aim here was to provide a background for his own solution to the problems the Presocratics discussed. Hence his treatment is given from a different standpoint than that of pure historical exposition. [Are his expositions slanted?] [Many of the other sources Kirk, Raven, and Schofield cite depend directly or indirectly on Aristotle--for example, Theophrastus, Aristotle's nephew and disciple, and Simplicius, whose information, according to KRS, comes from Theophrastus. The attempt to get "behind" Aristotle on the understanding of these philosophers is a natural reaction to the sheer bulk of writings which have survived from Plato and Aristotle compared to that of the writings of their predecessors.

## General features of the Ionian philosophy:

1. Designation of a ruling element, either earth, air, fire, or water, which Aristotle interprets as having been for them the basic substance, or (Greek) 'ousia' of everything. There is implied here according to Aristotle a conservation principle: substance is conserved--it can be neither created nor destroyed.
2. Preoccupation with the cyclic changes in nature (birth-death, day- night, summer-winter) and

how to explain them.

3. Departure from mythological patterns of explanation (i. e., by means of stories of personal divinities and their actions) for natural occurrences, although some mythological language remains.
4. Seeing these cycles as changes in element- dominance (i. e., at night, light recedes and darkness becomes dominant), interpreted by some of the Ionians as eternal warfare of the elements (seemingly Anaximander and Heraclitus).
5. Perhaps ascribing immanent Mind or Intelligence to one or more of the elements.

## Democritus

**Democritus** (c. 460 - 370 B.C.), sometimes known as the "**Laughing Philosopher**", was a Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher from **Thrace** in northern Greece. Along with his teacher, **Leucippus**, he was the founder of the Greek philosophical school of Atomism and developed a Materialist account of the natural world.

Although he was a contemporary of Socrates, he usually considered Pre-Socratic in that his philosophy and his approach were more similar to other Pre-Socratic thinkers than to Socrates and Plato.

## Life

Democritus was born in **Abdera**, a town in Thrace in northern Greece, which had originally been settled by Greek colonists from the **Ionian** city of Teos in present-day Turkey). His date of birth is usually given as 460 B.C., although some authorities argue for up to ten years earlier, and some for a few years later.

His father was very wealthy, and had even received the Persian king **Xerxes** on his march through Abdera. According to some accounts, Democritus studied **astronomy** and **theology** from some of the **magi** (wise men) Xerxes left in Abdera in gratitude.

On his father's death, Democritus spent his inheritance on extensive travels to distant countries, to satisfy his thirst for knowledge. He is reputed to have traveled to **Persia**, **Babylon** (modern-day Iraq), **Asia** (as far as India), **Ethiopia** and **Egypt** (where he lived for five years, being particularly impressed by the Egyptian mathematicians). He also traveled throughout **Greece** to acquire a knowledge of its culture and meet Greek philosophers (he may have met the physician **Hippocrates** (c. 460 B.C.) and Socrates, and possibly also Anaxagoras, whom he praises in his own work), and his wealth enabled him to purchase their writings. He was known as one of the most traveled scholars of his time.

On returning to his native land, (now with no means of subsistence), he settled with his brother **Damosis**, and occupied himself with natural philosophy and gave public lectures in order to pay his way. His greatest influence was certainly **Leucippus**, with whom he is credited as co-founding Atomism. In around 440 B.C. or 430 B.C., Leucippus had founded a school at Abdera, and Democritus became his star pupil. There are no existing writings which can be **positively** attributed to Leucippus, and so it is virtually impossible to identify which ideas were unique to Democritus and which are Leucippus', or any views about which they disagreed.

From anecdotal evidence, Democritus was known for his disinterestedness, modesty and

simplicity, and appeared to live solely for his studies, declining the public honors he was offered. One story has him deliberately blinding himself in order to be less disturbed in his pursuits, although it is more likely that he lost his sight in old age. He was always cheerful and ready to see the comical side of life, and he was affectionately known as the "Laughing Philosopher" (although some writers maintain that he laughed at the foolishness of other people and was also known as "The Mocker"). His knowledge of natural phenomena (such as diagnosing illnesses and predicting the weather) gave him the reputation of being something of a prophet or soothsayer.

It is believed that he died at the age of 90, in about 370 B.C., although some writers have him living to over a hundred years of age.

## Work

**Diogenes Laertius**, the 3rd Century historian of the early Greek philosophers, lists a large number of works by Democritus, covering Ethics, physics, mathematics, music and cosmology, including two works called the "**Great World System**" and the "**Little World System**". However, his works have survived only in secondhand reports, sometimes unreliable or conflicting. Much of the best evidence comes from Aristotle, who was perhaps the chief critic of Atomism, although he nevertheless praised Democritus for arguing from sound considerations, and considered Democritus an important rival in natural philosophy.

Like many other Pre-Socratic philosophies, the Atomism of Leucippus and Democritus was largely a response to the unacceptable claim of Parmenides that change was impossible without something coming from nothing (which is itself impossible), and thus any perceived change or movement was merely illusory.

In the Atomist version, there are multiple unchanging material principles which constantly rearrange themselves in order to affect what we see as changes. These principles are very small, indivisible and indestructible building blocks known as atoms (from the Greek "atomos", meaning "uncuttable"). All of reality and all the objects in the universe are composed of different arrangements of these eternal atoms and an infinite void, in which they form different combinations and shapes.

There is no room in this theory for the concept of a God, and essentially Atomism is a type of Materialism or Physicalism, as well as being atheistic and deterministic in its outlook. However, Democritus did allow for the existence of the human soul, which he saw as composed of a special kind of spherical atom, in constant motion, and he explained the senses in a similar manner.

In Epistemology, Democritus distinguished two types of knowledge: "**bastard**" (subjective and insufficient knowledge, obtained by perception through the senses), and "**legitimate**" (genuine knowledge obtained by the processing of this unreliable "bastard" knowledge using inductive reasoning).

In the field of Ethics, Democritus pursued a type of early Hedonism or Epicureanism. He was one of the earliest thinkers to explicitly posit a supreme good or goal, which he called cheerfulness or well-being and identified with the untroubled enjoyment of life. He saw this as achievable through moderation in the pursuit of pleasure, through distinguishing useful pleasures from harmful ones,

and through conforming to conventional morality. He is quoted as saying, "The brave man is he who overcomes not only his enemies but his pleasures".

Democritus was also a pioneer of mathematics and geometry, and produced works entitled "**On Numbers**", "**On Geometrics**", "**On Tangencies**", "**On Mapping**" and "**On Irrationals**", although these works have not survived. We do know that he was among the first to observe that a **cone** or pyramid has one-third the volume of a cylinder or prism respectively with the same base and height.

He was also the first philosopher we know who realized that the celestial body we call the **Milky Way** is actually formed from the light of distant stars, even though many later philosophers (including Aristotle) argued against this. He was also among the first to propose that the universe contains many worlds, some of which may be inhabited. He devoted many of the later years of his life to researches into the properties of minerals and plants, although we have no record of any **conclusions** he may have drawn.

## **The Sophists**

The term sophist (sophistēs) derives from the Greek words for wisdom (sophia) and wise (sophos). Since Homer at least, these terms had a wide range of application, extending from practical know-how and prudence in public affairs to poetic ability and theoretical knowledge. Notably, the term sophia could be used to describe disingenuous cleverness long before the rise of the sophistic movement. Theognis, for example, writing in the sixth century B.C.E., counsels Cynos to accommodate his discourse to different companions, because such cleverness (sophiē) is superior to even a great excellence (Elegiac Poems, 1072, 213).

In the fifth century B.C.E. the term sophistēs was still broadly applied to 'wise men', including poets such as Homer and Hesiod, the Seven Sages, the Ionian 'physicists' and a variety of seers and prophets. The narrower use of the term to refer to professional teachers of virtue or excellence (aretē) became prevalent in the second half of the fifth century B.C.E., although this should not be taken to imply the presence of a clear distinction between philosophers, such as Socrates, and sophists, such as Protagoras, Gorgias and Prodicus. This much is evident from Aristophanes' play *The Clouds* (423 B.C.E.), in which Socrates is depicted as a sophist and Prodicus praised for his wisdom.

Aristophanes' play is a good starting point for understanding Athenian attitudes towards sophists. *The Clouds* depicts the tribulations of Strepsiades, an elderly Athenian citizen with significant debts. Deciding that the best way to discharge his debts is to defeat his creditors in court, he attends *The Thinkery*, an institute of higher education headed up by the sophist Socrates. When he fails to learn the art of speaking in *The Thinkery*, Strepsiades persuades his initially reluctant son, Pheidippides, to accompany him. Here they encounter two associates of Socrates, the Stronger and the Weaker Arguments, who represent lives of justice and self-discipline and injustice and self-indulgence respectively. On the basis of a popular vote, the Weaker Argument prevails and leads Pheidippides into *The Thinkery* for an education in how to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger. Strepsiades later revisits *The Thinkery* and finds that Socrates has turned his son into a pale and useless intellectual. When Pheidippides graduates, he subsequently prevails not only over Strepsiades' creditors, but also beats his father and offers a persuasive rhetorical justification for the act. As Pheidippides prepares to beat his mother, Strepsiades' indignation motivates him to

lead a violent mob attack on The Thinkery.

Aristophanes' depiction of Socrates the sophist is revealing on at least three levels. In the first instance, it demonstrates that the distinction between Socrates and his sophistic counterparts was far from clear to their contemporaries. Although Socrates did not charge fees and frequently asserted that all he knew was that he was ignorant of most matters, his association with the sophists reflects both the indeterminacy of the term sophist and the difficulty, at least for the everyday Athenian citizen, of distinguishing his methods from theirs. Secondly, Aristophanes' depiction suggests that the sophistic education reflected a decline from the heroic Athens of earlier generations. Thirdly, the attribution to the sophists of intellectual deviousness and moral dubiousness predates Plato and Aristotle.

Hostility towards sophists was a significant factor in the decision of the Athenian *dēmos* to condemn Socrates to the death penalty for impiety. Anytus, who was one of Socrates' accusers at his trial, was clearly unconcerned with details such as that the man he accused did not claim to teach *aretē* or extract fees for so doing. He is depicted by Plato as suggesting that sophists are the ruin of all those who come into contact with them and as advocating their expulsion from the city (*Meno*, 91c-92c). Equally as revealing, in terms of attitudes towards the sophists, is Socrates' discussion with Hippocrates, a wealthy young Athenian keen to become a pupil of Protagoras (*Protagoras*, 312a). Hippocrates is so eager to meet Protagoras that he wakes Socrates in the early hours of the morning, yet later concedes that he himself would be ashamed to be known as a sophist by his fellow citizens.

Plato depicts Protagoras as well aware of the hostility and resentment engendered by his profession (*Protagoras*, 316c-e). It is not surprising, Protagoras suggests, that foreigners who profess to be wise and persuade the wealthy youth of powerful cities to forsake their family and friends and consort with them would arouse suspicion. Indeed, Protagoras claims that the sophistic art is an ancient one, but that sophists of old, including poets such as Homer, Hesiod and Simonides, prophets, seers and even physical trainers, deliberately did not adopt the name for fear of persecution. Protagoras says that while he has adopted a strategy of openly professing to be a sophist, he has taken other precautions – perhaps including his association with the Athenian general Pericles – in order to secure his safety.

The low standing of the sophists in Athenian public opinion does not stem from a single source. No doubt suspicion of intellectuals among the many was a factor. New money and democratic decision-making, however, also constituted a threat to the conservative Athenian aristocratic establishment. This threatening social change is reflected in the attitudes towards the concept of excellence or virtue (*aretē*) alluded to in the summary above. Whereas in the Homeric epics *aretē* generally denotes the strength and courage of a real man, in the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. it increasingly became associated with success in public affairs through rhetorical persuasion.

In the context of Athenian political life of the late fifth century B.C.E. the importance of skill in persuasive speech, or rhetoric, cannot be underestimated. The development of democracy made mastery of the spoken word not only a precondition of political success but also indispensable as a form of self-defence in the event that one was subject to a lawsuit. The sophists accordingly answered a growing need among the young and ambitious. *Meno*, an ambitious pupil of Gorgias, says that the *aretē* – and hence function – of a man is to rule over people, that is, manage his

public affairs so as to benefit his friends and harm his enemies (73c-d). This is a long-standing ideal, but one best realised in democratic Athens through rhetoric. Rhetoric was thus the core of the sophistic education (Protagoras, 318e), even if most sophists professed to teach a broader range of subjects.

Suspicion towards the sophists was also informed by their departure from the aristocratic model of education (*paideia*). Since Homeric Greece, *paideia* had been the preoccupation of the ruling nobles and was based around a set of moral precepts befitting an aristocratic warrior class. The business model of the sophists presupposed that *aretē* could be taught to all free citizens, a claim that Protagoras implicitly defends in his great speech regarding the origins of justice. The sophists were thus a threat to the status quo because they made an indiscriminate promise – assuming capacity to pay fees – to provide the young and ambitious with the power to prevail in public life. One could therefore loosely define sophists as paid teachers of *aretē*, where the latter is understood in terms of the capacity to attain and exercise political power through persuasive speech. This is only a starting point, however, and the broad and significant intellectual achievement of the sophists, which we will consider in the following two sections, has led some to ask whether it is possible or desirable to attribute them with a unique method or outlook that would serve as a unifying characteristic while also differentiating them from philosophers.

Scholarship in the nineteenth century and beyond has often fastened on method as a way of differentiating Socrates from the sophists. For Henry Sidgwick (1872, 288-307), for example, whereas Socrates employed a question-and-answer method in search of the truth, the sophists gave long epideictic or display speeches for the purposes of persuasion. It seems difficult to maintain a clear methodical differentiation on this basis, given that Gorgias and Protagoras both claimed proficiency in short speeches and that Socrates engages in long eloquent speeches – many in mythical form – throughout the Platonic dialogues. It is moreover simply misleading to say that the sophists were in all cases unconcerned with truth, as to assert the relativity of truth is itself to make a truth claim. A further consideration is that Socrates is guilty of fallacious reasoning in many of the Platonic dialogues, although this point is less relevant if we assume that Socrates' logical errors are unintentional.

G.B. Kerferd (1981a) has proposed a more nuanced set of methodological criteria to differentiate Socrates from the sophists. According to Kerferd, the sophists employed eristic and antilogical methods of argument, whereas Socrates disdained the former and saw the latter as a necessary but incomplete step on the way towards dialectic. Plato uses the term eristic to denote the practice – it is not strictly speaking a method – of seeking victory in argument without regard for the truth. We find a representation of eristic techniques in Plato's dialogue *Euthydemus*, where the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysiodorus deliberately use egregiously fallacious arguments for the purpose of contradicting and prevailing over their opponent. Antilogic is the method of proceeding from a given argument, usually that offered by an opponent, towards the establishment of a contrary or contradictory argument in such a way that the opponent must either abandon his first position or accept both positions. This method of argumentation was employed by most of the sophists, and examples are found in the works of Protagoras and Antiphon.

Kerferd's claim that we can distinguish between philosophy and sophistry by appealing to dialectic remains problematic, however. In what are usually taken to be the "early" Platonic dialogues, we find Socrates' employing a dialectical method of refutation referred to as the *elenchus*. As Nehamas has argued (1990), while the *elenchus* is distinguishable from eristic because of its

concern with the truth, it is harder to differentiate from antilogic because its success is always dependent upon the capacity of interlocutors to defend themselves against refutation in a particular case. In Plato's "middle" and "later" dialogues, on the other hand, according to Nehamas' interpretation, Plato associates dialectic with knowledge of the forms, but this seemingly involves an epistemological and metaphysical commitment to a transcendent ontology that most philosophers, then and now, would be reluctant to uphold.

More recent attempts to explain what differentiates philosophy from sophistry have accordingly tended to focus on a difference in moral purpose or in terms of choices for different ways of life, as Aristotle elegantly puts it (*Metaphysics* IV, 2, 1004b24-5). Section 4 will return to the question of whether this is the best way to think about the distinction between philosophy and sophistry. Before this, however, it is useful to sketch the biographies and interests of the most prominent sophists and also consider some common themes in their thought.

## 2. The Sophists

### a. Protagoras

Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490-420 B.C.E.) was the most prominent member of the sophistic movement and Plato reports he was the first to charge fees using that title (*Protagoras*, 349a). Despite his animus towards the sophists, Plato depicts Protagoras as quite a sympathetic and dignified figure.

One of the more intriguing aspects of Protagoras' life and work is his association with the great Athenian general and statesman Pericles (c. 495-429 B.C.E.). Pericles, who was the most influential statesman in Athens for more than 30 years, including the first two years of the Peloponnesian War, seems to have held a high regard for philosophers and sophists, and Protagoras in particular, entrusting him with the role of drafting laws for the Athenian foundation city of Thurii in 444 B.C.E.

From a philosophical perspective, Protagoras is most famous for his relativistic account of truth – in particular the claim that 'man is the measure of all things' – and his agnosticism concerning the Gods. The first topic will be discussed in section 3b. Protagoras' agnosticism is famously articulated in the claim that 'concerning the gods I am not in a position to know either that (or how) they are or that (or how) they are not, or what they are like in appearance; for there are many things that prevent knowledge, the obscurity of the matter and the brevity of human life' (*DK*, 80B4). This seems to express a form of religious agnosticism not completely foreign to educated Athenian opinion. Despite this, according to tradition, Protagoras was convicted of impiety towards the end of his life. As a consequence, so the story goes, his books were burnt and he drowned at sea while departing Athens. It is perhaps significant in this context that Protagoras seems to have been the source of the sophistic claim to 'make the weaker argument defeat the stronger' parodied by Aristophanes.

Plato suggests that Protagoras sought to differ his educational offering from that of other sophists, such as Hippias, by concentrating upon instruction in *aretē* in the sense of political virtue rather than specialised studies such as astronomy and mathematics (*Protagoras*, 318e).

Apart from his works *Truth* and *On the Gods*, which deal with his relativistic account of truth and

agnosticism respectively, Diogenes Laertius says that Protagoras wrote the following books: Antilogies, Art of Eristics, Imperative, On Ambition, On Incorrect Human Actions, On those in Hades, On Sciences, On Virtues, On Wrestling, On the Original State of Things and Trial over a Fee.

### **b. Gorgias**

Gorgias of Leontini (c.485 – c.390 B.C.E.) is generally considered as a member of the sophistic movement, despite his disavowal of the capacity to teach aretē (Meno, 96c). The major focus of Gorgias was rhetoric and given the importance of persuasive speaking to the sophistic education, and his acceptance of fees, it is appropriate to consider him alongside other famous sophists for present purposes.

Gorgias visited Athens in 427 B.C.E. as the leader of an embassy from Leontini with the successful intention of persuading the Athenians to make an alliance against Syracuse. He travelled extensively around Greece, earning large sums of money by giving lessons in rhetoric and epideictic speeches.

Plato's Gorgias depicts the rhetorician as something of a celebrity, who either does not have well thought out views on the implications of his expertise, or is reluctant to share them, and who denies his responsibility for the unjust use of rhetorical skill by errant students. Although Gorgias presents himself as moderately upstanding, the dramatic structure of Plato's dialogue suggests that the defence of injustice by Polus and the appeal to the natural right of the stronger by Callicles are partly grounded in the conceptual presuppositions of Gorgianic rhetoric.

Gorgias' original contribution to philosophy is sometimes disputed, but the fragments of his works On Not Being or Nature and Helen – discussed in detail in section 3c – feature intriguing claims concerning the power of rhetorical speech and a style of argumentation reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno. Gorgias is also credited with other orations and encomia and a technical treatise on rhetoric titled At the Right Moment in Time.

### **c. Antiphon**

The biographical details surrounding Antiphon the sophist (c. 470-411 B.C.) are unclear – one unresolved issue is whether he should be identified with Antiphon of Rhamnus (a statesman and teacher of rhetoric who was a member of the oligarchy which held power in Athens briefly in 411 B.C.E.). However, since the publication of fragments from his On Truth in the early twentieth century he has been regarded as a major representative of the sophistic movement.

On Truth, which features a range of positions and counterpositions on the relationship between nature and convention (see section 3a below), is sometimes considered an important text in the history of political thought because of its alleged advocacy of egalitarianism: Those born of illustrious fathers we respect and honour, whereas those who come from an undistinguished house we neither respect nor honour. In this we behave like barbarians towards one another. For by nature we all equally, both barbarians and Greeks, have an entirely similar origin: for it is fitting to fulfil the natural satisfactions which are necessary to all men: all have the ability to fulfil these in the same way, and in all this none of us is different either as barbarian or as Greek; for we all breathe into the air with mouth and nostrils and we all eat with the hands (quoted in Untersteiner, 1954).

Whether this statement should be taken as expressing the actual views of Antiphon, or rather as

part of an antilogical presentation of opposing views on justice remains an open question, as does whether such a position rules out the identification of Antiphon the sophist with the oligarchical Antiphon of Rhamnus.

#### **d. Hippias**

The exact dates for Hippias of Elis are unknown, but scholars generally assume that he lived during the same period as Protagoras. Whereas Plato's depictions of Protagoras – and to a lesser extent Gorgias – indicate a modicum of respect, he presents Hippias as a comic figure who is obsessed with money, pompous and confused.

Hippias is best known for his polymathy (DK 86A14). His areas of expertise seem to have included astronomy, grammar, history, mathematics, music, poetry, prose, rhetoric, painting and sculpture. Like Gorgias and Prodicus, he served as an ambassador for his home city. His work as a historian, which included compiling lists of Olympic victors, was invaluable to Thucydides and subsequent historians as it allowed for a more precise dating of past events. In mathematics he is attributed with the discovery of a curve – the quadratrix – used to trisect an angle.

In terms of his philosophical contribution, Kerferd has suggested, on the basis of Plato's *Hippias Major* (301d-302b), that Hippias advocated a theory that classes or kinds of thing are dependent on a being that traverses them. It is hard to make much sense of this alleged doctrine on the basis of available evidence. As suggested above, Plato depicts Hippias as philosophically shallow and unable to keep up with Socrates in dialectical discussion.

#### **e. Prodicus**

Prodicus of Ceos, who lived during roughly the same period as Protagoras and Hippias, is best known for his subtle distinctions between the meanings of words. He is thought to have written a treatise titled *On the Correctness of Names*.

Plato gives an amusing account of Prodicus' method in the following passage of the *Protagoras*: Prodicus spoke up next: ... 'those who attend discussions such as this ought to listen impartially, but not equally, to both interlocutors. There is a distinction here. We ought to listen impartially but not divide our attention equally: More should go to the wiser speaker and less to the more unlearned ... In this way our meeting would take a most attractive turn, for you, the speakers, would then most surely earn the respect, rather than the praise, of those listening to you. For respect is guilelessly inherent in the souls of listeners, but praise is all too often merely a deceitful verbal expression. And then, too, we, your audience, would be most cheered, but not pleased, for to be cheered is to learn something, to participate in some intellectual activity; but to be pleased has to do with eating or experiencing some other pleasure in the body' (337a-c).

Prodicus' epideictic speech, *The Choice of Heracles*, was singled out for praise by Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, II.1.21-34) and in addition to his private teaching he seems to have served as an ambassador for Ceos (the birthplace of Simonides) on several occasions.

Socrates, although perhaps with some degree of irony, was fond of calling himself a pupil of Prodicus (*Protagoras*, 341a; *Meno*, 96d).

## **f. Thrasymachus**

Thrasymachus was a well-known rhetorician in Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B.C.E., but our only surviving record of his views is contained in Plato's Cleitophon and Book One of The Republic. He is depicted as brash and aggressive, with views on the nature of justice that will be examined in section 3a.

## **3. Major Themes of Sophistic Thought**

### **a. Nature and Convention**

The distinction between *physis* (nature) and *nomos* (custom, law, convention) was a central theme in Greek thought in the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. and is especially important for understanding the work of the sophists. Before turning to sophistic considerations of these concepts and the distinction between them, it is worth sketching the meaning of the Greek terms. Aristotle defines *physis* as 'the substance of things which have in themselves as such a source of movement' (Metaphysics, 1015a13-15). The term *physis* is closely connected with the Greek verb to grow (*phuō*) and the dynamic aspect of *physis* reflects the view that the nature of things is found in their origins and internal principles of change. Some of the Ionian thinkers now referred to as presocratics, including Thales and Heraclitus, used the term *physis* for reality as a whole, or at least its underlying material constituents, referring to the investigation of nature in this context as *historia* (inquiry) rather than philosophy.

The term *nomos* refers to a wide range of normative concepts extending from customs and conventions to positive law. It would be misleading to regard the term as referring only to arbitrary human conventions, as Heraclitus' appeal to the distinction between human *nomoi* and the one divine *nomos* (DK 22B2 and 114) makes clear. Nonetheless, increased travel, as exemplified by the histories of Herodotus, led to a greater understanding of the wide array of customs, conventions and laws among communities in the ancient world. This recognition sets up the possibility of a dichotomy between what is unchanging and according to nature and what is merely a product of arbitrary human convention.

The dichotomy between *physis* and *nomos* seems to have been something of a commonplace of sophistic thought and was appealed to by Protagoras and Hippias among others. Perhaps the most instructive sophistic account of the distinction, however, is found in Antiphon's fragment On Truth.

Antiphon applies the distinction to notions of justice and injustice, arguing that the majority of things which are considered just according to *nomos* are in direct conflict with nature and hence not truly or naturally just (DK 87 A44). The basic thrust of Antiphon's argument is that laws and conventions are designed as a constraint upon our natural pursuit of pleasure. In a passage suggestive of the discussion on justice early in Plato's Republic, Antiphon also asserts that one should employ justice to one's advantage by regarding the laws as important when witnesses are present, but disregarding them when one can get away with it. Although these arguments may be construed as part of an antilogical exercise on nature and convention rather than prescriptions for a life of prudent immorality, they are consistent with views on the relation between human nature and justice suggested by Plato's depiction of Callicles and Thrasymachus in the Gorgias and Republic respectively.

Callicles, a young Athenian aristocrat who may be a real historical figure or a creation of Plato's imagination, was not a sophist; indeed he expresses disdain for them (Gorgias, 520a). His account of the relation between *physis* and *nomos* nonetheless owes a debt to sophistic thought. According to Callicles, Socrates' arguments in favour of the claim that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice trade on a deliberate ambiguity in the term justice. Callicles argues that conventional justice is a kind of slave morality imposed by the many to constrain the desires of the superior few. What is just according to nature, by contrast, is seen by observing animals in nature and relations between political communities where it can be seen that the strong prevail over the weak. Callicles himself takes this argument in the direction of a vulgar sensual hedonism motivated by the desire to have more than others (*pleonexia*), but sensual hedonism as such does not seem to be a necessary consequence of his account of natural justice.

Although the sophist Thrasymachus does not employ the *physis/nomos* distinction in Book One of the Republic, his account of justice (338d-354c) belongs within a similar conceptual framework. Like Callicles, Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of deliberate deception in his arguments, particularly in the claim the art of justice consists in a ruler looking after their subjects. According to Thrasymachus, we do better to think of the ruler/ruled relation in terms of a shepherd looking after his flock with a view to its eventual demise. Justice in conventional terms is simply a naive concern for the advantage of another. From another more natural perspective, justice is the rule of the stronger, insofar as rulers establish laws which persuade the multitude that it is just for them to obey what is to the advantage of the ruling few. An alternative, and more edifying, account of the relation between *physis* and *nomos* is found in Protagoras' great speech (Protagoras, 320c-328d). According to Protagoras' myth, man was originally set forth by the gods into a violent state of nature reminiscent of that later described by Hobbes. Our condition improved when Zeus bestowed us with shame and justice; these enabled us to develop the skill of politics and hence civilized communal relations and virtue. Apart from supporting his argument that *aretē* can be taught, this account suggests a defence of *nomos* on the grounds that nature by itself is insufficient for the flourishing of man considered as a political animal.

## **b. Relativism**

The primary source on sophistic relativism about knowledge and/or truth is Protagoras' famous 'man is the measure' statement. Interpretation of Protagoras' thesis has always been a matter of controversy. Caution is needed in particular against the temptation to read modern epistemological concerns into Protagoras' account and sophistic teaching on the relativity of truth more generally.

Protagoras measure thesis is as follows: A human being is the measure of all things, of those things that are, that they are, and of those things that are not, that they are not (DK, 80B1). There is near scholarly consensus that Protagoras is referring here to each human being as the measure of what is rather than 'humankind' as such, although the Greek term for 'human' – *hōanthrōpos* – certainly does not rule out the second interpretation. Plato's Theaetetus (152a), however, suggests the first reading and I will assume its correctness here. On this reading we can regard Protagoras as asserting that if the wind, for example, feels (or seems) cold to me and feels (or seems) warm to you, then the wind is cold for me and is warm for you.

Another interpretative issue concerns whether we should construe Protagoras' statement as primarily ontological or epistemological in intent. Scholarship by Kahn, Owen and Kerferd among

others suggests that, while the Greeks lacked a clear distinction between existential and predicative uses of 'to be', they tended to treat existential uses as short for predicative uses. Having sketched some of the interpretative difficulties surrounding Protagoras' statement, we are still left with at least three possible readings (Kerferd, 1981a, 86). Protagoras could be asserting that (i) there is no mind-independent wind at all, but merely private subjective winds (ii) there is a wind that exists independently of my perception of it, but it is in itself neither cold nor warm as these qualities are private (iii) there is a wind that exists independently of my perception of it and this is both cold and warm insofar as two qualities can inhere in the same mind-independent 'entity'.

All three interpretations are live options, with (i) perhaps the least plausible. Whatever the exact import of Protagoras' relativism, however, the following passage from the Theaetetus suggests that it was also extended to the political and ethical realm:

Whatever in any particular city is considered just and admirable is just and admirable in that city, for so long as the convention remains in place (167c).

One difficulty this passage raises is that while Protagoras asserted that all beliefs are equally true, he also maintained that some are superior to others because they are more subjectively fulfilling for those who hold them. Protagoras thus seems to want it both ways, insofar as he removes an objective criterion of truth while also asserting that some subjective states are better than others. His appeal to better and worse beliefs could, however, be taken to refer to the persuasiveness and pleasure induced by certain beliefs and speeches rather than their objective truth.

The other major source for sophistic relativism is the *Dissoi Logoi*, an undated and anonymous example of Protagorean antilogic. In the *Dissoi Logoi* we find competing arguments on five theses, including whether the good and the bad are the same or different, and a series of examples of the relativity of different cultural practices and laws. Overall the *Dissoi Logoi* can be taken to uphold not only the relativity of truth but also what Barney (2006, 89) has called the variability thesis: whatever is good in some qualified way is also bad in another respect and the same is the case for a wide range of contrary predicates.

### **c. Language and Reality**

Understandably given their educational program, the sophists placed great emphasis upon the power of speech (*logos*). *Logos* is a notoriously difficult term to translate and can refer to thought and that about which we speak and think as well as rational speech or language. The sophists were interested in particular with the role of human discourse in the shaping of reality. Rhetoric was the centrepiece of the curriculum, but literary interpretation of the work of poets was also a staple of sophistic education. Some philosophical implications of the sophistic concern with speech are considered in section 4, but in the current section it is instructive to concentrate on Gorgias' account of the power of rhetorical *logos*.

The extant fragments attributed to the historical Gorgias indicate not only scepticism towards essential being and our epistemic access to this putative realm, but an assertion of the omnipotence of persuasive *logos* to make the natural and practical world conform to human desires. Reporting upon Gorgias' speech *About the Nonexistent or on Nature*, Sextus says that the rhetorician, while adopting a different approach from that of Protagoras, also eliminated the

criterion (DK, 82B3). The elimination of the criterion refers to the rejection of a standard that would enable us to distinguish clearly between knowledge and opinion about being and nature. Whereas Protagoras asserted that man is the measure of all things, Gorgias concentrated upon the status of truth about being and nature as a discursive construction.

About the Nonexistent or on Nature transgresses the injunction of Parmenides that one cannot say of what is that it is not. Employing a series of conditional arguments in the manner of Zeno, Gorgias asserts that nothing exists, that if it did exist it could not be apprehended, and if it was apprehended it could not be articulated in logos. The elaborate parody displays the paradoxical character of attempts to disclose the true nature of beings through logos: For that by which we reveal is logos, but logos is not substances and existing things. Therefore we do not reveal existing things to our comrades, but logos, which is something other than substances (DK, 82B3) Even if knowledge of beings was possible, its transmission in logos would always be distorted by the rift between substances and our apprehension and communication of them. Gorgias also suggests, even more provocatively, that insofar as speech is the medium by which humans articulate their experience of the world, logos is not evocative of the external, but rather the external is what reveals logos. An understanding of logos about nature as constitutive rather than descriptive here supports the assertion of the omnipotence of rhetorical expertise. Gorgias' account suggests there is no knowledge of nature sub specie aeternitatis and our grasp of reality is always mediated by discursive interpretations, which, in turn, implies that truth cannot be separated from human interests and power claims.

In the Encomium to Helen Gorgias refers to logos as a powerful master (DK, 82B11). If humans had knowledge of the past, present or future they would not be compelled to adopt unpredictable opinion as their counsellor. The endless contention of astronomers, politicians and philosophers is taken to demonstrate that no logos is definitive. Human ignorance about non-existent truth can thus be exploited by rhetorical persuasion insofar as humans desire the illusion of certainty imparted by the spoken word: The effect of logos upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of logoi, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion (DK, 82B11).

All who have persuaded people, Gorgias says, do so by moulding a false logos. While other forms of power require force, logos makes all its willing slave.

This account of the relation between persuasive speech, knowledge, opinion and reality is broadly consistent with Plato's depiction of the rhetorician in the Gorgias. Both Protagoras' relativism and Gorgias' account of the omnipotence of logos are suggestive of what we moderns might call a deflationary epistemic anti-realism.

#### **4. The Distinction Between Philosophy and Sophistry**

The distinction between philosophy and sophistry is in itself a difficult philosophical problem. This closing section examines the attempt of Plato to establish a clear line of demarcation between philosophy and sophistry.

As alluded to above, the terms 'philosopher' and 'sophist' were disputed in the fifth and fourth

century B.C.E., the subject of contention between rival schools of thought. Histories of philosophy tend to begin with the Ionian 'physicist' Thales, but the presocratics referred to the activity they were engaged in as *historia* (inquiry) rather than *philosophia* and although it may have some validity as a historical projection, the notion that philosophy begins with Thales derives from the mid nineteenth century. It was Plato who first clearly and consistently refers to the activity of *philosophia* and much of what he has to say is best understood in terms of an explicit or implicit contrast with the rival schools of the sophists and Isocrates (who also claimed the title *philosophia* for his rhetorical educational program).

The related questions as to what a sophist is and how we can distinguish the philosopher from the sophist were taken very seriously by Plato. He also acknowledges the difficulty inherent in the pursuit of these questions and it is perhaps revealing that the dialogue dedicated to the task, *Sophist*, culminates in a discussion about the being of non-being. Socrates converses with sophists in *Euthydemus*, *Hippias Major*, *Hippias Minor*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras* and the *Republic* and discusses sophists at length in the *Apology*, *Sophist*, *Statesman* and *Theaetetus*. It can thus be argued that the search for the sophist and distinction between philosophy and sophistry are not only central themes in the Platonic dialogues, but constitutive of the very idea and practice of philosophy, at least in its original sense as articulated by Plato.

This point has been recognised by recent poststructuralist thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Jean Francois-Lyotard in the context of their project to place in question central presuppositions of the Western philosophical tradition deriving from Plato. Derrida attacks the interminable trial prosecuted by Plato against the sophists with a view to exhuming 'the conceptual monuments marking out the battle lines between philosophy and sophistry' (1981, 106). Lyotard views the sophists as in possession of unique insight into the sense in which discourses about what is just cannot transcend the realm of opinion and pragmatic language games (1985, 73-83).

The prospects for establishing a clear methodological divide between philosophy and sophistry are poor. Apart from the considerations mentioned in section 1, it would be misleading to say that the sophists were unconcerned with truth or genuine theoretical investigation and Socrates is clearly guilty of fallacious reasoning in many of the Platonic dialogues. In the *Sophist*, in fact, Plato implies that the Socratic technique of dialectical refutation represents a kind of 'noble sophistry' (*Sophist*, 231b).

This in large part explains why contemporary scholarship on the distinction between philosophy and sophistry has tended to focus on a difference in moral character. Nehamas, for example, has argued that 'Socrates did not differ from the sophists in method but in overall purpose' (1990, 13). Nehamas relates this overall purpose to the Socratic *elenchus*, suggesting that Socrates' disavowal of knowledge and of the capacity to teach *aretē* distances him from the sophists. However, this way of demarcating Socrates' practice from that of his sophistic counterparts, Nehamas argues, cannot justify the later Platonic distinction between philosophy and sophistry, insofar as Plato forfeited the right to uphold the distinction once he developed a substantive philosophical teaching, that is, the theory of forms.

There is no doubt much truth in the claim that Plato and Aristotle depict the philosopher as pursuing a different way of life than the sophist, but to say that Plato defines the philosopher either through a difference in moral purpose, as in the case of Socrates, or a metaphysical presumption regarding the existence of transcendent forms, as in his later work, does not in itself adequately

characterise Plato's critique of his sophistic contemporaries. Once we attend to Plato's own treatment of the distinction between philosophy and sophistry two themes quickly become clear: the mercenary character of the sophists and their overestimation of the power of speech. For Plato, at least, these two aspects of the sophistic education tell us something about the persona of the sophist as the embodiment of a distinctive attitude towards knowledge.

The fact that the sophists taught for profit may not seem objectionable to modern readers; most present-day university professors would be reluctant to teach pro bono. It is clearly a major issue for Plato, however. Plato can barely mention the sophists without contemptuous reference to the mercenary aspect of their trade: particularly revealing examples of Plato's disdain for sophistic money-making and avarice are found at Apology 19d, Euthydemus 304b-c, Hippias Major 282b-

e, Protagoras 312c-d and Sophist 222d-224d, and this is not an exhaustive list. Part of the issue here is no doubt Plato's commitment to a way of life dedicated to knowledge and contemplation. It is significant that students in the Academy, arguably the first higher education institution, were not required to pay fees. This is only part of the story, however.

A good starting point is to consider the etymology of the term *philosophia* as suggested by the Phaedrus and Symposium. After completing his palinode in the Phaedrus, Socrates expresses the hope that he never be deprived of his 'erotic' art. Whereas the speechwriter Lysias presents *erōs* (desire, love) as an unseemly waste of expenditure (Phaedrus, 257a), in his later speech Socrates demonstrates how *erōs* impels the soul to rise towards the forms. The followers of Zeus, or philosophy, Socrates suggests, educate the object of their *erōs* to imitate and partake in the ways of the God. Similarly, in the Symposium, Socrates refers to an exception to his ignorance. Approving of the suggestion by Phaedrus that the drinking party eulogise *erōs*, Socrates states that *ta erōtika* (the erotic things) are the only subject concerning which he would claim to possess rigorous knowledge (Symposium, 177 d-e). When it is his turn to deliver a speech, Socrates laments his incapacity to compete with the Gorgias-influenced rhetoric of Agathon before delivering Diotima's lessons on *erōs*, represented as a daimonion or semi-divine intermediary between the mortal and the divine. *Erōs* is thus presented as analogous to philosophy in its etymological sense, a striving after wisdom or completion that can only be temporarily fulfilled in this life by contemplation of the forms of the beautiful and the good (204a-b). The philosopher is someone who strives after wisdom – a friend or lover of wisdom – not someone who possesses wisdom as a finished product, as the sophists claimed to do and as their name suggests.

Plato's emphasis upon philosophy as an 'erotic' activity of striving for wisdom, rather than as a finished state of completed wisdom, largely explains his distaste for sophistic money-making. The sophists, according to Plato, considered knowledge to be a ready-made product that could be sold without discrimination to all comers. The Theages, a Socratic dialogue whose authorship some scholars have disputed, but which expresses sentiments consistent with other Platonic dialogues, makes this point with particular clarity. The farmer Demodokos has brought his son, Theages, who is desirous of wisdom, to Socrates. As Socrates questions his potential pupil regarding what sort of wisdom he seeks, it becomes evident that Theages seeks power in the city and influence over other men. Since Theages is looking for political wisdom, Socrates refers him to the statesmen and the sophists. Disavowing his ability to compete with the expertise of Gorgias and Prodicus in this respect, Socrates nonetheless admits his knowledge of the erotic things, a subject about which he claims to know more than any man who has come before or indeed any of those to come

(Theages, 128b). In response to the suggestion that he study with a sophist, Theages reveals his intention to become a pupil of Socrates. Perhaps reluctant to take on an unpromising pupil, Socrates insists that he must follow the commands of his daimonion, which will determine whether those associating with him are capable of making any progress (Theages, 129c). The dialogue ends with an agreement that all parties make trial of the daimonion to see whether it permits of the association.

One need only follow the suggestion of the Symposium that *erōs* is a daimonion to see that Socratic education, as presented by Plato, is concomitant with a kind of 'erotic' concern with the beautiful and the good, considered as natural in contrast to the purely conventional. Whereas the sophists accept pupils indiscriminately, provided they have the money to pay, Socrates is oriented by his desire to cultivate the beautiful and the good in promising natures. In short, the difference between Socrates and his sophistic contemporaries, as Xenophon suggests, is the difference between a lover and a prostitute. The sophists, for Xenophon's Socrates, are prostitutes of wisdom because they sell their wares to anyone with the capacity to pay (*Memorabilia*, I.6.13). This – somewhat paradoxically – accounts for Socrates' shamelessness in comparison with his sophistic contemporaries, his preparedness to follow the argument wherever it leads. By contrast, Protagoras and Gorgias are shown, in the dialogues that bear their names, as vulnerable to the conventional opinions of the paying fathers of their pupils, a weakness contributing to their refutation. The sophists are thus characterised by Plato as subordinating the pursuit of truth to worldly success, in a way that perhaps calls to mind the activities of contemporary advertising executives or management consultants.

The overestimation of the power of human speech is the other theme that emerges clearly from Plato's (and Aristotle's) critique of the sophists. In the *Sophist*, Plato says that dialectic – division and collection according to kinds – is the knowledge possessed by the free man or philosopher (*Sophist*, 253c). Here Plato reintroduces the difference between true and false rhetoric, alluded to in the *Phaedrus*, according to which the former presupposes the capacity to see the one in the many (*Phaedrus*, 266b). Plato's claim is that the capacity to divide and synthesise in accordance with one form is required for the true expertise of *logos*. Whatever else one makes of Plato's account of our knowledge of the forms, it clearly involves the apprehension of a higher level of being than sensory perception and speech. The philosopher, then, considers rational speech as oriented by a genuine understanding of being or nature. The sophist, by contrast, is said by Plato to occupy the realm of falsity, exploiting the difficulty of dialectic by producing discursive semblances, or phantasms, of true being (*Sophist*, 234c). The sophist uses the power of persuasive speech to construct or create images of the world and is thus a kind of 'enchanter' and imitator.

This aspect of Plato's critique of sophistry seems particularly apposite in regard to Gorgias' rhetoric, both as found in the Platonic dialogue and the extant fragments attributed to the historical Gorgias. In response to Socratic questioning, Gorgias asserts that rhetoric is an all-comprehending power that holds under itself all of the other activities and occupations (*Gorgias*, 456a). He later claims that it is concerned with the greatest good for man, namely those speeches that allow one to attain freedom and rule over others, especially, but not exclusively, in political settings (452d). As suggested above, in the context of Athenian public life the capacity to persuade was a precondition of political success. For present purposes, however, the key point is that freedom and rule over others are both forms of power: respectively power in the sense of liberty or capacity to do something, which suggests the absence of relevant constraints, and power in the sense of

dominion over others. Gorgias is suggesting that rhetoric, as the expertise of persuasive speech, is the source of power in a quite comprehensive sense and that power is 'the good'. What we have here is an assertion of the omnipotence of speech, at the very least in relation to the determination of human affairs.

The Socratic position, as becomes clear later in the discussion with Polus (466d-e), and is also suggested in Meno (88c-d) and Euthydemus (281d-e), is that power without knowledge of the good is not genuinely good. Without such knowledge not only 'external' goods, such as wealth and health, not only the areas of expertise that enable one to attain such so-called goods, but the very capacity to attain them is either of no value or harmful. This in large part explains the so-called Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge.

Plato's critique of the sophists' overestimation of the power of speech should not be conflated with his commitment to the theory of the forms. For Plato, the sophist reduces thinking to a kind of making: by asserting the omnipotence of human speech the sophist pays insufficient regard to the natural limits upon human knowledge and our status as seekers rather than possessors of knowledge (Sophist, 233d). This critique of the sophists does perhaps require a minimal commitment to a distinction between appearance and reality, but it is an oversimplification to suggest that Plato's distinction between philosophy and sophistry rests upon a substantive metaphysical theory, in large part because our knowledge of the forms for Plato is itself inherently ethical. Plato, like his Socrates, differentiates the philosopher from the sophist primarily through the virtues of the philosopher's soul (McKoy, 2008). Socrates is an embodiment of the moral virtues, but love of the forms also has consequences for the philosopher's character.

There is a further ethical and political aspect to the Platonic and Aristotelian critique of the sophists' overestimation of the power of speech. In Book Ten of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that the sophists tended to reduce politics to rhetoric (1181a12-15) and overemphasised the role that could be played by rational persuasion in the political realm. Part of Aristotle's point is that there is an element to living well that transcends speech. As Hadot eloquently puts it, citing Greek and Roman sources, 'traditionally people who developed an apparently philosophical discourse without trying to live their lives in accordance with their discourse, and without their discourse emanating from their life experience, were called sophists' (2004, 174).

The testimony of Xenophon, a Greek general and man of action, is instructive here. In his treatise on hunting, (*Cynēgeticus*, 13.1-9), Xenophon commends Socratic over sophistic education in *aretē*, not only on the grounds that the sophists hunt the young and rich and are deceptive, but also because they are men of words rather than action. The importance of consistency between one's words and actions if one is to be truly virtuous is a commonplace of Greek thought, and this is one important respect in which the sophists, at least from the Platonic-Aristotelian perspective, fell short.

One might think that a denial of Plato's demarcation between philosophy and sophistry remains well-motivated simply because the historical sophists made genuine contributions to philosophy. But this does not entail the illegitimacy of Plato's distinction. Once we recognise that Plato is pointing primarily to a fundamental ethical orientation relating to the respective personas of the philosopher and sophist, rather than a methodological or purely theoretical distinction, the tension dissolves. This is not to deny that the ethical orientation of the sophist is likely to lead to a certain kind of philosophising, namely one which attempts to master nature, human and external, rather

than understand it as it is.

Sophistry for Socrates, Plato and Aristotle represents a choice for a certain way of life, embodied in a particular attitude towards knowledge which views it as a finished product to be transmitted to all comers. Plato's distinction between philosophy and sophistry is not simply an arbitrary viewpoint in a dispute over naming rights, but is rather based upon a fundamental difference in ethical orientation. Neither is this orientation reducible to concern with truth or the cogency of one's theoretical constructs, although it is not unrelated to these.

Where the philosopher differs from the sophist is in terms of the choice for a way of life that is oriented by the pursuit of knowledge as a good in itself while remaining cognisant of the necessarily provisional nature of this pursuit.

## **Socrates**

Socrates was an ancient Greek philosopher considered to be the main source of Western thought. He was condemned to death for his Socratic method of questioning. Socrates was a scholar, teacher and philosopher born in ancient Greece. His Socratic method laid the groundwork for Western systems of logic and philosophy.

When the political climate of Greece turned against him, Socrates was sentenced to death by hemlock poisoning in 399 B.C. He accepted this judgment rather than fleeing into exile.

## **Early Years**

Born circa 470 B.C. in Athens, Greece, Socrates's life is chronicled through only a few sources: the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon and the plays of Aristophanes.

Because these writings had other purposes than reporting his life, it is likely none present a completely accurate picture. However, collectively, they provide a unique and vivid portrayal of Socrates's philosophy and personality.

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, an Athenian stonemason and sculptor, and Phaenarete, a midwife. Because he wasn't from a noble family, he probably received a basic Greek education and learned his father's craft at a young age. It's believed Socrates worked as mason for many years before he devoted his life to philosophy.

Contemporaries differ in their account of how Socrates supported himself as a philosopher. Both Xenophon and Aristophanes state Socrates received payment for teaching, while Plato writes Socrates explicitly denied accepting payment, citing his poverty as proof.

Socrates married Xanthippe, a younger woman, who bore him three sons: Lamprocles, Sophroniscus and Menexenus. There is little known about her except for Xenophon's characterization of Xanthippe as "undesirable."

He writes she was not happy with Socrates's second profession and complained that he wasn't supporting family as a philosopher. By his own words, Socrates had little to do with his sons' upbringing and expressed far more interest in the intellectual development of Athens' other young boys.

## **Life in Athens**

Athenian law required all able-bodied males serve as citizen soldiers, on call for duty from ages 18 until 60. According to Plato, Socrates served in the armored infantry – known as the hoplite – with shield, long spear and face mask.

He participated in three military campaigns during the Peloponnesian War, at Delium, Amphipolis and Potidaea, where he saved the life of Alcibiades, a popular Athenian general.

Socrates was known for his fortitude in battle and his fearlessness, a trait that stayed with him throughout his life. After his trial, he compared his refusal to retreat from his legal troubles to a soldier's refusal to retreat from battle when threatened with death.

Plato's Symposium provides the best details of Socrates' physical appearance. He was not the ideal of Athenian masculinity. Short and stocky, with a snub nose and bulging eyes, Socrates always seemed to appear to be staring.

However, Plato pointed out that in the eyes of his students, Socrates possessed a different kind of attractiveness, not based on a physical ideal but on his brilliant debates and penetrating thought.

Socrates always emphasized the importance of the mind over the relative unimportance of the human body. This credo inspired Plato's philosophy of dividing reality into two separate realms, the world of the senses and the world of ideas, declaring that the latter was the only important one.

## **Philosophy**

Socrates believed that philosophy should achieve practical results for the greater well-being of society. He attempted to establish an ethical system based on human reason rather than theological doctrine.

Socrates pointed out that human choice was motivated by the desire for happiness. Ultimate wisdom comes from knowing oneself. The more a person knows, the greater his or her ability to reason and make choices that will bring true happiness.

Socrates believed that this translated into politics with the best form of government being neither a tyranny nor a democracy. Instead, government worked best when ruled by individuals who had the greatest ability, knowledge and virtue, and possessed a complete understanding of themselves.

## **Plato's Life and Times**

Born into an aristocratic and influential Athenian family, and raised during the Peloponnesian War, Plato's family expected him to go into politics, but he fell in love with philosophy. After his mentor, Socrates, was executed in 399 bce, a disgusted Plato left Athens. He returned in 387 to found the Academy, often considered the first university.

His Academy developed thinkers such as Aristotle. Plato spent time writing dialogues, typically divided into stages: early, middle, and late. These reflect developments in his thinking; he extended and effectively completed Socrates's interest in ethics to a systematic philosophy encompassing

ideas in metaphysics and epistemology.

## **Plato's Theory of Knowledge**

Plato's rationalism marks him out from other ancient thinkers such as Heraclitus in his rejection of the ever-changing physical world as a source of knowledge. Instead, he proposed that knowledge is to be found in a transcendent realm of the Forms. The Forms, however, do not provide a convincing theory of knowledge. Instead, Aristotle's account of knowledge gained through experience is more convincing and supported by the philosophy of Locke in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and later A.J Ayer in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. While Ayer's verificationism raises the problem of relativism, I shall argue that these problems must be solved by an empiricist approach, rather than Plato's mysterious realm of the Forms.

Heraclitus observed that 'No man can step in the same river twice', which acknowledged that the physical world is constantly changing. Plato insists, however, that there exists an eternal, perfect and immaterial form of physical objects; the properties of physical objects and values, such as justice, beauty and truth. This can be seen as part of a convincing theory of knowledge to the extent that it explains how a person can recognise particular things as belonging to a universal idea, even if those particular things are imperfect reflections of their universal form; for example, one can recognise different dogs as dogs because they have an innate memory of the form of a dog, according to Plato. This innate memory, Plato explains, comes from before birth when the soul belonged in the realm of the forms.

The problem with this theory of knowledge, however, is that there is no evidence that there actually exists a realm of the forms. John Locke was an empiricist who argued that we gain knowledge from experience. We understand the concept of a dog not because we recollect the Form of a dog that exists independently of any particular dog, but because we are able to compare a particular dog to other dogs that we have experienced. Using our imagination, we can then abstract the concept of a dog from those experiences of the things that all dogs have in common. Aristotle, also an empiricist, argued that 'goodness', rather than existing in a mysterious realm of the forms as the source of all perfection and existence, is only meaningful as a judgment about whether or not something fulfils its function in practice, e.g. a knife is 'good' if it cuts well.

One may argue that not all knowledge is based on experience, for example, the idea of a unicorn. Some knowledge, therefore must be innate in a way similar to how Plato describes. John Locke, however, in his 'Essay concerning Human Understanding', argues that even ideas in our imagination are based on a combination of things drawn from experience. He suggests that if certain ideas were innate, like the law of non-contradiction, then 'children and idiots' would understand them, but there is no evidence that they do.

Iris Murdoch, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, argued that Plato's theory of knowledge is convincing. She argued that there must exist a Platonic form of 'goodness' that guides us to become better people and rise to an external standard of morality. This may be convincing if we consider that without this, when we judge something as good or beautiful, we are just expressing an opinion based on popular opinion. This would mean that values are relative and we would be unable to judge others for acts or views that we intuitively perceive as absolutely wrong, e.g. rape or genocide. Plato was warning against relativism in his allegory of the cave when he describes those who are bound by popular opinion as being prisoners who merely see shadows on a wall as oppose to the real

objects of knowledge, the forms. Plato further explains this idea with the analogy of the divided line that shows that the forms are more real than physical objects by a ratio of 2:1, an idea that was influenced by Pythagoras.

Ayer, however, would argue that Plato's theory of knowledge is unconvincing because the Forms cannot be verified. He denied the existence of any "reality transcending the limits of all possible sense-experience" and argued that any statement that cannot be directly or indirectly verified is meaningless. This implies that statements about goodness and beauty (both of which Plato believes to be Forms of absolute truth) are relative and simply expressions of emotion. Ayer's approach to knowledge is more convincing than Plato's because it is based on what can be scientifically proven, however, the problems of relativism that have just been raised are unavoidable on Ayer's understanding of knowledge.

Aristotle and Locke's common sense empiricism more convincingly explains how we have knowledge of concepts derived from physical things. While there may be problems with relativism on Ayer's understanding of concepts like goodness and beauty, Plato's Forms are unverifiable. There must be a solution to the problems of relativism that are based on a scientific, verifiable view of the world.

**Knowledge and Reality** Plato believed that there are truths to be discovered; that knowledge is possible. Moreover, he held that truth is not, as the Sophists thought, relative. Instead, it is objective; it is that which our reason, used rightly, apprehends. Through his systematic philosophy, he developed a formidable rejection of skepticism, the view that we lack knowledge in some fundamental way.

**Believing and Knowing** For Plato, there is a distinction between believing and knowing. Since there are objective truths to be known, we may believe X, but belief alone does not guarantee we are correct. There are three necessary and sufficient conditions, according to Plato, for one to have knowledge: (1) the proposition must be believed; (2) the proposition must be true; and (3) the proposition must be supported by good reasons, which is to say, you must be justified in believing it. Thus, for Plato, knowledge is justified, true belief.

**Reason and the Forms** Since truth is objective, our knowledge of true propositions must be about real things. According to Plato, these real things are Forms. Their nature is such that the only mode by which we can know them is rationality. Forms are the eternal and immutable blueprints or models for everything that is. Consequently, they are more real than their particulars.

Because the Forms make particulars possible, they explain what is—we can understand what is by understanding the Forms. We can also extrapolate from particulars to get closer to contemplating the Forms. This extrapolation process is made possible by the way that reason works.

Unlike the senses, which can only tell us about this or that sensation, reason can think both about particulars and general concepts. Since the Forms are the most general things there are, the only way we can consider them is by way of our rationality. Moreover, Plato holds that our souls learned about the Forms before we were born, so we already know them—we have innate knowledge that needs to be elicited through the Socratic method.

## Plato's Rationalism

Following Parmenides, Plato privileges rationalism over empiricism, or reason over the senses, as the way we know. Unaided by the senses, reason will come to contemplate the Forms.

**Allegory of the Cave** Plato's Allegory of the Cave explains, among other things, how we come to the proper use of our reason to know the Forms.

## Immortality, Morality, and the Soul

### The Immortal Soul

The soul is immortal, according to Plato. In various dialogues, specifically the *Phaedo*, Plato articulates the relation between philosophy and the soul, where the activity of philosophy prepares the soul for a good death and afterlife. In this dialogue, Plato offers several arguments in support of the claim that the soul is immortal, one of which harkens back to the theory of recollection demonstrated in the *Meno*. (See Ch. 3.) Another argument involves the idea that there are two types of being, one of which is associated with perishable things, like human bodies, and another that is associated with imperishable things, like the soul.

**The Three-Part Soul** The soul consists of three parts: appetitive (appetites or urges), spirited (emotional), and rational. When one of the first two is not in control, the soul is in a state of disarray. In such a condition, individuals make poor choices and live unhappy lives.

**The Moral Soul** The moral soul is the harmonious and just soul guided by reason. This is the soul in which each of the two lower parts, appetite and spirit, are kept in alignment by reason.

**The Individual and the State** The individual is a microcosm of the state. The harmonious state is one in which each person performs his or her role according to his or her most prominent part of the soul or our nature: appetitive, spirited, or rational. The person driven most by his or her appetitive side is a producer, while the auxiliary is the spirited person, and the guardian is most rational. The producers are the laborers, carpenters, artists, and farmers of society; the auxiliaries are the soldiers, warriors, and police; and the guardians are the leaders, rulers, or philosopher-kings.

This arrangement lends itself to an aristocracy, a society ruled by a privileged class, rather than a democracy. This privilege is, however, practically speaking a burden. Doing what's best for society means thinking always and only about the right way to govern, the right way to achieve a unified state. The society Plato envisions is one he thinks can alone ensure people get their due. This, he thinks, is a meritocracy, or system of rule whereby people are distinguished by their abilities and achievements.

## Outline of Plato's contrast of knowledge and opinion:

1. Knowledge is a mental faculty/power that allows us to apprehend "being" (i.e., reality).
2. Ignorance is the opposite of knowledge.
3. Opinion is subject to error, but knowledge is not.
4. Opinion differs from knowledge
5. Different faculties involve different "spheres" (areas they govern). Opinion involves a different faculty, and has a different subject-matter.

6. Particular objects are subject to "opposite names." For example: The same house is beautiful to one person, ugly to another, and the same person is at one time young, at another time old.
7. Particulars are in the region between being and not-being.
8. Particulars are the subject-matter of opinion
9. Particulars are the subject-matter of opinion.
10. Eternal and immutable natures are the subject-matter of knowledge.

Opinion can possibly be true, in which case it serves as a successful guide to action (and this explains how Athens' heroes were good, they had correct opinions). But even true opinion, because it is only opinion, cannot be defended, and thus "like a runaway slave" flees when attacked. However, knowledge differs from mere opinion in that it can be defended by a logos, a rational explanation of why that opinion is true. Thus emerges the formula that knowledge is true opinion accompanied by a logos, or as it came to be expressed in the Western tradition, as "justified true belief."

This means that the real difference between opinion and knowledge lies in the "justification" (the logos). An opinion can become justified by showing how it can be deduced from other premises, if those premises are true. But no matter how validly we reason, Socrates saw that we cannot justify any opinion unless we start from premises known to be true, rather than just assumed as "hypotheses" in the way the mathematician assumes certain axioms. The series of justifications would seem to be infinite unless some "first" premises can be known directly and not inferred from "higher" premises. How can we attain knowledge of such premises which are not merely possibly true, like a mere hypothesis, but are necessarily true?

Thus, we can assume that, there are three minimum conditions for knowledge. They are, 1. **True** (it must be true) 2. **Believe** (we must actually believe it. Belief must be consciously held), 3. **Justification** is present (there must be sufficient evidence for it). Therefore, what is known has to be fact and thus true must come from the regard of the person acknowledging it as truth. The person must have an adequate basis for believing it, that is, have sufficient justification for believing it.

The purpose of belief is to represent the world accurately. Therefore, belief serves its role only if the formation, retention and revision of belief are sensitive to what one takes to be one's evidence. In the definition of belief, "Belief is a species of propositional attitude distinguished by their having the mind-to-world direction of fit". Most philosophers have assumed that belief is an inner state of mind, directly accessible to introspection and distinct from, though casually related to, the believer's behavior. Thus, belief plays a central role in theoretical reasoning (reason about what is so) and hence in practical reasoning (reason about what to do). We, therefore, need to know what we can do and how we can do is related to what we want. When seeking knowledge of these things we seek true belief about them. Thus, what we do is conditioned by what we believe. Belief issues in behavior only in conjunction with appropriate other propositional attitudes. In support of this theory, is the fact that not only can others check our claims to believe by considering whether we behave appropriately, but we ourselves may also take the results of such a test to overrule claims to believe that which we have sincerely made. Knowledge and belief are not only distinct attitudes but they also have a distinct and proprietary objectives. Whereas, belief can be true or false, knowledge is neither. But belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. Knowledge is acquired by deriving beliefs from other beliefs (foundation beliefs). Therefore, we accept belief(s) as a foundational principle because;

1. They are innate,
2. they are beliefs about present conscious experience,
3. They are beliefs that belong to our sense of experience.
4. They are self-evident.

## **Plato Theory Of Ideas**

Platonic theory of ideas is an answer to a fundamental question of metaphysics What is the ultimate reality of the world? As per the great thinker and Philosopher Plato, Ideas are the ultimate realities. In this world, there are lots of particular things but if we take these things in a particular way only, nothing general can be extracted. Thus, on the basis of some common qualities of things, Plato divides particular things into different classes. Ideas are nothing but essential features common to all members of these classes.

As an example, there is a class man, and every member of this class possesses a quality called manness. Thus, there exists an idea of manness. Likewise, there are several ideas including an idea of tree, idea of horseness etc. Throwing light on the importance of ideas, Plato says that the concept is important to understand a sentence. As an example, there is a sentence say, India is a democratic world. To understand it properly, we should have an idea of democracy. Here comes the necessity of ideas to plato Features of Ideas, as explained by Plato: . Ideas are substances as they are the ultimate realities of the world . Ideas are eternal because they exist beyond space and time . Ideas exist prior to particular things and apart from them . Ideas are many in number. Thus, Plato is a pluralist as he considers the reality to be more than one in number. However, bridging the gap between atomists and Parmenides, Plato says that ideas are unity in plurality.

There are many trees but idea of tree is one. . Ideas are perfect. For example, idea of beauty is a perfect idea. No other thing in the world exists that carries the same level of perfection. Discussing the origin and status of ideas, Plato says that there is a different world of ideas, also called heaven of ideas. It can be comprehended by our reason but this world of ideas does not depend on us for its existence. Plato, here, lays the foundation of Rationalism by saying that in human reason , there exist some universal principles which act as starting point of knowledge. On the other hand, by accentuating that ideas do not depend on us for their existence, Plato advocates Objective Idealism. Ideas have been presented in a scale as per the degree of comprehensiveness. Idea of Good is at the top that imparts axiological dimension to Platonic theory( Zeller).

Plato considers the reality to be good and beautiful. In views of Zeller, the theory also carries ontological dimensions because ideas are not mere mental constructions, they are the substances. W.C. states that ideas are epistemological because they have been considered as the starting point of knowledge. In addition, they are mystical because they have their own world ,different from our world. Succinctly put, ideas are the realities of the world. However, this consideration has left big questions: How this real world has been derived from the world of ideas? What is the relation between this world and the world of ideas? In answer to these questions, Plato has come up with two concepts:

- 1) Relation of appearance and reality
- 2) Concept of participation

According to Plato, world of ideas is a reality and our physical world is just a copy of it. In his book Republic, Plato takes an example of allegory of caves to prove his point. In this example, a man is considered to be fully chained, can't move from his place. Sunlight coming from behind makes his shadow on the wall in front of him. As the man can't move from his place, he is only able to see the shadow and nothing except that. Thus, he considers the shadow to be real. However, shadow is just an appearance. Reality is the sunlight coming from behind. Same is the case with our world. As we continuously see this world, we start considering it a reality. In actuality, reality is the ideas and this world is a mere shadow of ideas. Plato also provides second argument and opines that things and beings of the world participate in ideas. A particular thing may participate simultaneously in plurality of forms and assumes new forms when it undergoes any change. Ideas exist prior to things and apart from them. We can't think of man without having an idea of manness but not vice versa. Thus, ideas are necessary for this physical world to exist. Secondly, things of the physical world exist only to the extent that they participate in the world of ideas. Thus, ideas explain the physical world. Platonic theory draws praises from Whitehead but at the same time has been criticized on the basis of inconsistencies.

Successor, Aristotle, makes a severe attack by saying that ideas are posterior, not prior to things. He further says that ideas are abstract entities and they can not explain the existence of this concrete physical world. Plato considers two worlds in his theory, world of ideas and physical world. Because of this, he has been attacked by Aristotle of keeping this distinction between form (ideas) and matter. He says that Plato could not reconcile between form and matter. Plato stated that world of ideas is the only reality and this physical world a mere shadow, on the other hand he said that physical things are real to the extent they participate in the world of ideas. This seems illogical.

## **Dialectic**

Plato uses the term dialectic throughout his works to refer to whatever method he happens to be recommending as the vehicle of philosophy. The term, from *dialogesthai*, meaning to converse or talk through, gives insight into his core conception of the project. Yet it is also evident that he stresses different aspects of the conversational method in different dialogues.

The form of dialectic featured in the Socratic works became the basis of subsequent practice in the Academy—where it was taught by Aristotle—and in the teachings of the Skeptics during the Hellenistic Age. While the conversation in a Socratic dialogue unfolds naturally, it features a process by which even someone who lacks knowledge of a given subject (as Socrates in these works claims to do) may test the understanding of a putative expert. The testing consists of a series of questions posed in connection with a position the interlocutor is trying to uphold. The method presupposes that one cannot have knowledge of any fact in isolation; what is known must be embedded in a larger explanatory structure. Thus, in order to know if a certain act is pious, one must know what piety is. This requirement licenses the questioner to ask the respondent about issues suitably related to his original claim. If, in the course of this process, a contradiction emerges, the supposed expert is revealed not to command knowledge after all: if he did, his grasp of the truth would have enabled him to avoid contradiction. While both Socrates and the Skeptics hoped to find the truth (a *skeptikos* is after all a “seeker”), the method all too often reveals only the inadequacy of the respondent. Since he has fallen into contradiction, it follows that he is not an expert, but this does not automatically reveal what the truth is.

By the time of the composition of the Republic, Plato's focus had shifted to developing positive views, and thus "dialectic" was now thought of not as a technique of testing but as a means of "saying of each thing what it is." The Republic stresses that true dialectic is performed by thinking solely of the abstract and nonsensible realm of forms; it requires that reason secure an unhypothetical first principle (the Good) and then derive other results in light of it. Since this part of the dialogue is merely a programmatic sketch, however, no actual examples of the activity are provided, and indeed some readers have wondered whether it is really possible.

In the later dialogue Parmenides, dialectic is introduced as an exercise that the young Socrates must undertake if he is to understand the forms properly. The exercise, which Parmenides demonstrates in the second part of the work, is extremely laborious: a single instance involves the construction of eight sections of argument; the demonstration then takes up some three-quarters of the dialogue. The exercise challenges the reader to make a distinction associated with a sophisticated development of the theory of Platonic forms. Even after a general understanding has been achieved, repeating the exercise with different subjects allows one to grasp each subject's role in the world.

This understanding of dialectic gives a central place to specifying each subject's account in terms of genus and differentiae (and so, relatedly, to mapping its position in a genus-species tree). The Phaedrus calls the dialectician the person who can specify these relations—and thereby "carve reality at the joints." Continuity among all the kinds of dialectic in Plato comes from the fact that the genus-species divisions of the late works are a way of providing the accounts that dialectic sought in all the previous works.

## Plato's Theory of Soul

The intellectual world is teleological. That is to say nothing is written without purpose and each intellectual responds to; reflects upon; provides intellectual explanation and justification or critique and alternative to the issues and circumstances prevailing in his contemporary time-space. Plato's **Republic** is not an utopia addressed to no-one but a passionate appeal to fellow Athenians to overthrow the existing democratic governance that is in his opinion, the government of fools, which he "vows" to overthrow and replace it with the ideal state. Though he could not overthrow it, Roman aggressors did, couple of centuries later.

As the state is the institution of managing the common affairs of humans, Plato, like the modern liberal political theorists, begins with the dissection of human psychology with tripartite assumption of human soul. Plato's assumptions and views regarding the soul constitute the foundation and basis of his theory of Justice and thereby of Ideal State, which shall be elaborated in subsequent sections. Like the Idea of the Good, Plato avoids defining soul in terms of empirically verifiable facts but explores the world of desirable philosophical abstractions in the search of perfection. Plato's theory of Soul not only lays the foundation of his theory of justice to be attained in Ideal State ruled by the philosopher king/queen but is intimately related to his theory of Idea or Form. In fact soul is the means for the acquisition and comprehension of the Idea or the Form of good.

Plato considers soul to be above and beyond the visible, bodily person, just the appearance, the essence lies in the its immortal, eternal, infinite in the soul, not part of the visible phenomenal world but of invisible world of Ideas or Form, which Plato uses interchangeably, in an acknowledgment of the spiritualism and the super-naturalism. Soul and conscience, as human

attributes do not exist outside but inside human person and dies with the death of person. Plato, like Pythagoras believed in the eternity and transcendence of soul, that is also one of the key messages of Gita.

According to him the soul is divine and eternal that roams in the world of Ideas and not in the visible phenomenal world. Theorists of the eternity of soul and its transcendence from one to another body do not explain the source surplus souls required for the bodies of the increased population! To quote him from Phaedo, "The soul is infinitely like unchangeable; even the most stupid person would not deny that." He further adds, "What is the definition of that which is named soul? Can we imagine any other definition than The motion that moves by itself".

The motion of soul is first in origin and power that moves by itself." He reaffirms in his last work, the Laws, "Motion of the soul is the first in origin and power." And, "the soul is most ancient and divine of all things whose motion is an ever flowing source of real existence."

A detailed discussion on the theory of soul is beyond the scope of our present needs. Plato uses his tripartite assumption of the soul as consisting of the reason; spirit and appetite and their respective as philosophical tool for his division of society into 3 classes.

### **The Elements of Soul**

Plato divides the soul into 3, hierarchical faculties – reason, spirit and appetite, in descending order. In fact this trilogy of the soul provides the philosophical foundation of his hierarchal order of the Ideal State, the abode of justice, his central concern in the Republic. The abode of the lowest faculty, the appetite is stomach and those of spirit and the reason are chest and the mind respectively. The appetite is identified in both the Republic as well as Phaedo with desires; greed; economic gains; physical comforts and sensuous pleasure. The spirit is identified with fearlessness, valor and warrior like qualities. The highest faculty of the soul is the reason – simple and indivisible, eternal and immortal. The reason is beyond the time and space, whereas spirit and appetite are within the time and space. The reason is, according to him, immortal and divine whereas spirit and appetite are mortal and mundane.

### **The Virtues of Soul**

After defining the soul in terms of its constituent elements, delves into their respective virtues and thence derives the virtue of soul by integrating them together. Every particular object has its particular nature and realizing that nature is its virtue. The nature of teacher is to induce students into critical thinking and help them in molding themselves into fearless, responsible citizen and in his/her attempts to invent newer knowledge. If a teacher satisfactorily does that he is a virtuous teacher. Virtue of a student is to study and discourse to acquire knowledge and expand in the same way as the virtue of the eyes is clear vision and of mind is clear thinking and reasoning. A soul is virtuous if its elements realize their nature, i.e. be virtuous. He first discusses the particular virtues of particular elements and combines them to construct a new virtue, superior to them and their coordinating force – the justice, Plato's central concern in the Republic. The virtue of reason is wisdom, that of spirit and appetite are courage and temperance respectively. A soul is just or virtuous that has the virtuous faculties and the inferior elements are regulated and directed by the superior ones. In other words, the spirit and appetite must take directions from, and obey the dictates of, the reason.

## **Wisdom or Knowledge**

There corresponds a particular virtue to each faculty. The virtue corresponding to the faculty of reason is knowledge or wisdom. Plato conceptualizes wisdom or knowledge in specific terms. The knowledge of mundane affairs or the knowledge of particular skill falls outside its ambit. Knowledge of varieties of soil fit for cultivation of particular crops or knowledge of medicine for particular disease is not wisdom. Plato calls them the opinions or technical knowledge. Even the knowledge of mathematics (arithmetic), geometry, astronomy or any other science disciplines, which Plato places in the realm of intelligible world, too is not knowledge, as they too use assumptions based on the objects of the visible world. He explains it through his, oft-quoted, line diagram. Wisdom does not come from the study of the objects of the visible world, as if the ideas come from some vacuum, in opposition to the fact that ideas are abstractions from the objects and have been historically emanating from them. According to him wisdom comes from ability to reason and analyze; discuss and debate; deliberate and discourse. Plato's pessimism does not allow him to accord these potentialities to anyone but to 'gifted' few 'endowed' with immanently innate qualities of excellence in the realm of reason. Plato's theory of knowledge shall be discussed below as an independent subtitle.

## **The Courage**

Courage is the cardinal virtue of the spirit. It finds frequent mentions in Republic. Traditionally, the courage meant manliness. For early Greeks, courage meant fearlessness, even of the death; patience in difficult situation; valour etc. For Plato courage is not just warrior like bravery but also firmly defend correct stand.

## **Temperance**

The third particular virtue is temperance of restraint that has been elaborately described in books III & IV of the Republic. It simply means control of the desires. "To be stronger than one-self"; "To be master of oneself"; doing not as one wishes but what one ought to.

## **Justice**

Apart from the above 3 particular virtue there is 4<sup>th</sup> virtue, a superior virtue that harmoniously coordinates them and is the central concern of the **Republic**, as is evident from its subtitle, Concerning Justice.

## **Plato's Theory of God Western Concepts of God**

Western concepts of God have ranged from the detached transcendent demiurge of Aristotle to the pantheism of Spinoza. Nevertheless, much of western thought about God has fallen within some broad form of theism. Theism is the view that there is a God which is the creator and sustainer of the universe and is unlimited with regard to knowledge (omniscience), power (omnipotence), extension (omnipresence), and moral perfection. Though regarded as sexless, God has traditionally been referred to by the masculine pronoun.

Concepts of God in philosophy are entwined with concepts of God in religion. This is most obvious in figures like Augustine and Aquinas, who sought to bring more rigor and consistency to concepts found in religion. Others, like Leibniz and Hegel, interacted constructively and deeply with religious concepts. Even those like Hume and Nietzsche, who criticized the concept of God, dealt with religious concepts. While Western philosophy has interfaced most obviously with Christianity, Judaism and Islam have had some influence. The orthodox forms of all three religions have

embraced theism, though each religion has also yielded a wide array of other views. Philosophy has shown a similar variety. For example, with regard to the initiating cause of the world, Plato and Aristotle held God to be the crafter of uncreated matter. Plotinus regarded matter as emanating from God. Spinoza, departing from his judaistic roots, held God to be identical with the universe, while Hegel came to a similar view by reinterpreting Christianity.

Issues related to Western concepts of God include the nature of divine attributes and how they can be known, if or how that knowledge can be communicated, the relation between such knowledge and logic, the nature of divine causality, and the relation between the divine and the human will.

## **Sources of Western Concepts of God**

Sources of western concepts of the divine have been threefold: experience, revelation, and reason. Reported experiences of God are remarkably varied and have produced equally varied concepts of the divine being. Experiences can be occasioned by something external and universally available, such as the starry sky, or by something external and private, such as a burning bush. Experiences can be internal and effable, such as a vision, or internal and ineffable, as is claimed by some mystics. Revelation can be linked to religious experience or a type of it, both for the person originally receiving it and the one merely accepting it as authoritative. Those who accept its authority typically regard it as a source of concepts of the divine that are more detailed and more accurate than could be obtained by other means. Increasingly, the modern focus has been on the complexities of the process of interpretation (philosophical hermeneutics) and the extent to which it is necessarily subjective. Revelation can be intentionally unconnected to reason such that it is accepted on bare faith (fideism; compare Kierkegaard), or at the other extreme, can be grounded in reason in that it is accepted because and only insofar as it is reasonable (compare Locke). Reason has been taken as ancillary to religious experience and revelation, or on other accounts, as independent and the sole reliable source of concepts of God.

Each of the three sources of concepts of God has had those who regard it as the sole reliable basis of our idea of the divine. By contrast, others have regarded two or three of the sources as interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Regardless of these differing approaches, theism broadly construed has been a dominant theme for much of the history of Western thought.

- Historical Overview

- a. Greeks

- At the dawn of philosophy, the Ionian Greeks sought to understand the true nature of the cosmos and its manifestations of both change and permanence. To Heraclitus, all was change and nothing endured, whereas to Parmenides, all change was apparent. The Pythagoreans found order and permanence in mathematics, giving it religious significance as ultimate being. The Stoics identified order with divine reason.

To Plato, God is transcendent—the highest and most perfect being—and one who uses eternal forms, or archetypes, to fashion a universe that is eternal and uncreated. The order and purpose he gives the universe is limited by the imperfections inherent in material. Flaws are therefore real and exist in the universe; they are not merely higher divine purposes misunderstood by humans. God is not the author of everything because some things are evil. We can infer that God is the author of the punishments of the wicked because those punishments benefit the wicked. God,

being good, is also unchangeable since any change would be for the worse. For Plato, this does not mean (as some later Christian thought held) that God is the ground of moral goodness; rather, whatever is good is good in an of itself. God must be a first cause and a self- moved mover otherwise there will be an infinite regress to causes of causes. Plato is not committed to monotheism, but suggests for example that since planetary motion is uniform and circular, and since such motion is the motion of reason, then a planet must be driven by a rational soul. These souls that drive the planets could be called gods.

Aristotle made God passively responsible for change in the world in the sense that all things seek divine perfection. God imbues all things with order and purpose, both of which can be discovered and point to his (or its) divine existence. From those contingent things we come to know universals, whereas God knows universals prior to their existence in things. God, the highest being (though not a loving being), engages in perfect contemplation of the most worthy object, which is himself. He is thus unaware of the world and cares nothing for it, being an unmoved mover. God as pure form is wholly immaterial, and as perfect he is unchanging since he cannot become more perfect. This perfect and immutable God is therefore the apex of being and knowledge. God must be eternal. That is because time is eternal, and since there can be no time without change, change must be eternal. And for change to be eternal the cause of change-the unmoved mover-must also be eternal. To be eternal God must also be immaterial since only immaterial things are immune from change. Additionally, as an immaterial being, God is not extended in space.

The Neo-Platonic God of Plotinus (204/5-270 A.D.) is the source of the universe, which is the inevitable overflow of divinity. In that overflow, the universe comes out of God (ex deo) in a timeless process. It does not come by creation because that would entail consciousness and will, which Plotinus claimed would limit God. The first emanation out of God (nous) is the highest, successive emanations being less and less real. Finally, evil is matter with no form at all, and as such has no positive existence. God is an impersonal It who can be described only in terms of what he is not. This negative way of describing God (the via negativa) survived well into the middle ages. Though God is beyond description, Plotinus (perhaps paradoxically) asserted a number of things, such as that virtue and truth inhere in God. Because for Plotinus God cannot be reached intellectually, union with the divine is ecstatic and mystical. His thought influenced a number of Christian mystics, such as Meister Eckhart (1260-1327).

## **Aristotle – Classification of the sciences**

In one of his monumental works, *Physics*, Aristotle sets out to investigate the appropriate divisions of science. According to Aristotle, a science is possible if and only if there are knowable objects. There cannot be a science of dragons, for example, because dragons do not exist and hence a 'science' of dragons would lack knowable objects and thus would not be a 'science'. Furthermore, he thought the aim of scientific knowledge was the attainment of universal and necessary truths; that is, truths that apply everywhere, at all times, and of necessity must apply.

The first division of science, according to Aristotle, was **Theoretical science**. Those who engage in theoretical science seek knowledge for its own sake. For Aristotle theoretical science in turn was divided into three sub-categories. The first sub- category studies natural objects which generate movement and growth internally; that is, living objects as well as the the 'heavenly bodies' and geological phenomena. The second sub-category of theoretical science studies objects in abstraction from their motion. In other words, it studies the quantitative aspect of objects. This

second division of theoretical science is the domain of mathematics. The third and final sub-category of theoretical science is the study of objects that are not in motion, or are immovable. This is the study of “first causes”, so to speak, and is the domain of theology.

The second division of science for Aristotle was **Productive science**. Such a science aims at the creation of a product. A science of computers, for example, aims at the production of computers. For Aristotle only human beings, who alone have rationality, are capable of engaging in productive science. A bird which builds a nest is merely acting according to its instincts, and not at all according to reason and scientific knowledge. Thus, only human beings can engage in productive science, and create a product through the utilization of theoretical knowledge.

The third and final division of science for Aristotle was **Practical science**. Such a science aims at knowledge of action, or praxis. The science of action underlies the ability to act well, or to live the good life, which according to Aristotle was a life guided by reason.

These three divisions, according to Aristotle, encompass every conceivable object or phenomena which science can investigate. And up until today, over 2000 years after Aristotle proposed these three divisions of science, no one has been able to think of an object of science which does not fall into one of these three categories.

## **Aristotelian logic**

Aristotelian logic, after a great and early triumph, consolidated its position of influence to rule over the philosophical world throughout the Middle Ages up until the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. All that changed in a hurry when modern logicians embraced a new kind of mathematical logic and pushed out what they regarded as the antiquated and clunky method of syllogisms. Although Aristotle’s very rich and expansive account of logic differs in key ways from modern approaches, it is more than a historical curiosity. It provides an alternative way of approaching logic and continues to provide critical insights into contemporary issues and concerns. The main thrust of this article is to explain Aristotle’s logical system as a whole while correcting some prominent misconceptions that persist in the popular understanding and even in some of the specialized literature. Before getting down to business, it is important to point out that Aristotle is a synoptic thinker with an overarching theory that ties together all aspects and fields of philosophy. He does not view logic as a separate, self-sufficient subject-matter, to be considered in isolation from other aspects of disciplined inquiry. Although we cannot consider all the details of his encyclopedic approach, we can sketch out the larger picture in a way that illuminates the general thrust of his system. For the purposes of this entry, let us define logic as that field of inquiry which investigates how we reason correctly (and, by extension, how we reason incorrectly). Aristotle does not believe that the purpose of logic is to prove that human beings can have knowledge. (He dismisses excessive scepticism.) The aim of logic is the elaboration of a coherent system that allows us to investigate, classify, and evaluate good and bad forms of reasoning.

## **The Organon**

To those used to the silver tones of an accomplished writer like Plato, Aristotle’s prose will seem, at first glance, a difficult read. What we have are largely notes, written at various points in his career, for different purposes, edited and cobbled together by later followers. The style of the resulting collection is often rambling, repetitious, obscure, and disjointed. There are many arcane, puzzling, and perhaps contradictory passages. This problem is compounded by the abstract,

technical vocabulary logic sometimes requires and by the wide-ranging scope and the scattered nature of Aristotle's observations. Some familiarity with Greek terminology is required if one hopes to capture the nuances in his thought. Classicists and scholars do argue, of course, about the precise Greek meaning of key words or phrases but many of these debates involve minor points of interpretation that cannot concern us here. Aristotle's logical vocabulary needs to be understood within the larger context of his system as a whole. Many good translations of Aristotle are available. (Parenthetical citations below include the approximate Bekker number (the scholarly notation for referring to Aristotelian passages according to page, column, and line number of a standard edition), the English title of the work, and the name of the translator.)

Ancient commentators regarded logic as a widely-applicable instrument or method for careful thinking. They grouped Aristotle's six logical treatises into a sort of manual they called the *Organon* (Greek for "tool"). The *Organon* included the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, the *Prior Analytics*, the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and *On Sophistical Refutations*. These books touch on many issues: the logical structure of propositions, the proper structure of arguments (syllogisms), the difference between induction and deduction, the nature of scientific knowledge, basic fallacies (forms of specious reasoning), debating techniques, and so on. But we cannot confine our present investigations to the *Organon*. Aristotle comments on the principle of non-contradiction in the *Metaphysics*, on less rigorous forms of argument in the *Rhetoric*, on the intellectual virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, on the difference between truth and falsity in *On the Soul*, and so on. We cannot overlook such important passages if we wish to gain an adequate understanding of Aristotelian logic.

### • **Categories**

The world, as Aristotle describes it in his *Categories*, is composed of substances— separate, individual things—to which various characterizations or properties can be ascribed. Each substance is a unified whole composed of interlocking parts. There are two kinds of substances. A primary substance is (in the simplest instance) an independent (or detachable) object, composed of matter, characterized by form. Individual living organisms—a man, a rainbow trout, an oak tree—provide the most unambiguous examples of primary substances. Secondary substances are the larger groups, the species or genera, to which these individual organisms belong. So man, horse, mammals, animals (and so on) would be examples of secondary substances. As we shall see, Aristotle's logic is about correctly attributing specific properties to secondary substances (and therefore, indirectly, about attributing these properties to primary substances or individual things).

Aristotle elaborates a logic that is designed to describe what exists in the world. We may well wonder then, how many different ways can we describe something? In his *Categories* (4.1b25-2a4), Aristotle enumerates ten different ways of describing something. These categories (Greek=*kategoria*, deriving from the verb to indicate, signify) include (1) substance, (2) quantity, (3) quality, (4) relation, (5) where, (6) when, (7) being-in-a-position, (8) possessing, (9) doing or (10) undergoing something or being affected by something. In the *Topics* (I.9, 103b20-25), he includes the same list, replacing "substance" (*ousia*) with "essence" (*ti esti*). We can, along with Aristotle, give an example of each kind of description: (1) to designate something as a "horse" or a "man" is to identify it as a substance or to attribute an essence to it; (2) to say that the wall is four feet long is to describe it in terms of quantity; (3) to say that the roof is "white" is to ascribe a quality to it; (4) to say that your weight is "double" mine is to describe a relation between the two;

(5) to say something happened in the market-place isto explain where; (6) to say it happened last year is to explain when; (7) to say an old man is sitting is to describe his position; (8) to say the girl has shoes on is to describe what she possesses; (9) to say the head chef is cutting a carrot with a knife is to describe what he is doing; and finally, (10) to say wood is being burned in the fireplace is to describe what it means for the wood to undergo burning or to be affected by fire. Commentators claim that these ten categories represent either different descriptions of being or different kinds of being. (To be a substance is to be in a certain way; to possess quantity is to be in a certain way; to possess a quality is to be in a certain way, and so on.) There is nothing magical about the number ten. Aristotle gives shorter lists elsewhere. (Compare Posterior Analytics, I.22.83a22-24, where he lists seven predications, for example). Whether Aristotle intends the longer lists as a complete enumeration of all conceivable types of descriptions is an open question. Scholars have noticed that the first category, substance or essence, seems to be fundamentally different than the others; it is what something is in the most complete and perfect way.

### ● From Words into Propositions

Aristotle does not believe that all reasoning deals with words. (Moral decision-making is, for Aristotle, a form of reasoning that can occur without words.) Still, words are a good place to begin our study of his logic. Logic, as we now understand it, chiefly has to do with how we evaluate arguments. But arguments are made of statements, which are, in turn, made of words. In Aristotelian logic, the most basic statement is a proposition, a complete sentence that asserts something. (There are other kinds of sentences—prayers, questions, commands—that do not assert anything true or false about the world and which, therefore, exist outside the purview of logic.) A proposition is ideally composed of at least three words: a subject (a word naming a substance), a predicate (a word naming a property), and a connecting verb, what logicians call a copula (Latin, for “bond” or “connection”). Consider the simple statement: “Socrates is wise.” Socrates is the subject; the property of being wise is the predicate, and the verb “is” (the copula) links Socrates and wisdom together in a single affirmation. We can express all this symbolically as “S is P” where “S” stands for the subject “Socrates” and “P” stands for the predicate “being wise.” The sentence “Socrates is wise” (or symbolically, “S is P”) qualifies as a proposition; it is a statement that claims that something is true about the world. Paradigmatically, the subject would be a (secondary) substance (a natural division of primary substances) and the predicate would be a necessary or essential property as in: “birds are feathered,” or “triangles have interior angles equal to two right angles,” or “fire is upward-moving.” But any overly restrictive metaphysical idea about what terms in a proposition mean seems to unnecessarily restrict intelligent discourse. Suppose someone were to claim that “anger is unethical.” But anger is not a substance; it is a property of a substance (an organism). Still, it makes perfect sense to predicate properties of anger. We can say that anger is unethical, hard to control, an excess of passion, familiar enough, and so on. Aristotle himself exhibits some flexibility here. Still, there is something to Aristotle’s view that the closer a proposition is to the metaphysical structure of the world, the more it counts as knowledge. Aristotle has an all-embracing view of logic and yet believes that, what we could call “metaphysical correctness” produces a more rigorous, scientific form of logical expression.

Of course, it is not enough to produce propositions; what we are after is true propositions. Aristotle believes that only propositions are true or false.

Truth or falsity (at least with respect to linguistic expression) is a matter of combining words into complete propositions that purport to assert something about the world. Individual words or incomplete phrases, considered by themselves, are neither true or false. To say, "Socrates," or "jumping up and down," or "brilliant red" is not to assert anything true or false about the world. It is to repeat words without making any claim about the way things are. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle provides his own definition of true and false: "to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true"; and "to say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false." (IV.7.1011b25, Ross.) In other words, a true proposition corresponds to way things are. But Aristotle is not proposing a correspondence theory of truth as an expert would understand it. He is operating at a more basic level. Consider the statement: "Spiders have eight legs." (Symbolically, "All S is P," where S, the subject, is "spiders"; P, the predicate, is "the state of being eight-legged," and the verb "is" functions as the copula.) What does it mean to say that this claim is true? If we observe spiders to discover how many legs they have, we will find that (except in a few odd cases) spiders do have eight legs, so the proposition will be true because what it says matches reality. As we shall see, Aristotle's logic is designed to produce just this kind of general statement.

### ● Kinds of Propositions

Aristotle suggests that all propositions must either affirm or deny something. Every proposition must be either an affirmation or a negation; it cannot be both. He also points out that propositions can make claims about what necessarily is the case, about what possibly is the case, or even about what is impossible. His modal logic, which deals with these further qualifications about possibility or necessity, presents difficulties of interpretation. We will focus on his assertoric (or non-modal) logic here. Still, many of Aristotle's points about necessity and possibility seem highly intuitive. In one famous example about a hypothetical sea battle, he observes that the necessary truth of a mere proposition does not trump the uncertainty of future events. Because it is necessarily true that there will be or will not be a sea battle tomorrow, we cannot conclude that either alternative is necessarily true. (De Interpretatione, 9.19a30ff.) So the necessity that attaches to the proposition "there will or will not be a sea battle tomorrow" does not transfer over to the claim "that there will be a sea battle tomorrow" or to the claim "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow." Aristotle goes out of his way to emphasize the point that our personal beliefs about what will happen in the future do not determine whether the individual propositions are true. (Note that we must not confuse the necessary truth of a proposition with the necessity that precipitates the conclusion of a deductively-valid argument. The former is sometimes called "material," "non-logical," or "metaphysical" necessity; the later, "formal," "deductive," or "logical" necessity." We discuss these issues further below.)

Aristotle claims that all propositions can be expressed using the "Subject copula Predicate" formula and that complex propositions are, on closer inspection, collections of simpler claims that display, in turn, this fundamental structure. Having fixed the proper logical form of a proposition, he goes on to classify different kinds of propositions. He begins by distinguishing between particular terms and universal terms. (The term he uses for "universal" is the Greek "katholou.") Particular terms refer to individual things; universal terms refer to groups of things. The name "Socrates" is a particular term because it refers to a single human being; the word "spiders" is a universal term for it universally applies to all members of the group "spiders." Aristotle realizes, of course, that universal terms may be used to refer to parts of a group as well as to entire groups. We may claim that all spiders have eight legs or that only some spiders have book-lungs. In the first case, a property, eight-leggedness, is predicated of the entire group referred to by the

universal term; in the second case, the property of having book-lungs is predicated of only part of the group. So, to use Aristotelian language, one may predicate a property universally or not universally of the group referred to by a universal term.


This brings us to Aristotle's classification of the four different kinds of categorical propositions (called "categorical propositions" because they assert a relationship between two categories or kinds). Each different categorical proposition possesses quantity inasmuch as it represents a universal or a particular predication (referring to all or only some members of the subject class). It also possesses a definite quality (positive or negative) inasmuch as it affirms or denies the specified predication. The adjectives "all," "no," and "some" (which is understood as meaning "at least one") determine the quantity of the proposition; the quality is determined by whether the verb is in the affirmative or the negative. Rather than going into the details of Aristotle's original texts, suffice it to say that contemporary logicians generally distinguish between four logical possibilities:

- Universal Affirmation: All S are P (called A statements from the Latin, "AFFIRMO": I affirm).
- Universal Negation: No S are P (called E statements from "NEGO": I deny).
- Particular Affirmation: Some S are P (called I statements from AFFIRMO).
- Particular Negation: Some S are not P (called O statements from NEGO).

Note that these four possibilities are not, in every instance, mutually exclusive. As mentioned above, particular statements using the modifier "some" refer to at least one member of a group. To say that "some S are P" is to say that "at least one S is P"; to say that "some S are not P" is to say that "at least one S is not P." It must follow then (at least on Aristotle's system) that universal statements require the corresponding particular statement. If "All S are P," at least one S must be P; that is, the particular statement "Some S are P" must be true. Again, if "No S are P," at least one S must not be P; that is, the particular statement "Some S are not P" must be true. (More on this, with qualifications, below.) Note also that Aristotle treats propositions with an individual subject such as "Socrates is wise" as universal propositions (as if the proposition was saying something like "all instances of Socrates" are wise.) One caveat: Although we cannot linger on further complications here, keep in mind that this is not the only way to divide up logical possibility.

#### • **Square of Opposition**

Aristotle examines the way in which these four different categorical propositions are related to one another. His views have come down to us as "the square of opposition," a mnemonic diagram that captures, systematizes, and slightly extends what Aristotle says in *De Interpretatione*. (Cf. 6.17a25ff.)



**Figure 1**

### **The Traditional Square of Opposition**

As it turns out, we can use a square with crossed interior diagonals (Fig. 1 above) to identify four kinds of relationships that hold between different pairs of categorical propositions. Consider each relationship in turn.

1) Contradictory propositions possess opposite truth-values. In the diagram, they are linked by a diagonal line. If one of two contradictories is true, the other must be false, and vice versa. So the A proposition (All S are P) and the O proposition (Some S are not P) are contradictories. Clearly, if it is true that “all S are P,” then the O statement that “some S are not P” must be false. And if it is true that “some S are not P,” then the A statement that “all S are P” must be false. The same relationship holds between E (No S are P) and I (Some S are P) propositions. To use a simple example: If it is true that “all birds lay eggs,” then it must be false that “some birds do not lay eggs.” And if it is true that “some birds do not fly,” then it must be false that “all birds fly.”

2) Contrary propositions cannot both be true. The top horizontal line in the square joining the A proposition (All S are P) to the E proposition (No S are P) represents this logical relationship. Clearly, it cannot be true that “all S are P” and that “no S are P.” The truth of one of these contrary propositions excludes the truth of the other. It is possible, however, that both statements are false as in the case where some S are P and some (other) S are not P. So, for example, the statements “all politicians tell lies” and “no politicians tell lies” cannot both be true. They will, however, both be false if it is indeed the case that some politicians tell lies whereas some do not.

3) The relationship of subalternation results when the truth of a universal proposition, “the superaltern,” requires the truth of a second particular proposition, “the subaltern.” The vertical lines

moving downward from the top to the bottom of the square in the diagram represent this condition. Clearly, if all members of an existent group possess (or do not possess) a specific characteristic, it must follow that any smaller subset of that group must possess (or not possess) that specific characteristic. If the A proposition (All S are P) is true, it must follow that the I proposition ("Some S are P") must be true. Again, if the E proposition (No S are P) is true, it must follow that the O proposition (Some S are not P) must be true. Consider, for example, the statement, "all cheetahs are fast." If every member of the whole group of cheetahs is fast, then it must be the case that at least one member of the group of cheetahs is fast; that is, the statement "some cheetahs are fast" must be true. And, to reformulate the same example as a negation, if it is true that "no cheetahs are slow," then it must be the case that at least one member of the group of cheetahs is not slow; that is, the statement "some cheetahs are not slow" must be true.

Note that subalternation does not work in the opposite direction. If "Some S are P," it need not follow that "All S are P." And if "Some S are not P," it need not follow that "No S are P." We should also point out that if the subaltern is false, it must follow that the superaltern is false. If it is false to say that "Some S are P," it must be false to say that "All S are P." And if it is false to say that "Some S are not P," it must be false to say that "No S are P."

4) Subcontrary propositions cannot both be false. The bottom horizontal line in the square joining the I proposition (Some S are P) to the O proposition (Some S are not P) represents this kind of subcontrary relationship. Keeping to the assumptions implicit in Aristotle's system, there are only three possibilities: (1) All S have property P; in which case, it must also be true (by subalternation) that "some S are P." (2) No S have property P; in which case it must also be true (by subalternation) that "some S are not P." (3) Some S have and some S do not have property P; in which case it will be true that "some S are P" and that "some S are not P." It follows that at least one of a pair of subcontrary propositions must be true and that both will be true in cases where P is partially predicated of S. So, for example, both members of the subcontrary pair "some men have beards" and "some men do not have beards" are true. They are both true because having a beard is a contingent or variable male attribute. In contrast, only one member of the subcontrary pair "some snakes are legless" and "some snakes are not legless" is true. As all snakes are legless, the proposition "some snakes are not legless" must be false.

Traditional logicians, inspired by Aristotle's wide-ranging comments, identified a series of "immediate inferences" as a way of deriving new propositions through a routine rearrangement of terms. Subalternation is an obvious example of immediate inference. From "All S are P" we can immediately infer—that is, without argument—that "some S are P." They also recognized conversion, obversion, and contraposition as immediate inferences.

In conversion, one interchanges the S and P terms. If, for example, we know that "No S is P," we can immediately infer that "No P is S." (Once we know that "no circles are triangles," we know right away that "no triangles are circles.")

In obversion, one negates the predicate term while replacing it with the predicate term of opposite quality. If, for example, we know that "Some S are P," we can immediately infer the obverse, "Some S are not non-P." (Once we know that "some students are happy," we know right away that "some students are not unhappy.")

Finally, in contraposition, one negates both terms and reverses their order. If, for example, we know that “All S are P,” we can infer the contrapositive “All non-P are non-S.” (Once we know that “all voters are adults,” we know right away that “all children are unable to vote.”) More specific rules, restrictions, and details are readily available elsewhere.

### • **Laws of Thought**

During the 18th, 19th, and early 20th Century, scholars who saw themselves as carrying on the Aristotelian and Medieval tradition in logic, often pointed to the “laws of thought” as the basis of all logic. One still encounters this approach in textbook accounts of informal logic. The usual list of logical laws (or logical first principles) includes three axioms: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. (Some authors include a law of sufficient reason, that every event or claim must have a sufficient reason or explanation, and so forth.) It would be a gross simplification to argue that these ideas derive exclusively from Aristotle or to suggest (as some authors seem to imply) that he self-consciously presented a theory uniquely derived from these three laws. The idea is rather that Aristotle’s theory presupposes these principles and/or that he discusses or alludes to them somewhere in his work. Traditional logicians did not regard them as abstruse or esoteric doctrines but as manifestly obvious principles that require assent for logical discourse to be possible.

The law of identity could be summarized as the patently unremarkable but seemingly inescapable notion that things must be, of course, identical with themselves. Expressed symbolically: “A is A,” where A is an individual, a species, or a genus. Although Aristotle never explicitly enunciates this law, he does observe, in the *Metaphysics*, that “the fact that a thing is itself is [the only] answer to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical.” (VII.17.1041a16-18, Ross.) This suggests that he does accept, unsurprisingly, the perfectly obvious idea that things are themselves. If, however, identical things must possess identical attributes, this opens the door to various logical maneuvers. One can, for example, substitute equivalent terms for one another and, even more portentously, one can arrive at some conception of analogy and induction. Aristotle writes, “all water is said to be . . . the same as all water . . . because of a certain likeness.” (*Topics*, I.7.103a19-20, Pickard-Cambridge.) If water is water, then by the law of identity, anything we discover to be water must possess the same water-properties.

Aristotle provides several formulations of the law of non-contradiction, the idea that logically correct propositions cannot affirm and deny the same thing:

“It is impossible for anyone to believe the same thing to be and not be.” (*Metaphysics*, IV.3.1005b23-24, Ross.)

“The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.” (*Ibid.*, IV.3.1005b19-20.)

“The most indisputable of all beliefs is that contradictory statements are not at the same time true.” (*Ibid.*, IV.6.1011b13-14.) Symbolically, the law of non-contradiction is sometimes represented as “not (A and not A).”

The law of excluded middle can be summarized as the idea that every proposition must be either true or false, not both and not neither. In Aristotle’s words, “It is necessary for the affirmation or

the negation to be true or false.” (De Interpretatione, 9.18a28-29, Ackrill.) Symbolically, we can represent the law of excluded middle as an exclusive disjunction: “A is true or A is false,” where only one alternative holds. Because every proposition must be true or false, it does not follow, of course, that we can know if a particular proposition is true or false.

Despite perennial challenges to these so-called laws (by intuitionists, dialetheists, and others), Aristotelians inevitably claim that such counterarguments hinge on some unresolved ambiguity (equivocation), on a conflation of what we know with what is actually the case, on a false or static account of identity, or on some other failure to fully grasp the implications of what one is saying.

- **Existential Assumptions**

Before we move on to consider Aristotle’s account of the syllogism, we need to clear up some widespread misconceptions and explain a few things about Aristotle’s project as a whole. Criticisms of Aristotle’s logic often assume that what Aristotle was trying to do coincides with the basic project of modern logic. Begin with the usual criticism brought against the traditional square of opposition. For reasons we will not explore, modern logicians assume that universal claims about non-existent objects (or empty sets) are true but that particular claims about them are false. On this reading, the claim that “all fairy-god mothers are beautiful” is true, whereas the claim that “some fairy-god mothers are beautiful” is false. Clearly, this clashes with the traditional square of opposition. By simple subalternation, the truth of the proposition “all fairy-god mothers are beautiful” requires the truth of the proposition “some fairy-god mothers are beautiful.” If the first claim is true, the second claim must also be true. For this and similar reasons, some modern logicians dismiss the traditional square as inadequate, claiming that Aristotle made a mistake or overlooked relevant issues. Aristotle, however, is involved in a specialized project. He elaborates an alternative logic, specifically adapted to the problems he is trying to solve.

Aristotle devises a companion-logic for science. He relegates fictions like fairy godmothers and mermaids and unicorns to the realms of poetry and literature. In his mind, they exist outside the ambit of science. This is why he leaves no room for such non-existent entities in his logic. This is a thoughtful choice, not an inadvertent omission. Technically, Aristotelian science is a search for definitions, where a definition is “a phrase signifying a thing’s essence.” (Topics, I.5.102a37, Pickard-Cambridge.) To possess an essence—is literally to possess a “what-it-is-to-be” something (to ti ēn einai). Because non-existent entities cannot be anything, they do not, in Aristotle’s mind, possess an essence. They cannot be defined. Aristotle makes this point explicitly in the Posterior Analytics. He points out that a definition of a goat-stag, a cross between a goat and a deer (the ancient equivalent of a unicorn), is impossible.

He writes, “no one knows the nature of what does not exist—[we] can know the meaning of the phrase or name ‘goat-stag’ but not what the essential nature of a goat-stag is.” (II.7.92b6-8, Mure.) Because we cannot know what the essential nature of a goat-stag is—indeed, it has no essential nature—we cannot provide a proper definition of a goat-stag. So the study of goat-stags (or unicorns) is not open to scientific investigation. Aristotle sets about designing a logic that is intended to display relations between scientific propositions, where science is understood as a search for essential definitions. This is why he leaves no place for fictional entities like goat-stags (or unicorns). Hence, the assumed validity of a logical maneuver like subalternation.

- **Form versus Content**

However, this is not the only way Aristotle's approach parts ways with more modern assumptions. Some modern logicians might define logic as that philosophical inquiry which considers the form not the content of propositions. Aristotle's logic is unapologetically metaphysical. We cannot properly understand what Aristotle is about by separating form from content. Suppose, for example, I was to claim that (1) all birds have feathers and (2) that everyone in the Tremblay family wears a red hat. These two claims possess the same very same propositional form, A.

We can represent the first claim as: "All S are P," where S=birds, and P=being feathered. And we can also represent the second claim as "All S are P," where S=members of the Tremblay family, and P=wearing a red hat. Considered from an Aristotelian point of view, however, these two "All S are P" propositions possess a very different logical status. Aristotle would view the relationship between birds and feathers expressed in the first proposition as a necessary link, for it is of the essence of birds to be feathered.

Something cannot be a bird and lack feathers. The link between membership in the Tremblay family and the practice of wearing a red hat described in the second proposition is, in sharp contrast, a contingent fact about the world. A member of the Tremblay family who wore a green hat would still be a member of the Tremblay family. The fact that the Tremblays only wear red hats (because it is presently the fashion in Quebec) is an accidental (or surface) feature of what a Tremblay is. So this second relationship holds in a much weaker sense. In Aristotle's mind, this has important consequences not just for metaphysics, but for logic.

It is hard to capture in modern English the underlying metaphysical force in Aristotle's categorical statements. In the *Prior Analytics* Aristotle renders the phrase "S is P" as "P belongs to S." The sense of belonging here is crucial. Aristotle wants a logic that tells us what belongs to what.

But there are different levels of belonging. My billfold belongs to me but this is a very tenuous sort of belonging. The way my billfold belongs to me pales in significance to, say, the way a bill belongs to a duck-billed platypus. It is not simply that the bill is physically attached to the platypus. Even if you were to cut off the bill of a platypus, this would just create a deformed platypus; it would not change the sense of necessary belonging that connects platypuses and bills. The deep nature of a platypus requires—it necessitates—a bill. In so much as logic is about discovering necessary relationships, it is not the mere arrangement of terms and symbols but their substantive meaning that is at issue.

As only one consequence of this "metaphysical attitude," consider Aristotle's attitude towards inductive generalizations. Aristotle would have no patience for the modern penchant for purely statistical interpretations of inductive generalizations. It is not the number of times something happens that matters. It is the deep nature of the thing that counts. If the wicked boy (or girl) next door pulls three legs off a spider, this is just happenstance. This five-legged spider does not (for Aristotle) present a serious counterexample to the claim that "all spiders are eight-legged." The fact that someone can pull legs off a spider does not change the fact that there is a necessary connection between spiders and having eight legs.

Aristotle is too keen a biologist not to recognize that there are accidents and monstrosities in the world, but the existence of these individual imperfections does not change the deep nature of

things. Aristotle recognizes then that some types of belonging are more substantial—that is, more real—than others. But this has repercussions for the ways in which we evaluate arguments. In Aristotle’s mind, the strength of the logical connection that ties a conclusion to the premises in an argument depends, decisively, on the metaphysical status of the claims we are making.

Another example may help. Suppose I were to argue, first: “Ostriches are birds; all birds have feathers, therefore, ostriches have feathers.” Then, second, “Hélène is the youngest daughter of the Tremblay family; all members of the Tremblay family wear red hats; therefore, Hélène wears a red hat.” These arguments possess the same form. (We will worry about formal details later.) But, to Aristotle’s way of thinking, the first argument is, logically, more rigorous than the second. Its conclusion follows from the essential and therefore necessary features of birds. In the second argument, the conclusion only follows from the contingent state of fashion in Quebec. In Aristotelian logic, the strength of an argument depends, in some important way, on metaphysical issues. We can’t simply say “All S are P; and so forth” and be done with it. We have to know what “S” and “P” stand for. This is very different than modern symbolic logic. Although Aristotle does use letters to take the place of variable terms in a logical relation, we should not be misled into thinking that the substantive content of what is being discussed does not matter.

- **The Syllogism**

We are now in a position to consider Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism. Although one senses that Aristotle took great pride in these accomplishments, we could complain that the persistent focus on the mechanics of the valid syllogism has obscured his larger project. We will only cover the most basic points here, largely ignoring hypothetical syllogisms, modal syllogisms, extended syllogisms (sorites), inter alia. The syllogistic now taught in undergraduate philosophy departments represents a later development of Aristotle’s ideas, after they were reworked at the hands of Medieval and modern logicians. We will begin with a brief account of the way syllogisms are presented in modern logic and then move on to discussion of Aristotle’s somewhat different account.

We can define a syllogism, in relation to its logical form, as an argument made up of three categorical propositions, two premises (which set out the evidence), and a conclusion (that follows logically from the premises). In the standard account, the propositions are composed of three terms, a subject term, a predicate term, and a middle term: the subject term is the (grammatical) subject of the conclusion; the predicate term modifies the subject in the conclusion, and the middle term links the subject and predicate terms in the premises. The subject and predicate terms appear in different premises; the middle term appears once in each premise. The premise with the predicate term and the middle term is called the major premise; the premise with the subject term and the middle term is called the minor premise.

Because syllogisms depend on the precise arrangement of terms, syllogistic logic is sometimes referred to as term logic. Most readers of this piece are already familiar with some version of a proverbial (non-Aristotelian) example: “All men are mortal; (all) Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are men; therefore, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are mortal.” If we symbolize the three terms in this syllogism such that Middle Term, M=man; Subject Term, S=Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; Predicate Term, P=mortal; we can represent the argument as: Major Premise: All M is P; Minor Premise: All S is M; Conclusion: So, All S is P. In the Middle Ages, scholars came up with Latin names for valid syllogisms, using vowels to represent the position of each categorical proposition. (Their list

is readily available elsewhere.) The precise arrangement of propositions in this syllogism goes by the Latin moniker “Barbara” because the syllogism is composed of three A propositions: hence, **BARbArA**: A syllogism in Barbara is clearly valid where validity can be understood (in modern terms) as the requirement that if the premises of the argument are true, then the conclusion must be true. Modern textbook authors generally prove the validity of syllogisms in two ways. First, they use a number of different rules.

For example: “when major and minor terms are universal in the conclusion they must be universal in the premises”; “if one premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative”; “the middle term in the premises must be distributed (include every member of a class) at least once,” and so on. Second, they use Venn diagrams, intersecting circles marked to indicate the extension (or range) of different terms, to determine if the information contained in the conclusion is also included in the premises.

Modern logicians, who still hold to traditional conventions, classify syllogisms according to figure and mood. The four figure classification derives from Aristotle; the mood classification, from Medieval logicians. One determines the figure of a syllogism by recording the positions the middle term takes in the two premises. So, for Barbara above, the figure is MP-SM, generally referred to as Figure 1. One determines the mood of a syllogism by recording the precise arrangement of categorical propositions.

So, for Barbara, the mood is AAA. By tabulating figures and moods, we can make an inventory of valid syllogisms. (Medieval philosophers devised a mnemonic poem for such purposes that begins with the line “Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris.”) Although traditional classroom treatments prefer to stick to this time-honoured approach, Fred Sommers and George Englebretsen have devised a more up-to-date term logic that uses equations with “+” and “-” operators and is more attuned to natural language reasoning than the usual predicate logic. Turn then to a brief discussion of Aristotle’s own account of the syllogism.

As already mentioned, we need to distinguish between two kinds of necessity. Aristotle believes in metaphysical or natural necessity. Birds must have feathers because that is their nature. So the proposition “All birds have feathers” is necessarily true.” But Aristotle identifies the syllogistic form with the logical necessity that obtains when two separate propositions necessitate a third.

He defines a *sullogismos* as “a discourse [logos] in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from them.” (Prior Analytics, I.1.24b18-20, Jenkinson.) The emphasis here is on the sense of inevitable consequence that precipitates a conclusion when certain forms of propositions are added together. Indeed, the original Greek term for syllogism is more rigorously translated as “deduction.” In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle’s method is exploratory. He searches for pairs of propositions that combine to produce a necessary conclusion. He begins by accepting that a few syllogisms are self-evidently (or transparently) true. Barbara, AAA-Fig.1, discussed above, is the best example of this kind of “perfect syllogism.” Another example of a perfect syllogism is Celarent: EAE-Fig.1. On seeing the arrangement of terms in such cases, one immediately understands that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. In the case of imperfect syllogisms Aristotle relies on a method of proof that translates them, step-by-step, into perfect syllogisms through a careful rearrangement of terms. He does this directly, through conversion, or indirectly, through the relationships of contradiction and contrariety outlined in the square of opposition. To cite only one very simple example, consider a brief

passage in the *Prior Analytics* (I.5.27a5ff) where Aristotle demonstrates that the propositions “No P are M,” and “All S are M” can be combined to produce a syllogism with the conclusion, “No S are P.” If “No P are M,” it must follow that “No M are P” (conversion); but “No M are P” combined with the second premise, “All S are M” proves that “No S are P.” (This is to reduce the imperfect syllogism Cesare to the perfect syllogism Celarent.) This conversion of an imperfect syllogism into a perfect syllogism demonstrates that the original arrangement of terms is a genuine deduction. In other cases, Aristotle proves that particular arrangements of terms cannot yield proper syllogisms by showing that, in these instances, true premises lead to obviously false or contradictory conclusions. Alongside these proofs of logical necessity, Aristotle derives general rules for syllogisms, classifies them according to figure, and so on.

It is important to reiterate that Aristotelian syllogisms are not (primarily) about hypothetical sets, imaginary classes, or purely abstract mathematical entities. Aristotle believes there are natural groups in the world—species and genera—made up of individual members that share a similar nature, and hence similar properties. It is this sharing of individual things in a similar nature that makes universal statements possible. Once we have universal terms, we can make over-arching statements that, when combined, lead inescapably to specific results. In the most rigorous syllogistic, metaphysical necessity is added to logical necessity to produce an unassailable inference. Seen in this Aristotelian light, syllogisms can be construed as a vehicle for identifying the deep, immutable natures that make things what they are.

Medieval logicians summarized their understanding of the rationale underlying the syllogism in the so-called *dictum de omni et nullo* (the maxim of all and none), the principle that whatever is affirmed or denied of a whole must be affirmed or denied of a part (which they alleged derived from a reading of *Prior Analytics* I.1.24b27-30). Some contemporary authors have claimed that Aristotelian syllogistic is at least compatible with a deflationary theory of truth, the modern idea that truth-claims about propositions amount to little more than an assertion of the statement itself. (To say that “S is P” is true, is just to assert “S is P.”) Perhaps it would be better to say that one can trace the modern preoccupation with validity in formal logic to the distinction between issues of logical necessity and propositional truth implicit in Aristotle. In Aristotle’s logic, arguments do not take the form: “this state of affairs is true/false,” “this state of affairs is true/false,” therefore this state of affairs is true/false.” We do not argue “All S is M is true” but merely, “All S is M.” When it comes to determining validity—that is, when it comes to determining whether we have discovered a true syllogism—the question of the truth or falsity of propositions is pushed aside and attention is focused on an evaluation of the logical connection between premises and conclusion. Obviously, Aristotle recognizes that ascertaining the material truth of premises is an important part of argument evaluation, but he does not present a “truth-functional” logic. The concept of a “truth value” does not play any explicit role in his formal analysis the way it does, for example, with modern truth tables. Mostly, Aristotle wants to know what we can confidently conclude from two presumably true premises; that is, what kind of knowledge can be produced or demonstrated if two given premises are true.

### • Inductive Syllogism

Understanding what Aristotle means by inductive syllogism is a matter of serious scholarly dispute. Although there is only abbreviated textual evidence to go by, his account of inductive argument can be supplemented by his ampler account of its rhetorical analogues, argument from analogy and argument from example. What is clear is that Aristotle thinks of induction (*epagoge*)

as a form of reasoning that begins in the sense perception of particulars and ends in a understanding that can be expressed in a universal proposition (or even a concept). We pick up mental momentum through a familiarity with particular cases that allows us to arrive at a general understanding of an entire species or genus. As we discuss below, there are indications that Aristotle views induction, in the first instance, as a manifestation of immediate understanding and not as an argument form. Nonetheless, in the *Prior Analytics* II.23 (and 24), he casts inductive reasoning in syllogistic form, illustrating the “syllogism that springs out of induction” (ho ex epagoges sullogismos) by an argument about the longevity of bileless animals.

Relying on old biological ideas, Aristotle argues that we can move from observations about the longevity of individual species of bileless animals (that is, animals with clean-blood) to the universal conclusion that bilelessness is a cause of longevity. His argument can be paraphrased in modern English: All men, horses, mules, and so forth, are long-lived; all men, horses, mules, and so forth, are bileless animals; therefore, all bileless animals are long-lived. Although this argument seems, by modern standards, invalid, Aristotle apparently claims that it is a valid deduction. (Remember that the word “syllogism” means “deduction,” so an “inductive syllogism” is, literally, an “inductive deduction.”) He uses a technical notion of “convertibility” to formally secure the validity of the argument. According to this logical rule, terms that cover the same range of cases (because they refer to the same nature) are interchangeable (antistrophe). They can be substituted for one another. Aristotle believes that because the logical terms “men, horses, mules, etc” and “bileless animals” refer to the same genus, they are convertible. If, however, we invert the terms in the proposition “all men, horses, mules, and so forth, are bileless animals” to “all bileless animals are men, horses, mules, and so forth,” we can then rephrase the original argument: All men, horses, mules, and so forth, are long-lived; all bileless animals are men, horses, mules, and so forth; therefore, all bileless animals are long-lived. This revised induction possesses an obviously valid form (Barbara, discussed above). Note that Aristotle does not view this inversion of terms as a formal gimmick or trick; he believes that it reflects something metaphysically true about shared natures in the world. (One could argue that inductive syllogism operates by means of the quantification of the predicate term as well as the subject term of a categorical proposition, but we will not investigate that issue here.)

These passages pose multiple problems of interpretation. We can only advance a general overview of the most important disagreements here. We might identify four different interpretations of Aristotle’s account of the inductive syllogism.

(1) The fact that Aristotle seems to view this as a valid syllogism has led many commentators (such as Ross, McKirahan, Peters) to assume that he is referring to what is known as “perfect induction,” a generalization that is built up from a complete enumeration of particular cases. The main problem here is that it seems to involve a physical impossibility. No one could empirically inspect every bileless animal (and/or species) to ascertain that the connection between bilelessness and longevity obtains in every case.

(2) Some commentators combine this first explanation with the further suggestion that the bileless example is a rare case and that Aristotle believes, in line with modern accounts, that most inductions only produce probable belief. (Cf. Govier’s claim that there is a “tradition going back to Aristotle, which maintains that there are . . . only two broad types of argument: deductive arguments which are conclusive, and inductive arguments, which are not.” (*Problems in Argument Analysis*, 52.)) One problem with such claims is that they overlook the clear distinction that

Aristotle makes between rigorous inductions and rhetorical inductions (which we discuss below).

(3) Some commentators claim that Aristotle (and the ancients generally) overlooked the inherent tenuousness of the inductive reasoning. On this account, Empiricists such as Locke and Hume discovered something seriously wrong about induction that escaped the notice of an ancient author like Aristotle. Philosophers in the modern Anglo-American tradition largely favor this interpretation. (Cf. Garrett's and Barbanell's insistence that "Hume was the first to raise skeptical doubts about inductive reasoning, leaving a puzzle as to why the concerns he highlighted had earlier been so completely overlooked." ("Induction," 172.) Such allegations do not depend, however, on any close reading of a wealth of relevant passages in the Aristotelian corpus and in ancient philosophy generally.

(4) Finally, a minority contemporary view, growing in prominence, has argued that Aristotle did not conceive of induction as an enumerative process but as a matter of intelligent insight into natures. (Cf. McCaskey, Biondi, Rijk, Groarke.) On this account, Aristotle does not mean to suggest that inductive syllogism depends on an empirical inspection of every member of a group but on a universal act of understanding that operates through sense perception. Aristotelian induction can best be compared to modern notions of abduction or inference to the best explanation. This non-mathematical account has historical precedents in neo-Platonism, Thomism, Idealism, and in the textbook literature of traditionalist modern logicians that opposed the new formal logic. This view has been criticized, however, as a form of mere intuitionism dependent on an antiquated metaphysics.

The basic idea that induction is valid will raise eyebrows, no doubt. It is important to stave off some inevitable criticism before continuing. Modern accounts of induction, deriving, in large part, from Hume and Locke, display a mania for prediction. (Hence Hume's question: how can we know that the future bread we eat will nourish us based on past experience of eating bread?) But this is not primarily how Aristotle views the problem. For Aristotle, induction is about understanding natural kinds. Once we comprehend the nature of something, we will, of course, be able to make predictions about its future properties, but understanding its nature is the key. In Aristotle's mind, rigorous induction is valid because it picks out those necessary and essential traits that make something what it is. To use a very simple example, understanding that all spiders have eight legs—that is, that all undamaged spiders have eight legs—is a matter of knowing something deep about the biological nature that constitutes a spider. Something that does not have eight legs is not a spider. (Fruitful analogies might be drawn here to the notion of "a posteriori necessity" countenanced by contemporary logicians such as Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke or to the "revised" concept of a "natural kind" advanced by authors such as Hilary Kornblith or Brian Ellis.) It is commonly said that Aristotle sees syllogisms as a device for explaining relationships between groups. This is, in the main, true. Still, there has to be some room for a consideration of individuals in logic if we hope to include induction as an essential aspect of reasoning. As Aristotle explains, induction begins in sense perception and sense perception only has individuals as its object. Some commentators would limit inductive syllogism to a movement from smaller groups (what Aristotle calls "primitive universals") to larger groups, but one can only induce a generalization about a smaller group on the basis of a prior observation of individuals that compose that group. A close reading reveals that Aristotle himself mentions syllogisms dealing with individuals (about the moon, *Topics*; about the wall; about the eclipse, *Posterior Analytics*, and so on.) If we treat individuals as universal terms or as representative of universal classes, this poses no problem for formal analysis. Collecting observations about one individual or about

individuals who belong to a larger group can lead to an accurate generalization.

### • Deduction versus Induction

We cannot fully understand the nature or role of inductive syllogism in Aristotle without situating it with respect to ordinary, “deductive” syllogism. Aristotle’s distinction between deductive and inductive argument is not precisely equivalent to the modern distinction. Contemporary authors differentiate between deduction and induction in terms of validity. (A small group of informal logicians called “Deductivists” dispute this account.) According a well-worn formula, deductive arguments are valid; inductive arguments are invalid. The premises in a deductive argument guarantee the truth of the conclusion: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. The premises in an inductive argument provide some degree of support for the conclusion, but it is possible to have true premises and a false conclusion. Although some commentators attribute such views to Aristotle, this distinction between strict logical necessity and merely probable or plausible reasoning more easily maps onto the distinction Aristotle makes between scientific and rhetorical reasoning (both of which we discuss below). Aristotle views inductive syllogism as scientific (as opposed to rhetorical) induction and therefore as a more rigorous form of inductive argument.

We can best understand what this amounts to by a careful comparison of a deductive and an inductive syllogism on the same topic. If we reconstruct, along Aristotelian lines, a deduction on the longevity of bileless animals, the argument would presumably run: All bileless animals are long-lived; all men, horses, mules, and so forth, are bileless animals; therefore, all men, horses, mules, and so forth, are long-lived. Defining the terms in this syllogism as: Subject Term, S=men, horses, mules, and so forth; Predicate Term, P=long-lived animals; Middle Term, M=bileless animals, we can represent this metaphysically correct inference as: Major Premise: All M are P. Minor Premise: All S are M.

Conclusion: Therefore all S are P. (Barbara.) As we already have seen, the corresponding induction runs: All men, horses, mules, and so forth, are long-lived; all men, horses, mules, and so forth, are bileless animals; therefore, all bileless animals are long-lived. Using the same definition of terms, we are left with: Major Premise: All S are P. Minor Premise: All S are M (convertible to All M are S).

Conclusion: Therefore, all M are P. (Converted to Barbara.) The difference between these two inferences is the difference between deductive and inductive argument in Aristotle. Clearly, Aristotelian and modern treatments of these issues diverge. As we have already indicated, in the modern formalism, one automatically defines subject, predicate, and middle terms of a syllogism according to their placement in the argument. For Aristotle, the terms in a rigorous syllogism have a metaphysical significance as well. In our correctly formulated deductive-inductive pair, S represents individual species and/or the individuals that make up those species (men, horses, mules, and so forth); M represents the deep nature of these things (bilelessness), and P represents the property that necessarily attaches to that nature (longevity). Here then is the fundamental difference between Aristotelian deduction and induction in a nutshell. In deduction, we prove that a property (P) belongs to individual species (S) because it possesses a certain nature (M); in induction, we prove that a property (P) belongs to a nature (M) because it belongs to individual species (S). Expressed formally, deduction proves that the subject term (S) is associated with a predicate term (P) by means of the middle term (M); induction proves that the middle term (M) is

associated with the predicate term (P) by means of the subject term (S). (Cf. Prior Analytics, II.23.68b31-35.)

Aristotle does not claim that inductive syllogism is invalid but that the terms in an induction have been rearranged. In deduction, the middle term joins the two extremes (the subject and predicate terms); in induction, one extreme, the subject term, acts as the middle term, joining the true middle term with the other extreme. This is what Aristotle means when he maintains that in induction one uses a subject term to argue to a middle term. Formally, with respect to the arrangement of terms, the subject term becomes the “middle term” in the argument.

Aristotle distinguishes then between induction and deduction in three different ways. First, induction moves from particulars to a universal, whereas deduction moves from a universal to particulars. The bileless induction moves from particular species to a universal nature; the bileless deduction moves from a universal nature to particular species. Second, induction moves from observation to language (that is, from sense perception to propositions), whereas deduction moves from language to language (from propositions to a new proposition). The bileless induction is really a way of demonstrating how observations of bileless animals lead to (propositional) knowledge about longevity; the bileless deduction demonstrates how (propositional) knowledge of a universal nature leads (propositional) knowledge about particular species. Third, induction identifies or explains a nature, whereas deduction applies or demonstrates a nature. The bileless induction provides an explanation of the nature of particular species: it is of the nature of bileless organisms to possess a long life. The bileless deduction applies that finding to particular species; once we know that it is of the nature of bileless organisms to possess a long life, we can demonstrate or put on display the property of longevity as it pertains to particular species.

One final point needs clarification. The logical form of the inductive syllogism, after the convertibility maneuver, is the same as the deductive syllogism. In this sense, induction and deduction possess the same (final) logical form. But, of course, in order to successfully perform an induction, one has to know that convertibility is possible, and this requires an act of intelligence which is able to discern the metaphysical realities between things out in the world. We discuss this issue under non-discursive reasoning below.

#### • **Science**

Aristotle wants to construct a logic that provides a working language for rigorous science as he understands it. Whereas we have been talking of syllogisms as arguments, Aristotelian science is about explanation. Admittedly, informal logicians generally distinguish between explanation and argument. An argument is intended to persuade about a debatable point; an explanation is not intended to persuade so much as to promote understanding. Aristotle views science as involving logical inferences that move beyond what is disputable to a consideration of what is the case. Still, the “explanatory” syllogisms used in science possess precisely the same formal structures as “argumentative” syllogisms. So we might consider them arguments in a wider sense. For his part, Aristotle relegates eristic reason to the broad field of rhetoric. He views science, perhaps naively, as a domain of established fact. The syllogisms used in science are about establishing an explanation from specific cases (induction) and then applying or illustrating this explanation to specific cases (deduction).

The ancient Greek term for science, “episteme,” is not precisely equivalent to its modern


counterpart. In Aristotle's worldview, science, as the most rigorous sort of discursive knowledge, is opposed to mere opinion (*doxa*); it is about what is universal and necessary as opposed to what is particular and contingent, and it is theoretical as opposed to practical. Aristotle believes that knowledge, understood as justified true belief, is most perfectly expressed in a scientific demonstration (*apodeixis*), also known as an *apodeitic* or scientific syllogism. He posits a number of specific requirements for this most rigorous of all deductions. In order to qualify as a scientific demonstration, a syllogism must possess premises that are "true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion." (*Posterior Analytics*, I.2.71b20ff, Tredennick.) It must yield information about a natural kind or a group of individual things. And it must produce universal knowledge (*episteme*). Specialists have disputed the meaning of these individual requirements, but the main message is clear. Aristotle accepts, as a general rule, that a conclusion in an argument cannot be more authoritative than the premises that led to that conclusion. We cannot derive better (or more reliable) knowledge from worse (or less reliable) knowledge. Given that a scientific demonstration is the most rigorous form of knowledge possible, we must start with premises that are utterly basic and as certain as possible, which are "immediately" induced from observation, and which confirm to the necessary structure of the world in a way that is authoritative and absolutely incontrovertible. This requires a reliance on first principles which we discuss below.

In the best case scenario, Aristotelian science is about finding definitions of species that, according to a somewhat bald formula, identify the genus (the larger natural group) and the differentia (that unique feature that sets the species apart from the larger group). As Aristotle's focus on definitions is a bit cramped and less than consistent (he himself spends a great deal of time talking about necessary rather than essential properties), let us broaden his approach to science to focus on ostensible definitions, where an ostensible definition is either a rigorous definition or, more broadly, any properly-formulated phrase that identifies the unique properties of something. On this looser approach, which is more consistent with Aristotle's actual practice, to define an entity is to identify the nature, the essential and necessary properties, that make it uniquely what it is. Suffice it to say that Aristotle's idealized account of what science entails needs to be expanded to cover a wide range of activities and that fall under what is now known as scientific practice. What follows is a general sketch of his overall orientation. (We should point out that Aristotle himself resorts to whatever informal methods seem appropriate when reporting on his own biological investigations without too much concern for any fixed ideal of formal correctness. He makes no attempt to cast his own scientific conclusions in metaphysically-correct syllogisms. One could perhaps insist that he uses enthymemes (syllogisms with unstated premises), but mostly, he just seems to record what seems appropriate without any deliberate attempt at correct formalization. Note that most of Aristotle's scientific work is "historia," an earlier stage of observing, fact-collecting, and opinion-reporting that proceeds the principled theorizing of advanced science.)

For Aristotle, even theology is a science inasmuch as it deals with universal and necessary principles. Still, in line with modern attitudes (and in opposition to Plato), Aristotle views sense-perception as the proper route to scientific knowledge. Our empirical experience of the world yields knowledge through induction. Aristotle elaborates then an inductive-deductive model of science. Through careful observation of particular species, the scientist induces an ostensible definition to explain a nature and then demonstrates the consequences of that nature for particular species. Consider a specific case. In the *Posterior Analytics* (II.16-17.98b32ff, 99a24ff), Aristotle mentions an explanation about why deciduous plants lose their leaves in the winter. The ancients apparently

believed this happens because sap coagulates at the base of the leaf (which is not entirely off the mark). We can use this ancient example of a botanical explanation to illustrate how the business of Aristotelian science is supposed to operate. Suppose we are a group of ancient botanists who discover, through empirical inspection, why deciduous plants such as vines and figs lose their leaves. Following Aristotle's lead, we can cast our discovery in the form of the following inductive syllogism: "Vine, fig, and so forth, are deciduous. Vine, fig, and so forth, coagulate sap. Therefore, all sap-coagulators are deciduous." This induction produces the definition of "deciduous." ("Deciduous" is the definiendum; sap-coagulation, the definiens; the point being that everything that is a sap-coagulator is deciduous, which might not be the case if we turned it around and said "All deciduous plants are sap-coagulators.") But once we have a definition of "deciduous," we can use it as the first premise in a deduction to demonstrate something about say, the genus "broad-leaved trees." We can apply, in other words, what we have learned about deciduous plants in general to the more specific genus of broad-leaved trees. Our deduction will read: "All sap-coagulators are deciduous. All broad-leaved trees are sap-coagulators. Therefore, all broad-leaved trees are deciduous." We can express all this symbolically. For the induction, where S=vine, fig, and so forth, P=deciduous, M= being a sap-coagulator, the argument is: "All S is P; all S is M (convertible to all M is S); therefore, all M are P (converted to Barbara). For the deduction, where S=broad-leaved trees, M=being a sap-coagulator, P=deciduous, the argument can be represented: "All M are P; all S is M; therefore, all S is P" (Barbara). This is then the basic logic of Aristotelian science.

A simple diagram of how science operates follows (Figure 2).



**Figure 2**

### **The Inductive-Deductive Method of Aristotelian Science**

Aristotle views science as a search for causes (aitia). In a well-known example about planets not twinkling because they are close to the earth (Posterior Analytics, I.13), he makes an important distinction between knowledge of the fact and knowledge of the reasoned fact. The rigorous scientist aims at knowledge of the reasoned fact which explains why something is the way it is. In our example, sap-coagulation is the cause of deciduous; deciduous is not the cause of sap-coagulation. That is why "sap-coagulation" is featured here as the middle term, because it is the cause of the phenomenon being investigated. The deduction "All sap-coagulators are deciduous; all broad-leaved trees are sap-coagulators; therefore, all broad-leaved trees are deciduous" counts as knowledge of the reasoned fact because it reveals the cause of broad-leaved deciduousness.

Aristotle makes a further distinction between what is more knowable relative to us and what is more knowable by nature (or in itself). He remarks in the *Physics*, “The natural way of [inquiry] is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not ‘knowable relatively to us’ and ‘knowable’ without qualification.” (I.184a15, Hardie, Gaye.) In science we generally move from the effect to the cause, from what we see and observe around us to the hidden origins of things. The outward manifestation of the phenomenon of “deciduousness” is more accessible to us because we can see the trees shedding their leaves, but sap-coagulation as an explanatory principle is more knowable in itself because it embodies the cause. To know about sap-coagulation counts as an advance in knowledge; someone who knows this knows more than someone who only knows that trees shed their leaves in the fall. Aristotle believes that the job of science is to put on display what best counts as knowledge, even if the resulting theory strays from our immediate perceptions and first concerns.

Jan Lukasiewicz, a modern-day pioneer in term logic, comments that “some queer philosophical prejudices which cannot be explained rationally” made early commentators claim that the major premise in a syllogism (the one with the middle and predicate terms) must be first. (Aristotle’s *Syllogistic*, 32.) But once we view the syllogism within the larger context of Aristotelian logic, it becomes perfectly obvious why these early commentators put the major premise first: because it constitutes the (ostensible) definition; because it contains an explanation of the nature of the thing upon which everything else depends. The major premise in a scientific deduction is the most important part of the syllogism; it is scientifically prior in that it reveals the cause that motivates the phenomenon. So it makes sense to place it first. This was not an irrational prejudice.

#### • **Non-Discursive Reasoning**

The distinction Aristotle draws between discursive knowledge (that is, knowledge through argument) and non-discursive knowledge (that is, knowledge through nous) is akin to the medieval distinction between ratio (argument) and intellectus (direct intellection). In Aristotelian logic, non-discursive knowledge comes first and provides the starting points upon which discursive or argumentative knowledge depends. It is hard to know what to call the mental power that gives rise to this type of knowledge in English. The traditional term “intuition” invites misunderstanding. When Aristotle claims that there is an immediate sort of knowledge that comes directly from the mind (nous) without discursive argument, he is not suggesting that knowledge can be accessed through vague feelings or hunches. He is referring to a capacity for intelligent appraisal that might be better described as discernment, comprehension, or insight. Like his later medieval followers, he views “intuition” as a species of reason; it is not prior to reason or outside of reason, it is—in the highest degree—the activity of reason itself. (Cf. *Posterior Analytics*, II. 19; *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV.6.)

For Aristotle, science is only one manifestation of human intelligence. He includes, for example, intuition, craft, philosophical wisdom, and moral decision-making along with science in his account of the five intellectual virtues. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, VI.3-8.) When it comes to knowledge-acquisition, however, intuition is primary. It includes the most basic operations of intelligence, providing the ultimate ground of understanding and inference upon which everything else depends. Aristotle is a firm empiricist. He believes that knowledge begins in perception, but he also believes that we need intuition to make sense of perception. In the *Posterior Analytics*

(II.19.100a3-10), Aristotle posits a sequence of steps in mental development: sense perception produces memory which (in combination with intuition) produces human experience (*empeiria*), which produces art and science. Through a widening movement of understanding (really, a non-discursive form of induction), intuition transforms observation and memory so as to produce knowledge (without argument). This intuitive knowledge is even more reliable than science. As Aristotle writes in key passages at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, “no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge,” and “nothing except intuition can be truer than scientific knowledge.” (100b8ff, Mure, slightly emended.)

Aristotelian intuition supplies the first principles (*archai*) of human knowledge: concepts, universal propositions, definitions, the laws of logic, the primary principles of the specialized science, and even moral concepts such as the various virtues. This is why, according to Aristotle, intuition must be viewed as infallible. We cannot claim that the first principles of human intelligence are dubious and then turn around and use those principles to make authoritative claims about the possibility (or impossibility) of knowledge. If we begin to doubt intuition, that is, human intelligence at its most fundamental level of operation, we will have to doubt everything else that is built upon this universal foundation: science, philosophy, knowledge, logic, inference, and so forth. Aristotle never tries to prove first principles. He acknowledges that when it comes to the origins of human thought, there is a point when one must simply stop asking questions. As he points out, any attempt at absolute proof would lead to an infinite regress. In his own words: “It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything; there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration.” (*Metaphysics*, 1006a6ff, Ross.) Aristotle does make arguments, for example, that meaningful speech presupposes a logical axiom like the principle of non-contradiction, but that is not, strictly speaking, a proof of the principle.

Needless to say, Aristotle’s reliance on intuition has provoked a good deal of scholarly disagreement. Contemporary commentators such as Joseph Owens, G. L. Owen, and Terrence Irwin have argued that Aristotelian first principles begin in dialectic. On their influential account, we arrive at first principles through a weaker form of argument that revolves around a consideration of “*endoxa*,” the proverbial opinions of the many and/or the wise. Robin Smith (and others) severely criticize their account. The idea that mere opinion could somehow give rise to rigorous scientific knowledge conflicts with Aristotle’s settled view that less reliable knowledge cannot provide sufficient logical support for the more reliable knowledge. As we discuss below, *endoxa* do provide a starting point for dialectical (and ethical) arguments in Aristotle’s system. They are, in his mind, a potent intellectual resource, a library of stored wisdom and right opinion. They may include potent expressions of first principles already discovered by other thinkers and previous generations. But as Aristotle makes clear at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* and elsewhere, the recognition that something is a first principle depends directly on intuition. As he reaffirms in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, “it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles.” (VI.6.1141a7, Ross.) If Irwin and his colleagues seek to limit the role of intuition in Aristotle, authors such as Lambertus Marie de Rijk and D. W. Hamlyn go to an opposite extreme, denying the importance of the inductive syllogism and identifying induction (*epagoge*) exclusively with intuition. De Rijk claims that Aristotelian induction is “a pre-argumentation procedure consisting in . . . [a] disclosure [that] does not take place by a formal, discursive inference, but is, as it were, jumped upon by an intuitive act of knowledge.” (*Semantics and Ontology*, I.2.53, 141-2.) Although this position seems extreme, it seems indisputable that inductive syllogism depends on intuition, for without intuition (understood as intelligent discernment), one could not recognize the convertibility of subject and middle terms (discussed above). Aristotle also points out that one needs intuition to recognize the

(ostensible) definitions so crucial to the practice of Aristotelian science. We must be able to discern the difference between accidental and necessary or essential properties before coming up with a definition. This can only come about through some kind of direct (non-discursive) discernment. Aristotle proposes a method for discovering definitions called division—we are to divide things into smaller and smaller sub-groups—but this method depends wholly on nous. (Cf. *Posterior Analytics*, II.13.) Some modern Empiricist commentators, embarrassed by such mystical-sounding doctrines, warn that this emphasis on non-discursive reasoning collapses into pure rationalism (or Platonism), but this is a caricature. What Aristotle means by rational “intuition” is not a matter of pure, disembodied thought. One does not arrive at first principles by closing one’s eyes and retreating from the world (as with Cartesian introspection). For Aristotle, first principles arise through a vigorous interaction of the empirical with the rational; a combination of rationality and sense experience produces the first seeds of human understanding.

Note that Aristotle believes that there are first principles (*koinai archai*) that are common to all fields of inquiry, such as the principle of non-contradiction or the law of excluded middle, and that each specialized science has its own first principles. We may recover these first principles second-hand by a (dialectical) review of authorities. Or, we can derive them first hand by analysis, by dividing the subject matter we are concerned with into its constituent parts. At the beginning of the *Physics*, Aristotle explains, “What is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. . . . Similarly a child begins by calling all men ‘father,’ and all women ‘mother,’ but later on distinguishes each of them.” (I.1.184a22-184b14, Hardie, Gaye.) Just as children learn to distinguish their parents from other human beings, those who successfully study a science learn to distinguish the different natural kinds that make up the whole of a scientific phenomenon. This precedes the work of induction and deduction already discussed. Once we have the parts (or the aspects), we can reason about them scientifically.

#### • Rhetoric

Argumentation theorists (less aptly characterized as informal logicians) have critiqued the ascendancy of formal logic, complaining that the contemporary penchant for symbolic logic leaves one with an abstract mathematics of empty signs that cannot be applied in any useful way to larger issues. Proponents of formal logic counter that their specialized formalism allows for a degree of precision otherwise not available and that any focus on the substantive meaning or truth of propositions is a distraction from logical issues per se. We cannot readily fit Aristotle into one camp or the other. Although he does provide a formal analysis of the syllogism, he intends logic primarily as a means of acquiring true statements about the world. He also engages in an enthusiastic investigation of less rigorous forms of reasoning included in the study of dialectic and rhetoric.

Understanding precisely what Aristotle means by the term “dialectics” (*dialektike*) is no easy task. He seems to view it as the technical study of argument in general or perhaps as a more specialized investigation into argumentative dialogue. He intends his rhetoric (*rhetorike*), which he describes as the counterpart to dialectic, as an expansive study of the art of persuasion, particularly as it is directed towards a non-academic public. Suffice it to say, for our purposes, that Aristotle reserves a place in his logic for a general examination of all arguments, for scientific

reasoning, for rhetoric, for debating techniques of various sorts, for jurisprudential pleading, for cross-examination, for moral reasoning, for analysis, and for non-discursive intuition.

Aristotle distinguishes between what I will call, for convenience, rigorous logic and persuasive logic. Rigorous logic aims at *epistēmē*, true belief about what is eternal, necessary, universal, and unchanging. (Aristotle sometimes qualifies this to include “for the most part” scientific knowledge.) Persuasive logic aims at acceptable, probable, or convincing belief (what we might call “opinion” instead of knowledge.) It deals with approximate truth, with *endoxa* (popular or proverbial opinions), with reasoning that is acceptable to a particular audience, or with claims about accidental properties and contingent events. Persuasive syllogisms have the same form as rigorous syllogisms but are understood as establishing their conclusions in a weaker manner. As we have already seen, rigorous logic produces deductive and inductive syllogisms; Aristotle indicates that persuasive logic produces, in a parallel manner, enthymemes, analogies, and examples. He defines an enthymeme as a deduction “concerned with things which may, generally speaking, be other than they are,” with matters that are “for the most part only generally true,” or with “probabilities and signs” (*Rhetoric*, I.2.1357a, Roberts). He also mentions that the term “enthymeme” may refer to arguments with missing premises. (*Rhetoric*, I.2.1357a16-22.) When it comes to induction, Aristotle’s presentation is more complicated, but we can reconstruct what he means in a more straightforward manner.

The persuasive counterpart to the inductive syllogism is the analogy and the example, but the example is really a composite argument formed from first, an analogy and second, an enthymeme. Some initial confusion is to be expected as Aristotle’s understanding of analogies differs somewhat from contemporary accounts. In contemporary treatments, analogies depend on a direct object(s)-to-object(s) comparison. Aristotelian analogy, on the other hand, involves reasoning up to a general principle. We are to conclude (1) that because individual things of a certain nature X have property z, everything that possesses nature X has property z. But once we know that every X possesses property z, we can make a deduction (2) that some new example of nature X will also have property z. Aristotle calls (1), the inductive movement up to the generalization, an analogy (literally, an argument from likeness=*ton homoion*); he calls (2), the deductive movement down to a new case, an enthymeme; and he considers (1) + (2), the combination of the analogy and the enthymeme together, an example (*paradeigma*). He presents the following argument from example in the *Rhetoric* (I.2.1357b31-1358a1). Suppose we wish to argue that Dionysius, the ruler, is asking for a bodyguard in order to set himself up as despot. We can establish this by a two-step process. First, we can draw a damning analogy between previous cases where rulers asked for a bodyguard and induce a general rule about such practices. We can insist that Peisistratus, Theagenes, and other known tyrants, were scheming to make themselves despots, that Peisistratus, Theagenes, and other known tyrants also asked for a bodyguard, and that therefore, everyone who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make themselves dictators. But once we have established this general rule, we can move on to the second step in our argument, using this conclusion as a premise in an enthymeme. We can argue that all people asking for a bodyguard are scheming to make themselves despots, that Dionysius is someone asking for a bodyguard, and that therefore, Dionysius must be scheming to make himself despot. This is not, in Aristotle’s mind, rigorous reasoning. Nonetheless, we can, in this way, induce probable conclusions and then use them to deduce probable consequences. Although these arguments are intended to be persuasive or plausible rather than scientific, but the reasoning strategy mimics the inductive-deductive movement of science (without compelling, of course, the same degree of belief).

We should point out that Aristotle does not restrict himself to a consideration of purely formal issues in his discussion of rhetoric. He famously distinguishes, for example, between three means of persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos. As we read, at the beginning of his *Rhetoric*: “Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. . . . [Firstly,] persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. . . . Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved [the point] by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.” (*Rhetoric*, I.2.1356a2-21, Roberts.) Aristotle concludes that effective arguers must (1) understand morality and be able to convince an audience that they themselves are good, trustworthy people worth listening to (ethos); (2) know the general causes of emotion and be able to elicit them from specific audience (pathos); and (3) be able to use logical techniques to make convincing (not necessarily sound) arguments (logos). Aristotle broaches many other issues we cannot enter into here. He acknowledges that the goal of rhetoric is persuasion, not truth. Such techniques may be bent to immoral or dishonest ends. Nonetheless, he insists that it is in the public interest to provide a comprehensive and systematic survey of the field.

We might mention two other logical devices that have a place in Aristotle’s work: the *topos* and the *aporia*. Unfortunately, Aristotle never explicitly explains what a *topos* is. The English word “topic” does not do justice to the original notion, for although Aristotelian *topoi* may be organized around subject matter, they focus more precisely on recommended strategies for successful arguing. (The technical term derives from a Greek word referring to a physical location. Some scholars suggest a link to ancient mnemonic techniques that superimposed lists on familiar physical locations as a memory aid.) In relevant discussions (in the *Topics* and the *Rhetoric*) Aristotle offers helpful advice about finding (or remembering) suitable premises, about verbally out-manoeuvring an opponent, about finding forceful analogies, and so on. Examples of specific *topoi* would include discussions about how to argue which is the better of two alternatives, how to substitute terms effectively, how to address issues about genus and property, how to argue about cause and effect, how to conceive of sameness and difference, and so on. Some commentators suggest that different *topoi* may have been used in a classroom situation in conjunction with student exercises and standardized texts, or with written lists of *endoxa*, or even with ready-made arguments that students were expected to memorize.

An *aporia* is a common device in Greek philosophy. The Greek word *aporia* (plural, *aporiai*) refers to a physical location blocked off by obstacles where there is no way out; by extension, it means, in philosophy, a mental perplexity, an impasse, a paradox or puzzle that stoutly resists solution. Aristotle famously suggests that philosophers begin with *aporiai* and complete their task by resolving the apparent paradoxes. An attentive reader will uncover many *aporiai* in Aristotle who begins many of his treatises with a *diaporia*, a survey of the puzzles that occupied previous thinkers. Note that *aporiai* cannot be solved through some mechanical rearrangement of symbolic terms. Solving puzzles requires intelligence and discernment; it requires some creative insight into what is at stake.

#### • Fallacies

In a short work entitled *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle introduces a theory of logical fallacies that has been remarkably influential. His treatment is abbreviated and somewhat obscure, and

there is inevitably scholarly disagreement about precise exegesis. Aristotle thinks of fallacies as instances of specious reasoning; they are not merely errors but hidden errors. A fallacy is an incorrect reasoning strategy that gives the illusion of being sound or somehow conceals the underlying problem. Aristotle divides fallacies into two broad categories: those which depend on language (sometimes called verbal fallacies) and those that are independent of language (sometimes called material fallacies). There is some scholarly disagreement about particular fallacies, but traditional English names and familiar descriptions follow. Linguistic fallacies include: homonymy (verbal equivocation), ambiguity (amphiboly or grammatical equivocation), composition (confusing parts with a whole), division (confusing a whole with parts), accent (equivocation that arises out of mispronunciation or misplaced emphasis) and figure of speech (ambiguity resulting from the form of an expression). Independent fallacies include accident (overlooking exceptions), converse accident (hasty generalization or improper qualification), irrelevant conclusion, affirming the consequent (assuming an effect guarantees the presence of one possible cause), begging the question (assuming the point), false cause, and complex question (disguising two or more questions as one). Logicians, influenced by scholastic logic, often gave these characteristic mistakes Latin names: *compositio* for composition, *divisio* for division, *secundum quid et simpliciter* for converse accident, *ignoranti enlenchi* for nonrelevant conclusion, and *petitio principii* for begging the question.


Consider three brief examples of fallacies from Aristotle's original text. Aristotle formulates the following amphiboly (which admittedly sounds awkward in English): "I wish that you the enemy may capture." (Sophistical Refutations, 4.166a7-8, Pickard-Cambridge.) Clearly, the grammatical structure of the statement leaves it ambiguous as to whether the speaker is hoping that the enemy or "you" be captured. In discussing complex question, he supplies the following perplexing example: "Ought one to obey the wise or one's father?"

(Ibid., 12.173a21.) Obviously, from a Greek perspective, one ought to obey both. The problem is that the question has been worded in such a way that anyone who answers will be forced to reject one moral duty in order to embrace the other. In fact, there are two separate questions here—Should one obey the wise? Should one obey one's father?—that have been illegitimately combined to produce a single question with a single answer. Finally, Aristotle provides the following time-honoured example of affirming the consequent: "Since after the rain the ground is wet, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining; whereas that does not necessarily follow" (Ibid., 5.167b5-8.) Aristotle's point is that assuming that the same effect never has more than one cause misconstrues the true nature of the world. The same effect may have several causes. Many of Aristotle's examples have to do with verbal tricks which are entirely unconvincing—for example, the person who commits the fallacy of division by arguing that the number "5" is both even and odd because it can be divided into an even and an odd number: "2" and "3." (Ibid., 4.166a32-33.) But the interest here is theoretical: figuring out where an obviously-incorrect argument or proposition went wrong. We should note that much of this text, which deals with natural language argumentation, does not presuppose the syllogistic form. Aristotle does spend a good bit of time considering how fallacies are related to one another. Fallacy theory, it is worth adding, is a thriving area of research in contemporary argumentation theory. Some of these issues are hotly debated.

#### • Moral Reasoning

In the modern world, many philosophers have argued that morality is a matter of feelings, not reason. Although Aristotle recognizes the connative (or emotional) side of morality, he takes a

decidedly different tack. As a virtue ethicist, he does not focus on moral law but views morality through the lens of character. An ethical person develops a capacity for habitual decision-making that aims at good, reliable traits such as honesty, generosity, high-mindedness, and courage. To modern ears, this may not sound like reason-at-work, but Aristotle argues that only human beings—that is, rational animals—are able to tell the difference between right and wrong. He widens his account of rationality to include a notion of practical wisdom (phronesis), which he defines as “a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.” (Nicomachean Ethics, VI.5.1140b4-5, Ross, Urmsen). The operation of practical wisdom, which is more about doing than thinking, displays an inductive-deductive pattern similar to science as represented in Figure 3. It depends crucially on intuition or nous. One induces the idea of specific virtues (largely, through an exercise of non-discursive reason) and then deduces how to apply these ideas to particular circumstances. (Some scholars make a strict distinction between “virtue” (areté) understood as the mental capacity which induces moral ideas and “phronesis” understood as the mental capacity which applies these ideas, but the basic structure of moral thinking remains the same however strictly or loosely we define these two terms.)



**Figure 3**

### **The Inductive-Deductive Method of Aristotelian Ethics**

We can distinguish then between moral induction and moral deduction. In moral induction, we induce an idea of courage, honesty, loyalty, and so on. We do this over time, beginning in our childhood, through habit and upbringing. Aristotle writes that the successful moral agent “must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good.” (Ibid., VI.7.1114b6ff.) Once this intuitive capacity for moral discernment has been sufficiently developed—once the moral eye is able to see the difference between right and wrong,—we can apply moral norms to the concrete circumstances of our own lives. In moral deduction, we go on to apply the idea of a specific virtue to a particular situation. We do not do this by formulating moral arguments inside our heads, but by making reasonable decisions, by doing what is morally required given the circumstances. Aristotle refers, in this connection, to the practical syllogism which results “in a conclusion which is an action.” (Movement of Animals,

701a10ff, Farquharson.) Consider a (somewhat simplified) example. Suppose I induce the idea of promise-keeping as a virtue and then apply it to question of whether I should pay back the money I borrowed from my brother. The corresponding theoretical syllogism would be: Promise-keeping is good; giving back the money I owe my brother is an instance of promise-keeping; so giving the back the money I owe my brother is good." In the corresponding practical syllogism, I do not conclude with a statement: "this act is good." I go out and pay back the money I owe my brother. The physical exchange of money counts as the conclusion. In Aristotle's moral system, general moral principles play the role of an ostensible definition in science. One induces a general principle and deduces a corresponding action. Aristotle does believe that moral reasoning is a less rigorous form of reasoning than science, but chiefly because scientific demonstrations deal with universals whereas the practical syllogism ends a single act that must be fitted to contingent circumstances. There is never any suggestion that morality is somehow arbitrary or subjective. One could set out the moral reasoning process using the moral equivalent of an inductive syllogism and a scientific demonstration.

Although Aristotle provides a logical blueprint for the kind of reasoning that is going on in ethical decision-making, he obviously does not view moral decision-making as any kind of mechanical or algorithmic procedure. Moral induction and deduction represent, in simplified form, what is going on. Throughout his ethics, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of context. The practice of morality depends then on a faculty of keen discernment that notices, distinguishes, analyzes, appreciates, generalizes, evaluates, and ultimately decides. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he includes practical wisdom in his list of five intellectual virtues. (Scholarly commentators variously explicate the relationship between the moral and the intellectual virtues.) Aristotle also discusses minor moral virtues such as good deliberation (*eubulia*), theoretical moral understanding (*sunesis*), and experienced moral judgement (*gnome*). And he equates moral failure with chronic ignorance or, in the case of weakness of will (*akrasia*), with intermittent ignorance.

### **Aristotle Critique of Plato's theory of Ideas**

Plato (c. 428–c. 348 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) are generally regarded as the two greatest figures of Western philosophy. For some 20 years Aristotle was Plato's student and colleague at the Academy in Athens, an institution for philosophical, scientific, and mathematical research and teaching founded by Plato in the 380s. Although Aristotle revered his teacher, his philosophy eventually departed from Plato's in important respects. Aristotle also investigated areas of philosophy and fields of science that Plato did not seriously consider. According to a conventional view, Plato's philosophy is abstract and utopian, whereas Aristotle's is empirical, practical, and commonsensical. Such contrasts are famously suggested in the fresco *School of Athens* (1510–11) by the Italian Renaissance painter Raphael, which depicts Plato and Aristotle together in conversation, surrounded by philosophers, scientists, and artists of earlier and later ages. Plato, holding a copy of his dialogue *Timeo* (*Timaeus*), points upward to the heavens; Aristotle, holding his *Etica* (*Ethics*), points outward to the world.

Although this view is generally accurate, it is not very illuminating, and it obscures what Plato and Aristotle have in common and the continuities between them, suggesting wrongly that their philosophies are polar opposites.

So how exactly does Plato's philosophy differ from Aristotle's? Here are three main differences.

**Forms.** The most fundamental difference between Plato and Aristotle concerns their theories of

forms. (When used to refer to forms as Plato conceived them, the term “Form” is conventionally capitalized, as are the names of individual Platonic Forms. The term is lowercased when used to refer to forms as Aristotle conceived them.) For Plato, the Forms are perfect exemplars, or ideal types, of the properties and kinds that are found in the world. Corresponding to every such property or kind is a Form that is its perfect exemplar or ideal type. Thus the properties “beautiful” and “black” correspond to the Forms the Beautiful and the Black; the kinds “horse” and “triangle” correspond to the Forms the Horse and the Triangle; and so on.

A thing has the properties it has, or belongs to the kind it belongs to, because it “participates” in the Forms that correspond to those properties or kinds. A thing is a beautiful black horse because it participates in the Beautiful, the Black, and the Horse; a thing is a large red triangle because it participates in the Large, the Red, and the Triangle; a person is courageous and generous because he or she participates in the Forms of Courage and Generosity; and so on.

For Plato, Forms are abstract objects, existing completely outside space and time. Thus they are knowable only through the mind, not through sense experience. Moreover, because they are changeless, the Forms possess a higher degree of reality than do things in the world, which are changeable and always coming into or going out of existence. The task of philosophy, for Plato, is to discover through reason (“dialectic”) the nature of the Forms, the only true reality, and their interrelations, culminating in an understanding of the most fundamental Form, the Good or the One.

Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Forms but not the notion of form itself. For Aristotle, forms do not exist independently of things—every form is the form of some thing. A “substantial” form is a kind that is attributed to a thing, without which that thing would be of a different kind or would cease to exist altogether. “Black Beauty is a horse” attributes a substantial form, horse, to a certain thing, the animal Black Beauty, and without that form Black Beauty would not exist. Unlike substantial forms, “accidental” forms may be lost or gained by a thing without changing its essential nature. “Black Beauty is black” attributes an accidental form, blackness, to a certain animal, who could change color (someone might paint him) without ceasing to be himself.

Substantial and accidental forms are not created, but neither are they eternal. They are introduced into a thing when it is made, or they may be acquired later, as in the case of some accidental forms.

**Ethics.** For both Plato and Aristotle, as for most ancient ethicists, the central problem of ethics was the achievement of happiness. By “happiness” (the usual English translation of the Greek term *eudaimonia*), they did not mean a pleasant state of mind but rather a good human life, or a life of human flourishing. The means by which happiness was acquired was through virtue. Thus ancient ethicists typically addressed themselves to three related questions: (1) What does a good or flourishing human life consist of?, (2) What virtues are necessary to achieve it?, and (3) How does one acquire those virtues?

Plato’s early dialogues encompass explorations of the nature of various conventional virtues, such as courage, piety, and temperance, as well as more general questions, such as whether virtue can be taught. Socrates (Plato’s teacher) is portrayed in conversation with presumed experts and the occasional celebrity; invariably, Socrates exposes their definitions as inadequate. Although Socrates does not offer his own definitions, claiming to be ignorant, he suggests that virtue is a

kind of knowledge, and that virtuous action (or the desire to act virtuously) follows necessarily from having such knowledge—a view held by the historical Socrates, according to Aristotle.

In Plato's later dialogue *Republic*, which is understood to convey his own views, the character Socrates develops a theory of "justice" as a condition of the soul. As described in that work, the just or completely virtuous person is the one whose soul is in harmony, because each of its three parts—Reason, Spirit, and Appetite—desires what is good and proper for it and acts within proper limits. In particular, Reason understands and desires the good of the individual (the human good) and the Good in general. Such understanding of the Form of the Good, however, can be acquired only through years of training in dialectic and other disciplines, an educational program that the *Republic* also describes. Ultimately, only philosophers can be completely virtuous.

Characteristically, for Aristotle, happiness is not merely a condition of the soul but a kind of right activity. The good human life, he held, must consist primarily of whatever activity is characteristically human, and that is reasoning. The good life is therefore the rational activity of the soul, as guided by the virtues. Aristotle recognized both intellectual virtues, chiefly wisdom and understanding, and practical or moral virtues, including courage and temperance. The latter kinds of virtue typically can be conceived as a mean between two extremes (a temperate person avoids eating or drinking too much but also eating or drinking too little). In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle held that happiness is the practice of philosophical contemplation in a person who has cultivated all of the intellectual and moral virtues over much of a lifetime. In the *Eudemian Ethics*, happiness is the exercise of the moral virtues specifically in the political realm, though again the other intellectual and moral virtues are presupposed.

**Politics.** The account of justice presented in Plato's *Republic* is not only a theory of virtue but also a theory of politics. Indeed, the character Socrates there develops a theory of political justice as a means of advancing the ethical discussion, drawing an analogy between the three parts of the soul—Reason, Spirit, and Appetite—and the three classes of an ideal state (i.e., city-state)—Rulers, Soldiers, and Producers (e.g., artisans and farmers). In the just state as in the just individual, the three parts perform the functions proper to them and in harmony with the other parts. In particular, the Rulers understand not only the good of the state but, necessarily, the Good itself, the result of years of rigorous training to prepare them for their leadership role. Plato envisioned that the Rulers would live simply and communally, having no private property and even sharing sexual partners (notably, the rulers would include women). All children born from the Rulers and the other classes would be tested, those showing the most ability and virtue being admitted to training for rulership.

The political theory of Plato's *Republic* is notorious for its assertion that only philosophers should rule and for its hostility toward democracy, or rule by the many. In the latter respect it broadly reflects the views of the historical Socrates, whose criticisms of the democracy of Athens may have played a role in his trial and execution for impiety and other crimes in 399. In one of his last works, the *Laws*, Plato outlined in great detail a mixed constitution incorporating elements of both monarchy and democracy. Scholars are divided over the question of whether the *Laws* indicates that Plato changed his mind about the value of democracy or was simply making practical concessions in light of the limitations of human nature. According to the latter view, the state of the *Republic* remained Plato's ideal, or utopia, while that of the *Laws* represented the best that could be achieved in realistic circumstances, according to him.

In political theory, Aristotle is famous for observing that “man is a political animal,” meaning that human beings naturally form political communities. Indeed, it is impossible for human beings to thrive outside a community, and the basic purpose of communities is to promote human flourishing. Aristotle is also known for having devised a classification of forms of government and for introducing an unusual definition of democracy that was never widely accepted.

According to Aristotle, states may be classified according to the number of their rulers and the interests in which they govern. Rule by one person in the interest of all is monarchy; rule by one person in his own interest is tyranny. Rule by a minority in the interest of all is aristocracy; rule by a minority in the interest of itself is oligarchy. Rule by a majority in the interest of all is “polity”; rule by a majority in its own interest—i.e., mob rule—is “democracy.” In theory, the best form of government is monarchy, and the next best is aristocracy. However, because monarchy and aristocracy frequently devolve into tyranny and oligarchy, respectively, in practice the best form is polity.

### **Aristotle’s Criticism**

Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato Aristotle has stated that, “Wisdom will never die with Plato”, and on another occasion he said, Plato is dear, but truth is dearer. As mentioned above, while Academy was dedicated to speculative and political philosophy, Lyceum took biology and natural sciences seriously. But metaphysics or first philosophy occupies a central role in his scheme of things as well. According to him, mathematical and physical sciences treat of the quantity, quality, and relations of things.

On the other hand, the first philosophy deals with the category of substance and also studies the causes of things. It enquires into the nature of being without considering the conditions imposed by space and time. The absolute and necessary being, as understood by Aristotle, is the eternal essence of things as opposed to the relative, contingent, and accidental. In this regard he agrees with Plato to a great deal.

Aristotle’s major criticism of Plato’s philosophy targeted the latter’s idea of universal essences. For Plato they are universal and objective realities and they exist independent of objects. They are eternal and imperishable and the objects in the world are fundamentally unreal and are mere copies of these eternal essences.

Aristotle agrees with Plato on many counts. But he opposes the latter’s transcendentalism, which maintains that the essences are apart from the things. According to Aristotle, essences or forms are immanent to things.

As Russell says, Aristotle considered them as common nouns and not as objective realities and things. Any name capable of universal application to the members of a class represents a universal. Opposing Plato’s theory, which posits them as abstract original forms to which objects “participate”, Aristotle initiates the third man argument.

### **Third Man Argument**

This argument aims at criticizing Plato’s theory of ideas, which according to Aristotle states that, “a man is a man because he resembles or participates in the idea of man in the world of essences.” Aristotle states that, if a man is a man because he resembles the ideal man, there must

be a still more ideal man to whom both ordinary men and the ideal man are similar.

Aristotle intends to demonstrate that the notion of imitation or copying used in the theory of forms runs into logical difficulties. In order to explain the similarity between a man and the form of man, one needs to construe a third form of man, and this always requires another form and hence the theory of ideas leads to ad infinitum.

Aristotle further asks whether the ideal man is an ideal animal. If he is, there must be as many ideal animals as there are species of animals. Again, how does the perfect and the eternal world be held responsible for the imperfect and perishable world of material objects? Plato's transcendentalism conceived Ideas as real beings existing apart from the individuals, which express them. Aristotle finds this position objectionable. He asks, if the general Idea is the substance of the particulars or the essence of the things, how can it exist apart from that of which it is the substance and the essence? He affirms that the general cannot exist outside of and along side of the particular.

According to him ideas considered as such and apart from the things, are not real beings or substances. Opposing Plato he maintains that the phenomenal world is not unreal and argues that both form and matter coexist in the world of objects. Their coexistence is responsible for the existence of the world we live. Since he considers this world as real he finds it worthwhile in pursuing knowledge about it. This makes natural scientific investigations meaningful and important. He maintains that genuine scientific knowledge is not a mere acquaintance with facts as knowledge consists in knowing the reasons and causes of things and it should explain why they cannot be other than what they are. The theory of form-matter coexistence answers these fundamental questions.

Aristotle asserts that ideas do not and cannot exist apart from things. On the other hand, they are inherent or immanent in things. The idea is the form of the thing, and cannot be separated from it except by abstraction. It is the essence of the particular and with it constitutes an indivisible whole. For example, Aristotle would hold that there is manness because there are actual men in this world. There is parenthood, because there are parents. Russell elucidates Aristotle's argument of immanence with an interesting simile. He says that, when we say "there is such a thing as the game of football," it will be nonsensical to assume that football could exist without football-players. Russell in his usual style of language analysis explains Aristotle's position in the following way.

And this dependence is thought to be not reciprocal: the men who play football would still exist even if they never played football; things which are usually sweet may turn sour; and my face, which is usually red, may turn pale without ceasing to be my face. In this way we are led to conclude that what is meant by an adjective is dependent for its being on what is meant by a proper name, but not vice versa. This is, I think, what Aristotle means. His doctrine on this point, as on many others, is a common-sense prejudice pedantically expressed.

Aristotle's concept of matter is unique. According to him matter is coexistent with form and different forms design matter differently in the process of evolution of objects. It is something that changes and Aristotle believed that each concrete instance of matter has an inner purpose. It is destined to become something. But Aristotle also maintains that matter has no reality apart from the form, as matter without the Idea is also an abstraction like Idea apart from particular object. We shall take a concrete example of a pen in order to understand the concept of matter and

matter-form relationship.

Consider the form and matter of a ball pen. The form of the ball point pen is constituted by the properties of the pen, it has a ball point, it has ink in it, it can be used to write and can be held by the hand. Matter on the other hand is the material stuff to which these properties are attached to, the material by which the pen is made up of etc.

The form of the pen, he affirms, is inherent in the material stuff. The former does not have an existence apart from and independent of the latter or many such pens. But in a unique manner, the form is independent, as it does not depend on any particular pen in this world. At the same time, Aristotle is not prepared to separate the form completely from the actual pens in the world.

Aristotle's philosophical perspective advocates avoiding the extremes and adopting a middle path. His metaphysical theory thus adopts a position, which avoids the extremes of Platonism and Atomism. He rejects Plato's view, which considers essences alone as real and the material world as illusion. As a consequence of his idealism, Plato also affirmed that all change is an illusion. The Atomists, on the other hand, advocated a unique form of materialism, which holds that everything is made up of atoms.

According to them, the ultimate reality is constitutive of atoms and they try to explain the nature of reality and world in quantitative terms. They hold that atoms have no natural properties and all qualities and nature of objects result from a combination of atoms. Atoms themselves have no natural qualities. To this Aristotle responds by arguing that, if qualities and properties are not actually there but are only illusions, then the sensible world cannot be trusted. Aristotle holds that everything that exists has a definite nature and hence is potential to become something. Aristotle explains matter in terms of substantial material elements:

- 1) earth,
- 2) water,
- 3) fire,
- 4) air and
- 5) ether.

These five basic elements have qualities and each is distinguished from the other in terms of their unique quality and hence things have definite nature. Hence the Atomists' doctrine is unacceptable for him. Aristotle says that these qualities can transfer through matter. One important aspect of Aristotle's metaphysics is his conception that all change is evolution. He maintains that all change is evolution. Form and matter, according to him, eternally coexist as they cannot be separated from one another. The form of an object changes when it evolves into another thing. For example, seed into tree. Here matter remains more or less the same and different forms design the matter differently. In this process of evolution, the seed becomes a tree; it realizes its purpose.

Aristotle here provides a teleological explanation of the universe in terms of the matter-form relationship. Though the forms are eternal and non-perishable—and here Aristotle subscribes to the Platonic view—he maintains that they are nevertheless not transcendent. It is often stated that Aristotle has brought forms from heaven to earth. According to him, they are not apart from things but in them. They are not transcendent, but immanent.

On the other hand, matter too is equally real and eternal. It is not non-being, but dynamic and is in the process of change. Matter realizes the form or idea of the thing in the process of evolution. Aristotle explains the problem of change in the world with this dualism of form and matter and their constant coexistence. Here Aristotle significantly deviates from Plato's position, which held that all change is illusion.

According to Plato the material world is a copy and hence no knowledge is possible about it. We can form only opinions about it. Aristotle, on the other hand considers the material world as real and explains it in terms of the above described form-matter coexistence. His conception of change becomes relevant in this context. His theory of change is different from most of his predecessors. Unlike Plato and Parmenides, he never treated change as unreal and an illusion. But he does not agree with Heraclitus and others who find nothing but blind change as real. Aristotle adopts a middle path and affirms that all change is not illusion. Change is not blind, but purposeful and meaningful.

Every entity in nature is actually something and has the potential to become something else. For example, the seed is actually a seed but it has the potential to become a tree. According to Aristotle, in the seed state, the form of seed fashions or shapes in order to make it an actual seed. But as the seed progresses to the tree, it gets shaped and designed by different other forms. Finally the seed actualizes its potentials and becomes a tree.

Aristotle thus considers both change and permanence are real. In change it is the form that changes while the matter remains the same. Change occurs when the arrangement of the matter changes. Even though the form of an object can change, it is form, not matter, that provides the order and permanence in the world. The matter of all things is ultimately the same. Underlying this conception of change is his idea that all change is purposeful, because, according to him all change is evolution. He further explains this theory with a teleological explanation. He contends that the essential form of a thing determines what an object is and it guides the changes and development of that thing. Hence changes are not blind or illusory, but are intelligible. During evolution an organism realizes its purpose. Hence, there is no concept of complete change.

Only some aspects of the form of a thing changes and as long as a thing remains in existence, its essential form remains the same. An apple seed will evolve into an apple tree and not to anything else. The form of the matter changes in those ways that are necessary for it to become an apple tree. Again, while Plato rejected the world as illusion, for Aristotle it is real. The world is not just an imitation or a shadow, but a reality and hence it is possible to have knowledge about it. Consequently, Aristotle believes that studying the processes of the natural world is not worthless. This approach to the physical world and knowledge about it had encouraged the growth of natural sciences. We can see that the systematic study of natural sciences began with Aristotle's systematic approach to the knowledge about the natural world. It was he who initiated the classification of the living universe as species and genera, which even today lies at the foundation of elementary scientific enquiries.

### **Aristotle's Ethical Theory**

As mentioned above, Aristotle adopts a teleological approach and attempts to explain everything, including human reality with the assumption that the nature of reality, including the human world, can be explained teleologically; as the actualization of a purpose. According to him, the purpose of

human life is eudemonia. Before we explain what this constitutes, let us examine his conception of human reality.

Aristotle conceived ethics as a very important science and according to him it deals with actual human behavior. Unlike Plato, he affirmed that the empirical world and life in it are valuable. But unlike the materialists, he adopts a teleological conception of human life and hence conceived that there is a higher purpose to life, which needs to be realized in our present life in this world. Russell comments that, Aristotle's metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense. He is difficult because Plato and common sense do not mix easily.

## Theory of causation

Each Aristotelian science consists in the causal investigation of a specific department of reality. If successful, such an investigation results in causal knowledge; that is, knowledge of the relevant or appropriate causes. The emphasis on the concept of cause explains why Aristotle developed a theory of causality which is commonly known as the doctrine of the four causes. For Aristotle, a firm grasp of what a cause is, and how many kinds of causes there are, is essential for a successful investigation of the world around us.

As will become clear in due course, Aristotle is committed to a form of causal pluralism. For Aristotle, there are four distinct and irreducible kinds of causes. The focus of this entry is on the systematic interrelations among these four kinds of causes.

## The Four Causes

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle places the following crucial condition on proper knowledge: we think we have knowledge of a thing only when we have grasped its cause. That proper knowledge is knowledge of the cause is repeated in the Physics: we think we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause. Since Aristotle obviously conceives of a causal investigation as the search for an answer to the question "why?", and a why- question is a request for an explanation, it can be useful to think of a cause as a certain type of explanation.

Needless to say, not all why-questions are requests for an explanation that identifies a cause, let alone a cause in the particular sense envisioned by Aristotle. Still, Aristotle is clearly committed to the view that giving the relevant cause (or causes) is necessary and sufficient for offering a scientific explanation. His conception of a cause has both a metaphysical and an epistemological component. Part of the challenge for us is to do justice to both components. Following a recent suggestion, we may say that "causes are not ways in which we explain things, except derivatively, in virtue of the fact that they are ways in which some elements of the natural world explain others".

In Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2, Aristotle offers his general account of the four causes. This account is general in the sense that it applies to everything that requires an explanation, including artistic production and human action. Here Aristotle recognizes four kinds of things that can be given in answer to a why- question:

- **The material cause:** "that out of which", e.g., the bronze of a statue.
- **The formal cause:** "the form", "the account of what-it-is-to-be", e.g., the shape of a statue.
- **The efficient cause:** "the primary source of the change or rest", e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue, the man who gives advice, the father of the child.

- **The final cause:** “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, e.g., health is the end of walking, losing weight, purging, drugs, and surgical tools.

All the four (kinds of) causes may enter in the explanation of something. Consider the production of an artifact like a bronze statue. The bronze enters in the explanation of the production of the statue as the material cause. Note that the bronze is not only the material out of which the statue is made; it is also the subject of change, that is, the thing that undergoes the change and results in a statue. The bronze is melted and poured in order to acquire a new shape, the shape of the statue. This shape enters in the explanation of the production of the statue as the formal cause. However, an adequate explanation of the production of a statue requires also a reference to the efficient cause or the principle that produces the statue.

This result is mildly surprising and requires a few words of elaboration. There is no doubt that the art of bronze-casting resides in an individual artisan who is responsible for the production of the statue. According to Aristotle, however, all the artisan does in the production of the statue is the manifestation of specific knowledge. This knowledge, not the artisan who has mastered it, is the salient explanatory factor that one should pick as the most accurate specification of the efficient cause. By picking the art, not the artisan, Aristotle is not just trying to provide an explanation of the production of the statue that is not dependent upon the desires, beliefs and intentions of the individual artisan; he is trying to offer an entirely different type of explanation—namely, an explanation that does not make a reference (implicit or explicit) to these desires, beliefs and intentions. More directly, the art of bronze-casting the statue enters in the explanation as the efficient cause because it helps us to understand what it takes to produce the statue; that is to say, what steps are required to produce the statue. But can an explanation of this type be given without a reference to the final outcome of the production, the statue? The answer is emphatically “no”. A model is made for producing the statue. A mold is prepared for producing the statue. The bronze is melted and poured for producing the statue. Both the prior and the subsequent stage are for the sake of a certain end, the production of the statue. Clearly, the statue enters in the explanation of each step of the artistic production as the final cause or that for the sake of which everything in the production process is done.

In thinking about the four causes, we have come to understand that Aristotle offers a teleological explanation of the production of a bronze statue; that is to say, an explanation that makes a reference to the telos or end of the process. Moreover, a teleological explanation of the type sketched above does not crucially depend upon the application of psychological concepts such as desires, beliefs and intentions. This is important because artistic production provides Aristotle with a teleological model for the study of natural processes, whose explanation does not involve beliefs, desires, intentions or anything of this sort. Some have objected that Aristotle explains natural process on the basis of an inappropriately psychological teleological model; that is to say, a teleological model that involves a purposive agent who is somehow sensitive to the end. This objection can be met if the artistic model is understood in non-psychological terms. In other words, Aristotle does not psychologize nature because his study of the natural world is based on a teleological model that is consciously free from psychological factors.

One final clarification is in order. By insisting on the art of bronze-casting as the most accurate efficient cause of the production of the statue, Aristotle does not mean to preclude an appeal to the beliefs and desires of the individual artisan. On the contrary, there are cases where the individual realization of the art obviously enters in the explanation of the bronze statue. For

example, one may be interested in a particular bronze statue because that statue is the great achievement of an artisan who has not only mastered the art but has also applied it with a distinctive style. In this case it is perfectly appropriate to make reference to the beliefs and desires of the artisan. Aristotle seems to make room for this case when he says that we should look “for general causes of general things and for particular causes of particular things”. Note, however, that the idiosyncrasies that may be important in studying a particular bronze statue as the great achievement of an individual artisan may be extraneous to a more central (and more interesting) case. To understand why let us focus on the study of nature. When the student of nature is concerned with the explanation of a natural phenomenon like the formation of sharp teeth in the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth, the student of nature is concerned with what is typical about that phenomenon. In other words, the student of nature is expected to provide an explanation of why certain animals typically have a certain dental arrangement. We shall return to this example in due course. For the time being, it is important to emphasize this important feature of the explanatory project attempted by Aristotle; a feature that we must keep in mind in trying to understand his theory of causality. This theory has in fact been developed primarily (but not exclusively) for the study of nature.

### **3. The Four Causes and the Science of Nature**

In the *Physics*, Aristotle builds on his general account of the four causes by developing explanatory principles that are specific to the study of nature. Here Aristotle insists that all four causes are involved in the explanation of natural phenomena, and that the job of “the student of nature is to bring the why- question back to them all in the way appropriate to the science of nature”. The best way to understand this methodological recommendation is the following: the science of nature is concerned with natural bodies insofar as they are subject to change, and the job of the student of nature is to provide the explanation of their natural change. The factors that are involved in the explanation of natural change turn out to be matter, form, that which produces the change, and the end of this change. Note that Aristotle does not say that all four explanatory factors are involved in the explanation of each and every instance of natural change. Rather, he says that an adequate explanation of natural change may involve a reference to all of them.

Aristotle goes on by adding a specification on his doctrine of the four causes: the form and the end often coincide, and they are formally the same as that which produces the change. This is one of the several times where Aristotle offers the slogan “it takes a human being to generate a human being”. This slogan is designed to point at the fundamental fact that the generation of a human being can be understood only in the light of the end of the process; that is to say, the fully developed human being. The question thus arises as to what it takes for a human being to be fully developed. Aristotle frames his answer in terms of the human form, maintaining that a human form is fully realized at the end of generation. But this does not explain why it takes a human being to generate a human being. Note, however, that a fully developed human being is not only the end of generation; it is also what initiates the entire process. For Aristotle, the ultimate moving principle responsible for the generation of a human being is a fully developed living creature of the same kind; that is, a human being who is formally the same as the end of generation. (A final clarification is in order here: Aristotle is committed to a hylomorphic explanation of animal generation. His considered view is that the father supplies the form whereas the mother provides the matter.)

Thus, the student of nature is often left with three types of causes: the formal/final cause, the efficient cause, and the material cause. However, the view that there are in nature causes besides

material and efficient causes was controversial in antiquity. According to Aristotle, most of his predecessors recognized only the material and the efficient cause. This explains why Aristotle cannot be content with saying that formal and final causes often coincide, but he also has to defend his thesis against an opponent who denies that final causality is a genuine mode of causality.

#### **4. Final Causes Defended**

Physics II 8 contains Aristotle's most general defense of final causality. Here Aristotle establishes that explaining nature requires final causality by discussing a difficulty that may be advanced by an opponent who denies that there are final causes in nature. Aristotle shows that an opponent who claims that material and efficient causes alone suffice to explain natural change fails to account for their characteristic regularity. Before considering how the defense is attempted, however, it is important to clarify that this defense does not perform the function of a proof. By showing that an approach to the study of nature that ignores final causality cannot account for a crucial aspect of nature, Aristotle does not thereby prove that there are final causes in nature. Strictly speaking, the only way to prove that nature exhibits final causality is to establish it on independent grounds. But this is not what Aristotle does in Physics II 8. Final causality is here introduced as the best explanation for an aspect of nature which otherwise would remain unexplained.

The difficulty that Aristotle discusses is introduced by considering the way in which rain works. It rains because of material processes which can be specified as follows: when the warm air that has been drawn up is cooled off and becomes water, then this water comes down as rain. It may happen that the corn in the field is nourished or the harvest is spoiled as a result of the rain, but it does not rain for the sake of any good or bad result. The good or bad result is just a coincidence. So, why cannot all natural change work in the same way? For example, why cannot it be merely a coincidence that the front teeth grow sharp and suitable for tearing the food and the molars grow broad and useful for grinding the food? When the teeth grow in just this way, then the animal survives. When they do not, then the animal dies. More directly, and more explicitly, the way the teeth grow is not for the sake of the animal, and its survival or its death is just a coincidence.

Aristotle's reply is that the opponent is expected to explain why the teeth regularly grow in the way they do: sharp teeth in the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth. Moreover, since this dental arrangement is suitable for biting and chewing the food that the animal takes in, the opponent is expected to explain the regular connection between the needs of the animal and the formation of its teeth. Either there is a real causal connection between the formation of the teeth and the needs of the animal, or there is no real causal connection and it just so happens that the way the teeth grow is good for the animal. In this second case it is just a coincidence that the teeth grow in a way that it is good for the animal. But this does not explain the regularity of the connection. Where there is regularity there is also a call for an explanation, and coincidence is no explanation at all. In other words, to say that the teeth grow as they do by material necessity and this is good for the animal by coincidence is to leave unexplained the regular connection between the growth of the teeth and the needs of the animal. Aristotle offers final causality as his explanation for this regular connection: the teeth grow in the way they do for biting and chewing food and this is good for the animal.

One thing to be appreciated about Aristotle's reply is that the final cause enters in the explanation of the formation of the parts of an organism like an animal as something that is good either for the existence or the flourishing of the animal. In the first case, something is good for the animal

because the animal cannot survive without it; in the second case, something is good for the animal because the animal is better off with it. This helps us to understand why in introducing the concept of end (telos) that is relevant to the study of natural processes Aristotle insists on its goodness: "not everything that is last claims to be an end (telos), but only that which is best".

Once his defense of the use of final causes is firmly in place, Aristotle can make a step further by focusing on the role that matter plays in his explanatory project. Let us return to the example chosen by Aristotle, the regular growth of sharp teeth in the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth. What explanatory role is left for the material processes involved in the natural process? Aristotle does not seem to be able to specify what material processes are involved in the growth of the teeth, but he is willing to recognize that certain material processes have to take place for the teeth to grow in the particular way they do. In other words, there is more to the formation of the teeth than these material processes, but this formation does not occur unless the relevant material processes take place. For Aristotle, these material processes are that which is necessary to the realization of a specific goal; that which is necessary on the hypothesis that the end is to be obtained.

Hypothetical necessity is often equated to conditional necessity. But this equation can be a first approximation at best. Stating the conditions under which something is the case is not yet giving a successful explanation. In other words, conditional necessity is a wider, and indeed weaker, notion than hypothetical necessity.

Physics II 9 is entirely devoted to the introduction of the concept of hypothetical necessity and its relevance for the explanatory ambition of Aristotle's science of nature. In this chapter, matter is reconfigured as hypothetical necessity. By so doing Aristotle acknowledges the explanatory relevance of the material processes, while at the same time he emphasizes their dependency upon a specific end.

## **5. The Explanatory Priority of Final Causes**

In the *Physics*, Aristotle builds on his general account of the four causes in order to provide the student of nature with the explanatory resources indispensable for a successful investigation of the natural world. However, the *Physics* does not provide all the explanatory resources for all natural investigations. Aristotle returns to the topic of causality in the first book of the *Parts of Animals*. This is a relatively independent and self-contained treatise entirely devoted to developing the explanatory resources required for a successful study of animals and animal life. Here Aristotle completes his theory of causality by arguing for the explanatory priority of the final cause over the efficient cause.

Significantly enough, there is no attempt to argue for the existence of four fundamental modes of causality in the first book of the *Parts of Animals*. Evidently, Aristotle expects his reader to be already familiar with his general account of the four causes as well as his defense of final causality. The problem that here concerns Aristotle is presented in the following way: since both the final and the efficient cause are involved in the explanation of natural generation, we have to establish what is first and what is second. Aristotle argues that there is no other way to explain natural generation than by reference to what lies at the end of the process. This has explanatory priority over the principle that is responsible for initiating the process of generation. Aristotle relies on the analogy between artistic production and natural generation, and the teleological model that he has developed for the explanation of artistic production. Consider, for example, house-building.

There is no other way to explain how a house is built, or is being built, than by reference to the final result of the process, the house. More directly, the bricks and the beams are put together in the particular way they are for the sake of achieving a certain end: the production of the house. This is true also in the case of natural generation. In this context Aristotle's slogan is "generation is for the sake of substance, not substance for the sake of generation". This means that the proper way to explain the generation of an organism like an animal, or the formation of its parts, is by reference to the product that lies at the end of the process; that is to say, a substance of a certain type.

From Aristotle we learn that Empedocles explained the articulation of the human spine into vertebrae as the result of the twisting and turning that takes place when the fetus is in the womb of the mother. Aristotle finds this explanation unacceptable. To begin with, the fetus must have the power to twist and turn in the way it does, and Empedocles does not have an explanation for this fact. Secondly, and more importantly, Empedocles overlooks the fact that it takes a human being to generate a human being. That is to say, the originating principle of the generation is a fully developed human being which is formally the same as the final outcome of the process of generation. It is only by looking at the fully developed human being that we can understand why our spine is articulated into vertebrae and why the vertebrae are arranged in the particular way they are. This amounts to finding the role that the spine has in the life of a fully developed human being. Moreover, it is only by looking at the fully developed human being that we can explain why the formation of the vertebrae takes place in the particular way it does.

Perhaps we are now in the position to understand how Aristotle argues that there are four kinds of causes and at the same time says that proper knowledge is knowledge of the cause or knowledge of the why. Admittedly, at least at first sight, this is a bit confusing. Confusion dissolves when we realize that Aristotle recognizes the explanatory primacy of the final/formal cause over the efficient and material cause. Of course this does not mean that the other causes can be eliminated. Quite the contrary: Aristotle is adamant that, for a full range of cases, all four causes must be given in order to give an explanation. More explicitly, for a full range of cases, an explanation which fails to invoke all four causes is no explanation at all. At the same time, however, the final/formal cause is the primary cause and knowledge of this cause amounts to knowledge of the why.

## **6. The Explanation of a Lunar Eclipse**

We have already seen that Aristotle is not committed to the view that everything has all four kinds of causes. Rather, his view is that a scientific explanation requires up to four kinds of causes. We may illustrate this point with the help of an example. Consider, in particular, the case of a lunar eclipse. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that an eclipse of the moon does not have a final cause. He also says that, strictly speaking, a lunar eclipse does not have matter. Rather, it has a cause that plays a role analogous to matter. This second claim can be inferred from what Aristotle says about the things that exist by nature but are not substances. With respect to these things, Aristotle says that they do not have matter but rather something that underlies. In the case of a lunar eclipse, that which underlies is the subject affected by the eclipse, that is, the moon. The moon is not strictly speaking the matter of the eclipse but rather the subject that undergoes an eclipse when the earth comes in the middle between the moon and the sun. Should we give the earth as the efficient cause of a lunar eclipse? We have to be careful here. By saying that the moon is a deprivation of light caused by the earth, we distinguish this particular deprivation of light from other kinds of deprivation of light. Still, by citing the earth as the efficient cause of a lunar eclipse, we are not yet giving the most precise description of the efficient cause. More directly, we are not

yet saying what the earth is doing to cause a lunar eclipse. A lunar eclipse is a deprivation of light caused by the interposition of the earth between the sun and the moon. By coming in the middle of the moon and the sun the earth blocks the light and causes the moon to suffer an eclipse. Hence, it is the interposition of the earth between the sun and the moon is the proximate efficient cause of a lunar eclipse. Citing the proximate efficient cause is also giving the most accurate description, and indeed the full explanation, of a lunar eclipse.

This brief discussion of the explanation of eclipse of the moon brings us back to a point that was already made in connection with Aristotle's explanation of the production of an artifact such as a bronze statue. There too we are required to look for the most accurate description of the efficient cause, which is to be identified with the art of bronze-casting a statue rather than the artisan. It is possible to build on both examples to conclude that Aristotle is concerned not only with finding the relevant kinds of causes but also with giving the most accurate description of those causes. By his lights, it is only the most accurate description of all the relevant causes that gives us the full explanation, and thereby scientific knowledge, of something.

### **Aristotle: the body and soul**

According to Aristotle a living creature is 'substance'. Body=matter Soul = form The soul (psyche) is the structure of the body - its function and organization. This was the word Greeks gave to the animator, the living force in a living being. For Aristotle the psyche controlled reproduction, movement and perception.

In contrast Aristotle regarded reason (nous) as the highest form of rationality. He believed that the 'unmoved mover' of the universe was a cosmic nous. Aristotle thought that the soul is the Form of the body. The soul is simply the sum total of the operations of a human being. Aristotle believed that there exists a hierarchy of living things – plants only have a vegetative soul, animals are above plants because they have appetites, humans are above animals because it has the power of reason.

Aristotle tries to explain his understanding of the distinction between the body and the soul using the analogy of an axe. If an axe were a living thing then its body would be made of wood and metal. However, its soul would be the thing which made it an axe i.e. its capacity to chop. If it lost its ability to chop it would cease to be an axe – it would simply be wood and metal.

Another illustration he uses is the eye. If the eye were an animal, sight would have to be its soul. When the eye no longer sees then it is an eye in name only.

Likewise, a dead animal is only an animal in name only – it has the same body but it has lost its soul.

What is important for Aristotle is the end purpose of something – an axe chops, an eye sees, an animal is animated...etc. This is what is meant by 'teleology' from the Greek teleo meaning end. For Aristotle, the body and soul are not two separate elements but are one thing. The body and the soul are not, as Plato would have it, two distinct entities, but are different parts or aspects of the same thing.

Aristotle does not allow for the possibility of the immortality of the soul. The soul is simply the

Form of the body, and is not capable of existing without the body. The soul is that which makes a person a person rather than just a lump of meat! Without the body the soul cannot exist. The soul dies along with the body.

Aristotle appears to make one exception – reason (nous). However, he is not clear about how this reason survives death or whether or not it is personal.

### **Criticisms of Aristotle**

Aristotle dismisses Plato's Realms saying there is no clear evidence for them. Instead he appeals to our senses, claiming that it through them that we experience reality. However, we are still left with the problem that there is no clear evidence that our senses are reliable. A religious person might argue that we know the world through faith and revelation.

There is no clear evidence that everything does have a final cause. Some philosophers deny that there is any purpose to the universe. Such philosophers claim that the universe has no intrinsic purpose other than existing.

The concept of the an Unmoved Mover - or Prime Mover depends upon the argument that everything must have a cause. The argument then contradicts itself by claiming that God does exactly what it claims is impossible.

Aristotle does not adequately explain how God as a thinking force could be responsible for causing movement. On the one hand he stresses that real knowledge beings with the senses but the concept of something being moved just through thought is not what most of us experience.

### **Aristotle's Influence on Christian Thought**

Aristotle's philosophy found new found interest in the writings of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Just like Plato, theologians tend to pick and choose the bits that they like. Christian theologians have adopted:

- God is eternal, beyond space and time, immutable
- The universe has a purpose
- God is the Final Cause – the Unmoved Mover – the Christian cosmological argument for the existence of God
- Aristotle's teleology supports Aquinas' Natural Law

### **Aristotle's Concept of Matter and Form**

Aristotle was interested in the material world which he saw about him. He was interested in the nature of things and their substance. However, Aristotle was still interested in questions such as 'what is it about a table that gives it its tableness?' However, unlike his teacher Plato, Aristotle believed that the form of an object was not some kind of abstract ideal. He believed that the form of an object was contained within the object itself. To put it another way, its form was within the structure itself. This meant that the form of an object could be perceived using ones senses.

Aristotle uses the word substance in many ways which often makes it difficult to grasp his concept. Let us look at the example of a table. The substance of a table is the wood and the nails and the glue. However, the form of the table is that it has four legs...etc.

To confuse things further, Aristotle also used the word matter to mean the stuff of which something was made. A chair's matter is wood! Its form is the structure of the chair itself – i.e. that particular chair NOT some abstract universal.

This allowed Aristotle to also wonder whether it was possible that something could have matter but no form. He concluded that there could be prime matter or stuff that has no particular form and not arranged in any particular structure. Likewise, Aristotle wondered whether something could have form and structure without having matter. He proposed that something that has form and structure without matter is God.

## **Aristotle's Four Causes**

Aristotle wanted to ask 'what causes something to be what it is, to have the characteristics that it has, or to change in the way that it does?' This sort of questioning is often found in small children. Sometimes they go through a phase of asking 'why?' about anything and everything. Perhaps small children are the best philosophers!

For each answer they are given, they want to know the reason for this answer, and the cause of something can be traced back, showing not just one reason but a whole chain, going from the immediate to a final 'because it just is', or 'because I say so' or 'because it's just made that way'. Someone once commented that this is the reason we send children to school – to make them stop asking annoying questions. By the time children enter into the sixth form they think they know it all and have definitely stopped asking questions.

Aristotle thought about this; he concluded that the explanation of things could be seen in the four different ways, at four different levels: the four causes. 'Causes' is the best translation we have of the word he used – 'aition' (Gk - aition - meaning cause or fault) , which is a responsible, explanatory factor.

### **Aristotle's four causes can be summarised:**

1. Material cause – what is something made of?
2. Efficient cause – what brings something about?
3. Formal cause – what characteristics does an object have?
4. Final cause – what is the reason for something's existence?

For Aristotle the essence of an object was not just its material component parts, or its particular shape or characteristics; it also had a purpose, a function to perform.

When Aristotle looked at the world about him he not only asked questions such as what is such and such made of, or how can it be classified but also what is its purpose.

The fourth, final cause is the most important, and which in Aristotle's view gives the best explanation of an object. The final end, or purpose, or 'teleology' of a thing, when realised, gives that thing its full perfection and reality.

When something is doing what it was meant to do, or has developed into whatever it was

supposed to develop into, it has achieved goodness. The purpose of an object, for Aristotle, is part of the object itself, and not something which we might choose to impose on it – it is intrinsic.

All the different elements of nature have a purpose, according to Aristotle, and nothing is superfluous. We might not know what a slug is for but nevertheless it still has its own intrinsic purpose. But that is not all; the universe as a whole has a purpose too.

## **St. Augustine: Problem of Evil.**

### **The Theodicy of Augustine of Hippo**

Augustine of Hippo (354-430) based his theodicy on his reading of key Biblical passages: Genesis 3 and Romans 5. Genesis 3 is the story of Adam and Eve and their 'Fall' in the Garden of Eden. In it the snake convinces the woman to eat the forbidden fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The woman picks the fruit, and passes some to Adam. Because of their disobedience God has them evicted from the garden. In Romans 5 Paul describes the Christian belief that Jesus' sacrifice on the cross cancels out the disobedience of Adam and Eve. In his self-sacrifice Jesus has made available the gift of righteousness.

### **Augustine's theodicy can be summarised:**

- God is perfect. The world he created reflects that perfection.
- Humans were created with free will.
- Sin and death entered the world through Adam and Eve, and their disobedience.
- Adam and Eve's disobedience brought about 'disharmony' in both humanity and Creation.
- The whole of humanity experiences this disharmony because we were all 'seminally' present in the loins of Adam.
- Natural evil is consequence of this disharmony of nature brought about by the Fall.
- God is justified in not intervening because the suffering is a consequence of human action.

Central to Augustine's theory is that of 'privation' – evil is not a substance it is a deprivation i.e. an absence of something. Augustine uses the analogy of blindness – blindness is not an entity but the absence of sight. For Augustine, evil came about as a direct result of the misuse of free will. All suffering is therefore a consequence of this abuse of free will. This includes natural evil as well as moral evil. Natural evil has come about through an imbalance in nature brought about by the Fall.

God's love for the world is demonstrated through the reconciliation made possible through Jesus Christ.

For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him.

A modern advocate of Augustine's view can be found in Alvin Plantinga (God, Freedom and Evil, 1974) who claimed that for God to have created a being who could only have performed good actions would have been logically impossible. This view was later criticised by Anthony Flew and J.L. Mackie, who both argue that God could have chosen to create "good robots" who still

possessed free-will.

### **Criticism of Augustine's Theodicy**

Augustine held that there was a state of ignorant bliss in the Garden of Eden which was unbalanced by the Fall. This is at odds with Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. If God can be held responsible for the system by which the natural world works, he should be held responsible for the suffering that his system causes. Augustine's theodicy puts all the blame on the first humans yet all suffer. Why should people suffer for the misdemeanours of past generations. Augustine makes much of the idea of hell – as part of Creation. Therefore God must be directly responsible for its creation, and therefore must have foreseen the need for punishment.

### **The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God Anselm of Canterbury**

The ontological argument for the existence of God, as it is found in its classical form, was first formulated by the eleventh century Benedictine monk, Archbishop and theologian, St Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). Anselm had prayed for a single, short argument by which to prove almost everything about God. The result was a simple deductive argument.

### **Deductive Arguments**

A deductive argument is one where the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises – if the premises are true then the conclusion must follow. For example we could put forward the premise that:

1. A bachelor is an unmarried man
2. George is an unmarried man
3. Therefore, it can be deduced that George is a bachelor

Providing premises (1) and (2) are correct then the conclusion (3) must necessarily follow. The validity of a deductive argument depends upon its internal logic – i.e. the very definition of words determines whether or not the argument can hold to be true.

### **Inductive Arguments**

The opposite of a deductive argument is an inductive argument. Inductive arguments are based on observation.

1. Jo, Charmaine, Kate, Lauren and Sarah wear skirts
2. Jo, Charmaine, Kate, Lauren and Sarah are women
3. Therefore, all women wear skirts

The validity of inductive arguments can vary from 0% to 100% as they are based on empirical observation and not internal logic. Premise (1) and (2) may well be true but the conclusion (3) may well be a massive assumption.

### **A priori vs. a posteriori**

A deductive argument can be said to be 'a priori' as it does not depend upon external validation. The validity of a deductive argument can be ascertained before empirical validation. Because of their internal logic deductive arguments appeal to many philosophers c.f. Immanuel Kant's 'Categorical Imperative'.

## **Ontological**

The term 'ontological' is derived from the Greek 'onto' meaning 'being' and 'logos' meaning 'the study of'. In philosophy ontology is a branch of metaphysics. The ontological argument is so called because it deals with the very being of God.

## **Anselm's Argument**

Anselm's first form of his argument follows:

1. God is the greatest possible being (nothing greater can be conceived)
2. If God exists in the mind alone (only as an idea), then a greater being could be imagined to exist both in the mind and in reality
3. This being would then be greater than God
4. Thus God cannot exist only as an idea in the mind
5. Therefore, God exists both in the mind (as an idea) and in reality.

The first premise (1) that God is the greatest possible being stems from the classical attributes of God i.e. omnipotence, omnipresent, omniscience...etc. It naturally follows that there cannot be two rival omnipotent beings...etc. For Anselm (and most theistic thinkers) this understanding of God goes without saying. It is axiomatic to say that God is omnipotent...etc. Any other definition of God would not be God.

The second and third premises (2 and 3) argue that something that exists in reality is better than something that exists only in one's imagination. For example, which is better imagining that you have £1 million, or actually having £1 million in your bank account?

The conclusion (4) follows from the first three premises (1,2 and 3). Anselm's final conclusion (5) is that if all the previous premises are true (1,2,3 and 4) then God must exist.

## **Gaunilo of Marmoutiers' objection to Anselm's Argument**

One problem with Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God is that it invites parody. Parallel arguments purporting to prove the existence of any perfect thing at all can be constructed. This objection was first raised by one of Anselm's contemporaries, the monk Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, who constructed an ontological argument for the existence of the perfect island in his *On Behalf of the Fool*.

1. Gaunilo invited his readers to think of the greatest, or most perfect, conceivable island.
2. As a matter of fact, it is likely that no such island actually exists.
3. However, his argument would then say that we aren't thinking of the greatest conceivable island, because the greatest conceivable island would exist, as well as having all those other desirable properties.
4. Since we can conceive of this greatest or most perfect conceivable island, then it must exist.

Gaunilo argued that this line of argument was no less absurd than Anselm's original argument. Similar arguments for the existence of the perfect baseball pitcher, or the perfect husband or dragons or even unicorns—for the existence of any perfect thing at all—can be constructed. If any of these arguments is sound, it seems, then they must all be sound.

Clearly, though, these arguments are not all sound; the perfect baseball pitcher does not exist, and neither does the perfect husband. There is something wrong with the logic of these arguments. Each of these ontological arguments, though, uses the same logic. They must therefore all be unsound.

The fact that there is no perfect island, and no perfect baseball pitcher, then, shows that the logic of the ontological argument for God's existence is flawed.

Such objections are known as "Overload Objections"; they don't claim to show where or how the ontological argument goes wrong, they simply argue that if it is sound, then so are many other arguments of the same logical form which we don't want to accept, arguments which would overload the world with an indefinitely large number of things like perfect islands, perfect pizzas, perfect pencils, etc.

Such objections always depend upon the accuracy of the analogy. That is, we must be able to show that the objector's argument is sufficiently like the ontological argument for us to be able to conclude that if one works so must the other.

### **Criticisms of Gaunilo's Objection – Anselm's Reply**

The main problem with Gaunilo's objection is the definition of 'perfect'. There will be disagreements as to what makes an island perfect i.e. tropical, deserted, inhabited...etc. When we analyse it any definition here of 'perfect' in the case of an island would be subjective. Your idea of a perfect island might not be my idea of a perfect island.

Another problem is the use of the term 'perfect' in the case of islands. By definition any piece of land surrounded by water is an island. Any piece of land perfectly (i.e. – completely) surrounded by water is a 'perfect island'. In this case all islands are perfect islands.

Anselm would argue that this line of argument does not work for everyday objects. Anselm is concerned with a being and a necessary being at that – the greatest being one can conceive. Anselm argued that he was not talking about temporal contingent things such as islands which are rooted in time and space. Such things are dependent upon other things for their existence. Anselm is talking about the greatest thing that can be thought. God is not contingent or temporal. God's existence is necessary i.e. not dependent upon other things for his existence.

### **Definitions**

Necessary – inevitably resulting from or produced by the nature of things...etc., so that the contrary is impossible.

Contingent – that which need not be, that which could have been different; something that has dependency.

### **Anselm's second ontological argument**

Anselm's first argument left himself open to criticism from Gaunilo and his perfect island. Anselm only real reply to Gaunilo was to point him to chapter 3 of his Proslogion.

Gaulino's main objection to Anselm was that he thought no mere mortal could conceive (or understand) God's nature.

Anselm would have agreed with Gaulino – it is impossible to understand God in the same way one might understand geometry. However, this does not rule out the possibility to understand the concept that God is 'that which nothing greater can be conceived'.

At the heart of Anselm's argument is the philosophical understanding of 'necessary existence':

- necessary – cannot not be
- contingent – can cease to exist

### **Anselm's second argument follows:**

1. Either God exists or He does not exist
2. If God exists, God's existence must be necessary
3. If God does not exist, then his existence is logically impossible
4. God is not a logically impossible thing
5. Therefore, God's existence is necessary
6. Therefore, God exists

Either God exists or He does not exist Anselm is on solid ground here with a black and white statement If God exists, God's existence must be necessary It would be inconceivable to think of God in terms of Him being contingent – i.e. dependent upon something else. If we are going to think of God in terms of Him being omnipotent...etc. then by definition God must be necessary.

If God does not exist, then his existence is logically impossible There are two kinds of things which cannot exist:

- contingent things e.g. Superman, unicorns or Queen Victoria
- logically impossible things e.g. square circles, male sisters

God cannot be contingent. If we are going to reject the notion of God then it must be because he is illogical.

God is not a logically impossible thing There is no logical contradiction in the notion of God. It is logically possible for him to exist.

Therefore, God's existence is necessary and therefore, God exists As God is not logically impossible and also is not a contingent non-existence thing, then there is only one possible state left: that of a necessary being. It, therefore, follows that God's existence is necessary and God does exist.

## Anselm is arguing God's existence as a process of eliminations:

- God cannot be an existing contingent being (e.g. like you and me!)
- God cannot be a non-existent contingent being (e.g. a unicorn)
- God cannot be a logically impossible being (e.g. an omnipotent God who is impotent)
- God cannot be a necessary non-existent being (it is logically impossible)
- God must be a necessary existent being.

Anselm's second argument unlike his first is not dependent upon existence as being a perfection of a matter of greatness. Rather than saying that God must exist because existence is a perfection, Anselm is arguing that God must exist because God is a necessary being.

	<b>Non-existent</b>	<b>Existent</b>
<b>Contingent</b>	God cannot be a non-existent contingent being e.g. unicorns, dragons...etc.	God cannot be an existent contingent being e.g. like me and you!
<b>Necessary</b>	It would be logically impossible for God to be a non-existent necessary being i.e. how can something which cannot not be not exist!	Only available option! God must be a necessary existent being.

## Descartes' Support for the Ontological Argument

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is generally regarded the founder of modern western philosophy. Descartes was instrumental in bringing about the Age of the Enlightenment in Western Europe. His writings challenged conventional beliefs which were still based upon Church teachings.

Descartes imagines the entire universe to be the work of a malevolent demon who creates the illusion that things exist. This is known as Cartesian Doubt. Descartes asked the question, 'How can I be sure that what I am experiencing through my senses is true?' After speculating that he is being deceived by a demon he concludes that the only thing he can be sure of is the fact that he is thinking. This gives rise to probably the most famous quote in western philosophy, "I think, therefore I am." >p> Having established that at least he exists, Descartes begins to look at things in the universe which can be established independently of empirical investigation i.e. a priori things e.g. mathematics. Anselm's deductive ontological argument became a powerful tool in Descartes hands.

Like Anselm, Descartes thought of God in terms of a perfect being. Following Anselm's first argument, Descartes was in agreement that existence was more perfect than non-existence. For Descartes, God's existence was part of His essence. For Descartes, there are some qualities that an object necessarily has or else it would not be that object. To illustrate this Descartes argued that the essence of a triangle is a 'three sided plane figure'. To say that God does not exist is rather like saying 'a triangle does not have three sides' or that the internal angles don't add up to 180°. In the same way, existence cannot be separated from the concept of God.

Descartes took on board Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm's first argument. Like Anselm before him, Descartes points to the distinction between a necessary being and a contingent being. The argument applies only to an absolutely perfect and necessary being. The argument cannot be applied to islands, dragons, unicorns or even pizzas! For Descartes, God alone is the being whose essence entails His existence. There cannot be more than one such being.

God then becomes the guarantor of the certainty that the external world exists. There is no longer the fear that there might be a malevolent demon out to deceive you. God is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, He would not permit such a thing. God becomes the basis of Descartes' epistemology.

### **Criticism of Descartes' Ontological Argument**

A priest called Caterus responded to Descartes' argument. Caterus argued that the statement 'If God exists then he is highest being' was a tautology (the truth of the statement is self evident). But Caterus emphasised the word 'if'. It was not illogical to say, 'God does not exist therefore there is no highest being'. To use Descartes' analogy of a triangle it is possible to say, 'If a triangle exists it has three sides'. However, all this really tells us is something about triangles. It is equally coherent to say, 'triangles do not exist therefore three sided things do not exist.' Likewise, we might say, 'unicorns have one horn' but this does not prove there are any unicorns.

### **Kant's Objection to the Ontological Argument Kant's Background to the Ontological Argument**

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) does not seem to show familiarity with Anselm's version of the ontological argument, and it appears that he is responding to its less impressive forms found in the writings of René Descartes (1596-1650) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Nonetheless, his objection has historical significance and is often cited by contemporary philosophers as good reason to reject the ontological argument.

Kant thought the ontological argument was flawed. Any argument for the existence of God based on the proposition that a God that exists in reality is greater than a God that only in the imagination is based on a confusion.

### **Predicates**

According to Kant the confusion lies in the fact that existence is not a predicate. The predicate is that part of a sentence which is not the subject but which gives information about the subject. A predicate might be a single word like 'John laughed' where John is the subject and 'laughed' is the predicate. Or a string of words as in the sentence Clare went to school, 'Clare' is the subject and 'went to school' is the predicate. A predicate is a property that a thing can either possess or lack.

### **Predicates and the Existence of God**

When people assert that God exists they are not saying that there is a God and he possesses the property of existence. If that were the case, then when people assert that God does not exist they would be saying that there is a God and he lacks the property of existence, i.e. they would be both affirming and denying God's existence at the same time. Kant suggests that to say that something exists is to say that the concept of that thing is exemplified in the world. For Kant, existence is not a matter of a thing possessing a property i.e. existence. Existence is a concept corresponding to

something in the world.

Kant's objection to the ontological argument is that existence is not a property that can be attributed to beings like we can attribute other properties such as being blue, hard, or round. When we talk about entities existing, Kant contends that we do not mean to add existence as a property to their beings. In other words, the objection seems to be that one cannot go around adding existence as a property to God (or anything else for that matter) in order to define God (or anything else) into existence. Unfortunately, defining my bank account as such a place that contains millions of pounds would not mean that a careful understanding of that definition of 'my bank account' would really make it so. In order to see if that definition were true, we would have to go to an ATM and check the balance of my account and see if it is accurate. Similarly, a definition of God must be checked with reality to see if it is correct.

### **Kant's Objection to Descartes' Ontological Argument**

Descartes had argued that God had existence in the same way as a triangle has three sides. Kant would agree, if you had a triangle then you did indeed have an object with three sides. But if you do not have the triangle, you have neither its three angles or its three sides. If you accept that there is a God, it is logical to accept also that His existence is necessary. But you don't have to accept that there is a God.

### **Contemporary Views of the Ontological Argument**

Kant's objection has been very influential in the ontological argument debate. Philosophers are still divided as to whether or not existence is a predicate. Some thinkers controversially believe that existence can be thought of as a unique property. A modern advocate of the ontological argument is Alvin Plantinga (b.1932) Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame University, USA. He has forcefully argued that Kant's objection does not conflict with anything in Anselm's argument. For Anselm does not contingently add existence as a property to God and define him into existence. Naturally these objections are contentious, which adds to the intrigue of the ontological argument.

### **Aquinas' Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God**

St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) was a Dominican priest, theologian, and philosopher. Called the Doctor Angelicus (the Angelic Doctor,) Aquinas is considered one of the greatest Christian philosophers to have ever lived. Two of his most famous works, the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentiles, are the finest examples of his work on Christian philosophy.

In his Summa Theologiae Aquinas put forward five proofs (or five ways) for the existence of God:  
First Way – Argument from Motion  
Second Way – Causation of Existence  
Third Way – Contingent and Necessary Objects  
Fourth Way – The Argument from Degrees and Perfection  
Fifth Way – The Argument from Intelligent Design

#### **First Way - The Argument From Motion**

St. Thomas Aquinas, studying the works of the Greek philosopher Aristotle, concluded from common observation that an object that is in motion (e.g. the planets, a rolling stone) is put in motion by some other object or force. From this, Aquinas believes that ultimately there must have been an UNMOVED MOVER (GOD) who first put things in motion. Follow the argument this way:

1. Nothing can move itself.

2. If every object in motion had a mover, then the first object in motion needed a mover.
3. Movement cannot go on for infinity.
4. This first mover is the Unmoved Mover, called God.

Aquinas is starting from an a posteriori position. For Aquinas motion includes any kind of change e.g. growth. Aquinas argues that the natural condition is for things to be at rest. Something which is moving is therefore unnatural and must have been put into that state by some external supernatural power.

### **Second Way - Causation of Existence**

This Way deals with the issue of existence. Aquinas concluded that common sense observation tells us that no object creates itself. In other words, some previous object had to create it. Aquinas believed that ultimately there must have been an UNCAUSED FIRST CAUSE (GOD) who began the chain of existence for all things. Follow the argument this way:

1. There exist things that are caused (created) by other things.
2. Nothing can be the cause of itself (nothing can create itself.)
3. There cannot be an endless string of objects causing other objects to exist.
4. Therefore, there must be an uncaused first cause called God.

### **Third Way - Contingent and Necessary Objects**

This Way is sometimes referred to as the modal cosmological argument. Modal is a reference to contingency and necessary. This Way defines two types of objects in the universe: contingent beings and necessary beings. A contingent being is an object that cannot exist without a necessary being causing its existence. Aquinas believed that the existence of contingent beings would ultimately necessitate a being which must exist for all of the contingent beings to exist. This being, called a necessary being, is what we call God. Follow the argument this way:

1. Contingent beings are caused.
2. Not every being can be contingent.
3. There must exist a being which is necessary to cause contingent beings.
4. This necessary being is God.

### **Fourth Way - The Argument From Degrees And Perfection**

St. Thomas formulated this Way from a very interesting observation about the qualities of things. For example one may say that of two marble sculptures one is more beautiful than the other. So for these two objects, one has a greater degree of beauty than the other. This is referred to as degrees or gradation of a quality. From this fact Aquinas concluded that for any given quality (e.g. goodness, beauty, knowledge) there must be a perfect standard by which all such qualities are measured. These perfections are contained in God.

### **Fifth Way - The Argument From Intelligent Design**

The final Way that St. Thomas Aquinas speaks of has to do with the observable universe and the order of nature. Aquinas states that common sense tells us that the universe works in such a way, that one can conclude that it was designed by an intelligent designer, God. In other words, all physical laws and the order of nature and life were designed and ordered by God, the intelligent designer.

## **Faith and Reason**

Aquinas sees reason and faith as two ways of knowing. "Reason" covers what we can know by experience and logic alone. From reason, we can know that there is a God and that there is only one God; these truths about God are accessible to anyone by experience and logic alone, apart from any special revelation from God.

"Faith" covers what we can know by God's special revelation to us (which comes through the Bible and Christian Tradition). By faith, we can know that God came into the world through Jesus Christ and that God is triune (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). These truths about God cannot be known by reason alone.

Faith builds on reason. Since faith and reason are both ways of arriving at truth -- and since all truths are harmonious with each other -- faith is consistent with reason. If we understand faith and reason correctly, there will be no conflict between what faith tells us and what reason tells us.

## **St. Thomas Aquinas: Essence and Existence**

Metaphysics is the study of the basic structure of reality. It is, in Aristotle's words, the study of being as being, rather than the study of any particular being per se. Metaphysics is the framework by which we understand reality. We can't avoid metaphysics -- every act of understanding entails a metaphysical framework, a perspective. One might say that our metaphysical perspective is that by which we understand, contrasted to nature itself, which is that which we understand.

Our own metaphysical framework is often opaque to us. We use it, like we might use an intuitive political bias, without really examining the framework we are using. We each have a metaphysical bias -- it's unavoidable, and the important question is: does our bias lead us toward or away from the truth? Gaining metaphysical insight is not easy, but it pays big dividends. It helps us to know the truth -- indeed, it is that by which we know the truth.

## **A Rigorous and Consistent System**

St. Thomas Aquinas developed a rigorous and consistent system of metaphysics. He was the first Christian philosopher to insist that faith and reason, properly understood, are never in conflict. Belief in God is not contrary to knowledge of the natural world. St. Thomas' doctrine was controversial in his day, but it was accepted by the Church in the centuries after his death, and it became the intellectual foundation of the modern world, including the cornerstone of modern science.

Ironically, the correspondence of faith and reason is controversial today, especially in the atheist community. The denial of the compatibility between faith and reason is a lynchpin of atheist arguments for naturalism: atheists insist that science tells us the real truth about the world, and faith in God is superstition. The Thomistic reply is that genuine faith and reason both point to the same truth. The Thomistic understanding of reason and its correspondence with faith offer a powerful reply to atheistic naturalism. For readers who are interested in metaphysics and in these modernist controversies (which readers of Evolution News are likely to be), it's worthwhile taking a closer look at the principle that is the cornerstone of Thomistic metaphysics.

## Essence and Existence

The cornerstone of Thomistic metaphysics is the doctrine of essence and existence. It is this: essence is absolutely distinct from existence. This doctrine, which St. Thomas was the first philosopher to assert unequivocally and demonstrate with rigor, has profound implications for our understanding of reality, of nature, of science and of God. What does St. Thomas mean in saying “essence is absolutely distinct from existence”?

First, definitions. **Essence** is that which makes something the sort of thing it is. It is, succinctly, all the characteristics that are knowable about something. The essence of a cat is everything about the cat that makes it a cat. Its cat-shape, its furriness, its meow, its animality, etc. Some things about the cat – the fact, for instance, that at (unfortunate) times it can be a projectile launcher or a meal – are not parts of the essence of a cat. They are extraneous to it, although in rare circumstances, they may be true of it. You can see here where that modern notion of “essence” comes from. Essence is what’s important about something, what tells us what something really is.

## And Now for Existence

**Existence** is that a thing is, rather than what a thing is. The existence of a thing is different from the essence of a thing. I can know the essence of a rock, but it is the rock’s existence by which I stub my toe. I can’t stub my toe on essence, no matter how hard it is.

Prior to St. Thomas, many philosophers considered existence to be a property of something, part of its essence. We might say that my cat Fluffy’s essence is that she is shaped like a cat, purrs and meows, likes to play with yarn, and exists.

## Descartes

The first great philosopher of the modern era was René Descartes, whose new approach won him recognition as the progenitor of modern philosophy. Descartes’s pursuit of mathematical and scientific truth soon led to a profound rejection of the scholastic tradition in which he had been educated. Much of his work was concerned with the provision of a secure foundation for the advancement of human knowledge through the natural sciences. Fearing the condemnation of the church, however, Descartes was rightly cautious about publicly expressing the full measure of his radical views. The philosophical writings for which he is remembered are therefore extremely circumspect in their treatment of controversial issues.

After years of work in private, Descartes finally published a preliminary statement of his views in the *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason* (1637). Since mathematics has genuinely achieved the certainty for which human thinkers yearn, he argued, we rightly turn to mathematical reasoning as a model for progress in human knowledge more generally. Expressing perfect confidence in the capacity of human reason to achieve knowledge, Descartes proposed an intellectual process no less unsettling than the architectural destruction and rebuilding of an entire town. In order to be absolutely sure that we accept only what is genuinely certain, we must first deliberately renounce all of the firmly held but questionable beliefs we have previously acquired by experience and education.

The progress and certainty of mathematical knowledge, Descartes supposed, provide an emulable model for a similarly productive philosophical method, characterized by four simple rules:

1. Accept as true only what is indubitable.
2. Divide every question into manageable parts.
3. Begin with the simplest issues and ascend to the more complex.
4. Review frequently enough to retain the whole argument at once.

This quasi-mathematical procedure for the achievement of knowledge is typical of a rationalistic approach to epistemology.

While engaged in such a comprehensive revision of our beliefs, Descartes supposed it prudent to adhere to a modest, conventional way of life that provides a secure and comfortable environment in which to pursue serious study. The stoic underpinnings of this "provisional morality" are evident in the emphasis on changing oneself to fit the world. Its general importance as an avenue to the contemplative life, however, is more general. Great intellectual upheavals can best be undertaken during relatively calm and stable periods of life.

### **Anticipated Results**

In this context, Descartes offered a brief description of his own experience with the proper approach to knowledge. Begin by renouncing any belief that can be doubted, including especially the testimony of the senses; then use the perfect certainty of one's own existence, which survives this doubt, as the foundation for a demonstration of the providential reliability of one's faculties generally. Significant knowledge of the world, Descartes supposed, can be achieved only by following this epistemological method, the rationalism of relying on a mathematical model and eliminating the distraction of sensory information in order to pursue the demonstrations of pure reason.

Later sections of the Discourse (along with the supplementary scientific essays with which it was published) trace some of the more significant consequences of following the Cartesian method in philosophy. His mechanistic inclinations emerge clearly in these sections, with frequent reminders of the success of physical explanations of complex phenomena. Non-human animals, on Descartes's view, are complex organic machines, all of whose actions can be fully explained without any reference to the operation of mind in thinking.

In fact, Descartes declared, most of human behavior, like that of animals, is susceptible to simple mechanistic explanation. Cleverly designed automata could successfully mimic nearly all of what we do. Thus, Descartes argued, it is only the general ability to adapt to widely varying circumstances—and, in particular, the capacity to respond creatively in the use of language—that provides a sure test for the presence of an immaterial soul associated with the normal human body.

But Descartes supposed that no matter how human-like an animal or machine could be made to appear in its form or operations, it would always be possible to distinguish it from a real human being by two functional criteria. Although an animal or machine may be capable of performing any one activity as well as (or even better than) we can, he argued, each human being is capable of a greater variety of different activities than could be performed by anything lacking a soul. In a special instance of this general point, Descartes held that although an animal or machine might be made to utter sounds resembling human speech in response to specific stimuli, only an immaterial thinking substance could engage in the creative use of language required for responding

appropriately to any unexpected circumstances. My puppy is a loyal companion, and my computer is a powerful instrument, but neither of them can engage in a decent conversation. (This criterion anticipated the more formal requirements of the Turing test.)

## **The Method of Doubt**

The basic strategy of Descartes's method of doubt is to defeat skepticism on its own ground. Begin by doubting the truth of everything—not only the evidence of the senses and the more extravagant cultural presuppositions, but even the fundamental process of reasoning itself. If any particular truth about the world can survive this extreme skeptical challenge, then it must be truly indubitable and therefore a perfectly certain foundation for knowledge. The First Meditation, then, is an extended exercise in learning to doubt everything that I believe, considered at three distinct levels:

### **1. Perceptual Illusion**

First, Descartes noted that the testimony of the senses with respect to any particular judgment about the external world may turn out to be mistaken. Things are not always just as they seem at first glance (or at first hearing, etc.) to be. But then, Descartes argues, it is prudent never wholly to trust in the truth of what we perceive. In ordinary life, of course, we adjust for mistaken perceptions by reference to correct perceptions. But since we cannot be sure at first which cases are veridical and which are not, it is possible (if not always feasible) to doubt any particular bit of apparent sensory knowledge.

### **2. The Dream Problem**

Second, Descartes raised a more systematic method for doubting the legitimacy of all sensory perception. Since my most vivid dreams are internally indistinguishable from waking experience, he argued, it is possible that everything I now "perceive" to be part of the physical world outside me is in fact nothing more than a fanciful fabrication of my own imagination. On this supposition, it is possible to doubt that any physical thing really exists, that there is an external world at all.

Severe as it is, this level of doubt is not utterly comprehensive, since the truths of mathematics and the content of simple natures remain unaffected. Even if there is no material world (and thus, even in my dreams) two plus three makes five and red looks red to me. In order to doubt the veracity of such fundamental beliefs, I must extend the method of doubting even more hyperbolically.

### **3. A Deceiving God**

Finally, then, Descartes raises even more comprehensive doubts by inviting us to consider a radical hypothesis derived from one of our most treasured traditional beliefs. What if (as religion teaches) there is an omnipotent god, but that deity devotes its full attention to deceiving me? The problem here is not merely that I might be forced by god to believe what something which is in fact false. Descartes means to raise the far more devastating possibility that whenever I believe anything, even if it has always been true up until now, a truly omnipotent deceiver could at that very moment choose to change the world so as to render my belief false. On this supposition, it seems possible to doubt the truth of absolutely anything I might come to believe.

Although the hypothesis of a deceiving god best serves the logical structure of the Meditations as a whole, Descartes offered two alternative versions of the hypothetical doubt for the benefit of

those who might take offense at even a counter-factual suggestion of impiety. It may seem more palatable to the devout to consider the possibility that I systematically deceive myself or that there is some evil demon who perpetually tortures me with my own error. The point in each case is that it is possible for every belief I entertain to be false.

Remember that the point of the entire exercise is to out-do the skeptics at their own game, to raise the broadest possible grounds for doubt, so that whatever we come to believe in the face of such challenges will indeed be that which cannot be doubted. It is worthwhile to pause here, wallowing in the depths of Cartesian doubt at the end of the First Meditation, the better to appreciate the escape he offers at the outset of Meditation Two.

## **I Am, I Exist**

The Second Meditation begins with a review of the First. Remember that I am committed to suspending judgment with respect to anything about which I can conceive any doubt, and my doubts are extensive. I mistrust every report of my senses, I regard the material world as nothing more than a dream, and I suppose that an omnipotent god renders false each proposition that I am even inclined to believe. Since everything therefore seems to be dubitable, does it follow that I can be certain of nothing at all?

It does not. Descartes claimed that one thing emerges as true even under the strict conditions imposed by the otherwise universal doubt: "I am, I exist" is necessarily true whenever the thought occurs to me. This truth neither derives from sensory information nor depends upon the reality of an external world, and I would have to exist even if I were systematically deceived. For even an omnipotent god could not cause it to be true, at one and the same time, **both** that I am deceived **and** that I do not exist. If I am deceived, then at least I am.

Although Descartes's reasoning here is best known in the Latin translation of its expression in the Discourse, "cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"), it is not merely an inference from the activity of thinking to the existence of an agent which performs that activity. It is intended rather as an intuition of one's own reality, an expression of the indubitability of first-person experience, the logical self-certification of self-conscious awareness in any form.

Skepticism is thereby defeated, according to Descartes. No matter how many skeptical challenges are raised—indeed, even if things are much worse than the most extravagant skeptic ever claimed—there is at least one fragment of genuine human knowledge: my perfect certainty of my own existence. From this starting-point, Descartes supposed, it is possible to achieve indubitable knowledge of many other propositions as well.

## **I Am a Thinking Thing**

An initial consequence may be drawn directly from the intuitive certainty of the cogito itself. If I know that I am, Descartes argued, I must also know what I am; an understanding of my true nature must be contained implicitly in the content of my awareness.

What then, is this "I" that doubts, that may be deceived, that thinks? Since I became certain of my existence while entertaining serious doubts about sensory information and the existence of a material world, none of the apparent features of my human body can have been crucial for my understanding of myself. But all that is left is my thought itself, so Descartes concluded that "sum

res cogitans" ("I am a thing that thinks"). In Descartes's terms, I am a substance whose inseparable attribute (or entire essence) is thought, with all its modes: doubting, willing, conceiving, believing, etc. What I really am is a mind or soul. So completely am I identified with my conscious awareness, Descartes claimed, that if I were to stop thinking altogether, it would follow that I no longer existed at all. At this point, nothing else about human nature can be determined with such perfect certainty.

### **Descartes: God and Human Nature Clear and Distinct Ideas**

At the outset of the Third Meditation, Descartes tried to use this first truth as the paradigm for his general account of the possibilities for achieving human knowledge. In the cogito, awareness of myself, of thinking, and of existence are somehow combined in such a way as to result in an intuitive grasp of a truth that cannot be doubted. Perhaps we can find in other cases the same grounds for indubitable truth. But what is it? The answer lies in Descartes's theory of ideas. Considered formally, as the content of my thinking activity, the ideas involved in the cogito are unusually clear and distinct. But ideas may also be considered objectively, as the mental representatives of things that really exist. According to a representative realist like Descartes, then, the connections among our ideas yield truth only when they correspond to the way the world really is. But it is not obvious that our clear and distinct ideas do correspond to the reality of things, since we suppose that there may be an omnipotent deceiver.

In some measure, the reliability of our ideas may depend on the source from which they are derived. Descartes held that there are only three possibilities: all of our ideas are either **adventitious** (entering the mind from the outside world) or **factitious** (manufactured by the mind itself) or **innate** (inscribed on the mind by god). But I don't yet know that there is an outside world, and I can imagine almost anything, so everything depends on whether god exists and deceives me.

### **God Exists**

The next step in the pursuit of knowledge, then, is to prove that god does indeed exist. Descartes's starting point for such a proof is the principle that the cause of any idea must have at least as much reality as the content of the idea itself. But since my idea of god has an absolutely unlimited content, the cause of this idea must itself be infinite, and only the truly existing god is that. In other words, my idea of god cannot be either adventitious or factitious (since I could neither experience god directly nor discover the concept of perfection in myself), so it must be innately provided by god. Therefore, god exists.

As a backup to this argument, Descartes offered a traditional version of the cosmological argument for god's existence. From the cogito I know that I exist, and since I am not perfect in every way, I cannot have caused myself. So something else must have caused my existence, and no matter what that something is (my parents?), we could ask what caused it to exist. The chain of causes must end eventually, and that will be with the ultimate, perfect, self-caused being, or god.

As Antoine Arnauld pointed out in an Objection published along with the Meditations themselves, there is a problem with this reasoning. Since Descartes will use the existence (and veracity) of god to prove the reliability of clear and distinct ideas in Meditation Four, his use of clear and distinct ideas to prove the existence of god in Meditation Three is an example of circular reasoning. Descartes replied that his argument is not circular because intuitive reasoning—in the proof of god as in the cogito—requires no further support in the moment of its conception. We must rely on a non-deceiving god only as the guarantor of veridical memory, when a demonstrative argument involves too many steps to be held in the mind at once. But this response is not entirely

convincing.

The problem is a significant one, since the proof of god's existence is not only the first attempt to establish the reality of something outside the self but also the foundation for every further attempt to do so. If this proof fails, then Descartes's hopes for human knowledge are severely curtailed, and I am stuck in solipsism, unable to be perfectly certain of anything more than my own existence as a thinking thing. With this reservation in mind, we'll continue through the Meditations, seeing how Descartes tried to dismantle his own reasons for doubt.

### **Deception and Error**

The proof of god's existence actually makes the hypothetical doubt of the First Meditation a little worse: I now know that there really is a being powerful enough to deceive me at every turn. But Descartes argued that since all perfections naturally go together, and since deception is invariably the product of imperfection, it follows that the truly omnipotent being has no reason or motive for deception. God does not deceive, and doubt of the deepest sort may be abandoned forever. It follows that the simple natures and the truths of mathematics are now secure. In fact, Descartes maintained, I can now live in perfect confidence that my intellectual faculties, bestowed on me by a veracious god, are properly designed for the apprehension of truth.

But this seems to imply too much: if I have a divinely-endowed capacity for discovering the truth, then why don't I always achieve it? The problem is not that I lack knowledge of some things; that only means that I am limited. Rather, the question is why I so often make mistakes, believing what is false despite my possession of god-given mental abilities. Descartes's answer derives from an analysis of the nature of human cognition generally.

Every mental act of judgment, Descartes held, is the product of two distinct faculties: the understanding, which merely observes or perceives, and the will, which assents to the belief in question. Considered separately, the understanding (although limited in scope) is adequate for human needs, since it comprehends completely everything for which it has clear and distinct ideas. Similarly, the will as an independent faculty is perfect, since it (like the will of god) is perfectly free in every respect. Thus, god has benevolently provided me with two faculties, neither of which is designed to produce error instead of true belief. Yet I do make mistakes, by misusing my free will to assent on occasions for which my understanding does not have clear and distinct ideas. For Descartes, error is virtually a moral failing, the willful exercise of my powers of believing in excess of my ability to perceive the truth.

### **The Essence of Matter**

Since the truths of reason have been restored by the demonstration of god's veracity, Descartes employed mathematical reasoning to discover the essence of bodies in the Fifth Meditation. We do not yet know whether there are any material objects, because the dream problem remains in force, but Descartes supposed that we can determine what they would be like if there were any by relying upon reason alone, since mathematics achieves certainty without supposing the reality of its objects.

According to Descartes, the essence of material substance is simply extension, the property of filling up space. So solid geometry, which describes the possibility of dividing an otherwise uniform space into distinct parts, is a complete guide to the essence of body. It follows that there

can be in reality only one extended substance, comprising all matter in a single spatial whole. From this, Descartes concluded that individual bodies are merely modes of the one extended being, that there can be no space void of extension, and that all motion must proceed by circular vortex. Thus, again, the true nature of bodies is understood by pure thought, without any information from the senses.

By the way, this explanation of essences suggested to Descartes another proof of god's existence, a modern variation on the Ontological Argument. Just as the essence of a triangle includes its having interior angles that add up to a straight line, Descartes argued, so the essence of god, understood as a being in whom all perfections are united, includes necessary existence in reality. As Descartes himself noted, this argument is no more certain than the truths of mathematics, so it also rests on the reliability of clear and distinct ideas, secured in turn by the proofs of god's existence and veracity in the Third and Fourth Meditations.

### **The Existence of Bodies**

In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes finally tried to eliminate the dream problem by proving that there is a material world and that bodies do really exist. His argument derives from the supposition that divinely-bestowed human faculties of cognition must always be regarded as adequately designed for some specific purpose. Since three of our faculties involve representation of physical things, the argument proceeds in three distinct stages.

First, since the understanding conceives of extended things through its comprehension of geometrical form, it must at least be possible for things of this sort to exist. Second, since the imagination is directed exclusively toward the ideas of bodies and of the ways in which they might be purposefully altered, it is probable that there really are such things. Finally, since the faculty of sense perception is an entirely passive ability to receive ideas of physical objects produced in me by some external source outside my control, it is certain that such objects must truly exist.

The only alternative explanation for perception, Descartes noted, is that god directly puts the ideas of bodies into my mind without there actually being anything real that corresponds to them. (This is precisely the possibility that Malebranche would later accept as the correct account of the material world.) But Descartes supposed that a non-deceiving god would never maliciously give me so complete a set of ideas without also causing their natural objects to exist in fact. Hence, the bodies I perceive do really exist.

### **Mind-Body Dualism**

Among the physical objects I perceive are the organic bodies of animals, other human beings, and myself. So it is finally appropriate to consider human nature as a whole: how am I, considered as a thinking thing, concerned with the organism I see in the mirror? What is the true relation between the mind and the body of any human being? According to Descartes, the two are utterly distinct. The Sixth Meditation contains two arguments in defence of Cartesian dualism: First, since the mind and the body can each be conceived clearly and distinctly apart from each other, it follows that god could cause either to exist independently of the other, and this satisfies the traditional criteria for a metaphysical real distinction. Second, the essence of body as a geometrically defined region of space includes the possibility of its infinite divisibility, but the mind, despite the variety of its many faculties and operations, must be conceived as a single, unitary, indivisible being; since incompatible properties cannot inhere in any one substance, the mind and body are perfectly

distinct.

This radical separation of mind and body makes it difficult to account for the apparent interaction of the two in my own case. In ordinary experience, it surely seems that the volitions of my mind can cause physical movements in my body and that the physical states of my body can produce effects on my mental operations. But on Descartes's view, there can be no substantial connection between the two, nor did he believe it appropriate to think of the mind as residing in the body as a pilot resides within a ship. Although he offered several tentative suggestions in his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, Descartes largely left for future generations the task of developing some reasonable account of volition and sensation, either by securing the possibility of mind-body interaction or by proposing some alternative explanation of the appearances. On the other hand, Cartesian dualism offers some clear advantages: For one thing, it provides an easy proof of the natural immortality of the human mind or soul, which cannot be substantially affected by death, understood as an alteration of the states of the physical organism. In addition, the distinction of mind from body establishes the absolute independence of the material realm from the spiritual, securing the freedom of scientists to rely exclusively on observation for their development of mechanistic explanations of physical events.

### **Cartesian Philosophy Consequences of Dualism**

Descartes worked out his own detailed theories about the physical operation of the material world in *Le Monde* (The World), but uncertainty about ecclesiastical reactions prevented him from publishing it. The final sections of the *Discourse*, however, include several significant hints about the positions he was prepared to defend. Their explanations of the activities of living organisms make the mechanistic implications of the Cartesian view more evident.

Since, as everyone acknowledges, non-human animals do not have souls, Descartes concluded that animals must be merely complex machines. Since they lack any immaterial thinking substance, animals cannot think, and all of the movements of their bodies can, in principle, be explained in purely mechanical terms. (Descartes himself incorrectly supposed that the nervous system functions as a complex hydraulic machine.) But since the structure of the human body and the behavior of human beings are similar to the structure and behavior of some animals, it is obvious that many human actions can also be given a mechanistic explanation. La Mettrie later followed this line of reasoning to its ultimate conclusion, supposing human beings to be nothing more than Cartesian machines.

### **Cartesianism**

The philosophy of Descartes won ready acceptance in the second half of the seventeenth century, especially in France and Holland. Although few of his followers, known collectively as Cartesians, employed his methods, they showed great diligence and ingenuity in their efforts to explain, defend, and advance his central doctrines.

In the physical sciences, for example, Cavendish, Rohault, and Régis were happy to abandon all efforts to employ final causes in their pursuit of mechanistic accounts of physical phenomena and animal behavior. On this basis, however, such philosophers were able to progress beyond a simple affirmation of the mysterious reality of mind-body interaction.

Metaphysicians like Cordemoy and Geulincx fared little better in their efforts to deal with this

crucial problem with dualism. If there is no genuine causal interaction between independent substances, we seem driven to suppose that the actions of mind and body are merely parallel or divinely synchronized.

Not everyone was entirely satisfied by the epistemological foundations of the Cartesian scheme, either. Critics like Arnauld, Nicole, and Foucher drew attention to the inherent difficulty of explaining in representationalist terms how our ideas of things can be known to resemble the things themselves and the implausibility of reliance upon innate ideas. Conway went even further, rejecting the dualistic foundations of Descartes's substance-ontology along with his approach to human knowledge.

### **Pascal: The Religious Mathematician**

One seventeenth-century thinker of greater independent significance was Blaise Pascal, with his unusual blend of religious piety, scientific curiosity, and mathematical genius. Led by his deep religious feelings to participate fully in the pietistic Jansenism of the Port-Royal community, Pascal maintained that formal reasoning about god can never provide an adequate substitute for genuine personal concern for the faith: "The heart has its reasons that reason cannot know."

Pascal's mathematical acumen was no less remarkable than that of Descartes; his work anticipated the development of game theory and the modern methods of calculating probability. In fact, his famous "Wager" applies these mathematical techniques to the prudence of religious conviction in the absence of adequate evidence: since the consequences of believing are infinitely beneficial if there is a god and only slightly inconvenient if there is not, while the outcome of atheism is only somewhat more pleasant if there is no god and eternally costly if there is, the expected value of theism is much greater than that of atheism, and it is reasonable to stake one's life on the possibility that god does exist.

### **Malebranche: Seeing All Things in God**

The most original and influential philosopher of the Cartesian tradition was Nicolas Malebranche. Noting the steady progress of efforts to provide mechanistic accounts of the behavior of the human body, Malebranche concluded that the mind and body are not only substantially distinct but causally independent of each other. The appearance of genuine interaction arises from what is in fact merely the perfect parallelism of events in the mental and physical realms.

According to Malebranche, then, our ideas of bodies do not result from any causal influence that physical objects have on our senses; rather, they are produced in our minds directly by god. Thus, he supposed, in sense perception what literally happens is that we "see all things in god." Similarly, our wills have no causal influence on the material world, but god provides for the coordination of our volitions with the movement of bodies. In general, since there is no causal interaction, it is the power of god alone that secures a perpetual, happy coincidence of the states and operations of minds and bodies.

Since only god's activity is efficacious in either mental or physical things, apparent causes in either realm are merely the occasions for the appearance of their supposed effects in the other. Thus, the views of Malebranche are often referred to collectively as occasionalism. Although the entire theory found few enthusiastic adherents, Malebranche's analysis of the regularities exhibited in

nature by causally independent beings and events was greatly influential on later philosophers, including Berkeley and Hume.

## **Spinoza: God, Nature, and Freedom**

Descartes regarded mathematical reasoning as the paradigm for progress in human knowledge, but Baruch Spinoza took this rationalistic appreciation even further, developing and expressing his mature philosophical views "in the geometrical manner." Thus, in the posthumously-published *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata* (Ethics) (1677), Spinoza claimed to deduce the entire system of thought from a restricted set of definitions and self-evident axioms.

Drawing specific doctrines from Cartesian thought, medieval scholasticism, and the Jewish tradition, Spinoza blended everything together into a comprehensive vision of the universe as a coherent whole governed solely by the immutable laws of logical necessity. Rigorous thought reveals that there can be only a single substance, of which we (and everything else) are merely insignificant parts. Although we may find it difficult to take any comfort in Spinoza's account of our place in the world, we are bound to admire the logical consistency with which he works out all the details.

## **The Unity of Substance**

The definitions and axioms with which Book I of the Ethics begins are critical to Spinoza's enterprise, since they are intended to carry his central doctrines as deductive consequences. Although they generally follow the usages of the scholastic tradition, many of them also include special features of great significance to the thought of Spinoza.

Substance, for example, he defined not only as existing in itself but also as "conceived through itself." This places a severe limit on the possibility of interaction between things, since Spinoza declared that causation is a relation of logical necessity, such that knowledge of the effect requires knowledge of its cause. Few will disagree that god is a substance with infinite attributes, but this definition carries some surprising implications in Spinoza's view of the world; notice also that freedom, according to Spinoza, just means that a thing exists and acts by its own nature rather than by external compulsion.

The numbered propositions that follow make it clear what Spinoza is getting at. Since causal interaction is impossible between two substances that differ essentially, and no two substances can share a common attribute or essence, it follows that no substance can produce genuine change in any another substance. Each must be the cause of its own existence and, since it cannot be subject to limitations imposed from outside itself, must also be absolutely infinite. Things that appear to be finite individuals interacting with each other, then, cannot themselves be substances; in reality, they can be nothing more than the modifications of a self-caused, infinite substance. And that, of course, is god.

## **"Deus sive Natura"**

Spinoza supposed it easy to demonstrate that such a being does really exist. As the ontological argument makes clear, god's very essence includes existence. Moreover, nothing else could possibly prevent the existence of that substance which has infinite attributes in itself. Finally, although it depends on a posteriori grounds to which Spinoza would rather not appeal, the cosmological argument helps us to understand that since we ourselves exist, so must an infinite

cause of the universe. Thus, god exists.

What is more, god is a being with infinitely many attributes, each of which is itself infinite, upon which no limits of any kind can be imposed. So Spinoza argued that infinite substance must be indivisible, eternal, and unitary. There can be only one such substance, "god or nature," in which everything else is wholly contained. Thus, Spinoza is an extreme monist, for whom "Whatever is, is in god." Every mind and every body, every thought and every movement, all are nothing more than aspects of the one true being. Thus, god is an extended as well as a thinking substance.

Finally, god is perfectly free on Spinoza's definition. Of course it would be incorrect to suppose that god has any choices about what to do. Everything that happens is not only causally determined but actually flows by logical necessity from immutable laws. But since everything is merely a part of god, those laws themselves, and cause and effect alike, are simply aspects of the divine essence, which is wholly self-contained and therefore free. Because there is no other substance, god's actions can never be influenced by anything else.

### **The Natural Order**

God is the only genuine cause. From the essence of god, Spinoza held, infinitely many things flow in infinitely many different ways. The entire universe emanates inexorably from the immutable core of infinite substance. Though we often find it natural to think of the world from the outside looking in, as *natura naturata* (nature natured), its internal structure can be more accurately conceived from the inside looking out, as *natura naturans* (nature naturing).

Since all that happens radiates from the common core, everything hangs together as part of the coherent whole which just is god or nature in itself. The infinite substance and each of its infinitely many distinct attributes (among which only thought and extension are familiar to us) are eternal expressions of the immutable essence of god. From each attribute flow the infinite immediate modes (infinite intellect and motion or rest), and out of these in turn come the infinite mediate modes (truth and the face of the universe). Thus, every mode of substance (each individual mind or body) is determined to be as it is because of the divine essence. Even the finite modes (particular thoughts and actions) are inevitably and wholly determined by the nature of god. Hence, everything in the world is as it must be; nothing could be other than it is.

### **Thought and Extension**

In the same deductive geometrical form, Book II of the *Ethics* offers an extensive account of human beings: our existence, our nature, and our activities. Remember that we are aware of only two of the infinitely many attributes of god, extension and thought, and that each of them independently expresses the entire essence of the one infinite substance.

That is, in the natural world (god's body), the attribute of extension, modified by varying degrees of motion and rest, produces the face of the universe, which includes all of the particular physical events which are the modes of extension. (This is almost exactly like Descartes's account of the material world.) Similarly, in the mental realm (god's idea), the attribute of thought—modified by infinite intellect—produces the truth, which includes all of the particular mental events which are the modes of thought. Since they arise from distinct attributes, each of these realms is causally independent of the other and wholly self-contained: the natural world and the mental realm are separate closed systems.

Despite the impossibility of any causal interaction between the two, Spinoza supposed that the inevitable unfolding of each these two independent attributes must proceed in perfect parallel with that of the other. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." (And so, of course, must be the order and connection of each of the infinitely many other attributes of god.) Since the development of each aspect of the divine nature follows with logical necessity from its own fundamental attribute, and since all of the attributes, in turn, derive from the central essential being of one and the same infinite substance, each exhibits the same characteristic pattern of organization even though they have no influence on each other.

Thus, for every object of the natural world that exists as a mode of the attribute of extension, there is a corresponding idea in the mind of god that exists as a mode of the attribute of thought. For every physical event that takes place in the material realm as the result of exclusively physical causes, a corresponding mental event must occur in the infinite intellect as a result of purely mental causes. Since everything flows from the same infinite being, we may suppose that the structure of thought in infinite intellect comprises an accurate representation of the structure of every other attribute.

### **Mind and Body**

Consider what all of this implies for each of us as a living human being. We are not substances, according to Spinoza, for only god or Nature is truly substantial; we can exist only as modes, depending for our existence upon the reality of the one real being. Since the one infinite substance is the cause of everything, each of us can only be regarded as a tiny cross-section of the whole.

Of course, that cross-section does include elements from each of the infinitely many attributes of that substance. In particular, we know that in each case it involves both a human body, the movements of whose organic parts are all physical events that flow from god via the attribute of extension, and a human mind, the formation of whose ideas are all mental events that flow from god via the attribute of thought. Although there can be no causal interaction between the mind and the body, the order and connection of their internal elements are perfectly correlated.

Thus, in principle, the human mind contains ideas that perfectly represent the parts of the human body. But since many of these ideas are inadequate in the sense that they do not carry with them internal signs of their accuracy, we do not necessarily know our own bodies. If, for example, there must be in my mind an idea that corresponds to each particular organic state of my spleen; but since I am unaware of its bodily correlate, it provides me with no clear awareness of that representational object.

### **Human Knowledge**

Spinoza maintained that human beings do have particular faculties whose functions are to provide some degree of knowledge. I typically assume, for example, that there may be some correlation between thought and extension with regard to sensations produced by the action of other bodies upon my eyes, ears, and fingertips. Even my memory may occasionally harbor some evidence of the order and connection common to things and ideas. And in self-conscious awareness, I seem to achieve genuine knowledge of myself by representing my mind to itself, using ideas to signify other ideas.

Near the end of Book II, then, Spinoza distinguished three kinds of knowledge of which we may be capable: First, **opinion**, derived either from vague sensory experience or from the signification of words in the memory or imagination, provides only inadequate ideas and cannot be relied upon as a source of truth. Second, **reason**, which begins with simple adequate ideas and by analyzing causal or logical necessity proceeds toward awareness of their more general causes, does provide us with truth. But **intuition**, in which the mind deduces the structure of reality from the very essence or idea of god, is the great source of adequate ideas, the highest form of knowledge, and the ultimate guarantor of truth.

Spinoza therefore recommends a three-step process for the achievement of human knowledge: First, disregard the misleading testimony of the senses and conventional learning. Second, starting from the adequate idea of any one existing thing, reason back to the eternal attribute of god from which it derives. Finally, use this knowledge of the divine essence to intuit everything else that ever was, is, and will be. Indeed, he supposed that the Ethics itself is an exercise in this ultimate pursuit of indubitable knowledge.

### **Action, Goodness, and Freedom**

The last three Books of the Ethics collectively describe how to live consistently on Spinozistic principles. All human behavior results from desire or the perception of pain, so (like events of any sort) it flows necessarily from the eternal attributes of thought and extension. But Spinoza pointed out a crucial distinction between two kinds of cases: Sometimes I am wholly unaware of the causes that underlie what I do and am simply overwhelmed by the strength of my momentary passions. But at other times I have adequate knowledge of the motives for what I do and can engage in deliberate action because I recognize my place within the grander scheme of reality as a whole.

It is in this fashion that moral value enters Spinoza's system. Good (or evil) just is what serves (or hinders) the long-term interests of life. Since my actions invariably follow from emotion or desire, I always do what I believe to be the good, which will truly be so if I have adequate ideas of everything involved. The greatest good of human life, then, is to understand one's place in the structure of the universe as a natural expression of the essence of god.

But how can we speak of moral responsibility when every human action is determined with rigid necessity? Remember that, for Spinoza, freedom is self-determination, so when I acquire adequate knowledge of the emotions and desires that are the internal causes of all my actions, when I understand why I do what I do, then I am truly free. Although I can neither change the way things are nor hope that I will be rewarded, I must continue to live and act with the calm confidence that I am a necessary component of an infinitely greater and more important whole. This way of life may not be easy, Spinoza declared, "But all noble things are as difficult as they are rare."

### **Leibniz's Monadology**

G.W. Leibniz's *Monadology* (1714) is a very concise and condensed presentation of his theory that the universe consists of an infinite number of substances called monads. Leibniz discusses the nature of monadic perception and consciousness, the principles which govern truth and reason, and the relation of the monadic universe to God.

Leibniz defines a monad as a simple substance which cannot be divided into parts. A compound substance may be formed by an aggregation of monads. Thus, a compound substance may be divided into simple parts.

According to Leibniz, monads differ in quality, and no two monads are exactly alike. Each monad has its own individual identity. Each monad has its own internal principle of being. A monad may undergo change, but this change is internally determined. Changes in the properties of any monad are not externally determined by other monads.

Each monad has a plurality of properties and relations, which constitutes its perception. Each monad has its own perceptions which differ from the perceptions of other monads. Perceptual changes are constituted by the internal actions of monads. Leibniz describes three levels of monads, which may be differentiated by their modes of perception. A simple or bare monad has unconscious perception, but does not have memory. A simple or ordinary soul is a more highly developed monad, which has distinct perceptions, and which has conscious awareness and memory. A rational soul or spirit is an even more highly developed monad, which has self-consciousness and reason (both of which constitute "apperception").

Leibniz says that necessary and eternal truths may be known by reason. A rational soul may know necessary and permanent truths, in contrast to an ordinary soul which can only connect perceptions by means of memory. A rational soul can know eternal truths about the universe and about the relation of the universe to God. A rational soul thinks of itself as limited, but thinks of God as unlimited.

Leibniz explains that reason is governed by two main principles: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of sufficient reason. According to the principle of contradiction, a proposition must be either true or false. If two propositions are contradictory to each other, then one of the propositions must be true, and the other must be false. According to the principle of sufficient reason, nothing happens without a reason. No proposition can be true without a sufficient reason for its being true and not false.

Leibniz declares that there are two kinds of truth: truths of reason, and truths of fact. Truths of reason are a priori, while truths of fact are a posteriori. Truths of reason are necessary, permanent truths. Truths of fact are contingent, empirical truths. Both kinds of truth must have a sufficient reason. Truths of reason have their sufficient reason in being opposed to the contradictoriness and logical inconsistency of propositions which deny them. Truths of fact have their sufficient reason in being more perfect than propositions which deny them.

Leibniz also claims, however, that the ultimate reason of all things must be found in a necessary and universal substance, which is God. A primary substance is not material, according to Leibniz, because matter is infinitely divisible. Every monad is produced from a primary unity, which is God. Every monad is eternal, and contributes to the unity of all the other monads in the universe.

Leibniz says that there is only one necessary substance, and that this is God. A necessary substance is one whose existence is logically necessary. The existence of a necessary substance cannot be denied without causing some form of self-contradiction. Thus, God's existence is logically necessary. God is absolutely real, infinite, and perfect. All perfection and all reality comes from God. God, as the supreme monad, is an absolute unity.

Leibniz explains that the perfection of a monad is revealed by its activity. The imperfection of a monad is revealed by its passivity. A monad is perfect insofar as it is active, and is imperfect insofar as it is passive. Actions and reactions are reciprocal relations between monads, and are constantly changing. The actions of some monads are a sufficient reason for the reactions of other monads. The reactions of some monads are given sufficient reason by the actions of other monads. All of the actions and reactions of monads are governed by a principle of harmony, which is established by God.

Leibniz argues that, insofar as the rational soul or spirit can know eternal truths and can act according to reason, it can reflect God. The spiritual world is a moral world, which can guide the natural world. The goodness of God ensures that there is harmony between the spiritual world and the natural world, and establishes harmony between moral laws and natural laws. A perfect harmony of moral and natural law is found in the spiritual world, which Leibniz calls the City of God. Leibniz also says that there are an infinite number of possible universes in the mind of God, but that God has chosen a single universe whose sufficient reason is that it is the best possible universe (i.e. having the highest possible degree of perfection). This claim may be disputed, however, because it may be misused as an argument for an excessive and unjustifiable form of optimism.

Leibniz argues that God is supremely perfect, and that therefore God has chosen the best possible plan for the universe. God's plan for the universe necessarily produces the greatest amount of happiness and goodness, because it reflects God's absolute perfection. But Leibniz's argument may be disputed by the opposing argument that the best of all possible worlds may not necessarily contain both good and evil. The best of all possible worlds may not necessarily contain both happiness and unhappiness. The universe may not necessarily be governed by harmony, but may be governed by disharmony. The universe may not necessarily reveal unity, but may reveal disunity.

## **The Uses of Logic**

The last of the great Continental Rationalists was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Known in his own time as a legal advisor to the Court of Hanover and as a practicing mathematician who co-invented the calculus, Leibniz applied the rigorous standards of formal reasoning in an effort to comprehend everything. A suitably sophisticated logical scheme, he believed, can serve as a reliable guide to the ultimate structure of reality.

But Leibniz published little of his philosophical work during his own lifetime. For an understanding of the technical logical foundations of his system, we must rely upon letters and notebooks which became available only centuries later and upon the aphoristic summary of its results in *La Monadologie* (*Monadology*) (1714). His *Discours de Metaphysique* (*Discourse on Metaphysics*) (1686) and *Théodicée* (*Theodicy*) (1710) present to the general public more popular expositions of Leibniz's central themes. Our strategy will be to begin with the logical theories and work outward to the more accessible doctrines.

## **Truths of reason and fact**

The basis for Leibniz's philosophy is pure logical analysis. Every proposition, he believed, can be expressed in subject-predicate form. What is more, every true proposition is a statement of identity

whose predicate is wholly contained in its subject, like "2 + 3 = 5." In this sense, all propositions are analytic for Leibniz. But since the required analysis may be difficult, he distinguished two kinds of true propositions:

**Truths of Reason** are explicit statements of identity, or reducible to explicit identities by a substitution of the definitions of their terms. Since a finite analysis always reveals the identity-structure of such truths, they cannot be denied without contradiction and are perfectly necessary.

**Truths of Fact**, on the other hand, are implicit statements of identity, the grounds for whose truth may not be evident to us. These truths are merely contingent and may be subject to dispute, since only an infinite analysis could show them to be identities.

Anything that human beings can believe or know, Leibniz held, must be expressed in one or the other of these two basic forms. The central insight of Leibniz's system is that all existential propositions are truths of fact, not truths of reason. This simple doctrine has many significant consequences.

### **Complete Individual Substances**

Consider next how this logic of propositions applies to the structure of reality itself for Leibniz. The subject of any proposition signifies a complete individual substance, a simple, indivisible, dimensionless being or monad, while the predicate signifies some quality, property, or power. Thus, each true proposition represents the fact that some feature is actually contained in this substance.

Each monad is a **complete** individual substance in the sense that it contains all of its features—past, present, and future. Because statements of identity are timeless, the facts they express perpetually obtain. (Thus, for example, I am the person whose daughter was born in 1982 and the person who now develops this web site and the person who will vacation in Manitoba next summer; since each of these predicates can be truly affirmed of me, each of these features is contained in me.) Everything that was, is, or will ever be true of any substance is already contained in it.

Moreover, each monad is a complete **individual** substance in the sense that its being is utterly independent of everything else. Because statements of identity are self-contained, any apparent relation between substances must actually be a matching pair of features that each possesses alone. (Thus, for example, I happen to have the property of being Aaron's father, and Aaron happens to have the property of being my son, but these are two facts, not one.) Hence, on Leibniz's view, there can be no interaction between substances, each of which is purely active. Monads are "windowless."

Where Spinoza saw the world as a single comprehensive substance like Descartes's extended matter, then, Leibniz supposed that the world is composed of many discrete particles, each of which is simple, active, and independent of every other, like Descartes's minds or souls. The rationalists' common reliance upon mathematical models of reasoning led to startlingly different conceptions of the universe. Yet the rationality, consistency, and necessity within each system is clear.

## **Sufficient reason and identity of indiscernibles**

Another way of summing up the structure of the universe on Leibniz's view is by reviewing the great logical principles from which all truths are said to flow: The Principle of Contradiction generates the truths of reason, each of which states the connection between an individual substance and one of its finite number of essential features. It would be a contradiction to deny any of these propositions, since the substance would not be what it is unless it had all of these features. Truths of reason, then, are not influenced by any contingent fact about the world; they are true "in all possible worlds." Thus, for example, "Garth Kemerling is a human being" would be necessarily true even if my parents had been childless.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason generates the truths of fact, each of which states the connection between an existing individual substance and one of its infinitely many accidental features or relations. The sufficient reason for the truth of each of these propositions is that this substance does exist as a member of the consistent set of monads which constitutes the actual world. Truths of fact, then, depend upon the reciprocal mirroring of each existing substance by every other.

Thus, for example, "Garth Kemerling is an oldest child" is contingently true only because my parents had no children before I was born.

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles establishes the fact that, within the set of monads that constitutes any possible world, no two can be exactly alike. If, on the contrary, there were two distinct but perfectly identical substances, Leibniz argued, then there could be no sufficient reason for each to occupy its own location rather than that of the other. More positively, since each monad mirrors the entire structure of the world, each must reflect a unique set of relations to every other.

Finally, the Principle of the Plenum (or principle of plenitude) affirms that the actual world, considered as a set of monads, is as full as it can possibly be. Since there is no genuine interaction among distinct substances, there would be no sufficient reason for the non-existence of any monad that would be consistent with the others within a possible world. Hence, anything that can happen will; every possibility within this world must be actualized. The world in which we live, then, is but one among the infinitely many possible worlds that might have existed. What makes this one special?

## **Space and Time**

Since we experience the actual world as full of physical objects, Leibniz provided a detailed account of the nature of bodies. As Descartes had correctly noted, the essence of matter is that it is spatially extended. But since every extended thing, no matter how small, is in principle divisible into even smaller parts, it is apparent that all material objects are compound beings made up of simple elements. But from this Leibniz concluded that the ultimate constituents of the world must be simple, indivisible, and therefore unextended, particles—dimensionless mathematical points. So the entire world of extended matter is in reality constructed from simple immaterial substances, monads, or entelechies.

In fact, Leibniz held that neither space nor time is a fundamental feature of reality. Of course individual substances stand in spatial relation to each other, but relations of this sort are reducible

in logic to the non-relational features of windowless monads. In exactly the same way, temporal relations can be logically analyzed as the timeless properties of individual monads. Space and time are unreal, but references to spatial location and temporal duration provide a convenient short-hand for keeping track of the relations among the consistent set of monads which is the actual world.

What is at work here again is Leibniz's notion of complete individual substances, each of which mirrors every other. A monad not only contains all of its own past, present, and future features but also, by virtue of a complex web of spatio-temporal references, some representation of every other monad, each of which in turn contains in a universe of windowless mirrors, each reflects any other, along with its reflections of every other, and so on ad infinitum. It is for this reason that an infinite analysis would be required to reveal the otherwise implicit identity at the heart of every truth of fact. In order fully to understand the simple fact that my eyes are brown, one would have to consider the eye-color of all of my ancestors, the anatomical structure of the iris, my personal ophthalmological history, the culturally-defined concept of color, the poetical associations of dark eyes, etc., etc., etc.; the slightest difference in any one of these things would undermine the truth of this matter of fact. Existential assertions presuppose the reality of just this one among all possible worlds as the actual world.

### **The Best of All Possible Worlds**

Both in the *Monadology* and at the more popular level of presentation that characterizes the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz (like Descartes) resolved some of the most thorny philosophical problems by reference to god. God (alone) exists necessarily, and everything else flows from the divine nature. Limited only by contradiction, god first conceives of every possible world—the world with just one monad; the worlds with exactly two monads; those with three, with seventeen, with five billion, etc. Then god simply chooses which of them to create.

Of course even god must have a sufficient reason for actualizing this world rather than any other. The most direct advantage of this world is that (as the plenum principle requires) it is the fullest. That is, more things exist and/or more events actually take place in this world than in any other consistent set of interrelated monads. In a more lofty tone, Leibniz declared that a benevolent god would choose to create whatever possible world contained the smallest amount of evil; hence (in a phrase that would later be mocked by Voltaire) this is "the best of all possible worlds," according to Leibniz. Nothing about it could be changed without making things worse rather than better on the whole.

Similarly, the existence of a benevolent god can be used to account for the smooth operation of a universe that consists of indefinitely many distinct individual substances, none of which have any causal influence over any other. A crucial element of god's creative activity, Leibniz held, is the establishment of a "pre-established harmony" among all existing things. Like well-made clocks that have been synchronized, wound, and set in motion together, the monads that make up our world are independent, self-contained, purely active beings whose features coincide without any genuine interaction among them.

One special case of this pre-established harmony, of course, accounts for the apparent interaction of mind and body in a human being as nothing more than the perfect parallelism of their functions. In fact, the human mind is just the dominant member of a local cluster of monads which

collectively constitute the associated human body. Neither has any real effect on the other, but these monads are most clearly reflected in each others' foreground. Thus, in both sensation and volition, the divinely-ordained coincidence of bodily movements and mental thoughts creates an illusion of genuine causal influence.

### **Problem of freedom**

The possibility human knowledge emerges more clearly from a slightly more technical account of Leibniz's position. All monads have the capacity for perception of the external world in the sense that, as complete individual substances, each of them contains as properties unconscious images of its spatio-temporal relations to everything else. These innate ideas constitute the unique point of view from which any monad may be said to represent the world as a whole.

But Leibniz held that some monads—namely, the souls of animals and human beings—also have conscious apperception in the sense that they are capable of employing sensory ideas as representations of physical things outside themselves. And a very few monads—namely, spirits such as ourselves and god—possess the even greater capacity of self-consciousness, of which genuine knowledge is the finest example. Although Leibniz himself did not draw the inference directly, notice that if a cluster of dimensionless monads can make up an extended body, it might be equally possible for a cluster of unconscious monads to constitute a thinking thing.

What Leibniz did claim is that we have the free will required for moral responsibility even though all of our future actions are already contained in us (along with the future of the entire actual world). Any awareness of those contingent future actions would follow from the principle of sufficient reason only upon an infinite analysis of my nature. Hence, since I lack knowledge of what I will do tomorrow, it will seem to me as if I act freely when I do it. Like space and time, freedom is a benevolent illusion that adequately provides for life in an uncertain world.

### **Concluding note on the Rationalists**

Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz illustrate well the range of diverse outcomes that may result from an effort to understand the world through a priori knowledge. If their systems of thought seem implausibly remote from the world of ordinary experience, it may help to remember that modern science leads to a similar result. Once we grant that the reality of things may be quite different from the way they appear to us, only the internal coherence of the scheme of thought makes much difference.

### **Proofs for the existence of God**

The core idea of the ontological proof is to show that the concept of existence is somehow contained in the concept of God, and that therefore God's existence can be logically derived – without any further assumptions about the external world – from the very idea, or definition, of God. Now, G.W. Leibniz has argued repeatedly that the traditional versions of the ontological proof are not fully conclusive, because they rest on the tacit assumption that the concept of God is possible, i.e. free from contradiction. A complete proof will rather have to consist of two parts. First, a proof of premise

- God is possible. Second, a demonstration of the “remarkable proposition”
- If God is possible, then God exists. The present contribution investigates an interesting paper in which Leibniz tries to prove proposition

- It will be argued that the underlying idea of God as a necessary being has to be interpreted with the help of a distinguished predicate letter 'E' (denoting the concept of existence) as follows:
- $g =df \exists x E(x)$ . Principle (2) which Leibniz considered as "the best fruit of the entire logic" can then be formalized as follows:

$$(1) \Diamond E(\exists x E(x)) \rightarrow E(\exists x E(x)).$$

At first sight, Leibniz's proof appears to be formally correct; but a closer examination reveals an ambiguity in his use of the modal notions. According to (4), the possibility of the necessary being has to be understood in the sense of something which possibly exists. However, in other places of his proof, Leibniz interprets the assumption that the necessary being is impossible in the diverging sense of something which involves a contradiction. Furthermore, Leibniz believes that an »impossible thing«,  $y$ , is such that contradictory propositions like  $F(y)$  and  $\neg F(y)$  might both be true of  $y$ .

It will be argued that the latter assumption is incompatible with Leibniz's general views about logic and that the crucial proof is better reinterpreted as dealing with the necessity, possibility, and impossibility of concepts rather than of objects. In this case, the counterpart of (2) turns out to be a theorem of Leibniz's second order logic of concepts; but in order to obtain a full demonstration of the existence of God, the counterpart of (1), i.e. the self-consistency of the concept of a necessary being, remains to be proved. In several papers dating from 1676 onwards, Leibniz explained why he considered the traditional proof of the existence of God (as invented by St. Anselm and modified by Descartes and Spinoza) as insufficient. Thus in the "Meditations on knowledge, truth, and ideas" of 1684 (which contains an extensive discussion of the basic principles of Descartes' theory of knowledge), Leibniz analyzes the "old argument for the existence of God" as follows:

The argument goes like this: Whatever follows from the idea or definition of a thing can be predicated of the thing. God is by definition the most perfect being, or the being nothing greater than which can be thought. Now, the idea of the most perfect being includes ideas of all perfections, and amongst these perfections is existence. So existence follows from the idea of God. Therefore [...]

God exists. But this argument shows only that if God is possible then it follows that he exists. For we can't safely draw conclusions from definitions unless we know first that they are real definitions, that is, that they don't include any contradictions. If a definition does harbour a contradiction, we can infer contradictory conclusions from it, which is absurd.

Hence, according to Leibniz, the traditional proof establishes the truth of the conditional statement 'If God is possible, then God exists'.

But since the possibility, i.e. the self-consistency, of an arbitrary concept  $C$  may not generally be taken for granted, a complete demonstration requires in addition a proof of the antecedent 'God is possible'.<sup>2</sup> In this connection two different conceptions of God have to be distinguished:

- (A) God as the most perfect being ("ens perfectissimum"), and
- (B) God as the necessary being ("ens necessarium"). Accordingly, a complete proof of the

existence of God will either consist of the two propositions

- (1A) The most perfect being is possible
- (2A) If the most perfect being is possible, then it exists or of the two propositions
- (1B) The necessary being is possible
- (2B) If the necessary being is possible, then it exists.

Leibniz used to illustrate the necessity of the requirement of self-consistency of a concept by means of the example of »the fastest motion« which, allegedly, "entails an absurdity": Suppose there is a wheel turning with the fastest motion. Anyone can see that if a spoke of the wheel came to poke out beyond the rim, the end of it would then be moving faster than a nail on the rim of the wheel. So the nail's motion is not the fastest, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Unfortunately, this famous example is quite inapt to illustrate the point in question, because – according to modern physics – the concept of the fastest motion doesn't contain a contradiction at all; it rather forms a cornerstone of Einstein's theory of relativity. However, in other papers Leibniz put forward more convincing examples of (implicitly) contradictory concepts such as »the greatest number« or »the greatest figure«.

Moreover, Leibniz pointed out that without the requirement of the self-consistency of the definition, the basic idea of the ontological proof might be misused to show not only the existence of a most perfect and necessary God, but similarly also the existence of a »most perfect man« or the existence of a »necessary beast«:

For example, let an entity A be defined as the absolutely necessary beast. Then one can argue that A has to exist as follows: Whatever is absolutely necessary will exist (by an indubitable axiom); now A is absolutely necessary (by definition), therefore A exists. But this is absurd, and one has to object that this definition or idea is impossible [...].

The variant of the ontological proof which makes use of the conception of the most perfect being has been investigated above all in the paper "Quod Ens Perfectissimum existit" which Leibniz composed in 1676 after having visited Spinoza in The Hague.

Leibniz's ideas about the »most perfect being« turned out to be very influential for the philosophical discussions of the 18th century, and, indeed, even for the revival of the ontological proof in the 20th century, notably by Kurt Gödel<sup>7</sup>. The present paper, however, concentrates on the second version of the proof which relies of the conception of a »necessary being«. Leibniz dealt with this topic mainly in the paper "Probatio existentiae DEI ex eius essentia" where he provided not only a short argument in favour of

- (1B) The necessary being is possible, but also an interesting, detailed proof of the conditional proposition
- (2B) If the necessary being is possible, then it exists. This proposition, which was praised by Leibniz as "one of the best fruits of the entire logic"<sup>8</sup>, will be examined in the subsequent section 2.

"Probatio existentiae DEI ex eius essentia" During his correspondence with Henning Huthmann, probably in January 1678, Leibniz devised three different versions of a "Derivation of the Existence of God from his Essence". One version was published already in 1926, while the other two variants

appeared only in 2006. 9 The most interesting variant runs as follows: Si Ens necessarium est possibile, actu existet. Nam ponamus non existere, inde ratiocinabor hoc modo:

- (i) 10 Ens Necessarium non existit, ex hypothesi.
- (ii) Quicquid non existit, illud possibile est non existere
- (iii) Quicquid possibile est non-existere illud falso dicitur non posse nonexistere
- (iv) Quicquid falso dicitur non posse non existere, illud falso dicitur esse necessarium. Nam necessarium est quod non potest non existere.
- (v) Ergo Ens necessarium falso dicitur esse necessarium.
- (vi) Quae conclusio est vel vera vel falsa.
- (vii) Si est vera, sequitur quod Ens necessarium implicet contradictionem, seu sit impossibile, quia de eo demonstrantur contradictoria, scilicet quod non sit necessarium. Conclusio enim contradictoria non nisi de re contradictionem implicante ostendi potest.
- (viii) Si est falsa, necesse est aliquam ex praemissis esse falsam. Sola autem ex praemissis falsa esse potest hypothesis, quod scilicet Ens necessarium non existat.
- (ix) Ergo concludimus Ens necessarium vel esse impossibile, vel existere.
- (x) Si ergo DEUM definiamus Ens a se, seu Ens ex cuius essentia sequitur existentia, seu Ens necessarium, sequitur DEUM si possibilis sit actu esse.

This is translated this as follows:

If the necessary being is possible, then it actually exists. For if we assume that it doesn't exist, one may reason as follows:

- (i) By hypothesis, the necessary being doesn't exist.
- (ii) Whenever something doesn't exist, it possibly doesn't exist.
- (iii) Whenever something possibly doesn't exist, it is falsely maintained to be impossible not to exist.
- (iv) Whenever something is falsely maintained to be impossible not to exist, then it is falsely maintained to be necessary. (For necessary is what is impossible not to exist.)
- (v) Therefore the necessary being is falsely maintained to be necessary.
- (vi) This conclusion is either true or false.
- (vii) If it is true, it follows that the necessary being contains a contradiction, or is impossible, because contradictory assertions have been proved about it, namely that it is not necessary. For a contradictory conclusion can only be shown about a thing which implies a contradiction.
- (viii) If it is false, necessarily one of the premises must be false. But the only premise that might be false is the hypothesis saying that the necessary being doesn't exist.
- (ix) Hence we conclude that the necessary being either is impossible, or it exists.
- (x) So if we define GOD as an "Ens a se", i.e. a being from whose essence its existence follows, i.e. a necessary being, it follows that GOD, if he is possible, actually exists.

### **Formalization and Logical Analysis of the "Probatio"**

In order to analyze the validity of Leibniz's proof, it must first be clarified how the idea of the possibility of God and the idea of a necessary being may be represented within the framework of modern logic. The modal operators of necessity,  $\Box$ , and possibility,  $\Diamond$ , are usually applicable only to propositions, but not to objects. Now, as Leibniz explained at the beginning of the Probatio, the possibility of an object,  $x$ , shall be understood as the possibility of  $x$ 's existence which in turn may

also be equated with x's essence.

Since, moreover, Leibniz considers 'existence' as a normal property, it may be represented by a distinguished predicate letter, say 'E'. If the name 'God' is abbreviated by an individual constant, say 'g', then the proposition 'God exists' takes the form 'E(g)', while the proposition 'God is possible', i.e. 'God possibly exists', can be formalized by ' $\diamond E(g)$ '. In sum, then, Leibniz's "remarkable proposition" 'If God is possible, then he exists' may be transformed into formula

$$(2) \diamond E(g) \rightarrow E(g).$$

Now just like a possible object is interpreted as an object which possibly exists, the traditional idea of God as a »necessary being« has to be interpreted as a being which necessarily exists. Thus in a marginal note to the Probatio, Leibniz paraphrased the "Ens necessarium" as an "Ens necessario existens". Therefore one may define

$$(3) g =_{df} \iota x E(x).$$

The crucial variant of (2), which Leibniz considered as the "best fruit of the entire logic", can hence be formalized as follows:

$$(4) \diamond E(\iota x E(x)) \rightarrow E(\iota x E(x)).$$

This formula is in full accordance with Leibniz's paraphrase „Si Ens necessario existens est possibile, utique actu existet“ (A II, 1, 588, fn. 1). Anyway, we are now in a position to formalize Leibniz's proof as follows:

- (i)  $\neg E(\iota x E(x))$  "By hypothesis, the necessary being doesn't exist."
- (ii)  $\Lambda x (\neg E(x) \rightarrow \diamond \neg E(x))$  "Whenever something doesn't exist, it possibly doesn't exist."
- (iii)  $\Lambda x (\diamond \neg E(x) \rightarrow \neg(\neg \diamond \neg E(x)))$  "Whenever something possibly doesn't exist, it is falsely maintained to be impossible not to exist."
- (iv)  $\Lambda x (\neg(\neg \diamond \neg E(x)) \rightarrow \neg E(x))$  "Whenever something is falsely maintained to be impossible not to exist, then it is falsely maintained to be necessary."
- (v)  $\neg E(\iota x E(x))$

"Therefore the necessary being is falsely maintained to be necessary." This first part of the Probatio is logically impeccable. It starts with the assumption (i), from which (ii) may be derived according to the well-known principle that, what is a fact, or is true, also must be possible ("ab esse ad posse valet consequentia"). (iii) contains an application of the principle of double negation ("duplex negatio affirmat"), while (iv) is based on the equivalence between 'necessarily p' and 'not possibly not-p'. Hence (i) logically entail (v)

However, (v) doesn't yet represent the desired proof of (4), for (v) only says (by logical contraposition) that the negation of (v), i.e.  $E(\iota x E(x))$ , entails the negation of (i), i.e.  $\neg E(\iota x E(x))$ . This inference constitutes an instance of the well-known schema  $p \rightarrow p$ , i.e. the traditional principle "ab necesse ad esse valet consequentia". What has, however, to be shown is that the same conclusion,  $E(\iota x E(x))$ , already follows from the much weaker premise  $\diamond E(\iota x E(x))$ , or (again by logical contraposition):

(β) (i) logically entails  $\neg\Diamond E(\iota x E(x))$ . Leibniz attempted to justify the stronger inference (β) as follows. According to the well-known principle “tertium non datur”, one has:

(vi)  $\neg E(\iota x E(x)) \vee \neg\neg E(\iota x E(x))$  “This conclusion [(v)] is either true or false.” Next it is argued:  
 $\neg E(\iota x E(x)) \rightarrow (\iota x E(x) \text{ is impossible})$ <sup>13</sup> “If it [(v)] is true, it follows that the necessary being contains a contradiction, or is impossible”.

$\neg\neg E(\iota x E(x)) \rightarrow E(\iota x E(x))$  “If it [(v)] is false, necessarily one of the premises must be false. But the only premise that might be false is hypothesis [i] saying that the necessary being doesn’t exist.” In view of (vi), the two results (vii) and (viii) taken together yield:

(ix)  $(\iota x E(x) \text{ is impossible}) \vee E(\iota x E(x))$  “Hence we conclude that the necessary being either is impossible, or it exists.” Finally, Leibniz rounds off his proof by paraphrasing (ix) as follows:

(x)  $(\iota x E(x) \text{ is possible}) \rightarrow E(\iota x E(x))$  “So if we define GOD as [...] a necessary being, it follows that GOD, if he is possible, actually exists.”

At first sight, also the second part of the Probatio appears to be logically correct, but upon closer inspection two problems become visible. First, step (vii) of the proof has not yet been sufficiently justified. It remains to be shown in which sense the assumption that the necessary being doesn’t necessarily exist,  $\neg E(\iota x E(x))$ , entails a contradiction. This point will be scrutinized in section 5.

Second, within the Probatio Leibniz uses the notion of possibility in an ambiguous way. According to the explanation given at the beginning of this section, the possibility of an entity x has to be understood in the sense of something which possibly exists,  $\Diamond E(x)$ .

However, in connection with steps (vii)-(x), Leibniz interprets the assumption that the necessary being is impossible in the diverging sense of an entity which involves a contradiction; and it is far from evident whether these two notions coincide with one another. The following section is devoted to the question whether the latter notion of an »impossible object« does make sense at all. The Problem of »Impossible objects« In step (vii) of the above proof, Leibniz maintained that “a contradictory conclusion can only be shown about a thing which implies a contradiction”.

Towards the end of the Probatio, he explains more exactly that an entity, y, is impossible if and only if “contradictory propositions” are true about y, and he argues that some such »impossible objects« do really exist: It is worthwhile noting here that a conclusion which entails a contradiction can nevertheless be true, namely if it is about an impossible thing. E.g., ‘A square circle is not a circle’. This proposition, although contradictory, is true, for it can be correctly derived from true premises as follows:

A square is not a circle  
A square circle is square  
Hence, A square circle is not a circle.<sup>14</sup> take a closer look at this inference which admits of at least two different interpretations! It appears quite natural to understand both the premises and the conclusion as universal propositions. In this case the syllogism (or better: quasi- syllogism)<sup>15</sup> amounts to the following inference: P1 Whatever is a square is not a circle

P2 Whatever is a square circle is a square  
K Whatever is a square circle is not a circle  
Letting ‘S’

and 'C' abbreviate the predicates 'is a square' and 'is a circle', respectively, the inference can be formalized as follows:

P1  $\forall x(S(x) \rightarrow \neg C(x))$

P2  $\forall x(S(x) \wedge C(x) \rightarrow S(x))$

K1  $\forall x(S(x) \wedge C(x) \rightarrow \neg C(x))$

This inference is logically valid and all its premises are true, for P1 is an analytic truth while P2 is a tautology. Furthermore, the conclusion K1 is somehow contradictory where its contradictoriness becomes more explicit if one considers the tautology  $\forall x(S(x) \wedge C(x) \rightarrow C(x))$  which, in addition to K1, yields the strengthened formula:

K2 =  $\forall x(S(x) \wedge C(x) \rightarrow C(x) \wedge \neg C(x))$ .

So Leibniz's claim, that one may derive a contradictory conclusion from true premises, turns out to be, at least somehow, correct. However, proposition K2 is not strictly contradictory, because it only maintains that if there were a square circle, y, then y would possess the contradictory properties of both being a circle and not being a circle. But since K2 is only a conditional, it doesn't entail the existence of an »impossible object« y such that  $C(y) \wedge \neg C(y)$ . In order to obtain a genuine inconsistency, one might resort to an alternative interpretation of the syllogism where the second premise "circulus quadratus est quadratus" is now taken in the sense of the particular proposition 'Some square circles are squares'. In terms of first order logic, this inference (of type "Ferio") would have to be formalized as follows:

P1  $\forall x(S(x) \rightarrow \neg C(x))$  P3  $\exists x(S(x) \wedge C(x) \wedge S(x))$  K3  $\exists x(S(x) \wedge C(x) \wedge \neg C(x))$

In this case, K3 represents an outright inconsistency, but this conclusion has no longer been inferred, as Leibniz maintained, entirely from "true propositions". Unlike P2, premise P3 is no longer a tautology. As a matter of fact, it is not true at all, for it entails the existence of an object, x, which would be both a square and a circle:

$\exists x(S(x) \wedge C(x))$ .

But this existential proposition directly negates the content of the other premise P1, namely, that whatever is a square can't (also) be a circle! Hence the above syllogism turns out to contain two logically incompatible premises, and it is small wonder that from this inconsistent pair of propositions another inconsistency, namely K3, can be logically derived. So Leibniz' argument fails to show that there exists an »impossible object« y such that contradictory propositions would be true about y.

Let it be mentioned in passing that the assumption of »impossible objects« would also be in conflict with the basic principles of classical, two-valued logic which Leibniz adheres to in all his later writings. Thus, e.g., in a paper of around 1686, he defended the principle of non-contradiction as follows: Above all I assume all propositions (both the affirmative and the negative ones) to be either true or false. If an affirmation is true, then the negation is false, and if the negation is true, then the affirmation is false [...] All this is usually understood by the Principle of Contradiction (Cf. GP 7, 299). Hence the assumption of a proposition which would be both true ('Square y is round') and false ('Square y is not round') contradicts this highest principle of reason.

Furthermore, for Leibniz the principle of non-contradiction is an indispensable basis for his construction of logical proofs. Thus in the fragment “De Principiis” he concisely emphasized: *Identica sunt vera, et contradictionem implicantia sunt falsa*, i.e. identical propositions are logically true, while propositions which entail a contradiction are logically false (Cf. C, 183). 5 Reconsideration of the “Probatio” (without Recourse to »Impossible Objects«) As has already been stressed in section 3, assumption (i), i.e.  $\neg E(\exists x E(x))$ , logically entails (v), i.e.  $\neg E(\exists x E(x))$ , which Leibniz considers as contradictory. The (alleged) inconsistency of this proposition is then used by Leibniz to conclude that its subject, i.e. the necessary being, must be an »impossible object«. But in view of the discussion of the foregoing section, such a detour (from an impossible proposition to an »impossible object«) is extremely problematic and should better be avoided. Why shouldn't we just stop at the inconsistency of proposition (v) and infer – by “reductio ad absurdum” – that the hypothesis (i), from which (v) was derived, therefore must be false? Briefly speaking, one might be tempted to simplify the Probatio as follows: (α) (i) logically entails (v) (γ) (v) is contradictory because it attributes to the necessary being the property of not being necessary. Hence (δ) Assumption (i), saying that the necessary being does not exist, must be false, i.e. the necessary being exists:  $E(\exists x E(x))$ . Alas, this argument – if valid – would not only constitute a proof of Leibniz's conditional thesis (2B) If the necessary being is possible, then it exists; but even a proof of the categorical proposition that the necessary being exists. So what about Leibniz's notorious claim that the usual versions of the ontological proof are incomplete and have to be supplemented by a proof of premise

(1B) ‘The necessary being is possible’? Well, the point is that our shortened »proof« contains the same grave mistake that is also hidden in step (vii) of the Probatio, namely the claim that (v) is a contradictory proposition. As a matter of fact, (v) »only« maintains that the necessarily existing being does not necessarily exist, formally  $\neg E(\exists x E(x))$ .

Although this proposition is rather strange, it is not strictly self-contradictory. In order to obtain a genuine contradiction, one would need an additional premise which Leibniz evidently took for granted, namely the assumption that the necessarily existing being (so-to-speak »by definition«) exists necessarily:

(xi)  $E(\exists x E(x))$ . Now there are basically two strategies to cope with this situation. First, one might try to find an additional proof for this formula; or, second, one might treat (xi) as an additional premise. In the latter case, however, Leibniz's entire proof would become severely circular. After all, the aim of the Probatio was to show that if the necessary being is possible, then it exists. If one now introduces (xi) as an additional premise, this would mean that one presupposes that the necessary being exists necessarily. From this assumption, of course, one may trivially infer<sup>16</sup> that the necessary being exists simpliciter,  $E(\exists x E(x))$ ; and a fortiori one may derive Leibniz's conditional thesis

(2B),  $\Diamond E(\exists x E(x)) \rightarrow E(\exists x E(x))!$

Such an argument really doesn't deserve the name of a proof. So let us see whether one may perhaps prove formula

(xi)! After all, in modern calculi of first order logic with identity and definite descriptions, one usually has an axiom like (DD)  $\Phi(\exists x \Phi(x))$ , which guarantees that (under a certain presupposition

not spelled out in DD) the  $\Phi$ , i.e. the one and only thing with property  $\Phi$ , trivially does have property  $\Phi$ . So if we substitute for  $\Phi$  the condition of necessary existence,  $E(x)$ , we obtain the desired result

(xi),  $E(\iota x E(x))$ . However, the crucial presupposition for the validity of DD says that the respective definite description term  $\iota x \Phi(x)$  satisfies the normal condition which means that there exists exactly one object  $x$  with property  $\Phi$ ! In the case of  $E(x)$ , this normal condition amounts to the existence and uniqueness of an  $x$  necessarily exists. Notwithstanding the question how the uniqueness of a necessary being, i.e.  $\forall x \forall y (E(x) \wedge E(y) \rightarrow x = y)$ , might ever be proved, it seems clear that the requirement of the existence of a necessary being,

(xii)  $\exists x(E(x))$ , again renders Leibniz's proof circular. However, this charge of circularity may perhaps turn out to be premature because there is a subtle ambiguity between the notion of existence as used in the consequent of (x), on the one hand, and in the additional premise (xiii), needed to validate the application of DD, on the other hand. In the former case, God's existence, i.e. the existence of the "Ens necessarium", is formalized by means of the predicate of existence as  $E(\iota x E(x))$ , while in the latter case an existential quantifier is used to express the existence of (at least one) entity  $x$  which falls under the predicate of necessary existence,  $\exists x(E(x))$ . In order to investigate this point a bit further, we now introduce an entirely different interpretation of the Probatio as based on Leibniz's own logic.

### Interpretation of the "Probatio" within the Framework of Leibniz's Logic

The text of the Probatio dates from 1676, while Leibniz's ripe logic of concepts was developed only between 1679 and 1690. The essentials of the algebra of concepts (L1) plus its quantifier extension (L2) before reconsidering Leibniz's main ideas about the ontological proof.

#### The Algebra of Concepts L1

The algebra of concepts grows out of the framework of 17th century syllogistic by three achievements. First, Leibniz drops the quantifier expression 'every' and formulates the universal affirmative proposition 'Every A is B' simply as 'A is B' or, equivalently, as 'A contains B'.

This fundamental proposition shall here be symbolized as  $A \in B$  while its negation will be abbreviated as  $A \notin B$ . Second, Leibniz introduces an operator of conceptual conjunction which combines two concepts A and B into AB (sometimes also written as "A+B"). Third, Leibniz allows the unrestricted use of conceptual negation ("Not-A") which shall here be symbolized as  $\sim A$ . Hence, in particular, one can form the inconsistent concept  $A \sim A$  and its tautological counterpart  $\sim(A \sim A)$ . Identity or coincidence of concepts may be defined as mutual containment: DEF 1 ( $A = B$ ) =df ( $A \in B$ )  $\wedge$  ( $B \in A$ ).

Alternatively, the algebra of concepts might be built up with '=' as a primitive operator while ' $\in$ ' is defined by DEF 2 ( $A \in B$ ) =df ( $A = AB$ ).

Another important operator may be introduced by definition. Concept B is possible if B does not contain a contradiction like  $A \sim A$ : DEF 3 P(B) =df ( $B \notin A \sim A$ ).

Leibniz uses many different locutions to express the self-consistency of a concept. Instead of 'A is possible' ("A est possibile") he often says 'A is a thing' ("A est res"), or 'A is a being' ("A est ens"). In

the opposite case of an impossible concept he sometimes calls A a »false term« (“terminus falsus”). Identity can be axiomatized by the law of reflexivity in conjunction with the rule of substitutivity: IDEN 1  $A = A$  IDEN 2 If  $A = B$ , then  $\alpha[A] \leftrightarrow \alpha[B]$ .

The containment relation is characterized by the following laws of reflexivity and transitivity:

CONT 1  $A \in A$

CONT 2  $A \in B \wedge B \in C \rightarrow A \in C$ .

The most fundamental principle for the operator of conceptual conjunction says: “That A contains B and A contains C is the same as that A contains BC” (cf. LLP, 58,fn. 4), i.e.: CONJ 1  $A \in BC \leftrightarrow A \in B \wedge A \in C$ .

Conjunction then satisfies the following laws:

CONJ 2  $AA = A$  CONJ 3  $AB = BA$  CONJ 4  $AB \in A$

CONJ 5  $AB \in B$ .

The next operator is conceptual negation. Leibniz had serious problems with finding the proper laws governing this operator. From the tradition, he knew little more than the “law of double negation”:

NEG 1  $\sim\sim A = A$ .

One important step towards a complete theory of conceptual negation was to transform the informal principle of contraposition, ‘Every A is B, therefore Every Not-B is Not-A’ into the following axiom of L1:

NEG 2  $A \in B \leftrightarrow \sim B \in \sim A$ .

Furthermore Leibniz discovered various variants of a “law of consistency”:

NEG 3  $A \neq \sim A$

NEG 4  $A = B \rightarrow A \neq \sim B$ .

NEG 5\*  $A \notin \sim A$

NEG 6\*  $A \in B \rightarrow A \notin \sim B$ .<sup>18</sup>

Principles NEG 5\* and NEG 6\* have been marked with a ‘\*’ in order to indicate that the laws as stated by Leibniz are not absolutely valid but have to be restricted to self-consistent terms:

NEG 5  $P(A) \rightarrow A \notin \sim A$

NEG 6  $P(A) \rightarrow (A \in B \rightarrow A \notin \sim B)$ .

The following two laws describe some characteristic relations between the possibility-operator P and the other operators of L1:

POSS 1  $A \in B \wedge P(A) \rightarrow P(B)$  POSS 2  $A \in B \leftrightarrow \neg P(A \sim B)$ .

All these principles have been discovered by Leibniz himself who thus provided an almost complete axiomatization of L1. As a matter of fact, the »intensional« algebra of concept can be proven to be equivalent to Boole’s extensional algebra of sets provided that one adds the following counterpart of the “ex contradictorio quolibet”:

NEG 7  $(A \sim A) \in B$ .

As regards the fundamental relation  $A \in B$ , it is important to observe that Leibniz's standard formulation 'A contains B' expresses the so-called »intensional« view, while we here want to develop an extensional interpretation in terms of the sets of individuals that fall under the concepts. Leibniz explained the mutual relationship between these two points of view in the following passage from the "New Essays on Human understanding":

The common manner of statement concerns individuals, whereas Aristotle's refers rather to ideas or universals. For when I say 'Every man is an animal' I mean that all the men are included among all the animals; but at the same time I mean that the idea of animal is included in the idea of man. 'Animal' comprises more individuals than 'man' does, but 'man' comprises more ideas or more attributes: one has more instances, the other more degrees of reality; one has the greater extension, the other the greater intension. If 'Int(A)' and 'Ext(A)' abbreviate the »intension« and the extension of a concept A, respectively, then the so-called law of reciprocity can be formalized as follows:

RECI  $\text{Int}(A) \subseteq \text{Int}(B) \leftrightarrow \text{Ext}(A) \supseteq \text{Ext}(B)$ .

From this it immediately follows that two concepts A, B have the same »intension« iff they have the same extension. This somewhat surprising result might seem to unveil an inadequacy of Leibniz's conception. However, »intensionality« in the sense of traditional logic must not be mixed up with intensionality in the modern sense. Furthermore, in Leibniz's view, the extension of a concept A is not just the set of actually existing individuals, but rather the set of all possible individuals that fall under concept A. Therefore one may define the concept of an extensional interpretation of L1 as follows:

DEF 4 Let U be a non-empty set (the domain of all possible individuals); let  $\varphi$  be a function such that  $\varphi(A) \subseteq U$  for each concept-letter A; and let V be a valuation function which assigns to each proposition  $\alpha$  of L1 a truth-value  $V(\alpha)$ . Then is an extensional interpretation of L1 if and only if:

- (1)  $\varphi(AB) = \varphi(A) \cap \varphi(B)$ ;
- (2)  $\varphi(\sim A) = \text{complement of } \varphi(A)$ ;
- (3)  $V(A \in B) = \text{true}$  iff  $\varphi(A) \subseteq \varphi(B)$ ;
- (4)  $V(P(A)) = \text{true}$  iff  $\varphi(A) \neq \emptyset$ .

According to (1), an individual x belongs to the extension of the conjunctive concept AB just in case x belongs to the extension of both concepts (and hence to their intersection). According to (2), the extension of the negative concept  $\sim A$  is the set of all individuals which do not fall under concept A. Condition (3) is a straightforward formalization of the law of reciprocity, while (4) says that a concept A is possible if and only if it has a non-empty extension.

At first sight, the latter requirement might appear to be somewhat inadequate, since there are certain concepts – such as that of a unicorn – which happen to be empty but which may nevertheless be regarded as possible, i.e. not involving a contradiction. However, the universe of discourse underlying the extensional interpretation of L1 does not consist of actually existing

objects only, but instead comprises all possible individuals.

Therefore the non-emptiness of the extension of A is both necessary and sufficient for the self-consistency of A. Clearly, if A is possible, then there must be at least one possible individual x that falls under concept A. It has often been noted that Leibniz's logic of concepts lacks the operator of disjunction. Although this is by and large correct, it doesn't imply any defect of the system L1 because the operator  $A \vee B$  may be introduced by definition: DEF 5  $A \vee B =_{df} \sim(\sim A \sim B)$ . On the background of the above axioms of negation and conjunction, the following standard laws become provable:

DISJ 1  $A \in (A \vee B)$

DISJ 2  $B \in (A \vee B)$

DISJ 3  $A \in C \wedge B \in C \rightarrow (A \vee B) \in C$ .

The Quantificational System L2

The quantifier logic L2 emerges from L1 by the introduction of so-called »indefinite concepts«. These concepts are symbolized by letters from the end of the alphabet X, Y, Z ..., and they function as quantifiers ranging over concepts. Thus in § 16 of the "General Inquiries" Leibniz explained: An affirmative proposition is 'A is B' or 'A contains B' [...].

That is, if we substitute the value for A, one obtains 'A coincides with BY'. For example, 'Man is an animal', i.e. 'Man' is the same as 'a ... animal' (namely, 'Man' is 'rational animal'). For by the sign 'Y' I mean something undetermined, so that 'BY' is the same as 'Some B', or 'A ... animal' [...], or 'A certain animal'. So 'A is B' is the same as 'A coincides with some B', i.e. 'A = BY'. With the help of the modern symbol for the existential quantifier, the latter law can be expressed more precisely as follows:

CONT 3  $A \in B \leftrightarrow \exists Y(A = BY)$ .

As Leibniz himself noted, the formalization of the UA according to CONT 3 is provably equivalent to the simpler representation according to DEF 2.20 On the one hand, according to the rule of existential generalization,

EXIST 1 If  $a \in [A]$ , then  $\exists Y a \in [Y]$ ,

$A = AB$  immediately entails  $\exists Y(A = YB)$ . On the other hand, if there exists some Y such that  $A = YB$ , then trivially also  $AB = YBB$ , i.e.  $AB = YB$  and hence (because of the premise  $A = YB$ )  $AB = A$ .<sup>21</sup> Next observe that Leibniz often used to formalize the PA 'Some A is B' by means of the indefinite concept Y as 'YA ∈ B'. In view of CONT 3, this representation may be transformed into the (elliptic) equation  $YA = ZB$ . However, both formalizations are somewhat inadequate because they are easily seen to be theorems of L2! According to CONJ 4,  $BA \in B$ , hence by EXIST 1:

CONJ 6  $\exists Y(YA \in B)$ .

Similarly, since, according to CONJ 3,  $AB = BA$ , a twofold application of EXIST 1 yields: CONJ 7  $\exists Y \exists Z(YA = BZ)$ .

These tautologies, of course, cannot adequately represent the PA which for an appropriate choice of concepts A and B may become false! In order to resolve these difficulties, consider a draft of a calculus probably written between 1686 and 1690, where Leibniz proved principle:

$$\text{NEG } 8^* A \notin B \leftrightarrow \exists Y(YA \in \sim B).$$

On the one hand, it is interesting to see that after first formulating the right hand side of the equivalence, »as usual«, in the elliptic way 'YA is Not-B', Leibniz later paraphrased it by means of the explicit quantifier expression "there exists a Y such that YA is Not-B"<sup>22</sup>. On the other hand, Leibniz discovered that NEG 8\* has to be improved by requiring more exactly that YA is possible, i.e. Y must be compatible with A:

$$\text{NEG } 8 A \notin B \leftrightarrow \exists Y(P(YA) \wedge YA \in \sim B).$$

In Leibniz's logical fragments there are only a few passages where indefinite concepts function as universal quantifiers. E.g., in C, 260 Leibniz put forward principle "(15) 'A is B' is the same as 'If Y is A, it follows that Y is B'" which clearly has to be understood as:

$$\text{CONT } 4 A \in B \leftrightarrow \forall Y(Y \in A \rightarrow Y \in B).$$

Furthermore, in § 32 GI, Leibniz at least vaguely recognized that just as  $A \in B$  (according to CONJ 6) is equivalent to  $\exists Y(A = YB)$ , so the negation  $A \notin B$  means that, for any indefinite concept Y,  $A \neq BY$ :  
 $\text{CONT } 5 A \notin B \leftrightarrow \forall Y(A \neq YB)$ .

Anyway, with the help of the universal quantifier '∀' one can formalize Leibniz's conception of individual concepts as maximally-consistent concepts in the following way:

$$\text{DEF } 6 \text{Ind}(A) \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} P(A) \wedge \forall Y(P(AY) \rightarrow A \in Y).$$

Hence A is an individual concept iff A is self-consistent and A contains every concept Y which is compatible with A. The underlying idea of the completeness of individual concepts had been formulated in § 72 GI as follows: "So if BY is [»being«], and the indefinite term Y is superfluous, i.e., in the way that 'a certain Alexander the Great' and 'Alexander the Great' are the same, then B is an individual. If the term BA is [»being«] and if B is an individual, then A will be superfluous; or if BA=C, then B=C".<sup>25</sup> It should be noted that DEF 6 can be simplified by requiring that, for each concept Y, A either contains Y or contains ~Y:

$$\text{IND } 1 \text{Ind}(A) \leftrightarrow \forall Y(A \in \sim Y \leftrightarrow A \notin Y).$$

As a corollary it follows that the invalid principle  $\text{NEG } 9^* A \notin B \rightarrow A \in \sim B$ , which Leibniz again and again had considered as valid, in fact holds only for individual concepts:

$$\text{NEG } 9 \text{Ind}(A) \rightarrow (A \notin B \rightarrow A \in \sim B).$$

The definition of individual concepts, DEF 6, is semantically correct. If the idea of an extensional interpretation of L1 according to DEF 4 is duly extended to the quantifier logic L2, then the following condition becomes provable:

$V(\text{Ind}(A)) = \text{true}$  iff there exists a  $x \in U$  such that  $\Phi(A) = \{x\}$ . Hence the extension of an individual-concept  $A$  is just a unit-set containing the corresponding (possible) individual  $a \in U$ . With the help of the operator 'Ind', a second sort of quantifiers ranging over »individuals« (i.e., more exactly, over individual-concepts) may be introduced as follows:

DEF 7  $\forall X \alpha =_{df} \exists X(\text{Ind}(X) \wedge \alpha) \wedge X \alpha =_{df} \forall X(\text{Ind}(X) \rightarrow \alpha)$ .

E.g., the proposition  $\forall X(X \in B)$  now says that there is at least one individual concept  $X$  such that  $X$  contains  $B$ . This condition holds whenever concept  $B$  is self-consistent:

POSS 3  $P(B) \leftrightarrow \forall X(X \in B)$ .

Principle POSS 3 syntactically mirrors the semantic postulate (4) of DEF 4 according to which concept  $B$  is possible if and only if there is at least one possible individual  $x$  which belongs to the extension of  $B$ . Note that whenever  $A$  is an individual concept, then formula  $A \in C$  is so-to-speak the »intensional counterpart« of the »extensional« formula of first order logic,  $C(a)$ , which attributes property  $C$  to the individual  $a$ . Furthermore, the universal affirmative proposition  $B \in C$  may not only be paraphrased by  $\forall X(X \in B \rightarrow X \in C)$  (see principle CONT 4 above), but also by means of the new »object« quantifier ' $\wedge$ ' as follows:

CONT 5  $B \in C \leftrightarrow \wedge X(X \in B \rightarrow X \in C)$ .

Again, the formula on the right hand side,  $\wedge X(X \in B \rightarrow X \in C)$ , represents the »intensional counterpart« of the corresponding »extensional« formula of first order logic,  $\wedge x(B(x) \rightarrow C(x))$ .

the ontological proof, however, such an assumption may not simply be taken for granted! As was stressed at the beginning of this paper, Leibniz had repeatedly pointed out that a complete proof of the existence of God requires ademonstration of the premise that God is possible:

GOD 1  $P(G)$ .

Since, according to POSS 3, this premise is equivalent to the formula  $\forall X(X \in G)$ , it might seem that a proof of GOD 1 is already sufficient for the demonstration of the existence of God. After all, this formula is normally understood as saying that there »exists« an individual-concept  $X$  such that  $X$  is God. However, the range of the quantifier ' $\forall X$ ' is the universe of all possible individuals and not just the domain of all existing objects! Therefore ' $\forall X(X \in G)$ ' only means that there is some possible object  $X$  which has the property of a God while the issue of the ontological proof is whether such a possible God actually exists! Within the framework of L2, the real existence of God will rather have to be expressed by means of the »predicate« (or concept) of existence,  $E$ , in the form ' $G \in E$ '. The second part of the ontological proof can then be formalized as follows:

GOD 2  $P(G) \rightarrow G \in E$ .

It turned out, somewhat surprisingly, that GOD 2 is indeed a theorem of L2, provided that the concept of God is more specifically interpreted as an "Ens necessarium", i.e. as a being which necessarily exists. This traditional conception of God can be captured within L2 by the following definition:

GOD 3  $\wedge X(X \in G \leftrightarrow_{df} (X \in E))$ .

We must abstain from reproducing the proof of GOD 2 here because it rests on some further logical constructions (such as the idea of possible worlds as maximal collections of compossible individuals) which clearly exceed the scope of this paper.<sup>27</sup> Suffice it to say that the other part of the proof, GOD 1, turns out not to be a theorem of L2! So in the end, Leibniz's sophisticated ontological proof suffers the same fate as its various predecessors (and followers): There is no logical guarantee that God – whether conceived of as a “Ens necessarium” or as a “Ens perfectissimum – actually exists!

### **Locke: Ideas and their classification**

An extended look at philosophy in Great Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Here the favored model for achieving human knowledge was not the abstract mathematical reasoning so admired by the rationalists but the more concrete observations of natural science. Heeding the call of Francis Bacon, British scientists had pursued a vigorous program of observation and experiment with great success. Isaac Newton showed that both celestial and terrestrial motion could be explained by reference to a simple set of laws of motion and gravitation; Robert Boyle investigated the behavior of gasses and proposed a general theory of matter as a collection of corpuscles; and Thomas Sydenham began to use observational methods for the diagnosis and treatment of disease.

Philosopher John Locke greatly admired the achievements that these scientists (his friends in the Royal Society) had made in physics, chemistry, and medicine, and he sought to clear the ground for future developments by providing a theory of knowledge compatible with such carefully-conducted study of nature.

The goal of Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), then, is to establish epistemological foundations for the new science by examining the reliability, scope, and limitations of human knowledge in contrast with the pretensions of uncritical belief, borrowed opinion, and mere superstition. Since the sciences had already demonstrated their practical success, Locke tried to apply their Baconian methods to the pursuit of his own philosophical aims. In order to discover how the human understanding achieves knowledge, we must trace that knowledge to its origins in our experience.

Locke's investigation into human knowledge began by asking how we acquire the basic materials out of which that knowledge is composed, our **ideas**. For Locke, an idea is *Essay I i 8*) (Note that this is an extremely broad definition: it includes concrete sensory images, abstract intellectual concepts, and everything in between. The colors and shapes I see before me right now are ideas, and so are my hunger, my memories of the ocean, my hopes for my children, the multiplication tables, and the principles of democratic government.) Ideas, then, are the immediate objects of all thought, the meaning or signification of all words, and the mental representatives of all things. Locke's question was, where do we get all of these ideas which are the content of our knowledge?

### **Refutation of innate ideas**

First, Locke eliminated one bad answer to the question. Most of Book I of the *Essay* is devoted to a detailed refutation of the belief that any of our knowledge is innate. Against the claims of the Cambridge Platonists and Herbert of Cherbury, Locke insisted that neither the speculative principles of logic and metaphysics nor the practical principles of morality are

inscribed on our minds from birth. Such propositions do not in fact have the universal consent of all human beings, Locke argued, since children and the mentally defective do not assent to them. Moreover, even if everyone did accept these principles, their universality could be better explained in terms of self-evidence or shared experience than by reference to a presumed innate origin. Innatism is the refuge of lazy intellectual dictators who wish thereby to impose their provincial notions upon others. Besides, Locke held, our knowledge cannot be innate because none of the ideas of which it is composed are innate.

As the correct answer to the question, Locke proposed the fundamental principle of empiricism: all of our knowledge and ideas arise from experience. The initially empty room of the mind is furnished with ideas of two sorts: first, by **sensation** we obtain ideas of things we suppose to exist outside us in the physical world; second, by **reflection** we come to have ideas of our own mental operations. Thus, for example, "hard," "red," "loud," "cold," "sweet," and "aromatic" are all ideas of sensation, while "perceiving," "remembering," "abstracting," and "thinking" are all ideas of reflection. ("Pleasure," "unity," and "existence," Locke held, are ideas that come to us from both sensation and reflection.) Everything we know, everything we believe, every thought we can entertain is made up of ideas of sensation and reflection and nothing else.

But wait. It isn't true that I can think only about what I myself have experienced; I can certainly think about dinosaurs (or unicorns) even though I have never seen one for myself. So Locke's claim must be about the ultimate origin of our ideas, the source of their content. He distinguished between simple and complex ideas and acknowledged that we often employ our mental capacities in order to manufacture complex ideas by conjoining simpler components. My idea of "unicorn," for example, may be compounded from the ideas of "horse" and "single spiral horn," and these ideas in turn are compounded from less complex elements. What Locke held was that every complex idea can be analyzed into component parts and that the final elements of any complete analysis must be simple ideas, each of which is derived directly from experience. Even so, the empiricist program is an ambitious one, and Locke devoted Book II of the Essay to a lengthy effort to show that every idea could, in principle, be derived from experience.

## **Complex Ideas**

Even if the simple ideas of sensation provide us with ample material for thinking, what we make of them is largely up to us. In his survey of ideas of reflection, Locke listed a variety of mental operations that we perform upon our ideas.

Notice that in each of these sections (Essay II ix-xii), Locke defined the relevant mental operations as we experience them in ourselves, but then went on to consider carefully the extent to which other animals seem capable of performing the same activities. This procedure has different results from Descartes's doctrinal rejection of animal thinking: according to Locke, only abstraction (the operation most crucial in forming the ideas of mixed modes, on which morality depends) is utterly beyond the capacity of any animal.

Perception of ideas through the senses and retention of ideas in memory, Locke held, are passive powers of the mind, beyond our direct voluntary control and heavily dependent on the material conditions of the human body. The active powers of the mind include distinguishing, comparing, compounding, and abstracting. It is by employing these powers, Locke supposed, that we manufacture new, complex ideas from the simple elements provided by experience. The resulting

complex ideas are of three sorts: Modes are complex ideas that combine simpler elements to form a new whole that is assumed to be incapable of existing except as a part or feature of something else. The ideas of "three," "seventy-five," and even "infinity," for example, are all modes derived from the simple idea of "unity." We can understand these ideas and know their mathematical functions, whether or not there actually exist numbers of things to which they would apply in reality. "Mixed modes" similarly combine simple components without any presumption about their conformity to existing patterns, yielding all of our complex ideas of human actions and their value. Substances are the complex ideas of real particular things that are supposed to exist on their own and to account for the unity and persistence of the features they exhibit. The ideas of "my only son," "the largest planet in the solar system," and "tulips," for example, are compounded from simpler ideas of sensation and reflection. Each is the idea of a thing (or kind of thing) that could really exist on its own. Since we don't understand all of the inner workings of natural objects, Locke supposed, our complex ideas of substances usually rely heavily on their secondary qualities and powers—the effects they are observed to have on ourselves and other things.

Relation are complex ideas of the ways in which other ideas may be connected with each other, in fact or in thought. The ideas of "younger," "stronger," and "cause and effect," for example, all involve some reference to the comparison of two or more other ideas.

Locke obviously could not analyze the content of every particular idea that any individual has ever had. But his defence of the empiricist principle did require him to show in principle that any complex idea can be derived from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection. The clarity, reality, adequacy, and truth of all of our ideas, Locke supposed, depend upon the success with which they fulfill their representative function. Here, we'll consider one of the most significant and difficult examples from each category:

## **Free Action**

Among our modal ideas, Locke believed that those of mixed modes, which combine both sensory and reflective elements, are especially important, since they include the ideas of human actions and provide for their moral evaluation. Among the mixed modes, the ideas of power, volition, and liberty are the most crucial and difficult. To them Locke devoted a chapter (II xxi) that grew, with alterations in later editions, to become the longest in the Essay.

The idea of power is illustrated every time we do something. Whether we think or move, the feeling that our mental preference leads to action provides a simple instance of power. The exercise of that power is volition or will, and the action taken as a result is a voluntary one. Liberty or freedom, on Locke's view, is the power to act on our volition, whatever it may be, without any external compulsion or restraint.

Under these definitions, the question of whether we have free will does not arise for Locke, since it involves what would later come to be called a category mistake. In particular, it does not matter whether we have control over our own preferences, whether we are free to will whatever we wish. In fact, Locke offered a strictly hedonistic account of human motivation, according to which our preferences are invariably determined by the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. What does matter for freedom and moral responsibility is that we can act on our preferences, whatever their source, without any outside interference. If I could have done otherwise (given a different preference), then I act freely and am responsible for my action.

## Distinction between primary and secondary qualities

Locke began his survey of our mental contents with the simple ideas of sensation, including those of colors, sounds, tastes, smells, shapes, size, and solidity. With just a little thought about specific examples of such ideas, we notice a significant difference among them: the color of the wall in front of me seems to vary widely from time to time, depending on the light in the room and the condition of my eyes, while its solidity persists independently of such factors. Following the lead of Galileo and Boyle, Locke explained this difference in corpuscularian fashion, by reference to the different ways in which the qualities of things produce our ideas of them.

The **primary qualities** of an object are its intrinsic features, those it really has, including the "Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion" of its parts. Since these features are inseparable from the thing even when it is divided into parts too small for us to perceive, the primary qualities are independent of our perception of them. When we do perceive the primary qualities of larger objects, Locke believed, our ideas exactly resemble the qualities as they are in things.

The **secondary qualities** of an object, on the other hand, are nothing in the thing itself but the power to produce in us the ideas of "Colors, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, etc." In these cases, our ideas do not resemble their causes, which are in fact nothing other than the primary qualities of the insensible parts of things. The **powers**, or tertiary qualities, of an object are just its capacities to cause perceptible changes in other things.

Thus, for example, the primary qualities of this rose include all of its quantifiable features, its mass and momentum, its chemical composition and microscopic structure; these are the features of the thing itself. The secondary qualities of the rose, on the other hand, include the ideas it produces in me, its yellow color, its delicate fragrance; these are the merely the effects of the primary qualities of its corpuscles on my eyes and nose. Like the pain I feel when I stick my finger on a thorn, the color and smell are not features of the rose itself.

Some distinction of this sort is important for any representative realist. Many instances of perceptual illusion can be explained by reference to the way secondary qualities depend upon our sensory organs, but the possibility of accurate information about the primary qualities is preserved, at least in principle. The botanical expert may be able to achieve detailed knowledge of the nature of roses, but that knowledge is not necessary for my appreciation of their beauty.

## Theory of Substance

The idea of a particular substance is the complex idea of a set of coexisting qualities and powers, together with the supposition that there is some unknown substrate upon which they all depend. Locke is derisive about the confused idea of this something, "we know not what," that is supposed by scholastic philosophers. But he cannot eliminate the concept of substance altogether, since he, too, must account for the existence and coherence of just this group of features.

About species or kinds of substances, Locke offers a more sophisticated explanation. Our complex idea of a specific kind of substance—"gold" or "horse," for example—is the collection of features by reference to which we classify individual substances as belonging to that kind. These **nominal essences**, developed for our convenience in sorting things into kinds, rely heavily upon the secondary qualities and powers that are the most obvious features of such things in our

experience—the color, weight, and malleability of gold, for example, and the shape, noises, and movements of horses.

As a corpuscularian, Locke supposed that individual substances must also have **real essences**, the primary qualities of their insensible parts, which cause all of their qualities. But since we cannot observe the "real inner constitutions" of things, we cannot use them for purposes of classification, nor can we even understand their causal influence on our perception. Since Locke doubted that real essences could ever be discovered, he was thrown back on the supposition of an underlying reality which we cannot know.

This account imposes a severe limitation on the possibilities of our knowledge of substances. According to Locke, the mechanical operations of nature remain hidden to us. Careful observation and experimentation may support a reliable set of generalizations about the appearances of the kinds of things we commonly encounter, but we cannot even conceive of their true natures.

## **Personal Identity**

Among our ideas of relations, the strongest is that of identity. Locke held that the criteria for identity depend upon the kind of thing we are considering. Substantial identity requires the unique spatio-temporal history that is just the existence of each substance, but this is not the only consideration in all cases.

The identity of the tree outside my window, for example, does not depend on the substantial identity of its parts (in fact, they change from day to day and season to season); what matters in this case is the organization of those parts into a common life. A similar explanation, Locke held, accounts for the identity of animals and human beings. We recognize living bodies at different times by the organization of their material parts rather than by their substantial composition.

In analogous fashion, Locke explained personal identity independently of identity of substance. The idea of the person is that of a moral agent who can be held responsible for his or her actions. But Locke used a series of hypothetical examples to show that the identity of an underlying immaterial substance or soul is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity in this sense. Even the identity of the same human body (though we may rely upon that for third-person attributions of identity) is not truly relevant. The only thing that does matter, on Locke's view, is that the person self-consciously appropriates actions as its own.

This is, as Locke says, a "forensic" notion of personal identity; its aim is to secure the justice and effectiveness of moral sanctions. If, and only if, I now remember having committed a particular act in the past can I be justly punished for having done so. If, and only if, I project myself into the future can the prospect of punishment or reward influence my deliberations about how to act now. Locke's way of thinking about personal identity has shaped discussions of the issue ever since.

## **Words**

Locke devoted Book III of the Essay to a discussion of language. His basic notion is clear: words signify ideas. Thus, the meaning of a word is always the idea it signifies in the minds of those who use it. Of course, those ideas are presumed in turn to represent things, but the accuracy of that representation does not directly affect the meaning of the word. The names of substances, for example, signify the complex ideas Locke called their nominal essences, not the real nature of the

substances themselves. Thus, common names for substances are general terms by means of which we classify things as we observe them to be; we can agree upon the meaning of such terms even though we remain ignorant of the real essences of the things themselves.

The chief point of Locke's theory of language was to eliminate the verbal disputes that arise when words are used without clear signification. It is always reasonable to ask for the meaning of a word, that is, to know what idea it signifies. If a speaker cannot supply the idea behind the word, then it has no meaning. Many of the academic squabbles that obstruct advancement in human knowledge, Locke believed, could be dissolved by careful attention to the meaning of words.

### **Theory of Knowledge and three grades of knowledge**

Having provided a thorough account of the origins of our ideas in experience, Locke opens Book IV of the Essay with a deceptively simple definition of knowledge. Knowledge is just perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. We know the truth of a proposition when we become aware of the relation between the ideas it conjoins. This can occur in any of three distinct ways, each with its characteristic degree of certainty.

**Intuitive knowledge** involves direct and immediate recognition of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. It yields perfect certainty, but is only rarely available to us. I know intuitively that three is not the same as seven.

In **demonstrative knowledge** we perceive the agreement or disagreement only indirectly, by means of a series of intermediate ideas. Since demonstration is a chain of reasoning, its certainty is no greater than its weakest link; only if each step is itself intuitively known will the demonstration as a whole be certain. If I know that A is greater than B and that B is greater than C, then I know demonstratively that A is greater than C.

Although intuition and demonstration alone satisfy the definition of knowledge, Locke held that the belief that our sensory ideas are caused by existing things deserves the name of **sensitive knowledge**. In the presence of a powerful, present idea of sensation, we cannot doubt that it has some real cause outside us, even though we do not know what that cause may be or how it produces the idea in us. I have only sensitive knowledge that there is something producing the odor I now smell.

### **Types of Knowledge**

Locke distinguished four sorts of agreement or disagreement between ideas, perception of which gives us four distinct types of knowledge:

Since knowledge of **identity and diversity** requires only a direct comparison of the ideas involved, it is intuitive whenever the ideas being compared are clear.

Knowledge of **coexistence** would provide detailed information about features of the natural world that occur together in our experience, but this scientific knowledge is restricted by our ignorance of the real essences of substances; the best we can do is to rely upon careful observations of the coincidental appearance of their secondary qualities and powers.

Mathematics and morality rest upon knowledge of **relation**, which Locke held to be demonstrative

whenever we form clear ideas and discover the links between them.

The degree of certainty in our knowledge of **real existence** depends wholly upon the content of our ideas in each case. Locke agreed with Descartes that we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and he supposed it possible to achieve demonstrative knowledge of god as the thinking creator of everything. But we have only sensitive knowledge of the existence of other things presently before our senses.

### **The Extent of Knowledge**

The result of all of this is that our knowledge is severely limited in its extent. On Locke's definition, we can achieve genuine knowledge only when we have clear ideas and can trace the connection between them enough to perceive their agreement or disagreement. That doesn't happen very often, especially where substances are at issue. The truths of mathematics are demonstrable precisely because they are abstract: since my ideas of lines, angles, and triangles are formed without any necessary reference to existing things, I can prove that the interior angles of any triangle add up to a straight line.

But any effort to achieve genuine knowledge of the natural world must founder on our ignorance of substances. We have "sensitive knowledge" of the existence of something that causes our present sensory ideas. But we do not have adequate ideas of the real essence of any substance, and even if we did, we would be unable to discover any demonstrative link between that real essence and the ideas it produces in us. The most careful observation can establish at best only the secondary qualities and powers that appear to coexist in our experience often enough to warrant our use of them as the nominal essence of a kind of substance.

Locke's efforts have therefore led to a sobering conclusion. Certainty is rarely within our reach; we must often be content with probable knowledge or mere opinion. Locke ultimately recommends that we adopt significantly reduced epistemological expectations.

### **The Great Concernments**

Despite all of these limitations, Locke believed that human knowledge is well-suited for the conduct of human life. We have all the knowledge we need to secure our "great concernments:" convenience in this life and the means for attaining a better life hereafter.

Survival and comfort in daily life are attainable in spite of our ignorance of the hidden operations of nature. We don't need to know the real essences of substances in order to make use of them productively. (Indeed, Locke suggests, additional information might actually make daily life more difficult.) Surely demonstrative knowledge of the true nature of fire or food is unnecessary for my survival; my natural aversion to the pain of being burned and desire for the pleasures of eating provide ample practical guidance.

Doing the right thing is also possible, since our action is properly guided by a demonstrable morality. The truths of morality are demonstrable for the same reason that the truths of mathematics are: the mixed modes that describe possible human actions, of the moral rules that govern them, and even of the possible agents that might perform them, are all complex ideas manufactured by the mind without reference to the real existence of substantial beings, so I can prove that murder is wrong.

Finally, we have all the knowledge we need to enter into a proper relation to our creator. God's existence is demonstrable on rational grounds, and the scriptures provide us with detailed information about the divine will for our lives. (The precise boundary between reason and revelation, Locke held, is itself known only as a matter of probable knowledge or opinion.) In the end, then, Locke believed that we have no reason to complain. Although restricted in extent, our knowledge is sufficient for our needs.

Respecting its limits will prevent us from wasting effort on pointless wrangling. Since our experience is itself limited, an empiricist epistemology can only advise caution and modesty in our claims to know.

### **Berkeley: Immaterialism**

As the self-proclaimed defender of common sense, Berkeley held that what we perceive really is as we perceive it to be. But what we perceive are just sensible objects, collections of sensible qualities, which are themselves nothing other than ideas in the minds of their perceivers. In the Dialogues Berkeley used Lockean arguments about the unreliability of secondary qualities in support of his own, more radical view.

Take heat, for example: does it exist independently of our perception of it? When exposed to great heat I feel a pain that everyone acknowledges to be in me, not in the fire, Berkeley argued, so the warmth I feel when exposed to lesser heat must surely be the same. What is more, if I dip both of my hands into a bowl of tepid water after chilling one and warming the other, the water will feel both warm and cold at the same time. Clearly, then, heat as I perceive it is nothing other than an idea in my mind.

Similar arguments and experiments establish that other sensible qualities—colors that vary with changes in ambient light, tastes and smells that change perceptibly when I have a cold, and sounds that depend for their quality on the position of my ears and conditions in the air—are, like heat, nothing but ideas in my mind. But the same considerations apply to primary qualities as well, Berkeley pointed out, since my perception of shape and size depend upon the position of my eyes, my experience of solidity depends upon my sense of touch, and my idea of motion is always relative to my own situation. Locke was correct in his view of secondary qualities but mistaken about primary qualities: all sensible qualities are just ideas.

But sensible objects are nothing more than collections of sensible qualities, so they are merely complex ideas in the minds of those who perceive them. For such ideas, Berkeley held, to be just is to be perceived (in Latin, *esse est percipi*). There is no need to refer to the supposition of anything existing outside our minds, which could never be shown to resemble our ideas, since "nothing can be like an idea but an idea." Hence, there are no material objects.

### **Material Substance is Inconceivable**

Locke's reference to an "unknown substratum" in which the features of material substances inhere is a pointless assumption, according to Berkeley. Since it is the very nature of sensible objects to be perceived, on his view, it would be absurd to suppose that their reality depends in any way upon an imperceptible core. This gives rise to a perfectly general argument against even the possibility of material substance.

Putting aside all of the forgoing lines of argument, Berkeley declared, the whole issue can be allowed to rest on a single question: is it possible to conceive of a sensible object existing independently of any perceiver? The challenge seems easy enough at first. All I have to do is think of something so remote—a tree in the middle of the forest, perhaps—that no one presently has it in mind. But if I conceive of this thing, then it is present in my mind as I think of it, so it is not truly independent of all perception.

According to Berkeley (and such later idealists as Fichte and Bradley) this argument shows irrefutably that the very concept of material substance as a sensible object existing independently of any perception is incoherent. No wonder the representationalist philosophy leads to skepticism: it introduces as a necessary element in our knowledge of the natural world a concept that is literally inconceivable!

## **Spirits**

Although he maintained that there can be no material substances, Berkeley did not reject the notion of substance altogether. The most crucial feature of substance is activity, he supposed, and in our experience the most obvious example activity is that of perceiving itself. So thinking substances do exist, and for these spirits (or souls or minds) to be is just to perceive (in Latin, *esse est percipere*).

Like Descartes and Leibniz, Berkeley held that each spirit is a simple, undivided, active being whose sole function is to think—that is, to have ideas such as those of sensible objects. Although each spirit is directly aware of its own existence and nature, it cannot be perceived. Since ideas are always of sensible qualities or objects for Berkeley, we have no ideas (but only notions) of spirits. This is a complete enumeration of what is real: active thinking substances and their passive ideas.

Strange though Berkeley's immaterialism may seem, it offers many clear advantages. It is a genuinely empiricist philosophy, since it begins with what we actually experience and claims to account for everything without making extravagant suppositions about unknowable entities. Next, we will consider how well this doctrine provides for common sense, science, and religion.

## **Common Sense**

Is Berkeley's immaterialism a reasonable view? He claimed to defend common sense against skeptical challenges, yet he maintained that sensible objects exist only in the minds of those who perceive them. Surely common sense includes the belief that ordinary things continue to exist when I am not perceiving them. Although all of my visual ideas disappear and reappear every time I blink my eyes, I do not suppose that the everything I see pops out of existence and then back in. While a strict phenomenalist might point out that there is no practical consequence even if it does, Berkeley disagreed.

The existence of what I see does not depend exclusively on my seeing it. Berkeley's central claim is that sensible objects cannot exist without being perceived, but he did not suppose that I am the only perceiver. So long as some sentient being, some thinking substance or spirit, has in mind the sensible qualities or objects at issue, they do truly exist. Thus, even when I close my eyes, the tree I now see will continue to exist, provided that someone else is seeing it.

This difference, Berkeley held, precisely marks the distinction between real and imaginary things. What I merely imagine exists in my mind alone and continues to exist only so long as I think of it. But what is real exists in many minds, so it can continue to exist whether I perceive it or not. (That's why, unsure of the reality of what I seem to see, I may ask someone else, "Did you see that?") The existence of sensible objects requires that they be perceived, but it is not dependent exclusively on my perception of them.

In fact, the persistence and regularity of the sensible objects that constitute the natural world is independent of all human perception, according to Berkeley. Even when none of us is perceiving this tree, god is. The mind of god serves as a permanent repository of the sensible objects that we perceive at some times and not at others. (Although Berkeley took great pains to deny it, this view of the divine role in perception is very similar to Malebranche's notion of "seeing all things in god.") So Berkeley's philosophy can claim to defend common sense. It emphasizes that bodies or sensible objects really are just the ideas we have of them, yet can also explain their apparent independence of our perception. All he rejects is the mysterious philosophical notion of the material object as an extended substance capable of existing independently of any perception. That supposition, he argued, is both unnecessary and untenable.

### **Science without Matter**

Even if we accept it as common sense, is Berkeley's immaterialism compatible with modern science? Certainly Galileo's astronomy, Newtonian mechanics, and the chemistry of Boyle all took for granted the existence and operation of physical objects. But Berkeley maintained that natural science, if properly conceived, could proceed and even thrive without assuming that bodies are material substances existing outside the mind.

Astronomy and optics seem to suppose that what we see exists at some distance from us. But Berkeley argued in his *New Theory of Vision* that our apparent perception of distance itself is a mental invention, easily explained in terms of the content of visual ideas, without any reference to existing material objects. In fact, Berkeley held, our visual and tactile perceptions are entirely independent. What we see and what we touch have nothing to do with each other; we have merely learned by experience to associate each with the other, just as we have learned to associate the appearance, the taste, and the smell of an apple. There is no reason to suppose that all of these qualities inhere in a common material substratum.

It follows that Locke was mistaken in supposing that our ideas of primary qualities have a special status because they arise from more than one of our senses. Although the corpuscularian hypothesis has yielded interesting results so far, Berkeley believed that science will soon enough outgrow it, learning to rely more directly on what we perceive for its hypotheses about what new experiences we rightly anticipate.

As we've already seen, Berkeley accounted for the persistence of bodies in terms of god's continuing perception of them. The causal regularities we observe in the natural world rely upon the same source. God's mind is an orderly one, and the apparent structures of space, time, and causality are nothing more than our awareness of the divine provision for our welfare. Natural science has plenty to do even in the absence of material objects, then: it is nothing less than a systematic exploration of the mind of god. (Here Berkeley came very close to the philosophy of

Malebranche.

More significantly for us, he also correctly anticipated much of the physical science of the twentieth century. Like Berkeley, we believe that the solidity of bodies is merely apparent, that a proper cosmology depends upon our capacity to conceive it, and that the role of science is to gather and correlate the independent observations of human perceivers. It is not surprising that physicists like Mach expressed an appreciation for the thought of Berkeley.

## **Religion**

The affinity between immaterialism and traditional religion is somewhat easier to understand. Materialism leads to atheism no less than to skepticism, Berkeley believed, since its belief that bodies exist outside the mind encourages the notion that the physical realm may always have existed independently of any spiritual influence. Immaterialism, by contrast, restores god to a role of central importance, not only as the chief among active thinking substances but also as the source of all sensible objects.

God's existence is made evident by everyday instances of perception, according to Berkeley. Since sensible objects are mind-dependent yet exhibit a persistence and regularity that transcends our perception of them, it follows that there must be a master-perceiver, god, in whose mind they always are. Thus, in the Dialogues, Philonous extols the beauty and majesty of the natural world, attributing them to the power and elegance of the divine mind. This leads to the traditional conception of god as deserving of worship because of the benevolent creation of all that we observe.

All in all, Berkeley developed a philosophical system worthy of no little respect. Immaterialism rests on the simple premise that there are no physical objects. Berkeley defended this notion with many clever arguments and worked out its implications consistently. Although counter-intuitive, immaterialism is difficult to refute.

## **Primary / Secondary qualities**

Distinction between perceived aspects of things. The primary qualities are intrinsic features of the thing itself (its size, shape, internal structure, mass, and momentum, for example), while the secondary qualities are merely its powers to produce sensations in us (its color, odor, sound, and taste, for example). This distinction was carefully drawn by Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Locke, whose statement of the distinction set the tone for future scientific inquiry. But Foucher, Bayle, and Berkeley argued that the distinction is groundless, so that all sensible qualities exist only in the mind of the perceiver.

## **Critique of abstract ideas**

Developing the basis for an empiricist immaterialism requires unlearning significant portions of what Locke taught us. Berkeley devoted the lengthy "Introduction" of his Principles of Human Knowledge to a detailed refutation of what he supposed to be one of Locke's most harmful mistakes, the belief that general terms signify abstract ideas.

As Berkeley correctly noticed, our experience is always of concrete particulars. When I contemplate the idea of "triangle," the image that comes to mind is that of some determinate shape; having the abstract image of a three-sided figure that is neither equilateral nor isosceles nor

scalene is simply impossible. It is unnecessary, too: for purposes of geometrical reasoning, any particular image can be used as a representative for all. (It is not at all clear that even Locke would have disagreed with this position.)

But the consequence of Berkeley's criticism is a theory of meaning entirely different from Locke's. General terms (or words of any sort) need not signify ideas of their own, on Berkeley's view. Instead, they acquire meaning by a process of association with particular experiences, which are in turn associated with each other. But of course mere association (as Locke himself had noted with respect to ideas) is not a reliable guide to reality.

In the Introduction to the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley laments the doubt and uncertainty found in philosophical discussions, and he attempts to find those principles that drew philosophy away from common sense and intuition. He finds the source of skepticism in the theory of abstract ideas, which he criticizes.

### **Berkeley begins by giving a general overview of the doctrine:**

It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by it self, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self abstract ideas. ... Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension: but only that the mind can frame to it self by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.

In §§8-9 he details the doctrine in terms of Locke's account in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Although theories of abstraction date back at least to Aristotle (Metaphysics, Book K, Chapter 3, 1061a29-1069b4), were prevalent among the medievals, and are found in the Cartesians, there seem to be two reasons why Berkeley focused on Locke. First, Locke's work was recent and familiar. Second, Berkeley seems to have considered Locke's account the best available. As he wrote in his notebooks, "Wonderful in Locke that he could w<sup>n</sup> advanc'd in years see at all thro a mist yt had been so long a gathering & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than yt he didn't see farther".

According to Locke, the doctrine of abstract ideas explains how knowledge can be communicated and how it can be increased. It explains how general terms obtain meaning. A general term, such as 'cat' refers to an abstract general idea, which contains all and only those properties that one deems common to all cats, or, more properly, the ways in which all cats resemble each other. The connection between a general term and an abstract idea is arbitrary and conventional, and the relation between an abstract idea and the individual objects falling under it is a natural relation (resemblance). If Locke's theory is sound, it provides a means by which one can account for the meaning of general terms without invoking general objects (universals).

Berkeley's attack on the doctrine of abstract ideas follows three tracks. There is the "I can't do it" argument in Intro. There is the "We don't need it" argument in Intro. And there is the "The theory leads to inconsistencies" argument in Intro. which Berkeley deemed the "killing blow". As we shall see, Berkeley uses a similar tripartite attack on doctrine of material substance.

Having outlined Locke's account of abstraction in Introduction, which allegedly results in the idea of a human which is colored but has no determinate color – that the idea includes a general idea of color, but not a specific color such as black or white or brown or yellow – which has a size but has no determinate size, and so forth, Berkeley argues in §10 that he can form no such idea. On the face of it, his argument is weak. At most it shows that insofar as he cannot form the idea, and assuming that all humans have similar psychological abilities, there is some evidence that no humans can form abstract ideas of the sort Locke described.

But there is a remark made in passing that suggests there is a much stronger argument implicit in the section. Berkeley writes: To be plain, I own my self able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some object, yet, it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper acceptations of abstraction.

This three-fold distinction among types of abstraction is found in Arnauld and Nicole's *Logic or the Art of Thinking*. The first type of abstraction concerns integral parts. The head, arms, torso, and legs are integral parts of a body: each can exist in separation from the body of which it is a part (Arnauld and Nicole, p. 37). The second kind of abstraction "arises when we consider a mode without paying attention to its substance, or two modes which are joined together in the same substance, taking each one separately" (Arnauld and Nicole, p. 37). The third concerns distinctions of reason, for example, conceiving of a triangle as equilateral without conceiving of it as equiangular (Arnauld and Nicole, p. 38). Berkeley grants that he can abstract in the first sense – "I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by it self abstracted or separated from the rest of the body" – but he denies that he can abstract in the latter two senses. The latter two cases represent impossible states of affairs. In §7 Berkeley noted that the abstractionists held that it is impossible for a mode to exist apart from a substance. Many abstractionists also accepted a conceivability criterion of possibility: If one can (clearly and distinctly) conceive of a state of affairs, then it is possible for that state of affairs to exist as conceived. This principle entails that impossible states of affairs are inconceivable. So, granting it is impossible for a mode to exist apart from a substance, it follows that it is impossible to conceive of a mode apart from a substance, that the second form abstraction is impossible. And if the second falls, the third falls as well, since the third requires that alternative descriptions of an object pick out no differences in reality. So, a traditional theory of modes and substances, the conceivability criterion of possibility, and abstraction are an inconsistent triad. The inconsistency can be resolved by dropping the doctrine of abstract ideas. Berkeley made this point explicitly in the first draft of the Introduction: It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive, that which God cannot cause to be? Now it is on all hands agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to exist, whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding.

One of the marks of the modern period is an adherence to the principle of parsimony (Ockham's Razor). The principle holds that the theoretically simpler of two explanations is more probably true. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this was sometimes expressed as "God does nothing in vain" So, if it is possible to construct a theory of meaning that does not introduce abstract ideas as a distinct kind of idea, that theory would be simpler and deemed more probably true. This is the strategy Berkeley adopts in Introduction.

Granting Locke that all existents are particulars (Locke 3.3.6, p. 410), Berkeley remarks, "But it seems that a word becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea but, of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind" (Intro. §11). Ideas remain particular, although a particular idea can function as a general idea. For example, when a geometer draws a line on a blackboard, it is taken to represent all lines, even though the line itself is particular and has determinate qualities. Similarly, a particular idea can represent all similar ideas. So, whether one takes Berkeley to mean that words apply immediately to objects or that meaning is mediated by paradigmatic ideas, the theory is simpler than the abstractionists' insofar as all ideas are particular and determinate.

In Introduction §13, Berkeley turns to Locke's abstract general idea of a triangle, an idea which "must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together". Upon quoting the passage, Berkeley merely asks his reader whether he or she can form the idea, but his point seems to be much stronger. The described idea is inconsistent, and therefore represents an impossible state of affairs, and it is therefore inconceivable, since whatever is impossible is inconceivable. This is explicit in a parallel passage in the *New Theory of Vision*. After quoting the triangle passage, Berkeley remarks, "But had he called to mind what he says in another place, to wit, 'That ideas of mixed modes wherein any inconsistent ideas are put together cannot so much as exist in the mind, i.e. be conceived.' vid. B. iii.

C. 10. S. 33. *ibid.* I say, had this occurred to his thoughts, it is not improbable he would have owned it above all the pains and skill he was master of, to form the above-mentioned idea of a triangle, which is made up of manifest, staring contradictions".

If abstract ideas are not needed for communication – Berkeley takes the fact that infants and poorly educated people communicate, while the formation of abstract ideas is said to be difficult, as a basis for doubting the difficulty thesis (Intro. §14) he is able to give short shrift to the contention that abstract ideas are necessary for knowledge. The abstractionists maintain that abstract ideas are needed for geometrical proofs. Berkeley argues that only properties concerning, for example, a triangle as such are germane to a geometric proof. So, even if one's idea of a triangle is wholly determinate (consider a diagram on a blackboard), none of the differentiating properties prevent one from constructing a proof, since a proof is not concerned solely with the idea (or drawing) with which one begins. He maintains that it is consistent with his theory of meaning to selectively attend to a single aspect of a complex, determinate idea.

Berkeley concludes his discussion of abstraction by noting that not all general words are used to denote objects or kinds of objects. His discussion of the nondenotative uses of language is often taken to anticipate Ludwig Wittgenstein's interest in meaning-as-use.

### **esse est percipi**

Latin phrase meaning "to be is to be perceived." According to Berkeley, this is the most basic feature of all sensible objects; for spirits, on the other hand, *esse est percipere* ("to be is to perceive"). Granting this to be the most fundamental principle of idealistic philosophy, Moore argued that it is indefensible.

Berkeley's famous principle is *esse is percipi*, to be is to be perceived. Berkeley was an idealist. He held that ordinary objects are only collections of ideas, which are mind-dependent. Berkeley was an immaterialist. He held that there are no material substances. There are only finite mental substances and an infinite mental substance, namely, God. On these points there is general agreement. There is less agreement on Berkeley's argumentative approach to idealism and immaterialism and on the role of some of his specific arguments. His central arguments are often deemed weak.

The account developed here is based primarily on the opening thirty-three sections of the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. It assumes, contrary to some commentators, that Berkeley's metaphysics rests on epistemological foundations.

This approach is *prima facie* plausible insofar as it explains the appeal to knowledge in the title of the *Principles* (cf. Intro. §4), it is consistent with Berkeley's epistemic concerns in other writings (cf. TVV §18), and it provides an explanatory role for abstract ideas. There will be occasional digressions concerning the problems perceived by those who claim that Berkeley's approach was more straightforwardly metaphysical.

### **Berkeley begins his discussion as follows:**

It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.. This seems to say that ideas are the immediate objects of knowledge in a fundamental sense (acquaintance). Following Locke, there are ideas of sense, reflection, and imagination. So, ordinary objects, as known, are collections of ideas marked by a single name. Berkeley's example is an apple.

If ideas are construed as objects of knowledge, then there must also be something that "knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them". This Berkeley calls this 'mind' or 'spirit'. Minds (as knowers) are distinct from ideas (as things known). For an idea, to be is to be perceived (known). Since this holds for ideas in general, it holds for "sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense" in particular.

Berkeley contends that the "opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a world all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from being perceived" is inconsistent, "a manifest contradiction". If one construes 'sensible objects' as ideas of sense, and ideas are objects of knowledge, then having a real existence distinct from being perceived would require that an object be known (as an idea) and unknown (as a thing distinct from being perceived), which is inconsistent. He explains the source of the error on the basis of the doctrine of abstract ideas, a discussion which parallels the discussion in Introduction. Ordinary objects, as known, are nothing but collections of ideas. If, like Descartes, Berkeley holds that claims of existence are justified if and only if the existent can be known, then ordinary objects must be at least collections of ideas. As Berkeley put it, "all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known". The only substance that

can be known is a spirit or thinking substance. But notice what has not yet been shown. It has not been shown that ordinary objects are only collections of ideas, nor has it be shown that thinking substances are immaterial. Berkeley's next move is to ask whether there are grounds for claiming ordinary objects are something more than ideas.

The above account is not the only interpretation of the first seven sections of the Principles. Many commentators take a more directly metaphysical approach. They assume that ideas are mental images, or objects of thought (Winker, p.6), or modes of a mental substance (Bracken, pp. 76ff), or immediate objects of perception (Pappas, pp. 21-22), or any of Berkeley's other occasional characterizations of ideas, and proceed to show that, on the chosen account of ideas, Berkeley's arguments fail. A. A. Luce tells us that Berkeley's characterization of an apple in terms of ideas is concerned with the apple itself, rather than a known apple, which suggests that Berkeley begs the question of the analysis of body. Many commentators tell us that what seems to be an allusion to ideas of reflection in the first sentence of §1 cannot be such, since Berkeley claims one has no ideas of minds or mental states. They ignore his allusions to ideas of reflection and the presumption that if there are such ideas, they are the effects of an active mind. Many commentators suggest that the argument for *esse is percipi* is in §3 – ignoring the concluding words in §2 – and find the “manifest contradiction” in §4 puzzling at best. Most commentators assume that the case for idealism – the position that there are only minds and mind-dependent entities – is complete by §7 and lament that Berkeley has not established the ‘only’. The epistemic interpretation we have been developing seems to avoid these problems.

Berkeley holds that ordinary objects are at least collections of ideas. Are they something more? In §§8-24 Berkeley examines the prime contenders for this “something more,” namely, theories of material substance. He prefaces his discussion with his likeness principle, the principle that nothing but an idea can resemble an idea. “If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas” (PHK §8). Why is this? A claim that two objects resemble each other can be justified only by a comparison of the objects. So, if only ideas are immediately perceived, only ideas can be compared. So, there can be no justification for a claim that an idea resembles anything but an idea. If claims of existence rest on epistemically justified principles, the likeness principle blocks both grounds for claiming that there are mediately perceived material objects and Locke's claim that the primary qualities of objects resemble one's ideas of them.

One of the marks of the modern period is the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. Although it was anticipated by Descartes, Malebranche, and others, the terms themselves were introduced in Robert Boyle's “Of the Origins of Forms and Qualities” (1666) and Locke's Essay. Primary qualities are the properties of objects as such. The primary qualities are solidity, extension, figure, number, and mobility. Secondary qualities are either the those arrangements of corpuscles containing only primary qualities that cause one to have ideas of color, sound, taste, heat, cold, and smell or, on some accounts, the ideas themselves. If the distinction can be maintained, there would be grounds for claiming that ordinary objects are something more than ideas. It is this theory of matter Berkeley considers first.

After giving a sketch of Locke's account of the primary/secondary quality distinction, his initial salvo focuses on his previous conclusions and the likeness principle. “By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion, do actually subsist” (PHK §9). Such a view is inconsistent with his earlier conclusions that extension,

figure, and motion are ideas. The likeness principle blocks any attempt to go beyond ideas on the basis of resemblance. Combining the previous conclusions with the standard account of primary qualities requires that primary qualities both exist apart from the mind and only in the mind. So, Berkeley concludes that “what is called matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it”. He then turns to the individual qualities.

If there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, there must be a ground for the distinction. Indeed, given the common contention that an efficient cause must be numerically distinct from its effect, if one cannot show that primary and secondary qualities are distinct, there are grounds for questioning the causal hypothesis. Berkeley argues that there is no ground for the distinction. Appealing to what one knows – ideas as they are conceived – Berkeley argues that one cannot conceive of a primary quality such as extension without some secondary quality as well: one cannot “frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind”. If such sensible qualities as color exist only in the mind, and extension and motion cannot be known without some sensible quality, there is no ground for claiming extension exists apart from the mind. The primary/secondary quality distinction collapses. The source of the philosophical error is cited as the doctrine of abstract ideas. His arguments in *Principles* show that no evidence can be found that any of the other so-called primary qualities can exist apart from the mind.

After disposing of the primary/secondary quality distinction, Berkeley turns to an older theory of material substance, a substratum theory. At least since Aristotle, philosophers had held that qualities of material objects depend on and exist in a substance which has those qualities. This supposed substance allegedly remains the same through change. But if one claims there are material substances, one must have reasons to support that claim. In *Principles* §§16-24 Berkeley develops a series of arguments to the effect that

- (1) one cannot form an idea of a substratum,
- (2) the theory of material substance plays no explanatory role, and
- (3) it is impossible to produce evidence for the mere possibility of such an entity.

Can one form an idea a substratum? No. At least one cannot form a positive idea of a material substratum itself – something like an image of the thing itself – a point that was granted by its most fervent supporters. The most one can do is form “An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general”, “though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them”. Berkeley argues that one cannot make good on the notion of ‘support’ – “It is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense, as when we say that pillars support a building: in what sense therefore must it be taken?” (PHK §16) – so one does not even have a relative idea of material substratum. Without a clear notion of the alleged relation, one cannot single out a material substance on the basis of a relation to something perceived.

If an idea of a material substratum cannot be derived from sense experience, claims of its existence might be justified if it is necessary to provide an explanation of a phenomenon. But no such explanation is forthcoming. As Berkeley notes: “But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend, there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond

dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without, resembling them". Since material substance is not necessary to provide an explanation of mental phenomena, reason cannot provide grounds for claiming the existence of a material substance.

Berkeley's final move against material substance is sometimes called the "Master Argument." It takes the form of a challenge, one on which Berkeley is willing to rest his entire case. "It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or colour, to exist without the mind, or unperceived. This easy trial may make you see, that what you contend for, is a downright contradiction" (PHK §22). Berkeley seems to argue that in any case one might consider – books in the back of a closet, plants deep in a wood with no one about, footprints on the far side of the moon – the objects are related to the mind conceiving of them. So, it is contradictory to claim that those objects have no relation to a mind. This is generally not considered Berkeley at his best, since many commentators argue that it is possible to distinguish between the object conceived and the conceiving of it. George Pappas has provided a more sympathetic interpretation of the passage. He contends that Berkeley is calling for an "impossible performance". Conceivability is the ground for claiming that an object is possible. If one conceives of an object, then that object is related to some mind, namely, the mind that conceives it. So, the problem is that it is not possible to fulfill the conditions necessary to show that it would be possible for an object to exist apart from a relation to a mind.

Thus, Berkeley concludes, there are no grounds for claiming that an ordinary object is more than a collection of ideas. The arguments in §§1-7 showed that ordinary objects are at least collections of ideas of sense. The arguments in §§8- 24 provide grounds for claiming that ordinary objects are nothing more than ideas. So, Berkeley is justified in claiming that they are only ideas of sense. Berkeley's argument for immaterialism is complete, although he has not yet provided criteria for distinguishing ideas of sense from ideas of memory and imagination. This is his task in §§29-33. Before turning to this, Berkeley introduces several remarks on mind.

Berkeley claims that an inspection of our ideas shows that they are causally inert. Since there is a continual succession of ideas in our minds, there must be some cause of it. Since this cause can be neither an idea nor a material substance, it must be a spiritual substance. This sets the stage for Berkeley's argument for the existence of God and the distinction between real things and imaginary things.

One knows that one causes some of one's own ideas . Since the mind is passive in perception, there are ideas which one's own mind does not cause. Only a mind or spirit can be a cause. "There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them" . As such, this is not an argument for the existence of God, although Berkeley's further discussion assumes that at least one mind is the divine mind.

He is now in a position to distinguish ideas of sense from ideas of the imagination: "The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are". This provides the basis for both the distinction between ideas of sense and ideas of imagination and for the distinction between real things and imaginary thing. Real things are composed solely of ideas of sense. Ideas of sense occur with predictable regularity; they form coherent wholes that themselves can be expected to "behave" in predictable ways. Ideas of sense

follow (divinely established) laws of nature.

So, Berkeley has given an account of ordinary objects without matter. Ordinary objects are nothing but lawfully arranged collections of ideas of sense.

## **Solipsism**

**Solipsism**, in philosophy, an extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself. The British idealist F.H. Bradley, in *Appearance and Reality* (1893), characterized the solipsistic view as follows: Presented as a solution of the problem of explaining human knowledge of the external world, it is generally regarded as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The only scholar who seems to have been a coherent radical solipsist is Claude Brunet, a 17th-century French physician.

## **Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds**

Solipsism is sometimes expressed as the view that “I am the only mind which exists,” or “My mental states are the only mental states.” However, the sole survivor of a nuclear holocaust might truly come to believe in either of these propositions without thereby being a solipsist. Solipsism is therefore more properly regarded as the doctrine that, in principle, “existence” means for me my existence and that of my mental states. Existence is everything that I experience – physical objects, other people, events and processes – anything that would commonly be regarded as a constituent of the space and time in which I coexist with others and is necessarily construed by me as part of the content of my consciousness.

For the solipsist, it is not merely the case that he believes that his thoughts, experiences, and emotions are, as a matter of contingent fact, the only thoughts, experiences, and emotions. Rather, the solipsist can attach no meaning to the supposition that there could be thoughts, experiences, and emotions other than his own. In short, the true solipsist understands the word “pain,” for example, to mean “my pain.” He cannot accordingly conceive how this word is to be applied in any sense other than this exclusively egocentric one.

## **The Importance of the Problem**

No great philosopher has espoused solipsism. As a theory, if indeed it can be termed such, it is clearly very far removed from common sense. In view of this, it might reasonably be asked why the problem of solipsism should receive any philosophical attention. There are two answers to this question. First, while no great philosopher has explicitly espoused solipsism, this can be attributed to the inconsistency of much philosophical reasoning. Many philosophers have failed to accept the logical consequences of their own most fundamental commitments and preconceptions. The foundations of solipsism lie at the heart of the view that the individual gets his own psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, and so forth.) from “his own cases,” that is by abstraction from “inner experience.”

This view, or some variant of it, has been held by a great many, if not the majority of philosophers since Descartes made the egocentric search for truth the primary goal of the critical study of the nature and limits of knowledge.

In this sense, solipsism is implicit in many philosophies of knowledge and mind since Descartes and any theory of knowledge that adopts the Cartesian egocentric approach as its basic frame of

reference is inherently solipsistic.

Second, solipsism merits close examination because it is based upon three widely entertained philosophical presuppositions, which are themselves of fundamental and wide-ranging importance. These are:

- (a) What I know most certainly are the contents of my own mind – my thoughts, experiences, affective states, and so forth.;
- (b) There is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical. For example, there is no necessary link between the occurrence of certain conscious experiences or mental states and the “possession” and behavioral dispositions of a body of a particular kind; and
- (c) The experiences of a given person are necessarily private to that person.

These presuppositions are of unmistakable Cartesian origin, and are widely accepted by philosophers and non-philosophers alike. In tackling the problem of solipsism, one immediately grapples with fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind. However spurious the problem of solipsism per se may strike one, these latter issues are unquestionably important. Indeed, one of the merits of the entire enterprise is the extent that it reveals a direct connection between apparently unexceptionable and certainly widely-held common sense beliefs and the acceptance of solipsistic conclusions. If this connection exists and we wish to avoid those solipsistic conclusions, we shall have no option but to revise, or at least to critically review, the beliefs from which they derive logical sustenance.

### **Historical Origins of the Problem**

In introducing “methodic doubt” into philosophy, René Descartes created the backdrop against which solipsism subsequently developed and was made to seem, if not plausible, at least irrefutable. For the ego that is revealed by the cogito is a solitary consciousness, a *res cogitans* that is not spatially extended, is not necessarily located in any body, and can be assured of its own existence exclusively as a conscious mind. (Discourse on Method and the Meditations). This view of the self is intrinsically solipsistic and Descartes evades the solipsistic consequences of his method of doubt by the desperate expedient of appealing to the benevolence of God. Since God is no deceiver, he argues, and since He has created man with an innate disposition to assume the existence of an external, public world corresponding to the private world of the “ideas” that are the only immediate objects of consciousness, it follows that such a public world actually exists. (Sixth Meditation). Thus does God bridge the chasm between the solitary consciousness revealed by methodic doubt and the intersubjective world of public objects and other human beings?

A modern philosopher cannot evade solipsism under the Cartesian picture of consciousness without accepting the function attributed to God by Descartes (something few modern philosophers are willing to do). In view of this it is scarcely surprising that we should find the specter of solipsism looming ever more threateningly in the works of Descartes’ successors in the modern world, particularly in those of the British empiricist tradition.

Descartes’ account of the nature of mind implies that the individual acquires the psychological concepts that he possesses “from his own case,” that is that each individual has a unique and privileged access to his own mind, which is denied to everyone else. Although this view utilizes

language and employs conceptual categories (“the individual,” “other minds,” and so forth.) that are inimical to solipsism, it is nonetheless fundamentally conducive historically to the development of solipsistic patterns of thought.

On this view, what I know immediately and with greatest certainty are the events that occur in my own mind – my thoughts, my emotions, my perceptions, my desires, and so forth. – and these are not known in this way by anyone else. By the same token, it follows that I do not know other minds in the way that I know my own; indeed, if I am to be said to know other minds at all – that they exist and have a particular nature – it can only be on the basis of certain inferences that I have made from what is directly accessible to me, the behavior of other human beings.

The essentials of the Cartesian view were accepted by John Locke, the father of modern British empiricism. Rejecting Descartes’ theory that the mind possesses ideas innately at birth, Locke argued that all ideas have their origins in experience. “Reflection” (that is introspection or “inner experience”) is the sole source of psychological concepts. Without exception, such concepts have their genesis in the experience of the corresponding mental processes.

If I acquire my psychological concepts by introspecting upon my own mental operations, then it follows that I do so independently of my knowledge of my bodily states. Any correlation that I make between the two will be effected subsequent to my acquisition of my psychological concepts. Thus, the correlation between bodily and mental states is not a logically necessary one. I may discover, for example, that whenever I feel pain my body is injured in some way, but I can discover this factual correlation only after I have acquired the concept “pain.” It cannot therefore be part of what I mean by the word “pain” that my body should behave in a particular way.

### **The Argument from Analogy**

What then of my knowledge of the minds of others? On Locke’s view there can be only one answer: since what I know directly is the existence and contents of my own mind, it follows that my knowledge of the minds of others, if I am to be said to possess such knowledge at all, has to be indirect and analogical, an inference from my own case. This is the so-called “argument from analogy” for other minds, which empiricist philosophers in particular who accept the Cartesian account of consciousness generally assume as a mechanism for avoiding solipsism.

Observing that the bodies of other human beings behave as my body does in similar circumstances, I can infer that the mental life and series of mental events that accompany my bodily behavior are also present in the case of others. Thus, for example, when I see a problem that I am trying unsuccessfully to solve, I feel myself becoming frustrated and observe myself acting in a particular way. In the case of another, I observe only the first and last terms of this three-term sequence and, on this basis, I infer that the “hidden” middle term, the feeling of frustration, has also occurred.

There are, however, fundamental difficulties with the argument from analogy. First, if one accepts the Cartesian account of consciousness, one must, in all consistency, accept its implications. One of these implications, as we have seen above, is that there is no logically necessary connection between the concepts of “mind” and “body;” my mind may be lodged in my body now, but this is a matter of sheer contingency. Mind need not become located in body. Its nature will not be affected in any way by the death of this body and there is no reason in principle why it should not have

been located in a body radically different from a human one.

By exactly the same token, any correlation that exists between bodily behavior and mental states must also be entirely contingent; there can be no conceptual connections between the contents of a mind at a given time and the nature and/or behavior of the body in which it is located at that time.

This raises the question as to how my supposed analogical inferences to other minds are to take place at all. How can I apply psychological concepts to others, if I know only that they apply to me? To take a concrete example again, if I learn what "pain" means by reference to my own case, then I will understand "pain" to mean "my pain" and the supposition that pain can be ascribed to anything other than myself will be unintelligible to me.

If the relationship between having a human body and a certain kind of mental life is as contingent as the Cartesian account of mind implies, it should be equally easy – or equally difficult – for me to conceive of a table as being in pain as it is for me to conceive of another person as being in pain. The point, of course, is that this is not so. The supposition that a table might experience pain is a totally meaningless one, whereas the ascription of pain to other human beings and animals that, in their physical characteristics and/or behavioral capabilities, resemble human beings is something which even very young children find unproblematic.

How is this to be accounted for? It will not do, in this context, to simply respond that a table does not have the same complex set of physical characteristics as a human body or that it is not capable of the same patterns of behavior as a human body. Because the Cartesian position implies that there is no logical connection between the mental and the physical, between the possession of a body of a particular kind and the capability for consciousness. Physical differentiation can and must be acknowledged, but it can play no role in any explanation of what it is to have a mental life.

I am surrounded by other bodies, some of which are similar to mine, and some of which are different. On Cartesian principles such similarities and such differences are irrelevant. The question as to whether it is legitimate for me to ascribe psychological predicates to entities other than myself, which the argument from analogy is designed to address, cannot hinge on the kind of body that I am confronted at a given time.

Assuming the validity of the Cartesian position, we have to infer that it makes as much or a little sense, on these premises, to attribute any psychological predicate to another human being as it does to attribute it to a table or a rock.

On these premises, it makes no sense to attribute consciousness to another human being at all. Thus on strict Cartesian principles, the argument from analogy will not do the work that is required of it to bridge the gulf between my conscious states and putative conscious states that are not mine. Ultimately, it must be confessed that on these principles I know only my own mental states and the supposition that there are mental states other than my own ceases to be intelligible to me. It is thus that solipsism comes to seem inescapable.

If the above argument is valid, it demonstrates that the acceptance of the Cartesian account of consciousness and the view that my understanding of psychological concepts derives, as do the concepts themselves, from my own case leads inexorably to solipsism. However, it may fairly be

said that the argument accomplishes more than just this. It can, and should, be understood as a *reductio ad absurdum* refutation of these Cartesian principles. Viewed from this perspective, the argument may be paraphrased as follows:

If there is no logical connection between the physical and the mental, if the physical forms no part of the criteria that govern my ascription of psychological predicates, then I would be able to conceive of an inanimate object such as a table as having a soul and being conscious. But I cannot attach any intelligibility to the notion of an inanimate object being conscious. It follows therefore that there is a logical connection between the physical and the mental: the physical does form part of the criteria that govern my ascription of psychological words.

## **The Physical and the Mental**

What then is this logical connection between the physical and the mental? This question can best be answered by reflecting, for example, on how a cartoonist might show that a particular table was angry or in pain. As indicated above, it is impossible to attach literal meaning to the assertion that a given inanimate object is angry or in pain, but clearly a certain imaginative latitude may be allowed for specific purposes and a cartoonist might conceivably want to picture a table as being angry for humorous reasons.

What is significant in this connection, however, is that to achieve this effect, the cartoonist must picture the table as having human features – the pictured table will appear angry to us only to the extent to that it possesses the natural human expression of anger.

The concept of anger can find purchase in relation to the table only if it is represented as possessing something like a human form. This example demonstrates a point of quite fundamental importance: so far from being acquired by abstraction from my own case, from my own “inner” mental life, my psychological concepts are acquired in a specifically intersubjective, social, linguistic context and part of their meaning is their primary application to living human beings.

To put this slightly differently, a person is a living human being and the human person in this sense functions as our paradigm of that which has a mental life; it is precisely in relation to their application to persons that we learn such concepts as “consciousness,” “pain,” “anger,” and so forth. As such, it is a necessary and antecedent condition for the ascription of psychological predicates such as these to an object that it should “possess” a body of a particular kind. Wittgenstein articulated this point in one of the centrally important methodological tenets of the *Investigations*: Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious. Consequently, the belief that there is something problematic about the application of psychological words to other human beings and that such applications are necessarily the products of highly fallible inferences to the “inner” mental lives of others, which require something like the argument from analogy for their justification, turns out to be fundamentally confused. The intersubjective world that we live with other human beings and the public language-system that we must master if we are to think at all are the primary data, the “proto-phenomena,” in Wittgenstein’s phrase.

Our psychological and non-psychological concepts alike are derived from a single linguistic

fountainhead. It is precisely because the living human being functions as our paradigm of that which is conscious and has a mental life that we find the solipsistic notion that other human beings could be “automatons,” machines devoid of any conscious thought or experience, bizarre and bewildering. The idea that other persons might all in reality be “automatons” is not one which we can seriously entertain.

## **Knowing Other Minds**

We are now in a position to see the essential redundancy of the argument from analogy. First, it is a misconception to think that we need any inferential argument to assure us of the existence of other minds. Such an assurance seems necessary only so long as it is assumed that each of us has to work “outwards” from the interiority of his/her own consciousness, to abstract from our own cases to the “internal” world of others.

As indicated above, this assumption is fundamentally wrong – our knowledge that other human beings are conscious and our knowledge of their mental states at a given time is not inferential in nature at all, but is rather determined by the public criteria that govern the application of psychological concepts. I know that a person who behaves in a particular way – who, for example, gets red in the face, shouts, gesticulates, speaks vehemently, and so forth – is angry precisely because I have learned the concept “anger” by reference to such behavioral criteria. There is no inference involved here. I do not reason “he behaves in this way, therefore he is angry” – rather “behaving in this way” is part of what it is to be angry and it does not occur to any sane person to question whether the individual who acts in this way is conscious or has a mental life.

Second, because the argument from analogy treats the existence of the mental lives of other living human beings as problematic, it seeks to establish that it is legitimate to infer that other living human beings do indeed have mental lives, that each one of us may be said to be justified in his confidence that he is surrounded by other persons rather than “automatons.” The difficulty here, however, is that the argument presupposes that I can draw an analogy between two things, myself as a person and other living human beings, that are sufficiently similar to permit the analogous comparison and sufficiently different to require it.

The question must be faced, however, is how or in what respects am I different from or similar to other human beings? The answer is that I am neither. I am a living human being, as are these others. I see about me living human beings and the argument from analogy is supposed to allow me to infer that these are persons like myself. However, the truth is that I have no criterion for discriminating living human beings from persons, for the very good reason that persons are living human beings – there is no conceptual difference between the two. Since the argument acknowledges that I know living human beings directly, it thereby implicitly acknowledges that I know other persons directly, thus making itself functionally redundant.

A final, frequently-encountered objection to the argument from analogy derives from the work of Strawson and Malcolm: the argument attempts to move inferentially from my supposed direct knowledge of my own mental life and “inner” states to my indirect knowledge of the mental states of others. It thus presupposes that I know what it means to assign mental states to myself without necessarily knowing what it means to ascribe them to others.

This is incoherent. To speak of certain mental states as being mine in the first place is to

discriminate them from mental states that are not mine and these, by definition, are the mental states of others. It follows, therefore, that in a fundamental sense the argument from analogy cannot get off the ground: one cannot know how to ascribe mental states to oneself unless one also knows what it means to ascribe mental states to others.

Plausible as this objection seems at first sight, it is (ironically, on Wittgensteinian criteria) quite mistaken. For it is not the case that when I am in pain I first identify the pain and subsequently come to recognize that it is one that I, as distinct from someone else, have. The personal pronoun "I" in the locution "I am in pain" is not the "I" of personal individuation – it does not refer to me or discriminate me as a publicly situated person as distinct from others.

The exponent of the argument from analogy is not guilty of the charge of presupposing the very thing that he is endeavoring to demonstrate, as both Strawson and Malcolm suggest. Wittgenstein in fact considered that there is a genuine asymmetry here, in relation to the ascription of psychological predicates to oneself and to others, which is dimly perceived but misrepresented by those who feel the need of the argument from analogy. Whereas one ascribes psychological states to others by reference to bodily and behavioral criteria, one has and requires no criteria at all to self-ascribe or self-avow them.

Thus the exponent of the argument from analogy sees, quite correctly, that present-tense, first-person psychological assertions such as "I am in pain" differ radically from third-person psychological predicate ascriptions, but thinks of the former as descriptions of "inner" mental states to which he alone has a privileged access. This is crucially wrong. Such uses of the word "I" as occur in present-tense, first-person psychological assertions do not identify a possessor; they do not discriminate one person from amongst a group. As Wittgenstein puts it, To say "I have pain" is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is.

To ascribe pain to a third party, on the other hand, is to identify a concrete individual as the possessor of the pain. On this point alone Wittgenstein concurs with the exponent of the argument from analogy. However, Wittgenstein here calls attention to the fact that the asymmetry is not one that exists between the supposedly direct and certain knowledge that I have of my own mental states as distinct from the wholly inferential knowledge which, allegedly, I have of the mental states of others.

Rather, the asymmetry is that the ascriptions of psychological predicates to others require criterial justificatory grounds, whereas the self-avowals or self- ascriptions of such predicates are criterionless. It thus transpires that the argument from analogy appears possible and necessary only to those who misapprehend the asymmetry between the criterial bases for third-person psychological predicate ascription and the non-criterial right for their self- ascription or self-avowal for a cognitive asymmetry between direct and indirect knowledge of mental states.

The Cartesian egocentric view of the mind and of mental events that gives rise both to the specter of solipsism and attempts to evade it by means of the argument from analogy has its origins in this very misapprehension.

## **The Privacy of Experience**

What then of solipsism? To what extent does the foregoing undermine it as a coherent

philosophical hypothesis, albeit one in which no-one really believes? Solipsism rests upon certain presuppositions about the mind and our knowledge of mental events and processes. Two of these, the thesis that I have a privileged form of access to and knowledge of my own mind and the thesis that there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the mental and the physical, have been dealt with above. If the foregoing is correct, both theses are false.

This leaves us with the final presupposition underlying solipsism, that all experiences are necessarily (that is logically) private to the individual whose experiences they are. This thesis – which, it is fair to say, is very widely accepted – also derives from the Cartesian account of mind and generates solipsistic conclusions by suggesting that experience is something that, because of its “occult” or ephemeral nature, can never literally be shared. No two people can ever be said to have the same experience. This again introduces the problem of how one person can know the experiences of another or, more radically, how one can know that another person has experiences at all.

Wittgenstein offers a comprehensive critique of this view. He attacks the notion that experience is necessarily private. His arguments against this are complex, if highly compressed and rather oracular.

Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of the word “private” as it is normally used: privacy of knowledge and privacy of possession. Something is private to me in the first sense if only I can know it; it is private to me in the second sense if only I can have it. Thus the thesis that experience is necessarily private can mean one of two things, which are not always discriminated from each other with sufficient care:

- (a) only I can know my experiences or
- (b) only I can have my experiences.

Wittgenstein argues that the first of these is false and the second is true in a sense that does not make experience necessarily private, as follows: Under (a), if we take pain as an experiential exemplar, we find that the assertion “Only I can know my pains” is a conjunction of two separate theses: (i) I (can) know that I am in pain when I am in pain and (ii) other people cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain. Thesis (i) is, literally, nonsense: it cannot be meaningfully asserted of me that I know that I am in pain. Wittgenstein’s point here is not that I do not know that I am in pain when I am in pain, but rather that the word “know” cannot be significantly employed in this way. This is because the verbal locution “I am in pain” is usually (though not invariably) an expression of pain – as part of acquired pain-behavior it is a linguistic substitute for such natural expressions of pain as groaning.

For this reason it cannot be governed by an epistemic operator. The prepositional function “I know that x” does not yield a meaningful proposition if the variable is replaced by an expression of pain, linguistic or otherwise. Thus to say that others learn of my pains only from my behavior is misleading, because it suggests that I learn of them otherwise, whereas I don’t learn of them at all – I have them.

Thesis (ii) – other people cannot know that I am in pain when I am in pain – is false. If we take the word “know” as it is normally used, then it is true to say that other people can and very frequently do know when I am in pain. Indeed, in cases where the pain is extreme, it is often

impossible to prevent others from knowing this even when one wishes to do so. Thus, in certain circumstances, it would not be unusual to hear it remarked of someone, for example, that “a moan of pain escaped him” – indicating that despite his efforts, he could not but manifest his pain to others. It thus transpires that neither thesis (i) nor (ii) is true.

If we turn to (b), we find that “Only I can have my pains” expresses a truth, but it is a truth that is grammatical rather than ontological. It draws our attention to the grammatical connection between the personal pronoun “I” and the possessive “my.” However, it tells us nothing specifically about pains or other experiences, for it remains true if we replace the word “pains” with many other plural nouns (e.g. “Only I can have my blushes”).

Another person can have the same pain as me. If our pains have the same phenomenal characteristics and corresponding locations, we will quite correctly be said to have “the same pain.” This is what the expression “the same pain” means.

Another person, however, cannot have my pains. My pains are the ones that, if they are expressed at all, are expressed by me. But by exactly the same (grammatical) token, another person cannot have my blushes, sneezes, frowns, fears, and so forth., and none of this can be taken as adding to our stockpile of metaphysical truths. It is true that I may deliberately and successfully keep an experience to myself, in which case that particular experience might be said to be private to me. But I might do this by articulating it in a language that those with whom I was conversing do not understand. There is clearly nothing occult or mysterious about this kind of privacy. (Investigations, II. xi, p. 222). Similarly, experience that I do not or cannot keep to myself is not private. In short, some experiences are private and some are not. Even though some experiences are private in this sense, it does not follow that all experiences could be private. As Wittgenstein points out, “What sometimes happens could always happen” is a fallacy. It does not follow from the fact that some orders are not obeyed that all orders might never be obeyed. For in that case the concept “order” would become incapable of instantiation and would lose its significance. (I. § 345).

## **The Incoherence of Solipsism**

With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough.

As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all. Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises that make solipsism apparently plausible, if not inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments – generally referred to as “the private language argument” – that we find in the Investigations against this assumption effectively administers the coup de grâce to both Cartesian dualism and solipsism.

Language is an irreducibly public form of life that is encountered in specifically social contexts.

Each natural language-system contains an indefinitely large number of “language-games,” governed by rules that, though conventional, are not arbitrary personal fiats. The meaning of a word is its (publicly accessible) use in a language. To question, argue, or doubt is to utilize language in a particular way. It is to play a particular kind of public language-game.

The proposition “I am the only mind that exists” makes sense only to the extent that it is expressed in a public language, and the existence of such language itself implies the existence of a social context. Such a context exists for the hypothetical last survivor of a nuclear holocaust, but not for the solipsist. A non-linguistic solipsism is unthinkable and a thinkable solipsism is necessarily linguistic. Solipsism therefore presupposes the very thing that it seeks to deny. That solipsistic thoughts are thinkable in the first instance implies the existence of the public, shared, intersubjective world that they purport to call into question.

## God's existence

The last major item in Berkeley's ontology is God, himself a spirit, but an infinite one. Berkeley believes that once he has established idealism, he has a novel and convincing argument for God's existence as the cause of our sensory ideas. He argues by elimination: What could cause my sensory ideas? Candidate causes, supposing that Berkeley has already established that matter doesn't exist, are (1) other ideas, (2) myself, or (3) some other spirit. Berkeley eliminates the first option with the following argument (PHK 25):

- (1) Ideas are manifestly passive—no power or activity is perceived in them.
- (2) But because of the mind-dependent status of ideas, they cannot have any characteristics which they are not perceived to have. Therefore,
- (3) Ideas are passive, that is, they possess no causal power.

It should be noted that premise (2) is rather strong; Phillip Cummins (1990) identifies it as Berkeley's “manifest qualities thesis” and argues that it commits Berkeley to the view that ideas are radically and completely dependent on perceivers in the way that sensations of pleasure and pain are typically taken to be.

The second option is eliminated with the observation that although I clearly can cause some ideas at will (e.g. ideas of imagination), sensory ideas are involuntary; they present themselves whether I wish to perceive them or not and I cannot control their content. The hidden assumption here is that any causing the mind does must be done by willing and such willing must be accessible to consciousness. Berkeley is hardly alone in presupposing this model of the mental; Descartes, for example, makes a similar set of assumptions.

This leaves us, then, with the third option: my sensory ideas must be caused by some other spirit. Berkeley thinks that when we consider the stunning complexity and systematicity of our sensory ideas, we must conclude that the spirit in question is wise and benevolent beyond measure, that, in short, he is God.

## Hume's Ideas

Hume's analysis of human belief begins with a careful distinction among our mental contents: **impressions** are the direct, vivid, and forceful products of immediate experience; **ideas** are merely feeble copies of these original impressions. Thus, for example, the background color of the screen

at which I am now looking is an impression, while my memory of the color of my mother's hair is merely an idea. Since every idea must be derived from an antecedent impression, Hume supposed, it always makes sense to inquire into the origins of our ideas by asking from which impressions they are derived.

To this beginning, add the fact that each of our ideas and impressions is entirely separable from every other, on Hume's view. The apparent connection of one idea to another is invariably the result of an association that we manufacture ourselves. We use our mental operations to link ideas to each other in one of three ways: resemblance, contiguity, or cause and effect. (This animal looks like that animal; this book is on that table; moving this switch turns off the light, for example.) Experience provides us with both the ideas themselves and our awareness of their association. All human beliefs (including those we regard as cases of knowledge) result from repeated applications of these simple associations.

Hume further distinguished between two sorts of belief. Relations of ideas are beliefs grounded wholly on associations formed within the mind; they are capable of demonstration because they have no external referent. Matters of fact are beliefs that claim to report the nature of existing things; they are always contingent. (This is Hume's version of the a priori / a posteriori distinction.) Mathematical and logical knowledge relies upon relations of ideas; it is uncontroversial but uninformative. The interesting but problematic propositions of natural science depend upon matters of fact. Abstract metaphysics mistakenly (and fruitlessly) tries to achieve the certainty of the former with the content of the latter.

### **Concerning Matters of Fact**

Since genuine information rests upon our belief in matters of fact, Hume was particularly concerned to explain their origin. Such beliefs can reach beyond the content of present sense-impressions and memory, Hume held, only by appealing to presumed connections of cause and effect. But since each idea is distinct and separable from every other, there is no self-evident relation; these connections can only be derived from our experience of similar cases. So the crucial question in epistemology is to ask exactly how it is possible for us to learn from experience. Here, Hume supposed, the most obvious point is a negative one: causal reasoning can never be justified rationally. In order to learn, we must suppose that our past experiences bear some relevance to present and future cases. But although we do indeed believe that the future will be like the past, the truth of that belief is not self-evident. In fact, it is always possible for nature to change, so inferences from past to future are never rationally certain. Thus, on Hume's view, all beliefs in matters of fact are fundamentally non-rational.

Consider Hume's favorite example: our belief that the sun will rise tomorrow. Clearly, this is a matter of fact; it rests on our conviction that each sunrise is an effect caused by the rotation of the earth. But our belief in that causal relation is based on past observations, and our confidence that it will continue tomorrow cannot be justified by reference to the past. So we have no rational basis for believing that the sun will rise tomorrow. Yet we do believe it!

### **Belief as a Habit**

Skepticism quite properly forbids us to speculate beyond the content of our present experience and memory, yet we find it entirely natural to believe much more than that. Hume held that these unjustifiable beliefs can be explained by reference to custom or habit. That's how we learn from

experience. When I observe the constant conjunction of events in my experience, I grow accustomed to associating them with each other. Although many past cases of sunrise do not guarantee the future of nature, my experience of them does get me used to the idea and produces in me an expectation that the sun will rise again tomorrow. I cannot prove that it will, but I feel that it must.

Remember that the association of ideas is a powerful natural process in which separate ideas come to be joined together in the mind. Of course they can be associated with each other by rational means, as they are in the relations of ideas that constitute mathematical knowledge. But even where this is possible, Hume argued, reason is a slow and inefficient guide, while the habits acquired by much repetition can produce a powerful conviction independently of reason. Although the truth of " $9 \times 12 = 108$ " can be established rationally in principle, most of us actually learned it by reciting our multiplication tables. In fact, what we call relative probability is, on Hume's view, nothing more than a measure of the strength of conviction produced in us by our experience of regularity.

Our beliefs in matters of fact, then, arise from sentiment or feeling rather than from reason. For Hume, imagination and belief differ only in the degree of conviction with which their objects are anticipated. Although this positive answer may seem disappointing, Hume maintained that custom or habit is the great guide of life and the foundation of all natural science.

### **Necessary Connection**

According to Hume, our belief that events are causally related is a custom or habit acquired by experience: having observed the regularity with which events of particular sorts occur together, we form the association of ideas that produces the habit of expecting the effect whenever we experience the cause. But something is missing from this account: we also believe that the cause somehow produces the effect. Even if this belief is unjustifiable, Hume must offer some explanation for the fact that we do hold it. His technique was to search for the original impression from which our idea of the necessary connection between cause and effect is copied.

The idea does not arise from our objective experience of the events themselves. All we observe is that events of the "cause" type occur nearby and shortly before events of the "effect" type, and that this recurs with a regularity that can be described as a "constant conjunction." Although this pattern of experience does encourage the formation of our habit of expecting the effect to follow the cause, it includes no impression of a necessary connection.

Nor do we acquire this impression (as Locke had supposed) from our own capacity for voluntary motion. Here the objective element of constant conjunction is rarely experienced, since the actions of our minds and bodies do not invariably submit to our voluntary control. And even if volition did always produce the intended movement, Hume argued, that would yield no notion of the connection between them. So there is no impression of causal power here, either.

Still, we do have the idea of a necessary connection, and it must come from somewhere. For a (non-justificatory) explanation, Hume refers us back to the formation of a custom or habit. Our (non-rational) expectation that the effect will follow the cause is accompanied by a strong feeling of conviction, and it is the impression of this feeling that is copied by our concept of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The force of causal necessity is just the strength of our

sentiment in anticipating efficacious outcomes.

## The Self

In a notorious passage of the Treatise, Hume offered a similar account of the belief in the reality of the self. Here there is the ordinary human supposition that lies behind our use of first-personal pronouns. Upon this relatively simple foundation, philosophers have erected the notion of an immaterial substance, a mind or soul that persists through time on its own. Hume's question is, "From what antecedent impression does the idea of the self arise?"

Hume pointed out that we do **not** have an impression of the self. No matter how closely I attend to my own experience, no matter how fully I notice the mental operations presently occurring "in my mind," I am never directly aware of "I." What I do experience is a succession of separate and individual ideas, associated with each other by relations of resemblance and causality. Although these relations may be extended through time by memory, there is no evidence of any substantial ground for their coherence. The persistent self and the immortal soul are philosophical fictions.

To suppose otherwise, Hume held, is to commit a category mistake: the self is just a bundle of perceptions, like the railroad cars in a train; to look for a self beyond the ideas would be like looking for a train beyond the cars. Our idea of a persistent self is simply a result of the human habit of attributing continued existence to any collection of associated parts. Like our idea of the necessary connection of cause with effect, belief in our own reality as substantial selves is natural, but unjustifiable.

## External World

Another perfectly ordinary feature of human cognition is our belief in the reality of the external world. As I write this lesson, I readily suppose that my fingers are touching a keyboard, that the sun is shining outside and that the radio is playing a Clapton song. In Hume's skeptical philosophy, what is the status of these beliefs?

The primitive human belief, Hume noted, is that we actually see (and hear, etc.) the physical objects themselves. But modern philosophy and science have persuaded us that this is not literally true. According to representationalists, we are directly aware of ideas, which must in turn be causally produced in our minds by external objects. The problem is that on this view we can never know that there really are physical objects that produce our sensory ideas.

We cannot rely on causal reasoning to convince us that there are external objects, Hume argued, since (as we have just seen) such reasoning arises from our observation of a constant conjunction between causes and effects. But according to the representationalist philosophy, we have no direct experience of the presumed cause! If we know objects only by means of ideas, then we cannot use those ideas to establish a causal connection between the things and the objects they are supposed to represent.

In fact, Hume supposed, our belief in the reality of an external world is entirely non-rational. It cannot be supported either as a relation of ideas or even as a matter of fact. Although it is utterly unjustifiable, however, belief in the external world is natural and unavoidable. We are in the habit of supposing that our ideas have external referents, even though we can have no real evidence for doing so. Representationalism thusly implodes: the ideas, originally introduced as

intermediaries between perceivers and things, end up absorbing both, rendering everything but themselves superfluous.

## **Skepticism**

Where does this leave us? Hume believed himself to be carrying out the empiricist program with rigorous consistency. Locke honestly proposed the possibility of deriving knowledge from experience, but did not carry it far enough. Bayle and Berkeley noticed further implications. Now Hume has shown that empiricism inevitably leads to an utter and total skepticism.

According to Hume, knowledge of pure mathematics is secure because it rests only on the relations of ideas, without presuming anything about the world. Experimental observations (conducted without any assumption of the existence of material objects) permit us to use our experience in forming useful habits. Any other epistemological effort, especially if it involves the pretense of achieving useful abstract knowledge, is meaningless and unreliable.

The most reasonable position, Hume held, is a "mitigated" skepticism that humbly accepts the limitations of human knowledge while pursuing the legitimate aims of math and science. In our non-philosophical moments, of course, we will be thrown back upon the natural beliefs of everyday life, no matter how lacking in rational justification we know them to be.

## **Personal Identity**

Later in eighteenth century, Scottish philosopher David Hume sought to develop more fully the consequences of Locke's cautious empiricism by applying the scientific methods of observation to a study of human nature itself. We cannot rely on the common-sense pronouncements of popular superstition, which illustrate human conduct without offering any illumination, Hume held, nor can we achieve any genuine progress by means of abstract metaphysical speculation, which imposes a spurious clarity upon profound issues. The alternative is to reject all easy answers, employing the negative results of philosophical skepticism as a legitimate place to start.

Stated more positively, Hume's position is that since human beings do in fact live and function in the world, we should try to observe how they do so. The key principle to be applied to any investigation of our cognitive capacities is, then, an attempt to discover the causes of human belief. This attempt is neither the popular project of noticing and cataloging human beliefs nor the metaphysical effort to provide them with an infallible rational justification. According to Hume, the proper goal of philosophy is simply to explain why we believe what we do. His own attempt to achieve that goal was the focus of Book I of the *Treatise of Human Nature* and all

## **Reason**

### **Grounds for Morality**

Having examined the epistemological basis for Hume's naturalism, we are ready to consider its application to human conduct. In morality as in all else, Hume supposed, our beliefs and actions are the products of custom or habit. Since all of our most scientific beliefs have exactly the same foundation, this account preserves the natural dignity of moral judgments.

Hume devoted the second book of the *Treatise* to an account of the human passions and a discussion of their role in the operation of the human will. It is our feelings or sentiments, Hume

claimed, that exert practical influence over human volition and action. Observation does reveal a constant conjunction between having a motive (not a reason) for acting and performing the action in question. Hence, with the same reliability that characterizes our belief in any causal relation, on Hume's view, we further believe that our feelings have the power to result in actions.

At one level, of course, this entails that we are determined to act as we do. Our feelings or sentiments produce our actions with the same degree of causal necessity, the same habitual expectation that the future will resemble the past, as that by which the rotation of the earth causes the sun to rise. (Like Locke, Hume denied that determination of this sort is relevant to our moral freedom; only when my actions are observed to be the effects of some cause outside myself could I decline to accept my own responsibility for them.) So a proper science of human nature will account for human actions, as well as for human beliefs, by reference to the natural formation of habitual associations with human feelings.

Clearly, rationality had no place in this account of morality. Although reason may judge relations of ideas and matters of fact, its most vivid outcomes never compel us to act as even the weakest of feelings may do. No compilation of facts, however complete or reliable, ever entails a moral obligation or results in action. "Reason is, and ought to be, only the slave of the passions," Hume held. All human actions flow naturally from human feelings, without any interference from human reason.

### **Moral Sentiment**

It does not follow that all actions are of equal value. On Hume's view, the judgments and recommendations of traditional morality arise not from reason, but from a moral sense. As a straightforward matter of fact (discoverable by experience), virtue is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, and vice by a feeling of pain. Thus, we praise an instance of virtuous action precisely because it arouses in us a pleasant feeling, and we avoid committing a vicious action because we anticipate that doing so would produce pain. Our feelings provide a natural guide for moral conduct.

Hume worked out the details of this account in Book III of the *Treatise*. The ideas of benevolence, utility, and justice arouse our deepest and most pervasive feelings, he maintained, and these feelings in turn motivate us toward actions of moral worth. I offer assistance to those in need because it makes me feel good to do so, and I am fair in my dealings with others because it would make me feel bad if I were not. All of morality rests firmly upon the natural human inclination to seek pleasure and avoid pain.

This noncognitive derivation of morality from emotion rather than from reason may seem hopelessly subjective at first glance, but remember that on Hume's view our confidence in causal efficacy has a similar source. I do what is morally right in the same way that I believe there is an external world—by following my natural inclinations in the absence of rational evidence. Thus, Hume regarded himself as having provided morality with a status no less significant in human life than that of natural science.

### **God's Existence**

Finally, we pause for a quick look at Hume's views on religion. In his own time, he was often regarded as a great enemy of organized religion. The posthumously published *Dialogues* offer an

extended treatment of the intellectual interchanges among facile orthodoxy, natural theology, and philosophical skepticism. There Hume took great care to expose what he believed to be the great mistake of trying to prove that god exists.

The newly-popular argument from design supposes that the order and beauty of the universe reflect the greatness and demonstrate the reality of its ultimate cause. Hume noted that since this analogical argument claims to infer a cause from presumed effects, it must be grounded as a matter of fact on the experience of a constant conjunction. But since in fact we have not observed repeated instances of gods creating universes, we cannot have formed the habit of associating our experience of the one with our inferences about the other. No causal relationship can ever be established from the observation of a unique example.

What is more, Hume argued that even if it were possible to engage in causal reasoning in this case, it could not warrant the intended conclusion. The presumed cause must always be supposed to be proportional to the observed effect, so the manifest imperfections of this world could never support belief in the perfection of its creator. The argument from design is a two-edged sword, as likely to persuade us of the frailty or malevolence as of the power and benevolence of the presumed cause of the world as we know it.

## **Miracles**

Nor did Hume suppose that references to the miraculous would provide a rational basis for religion. In this case, we do have the experience of constant conjunction to establish the "laws of nature" of which any purported miracle is a violation, and we have only the testimony of witnesses to establish the fact of the miracle itself. Since this testimony and the motives of the witnesses who offer it are always open to question, Hume argued, we will believe that the miracle occurred only when the possibility of false testimony seems an even greater violation of the natural order.

Some scholars suppose that the final paragraph of the essay "On Miracles" (Inquiry Section X) and the closing words of the Dialogues reflect Hume's acceptance of religious fideism, the notion that religion is properly a matter of faith, not reason. On this view, a fideistic Hume could hold that belief in the existence of god or the immortality of the soul is no less natural than belief in the existence of bodies or the persistence of the self. An alternative interpretation, however, accepts the lengthy rejection of religious orthodoxy as sincere while attributing the brief, moderate endings as a half-hearted effort to take the edge off. Certainly Hume's influence on the philosophy of religion has been primarily of the latter sort.

## **The Passions and the Will**

According to Hume's theory of the mind, the passions (what we today would call emotions, feelings, and desires) are impressions rather than ideas (original, vivid and lively perceptions that are not copied from other perceptions). The direct passions, which include desire, aversion, hope, fear, grief, and joy, are those that "arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure" that we experience or think about in prospect; however he also groups with them some instincts of unknown origin, such as the bodily appetites and the desires that good come to those we love and harm to those we hate, which do not proceed from pain and pleasure but produce them. The indirect passions, primarily pride, humility (shame), love and hatred, are generated in a more complex way, but still one involving either the thought or experience of pain or pleasure. Intentional actions are caused by the direct passions (including the instincts). Of the indirect passions Hume

says that pride, humility, love and hatred do not directly cause action; it is not clear whether he thinks this true of all the indirect passions.

Hume is traditionally regarded as a compatibilist about freedom and determinism, because in his discussion in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding he argues that if we understand the doctrines of liberty and necessity properly, all mankind consistently believe both that human actions are the products of causal necessity and that they are free. In the Treatise, however, he explicitly repudiates the doctrine of liberty as "absurd... in one sense, and unintelligible in any other". The two treatments, however, surprisingly enough, are entirely consistent.

Hume construes causal necessity to mean the same as causal connection (or rather, intelligible causal connection), as he himself analyzes this notion in his own theory of causation: either the "constant union and conjunction of like objects," or that together with "the inference of the mind from the one to the other". In both works he argues that just as we discover necessity (in this sense) to hold between the movements of material bodies, we discover just as much necessity to hold between human motives, character traits, and circumstances of action, on the one hand, and human behavior on the other. He says in the Treatise that the liberty of indifference is the negation of necessity in this sense; this is the notion of liberty that he there labels absurd, and identifies with chance or randomness (which can be no real power in nature) both in the Treatise and the first (epistemological) Enquiry.

Human actions are not free in this sense. However, Hume allows in the Treatise that they are sometimes free in the sense of 'liberty' which is opposed to violence or constraint. This is the sense on which Hume focuses in ECHU: "a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will;" which everyone has "who is not a prisoner and in chains". It is this that is entirely compatible with necessity in Hume's sense. So the positions in the two works are the same, although the polemical emphasis is so different – iconoclastic toward the libertarian view in the Treatise, and conciliatory toward "all mankind" in the first Enquiry.

Hume argues, as well, that the causal necessity of human actions is not only compatible with moral responsibility but requisite to it. To hold an agent morally responsible for a bad action, it is not enough that the action be morally reprehensible; we must impute the badness of the fleeting act to the enduring agent. Not all harmful or forbidden actions incur blame for the agent; those done by accident, for example, do not. It is only when, and because, the action's cause is some enduring passion or trait of character in the agent that she is to blame for it.

## **The Critical Philosophy**

Next we turn to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a watershed figure who forever altered the course of philosophical thinking in the Western tradition. Long after his thorough indoctrination into the quasi-scholastic German appreciation of the metaphysical systems of Leibniz and Wolff, Kant said, it was a careful reading of David Hume that "interrupted my dogmatic slumbers and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction." Having appreciated the full force of such skeptical arguments, Kant supposed that the only adequate response would be a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy, a recognition that the appearance of the external world depends in some measure upon the position and movement of its observers. This central idea became the basis for his life-long project of developing a critical philosophy that could withstand them.

Kant's aim was to move beyond the traditional dichotomy between rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists had tried to show that we can understand the world by careful use of reason; this guarantees the indubitability of our knowledge but leaves serious questions about its practical content. The empiricists, on the other hand, had argued that all of our knowledge must be firmly grounded in experience; practical content is thus secured, but it turns out that we can be certain of very little. Both approaches have failed, Kant supposed, because both are premised on the same mistaken assumption.

Progress in philosophy, according to Kant, requires that we frame the epistemological problem in an entirely different way. The crucial question is not how we can bring ourselves to understand the world, but how the world comes to be understood by us. Instead of trying, by reason or experience, to make our concepts match the nature of objects, Kant held, we must allow the structure of our concepts shape our experience of objects. This is the purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 1787): to show how reason determines the conditions under which experience and knowledge are possible.

### **Classification of judgements, possibility of synthetic a priori judgements**

In the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic (1783) Kant presented the central themes of the first Critique in a somewhat different manner, starting from instances in which we do appear to have achieved knowledge and asking under what conditions each case becomes possible. So he began by carefully drawing a pair of crucial distinctions among the judgments we do actually make.

The first distinction separates a priori from a posteriori judgments by reference to the origin of our knowledge of them. **A priori** judgments are based upon reason alone, independently of all sensory experience, and therefore apply with strict universality. **A posteriori** judgments, on the other hand, must be grounded upon experience and are consequently limited and uncertain in their application to specific cases. Thus, this distinction also marks the difference traditionally noted in logic between necessary and contingent truths.

But Kant also made a less familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, according to the information conveyed as their content. **Analytic** judgments are those whose predicates are wholly contained in their subjects; since they add nothing to our concept of the subject, such judgments are purely explicative and can be deduced from the principle of non-contradiction. **Synthetic** judgments, on the other hand, are those whose predicates are wholly distinct from their subjects, to which they must be shown to relate because of some real connection external to the concepts themselves. Hence, synthetic judgments are genuinely informative but require justification by reference to some outside principle.

Kant supposed that previous philosophers had failed to differentiate properly between these two distinctions. Both Leibniz and Hume had made just one distinction, between matters of fact based on sensory experience and the uninformative truths of pure reason. In fact, Kant held, the two distinctions are not entirely coextensive; we need at least to consider all four of their logically possible combinations:

- Analytic a posteriori judgments cannot arise, since there is never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely explicative assertion.

- Synthetic a posteriori judgments are the relatively uncontroversial matters of fact we come to know by means of our sensory experience (though Wolff had tried to derive even these from the principle of contradiction).
- Analytic a priori judgments, everyone agrees, include all merely logical truths and straightforward matters of definition; they are necessarily true.
- **Synthetic a priori** judgments are the crucial case, since only they could provide new information that is necessarily true. But neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the possibility of any such case.

Unlike his predecessors, Kant maintained that synthetic a priori judgments not only are possible but actually provide the basis for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed (pace Hume) that arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments and that natural science depends on them for its power to explain and predict events. What is more, metaphysics—if it turns out to be possible at all—must rest upon synthetic a priori judgments, since anything else would be either uninformative or unjustifiable. But how are synthetic a priori judgments possible at all? This is the central question Kant sought to answer.

## Mathematics

Consider, for example, our knowledge that two plus three is equal to five and that the interior angles of any triangle add up to a straight line. These (and similar) truths of mathematics are synthetic judgments, Kant held, since they contribute significantly to our knowledge of the world; the sum of the interior angles is not contained in the concept of a triangle. Yet, clearly, such truths are known a priori, since they apply with strict and universal necessity to all of the objects of our experience, without having been derived from that experience itself. In these instances, Kant supposed, no one will ask whether or not we have synthetic a priori knowledge; plainly, we do. The question is, how do we come to have such knowledge? If experience does not supply the required connection between the concepts involved, what does?

Kant's answer is that we do it ourselves. Conformity with the truths of mathematics is a precondition that we impose upon every possible object of our experience. Just as Descartes had noted in the Fifth Meditation, the essence of bodies is manifested to us in Euclidean solid geometry, which determines a priori the structure of the spatial world we experience. In order to be perceived by us, any object must be regarded as being uniquely located in space and time, so it is the spatio-temporal framework itself that provides the missing connection between the concept of the triangle and that of the sum of its angles. Space and time, Kant argued in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the first Critique, are the "pure forms of sensible intuition" under which we perceive what we do.

Understanding mathematics in this way makes it possible to rise above an old controversy between rationalists and empiricists regarding the very nature of space and time. Leibniz had maintained that space and time are not intrinsic features of the world itself, but merely a product of our minds. Newton, on the other hand, had insisted that space and time are absolute, not merely a set of spatial and temporal relations. Kant now declares that both of them were correct! Space and time are absolute, and they do derive from our minds. As synthetic a priori judgments, the truths of mathematics are both informative and necessary.

This is our first instance of a transcendental argument, Kant's method of reasoning from the fact that we have knowledge of a particular sort to the conclusion that all of the logical presuppositions

of such knowledge must be satisfied. We will see additional examples in later lessons, and can defer our assessment of them until then. But notice that there is a price to be paid for the certainty we achieve in this manner. Since mathematics derives from our own sensible intuition, we can be absolutely sure that it must apply to everything we perceive, but for the same reason we can have no assurance that it has anything to do with the way things are apart from our perception of them. Next time, we'll look at Kant's very similar treatment of the synthetic a priori principles upon which our knowledge of natural science depends.

## **Preconditions for Natural Science**

In natural science no less than in mathematics, Kant held, synthetic a priori judgments provide the necessary foundations for human knowledge. The most general laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, cannot be justified by experience, yet must apply to it universally. In this case, the negative portion of Hume's analysis—his demonstration that matters of fact rest upon an unjustifiable belief that there is a necessary connection between causes and their effects—was entirely correct. But of course Kant's more constructive approach is to offer a transcendental argument from the fact that we do have knowledge of the natural world to the truth of synthetic a priori propositions about the structure of our experience of it.

As we saw last time, applying the concepts of space and time as forms of sensible intuition is necessary condition for any perception. But the possibility of scientific knowledge requires that our experience of the world be not only perceivable but thinkable as well, and Kant held that the general intelligibility of experience entails the satisfaction of two further conditions:

First, it must be possible in principle to arrange and organize the chaos of our many individual sensory images by tracing the connections that hold among them. This Kant called the synthetic unity of the sensory manifold.

Second, it must be possible in principle for a single subject to perform this organization by discovering the connections among perceived images. This is satisfied by what Kant called the transcendental unity of apperception. Experiential knowledge is thinkable only if there is some regularity in what is known and there is some knower in whom that regularity can be represented. Since we do actually have knowledge of the world as we experience it, Kant held, both of these conditions must in fact obtain.

## **The metaphysical and the transcendental Deduction of the Categories**

Since (as Hume had noted) individual images are perfectly separable as they occur within the sensory manifold, connections between them can be drawn only by the knowing subject, in which the principles of connection are to be found. As in mathematics, so in science the synthetic a priori judgments must derive from the structure of the understanding itself.

Consider, then, the sorts of judgments distinguished by logicians (in Kant's day): each of them has some quantity (applying to all things, some, or only one); some quality (affirmative, negative, or complementary); some relation (absolute, conditional, or alternative); and some modality (problematic, assertoric, or apodeictic). Kant supposed that any intelligible thought can be expressed in judgments of these sorts. But then it follows that any thinkable experience must be understood in these ways, and we are justified in projecting this entire way of thinking outside ourselves, as the inevitable structure of any possible experience.

The result of this "Transcendental Logic" is the schematized table of categories, Kant's summary of the central concepts we employ in thinking about the world, each of which is discussed in a separate section of the Critique:

<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Quality</b>
Unity	Reality
Plurality	Negation
Totality	Limitation
Axioms of Intuition	Anticipations of Perception
<b>Relation</b>	<b>Modality</b>
Substance	Possibility
Cause	Existence
Community	Necessity
Analogies of Experience	Postulates of Empirical Thought

Our most fundamental convictions about the natural world derive from these concepts, according to Kant. The most general principles of natural science are not empirical generalizations from what we have experienced, but synthetic a priori judgments about what we could experience, in which these concepts provide the crucial connectives.

### **Phenomena and Noumena**

Having seen Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding applicable a priori to every possible experience, we might naturally wish to ask the further question whether these regulative principles are really true. Are there substances? Does every event have a cause? Do all things interact? Given that we must suppose them in order to have any experience, do they obtain in the world itself? To these further questions, Kant firmly refused to offer any answer.

According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the distinct realms of phenomena and noumena. **Phenomena** are the appearances, which constitute the our experience; **noumena** are the (presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our synthetic a priori judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not the noumenal. (It is only at this level, with respect to what we can experience, that we are justified in imposing the structure of our concepts onto the objects of our knowledge.) Since the thing in itself (Ding an sich) would by definition be entirely independent of our experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm.

Thus, on Kant's view, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, are knowable precisely because they make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribe the structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure forms of sensible

intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal realm but learn nothing of the noumenal realm. Math and science are certainly true of the phenomena; only metaphysics claims to instruct us about the noumena.

### **Rejection of speculative metaphysics**

Although our knowledge of mathematics and natural science yield easily to a Kantian analysis, the synthetic a priori judgments of metaphysics are much more difficult to explain. Here the forms of intuition and concepts of understanding are useless, since they find application only in the realm of our experience, while metaphysics seeks to transcend experience completely, in order to discover the nature of reality itself as comprehended under pure reason.

Metaphysical speculation properly begins with the same method as the "Aesthetic" and "Analytic," Kant supposed, but it invariably ends up in a "Dialectic." The transcendental arguments we employ in metaphysics need not restrict their determination to the phenomenal realm alone, since their aim is genuine knowledge of the noumena. Synthetic a priori judgments in metaphysics must be grounded upon truly transcendental ideas, which are regarded as applicable to things in themselves independently of our experience of them.

### **The Ideas of Reason – soul, God and world as a whole**

Kant's exposition of the transcendental ideas begins once again from the logical distinction among categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms. From this distinction, as we have seen, the understanding derives the concepts of substance, cause, and community, which provide the basis for rules that obtain as natural laws within our experience. Now, from the same distinction, the reason must carry things further in order to derive the transcendental ideas of the complete subject, the complete series of conditions, and the complete complex of what is possible. Thus, the "completion" of metaphysical reasoning requires transcendental ideas of three sorts, but Kant argued that each leads to its characteristic irresolvable difficulty.

The **Psychological Idea** is the concept of the soul as a permanent substance which lives forever. It is entirely natural to reason (as in Descartes's cogito) from knowledge that "I think" to my real existence as one and the same thinking thing through all time, but Kant held that our efforts to reach such conclusions are "Paralogisms," with only illusory validity. It is true that thought presupposes the unity of apperception and that every change presupposes an underlying substance, but these rules apply only to the phenomena we experience. Since substantial unity and immortality are supposed to be noumenal features of the soul as a thing in itself, Kant held, legitimate a priori judgments can never prove them, and the effort to transcend in this case fails.

The **Cosmological Idea** is the concept of a complete determination of the nature of the world as it must be constituted in itself. In this case, Kant held, the difficulty is not that we can conclude too little but rather that we can prove too much. From the structure of our experience of the world, it is easy to deduce contradictory particular claims about reality: finitude vs. infinity; simplicity vs. complexity; freedom vs. determinism; necessity vs. contingency. These "Antinomies" of Pure Reason can be avoided only when we recognize that one or both of the contradictory proofs in each antinomy holds only for the phenomenal realm. Once again, it is the effort to achieve transcendental knowledge of noumena that necessarily fails.

The **Theological Idea** is the concept of an absolutely perfect and most real being (or god). Again it

is natural to move from our recognition of dependence within the phenomenal realm to the notion of a perfectly independent noumenal being, the "Transcendental Ideal." But traditional attempts to prove that god really exists, founded as they are on what we experience, cannot establish the reality of a being necessarily beyond all experience.

The general point of the Transcendental Dialectic should by now be clear: metaphysical speculation about the ultimate nature of reality invariably fails. The synthetic a priori judgments which properly serve as regulative principles governing our experience can never be shown to have any force as constitutive of the real nature of the world. Pure reason inevitably reaches for what it cannot grasp.

## **The Limits of Reason**

Now that we've seen Kant's answers to all three parts of the Prolegomena's "Main Transcendental Question" and have traced their sources in the Critique of Pure Reason, we are in a position to appreciate his careful delineation of what is possible in metaphysical thought and what is not. What most clearly is not possible is any legitimate synthetic a priori judgment about things in themselves. The only thing that justifies the application of regulative principles in mathematics and natural science is their limitation to phenomena. Both sensible intuition and the understanding deal with the conditions under which experience is possible. But the whole point of speculative metaphysics is to transcend experience entirely in order to achieve knowledge of the noumenal realm. Here, only the faculty of reason is relevant, but its most crucial speculative conclusions, its deepest convictions about the self, the world, and god, are all drawn illegitimately.

What is possible—indeed, according to Kant what we are bound by our very nature as rational beings to do—is to think of the noumenal realm **as if** the speculative principles were true (whether or not they are). By the nature of reason itself, we are required to suppose our own existence as substantial beings, the possibility of our free action in a world of causal regularity, and the existence of god. The absence of any formal justification for these notions makes it impossible for us to claim that we know them to be true, but it can in no way diminish the depth of our belief that they are.

According to Kant, then, the rational human faculties lead us to the very boundaries of what can be known, by clarifying the conditions under which experience of the world as we know it is possible. But beyond those boundaries our faculties are useless. The shape of the boundary itself, as evidenced in the Paralogisms and Antinomies, naturally impels us to postulate that the unknown does indeed have certain features, but these further speculations are inherently unjustifiable.

The only legitimate, "scientific" metaphysics that the future may hold, Kant therefore held, would be a thoroughly critical, non-speculative examination of the bounds of pure reason, a careful description of what we can know accompanied by a clear recognition that our transcendental concepts (however useful they may seem) are entirely unreliable as guides to the nature of reality. It is this task, of course, that Kant himself had pursued in the First Critique.

## **Hegel and Absolute Idealism**

The greatest of all the German idealists was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who methodically constructed a comprehensive system of thought about the world. Focused like Kant on the goal of showing how some fundamental unity underlies the confusing multiplicity of experiential

contents, Hegel took a much more systematic approach by making absolute consciousness the key source of ultimate connections among all other things. Above all else, Hegel held that reality must be rational, so that its ultimate structure is revealed in the structure of our thought. Everything that is thinkable, especially apparent contradictions, must be resolvable under some common concept of the reason.

Even more than Aristotle and the Stoics, Hegel believed that the study of logic is an investigation into the fundamental structure of reality itself. According to Hegel, all logic (and, hence, all of reality) is dialectical in character. As Kant had noted in the Antinomies, serious thought about one general description of the world commonly leads us into a contemplation of its opposite. But Hegel did not suppose this to be the end of the matter; he made the further supposition that the two concepts so held in opposition can always be united by a shift to some higher level of thought. Thus, the human mind invariably moves from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, employing each synthesis as the thesis for a new opposition to be transcended by yet a higher level, continuing in a perpetual waltz of intellectual achievement.

Being, for example, is a basic concept that serves as a clear starting-point for any serious thinker, but serious contemplation of its nature reveals it to be so utterly devoid of specific content that the mind is naturally led to the thought of Nothing as its opposite; but these two are not really contradictory, since both may be unified under the more sophisticated and comprehensive notion of Becoming. If, on the other hand, our thesis is the concept of Being as a naive immediate presentation of experience, then its natural antithesis is the idea of Essence as knowledge mediated by classification; and the synthesis that unites these concepts is that of the Notion as a self-mediating interpretation of thought and reality combined.

On the grandest scale of conceivability, all of thought (including the dialectical logic itself) is comprised by the thesis Idea, whose natural antithesis is Nature, the otherness of the known considered independently of its relation to the knower; and the grand synthesis of the two is **Spirit**, the self-knowing, self-actualizing totality of all that is—namely, the Absolute itself. This embodies Hegel's fundamental convictions that reality is wholly rational and that whatever is rational must be real. Human thought is merely one portion of the Becoming of Absolute Spirit, which is (through us) thinking and creating itself as it goes. Even this development, as Hegel described it in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is best understood as the triadic transition from subjective to objective to absolute Spirit.

### **The conception of Geist (spirit) Subjective Spirit**

Considered as subjective, Spirit may be observed, through truths about human nature described by the discipline of psychology, in the structure of thought exhibited by each individual human being. In every concrete instantiation, consciousness strives to reach perfect knowledge, and the path of its struggle can, of course, be described as the movement from thesis through antithesis to synthesis:

The first level of consciousness is that of sensory awareness of objects. Despite the fact that sensory images invariably appear to us as concrete particulars, wholly unrelated to each other, we naturally universalize the apparent regularities of their appearance, imposing upon them the forms of space and time and the generalized laws of nature.

Recognition of the role we ourselves play in the origination of these Kantian regulative principles, Hegel supposed, leads us directly to the antithesis of sensory experience, the self-conscious awareness of the individual thinker, who acknowledges self as individual ego. Although this ultimately implies the existence of other selves as well, its immediate consequence is a tendency toward skepticism about the world of objects.

But Hegel held that these levels are transcended by their synthesis in universal consciousness, an abstract awareness of one's own place within the greater scheme of absolute spirit. The objects of my experience and my awareness of myself are unified by the recognition that each is wholly contained in the fundamental reality of a common whole. Here the faculty of reason is crucial, since it most clearly draws upon what is common to us all.

### **Objective Spirit**

Considered objectively, Spirit involves the interaction among many selves that are the proper subject of ethics and social or political theory. Once again, of course, Hegel maintained that a correct understanding of these fields is to be derived not by generalizing from what we observe, but rather by tracing the dialectic through new triads.

Ethics, on Hegel's view, begins with the concept of freedom understood as the right of each individual human being to act independently in pursuit of its own self-interest. The antithesis to this is the emergence of moral rules, which require the imposition of duty as a constraint upon the natural liberty of human desire. The synthesis of the two for Hegel is "the ethical life," which emerges from a sincere recognition of the significance of one's own stake in the greater good of the whole.

Political order has its origins in family life, in which the basic needs of all individuals are served by mutual feeling, without any formal principle of organization. The antithesis to this is civil life, in which the incorporation of so many more individual units often leads to a system of purely formal regulation of conduct, demanded by law without any emotional bond. The synthesis of the two, then, is the State, which Hegel believed to unite society into a sort of civil family, organized in legal fashion but bound together by a profound emotional sense of devotion.

According to Hegel, then, the modern nation must serve as an actualization of the self-conscious ethical will of a people {Ger. *Völk*}. Although this sounds something like Rousseau's general will, Hegel's version puts all of the emphasis on the collective expression of what is best for the people rather than on each individual's capacity to discover it for herself or himself. This view of the state fits well with the rise of modern nationalism in Europe during the nineteenth century, where the national spirit {Ger. *Völkergeist*} of each group emerges distinctively from every other.

### **Absolute Spirit**

Finally, when considered most purely, as absolute in itself, Spirit is just the historical process of human thought toward ever-greater awareness of the fundamental unity of all reality. In order to see how the Absolute gradually discovers and expresses its own nature, Hegel proposed, we need only observe the way in which the Spirit of the World (*Weltgeist*) develops dialectically in three distinguishable arenas, a triad of triads through which human culture achieves its transcendental aim.

Since it appreciates and evaluates the Absolute entirely through its presentations among the senses, Art is first to be considered. Effective artistic expression, Hegel supposed, must always transcend the subject/object dichotomy by leading us to awareness of some underlying unity. Historically, human art has embodied the dialectical development of the Absolute's sensory being, starting with the thesis of symbolic representation of natural objects and proceeding to its antithesis in highly stylized classical art before rising to the synthesis of Romantic expression. The antithesis of Art as a whole is the abstract notion of the Absolute as an objectified other, the divine being contemplated by Religion. Although traditional religion often speaks of god in personal terms, its theological exposition usually emphasizes the radical differentness of the deity and its incomprehensibility to us. Again, the historical development of religion displays a dialectical structure: the thesis is worship of nature, which gives rise to a religion of individuality tempered by revealed law, and both are transcended in the synthesis of Protestant Christianity, which unifies them under the notion of god in human form.

This leaves room for the grand culminating synthesis of human culture, which is (of course!) **Philosophy**, in which the Absolute learns to cognize itself in perfectly literal terms. As the self-conscious awareness of the Absolute, Hegel's philosophy unifies the sensibility of art and the objectification of religion by regarding the dialectical logic of reason as the ultimate structure of reality. Here, too, there has been historical development, most recently the emergence of absolute idealism as a synthesis transcending the dispute between empiricism and rationalism.

### **The Inexorability of History**

As we have already seen, Hegel's view of the world is determinedly historical; he believed that history itself (involving another triad, of original/reflective/philosophical history) exhibits the growth of self-consciousness in the Absolute, the process of development by means of which the Weltgeist comes to know itself. But since history inevitably follows the pattern of logical necessity through the dialectical movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis, the present age must be the highest stage of development. Certainly Hegel regarded the cultural achievements of his own time—nationalism, romanticism, protestantism, and idealism—as the culmination of all that had gone before, with his own philosophical work as its highest expression. Here is nineteenth-century optimism at its peak, full of self-confidence in the possibilities of rationality and enlightenment. Many thinkers of the nearly two centuries since Hegel's time have raised serious questions about the reliability of this modernist promise.

### **Hegel's Dialectics**

"Dialectics" is a term used to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of contradictory process between opposing sides. In what is perhaps the most classic version of "dialectics", the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, for instance, presented his philosophical argument as a back-and-forth dialogue or debate, generally between the character of Socrates, on one side, and some person or group of people to whom Socrates was talking (his interlocutors), on the other. In the course of the dialogues, Socrates' interlocutors propose definitions of philosophical concepts or express views that Socrates challenges or opposes. The back-and-forth debate between opposing sides produces a kind of linear progression or evolution in philosophical views or positions: as the dialogues go along, Socrates' interlocutors change or refine their views in response to Socrates' challenges and come to adopt more sophisticated views. The back-and-forth dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors thus becomes Plato's way of arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated views or positions and for the more

sophisticated ones later.

“Hegel’s dialectics” refers to the particular dialectical method of argument employed by the 19th Century German philosopher, G.W.F. Hegel, which, like other “dialectical” methods, relies on a contradictory process between opposing sides. Whereas Plato’s “opposing sides” were people (Socrates and his interlocutors), however, what the “opposing sides” are in Hegel’s work depends on the subject matter he discusses. In his work on logic, for instance, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of logical concepts that are opposed to one another. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which presents Hegel’s epistemology or philosophy of knowledge, the “opposing sides” are different definitions of consciousness and of the object that consciousness is aware of or claims to know. As in Plato’s dialogues, a contradictory process between “opposing sides” in Hegel’s dialectics leads to a linear evolution or development from less sophisticated definitions or views to more sophisticated ones later. The dialectical process thus constitutes Hegel’s method for arguing against the earlier, less sophisticated definitions or views and for the more sophisticated ones later. Hegel regarded this dialectical method or “speculative mode of cognition” as the hallmark of his philosophy, and used the same method in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as well as in all of the mature works he published later—the entire *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences* (including, as its first part, the “Lesser Logic” or the *Encyclopaedia Logic* [EL]), the *Science of Logic* [SL], and the *Philosophy of Right* [PR].

Note that, although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato’s version of dialectics. He argued that Plato’s dialectics deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness. According to the logic of a traditional *reductio ad absurdum* argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then, the scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss.

Hegel argues that, because Plato’s dialectics cannot get beyond arbitrariness and skepticism, it generates only approximate truths, and falls short of being a genuine science

### **Hegel’s description of his dialectical method**

Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, which is often called the *Encyclopaedia Logic* [EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments. These sides are not parts of logic, but, rather, moments of “every logical concept”, as well as “of everything true in general” (EL Remark to §79; we will see why Hegel thought dialectics is in everything in section 4). The first moment—the moment of the understanding—is the moment of fixity, in which concepts or forms have a seemingly stable definition or determination.

The second moment—the “dialectical” or “negatively rational” moment—is the moment of

instability. In this moment, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination from the moment of understanding comes to the fore, and the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into its opposite. Hegel describes this process as a process of “self-sublation”. The English verb “to sublimate” translates Hegel’s technical use of the German verb *aufheben*, which is a crucial concept in his dialectical method. Hegel says that *aufheben* has a doubled meaning: it means both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time.

The moment of understanding sublimes itself because its own character or nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self-sublation, or a process in which the determination from the moment of understanding sublimes itself, or both cancels and preserves itself, as it pushes on to or passes into its opposite.

The third moment—the “speculative” or “positively rational” moment—grasps the unity of the opposition between the first two determinations, or is the positive result of the dissolution or transition of those determinations. Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, *reductio ad absurdum* argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing. As Hegel suggests in the *Phenomenology*, such an argument is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results.

Although the speculative moment negates the contradiction, it is a determinate or defined nothingness because it is the result of a specific process. There is something particular about the determination in the moment of understanding—a specific weakness, or some specific aspect that was ignored in its one-sidedness or restrictedness—that leads it to fall apart in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment has a definition, determination or content because it grows out of and unifies the particular character of those earlier determinations, or is “a unity of distinct determinations”. The speculative moment is thus “truly not empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain determinations” (EL §82). When the result “is taken as the result of that from which it emerges”, Hegel says, then it is “in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content”. As he also puts it, “the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation]; a new form has thereby immediately arisen”. Or, as he says, “[b]ecause the result, the negation, is a determinate negation [bestimmte Negation], it has a content”.

Hegel’s claim in both the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic* that his philosophy relies on a process of “determinate negation [bestimmte Negation]” has sometimes led scholars to describe his dialectics as a method or doctrine of “determinate negation”.

There are several features of this account that Hegel thinks raise his dialectical method above the arbitrariness of Plato’s dialectics to the level of a genuine science. First, because the determinations in the moment of understanding sublimate themselves, Hegel’s dialectics does not require some new idea to show up arbitrarily. Instead, the movement to new determinations is driven by the nature of the earlier determinations. Indeed, for Hegel, the movement is driven by necessity. The nature of the determinations themselves drives or forces them to pass into their opposites. This sense of necessity—the idea that the method involves being forced from earlier moments to later ones—leads Hegel to regard his dialectics as a kind of logic. As he says in the

Phenomenology, the method's "proper exposition belongs to logic". Necessity—the sense of being driven or forced to conclusions—is the hallmark of "logic" in Western philosophy.

Second, because the form or determination that arises is the result of the self- sublation of the determination from the moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside. Instead, the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out of the process itself. Unlike in Plato's arbitrary dialectics, then—which must wait around until some other idea comes in from the outside—in Hegel's dialectics "nothing extraneous is introduced", as he says. His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or "inwardness" of its own content. As he puts it, dialectics is "the principle through which alone immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science".

Third, because later determinations "sublate" earlier determinations, the earlier determinations are not completely cancelled or negated. On the contrary, the earlier determinations are preserved in the sense that they remain in effect within the later determinations. When Being-for-itself, for instance, is introduced in the logic as the first concept of ideality or universality and is defined by embracing a set of "something-others", Being-for-itself replaces the something- others as the new concept, but those something-others remain active within the definition of the concept of Being-for-itself. The something-others must continue to do the work of picking out individual somethings before the concept of Being- for-itself can have its own definition as the concept that gathers them up. Being- for-itself replaces the something-others, but it also preserves them, because its definition still requires them to do their work of picking out individualsomethings.

The concept of "apple", for example, as a Being-for-itself, would be defined by gathering up individual "somethings" that are the same as one another (as apples). Each individual apple can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to an "other" that is the same "something" that it is (i.e., an apple). That is the one- sidedness or restrictedness that leads each "something" to pass into its "other" or opposite. The "somethings" are thus both "something-others". Moreover, their defining processes lead to an endless process of passing back and forth into one another: one "something" can be what it is (as an apple) only in relation to another "something" that is the same as it is, which, in turn, can be what it is (an apple) only in relation to the other "something" that is the same as it is, and soon, back and forth, endlessly. The concept of "apple", as a Being-for-itself, stops that endless, passing-over process by embracing or including the individual something-others (the apples) in its content. It grasps or captures their character or quality as apples. But the "something-others" must do their work of picking out and separating those individual items (the apples) before the concept of "apple"—as the Being-for-itself—can gather them up for its own definition. We can picture the concept of Being-for-itself like this:

### **Applying Hegel's dialectical method to his arguments**

Scholars often use the first three stages of the logic as the "textbook example" to illustrate how Hegel's dialectical method should be applied to his arguments. The logic begins with the simple and immediate concept of pure Being, which is said to illustrate the moment of the understanding. We can think of Being here as a concept of pure presence. It is not mediated by any other concept—or is not defined in relation to any other concept—and so is undetermined or has no further determination. It asserts bare presence, but what that presence is like has no further determination. Because the thought of pure Being is undetermined and so is a pure abstraction, however, it is really no different from the assertion of pure negation or the absolutely negative. It is

therefore equally a Nothing. Being's lack of determination thus leads it to sublimate itself and pass into the concept of Nothing, which illustrates the dialectical moment.

But if we focus for a moment on the definitions of Being and Nothing themselves, their definitions have the same content. Indeed, both are undetermined, so they have the same kind of undefined content. The only difference between them is "something merely meant", namely, that Being is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be presence, while Nothing is an undefined content, taken as or meant to be absence. The third concept of the logic—which is used to illustrate the speculative moment—unifies the first two moments by capturing the positive result of—or the conclusion that we can draw from—the opposition between the first two moments. The concept of Becoming is the thought of an undefined content, taken as presence (Being) and then taken as absence (Nothing), or taken as absence (Nothing) and then taken as presence (Being). To Become is to go from Being to Nothing or from Nothing to Being, or is, as Hegel puts it, "the immediate vanishing of the one in the other". The contradiction between Being and Nothing thus is not a *reductio ad absurdum*, or does not lead to the rejection of both concepts and hence to nothingness—as Hegel had said Plato's dialectics does—but leads to a positive result, namely, to the introduction of a new concept—the synthesis—which unifies the two, earlier, opposed concepts.

We can also use the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example to illustrate Hegel's concept of *aufheben* (to sublimate), which, as we saw, means to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time. Hegel says that the concept of Becoming sublimes the concepts of Being and Nothing (SL-M 105; cf. SL-dG 80). Becoming cancels or negates Being and Nothing because it is a new concept that replaces the earlier concepts; but it also preserves Being and Nothing because it relies on those earlier concepts for its own definition. Indeed, it is the first concrete concept in the logic. Unlike Being and Nothing, which had no definition or determination as concepts themselves and so were merely abstract, Becoming is a "determinate unity in which there is both Being and Nothing". Becoming succeeds in having a definition or determination because it is defined by, or piggy-backs on, the concepts of Being and Nothing.

This "textbook" Being-Nothing-Becoming example is closely connected to the traditional idea that Hegel's dialectics follows a thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, which, when applied to the logic, means that one concept is introduced as a "thesis" or positive concept, which then develops into a second concept that negates or is opposed to the first or is its "antithesis", which in turn leads to a third concept, the "synthesis", that unifies the first two. Versions of this interpretation of Hegel's dialectics continue to have currency. On this reading, Being is the positive moment or thesis, Nothing is the negative moment or antithesis, and Becoming is the moment of *aufheben* or synthesis—the concept that cancels and preserves, or unifies and combines, Being and Nothing. We must be careful, however, not to apply this textbook example too dogmatically to the rest of Hegel's logic or to his dialectical method more generally (for a classic criticism of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of Hegel's dialectics, see Mueller 1958). There are other places where this general pattern might describe some of the transitions from stage to stage, but there are many more places where the development does not seem to fit this pattern very well. One place where the pattern seems to hold, for instance, is where the Measure—as the combination of Quality and Quantity—transitions into the Measureless, which is opposed to it, which then in turn transitions into Essence, which is the unity or combination of the two earlier sides. This series of transitions could be said to follow the general pattern captured by the "textbook example": Measure would be the moment of the understanding or thesis, the Measureless would be the dialectical moment or

antithesis, and Essence would be the speculative moment or synthesis that unifies the two earlier moments. However, before the transition to Essence takes place, the Measureless itself is redefined as a Measure—undercutting a precise parallel with the textbook Being- Nothing-Becoming example, since the transition from Measure to Essence would not follow a Measure-Measureless-Essence pattern, but rather a Measure- (Measureless?)-Measure-Essence pattern.

Other sections of Hegel's philosophy do not fit the triadic, textbook example of Being-Nothing-Becoming at all, as even interpreters who have supported the traditional reading of Hegel's dialectics have noted. After using the Being- Nothing-Becoming example to argue that Hegel's dialectical method consists of "triads" whose members "are called the thesis, antithesis, synthesis", W.T. Stace, for instance, goes on to warn us that Hegel does not succeed in applying this pattern throughout the philosophical system. It is hard to see, Stace says, how the middle term of some of Hegel's triads are the opposites or antitheses of the first term, "and there are even 'triads' which contain four terms!". As a matter of fact, one section of Hegel's logic—the section on Cognition—violates the thesis- antithesis-synthesis pattern because it has only two sub-divisions, rather than three. "The triad is incomplete", Stace complains. "There is no third. Hegel here abandons the triadic method. Nor is any explanation of his having done so forthcoming".

Interpreters have offered various solutions to the complaint that Hegel's dialectics sometimes seems to violate the triadic form. Some scholars apply the triadic form fairly loosely across several stages. Others have applied Hegel's triadic method to whole sections of his philosophy, rather than to individual stages. For G.R.G. Mure, for instance, the section on Cognition fits neatly into a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis account of dialectics because the whole section is itself the antithesis of the previous section of Hegel's logic, the section on Life. Mure argues that Hegel's triadic form is easier to discern the more broadly we apply it. "The triadic form appears on many scales", he says, "and the larger the scale we consider the more obvious it is".

Scholars who interpret Hegel's description of dialectics on a smaller scale—as an account of how to get from stage to stage—have also tried to explain why some sections seem to violate the triadic form. J.N. Findlay, for instance—who, like Stace, associates dialectics "with the triad, or with triplicity"—argues that stages can fit into that form in "more than one sense". The first sense of triplicity echoes the textbook, Being-Nothing-Becoming example. In a second sense, however, Findlay says, the dialectical moment or "contradictory breakdown" is not itself a separate stage, or "does not count as one of the stages", but is a transition between opposed, "but complementary", abstract stages that "are developed more or less concurrently". This second sort of triplicity could involve any number of stages: it "could readily have been expanded into a quadruplicity, a quintuplicity and so forth". Still, like Stace, he goes on to complain that many of the transitions in Hegel's philosophy do not seem to fit the triadic pattern very well. In some triads, the second term is "the direct and obvious contrary of the first"—as in the case of Being and Nothing. In other cases, however, the opposition is, as Findlay puts it, "of a much less extreme character" (Findlay 1962: 69). In some triads, the third term obviously mediates between the first two terms. In other cases, however, he says, the third term is just one possible mediator or unity among other possible ones; and, in yet other cases, "the reconciling functions of the third member are not at all obvious". Let us look more closely at one place where the "textbook example" of Being- Nothing-Becoming does not seem to describe the dialectical development of Hegel's logic very well. In a later stage of the logic, the concept of Purpose goes through several iterations, from Abstract Purpose, to Finite or Immediate Purpose, and then through several stages of a syllogism to Realized Purpose. Abstract Purpose is the thought of any kind of purposiveness, where the purpose has not been

further determined or defined. It includes not just the kinds of purposes that occur in consciousness, such as needs or drives, but also the “internal purposiveness” or teleological view proposed by the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, according to which things in the world have essences and aim to achieve (or have the purpose of living up to) their essences. Finite Purpose is the moment in which an Abstract Purpose begins to have a determination by fixing on some particular material or content through which it will be realized. The Finite Purpose then goes through a process in which it, as the Universality, comes to realize itself as the Purpose over the particular material or content (and hence becomes Realized Purpose) by pushing out into Particularity, then into Singularity (the syllogism U-P-S), and ultimately into ‘out-there-ness,’ or into individual objects out there in the world.

Hegel’s description of the development of Purpose does not seem to fit the textbook Being-Nothing-Becoming example or the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. According to the example and model, Abstract Purpose would be the moment of understanding or thesis, Finite Purpose would be the dialectical moment or antithesis, and Realized Purpose would be the speculative moment or synthesis. Although Finite Purpose has a different determination from Abstract Purpose (it refines the definition of Abstract Purpose), it is hard to see how it would qualify as strictly “opposed” to or as the “antithesis” of Abstract Purpose in the way that Nothing is opposed to or is the antithesis of Being.

There is an answer, however, to the criticism that many of the determinations are not “opposites” in a strict sense. The German term that is translated as “opposite” in Hegel’s description of the moments of dialectics—*entgegensetzen*—has three root words: *setzen* (“to posit or set”), *gegen*, (“against”), and the prefix *ent-*, which indicates that something has entered into a new state. The verb *entgegensetzen* can therefore literally be translated as “to set over against”. The “*engegengesetzte*” into which determinations pass, then, do not need to be the strict “opposites” of the first, but can be determinations that are merely “set against” or are different from the first ones. And the prefix *ent-*, which suggests that the first determinations are put into a new state, can be explained by Hegel’s claim that the finite determinations from the moment of understanding sublate (cancel but also preserve) themselves: later determinations put earlier determinations into a new state by preserving them.

At the same time, there is a technical sense in which a later determination would still be the “opposite” of the earlier determination. Since the second determination is different from the first one, it is the logical negation of the first one, or is not-the-first-determination. If the first determination is “e”, for instance, because the new determination is different from that one, the new one is “not-e”. Since Finite Purpose, for instance, has a definition or determination that is different from the definition that Abstract Purpose has, it is not-Abstract- Purpose, or is the negation or opposite of Abstract Purpose in that sense. There is therefore a technical, logical sense in which the second concept or form is the “opposite” or negation of—or is “not”—the first one—though, again, it need not be the “opposite” of the first one in a strict sense.

Other problems remain, however. Because the concept of Realized Purpose is defined through a syllogistic process, it is itself the product of several stages of development (at least four, by my count, if Realized Purpose counts as a separate determination), which would seem to violate a triadic model. Moreover, the concept of Realized Purpose does not, strictly speaking, seem to be the unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose. Realized Purpose is the result of (and so unifies) the syllogistic process of Finite Purpose, through which Finite Purpose focuses on

and is realized in a particular material or content. Realized Purpose thus seems to be a development of Finite Purpose, rather than a unity or combination of Abstract Purpose and Finite Purpose, in the way that Becoming can be said to be the unity or combination of Being and Nothing.

These sorts of considerations have led some scholars to interpret Hegel's dialectics in a way that is implied by a more literal reading of his claim, in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, that the three "sides" of the form of logic—namely, the moment of understanding, the dialectical moment, and the speculative moment—"are moments of each [or every; jedes] logically-real, that is each [or every; jedes] concept". The quotation suggests that each concept goes through all three moments of the dialectical process—a suggestion reinforced by Hegel's claim, in the *Phenomenology*, that the result of the process of determinate negation is that "a new form has thereby immediately arisen". According to this interpretation, the three "sides" are not three different concepts or forms that are related to one another in a triad—as the textbook *Being-Nothing-Becoming* example suggests—but rather different momentary sides or "determinations" in the life, so to speak, of each concept or form as it transitions to the next one. The three moments thus involve only two concepts or forms: the one that comes first, and the one that comes next.

For the concept of Being, for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure presence. This determination is one-sided or restricted however, because, as we saw, it ignores another aspect of Being's definition, namely, that Being has no content or determination, which is how Being is defined in its dialectical moment. Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment of understanding undermines that determination and leads to the definition it has in the dialectical moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being (as pure presence) implies nothing. It is also the "unity of the determinations in their comparison [Entgegensetzung]": since it captures a process from one to the other, it includes Being's moment of understanding (as pure presence) and dialectical moment (as nothing or undetermined), but also compares those two determinations, or sets (-setzen) them up against (-gegen) each other. It even puts Being into a new state (as the prefix *ent-* suggests) because the next concept, Nothing, will sublate (cancel and preserve) Being.

The concept of Nothing also has all three moments. When it is asserted to be the speculative result of the concept of Being, it has its moment of understanding or stability: it is Nothing, defined as pure absence, as the absence of determination. But Nothing's moment of understanding is also one-sided or restricted: like Being, Nothing is also an undefined content, which is its determination in its dialectical moment. Nothing thus sublates itself: since it is an undefined content, it is not pure absence after all, but has the same presence that Being did. It is present as an undefined content. Nothing thus sublates Being: it replaces (cancels) Being, but also preserves Being insofar as it has the same definition (as an undefined content) and presence that Being had. We can picture Being and Nothing like this (the circles have dashed outlines to indicate that, as concepts, they are each undefined);




Figure 4

In its speculative moment, then, Nothing implies presence or Being, which is the “unity of the determinations in their comparison [Entgegensetzung]”; alternative translation), since it both includes but—as a process from one to the other— also compares the two earlier determinations of Nothing, first, as pure absence and, second, as just as much presence.

The dialectical process is driven to the next concept or form—Becoming—not by a triadic, thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern, but by the one-sidedness of Nothing— which leads Nothing to sublimate itself—and by the implications of the process so far. Since Being and Nothing have each been exhaustively analyzed as separate concepts, and since they are the only concepts in play, there is only one way for the dialectical process to move forward: whatever concept comes next will have to take account of both Being and Nothing at the same time. Moreover, the process revealed that an undefined content taken to be presence (i.e., Being) implies Nothing (or absence), and that an undefined content taken to be absence (i.e., Nothing) implies presence (i.e., Being). The next concept, then, takes Being and Nothing together and draws out those implications—namely, that Being implies Nothing, and that Nothing implies Being. It is therefore Becoming, defined as two separate processes: one in which Being becomes Nothing, and one in which Nothing becomes Being. We can picture Becoming this way:




Figure 5

In a similar way, a one-sidedness or restrictedness in the determination of Finite Purpose together with the implications of earlier stages leads to Realized Purpose. In its moment of understanding, Finite Purpose particularizes into (or presents) its content as “something-presupposed” or as a pre-given object. I go to a restaurant for the purpose of having dinner, for instance, and order a salad. My purpose of having dinner particularizes as a pre-given object—the salad. But this object or particularity—e.g. the salad—is “inwardly reflected”: it has its own content—developed in earlier stages—which the definition of Finite Purpose ignores. We can picture Finite Purpose this way:




Figure 6

In the dialectical moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the previously ignored content, or by that other content. The one-sidedness of Finite Purpose requires the dialectical process to continue through a series of syllogisms that determines Finite Purpose in relation to the ignored content. The first syllogism links the Finite Purpose to the first layer of content in the object: the Purpose or universality goes through the particularity (e.g., the salad) to its content, the singularity (e.g., lettuce as a type of thing)—the syllogism U-P-S. But the particularity is itself a universality or purpose, “which at the same time is a syllogism within itself [in sich]” (EL Remark to §208; alternative translation), in relation to its own content. The salad is a universality/purpose that particularizes as lettuce (as a type of thing) and has its singularity in this lettuce here—a second syllogism, U-P-S. Thus, the first singularity (e.g., “lettuce” as a type of thing)— which, in this second syllogism, is the particularity or P—“judges” (EL §207) or asserts that “U is S”: it says that “lettuce” as a universality (U) or type of thing is a singularity (S), or is “this lettuce here”, for instance. This new singularity (e.g. “this lettuce here”) is itself a combination of subjectivity and objectivity: it is an Inner or identifying concept (“lettuce”) that is in a mutually-defining relationship (the circular arrow) with an Outer or out-there-ness (“this here”) as its content. In the speculative moment, Finite Purpose is determined by the whole process of development from the moment of understanding—when it is defined by particularizing into a pre-given object with a content that it ignores—to its dialectical moment—when it is also defined by the previously ignored content. We can picture the speculative moment of Finite Purpose this way:




Figure 7

Finite Purpose's speculative moment leads to Realized Purpose. As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a return process (a series of return arrows) that establishes each layer and redefines Finite Purpose as Realized Purpose. The presence of "this lettuce here" establishes the actuality of "lettuce" as a type of thing (an Actuality is a concept that captures a mutually-defining relationship between an Inner and an Outer), which establishes the "salad", which establishes "dinner" as the Realized Purpose over the whole process. We can picture Realized Purpose this way:




Figure 8

If Hegel's account of dialectics is a general description of the life of each concept or form, then any section can include as many or as few stages as the development requires. Instead of trying to squeeze the stages into a triadic form—a technique Hegel himself rejects—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or form that tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine science.

## **HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM**

Hegel's conception of freedom might perhaps be called 'contextual', though this is a term which to my knowledge has not been applied to his or any other idea of freedom. I mean by this that Hegel conceives freedom always in a social context, or more accurately in the context of human interaction. The structure of such interaction constitutes the context of freedom in which it becomes something concrete and definite, an actuality rather than a mere idea. In pursuing Hegel's line of inquiry it is possible to distinguish four major kinds of freedom and four corresponding contexts or models of human interaction. These are: natural, ethical, civil and political, and I propose to look at them in this order.

### **Natural Freedom**

The foundation of the Hegelian theory of freedom rests on his concept of the will. Will is not a separate faculty, distinct from reason; thought and will are simply two aspects or modes of reason: 'the will is ... a special way of thinking, thinking translating itself into existence, thinking as the urge to give itself existence' (PhR, § 4 A). In choosing, deciding and acting a man thinks, reflects and uses concepts; he manifests or expresses his rationality, which is his essential characteristic. The way a man views himself, the image he has of himself or, more adequately, the conception he has of himself as a human being determines what kind of will he has and therefore what kind of interaction with other men is possible for him. Freedom is therefore bound up with self-consciousness and true freedom presupposes true self-consciousness.

The self-consciousness which purifies its object, content, and aim, and raises them to the universality effects this as thinking getting its own way in the will. Here is the point at which it becomes clear that it is only as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free. The slave does not know his essence, his infinity, his freedom; he does not know himself as human in essence; and he lacks this knowledge of himself because he does not think himself. This self-consciousness which apprehends itself through thinking as essentially human, and thereby frees itself from the contingent and the false, is the principle of right, morality, and all ethical life.

The will itself, at its most basic, is a complex idea; in the simplest act of willing Hegel distinguishes three elements or 'moments'. According to Hegel's theory of 'subjective spirit' will is foreshadowed in impulse and sentiment, which largely determine our conduct in childhood. At the level of development at which will and thought can be clearly distinguished from desire and feeling an act of will contains according to Hegel:

(1) 'the element of pure indeterminacy or that pure reflection of the ego into itself which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content'. This is the element of withdrawal from, or rejection of, all external determinators, an assertion of the will's independence vis-à-vis the external world. When the will's self-determination consists in this alone, or when representative thinking regards this side by itself as freedom and clings to it, then we have negative freedom or freedom as the Understanding conceives it.

(2) The second moment, 'the particularisation of the ego', consists in the ego giving itself 'differentiation, determination and positing a determinacy as a content and object'. This content may be something natural a need or desire - or something rational - some thought or principle of action. The determination or focusing of the ego on something definite or particular, the self-identification of the ego with it, constitutes the second, 'positive' element involved in willing, the second partial but essential aspect of the will.

(3) 'The will is the unity of both these moments.... It is the selfdetermination of the ego, which means that at one and the same time the ego posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as restricted and determinate, and yet remains by itself, i.e. in its self-identity and universality' (i.e. as a source of all determinations). 'This is the freedom of the will and it constitutes the concept or substantiality of the will, its weight so to speak, just as weight constitutes the substantiality of a body'.

Differently put, an act of will implies an agent capable of rejecting all courses of action except the one that he really chooses to follow.

When a man is so self-determined but the only content of his will the only source of his determinations - are his impulses, appetites and desires, he has what Hegel calls an 'immediate or natural' will (§ II). Such a will does not act according to its rational nature, although it is capable of utilitarian rationality; Hegel admits that impulses can be compared and evaluated in the light of experience and selected on grounds of satisfaction or happiness (§ 20). The indeterminacy of the will in the absence of a truly rational criterion of choice constitutes 'arbitrariness' (Willkiir). Such indeterminate, arbitrary will has sometimes been considered a paradigm of free will, but this is a serious mistake in Hegel's view.

The choice which I have is grounded in the universality of the will, in the fact that I can make this or that mine. This thing that is mine is particular in content and therefore not adequate to me and so is separate from me; it is only potentially mine, while I am the potentiality of linking myself to it. Choice, therefore, is grounded in the indeterminacy of the ego and the determinacy of a content. Thus the will, on account of this content, is not free, although it has an infinite aspect in virtue of its form. No single content is adequate to it and in no single content is it really at grips with itself. Arbitrariness implies that the content is made mine not by the nature of my will but by chance. Thus I am dependent on this content, and this is the contradiction lying in arbitrariness. The man in the street thinks he is free if it is open to him to act as he pleases, but his very arbitrariness implies that he is not free. When I will what is rational, then I am acting not as a particular individual but in accordance with the concept of ethics in general. In an ethical action, what I vindicate is not myself but the thing.

In other words, true freedom is ethical freedom and can only be reached in an ethical community. Because the arbitrary wills of men do not coincide when they act capriciously, an orderly,

structured society of natural men is impossible. It can only be conceived as an abstraction, 'a state of nature', in which impulse and violence reign unchecked, a Hobbesian state of 'war of all against all' in which life is 'nasty, brutish and short' and from which man should seek to escape by all means. Hegel regards 'natural freedom' as the freedom peculiar to such a state of nature; it is the only freedom which independent, egocentric and impulse-driven individuals can possibly have when they find themselves in a shared physical space. However, arbitrary choice has a place in a rational normative order, as Hegel admits in his account of civil society; in fact it is one of its fundamental constituents.

## **Ethical Freedom**

In order to have a minimum kind of stable interaction possible it is necessary that all men should recognise certain rules or principles of action, and follow them in practice. The minimum amount of rules that a rational agent will recognise and accept as rational will obviously be those which safeguard his life, limb and possessions, and which guarantee to him an area of activity free from the invasion and interference of others. Within this area each man can do what he pleases and can exercise his natural, immediate or arbitrary will to the fullest extent compatible with an equal opportunity of everybody else in society to do the same. The system of such rational rules, based on reciprocity and a necessary minimum of restriction, Hegel calls 'abstract right'. It is really the natural law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which was based on the revival of Roman law; in his discussions of the Roman Empire Hegel makes it clear that the idea of law as defining and protecting private rights of individuals was discovered precisely in that epoch of world history. Hegel's analysis of abstract right and its component elements of personality (capacity for rights), property, contract and wrongdoing in the *Philosophy of Right* add much to our understanding of his conception of freedom. Hegel bases the system of personal rights on man's appropriation of natural objects and the recognition of possessions as rightful property by other men. By appropriating things man rises above nature and asserts his independence as a free agent: 'a person is a unit of freedom aware of its sheer independence'. However, the principles of abstract right are 'actualised' in the positive legal system of civil society and thus become a part of the broader normative order of *Sittlichkeit*. They need not be discussed separately.

The same applies to the sphere of morality which in Hegel's view forms another element of ethical life. By morality Hegel means conduct determined by one's conscience, noble intentions or subjective judgement of what is absolutely good. Abstract right (and the positive law based upon it) is indifferent to motives and merely requires external conformity to objective rules of conduct. The question about the self-determination and motive of the will now enters . . . in connection with morality. Since man wishes to be judged in accordance with his own self-determined choices, he is free in this relation to himself whatever the external situation may impose upon him . . . Man's worth is estimated by reference to his inward action and hence the standpoint of morality is that of freedom aware of itself.

As we have already seen this is the conception of freedom Hegel ascribes to Rousseau and Kant and criticizes as inadequate - false in theory and disastrous in practice. However, as an element of *Sittlichkeit* it has an essential place in modern social and political life. It is a necessary corrective to all normative structures based on positive law, conventional morality and traditional institutions. *Sittlichkeit* is the real context in which men achieve freedom or self-determination. It is a structure of human interaction based on established laws and institutions which have survived the test of experience but also theoretical scrutiny. It is the actual, social mechanism through which men are

shaped into ethical agents - creatures in practice acting according to laws, recognising and fulfilling obligations, sometimes sharing aims and purposes with other men, and pursuing them through their joint endeavours. When Hegel speaks of ethical life as a 'substance' and men as its accidents' he wishes to draw our attention to the thoroughgoing way in which ethical life moulds man's nature or 'socialises' individuals." Sittlichkeit comprises the existing normative world, the historical world of human relations and ideals, and is so to speak the soil in which abstract right and morality grow. Without it the other two are meaningful only as hypothetical conditions or abstract models of human interaction.

The right and the moral cannot exist independently; they must have the ethical as their support and foundation, for the right lacks the moment of subjectivity, while morality in turn possesses that moment alone, and consequently both the right and the moral lack actuality by themselves.

In concrete historical terms the right and the moral are simply 'moments' or aspects of Sittlichkeit, which develop within the matrix of man's traditional social life in the course of world history, in the modern era, and enrich the primitive, simple, undifferentiated customary ethics with new and important elements: self-interest and conscience or, in Hegelian terminology, 'particularity' and 'subjectivity'. In terms of European culture Sittlichkeit is the ethical existence of the modern European man when he has become aware of his individuality, asserted its rights in theory and practice, and at the same time has accepted the necessity of an objectively existing ethical order in which his individuality is realised.

Looked at from another angle ethical life is the sum total of the determinants of the will - the ethical norms, rules or principles of actions which provide the substance of human decisions in so far as they are the acts of concrete thinking, choosing and willing agents. The key normative idea of Sittlichkeit is duty.

In Sittlichkeit the agent is faced with clusters of duties arising out of his concrete social position, for example as husband or father, employer or employee, teacher or student, member of an estate, profession or corporation, a voter, a parliamentary representative or a civil servant. These duties are not abstract or general as Kantian categorical imperatives are; they are contextual, particularised, tied to our special social roles, dependent on the sphere of activity in which we are engaged. The more complex, articulated and developed a structure society or community forms, the wider is the range of roles available to its individual members, but also the more elaborate the system of duties which ethically bind them. In other words duties are the content of laws, institutions, organisations and communities which together make up the structure of an ethical community. And in so far as they have been internalised as habits and dispositions, they are the content of volitions.

Hegel defines the freedom peculiar to Sittlichkeit ('ethical freedom') in terms of duty. This is paradoxical only if we accept the Hobbesian view that duties bind us and restrict our freedom of movement. But for Hegel there is no paradox.

The bond of duty can appear as a restriction only on indeterminate subjectivity or abstract freedom, and on the impulses either of the natural will or of the moral will which determines its indeterminate good arbitrarily. The truth is, however, that in duty the individual finds his liberation; first, liberation from dependence on mere natural impulse and from the depression which as a particular subject he cannot escape in his moral reflections on what ought to be and what might

be; secondly, liberation from the indeterminate subjectivity which, never reaching reality or the objective determinacy of action, remains self-enclosed and devoid of actuality. In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom.

In the Addition to this paragraph he concludes: Thus duty is not a restriction on freedom, but only on freedom in the abstract, i.e. on unfreedom. Duty is the attainment of our essence, the winning of positive freedom.

This conception of freedom as the conscientious acceptance and fulfilment of one's ethical obligations (in Bradley's famous phrase 'my station and its duties') may at first sight appear somewhat unattractive. Even if Hegel's perfect freedom was not simply the obedience to the Prussian state that it has sometimes been alleged to be, this kind of 'substantial' or 'positive' freedom appears compatible with all sorts of situations in which there is very little liberty as it is generally understood by liberals or democrats. A traditional patriarchal society, a feudal monarchy or a modern collectivise, highly regulated state would all seem happily to fit Hegel's conception of an ethical order. But to think that would be to ignore the peculiar modern dimensions of Sittlichkeit represented by abstract right and morality, which have just been mentioned. To count as true Sittlichkeit the ethical order in our own epoch must be shot through with personal rights and spheres of autonomy, and be acceptable to individual conscience. It must (in other words) incorporate the principles of particularity and subjectivity.

Hegel develops this point at great length in the Philosophy of Right in the sections of ethical life dealing with civil society and the state, but a word must be said about his concept of family which is, in fact, the basic form of ethical life. The family (i.e. the modern family) also has a subjective dimension - for example in the free choice of partners in marriage or the decision to beget children. It may also satisfy particular needs and desires of individuals for companionship, affection, emotional security and sexual gratification; to some extent it still has an economic function. Yet the dominant elements even in the modern family are 'universality' and 'objectivity'. It is a community which, despite love and affection, often faces its members as something burdensome, something which essentially restricts their arbitrary will. It requires of everybody frequent acts of self-sacrifice and the submersion of particularity in a common life. It is also, for the children at least, a necessity they cannot easily escape. The family is the only community in the modern world where Sittlichkeit in its primordial sense operates in a more or less pure form through precept, habit, unconscious imitation and other devices; these shape the individual's natural will and teach him the elements of ethical life - the recognition and acceptance of multifarious duties and moral discipline over desires and appetites, a discipline which is external to start with, but gradually becomes internalised as self-discipline.

In one sense Sittlichkeit pervades all aspects of social life, all relations, institutions, organisations and communities; it is, so to speak, their ethical substratum. But in the modern world it takes on the shape of two distinct ethical systems - complex and interdependent ('organic') social wholes the civil and the political order. In the latter, as in the family, the universal and the substantial elements predominate.

## **Civil Freedom**

By contrast with the family and the political community the elements of particularity and subjectivity (self-interest and personal choice) come to the fore in, and are the dominant

characteristics of, civil society. In civil society men interact with the minimum of ethical or legal constraints. In § 206 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel observes that in modern society, in the choice of a career or trade (and therefore class or estate membership), 'the essential and final and determining factors are subjective opinions and the individual arbitrary will, which win in this sphere their right, their merit and their dignity'. In Plato's Republic and in the ancient world generally (as Hegel points out in PhR, § 206R) one's social status was largely determined by the accident of birth or by the fiat of a despotic authority; free choice of one's role in society was not recognized or secured by appropriate law and institutions as it is in the modern civil society.

when subjective particularity is upheld by the objective order in conformity with it and is at the same time allowed its rights, then it becomes the animating principle of the entire civil society, of the development alike of mental activity, merit and dignity. The recognition and the right that what is brought about by reason of necessity in civil society and the state shall at the same time be effected by the mediation of the arbitrary will is the more precise definition of what is primarily meant by freedom in common parlance.

'Freedom in common parlance', or what one might call 'civil freedom' in the context of civil society, implies for Hegel the presence of various civil and economic rights, the right of association, the right to a trial by jury, the right to promote group interests through corporations, and the right to public assistance and protection against misfortune or the vagaries of the market. Many of them represent the enactment and institutionalisation of the sphere of abstract right - the realm of legal prohibitions which make it possible for men to act without getting into each other's way. In § 230 he seems to anticipate the rise of the so-called social or welfare state rights because he argues that 'the right actually present in the particular requires . . . that the securing of every single person's livelihood and welfare be treated and actualised as a right, i.e. that particular welfare as such be treated'. 'The police' in his special sense of the word and the corporation are concerned with the security of such social rights.

If we consider the question of duties, we can see that civil society with its complex and increasingly articulated structure provides individuals with a host of new social roles and ethical duties. They are not left to custom or convention alone. They are formulated in clear and unambiguous laws. Positive law, when rationally reformed, ensures that our actual social obligations do not contradict the principles of abstract right and morality, for example do not involve slavery, serfdom, arbitrary restrictions on property, compulsory religious attendance or membership of a religious sect. As a self-conscious ethical agent the modern man accepts his obligations gladly and performs them willingly. But he does nevertheless make a sacrifice of a part of his individuality in so doing. Modern community, so to speak, compensates the individual for this sacrifice by furthering his self-interest, by protecting his private rights and welfare, by caring for him as an individual. And this care is extended to him equally and universally as a man, irrespective of religion or nationality, as his basic human right.

## **Political Freedom**

The culminating point of the development of individual will towards freedom in the Philosophy of Right is the political realm, the sphere of the supreme public authority of 'the strictly political state'. It would seem to follow that 'political freedom' - the ethical freedom corresponding to this sphere of interaction - is the highest form of human freedom. We find, however, that 'political freedom' is an elusive concept in the Philosophy of Right, and Hegel has rather more to say about it in his

minor political works, especially those which he wrote before he took up residence in Berlin. The most likely explanation is that the completion of the Philosophy of Right coincided with the onset of reaction in Prussia, after a period of considerable liberalism, and it is more than likely that prudence (or political expediency) tempered Hegel's theoretical zeal in this area of his political philosophy. In fact the clearest acknowledgment of the importance of public freedom occurs in the Philosophy of Right not in the section on the constitution of the state, but in the context of Hegel's discussion of the corporation, which is an institution of civil society. The primary work of the corporation is to achieve security and other sectional benefits for its members, to promote group interests; but it incidentally fosters various ethical characteristics in its members - a sense of honesty, group pride, a sense of belonging and the consciousness of a common end for which they are united. 'As family was the first, so the Corporation is the second ethical root of the state, the one planted in civil society'.

Under modern political conditions, the citizens have only a restricted share in the public business of the state, yet it is essential to provide men - ethical entities - with work of a public character over and above their private business. This work of a public character, which the modern state does not always provide, is found in the Corporation. It is in the Corporation that unconscious compulsion first changes into a known and ethical mode of life.

In the strictly political section of the Philosophy of Right we get only a vague idea what political freedom means and why it is the culminating moment in the development of the will to complete self-determination. Although Hegel purports to offer a dialectical argument, it is clear that for pragmatic reasons he does not think that the opportunity to exercise political freedom need be as wide as the scope to enjoy civil freedom, and makes political freedom a universal right of all citizens only in a very attenuated form. Effectively political participation is a privilege of an elite. There are a number of reasons why Hegel nevertheless thinks the state to be vitally important for freedom and why it is in the state, a politically organised and governed community, that human freedom reaches its fullest embodiment. Let us imagine that we are members of a Hegelian civil society which appears to be fully rational and developed, in that it genuinely respects and promotes our particular interests and subjective choices through an appropriate system of laws and institutions. We fully enjoy what Hegel calls 'freedom in the common parlance', or civil freedom. Are we then completely self-conscious and self-determined, or is there still some extra element or dimension of freedom which is lacking? Hegel would probably answer this question along the following lines.

(1) Civil society, although autonomous, is ultimately subject to the political state and its governmental authority ('state power'). Rights may be abrogated, as they are in times of war or civil disturbance; property may be taxed for public purposes; corporate rights may be curtailed or independent social activities taken over by public bodies.

In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare (the family and civil society), the state is from one point of view an external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to it and dependent on it.

When the need for the state's intervention arises there is no machinery within civil society to explain and justify the need, and without it the intervention has the appearance of an arbitrary, high-handed activity. The certainty that sacrifices for the sake of the common good or some other

higher ethical principles are justified requires an exchange of views, an expression of opinions, an institutional channel for the debate of public issues. Although Hegel in the Philosophy of Right goes out of his way to stress the capricious and often trivial character of public opinion, and wishes to curb its 'excesses', he regards it as a necessary element of political life and the chief manifestation of 'subjective freedom' in the public realm.

The formal subjective freedom of individuals consists in their having and expressing their own private judgments, opinions and recommendations on affairs of state. This freedom is collectively manifested as what is called 'public opinion'.

The operation of public opinion presupposes the freedom of the press, publication and association, all of which can exist in civil society and indeed constitute essential civic freedoms. Hegel, however, argues - quite correctly - that such public opinion is either impotent or dangerous as long as it is not related to governmental authority. It is the function of a representative body to remedy this defect. This body, which Hegel call, 'the Assembly of Estates', forms part of the governmental authority or state power', and is a specifically political, not civil, institution.

The Estates have the function of bringing public affairs into existence not only implicitly, but also actually, i.e., of bringing into existence the moment of subjective formal freedom, the public consciousness as an empirical universal, of which the thoughts and opinions of the Many are particulars.

in them [the Estates] the subjective moment in universal freedom - the private judgement and private will of the sphere called 'civil society' in this book - comes into existence integrally related to the state.

It is well known that in the Philosophy of Right Hegel is extremely vague about the power of the Estates' Assembly, and in all his political writings he insists that rational suffrage is not universal, direct and individual, but limited, indirect and based on communities or organised interests. It should reflect the social articulation of the national and ethical community. Nevertheless, even in the Philosophy of Right, he treats the principle of representation as a rational feature of the modern state.

(2) Hegel makes the further point that the representative assembly, like the rest of the supreme public authority, is concerned with laws and policies which are necessarily general and must be discussed in universal, rational terms.

The state, therefore knows what it wills and knows it in its universality, i.e. as something thought. Hence it works and acts by reference to consciously adopted ends, known principles, and laws which are not merely implicit but are actually present to consciousness.

In the final analysis such ends and principles are part of the general culture of a particular country and express its 'national spirit'. Public opinion and representative institutions are the means through which the principles are related to the practical concerns of the community, where fundamental issues of public life are raised and thrashed out in debate. This makes deputies and the country at large conscious of the principles underlying the actual ethical order, reveals possible inadequacies and contradictions, and generates demands for reform. As for J. S. Mill, so for Hegel,

representative government is an essential agency of national education. Political institutions promote the kind of national and political self-consciousness which men do not acquire by being mere members of civil society, and they contribute to freedom because they clarify the principles on which the ethical, social and political life of their community is based.

(3) Another reason for Hegel's dissatisfaction with civil freedom as an adequate form of ethical freedom stems from the form of human interaction peculiar to civil society. Although 'burghers' come to depend closely on each other and form a relatively integrated society, their social interdependence is brought about to some extent by the external forces of needs, labour, the division of labour and the market, and not merely through inner individual commitment or personal choice. Also, while performing their duties to each other and cooperating closely, men remain primarily their own private ends - they (or as Hegel would say, their wills) do not consciously pursue their 'substantial' end, which is the existence of an ethical community making complete freedom possible. They promote the interest of such community only implicitly, indirectly, unconsciously. To this extent they remain within the realm of necessity more akin to nature than to the spiritual realm of freedom. The unity of particularity and universality in civil society is achieved without the knowledge and will of its members and so is not the identity which the ethical order requires, because at this level, that of division, both principles are self-subsistent. It follows that this unity is present here not as freedom but as necessity, since it is by compulsion that the particular rises to the form of universality and seeks and gains its stability in that form.

By contrast in the political community or the state the universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular interests and through the co-operation of particular knowing and willing and individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end.

Man as potentially free, self-determined agent, once he has become conscious of his nature, cannot allow himself to be determined by social forces operating on him externally, like natural forces, all the more so as those forces are in the last resort the product of his thought and will and so are potentially under his control. His proper end - the membership of a rational ethical community - must be his own conscious aim, otherwise he is not fully free. By participating in political activities, the public affairs of his state, the individual makes a direct contribution to the life and development of the community and thereby increases his self-determination. As we have seen, a start towards this kind of freedom is made already in civil society through the corporation, which changes the unconscious compulsion of working for others in the market economy into 'a known and thoughtful ethical mode of life'. The modern state creates further opportunities for participation to its citizens, although it allocates different shares according to education, property and status.

(4) Hegel's final line of argument that political freedom is distinct from civil freedom, and represents the highest stage in the development of freedom, is his version of Rousseau's idea of the General Will. Rousseau insisted that the General Will had to express or manifest itself in the actions of individual citizens performing public functions, especially voting on laws. The General Will is the rational or moral will of citizens acting for the common good (the general interest of the body politic) rather than for their own personal good or private interest. For Hegel the common good or public interest is identical with the totality of rational laws and institutions of a community

and constitutes the 'objective will' of the community.

Confronted with the claims made for the individual will, we must remember the fundamental conception that the objective will is rationality simplicity or in conception, whether it be recognised or not by individuals, whether their whims be deliberately for it or not.

But although Hegel differs from Rousseau by postulating a transcendent General Will which, as the 'objective will' of a rationally structured community, is more than the sum of individual wills, he agrees with him that such will must express or manifest itself in the actual thinking and willing of individual citizens, consciously identifying their subjective will with the 'objective will' and its needs. This union of subjective and objective will constitutes 'concrete freedom', which is higher than the abstract subjective and objective freedoms taken by themselves. It is through the political institutions of the ethical community that the reconciliation of the subjective and objective aspects of the will is effected.

In the Philosophy of Right the necessity of the subjective will assenting to laws and other requirements of the common good is argued by Hegel only with the reference to the monarch, as the official head of the political community, but in his Philosophy of Mind, the third part of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), this necessity is explicitly stated also with reference to the mass of citizens. In paragraph 544 of this work Hegel raises the question 'in what sense are we to understand the participation of private persons in state affairs?', and after ruling out superior intelligence or good will of the people as an adequate reason he answers his question as follows:

The desirability of private persons taking part in public affairs is partly to be put in their concrete, and therefore more urgent, sense of general wants. But the true motive is the right of the community (collective) spirit to appear as an externally universal will, acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public concerns. By such satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened, and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials; who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to enforce duties but also to have regard to rights. Private citizens are in the state the incomparably greater number and form the multitude of such as are recognised as persons. Hence the rational will (will-reason) exhibits its existence in them as a preponderating majority of freemen, or in its 'reflectional universality' which has its actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty.

The meaning of this somewhat poorly translated passage is fairly clear: the rational will of the ethical community, public, affairs must be mediated through the wills of the multitude and must take the form of an externally universal (general) will', i.e. one embodied in the particular wills of the citizens exercising political rights or participating in sovereignty. Only then does the general will become fully alive and acquire universal existence.

We may therefore conclude that Hegel has largely justified his claim that 'the [modern] state is the actuality of concrete freedom'. Freedom defined as the self-determination of a rational, moral and ethical agent reaches its fullest development only in a politically organised modern community, in which he interacts with other citizens and the government through free public debate, suffrage and representation. Political liberty, involved in these activities, is distinct from civil liberty. The *raison d'être* of civil society and the justification of civil freedom is the private interest and subjective choice of the individual bourgeois which, mediated through a system of economic and social

relations as well as laws, institutions and authorities, promotes the interest of the ethical community only indirectly and in the last resort. The *raison d'être* of political community and the justification of political liberty are the good of the ethical community itself, the common good or the public interest, which the fully self-conscious and self-determined citizen promotes for its own sake. In so doing he actualises his own deepest freedom and realises his nature not simply as a particular but as a universal, communal being. Political freedom, although roughly hewn, is the indispensable coping stone of Hegel's theory of freedom which (so to speak) is the obverse of his theory of political community. And the two theories taken as a whole represent Hegel's adaptation of Plato's idea of 'ethical substance' to the modern world and the solution of Rousseau's problems of political association how to live in community with others and yet remain a free individual.

# MCQs

1. intellectual midwifery is the theory of knowledge put forward by:

- (a) Plato
- (b) Thales
- (c) Comte
- (d) Socrates

Answer:d

2. --- is a Skeptic.

- (a) David Hume
- (b) Emmanuel Kant
- (c) Hegel
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

3. Esse est Percipi is the concept of

- (a) Rene Descartes
- (b) Benedict Spinoza
- (c) George Berkeley
- (d) Francis Bacon

Answer:c

4. The metaphysical view that there are many realities is known as

- (a) Dualism
- (b) pluralism
- (c) Monism
- (d) Non-dualism

Answer:b

5. The theory that holds reason as the source of knowledge is

- (a) Idealism
- (b) Rationalism
- (c) Empiricism
- (d) None of the above

Answer:b

6. Inborn ideas are known as:

- (a) Adventitious ideas
- (b) Factitious ideas
- (c) Innate ideas

(d) a b&c

Answer:c

7. The Philosophy of Hegel is known as

(a) Phenomenal idealism

(b) Personal idealism

(c) Objective idealism

(d) Absolute idealism

Answer:d

8. The founder of Positivism is

(a) Saint Simon

(b) C. S Pierce

(c) August Comte

(d) Francis Bacon

Answer:c

9. The author of Novum Organum is

(a) Rene Descartes

(b) Lemnitzer

(c) John Dewey

(d) Francis Bacon

Answer:d

10. The science of values is known as

(a) Axiology

(b) Sociology

(c) Ontology

(d) Cosmology

Answer:a

11. Metaphysics is the work of

(a) Socrates

(b) Plato

(c) Aristotle

(d) Thales

Answer:c

12. Early Skepticism is also known as

(a) pyrrhonism

(b) Positivism

(c) Materialism

(d) Idealism

Answer:a

13. The Greek word Pragma means

- (a) Truth
- (b) Act or deed
- (c) Utility
- (d) Beauty

Answer:b

14. The author of Republic

- (a) Socrates
- (b) Descartes
- (c) Plato
- (d) Hume

Answer:c

15. The metaphysical view that there is one ultimate reality is called

- (a) Dualism
- (b) Pluralism
- (c) Monism
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

16. According to the modern scientists matter is

- (a) Light
- (b) Energy
- (c) Illusion
- (d) All of these

Answer:b

17. ——— is a Greek atomist

- (a) Democritus
- (b) Xenophanes
- (c) Xenophon
- (d) Zeno

Answer:a

18. epistemology studies

- (a) Origin and Nature of knowledge
- (b) Validity of knowledge
- (c) Extent of knowledge
- (d) a, b & c

Answer:d

19. The two branches of Metaphysics are

- (a) Religion and Theology
- (b) Rationalism and Empiricism
- (c) Ontology and Cosmology
- (d) Materialism and Spiritualism

Answer: c

20. The three distempers of learning according to Francis Bacon are:

- (a) Mind, body and God
- (b) Ideas, experience and thought.
- (c) Fantastical, contentious and delicate
- (d) Tribe, cave and theatre

Answer: c

21. Philosophy is concerned with

- (a) The irrational
- (b) Beauty
- (c) ( c ) The ideal
- (d) experimentation

Answer: c

22. Ethics is a ---

- (a) Positive science
- (b) Normative science
- (c) Descriptive science
- (d) None of these

Answer: b

23. --- seeks to clarify and refine the process of knowing

- (a) Epistemology
- (b) Axiology
- (c) Metaphysics
- (d) Ethics

Answer: a

24. The Latin word --- is the root of rationalism

- (a) Sophia
- (b) Reason
- (c) Ratio
- (d) Experiential

Answer: c

25. --- insists on a priori knowledge.

- (a) Positivism

- (b) Empiricism
- (c) Rationalism
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

26.----- was written by Kant

- (a) Novum Organum
- (b) Republic
- (c) Critique of Pure Reason.
- (d) politics

Answer:c

27.Ontology deals with

- (a) Matter
- (b) Knowledge
- (c) Being
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

28.The method of Kant was

- (a) Dialectic
- (b) Critical
- (c) Speculative
- (d) Conversational

Answer:b

29.True knowledge is

- (a) Prama
- (b) Aprama
- (c) Pramana
- (d) Prameya

Answer:a

30.Berkeley argues that allknowledge is derived from

- (a) Impression
- (b) Ideas
- (c) Axioms
- (d) Postulates

Answer:b

31.----- helps in getting correctknowledge through anumana

- (a) Vyapti
- (b) Paksha

- (c) Sadhya
  - (d) Badha
- Answer:a

32. The words of a trustworthy person is known as

- (a) Satya
- (b) Dharma
- (c) Aptavakya
- (d) Linga

Answer:c

33. In Philosophy, what is an argument?

- (a) Debate
- (b) Verbal persuasion
- (c) Rational justification
- (d) opposition

Answer:c

34. The method of philosophy is

- (a) Rational reflection
- (b) Dogmatism
- (c) Empirical study
- (d) Revelation

Answer:a

35. ——— is a materialist

- (a) Gautama
- (b) Hegel
- (c) Marx
- (d) Spinoza

Answer:c

36. The author of Advancement of Learning

- (a) Karl Marx
- (b) Thomas Hobbes
- (c) Francis Bacon
- (d) Kant

Answer:c

37. A theory is a conclusion, where a method is a

- (a) Style
- (b) Manner
- (c) Inference
- (d) Procedure

Answer:d

38. Philosophy is the root and science is the

- ( a ) Fruit
- ( b ) Branch
- ( c ) Nourishment
- ( d ) Stem

Answer:a

39. Who said ? Philosophy is the Science of sciences

- ( a ) Plato
- ( b ) Voltaire
- ( c ) August's Comte
- ( d ) Russell

Answer:c

40. Bacon recommended ----- method to attain correct knowledge

- ( a ) Inductive
- ( b ) Intuitive
- ( c ) Mathematical
- ( d ) Doubt

Answer:a

41. Questions of philosophy are---- ones

- ( a ) Causal
- ( b ) Systematic
- ( c ) Inconsistent
- ( d ) Dogmatic

Answer:b

42. ----- said "whatever is. Clearly and distinctly perceived is true"

- ( a ) Locke
- ( b ) Berkeley
- ( c ) Descartes
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:c

43. According to Skepticism knowledge is -----

- ( a ) Certain
- ( b ) Possible
- ( c ) Uncertain
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:c

44. Cosmology was the characteristic of---- Philosophers.

- ( a ) Ionian
- ( b ) Cartesian
- ( c ) Scholastic
- ( d ) All these

Answer:a

45. For Idealism ——— is primary

- ( a ) Mind
- ( b ) Body
- ( c ) Perception
- ( d ) Sense experience

Answer:a

46. The problem of Universals was first introduced into philosophy by:

- ( a ) Aquinas
- ( b ) Aristotle
- ( c ) Plato
- ( d ) Berkeley

Answer:c

47. "Tabula rasa" is the term coined by:

- ( a ) John Locke
- ( b ) Kant
- ( c ) Socrates
- ( d ) Spinoza

Answer:a

48. The author of Meditations is

- ( a ) Leibniz
- ( b ) Patanjali
- ( c ) Descartes
- ( d ) Kanada

Answer:c

49. The only pramana accepted by Carvakas:

- ( a ) Inference
- ( b ) Comparison
- ( c ) Verbal testimony
- ( d ) Perception

Answer:d

50. Nyaya syllogism has ——— statements

- ( a ) One
- ( b ) Five
- ( c ) Three
- ( d ) Two

Answer:b

51. The two Heterodox schools in Indian Philosophy are:

- ( a ) Nyaya and Vaisheshika
- ( b ) Buddhism and Jainism
- ( c ) Sankhya and Yoga

( d ) Purva and Uttaramimamsa

Answer:b

52.The father of philosophy :

( a ) Descartes

( b ) Thales

( c ) Aristotle

( d ) Francis Bacon

Answer:b

53.Who said “ Two things fill me with awe and wonder the starry heavens above and the Moral law within”.

( a ) Karl Marx

( b ) Bertrand Russell

( c ) Kant

( d ) David Hume

Answer:c

54.A Treatise of Human Nature is the work of:

( a ) Karl Popper

( b ) David Hume

( c ) John Dewey

( d ) John Locke

Answer:b

55.The most original contribution of American thought at the end of nineteenth century:

( a ) Pragmatism

( b ) Positivism

( c ) Empiricism

( d ) Rationalism

Answer:a

56.According to Kant genuine knowledge appears in the form of— judgment.

( a ) Analytic

( b ) Synthetic

( c ) Synthetic a posteriori

( d ) Synthetic a priori

Answer:d

57.Leibniz was a—

( a ) Monist

( b ) Pluralist

( c ) Dualist

( d ) Non-dualist

Answer:b

58.Who is known as Cartesian dualist?

- ( a ) August Comte
- ( b ) Rene Descartes
- ( c ) St. Thomas Aquinas
- ( d ) Derrida

Answer:b

59. Who is the father of modern philosophy?

- ( a ) Descartes
- ( b ) Spinoza
- ( c ) Hobbes
- ( d ) Leibniz

Answer:a

60. ——— is a Subjective idealist

- ( a ) Hegel
- ( b ) Kant
- ( c ) Plato
- ( d ) Berkeley

Answer:d

61. Who is a philosopher, in the original sense of the word?

- ( a ) A person primarily interested in the truth about moral matters.
- ( b ) Someone who studies the stars and planets.
- ( c ) A clever and tricky arguer.
- ( d ) A lover and pursuer of wisdom, regardless of the subject matter.

Answer:d

62. The three main divisions of Philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, and ———

- ( a ) Axiology
- ( b ) Sociology
- ( c ) Anthropology
- ( d ) Cosmology

Answer:a

63. A logical sentence is called ———

- ( a ) Proposition
- ( b ) Syllogism
- ( c ) Preposition
- ( d ) Clause

Answer:a

64. The first Philosophy refers to ———

- ( a ) Aesthetics
- ( b ) Metaphysics
- ( c ) Epistemology
- ( d ) Ethics

Answer:b

65. The study of philosophy stimulates

- ( a ) Dogmatism
- ( b ) Critical thinking
- ( c ) Blind faith
- ( d ) All these

Answer:b

66. Mathematics is a study of certain and --- truths

- ( a ) Self-evident.
- ( b ) Numerical Comment [Office1]:
- ( c ) geometrical
- ( d ) Theoretical

Answer:a

67. Descartes was a --- thinker

- ( a ) Empirical
- ( b ) Rational
- ( c ) Materialistic
- ( d ) Idealistic

Answer:b

68. Which American mathematician/philosopher laid the foundation of Pragmatism

- ( a ) William James
- ( b ) J. Dewey
- ( c ) C.S Pierce
- ( d ) Spinoza

Answer:c

69. The Problem of Knowledge was written by ---

- ( a ) Aristotle
- ( b ) Plato
- ( c ) A.J Ayer
- ( d ) Collingwood

Answer:c

70. Spinoza's method is known as ---

- ( a ) Axiomatic
- ( b ) Theoretical
- ( c ) Geometrical
- ( d ) Doubt

Answer:a

71. The study of the origin and development of the universe is known as ---

- ( a ) Ontology
- ( b ) Cosmology
- ( c ) Zoology

( d ) Sociology

Answer:b

72. Who said ? "God is dead"

( a ) Schopenhauer.

( b ) Sartre

( c ) Popper

( d ) Nietzsche

Answer:d

73. Who is the father of existentialism?

( a ) Soren Kierkegaard.

( b ) Camus

( c ) Sartre

( d ) Heidegger

Answer:a

74. --- Introduced the term Aesthetics

( a ) Kant

( b ) Hegel

( c ) Baumgarten

( d ) Aristotle

Answer:d

75. Socratic method is

( a ) Skeptical

( b ) Conceptual

( c ) Conversational

( d ) All of these

Answer:d

76. The theory of understanding is explained in transcendental ---

( a ) Analytic.

( b ) Synthetic

( c ) Aesthetic

( d ) Pragmatic

Answer:a

77. Know thyself is the maxim of ---

( a ) Plato

( b ) Zeno

( c ) Socrates

( d ) Aristotle

Answer:c

78. Phaedros is the Work of ----

( a ) Heraclitus

- ( b ) Aristophanes
  - ( c ) Plato
  - ( d ) Anaxagoras
- Answer:c

79. Cogito ergo sum means:
- ( a ) I doubt therefore I am
  - ( b ) I think therefore I am
  - ( c ) I see therefore I am
  - ( d ) I question therefore I am .
- Answer:b

80. Leibniz was a ---- thinker
- ( a ) English
  - ( b ) French
  - ( c ) German
  - ( d ) American
- Answer:c

81. Plato was the teacher of ----
- ( a ) Georgias
  - ( b ) Socrates
  - ( c ) Aristotle
  - ( d ) Protogoras
- Answer:c

82. ---- is an Empiricist
- ( a ) Locke
  - ( b ) Berkeley
  - ( c ) Hume
  - ( d ) all of these
- Answer:d

83. The doubt of Descartes shouldnot be confused with ----
- ( a ) Skepticism
  - ( b ) Solipsism
  - ( c ) Idealism
  - ( d ) Intuitionism
- Answer:a

84. Locke is a ----
- ( a ) Idealist
  - ( b ) phenomenologist
  - ( c ) Critical realist
  - ( d ) Representative realist
- Answer:d

85. The Skepticism of Descartes is known as ----

- ( a ) Pure Skepticism
- ( b ) phenomenal Skepticism
- ( c ) Methodological Skepticism
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:c

86. Who said " Accept nothing as true which we do not perceive clearly and distinctly

- ( a ) Descartes
- ( b ) Spinoza
- ( c ) Leibniz
- ( d ) Kant

Answer:a

87. ---- explained the world with the theory of Monads

- ( a ) Democritus
- ( b ) St. Anselm
- ( c ) Leibniz
- ( d ) William James

Answer:c

88. ---- is said to be the origin of Philosophy

- ( a ) Greed
- ( b ) Wonder
- ( c ) Fear
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

89. The mind body relationship theory of Descartes is known as ----

- ( a ) Psycho physical parallelism
- ( b ) Interactionism
- ( c ) Pre established harmony
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

90 .Wittgenstein says that language is a

- ( a ) Statement
- ( b ) Picture of reality
- ( c ) Judgement
- ( d ) Concept

Answer:b

91. ---- rejected Metaphysics as meaningless

- ( a ) Logical positivists
- ( b ) Rationalists
- ( c ) Idealists
- ( d ) Spiritualists

Answer:a

92. --- means knowledge that follows some other knowledge

- ( a ) pratyaksa
- ( b ) Upamana
- ( c ) Sabda
- ( d ) Anumana

Answer:d

93. The invariable concomitance between hetu and sadhya is known as

- ( a ) Vyapati
- ( b ) Paksa
- ( c ) linga
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:a

94. The Pramana for knowing the nonexistence of a thing is

- ( a ) Anumana
- ( b ) Upamana
- ( c ) Arthapathi
- ( d ) Anupalabधि

Answer:d

95. Agama comes under ---

- ( a ) Sabha
- ( b ) Pratyaksa
- ( c ) Anumana
- ( d ) Upasana

Answer:a

96. According to Indian epistemology the person who knows is ---

- ( a ) premeya
- ( b ) Pramatha
- ( c ) Prama
- ( d ) Aprama

Answer:b

97. In Nyaya syllogism the statement to be proved is known as ---

- ( a ) Pratinja
- ( b ) Major premise
- ( c ) Udaharana
- ( d ) Nigamana

Answer:a

98. --- is known as queen Science

- ( a ) Mathematics
- ( b ) Physics
- ( c ) Philosophy

( d ) Psychology Answer:c

99. The author of Discourse of the method is ----

- ( a ) Sartre
- ( b ) Descartes
- ( c ) Malebranche
- ( d ) Hobbes

Answer:b

100. The author of Prince is ----

- ( a ) Machiavelli
- ( b ) Plato
- ( c ) Bruno
- ( d ) Aristotle

Answer:a

101. In India Philosophy is known as ----

- ( a ) Brahma Vidya
- ( b ) Atmabodha
- ( c ) Darshana
- ( d ) Yogavidya

Answer:c

102. The philosophy of God is called ----

- ( a ) Theology
- ( b ) Religion
- ( c ) philology
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:a

103. The proponent of Advaita Vedanta is ----

- ( a ) Ramanuja
- ( b ) Madhvacharya
- ( c ) Jaimini
- ( d ) Sankara

Answer:d

104. Nyaya Vaisesika accepts ---- pramanas.

- ( a ) Two
- ( b ) Three
- ( c ) Five.
- ( d ) Four

Answer:d

105. The philosopher seeks to harmonise the ideals of Truth, Good and ----

- ( a ) Love.
- ( b ) God
- ( c ) beauty.

( d ) knowledge

Answer:c

106.Henri Bergson advocated---

( a ) Intuitionism

( b ) Empiricism

( c ) Apriorism

( d ) Sensationalism

Answer:a

107.--- says "Understandingmakes Nature ".

( a ) Bergson

( b ) Herbert Spencer

( c ) Kant.

( d ) Lamarck

Answer:c

108.The highest Value in thePurusharthas:

( a ) Artha.

( b ) Kama

( c ) Dharma.

( d ) Moksa

Answer:c

109.Dialectical materialism is thetheory of---

( a ) Hegel

( b ) Marx

( c ) Nietzsche

( d ) Schopenhauer

Answer:b

110.--- is the father ofSpiritualistic pluralism

( a ) Locke

( b ) Dewey

( c )Leibniz

( d ) W. James

Answer:c

111.--- accepted four kinds ofcause

( a ) Aristotle.

( b ) David Hume

( c ) J. S Mill.

( d ) Plato

Answer:a

112.The author of Passions of theSoul is

( a ) Spinoza

( b ) A.J Ayer

- (c) Aristotle.
  - (d) Descartes
- Answer:d

113.---- said " Philosophy is the science of knowledge " .

- ( a ) Schelling
- ( b ) Fichte
- ( c ) Marx
- ( d ) Bruno

Answer:b

114.---- believes in the transcendence of God

- ( a ) Deism.
- ( b ) Theism
- ( c ) Agnosticism.
- ( d ) Atheism

Answer:a

115. According to ---- All is God and God is all.

- ( a ) Monotheism.
- ( b ) Monism
- ( c ) Henotheism.
- ( d ) Pantheism

Answer:d

116. According to Kant knowledge appears in the form of ----

- ( a ) Statement
- ( b ) Reasoning
- ( c ) Judgement.
- ( d ) Proposition

Answer:c

117. Space, time and categories of understanding are ---- forms of knowledge

- ( a ) a priori.
- ( b ) a posteriori
- ( c ) intuitive.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:a

118.---- is the work of Kant.

- ( a ) Leviathan
- ( b ) Critique of Judgement
- ( c ) Ethics
- ( d ) Republic

Answer:b

119. Transcendental aesthetic deals with the theory of

- ( a ) Understanding.
- ( b ) Sensations
- ( c ) Aesthetic Judgement.
- ( d ) Moral Judgement

Answer:b

120.Ethics is also known as ----

- ( a ) Axiology
- ( b ) Moral Philosophy
- ( c ) Utilitarianism.
- (d)All of these

Answer:b

121.Philosophy of art comes under----

- ( a ) Aesthetics.
- ( b ) Ethics
- ( c ) Anthropology.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:a

122.---- are the supreme norms of life.

- ( a ) Men.
- ( b ) Gods
- ( c ) Values.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:c

123.Ex NihiloNihilfit means-----

- ( a ) I think therefore I am.
- ( b ) Out of nothing comes nothing
- ( c ) To be or not to be
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

124.The philosophy of the Upanishadis Known as ----

- ( a ) Non- Dualism.
- ( b ) Monistic Spiritualism
- ( c ) Dualism.
- ( d ) Pluralism

Answer:b

125.---- awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumber

- ( a ) Locke 's empiricism.
- ( b ) Hume's Essays
- ( c ) Leibniz's talks.
- ( d ) Berkeley's Dialogues

Answer:b

126. Denial of the ultimate knowledge of the existence of God is known as ----

- ( a ) Atheism.
- ( b ) Agnosticism
- ( c ) Theism.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer: b

127. ---- believes reason as the source of knowledge

- ( a ) Rationalism.
- ( b ) Empiricism
- ( c ) Idealism.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer: a

128. The author of Poetics is ----

- ( a ) Plato.
- ( b ) Aristotle
- ( c ) Homer.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer: b

129. Buddhism is a philosophy of ----

- ( a ) pluralism
- ( b ) Monism
- ( c ) Dualism.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer: a

130. ---- is an Absolute idealist

- ( a ) Kant.
- ( b ) Hegel
- ( c ) Hume.
- ( d ) Descartes

Answer: b

131. Descartes was born at ----

- ( a ) Touraine
- ( b ) Amsterdam
- ( c ) Vienna.
- ( d ) Marseille

Answer: a

132. The Advancement of Learning was written by ----

- ( a ) Edmund Husserl
- ( b ) Francis Bacon
- ( c ) Henry Bergson.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

133.---- is a mild empiricist

- ( a ) David Hume.
- ( b ) Berkeley
- ( c ) John Locke.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:c

134.Spinoza was despised as an ---- by the Jews

- ( a ) pantheist
- ( b ) Atheist
- ( c ) Theist.
- ( d ) all of these

Answer:b

135.Res extensa means ----

- ( a ) Extended thing
- ( b ) God
- ( c ) Thinking substance.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:a

136.It is the art of ---- which brings other men's ideas to birth

- ( a ) Deception
- ( b ) Oratory
- ( c ) intellectual midwifery
- ( d ) All of these.

Answer:c

137.---- Greek philosopher is known for his probing questions

- ( a ) Socrates.
- ( b ) Plato
- ( d ) Aristotle.
- ( d ) Zeno

Answer:a

138.The etymological meaning of Philosophy is ----

- ( a ) Love of God.
- ( b ) Love of Wisdom
- ( c ) Love of Truth.
- ( d ) Love of Knowledge

Answer:b

139.The idol that stands for a person's individual inhibitions is known as ----

- ( a ) Cave
- ( b ) Theatre
- ( c ) Market Place.

( d ) Tribe

Answer:a

140.The author of Introduction toPositive Philosophy

( a ) Francis Bacon.

( b ) Henry Bergson

( c ) August Comte.

( d ) None of these

Answer:a

141.---- is also known as FirstPhilosophy

( a ) Epistemology.

( b ) Axiology

( c ) Metaphysics.

( d ) All of these

Answer:c

142.The word aesthetics is derivedfrom the Greek word----

( a ) Aestia

( b ) Aesthonomics

( c ) Aisthetikos

( d ) None of these

Answer:c

143.The 18th century German thinkerwho initiated dramatic changes in thefield of Aesthetics is –  
--

( a ) Leibniz.

( b ) Kant

( c ) Nietzsche

( d ) Schelling

Answer:b

144.In the word Epistemologyepistem means----

( a ) Knowledge.

( b ) Theory

( c ) Science.

( d ) None of these

Answer:a

145.Francis Bacon was an advocateand practitioner of ---- method

( a ) Positive.

( b ) Logical

( c ) Scientific.

( d ) Mathematical

Answer:c

146.There are ---- Systems orSchools in Indian Philosophy .

- ( a ) Two.
- ( b ) Seven
- ( c ) six
- ( d ) Four

Answer:b

147.---- is a heterodox school

- ( a ) NyayaVaisesika
- ( b ) Sankhya Yoga
- ( c ) Carvaka
- ( d ) Advaita

Answer:c

148.---- is an idealist

- ( a ) Berkeley
- ( b ) John Dewey
- ( c ) Locke.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:a

149.---- is a realist

- ( a ) Kant.
- ( b ) Locke
- ( c ) Hegel
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

150.---- is a MethodologicalSkeptic

- ( a ) Pyrrho.
- ( b ) Hume
- ( c ) Descartes.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:d

151.The tendency of human nature to have certain incorrect conclusions is known as ----.

- ( a ) idol of the cave
- ( b ) Idol of the tribe
- ( c ) Idol of the theatre.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

152.According to Comte ----is the stage of the society dominated by religion

- ( a ) Metaphysical stage.
- ( b ) Scientific stage
- ( c ) Theological stage.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:c

153. Bacon took up ---- ideas to build an inductive approach.

- (a) Aristotelian.
- (b) Socratic
- (c) Platonic.
- (d) All the three

Answer:a

154. The a priori factors in sensation are ---- and ----

- (a) Mind and Body.
- (b) Thought and extension
- (c) Space and Time.
- (d) All of these

Answer:c

155. A particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching something is called a ----

- (a) Routine.
- (b) Method
- (c) Experience.
- (d) All the three

Answer:b

156. A person who questions the validity or authenticity of something purporting to be factual is a ----

- (a) Skeptic.
- (b) Critic
- (c) Optimist.
- (d) Pessimist

Answer:a

157. According to Kant there are ---- categories

- (a) Two.
- (b) Three
- (c) Four.
- (d) Five

Answer:c

158. In the first stage of his philosophical career Kant was a ----

- (a) Rationalist.
- (b) Empiricist
- (c) Idealist.
- (d) Critical

Answer:a

159. Philosopher King was the concept of ----

- (a) Aristotle.
- (b) Socrates

- ( c ). Plato.
- ( d ) Thales

Answer:c

160.—— involves direct senseobject contact

- ( a ) Verbal testimony.
- ( b ) Perception
- ( c ) Inference.
- ( d ) Comparison

Answer:b

161.Sense Object contact istechnically called ——

- ( a ) Vyapti
- ( b ) Anumati
- ( c ) Sannikarsha
- ( d ) Hetu

Answer:c

162.Ordinary perception is known as——

- ( a ) laukika perception.
- ( b ) Yogic Perception
- ( c ) Alaukika Perception.
- ( d ) None of these Comment[Office2]:

Answer:a

163.The higher Values in life isnamed as——

- ( a ) Aryasatya
- ( b ) Purusarthas
- ( c ) Lokasayta.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

164.The perception in which the qualities of an object is determined isknown as——

- ( a ) Nirvikalpaka Perception.
- ( b ) Savikalpaka perception
- ( c ) Yogic Perception.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

165.The ground on which theinference is made

- ( a ) Hetu
- ( b ) Sadhya
- ( c ) Paksa
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:a

166.The Sanskrit word Upamanameans——

- ( a ) Implication.
- ( b ) Comparison
- ( c ) Inference
- ( d ) Perception

Answer:b

167.Philosophy aims at finding the :

- ( a ) Fundamental principles of the world.
- ( b ) Absolute
- ( c ) Soul.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:d

168.The science of morals is known as ----

- ( a ) Ethics.
- ( b ) Logic
- ( c ) Aesthetics.
- ( d ) Religion

Answer:a

169.---- is known as the father of Logic

- ( a ) J.S Mill
- ( b ) Aristotle
- ( c ) Socrates.
- ( d ) Creighton

Answer:b

170.The three faculties of the mind are thinking, feeling and ----

- ( a ) Willing.
- ( b ) Believing
- ( c ) Doubting.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:a

171.Logic is the science of correct ----

- ( a ) Behaving.
- ( b ) Thinking
- ( c ) appreciation
- ( c ) None of these

Answer:b

172.---- is a positive philosophy

- ( a ) Psychology.
- ( b ) Logic
- ( c ) Ethics.
- ( d ) Aesthetics

Answer:a

173. Jermy Bentham is a -----philosopher

- ( a ) Religious
- ( b ) Moral
- ( c ) Environment.
- ( d ) Structural

Answer:b

174. In ----the faculty of thinking is put to study

- ( a ) Ethics.
- ( b ) Logic
- ( c ) Aesthetics.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:b

175. The pramana which relies on implication is ----

- ( a ) Arthapathi
- ( b ) Anupalabdhi
- ( c ) Perception.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:a

176. ---- inspired Comte to Philosophy

- ( a ) J.S Mill.
- ( b ) Saint Simon
- ( c ) Herbert Spencer.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:b

177. The author of Iliad is

- ( a ) Homer.
- ( b ) Dante
- ( c ) Hesiod
- ( d ) Aristotle

Answer:a

178. Spinoza's Monism is known as ----

- ( a ) Abstract Monism.
- ( b ) Concrete monism
- ( c ) Phenomenal monism.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:a

179. Marx 's theory on the evolution of matter is known as ----

- ( a ) Emergent evolution
- ( b ) Material Evolution Comment[Office3]:
- ( c ) Dialectical Materialism.

( d ) None of these

Answer:c

180. Subjective idealism reduces matter to -----

( a ) Mind.

( b ) God

( c ) Sensations.

( d ) All of these

Answer:a

181. The idol which stands for wordsmen use in the commercial of daily life is known as-----

( a ) Idol of the cave.

( b ) Idol of the theatre

( c ) Idol of the market place

( d ) Idol of the

Answer:c

182. Descartes mathematical method consists in intuition and ----

( a ) Induction.

( b ) Deduction

( c ) Observation.

( d ) None of these

Answer:b

183. The author of Essay concerning Human Understanding is ----

( a ) Berkeley.

( b ) Descartes

( c ) Locke.

( d ) Hume

Answer:c

184. The author of Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

( a ) Berkeley.

( b ) Locke

( c ) Socrates.

( d ) Plato

Answer:a

185. In Indian philosophy ----- is a materialist school

( a ) Advaita.

( b ) Mimamsa

( c ) Yoga.

( d ) Carvaka

Answer:d

186. Locke rejected -----

( a ) Soul

- ( b ) God
  - ( c ) Matter.
  - ( d ) Innate ideas
- Answer:d

187.Hume rejected ----

- ( a ) Soul.
- ( b ) God
- ( c ) Matter
- ( d ) All of these

Answer:d

188.According to Descartes in Mathematics we begin with ----

- ( a ) axioms.
- ( b ) Calculations
- ( c ) assumptions.
- ( d ) None of these

Answer:a

189.The method of Descartes is also known as ----

- ( a ) Cartesian Method.
- ( b ) Discursive Method
- ( c ) Dialectic Method.
- ( d ) Critical Method

Answer:a

190.The end portion of the Vedas are known as ----

- ( a ) Brahmanas.
- ( b ) Mantras
- ( c ) Upanishads.
- ( d ) Aranyakas

Answer:c

191.Monadology is the work of ----

- ( a ) Leibniz.
- ( b ) Descartes
- ( c ) Hume.
- ( d ) Comte

Answer:a

192.The oldest literature in the world is ----

- ( a ) Mahabharata.
- ( b ) Ramayana
- ( c ) Vedas.
- ( d ) Puranas

Answer:c

193. Atheism is affiliated to ----

- ( a ) Spiritualism.
- ( b ) Materialism
- ( c ) Agnosticism.
- ( d ) All of these

Answer: b

194. Philosophy ---- the highest conclusions of different sciences

- ( a ) Harmonises.
- ( b ) Contradicts
- ( c ) proves.
- ( d ) differentiates

Answer: a

195. The Theory of being is known as ----

- ( a ) Cosmology.
- ( b ) Ontology
- ( c ) Epistemology
- ( d ) Biology

Answer: b

196. ---- believed in One ultimate reality

- ( a ) Buddhism.
- ( b ) Jainism
- ( c ) Upanishads.
- ( d ) All the three

Answer: c

197. Advaita Vedanta accepted ---- pramanas

- ( a ) Four
- ( b ) Five
- ( c ) Six.
- ( d ) One

Answer: c

198. The abhava of a thing is known through ----

- ( a ) Anupalabdhi
- ( b ) Arthapathi
- ( c ) Sabda
- ( d ) None of these

Answer: a

199. Normative Science studies a thing ----

- ( a ) As it is
- ( b ) As it ought to be
- ( c ) Both a and b
- ( d ) Neither a and b

Answer:b

200. Thales is the father of ———

- ( a ) Modern Philosophy
- ( b ) Philosophy
- ( c ) Indian Philosophy
- ( d ) Medieval Philosophy

Answer:b

201. Which pre-socratic philosopher developed a theory of reincarnation?

- (a) Protagoras
- (b) Heraclitus
- (c) Pythagoras
- (d) Parmenides

Answer:C

202. Which pre-socratic philosopher used his theory of the nature of atoms to explain the character of our sensations (such as our sense of color or the way certain foods taste)?

- (a) Empedocles
- (b) Thales
- (c) Democritus
- (d) Heraclitus

Answer:C

203. Which pre-socratic philosopher believed that the body was the source of evil and that the purpose of life was to purify the soul of the influence of the body?

- (a) Protagoras
- (b) Parmenides
- (c) Pythagoras
- (d) Pericles

Answer:C

204. Which pre-socratic philosopher thought that the constantly changing nature of reality was nevertheless made uniform and orderly insofar as it was governed by a force or principle he called the logos?

- (a) Democritus
- (b) Pythagoras
- (c) Parmenides
- (d) Heraclitus

Answer:D

205. The pre-socratic philosopher who thought reality was composed of atoms and empty space (or the void) was

- (a) Democritus
- (b) Parmenides

- (c) Pythagoras
  - (d) Empedocles
- Answer:A

206. Which of the following thinkers was a Sophist?

- (a) Pythagoras
  - (b) Democritus
  - (c) Protagoras
  - (d) Empedocles
- Answer:C

207. Which pre-socratic philosopher wrote in riddles and various paradoxical sayings?

- (a) Heraclitus
  - (b) Parmenides
  - (c) Anaximander
  - (d) Empedocles
- Answer:A

208. Which Sophist said that we couldn't know the nature of the gods because our mind are too limited, the subject is too obscure, and life is too short to attain such ultimate knowledge? Hint: he also said "man is the measure of all things."

- (a) Empedocles
  - (b) Protagoras
  - (c) Democritus
  - (d) Gorgias
- Answer:B

209. Which pre-socratic said that Being neither was nor will be but simply is?

- (a) Pythagoras
  - (b) Heraclitus
  - (c) Thales
  - (d) Parmenides
- Answer:D

210. Which pre-socratic philosopher said reality consisted of the four basic elements, earth, air, fire, and water (along with the force of love and strife)?

- (a) Anaximander
  - (b) Anaximenes
  - (c) Democritus
  - (d) Empedocles
- Answer:D

211. Which pre-socratic philosopher said that you cannot step into the same river twice?

- (a) Empedocles

- (b) Parmenides
  - (c) Heraclitus
  - (d) Pythagoras
- Answer:C

212. The Sophist who taught that truth was relative to believe was

- (a) Protagoras
  - (b) Gorgias
  - (c) Heraclitus
  - (d) Thales
- Answer:B

213. Which pre-socratic philosopher argued that change and motion were illusions and that we shouldn't listen to what our sense tell us about the world?

- (a) Heraclitus
  - (b) Thales
  - (c) Empedocles
  - (d) Parmenides
- Answer:D

214. Which pre-socratic philosopher believed that nature or the world came to be out of the struggle of fundamental oppositions (like dry and moist and hot and cold and light and dark) and the cyclic movement of these into and out of the apeiron (or the boundless or the unlimited)?

- (a) Thales
  - (b) Anaximander
  - (c) Anaximenes
  - (d) Anaxagoras
- Answer:B

215. Which pre-socratic philosopher believed that the cosmos generated a kind of glorious symphony (the Harmony of the Heavenly Spheres) that we could not hear unless our souls were sufficiently purified of the influence of our bodies?

- (a) Pythagoras
  - (b) Protagoras
  - (c) Heraclitus
  - (d) Anaximenes
- Answer:A

216. Which pre-socratic philosopher said that everything was ultimately air?

- (a) Anaximander
  - (b) Thales
  - (c) Anaximenes
  - (d) Empedocles
- Answer:C

217. Which of the following sayings is attributed to the Sophist Protagoras?

- (a) "you cannot step into the same river twice."
- (b) "wherever you go, there you are."
- (c) "man is the measure of all things."
- (d) "dogs bark at those whom they do not know."

Answer:C

218. The pre-socratic philosopher associated with music, mathematics, and mysticism was

- (a) Pythagoras
- (b) Empedocles
- (c) Heraclitus
- (d) Parmenides

Answer:A

219. The word philosophy was coined by Pythagoras. It's combination of philo and sophia which together mean

- (a) The love of God
- (b) The will of Zeus
- (c) The love of wisdom
- (d) The search for love

Answer:C

220. What were the two general attitudes toward life embraced by the Sophists?

- (a) Pragmatism and animism
- (b) Skepticism and relativism
- (c) Humanism and anthropomorphism
- (d) Apathy and cynicism

Answer:B

221. Which of the following statements was not included in Gorgias' treatise "On Nature or What is Not"?

- (a) Nothing exists
- (b) Even if something did exist, we could not know that it existed
- (c) Even if we could know that something existed, we could not communicate this knowledge to anyone else
- (d) Even if we could communicate this knowledge to someone else, he or she would probably not be that interested in it anyway

Answer:D

222. Philosophy emerged in ancient Greece when thinkers began to move from

- (a) More mythological to more rational ways of explaining the world
- (b) More agricultural to more industrial ways of making a living
- (c) More rational to more mythological ways of explaining the world

(d) More scientific to more religious ways of explaining the meaning of life

Answer:A

223. Which of the following figures is known as "the Father of Western Philosophy"? (Hint: there's a famous story told about his having once fallen in a cistern because he was so preoccupied looking up at the heavens.)

(a) Thales

(b) Heraclitus

(c) Parmenides

(d) Pythagoras

Answer:A

224. Which pre-socratic philosopher said that reality was one and that nothing changes?

(a) Pythagoras

(b) Parmenides

(c) Heraclitus

(d) Protagoras

Answer:B

225. What was Heraclitus' symbol for reality?

(a) Earth

(b) Air

(c) Fire

(d) Water

Answer:C

226. Name the ancient philosopher who wrote "The Republic":

(a) Eratosthenes

(b) Plato

(c) Diophantus

(d) Eppipides

Answer: B

227. After years of travel and study, Plato founded the Academy in:

(a) 357 B.C

(b) 367 B.C

(c) 377 B.C.

(d) 387 B.C.

Answer: D

228. Who was the mentor of Plato?

(a) Xenophon

(b) Aristotle

(c) Socrates

(d) Socrates

Answer: C

229. \_was a Classical Greek philosopher, mathematician, writer of philosophical dialogues, and founder of the Academy in Athens, the first Institution of higher learning in the Western world:

(a) Plato

(b) Aristotle

(c) Socrates

(d) None of these

Answer: A

230. Who was the teacher of Plato?

(a) Xenophn

(b) Aristotle

(c) Socrates

(d) None of these

Answer: C

231. Who was the student of Plato?

(a) Xenophn

(b) Aristotle

(c) Socrates

(d) None of these

Answer: B

232. Along with his mentor, Socrates, and his student, Aristotle, helped to lay the foundations of Western philosophy and science:

(a) Socraes

(b) Xenopon

(c) Aristole

(d) Plato

Answer: D

233. Which student of Plato developed the system of concentric spheres that became the epicycles of the Ptolemaic astronomical system?

(a) Socrates

(b) Xenophon

(c) Aristotle

(d) Eudoxus

Answer: D

234. Eudoxus was born in:

(a) Sparta

(b) Stagira

- (c) Athens
- (d) Cnidus Peninsula

Answer: D

235. Who said "Dictatorship naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme liberty:"

- (a) Eratosthenes
- (b) Plato
- (c) Diophantus
- (d) Eppipides

Answer: B

236. Who said "He who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden:"

- (a) Eratosthenes
- (b) Plato
- (c) Diophantus
- (d) Eppipides

Answer: B

237. Eudoxus was a great influence on:

- (a) Euclid
- (b) Ptolemy
- (c) Both (a) & (b)
- (d) None of these

Answer: Option C

238. Menaechmus was a pupil of:

- (a) Eudoxus
- (b) Callipus
- (c) Perga
- (d) Apollonius

Answer: A

239. Which work of Plato's was most influenced by the mystical-scientific ideas of the Pythagoreans?

- (a) Crito
- (b) Apology
- (c) Chermides
- (d) Timaeus

Answer: D

240. In "The Symposium" what Greek playwright suggests that all human beings are seeking their missing other halves?

- (a) Aristophanes
- (b) Aeschylus
- (c) Sophocles
- (d) Euripides

Answer: A

241. Which of Plato's works describes the trial of Socrates, and Socrates' defense against charges that he was corrupting the youth of Athens?

- (a) Crito
- (b) Meno
- (c) The Apology
- (d) Timaeus

Answer: C

242. Plato's writings mostly take the form of \_\_\_\_\_, in which knowledge is revealed as two characters ask and answer questions of each other:

- (a) Dialogues
- (b) Apology
- (c) Both (a) & (b)
- (d) None of these

Answer: Option A

243. Plato established an important method which has been passed down through the ages. That is that, when one has a problem that has already been solved, one can work backwards from it until a statement can be reached of which the veracity has already been determined. In other words, a method of attaining proofs. In which of his works was this method established?

- (a) Politicus
- (b) Meno
- (c) Protagoras
- (d) Phaedo

Answer: Option B

244. The origins of the fallacious insistence that the universe is perfect and that all planetary bodies make perfectly circular motions in their orbits is often traced to the works of Aristotle. But did Plato share these views:

- (a) Yes
- (b) No

Answer: Option A

245. In Plato's "The Republic", Socrates argues for freedom of expression and against censorship:

- (a) TRUE
- (b) FALSE

Answer: B

246. What is the primary subject of Socrates' dialogues with Thaetetus?

- (a) The nature of human knowledge
- (b) Whether or not God exists
- (c) The best form of civic government
- (d) The origin of the universe

Answer: A

247. Plato and his most esteemed student, Aristotle, both appear in the painting "The School of Athens" by which Renaissance master?

- (a) Michaelangelo
- (b) Raphael
- (c) Leonardo da Vinci
- (d) Titian

Answer: Option B

248. Augustine claims that all created things are:

- (a) eternally and unchangeably good.
- (b) good when taken together, but not good separately.
- (c) good, even taken separately.
- (d) none of the above.

Answer: c

249. Augustine identifies evil with:

- (a) the influence of the devil.
- (b) the absence of good.
- (c) a unique force, opposed to goodness.
- (d) pain.

Answer: b

250. Augustine claims that there can be no evil where there is no:

- (a) hatred.
- (b) greed.
- (c) love.
- (d) good.

Answer: d

251. Augustine claims that to be happy, one must know:

- (a) the causes of natural occurrences.
- (b) the causes of good and evil.
- (c) both a and b.
- (d) neither a nor b.

Answer: B

252. Augustine's view, lying is:

- (a) often permissible if done for the right reasons.
- (b) not evil in itself, although it can have bad consequences.
- (c) permissible only in very rare circumstances.
- (d) never permissible.

Answer: D

253. Augustine claims that Academic skepticism:

- (a) is true, and can be proven.
- (b) is true, but cannot be proven
- (c) is false but cannot be refuted.
- (d) is false and can be refuted.

Answer: d

254. Augustine holds that we can never err:

- (a) in any circumstances whatsoever.
- (b) except through ignorance.
- (c) except through wickedness.
- (d) except through temptation.

Answer: b

255. Augustine claims that to save another person from injury, it is permissible to:

- (a) lie.
- (b) steal.
- (c) both a and b.
- (d) neither a nor b.

Answer: d.

256. Anselm is seeking to \_\_ the truth of God.

- (a) better understand
- (b) believe in
- (c) deny
- (d) None of the above

Answer: a

257. According to Anselm, God...

- (a) Is omniscient, omnipotent, and all good.
- (b) Doesn't exist.
- (c) Is that which nothing greater can be conceived.
- (d) Only exists as a concept in our minds.

Answer: c

258. Which of the following best characterizes the position Anselm argues for?

- (a) It is possible for God to exist only in one's understanding
- (b) If God exists in one's understanding, necessarily God exists
- (c) God cannot exist, even in one's understanding

(d) God only exists in one's understanding

Answer:b

259. Choose the answer that best fills in the missing step in Anselm's argument:

(i) God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

(ii) God exists in one's understanding.

(iii) But then we can conceive something greater than God.

(iv) This is a contradiction, so if God exists in our understanding, God must exist

(a) If God exists in one's understanding, then God must exist in reality.

(b) It is possible for something to exist in one's understanding but not in reality.

(c) God is also something greater than can be conceived.

(d) If God only exists in one's understanding, we could still conceive of God existing in reality.

Answer:d

260. According to Anselm, not only is God that which nothing greater can be conceived, God is also...

(a) Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Allgood.

(b) The truth.

(c) Something greater than can be conceived.

(d) What gives meaning to our lives.

Answer:d

261. Anselm's "ontological" argument for the existence of God

(a) begins with easily observed facts about the world.

(b) moves from the premise that I exist to the conclusion that God exists.

(c) purports to establish that "There is no God" is self-contradictory.

(d) begins from the idea of God as the greatest thing I can

Answer:c

262. Anselm's argument

(a) moves from existence to essence.

(b) presupposes that God exists.

(c) starts from essence and ends with existence.

(d) begins with premises derived from Christian faith.

Answer:c

263. Thomas Aquinas

(a) depends on Anselm's ontological argument to buttress faith with reason.

(b) rejects Anselm's argument as invalid.

(c) thinks that God's existence cannot be proved, but must be accepted on faith.

(d) holds that we are not in the right epistemological position to use Anselm's argument.

Answer:d

264. Existence, Aquinas tells us,

- (a) is included in form, the principle of actuality in things.
- (b) is something we can take for granted.
- (c) is something added to the essence of finite things.
- (d) derives from essence, and from essence alone.

Answer:c

265. The argument for God's existence from change

- (a) claims that every change is a transition from actuality to potentiality.
- (b) assumes that something can be simultaneously both potentially hot and actually hot.
- (c) assumes that changes can be traced back to infinity.
- (d) argues that without a first cause of change there would be no intermediate causes of change.

Answer:d

266. Arguing from efficient causality, Aquinas says that

- (a) there must be something that is the efficient cause of itself.
- (b) the eternity of the world proves that God is not an efficient cause.
- (c) a series of causes going on forever proves that God is eternal.
- (d) a series of causes cannot go on forever.

Answer:d

267. When we say that God is good, according to Aquinas, we mean

- (a) that God is not bad.
- (b) to use the word "good" in an equivocal sense.
- (c) exactly what we mean when we use the word "good" in regard to created things—otherwise we wouldn't know what we do mean.
- (d) to apply the word "good" by analogy or proportion.

Answer:d

268. What we know first and most easily, according to Aquinas,

- (a) is the soul.
- (b) are the contents of our own minds.
- (c) are things like carrots and clouds.
- (d) are ideas of things like carrots and clouds.

Answer:d

269. What is right for us to do, according to natural law,

- (a) can be known only through careful attention to what is described as natural in the Scriptures.
- (b) is whatever naturally feels right.
- (c) is whatever God, the author of nature, arbitrarily legislates as right.
- (d) expresses our nature as rational human beings.

Answer:d

270 is not a representative of Rationalism

- (a) Kant

- (b) Descartes
- (c) Spinoza
- (d) All these

Answer:a

271. Descartes is considered as the founder of -----

- (a) Empiricism
- (b) Rationalism
- (c) Idealism
- (d) None of these

Answer:b

272. Generally the rise of modern Philosophy had been marked by -----

- (a) Critical thinking
- (b) Reflective spirit
- (c) Revolt against authority
- (d) All these

Answer:d

273. Descartes is a -----Philosopher

- (a) Greek
- (b) French
- (c) German
- (d) American

Answer:b

274. John Lock is -----Philosopher

- (a) Rationalist
- (b) Empiricist
- (c) Idealist
- (d) None of these

Answer:b

275. Cogito ergo sum is a key concept in the philosophy of -----

- (a) Leibniz
- (b) Spinoza
- (c) Descartes
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

276. The term 'natura naturans' is introduced by -----

- (a) Leibniz
- (b) Spinoza

- (c) Descartes
  - (d) Kant
- Answer:b

277. The doctrine of force relates to -

- (a) Monadology
- (b) Interactionism
- (c) Scholasticism
- (d) All these

Answer:a

278 is not a Rationalist

- (a) Kant
- (b) Descartes
- (c) Leibniz
- (d) All these

Answer:a

279 are the affections or modifications of substance

- (a) Modes
- (b) God
- (c) Attributes
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

280. Whose philosophy is conceived as Absolute Idealism

- (a) Kant
- (b) Hegel
- (c) Descartes
- (d) Spinoza

Answer:b

281. 'An Essay concerning human Understanding' is the work of -----

- (a) Spinoza
- (b) Descartes
- (c) Locke
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

282. Theory of Pre-established harmony is postulated by

- (a) Descartes
- (b) Leibniz
- (c) Spinoza
- (d) Hegel

Answer:b

283. Locke and Berkeley belong to ----- school

- (a) Empiricism
- (b) Rationalism
- (c) Idealism
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

284. Leibniz belongs to----- school

- (a) Rationalism
- (b) Empiricism
- (c) Idealism
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

285. According to Berkeley matter is an -----

- (a) Immanent idea
- (b) Abstract idea
- (c) Pure idea
- (d) All these

Answer:b

286. 'To be is to be perceived' is a theory of -----

- (a) Descartes
- (b) Leibniz
- (c) Spinoza
- (d) Berkeley

Answer:d

287. 'Ethics' is written by -----

- (a) Leibniz
- (b) Spinoza
- (c) Descartes
- (d) None of these

Answer:b

288 is the view that God is the immanent principle of universe

- (a) Pluralism
- (b) Dualism
- (c) Pantheism
- (d) Atheism

Answer:c

289. Hume is -----philosopher

- (a) Empiricist
- (b) Rationalist
- (c) Idealistic
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

290. Which one of the following is a secondary quality according to Locke

- (a) Solidity
- (b) Colour
- (c) Extension
- (d) Solidity

Answer:b

291. Who among the following is considered as the Subjective Idealist

- (a) Spinoza
- (b) Leibniz
- (c) Berkeley
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

292. 'All our reasoning about causality is derived from nothing but custom'. This relates to ----

- (a) Kant
- (b) Hegel
- (c) Leibniz
- (d) Hume

Answer:d

293. Kant's Rational theology deals with ..

- (a) The idea of God
- (b) Unity of self
- (c) The idea of world
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

294. Who among the following is an Idealist philosopher

- (a) Descartes
- (b) Kant
- (c) Locke
- (d) None of these

Answer:b

295. Descartes took-----as the model of his philosophical method

- (a) Religion
- (b) Mathematics
- (c) Sociology
- (d) Arts

Answer:b

296 is not a secondary quality according to Locke

- (a) Taste
- (b) Colour
- (c) Extension
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

297. 'Real is Rational, Rational is Real' is the concept of -----

- (a) Locke
- (b) Leibniz
- (c) Spinoza
- (d) Hegel

Answer:d

298. Who is considered as the father of modern philosophy

- (a) Kant
- (b) Descartes
- (c) Both (a) and (b)
- (d) Neither (a) nor (b)

Answer:b

299. According to Kant ----- judgments are always a priori

- (a) Synthetic
- (b) Ethical
- (c) Analytical
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

300. Which one of the following is a primary quality according to Locke

- (a) Colour
- (b) Figure
- (c) Extension
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

301. Tabula rasa refers to -----

- (a) Empty cabinet

- (b) Subtle emotion
- (c) Knowledge
- (d) None of these

Answer:a

302. Kant's Rational cosmology dealswith -----

- (a) Unity of self
- (b) The idea of God
- (c) The idea of one world
- (d) All these

Answer:c

303. Which one of the following is a work of Kant

- (a) Ethics
- (b) Monadology
- (c) Critique of pure reason
- (d) All of these

Answer:c

304. Psycho physical parallelism is a theory of ----

- (a) Descartes
- (b) Leibniz
- (c) Spinoza
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

305. Hegel developed his philosophy on the foundation laid by -----

- (a) Descartes
- (b) Fichte
- (c) Aristotle
- (d) None of these

Answer:b

306. Kant's Rational Psychology dealswith -----

- (a) The idea of world
- (b) The idea of God
- (c) Unity of self
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

307 is the method adopted by Kant

- (a) Inductive
- (b) Deductive

- (c) Empirical
- (d) Transcendental

Answer:d

308 is a mind body theory of Descartes

- (a) Psycho physical parallelism
- (b) Interactionism
- (c) Pre-established harmony
- (d) All these

Answer:b

309. According to Kant , knowledge of things – in –itself is called -----

- (a) Phenomena
- (b) Substance
- (c) Noumena
- (d) None of these

Answer:c

# **UNIT – 3**

## **Indian Ethics**

## **Purusārtha**

Puruṣārtha is purpose/fulfillment of life. By fulfilling Puruṣārtha, man gets fulfillment for life as well as sustains the society.

Purusārtha, The concept of purusārthas is the fundamental principle of Indian social ethics. The word purusārtha means “attainments” or “life purposes”. The aim of every person is to attain the four noble ends or purusārtha. These four purusārthas are – Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Moksha.

## **Dharma**

Dharma or the principle of righteousness is considered to be the supreme of the purusārthas. Dharma in Indian tradition is different from the Western concept of religion. The word religion has been derived from the latin root religare which means “to connect”. In this sense religion is a set of principles which connects human beings with God or which connects the thisworldly and the thatworldly. Therefore, religion essentially has some notion of God or some other supernatural entity. It is a particular way of worshipping.

On the other hand derived from the Sanskrit root dhr, which connotes to sustain, support or uphold, dharma has a wide range of meaning: it is the essential foundation of something or of things in general, and thus signifies ‘truth’; it is that which is established, customary, proper and therefore, means ‘traditional’ or ceremonial; it is one’s duty, responsibility, imperative and thereby ‘moral obligation’; it is that which is right, virtuous, meritorious, and accordingly ‘ethical; and it is that which is required, precepted, or permitted through religious authority, and thus legal.

Therefore, dharma in ancient India was a code of conduct for members of the society. P.V. Kane also defines dharma in terms of privileges, duties and obligations of a person. In the words of Kane, 61 “the word dharma passed through several transitions of meaning and ultimately its most prominent significance came to be the privileges, duties and obligations of man of the castes, as a person in a particular stage of life”. We find various forms of dharma in the sense of duty in ancient India like

1. Sāmānya Dharma— Some general rules which are universal in nature like truth, non-violence and non-stealing.
2. Rāj Dharma— Duties of the king.
3. Stree Dharma— Duties of woman.
4. Dāmpatya Dharma— Duties of husband and wife.
5. Varna Dharma— Duties of varnas.
6. Āshrama Dharma— Duties in the different stages of life.
7. Āpad Dharma— Duties during the crisis period.

## **Artha**

Artha is the second purusārtha. The term artha refers to worldly prosperity or wealth. It includes all the material means of life. Kautilya maintains that wealth is the basis of human requirements and that social well-being depends ultimately on material prosperity. Indian thinkers had recognised the pursuit of wealth as a legitimate human aspiration. But artha must be acquired by right means.

## **Kāma**

Kāma means worldly pleasures or sensual pleasures. It refers to some of the innate desires and urges in human beings. In the narrow sense kāma means sexual pleasure but in the wider sense it involves sexual, emotional and aesthetic life all together.

## **Moksha**

It is the ultimate purusārtha. Moksha means salvation or liberation from the cycle of birth and death. It is the summum bonum of human existence.

## **Varnāshrama System**

Various texts talk of varnāshramadharma or the dharma of different classes and dharma in the different stages of life. In ancient India there was a common dharma for all members of society which must be followed by all equally. But at the same time there were different codes of conduct for different classes or varnas called varna-dharma. Similarly, it was desired to follow different dharma at the different stages or āshrama of life called āshrama-dharma.

## **Varnas**

First reference of varna is seen in the Rig Veda. The tenth chapter of Rig Veda called Purusasūkta mentions the organic theory of the origin of varnas according to which varnas originated from the different organs of the Prajāpati or the creator. Manu also mentions that God created various varnas from his various organs. He created brahmins from his mouth, kshatriyas from his arms, vaishyas from his thighs and shudras from his legs. Though logically this explanation cannot be accepted but this clearly points out the varying significance of various varnas.

A much significant feature of this varna system was that the top three varnas— brahmins, kshatriyas and vaishyas were described as dvija or twice born. Their first birth was natural birth. But they were considered to be born again at the time of the pious yajñopavīta samskāra when they were invested with the sacred thread and included into the Aryan society as its full fledged member.

## **Brahmins**

Brahmins were at the top of varna hierarchy. They were believed to possess great spiritual powers. Thus they had a divine existence. In law, they claimed great privileges. Normally brahmins were exempt from execution, torture and corporal punishment. The main functions prescribed for brahmins were learning, teaching and priesthood.

## **Kshatriya**

The second class was the ruling class described as kshatriya or rājanya. Kshatriyas represented heroism, courage and strength. They constituted the warrior class.

The duty of kshatriyas was protection which had both internal and external aspects. External protection meant to protect the society from external invasion where as internal protection meant governance in peace and protection from anarchy. Kshatriyas had the right to possess arms.

## **Vaishyas**

Vaishyas represented the trading and commercial class. Though they were entitled to the services of the priesthood and to the ceremony of yajñopavīta, they were third in the social hierarchy.

According to Manu 63 the main task of the vaishya was to keep and maintain cattle. But it seems that later on vaishyas became economically a very important class of society. The ideal vaishya possessed the expert knowledge of jewels, metals, cloth, threads, spices, perfumes etc. In this sense vaishyas were the ancient Indian businessmen. In brahmanic literature, vaishyas are given few rights and humble status but Buddhist and Jaina literature mention many wealthy merchants living a luxurious life.

## **Shudras**

Shudras were at the bottom of the social hierarchy. They pursued the task of serving the other three varnas. They were not twice born. They were deprived of various rights. They were in fact second class citizens, on the fringes of Aryan society.

A.L. Basham maintains that shudras were of two types— 'not excluded' or anirvāsita and 'excluded' or nirvāsita. The distinction was made on the basis of the customs of the shudra group and the profession followed by the members of the group. Anirvāsita shudras were the part of Indian varna system whereas nirvāsita shudras were quite outside the pale of Hindu society and virtually indistinguishable from the strata of people known as untouchables.

Manu 65 prescribes the same penance for killing a shudra by a brahmin as for killing a cat or dog.

## **Untouchables**

A large number of people were deprived of all human rights. Having any contact with them might lead to the fall from grace by a normal Hindu. They were untouchables. Sometimes they are regarded as the excluded shudras whereas sometimes they are called the 'fifth class' (pancham varna). Probably, they were the aboriginal tribes who were defeated by the Aryans.

Most important of these groups was the Chāndāla. They were not allowed to live in the Aryan towns or villages. Their chief means of livelihood were the carrying and cremation of corpses and execution of criminals who were awarded the death penalty. According to the law books of ancient India, Chāndālas should be dressed in the garments of the corpses they cremated, should eat his food from broken vessels and should wear only those ornaments which were made of iron.

Later on the four varnas were divided into various subcategories called caste. The caste system is governed by two important rules: First, endogamy or marriage within the members of same caste, Second, the observance of certain rules of commensality whereby food was to be received from and consumed in the presence of either members of the same caste or of a higher caste but could not be consumed together with the members of the lower caste.

## **Two Paths: Shreyas and Preyas**

There is a beautiful stanza in the second chapter of the first cycle of Kathopanishad in which it is said – "The good and the pleasant come to a man and the thoughtful mind turns around them and distinguishes. The wise choose out the good from the pleasant, but the dull soul chooses the pleasant rather than the getting of his good and its having." (Kathopanishad, 1.2.2, translated by Sri Aurobindo) The two most important words in this verse which need to be understood in their root-sense are shreyas and preyas. In this issue my attempt is to explain the root-sense of these two words.

The word **shreyas** is derived from the root-sound **shri** which means to cause to lean or rest on, lay on or in, fix on, fasten to, direct or turn towards, spread or diffuse light or radiance or beauty over. The most common word from this root is **aashraya** meaning support, refuge, shelter, dependence etc. The third person singular form of the root **shri** in present tense is **shrayati** or **shrayate**. The word **shrii** is another most familiar word from this root which means light, lustre, radiance, splendour, glory, beauty, grace, loveliness, prosperity, welfare, good fortune, success, auspiciousness, wealth, treasure, riches, high rank, power, might, majesty, royal dignity etc. Goddess Lakshmi is known as shrii because she is the refuge and support of all existence; she is the goddess of beauty and harmony. It is the greater harmony that supports all movements in the creation, without that there will be no creation. The word **shriimaan** (feminine **shriimatii**) is one who is in possession of **shrii**, the one who shines with the knowledge of soul, lives in the light of the spirit. To achieve the knowledge that leads to the realization of the cosmic consciousness in each and everything is the object of **shriividya**. The word **shreshtha** which means the most excellent is also from the same root. The word **shreyas**, derived from the root **shri**, therefore, means that which diffuses light, brings happiness and bliss, and is good. It has the following meanings: auspicious, fortunate, conducive to welfare or prosperity, bliss, fortune, happiness, most splendid or beautiful, most excellent or distinguished, best, propitious, well disposed to, superior, preferable, better, better than etc. The word **shreyaskara** means that which promotes happiness and is favourable. The word **nihshreyas** is another important word in this group. It is formed by combining the prefix **nis** with the word **shreyas**. The prefix **nis** conveys the sense of certainty, fullness, completeness and integrality. So, **nihshreyas** refers to that which is certainly and completely good. The word **nihshreyas** is related to the soul's salvation. When we fall back entirely on the inner support or resources, then the real quest begins to bear fruit. This leads to the realization that our real existence is in the soul. This is **nihshreyas**, the perfect goodness or true happiness.

The word **preyas** is derived from the root **prii** which means: to please, gladden, delight, gratify, cheer, comfort, soothe, propitiate; to like, love, be kind to, to refresh. The third person singular form of this root in present tense is either **priiNaati** or **priiyate**. The words like **priiti**, **prema** and **priya** are derived from this root. The word **priiti** means pleasure, joy, gladness, satisfaction, amity, love etc.; **prema** means love and affection; **priya** refers to fondness, one who is dear to, favourite, liked. So the word **preyas** means that which is pleasant.

According to a verse in Kathopanishad (1.2.2) from between **shreyas** (that which is good to the soul) and **preyas** (that which is pleasing to the senses) the wise one always chooses the **shreyas**. In a true sense **preyas** is that pleasure which is born from the contact of the senses with the objects and 'is nectar to the lips at the first touch, but there is a secret poison in the bottom of the cup and after it the bitterness of disappointment, satiety, fatigue, revolt, disgust, sin, suffering, loss, transience.' And that which is born of the satisfaction of the higher mind and spirit is **shreyas**. This refers to the best and most inward with us. At first this may, though not necessarily, be like a poison but in the end it straight leads to the nectar of immortality. So, **preyas** is something pleasing to the senses and leads to failure and disappointment. And **shreyas** is something good to the growth of the soul which ultimately leads to **nihshreyas**, the perfect happiness.

## Preyas

Preyas is a Sanskrit word which can be translated as "dearer", "more agreeable" or "more desired". Preyas can also mean "immediately palatable," and as such it is known in yogic and Hindu philosophy as a way of life which is based on seeking instant gratification.

If one lives their life according to preyas, they make choices as to what will bring the most immediate pleasure. This may include sensory enticements, worldly enjoyment and material gains.

### **Explanation of Preyas**

The revered yogic text, the Bhagavad Gita explains the concept of preyas as a way of living that only gratifies the senses in the short term. Preyas has a strong appeal, but its rewards are only fleeting. Instead the Bhagavad Gita advocates an alternative approach to life, shreyas, which means to delay immediate pleasure and reward in order to pursue greater spiritual growth and ultimate happiness.

Sometimes preyas is thought of as the worldly path available to mankind, whereas shreyas is the spiritual. Thus preyas can be considered to be a valuable step on the spiritual journey, as it gradually leads to shreyas as long as the practitioner learns to discriminate and renounce its lures.

### **Shreyas**

Shreyas is a Sanskrit term meaning "that which brings light or happiness and is good." It can also be translated as meaning "auspicious," "fortune" or "conducive to well-being and prosperity." Shreyas comes from the root sound, shri, which means "to cause to lean in or rest on," "diffuse light" or "beauty."

In yogic philosophy, the word, shreyas, is often used to refer to an approach to life in which immediate gratification and short-term pleasure is delayed or deferred in order to pursue greater goals. This is considered the best approach for long-term happiness.

### **Explanation of Shreyas**

In understanding shreyas as an approach to life, greater presence and more conscious choices are needed in order to consider the future implications of decisions made together. In this way, shreyas brings about greater personal growth and development.

Shreyas is sometimes taught in contrast to an alternative approach of preyas, which means "immediately palatable." It refers to that which gratifies the senses and is instantly pleasurable. The well-known yogic text, the Bhagavad Gita, refers to these concepts and advocates for choosing shreyas, or the ultimate good, over preyas, the short-term reward.

### **Dharma**

Dharma is an important Hindu, Buddhist and yogic concept, referring to a law or principle which governs the universe. For an individual to live out their dharma is for them to act in accordance with this law. Dharma is considered to be one of the three jewels of Buddhism, alongside sangha and buddha, together paving the path to enlightenment. In Hinduism, it is one of the four main philosophical principles along with Artha, Kama and Moksha. It can also be understood as a law of righteousness and satya (truth), giving order to the customs, behaviours and ethics which make life possible.

The implication of dharma is that there is a right or true way for each person to carry out their life in order to serve both themselves and others. Dharma is closely related to the concepts of duty and selfless service, or seva, and is therefore a fundamental principle of yoga. Although it can be a

challenging concept to grasp since it has no single-word English translation, a close adaptation is "right way of living".

## **Explanation Dharma**

The word dharma comes from the Sanskrit root word dhri, which means "to hold," "to maintain," or "to preserve." In the early Vedas and other ancient Hindu texts, dharma referred to the cosmic law that created the ordered universe from chaos. Later, it was applied to other contexts, including human behaviors and ways of living that prevent society, family and nature from descending into chaos. This included the concepts of duty, rights, religion and morally appropriate behavior, and so dharma came to be understood as a means to preserve and maintain righteousness.

On an individual level, dharma can refer to a personal mission or purpose. Traditionally, an individual's dharma is thought to be pre-determined. Depending on karma, a soul is born into a particular caste or social group, either as a reward or a punishment for actions in their past lives. Their path in life is set by universal laws, and the only way to progress is to live within this path and work toward their destined purpose. According to the Bhagavad Gita, it is better to do your own dharma poorly than to do another's well.

It is said that all beings must accept their dharma for order and harmony to exist in the world. If an individual is following their dharma, they are pursuing their truest calling and serving all other beings in the universe by playing their true role.

To Hindus, all entities have their own dharma: even the sun must shine and the bees must make honey. In Buddhism, dharma additionally means acting in accordance with the teachings of the Buddha and the Four Noble Truths.

The result of living in this "right way" is believed to be self-realization and enlightenment. Above all, when your life is aligned with your dharma, it brings a sense of joy and fulfillment.

**The Sanskrit word Dharma** has no direct translation into English. Among other things, it can be thought of as righteousness in thought, word, and action. It comes from the root Dhr, which means to uphold, sustain, or uplift. Thus another interpretation of the word in English would be 'the collection of natural and universal laws that uphold, sustain, or uplift.' i.e. law of being; law of nature; individual nature; prescribed duty; social and personal duties; moral code; civil law; code of conduct; morality; way of life; practice; observance; justice; righteousness; religion; religiosity; harmony.

## **Dharma also refers to the following people from historic texts:**

- Yama, the lord of the departed and the judge of the actions of the departed souls; Justice personified as born from Yama, who is the divine father of Sāma, Kāma, Harṣa, Vidura and Yudhiṣṭhira
- the prajāpati who was the husband of 13 of the daughters of Dakṣa and the father of Hari and Nārāyana
- the son of Aṅu and the father of Ghṛtas
- a son of the Hehaya and father of Netra
- son of Pṛthuśravā; the 15th jaina arhat of the present avasarpinī

- a son of Gāndhāra and father of Dhṛta.

## Defining Dharma

The definition of Dharma as that which upholds, sustains and uplifts does not define the object that is being upheld, sustained, or uplifted. It does not imply any specific object (living or inanimate) and thus applies to all possible objects. It represents a 'Principle' or a 'Quality of being' that can be widely used in a variety of contexts to mean a variety of different ideas.

In the Mahabharata, Yudhistira asks Bhishma to explain the meaning and scope of Dharma. Bhishma replies: Tadrisho ayam anuprashno yatra dharmaha sudurlabaha Dushkamha pralisankhyatum tatkenatra vysvasyathi Prabhavarthaya bhutanam dharmappravachanam kritam Yasyat prabhavasamyuktaha sa dharma iti nischayaha.

It is most difficult to define Dharma. Dharma has been explained to be that which helps the upliftment of living beings. Therefore, that which ensures the welfare of living beings is surely Dharma. The learned rishis have declared that that which sustains is Dharma.

In the Karna Parva, Lord Krishna explains Dharma to Arjuna in the following words: Dharanat dharmamityahu dharmo dhara-yate prajahaYat syad dharanasamyuktam sa dharma iti nischayaha Dharma sustains the society. Dharma maintains the social order. Dharma ensures well being and progress of humanity. Dharma is surely that which fulfills these objectives.

Rishi Jaimini, the author of Purva Mimamsa and Uthara Mimamsa, explains Dharma as: Sa hi nisreyasena pumshamsamyunaktiti pra-tijaneemahe tadabhidhiyate chodanalakshno ariho dharmaha Dharma is that which is indicated by the Vedas as conducive to the highest good. Madhavacharya, in his commentary on Parashara Smriti, explains the meaning of dharma as Dharma is that which sustains and ensures progress and welfare of all in this world and eternal Bliss in the other world. Dharma is promulgated in the form of commands. (positive and negative vidhi and nishedha).

Dharma embraces every type of righteous conduct, covering every aspect of life essential for the sustenance and welfare of the individual and society. Further, it includes those rules which guide and enable those who believe in God and heaven to attain moksha.

## Dharma as Cosmic Order

The earliest import of the word Dharma, arises from the ancient Vedic idea of Ritam (or Cosmic Order). The entire universe is sustained by a cosmic order, which are physical laws that govern the motion of stars, suns, planets, satellites, asteroids and other physical bodies. For example, the law of gravity sustains life on the earth – since without it everything would fly away, never to come back. Similarly there are other natural laws that are responsible for sustaining and upholding various natural phenomenon. For example, why electrons keep revolving around the nucleus of an atom, why atoms combine in ways to form molecules, why the earth goes around the sun, and why human beings breathe out carbon-dioxide while plants breathe out oxygen. There are thus physical laws, chemical laws, biological laws, even psychological laws that both underlie the behavior and also sustain and maintain various natural phenomena.

There are geophysical laws that govern the occurrence of mountains, forests, climates, seas and

rivers, and the numerous phenomena we see on this planet. There are climatic laws that govern the seasons: summer follows spring, spring follows winter, and winter follows autumn and so on. The winds blow as though by an internal law – gently in normal times, and as hurricanes and gales, in abnormal times. And even the hurricanes and gales come only during their appointed season. The snows melt in the high mountains during summer, and the rivers flow in full spate, and thus the whole cycle of life is sustained.

There are biological laws that govern the birth, growth, sustenance and death of all things living, from the single-celled amoeba to the complex human being.

There is a digestive system that digests food, and a respiratory system that transforms oxygen into energy, a nervous system that carries impulses, a brain that initiates thought and co-ordinates movement, and so on. The Laws of Evolution have governed the progressive differentiation of species, and Laws of Destruction have destroyed numerous species in their time. There are laws that govern how the heart works, how the breath works, how hunger works and how food works, how speech works, how the mind works, how emotions work and how imagination works. It could be said that it is the Dharma of the Wind to blow, the Dharma of the Sun to heat up the world, the Dharma of the Ice to freeze and melt, the Dharma of Fire to burn. It is the Dharma of the Plants to give out oxygen, and the Dharma of the Animals to give out carbon dioxide. And behind the delicate workings and inter-relations between the various cosmic phenomena, there is an order, an intelligently engineered and organized system, a set of laws that seem to be at work governing the great forces and powers (Shakti) at play behind these laws.

This is Dharma as the cosmic order, that includes many dynamic sub-orders, each represented by powers and forces of great intensity and magnitude, each governed by their own dharma or internal law of being and working – each interacting upon one another, within the boundaries of that law, sustaining, maintaining and upholding all things material and phenomenal in this Universe.

### **Dharma as a Social Order**

While recognizing that in its inherent definition, Dharma must include all these natural cosmic laws that pertain to the physical universe, it is when the word is applied to Human life, that it gains additional significance. In the Mahabharata, Lord Krishna states that Dharma sustains society, maintains social order, and ensures wellbeing and progress of humanity.

Every society is prone to internal and external conflict. Individuals are fallible and prone to fall to the passions of greed, desire, jealousy and anger that may lay hold of the mind and give rise to all forms of social disturbance. In order to curb this likelihood, proper education and training must be provided and a sense of order living imparted. To live in peace in accordance to Dharma, individuals must learn to gain a free range of expression and experience while at the same time, know not to transgress the freedom and liberty of others.

Dharma, in this situation, is the collection of laws that uphold, sustain, and uplift society, social order, and the well-being and progress of humanity. It is the prescriptions and proscriptions that give rise to harmony, workability and stability in any society.

Every society has recognized the need for these as seen in religions that have created

commandments and injunctions, backed by threats of extraordinary punishments for transgression in the present life and afterlife.

Dharma has indeed been given an elevated place in the consciousness, enshrined through numerous stories and puranas, epics and tales in order to make it accessible to all, ranging from the uneducated villager to the powerful king, from the rishi to the merchant, irrespective of their station and role in society. This ensures that Dharma, the law of right living and conduct, is enshrined and passed on from father to son, from mother to daughter - from generation to generation.

### **Dharma as Ethical behavior**

Dharma includes the Golden rule "Do unto others as others would do unto you", and therefore the set of all possible values such as speaking the truth, being kind, speaking pleasant words, being respectful, demonstrating reverence towards the earth and the natural resources etc. Dharma includes all possible values, and not any one specific set of values, defined by any one individual or religious tradition, at a historical point of time. Dharma extends itself into the specific ways of life, our value systems, and attitudes.

When an individual conforms to a certain universal matrix of behavioral norms, (s)he contributes in the sustenance, maintenance, and the upliftment of societal order and thus the society itself. On the other hand, if the universal norms are transgressed, then a chain of actions and reactions takes place, which creates disorder. For example, the abused child becomes an abuser himself, or the hurt individual hurts another.

### **Dharma as Duty or Responsibility**

Dharma can be said to be expressed in the duties and responsibilities of an individual or a community that ensures the harmony and balance in society as a whole, in terms of its inter-relations and its dependencies. So Dharma upholds, sustains and uplifts all the various constituents of this universe, who are woven together in a common interdependent existence. When the parents perform their duties or discharge their responsibilities towards their children, that naturally sustains and uplifts their children. And when children perform their duties towards their parents, their actions sustain and uplift the parents. When there is a break in the discharge of the responsibilities of a parent towards a child, there is set in motion, a great cycle of disharmony, and society itself becomes unbalanced in some way.

Similarly when the citizens perform their duties or discharge their responsibilities (i.e. pay their taxes, don't break laws), this sustains the well-being of the society (and the State), and when the State discharges its responsibilities towards its citizens, that upholds, sustains and uplifts its citizens.

When the society discharges its duties and responsibilities towards the Earth and all its inhabitants i.e. plants and animals, then the Earth itself is upheld, sustained and uplifted. When humanity consumes the resources of the Earth indiscriminately, then that can unsettle the balance and harmony in this world and result in disaster.

## **Dharma as Service to the Community**

Ordinary human endeavors involve the pursuit of Artha and Kama – which can be loosely translated as security and pleasure, respectively. People's lives are predominantly given to the commitment of their professional lives, and the various pleasures that the physical world has to offer for experience. They hold on to their jobs for financial security, build and buy houses for security, invest in retirement funds for a secure future, and pursue various pastimes for pleasure. Infact, for most people, life is confined to the pursuit of Artha and Kama.

It is when they awaken to a wider possibility – that of subordinating personal interests in favor of ensuring the wellbeing of others – whether those others are within the family, neighborhood, village, city or state, or a specific community or even the country or the world – their lives take on a wider dimension. A commitment to pursue the greater good, clearly sustains, maintains, upholds and uplifts the prevailing social order, especially the community that is the beneficiary. Dharma is therefore inherent to any community service – whether it is the building of a school or running a hospital or an orphanage, or creating a philanthropic foundation or running a shelter for the homeless.

Dharmic life, is a life of self-less service, of sacrifice and contribution. It is the lifestyle that has been held in India from time immemorial as an ideal life, a life worth emulating, a life that one aspires towards. Making a difference in society at large, somehow honors and fulfills the human spirit, and brings to life the true possibility and potential of human existence. Every Purana thus extols Dharma. In the Ramayana this idea is personified in Lord Rama – who is widely called Vighrahaan Dharma – the embodiment of Dharma.

## **Dharma as Self-Expression**

Each human being is endowed with specific qualities and gifts. Some are born with a a talent for music or sports, while others have developed a talent for management. Some have a deep well developed intellectual disposition while others are blessed with great energy and entrepreneurship for social activity. Ultimately a human being uplifts himself, sustains and upholds his spirit, when heor she truly fully develops and expresses his or her unique gifts in the service of humanity.

Man must grow to his full potential, in conformity with his own inner law of being his Svadharma. Such self-actualization is consistent with the complete unfoldment of the specific gifts, talents and qualities that one is blessed with and results in the true fulfillment of one's life's potential as well as bestows these special gifts and talents to those surrounding such a person. This flowering of a human being is also Dharma - this developing of an inner potential and possibility to its full height and range of expression, this unfolding of human genius consistent with the individual's own inner law of being and action, and this manifestation in physical reality, the power of the human mind, thought, feeling and action.

When society has created the conditions of harmony and stability, the pre- conditions of progress are created. Such a society flowers naturally and easily, and there is an outburst of human creativity – and all manner of creative expression is found to arise. In short periods of time, such societies have brought forth great advances in art, architecture, science and technology, philosophy and thought, literature and drama, and all other fields of human development.

## **Dharma as a means for Moksha**

Progress of humanity can be conceived in many different terms – scientific, social, industrial, technological, arts, economic, political and so on. India's civilization has always conceived of humanity's progress in spiritual terms, and given it a pre- eminent significance. It is in the context of spiritual progress, that the notion of Dharma attains its fullest import. The Rig Veda was realized and composed on the banks of the Saraswati River many millennia ago. It describes the purpose of human life succinctly in the phrase "Atmano mokshartham jagat hitayacha" which means 'the pursuit of moksha while keeping in view the welfare of the world.' From a spiritual context, the ultimate fulfillment of a human life arises in the pursuit and attainment of moksha. A life of Dharma then is a life that keeps in full view the spiritual end of human life and harmonizes one's everyday life with the progression towards that end.

Dharma becomes the means to attain a spiritual end of life. Thus Dharma is that which sustains, upholds, and uplifts the spiritual progress of humanity, both individually and as a collective. Without a complete understanding of the essentially spiritual journey that human beings are on, without a recognition of the nature of the inner reality of the individual, and the relationship with the universe, and without establishing a notion of Bhagwan as the all-pervasive reality of this universe, the word Dharma cannot be fully understood.

## **Scriptural Discussions**

Dharma is outlined in both Sruti and Smriti. For example, the Rig Veda refers to it as Ritam later on, the Atharva Veda also refers to it. The Kalpa Sutras, a Vedanga, contain the Dharma Sutras, Sruta Sutras, Grihya Sutras and Sulba Sutras. Of these, Dharma Sutras outline dharma. Because of the critical importance of grhastha ashrama to the society, Grihya sutras (to be followed by Grhastha) are separately mentioned. These Sutras are specific to the adherents of each Veda Shakha. There are many other metrical codes written, for instance by Manu, Parashara and Vasistha, that serve the same purpose. Apart from these, the Itihasa and Puranas detail the nature of Dharma and illustrate through stories what is Dharma in various life situations.

Sutras are guidelines and not impositions. They provide a guide to persons desiring to go by a particular path regarding what benefits and what retards them in their path. The prayaschitta for deviation also applies only to someone wanting to go by a specific path.

Among the Smritis for instance, the Manusmriti has more of a record of what is/was, rather than a prescription. It is a statement of what kind of social setup existed and what were the norms followed. Parashara smriti, being more recent, is said to be applicable to kaliyuga. So the following are the texts needed to understanding Dharma:

1. Sutras (Dharma, Grihya)
2. Smritis
  - Metrical codes like Manusmriti
  - Itihasa Puranas

There are three sources of knowledge of Dharma:

1. Through scriptures
2. Through elders

3. By observing the behavior of noble men in different situations The concepts involved in understanding Dharma:
- Varna Dharma
  - Ashrama Dharma
  - Concept of Karma

These are overlapping and not exclusive concepts.

## **Types of Dharma**

Dharma can be classified into many subsets depending on application area and to whom or what is being discussed. For people, the following are examples of dharma that typically apply for day-to-day life:

- Vyakti dharma - the dharma of an individual
  - Parivarika dharma - family dharma (also called kutumba dharma)
  - Samaja dharma - societal dharma
  - Rashtra dharma - national dharma
  - Manava dharma - the dharma of mankind
  - Varna dharma - professional dharma
  - apad dharma - exceptional/abnormal situational dharma
  - Yuga dharma - dharma applicable for an age
  - Ashrama dharma - dharma for stage of life
- Dharma in Common Usage

Mahatma Gandhi brought the phrase "Ahimsa Paramo Dharma" into common usage stating (in contradiction to scripture) that non-violence was the topmost Dharma for all and he is often quoted by many people and leaders.

### **Dharma as a Civilizational Principle**

Ancient Rishis saw rights and responsibilities as two sides of the same coin and decided to emphasize responsibilities and duty over rights whereas other civilizations emphasized rights. They knew that when responsibilities and duties are fulfilled, people receive their rights. For example, when parents fulfill their duties and responsibilities for their children—their children receive their rights. The same principle applies for a nation and its citizens. Where people live in conformity with their dharma, the individual rights of all others are naturally granted. A culture that emphasizes rights over duties only results in a competitive clamoring where each group and sub-group organizes itself to lobby and fight for its rights. Whereas in Sanatana Dharma, one is taught to live consistently with one's dharma (swadharma), and leave the rest to Ishwara or Bhagwan

### **Varnashrama-dharma**

Varnashrama-dharma defines duties for the individual, classified according to four divisions of labour and four stages in life. These specific duties change, for example as one passes through the different ashrams. Varnashrama-dharma is the basis for accommodating diversity, and attributing different social and spiritual standards to various sections of society. Although varnashrama- dharma relates largely to social matters, it is not divorced from sanatana- dharma but is a means of recognising a common goal approached from different starting points. Some Hindu thinkers consider that the current, rigid caste system is a result of neglecting the principle of spiritual equality inherent in sanatana- dharma.

According to Hindu texts, Varnashrama-dharma is not a man-made system but refers to natural classifications that appear to various degrees in all human societies. Individuals have different innate tendencies for work and exhibit a variety of personal qualities. There are also natural phases in life, when it is easier and more rewarding to perform certain activities. Hinduism teaches that individuals best realise their potential by taking into account such natural arrangements, and that society should be structured and organised accordingly.

Each varna and ashram has its own specified dharma. What may be desirable for one section of society may be degrading for another. For example, absolute non-violence, which includes refraining from animal sacrifice, is essential for the priestly class but considered wholly unworthy of a kshatriya (warrior). Generating wealth and producing children are essential for householders, but intimate contact with money and women is spiritually suicidal for the renunciate. Underlying all these apparent differences is the common goal of advancing in spiritual life based on sanatana-dharma. Without the spiritual equality and sense of service inherent in sanatanadharm, varnashrama-dharma tends to degrade into the rigid and exploitative caste system.

## Key Points

- Varnashrama-dharma – duties performed according to the system of four varnas (social divisions) and four ashrams (stages in life).
- Focus is on responsibilities (which naturally fulfil the rights of others).
- Four varnas – brahmanas (priests, teachers, and intellectuals), kshatriyas (police, army, and administration), vaishyas (farmers, merchants, and business people), shudras (artisans and workers).
- Four ashrams – student life, household life, retirement, and renunciation.

## Useful Analogy The social body

The social body and its components are likened to the human form.

- Society is compared to a body with the brahmanas as the head, kshatriyas as the arms, vaishyas as the belly (or thighs) and the shudras as the legs
- Social functions are determined according to this analogy. For example, the brahmanas are the eyes and mouth of society. They provide a spiritual vision for society and teach people accordingly. Just as the arms are raised to defend the body, the kshatriya's main duty is to protect society. The vaishya's main duty is material nourishment, and the shudra supports all other sections of society.
- They are sometimes related to the same metaphor, with the successive stages of student life, household life, retirement and renunciation represented by the legs, belly, arms and head respectively.

## Sadharana dharma

Sadharana-dharma, general morality, is often defined according to prohibitions (yama) and recommended practices (niyama). Hindu opinion varies as to the exact number of each. Sādhāraṇadharmā literally means 'dharma that is common to all'.

## Classification of Dharma

The word 'dharma' has been used in the scriptures in several senses out of which the meaning

'duties and good conduct' is the most common. Dharma is usually classified into two categories:

1. Sādhāraṇa or sāmānya dharma
2. Viśeṣa-dharma

### **Peculiarities of Sādhāraṇa Dharma**

It is common to all walks of life. It pertains to all persons without exception. It is generally described as comprising the following ten qualities:

1. Ahimsā - not harming others
2. Satya - truth
3. Asteya - non-stealing
4. Dāna - giving gifts
5. Kṣānti - forbearance
6. Dama - self-control
7. Śama - keeping the mind at peace
8. Akārpaṇya - not demeaning oneself
9. Śauca - cleanliness and purity
10. Tapas - austere life

### **Virtues of Aspirant of Sādhāraṇa Dharma**

Other virtues included in such lists given by other sources are:

1. Nābhimānitā - absence of arrogance and pride
2. Anāyāsa - avoiding too much of exertion
3. Priya-vāditā - gentle speech
4. Maitrī - friendly feeling
5. Aspr̥hā - absence of greed
6. Anasuyā - absence of jealousy
7. Guruśuśrusā - serving the elders
8. Tirthānusaraṇa - going on a pilgrimage
9. Devabrāhmaṇapujana - worship of God and brāhmaṇas

### **Yajña**

Yajña is the central concept of Śrauta -- the tradition that follows from the Śruti (Veda). There are many concepts that are based on and evolved from the concept of yajña. The word yajña comes from the root-"yaj" which means to worship. Yajña is a broad concept which is hard to translate into English. The closest single English word for yajña is sacrifice. There are multiple synonyms of the word yajña that convey different aspects of this broad concept. For instance it is also called "karma", meaning action or the act of sacrifice/offering/worshiping. In the general sense it can be understood as any action done with the sense of sacrifice, like praying, remembering, meditating. In the specific sense it is the act of offering oblations to propitiate a Devata.

The word karma is also used in different contexts. Yajña is karma in the general sense. In the more specific sense, karma is the component rite of a yajña. In the most general sense, karma refers to any action. The path of karma/yajña is called Karma yoga or Karma mārga.

## The Theory of Yajña/Karma Mārga

Karma mārga is based on the concept of Dharma. The result of an action performed is determined by the Dharmic or adharmic nature of the action. Dharma determines the fruit of karma and karma determines the course of experience of beings. Karma Mīmāṃsā the base text for Karma Mīmāṃsā, opens up by saying "athāto dharma jijñāsa", to expound the nature of Dharma. The text clearly states that karma and its results are based on Dharma - "Dharma mātre tu karmasyād nivṛtṭefi prayājavat". In karma mārga, mukti is possible through karma nivṛtṭi, through the performance of righteous karma.

The object of central importance in karma mārga is karma or action. Worship or sacrifice too, assumes importance in the path of karma, primarily as the "act of worshiping or sacrifice" (karma), rather than the "state of worshiping" (which is the object in upāsana mārga). In contrast to the yoga/upāsana mārga where the worshiper and the process of worship dissolve in the object of worship (Īśvara), in Karma the act of worship assumes importance.

Being action-centric does not make yajña any more outward or superficial compared to Upāsana mārga. For instance, Baudhayana's "nā rudro rudram arcayet" (one who is not Rudra cannot worship Rudra - meaning one becomes or unites with Rudra in order to worship Him, by invoking Him) is interpreted differently in Karma and Upāsana mārgas. Upāsana, the state of union of the seeker and Rudra is primary, while the act of worship is secondary. In karma, the union is taken to be implicit, and the act of Rudra worshiping Himself becomes primary.

In the grand scheme, everything involved – the one who is performing sacrifice, the rites, the material involved, the offerings, the one who receives the offerings, are each a part of the act of sacrifice. Even sacrifice becomes part of a grander sacrifice (the universe itself is a grand sacrifice, involving many rites like creation). The Puruṣa sūkta of Rig Veda for example, explains this grand sacrifice. Sacrifice itself is the purpose in yajña, and there is no greater purpose. Everything else – desires, transcending desires, liberation -- are only by-products.

In Karma Yoga sacrifice assumes primary importance and Īśvara assumes secondary importance. The affirmation of Īśvara in the path of Karma is not unanimous. Īśvara and Nirīśvara approaches are held by Gīta and Karma Mīmāṃsā respectively. In Nirīśvara approach Karma phala or the result of sacrifice follows the rules of Dharma. In Īśvara Vāda, Īśvara receives the offerings of a sacrifice, presides over the sacrifice and gives the Karma phala.

## Pravṛtṭi and Nivṛtṭi

There are two directions of movement or phases in life, pravṛtṭi and nivṛtṭi. Pravṛtṭi is accumulating and indulging. Nivṛtṭi is clearing debts and transcending. In pravṛtṭi, yajña brings material possessions, righteousness and heavenly bliss. This helps man fulfill his aspirations as well as contribute to social living. Man gradually grows beyond desires and becomes more impersonal. This is how he enters the nivṛtṭi phase. During nivṛtṭi, yajña is done without any desire, merely as a duty. This helps in clearing past karma, but this greatly helps the well-being of surroundings (loka kalyāṇa). This is the way the realized soul performs yajña. This is the niṣkām karma explained in the Karma Yoga of Bhagavad Gīta. In nivṛtṭi, yajña brings eternal bliss. Brahmandavalli of the Taittirīya Upanishad expounds the gradation of happiness experienced by men, manes, Devatas, lord of Devatas, teacher of the Devatas, creator of Devatas and the creator of the universe in the ascending order, increasing hundred fold for each level. At each level, the bliss is equated to that of

a veda-wise person (Śrotriya) who overcame his desire (kāma hatasya). In pravṛtti one experiences the bliss of Devas. In nivṛtti one grows beyond desires and experiences the bliss of Brahman. In nivṛtti, yajña brings liberation.

If this is seen in parallel to the ashrama dharma, brahmacarya and grhastha ashramas involve pravṛtti. In brahmacarya, one increases his debts through his dependence, for sustenance as well as learning. In grhastha ashrama he attempts to repay these by offering the same back to the society, but increases his sources of attachment in that attempt. Through fulfillment of responsibilities and desires, one enters nivṛtti. Vānaprastha is the phase of containment, where rites are performed without any personal material desire. However some of the rites like pitru yajña are still performed. Sanyāsa is the phase of complete renunciation. It is not mandatory for a Sanyāsi to perform any yajña/karma, for he can renounce karma itself.

## Constituents of Yajña

The primary constituents of a Yajña are the inspiration or urge of the doer (bhāvana), learning (svādhyāya), rites involved (karma), offerings (tyāga), devata and the results (phala).

## Karma

There are two types of rites in a sacrifice, principal (artha karma) and subsidiary (guṇa karma). Guṇa karmas are the constituent accessory rites associated with a principal rite. In artha karma, the rite is primary and material is subsidiary to the rite. Material is treated as accessory. In guṇa karma, material is primary and rite secondary to it.

## Artha Karma

**Artha karmas are three types.**

- Nitya karma, done regularly. Example of nitya karma is Agni hotra (the homa done thrice a day).
- Naimittika karma, done occasionally. These are rites involving specific occasions. Those like pitru tarpana are naimittika rites. Nitya and naimittika rites are mandatory. There are specific Vedic injunctions that make the rites mandatory.
- Kāmya karma, done optionally. Optional rites are performed when a specific purpose is intended to be served through a sacrifice. The sacrifices like soma yāga and vājapeya are examples of optional rites. These are in turn three types based on the results they give. The rites that give results in the present life are called aihika. The ones whose results are enjoyed after the present life (such as heaven, prosperity in the next life or breaking the cycle of life itself) are called āmuṣmika. The rites that give both kinds of results are called aihika-āmuṣmika.

## Guṇa Karma

Guṇa karmas, which are subsidiary and form components of artha karmas, are intended for purification (samskāra). They are four types:

- utpatti (origination – for instance creating fire for the sacrifice)
- āpti (obtaining/attaining – for instance learning required to perform the rite)
- vikṛti (modification – for instance husking or cooking rice for sacrifice)
- samskṛti (consecration/purification – for instance purifying the material by sprinkling water and/or through mantra).

Subsidiary rites are in general meant for purification. This is again of two types, disposal (pratipatti) and purification.

Prāyaścitta or expiation rites are also part of the subsidiary rites/guṇa karmas. Bhāvana  
Bhāvana is the urge, inspiration to perform yajña. This is caused by the desire for its result. Thus from the perspective of yajña, desire is seen as an inspiration to performing karma. Need and desire are the two inspirations for beings to perform karma that run the activity of phenomenal world.

### **Bhāvana has three aspects:**

- what is desired
- what is the means
- what is the method.

From the injunctions of Śruti, these are learned. For instance, from injunctions such as “one who desires cattle should perform Citra”.

In pravṛtti mārga, one performs karma with a desired result. Following the injunctions of the scriptures and being righteous, one can fulfill these. However in the advanced stages in karma mārga, sacrifice alone remains the purpose. All that is desired is also desired for the sake of performing sacrifice, making yajña the ultimate purpose. The Camaka of Sri Rudram starts with praying for a variety of material gains, fulfillment of desires, grace of devatas, asking for devatas themselves, the various ingredients involved in sacrifice, the different rites of a sacrifice, and then towards conclusion, makes all these along with the life, mind, speech, soul and the whole sacrifice, a part of the sacrifice itself. This explains how desire is positively treated, and then sublimated in karma mārga.

### **Svadyaya**

Svadyaya means learning one’s Veda (the branch of Veda one is ordained to pursue) along with the Vedangas. It is through learning that one gains the knowledge of the rites he should perform as his duty, the rites he can perform for various other desired purposes, how to perform those, and what his conduct should be to gain the desired results (these could be material or heavenly or liberation).

Svadyaya is the primary duty during brahmacarya, and forms the basis for performing all the rites of subsequent ashramas.

### **Tyāga**

Tyāga is associated with offering. There are three kinds of offerings:

- yāga (sacrifice)
- dāna (giving)
- homa (offering)

Of these, the word yāga refers to principal rite and the other two are associated with subsidiary

rites.

Dāna is transferring one's right over what is given, to the one who is taking. This does not involve any expectation of result (though it has an invisible result, and it ensues only when the result is not desired for).

Homa is offering of havis in Agni. This involves tyāga of what is being offered, with the mention "na mama", meaning what is being offered is no more mine, it belongs to the Devata (or the pitri as the case may be) to whom the offering is being made. There is no expectation of result in the homa itself, but its result will become part of the result of the entire sacrifice.

Homa is central to any agni karya or sacrifice performed in Agni. It has become almost synonymous to the word yajña itself. However it should be understood that homa is a component of yajña. In some kinds of yajña which do not involve Agni karya, oblations are offered as dana instead of homa.

## Devata

Devata is a constituent of sacrifice as well as its result. Devatas consume the havis offered in a sacrifice and give the result of sacrifice performed. As a result of sacrifice, along with the desired result, the grace of devata remains.

When sacrifice is performed without desiring a result, devata's grace remains the result of sacrifice. Devata is mantra-baddha, meaning He is bound to give the result of a sacrifice/mantra when invoked. Thus the result of any form of worship is bound to come.

Havis offered in a sacrifice is the food for Devatas. Devatas grow on havis and bring the well-being of men (through rains and so on). Thus Devatas grow on man's offerings and man's elevation is brought by the Devatas. Thus through mutual nourishment, men and Devatas bring about the well-being of all.

This is explained in the Karma Yoga of Bhagavad Gīta:

देवाभवायतानेन ते देवा भावयन्तु वः । परस्परं भावयन्तः श्रेयः परमवाप्स्यथ ॥३-११॥	devān bhāvayatānena te devā bhāvayantu vafi parasparam bhāvayantafisreyah param avapsyatha
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All life is said to be a yajña. Every action, when made as an offering to the Īśvara, is a yajña. Worshipping, eating food, fighting war, creating wealth, contributing to human knowledge, running family, each of these is a yajña. Doing these as offerings to derive something greater, makes these actions yajñas. When these actions are not done for material gain but with a selfless motive, that is the highest form of yajña. Sacrifice brings transcendence. Transcendence through sacrifice is the meaning of life in the Vedic religion.

## **Agni**

Agni is called Deva Mukha and is the central deity for yajña. Oblations (havis) are offered in the fire and Agni is said to carry those to the Devas.

Offering and the carrier of offerings are inseparable and the former is stated to be the consort of the latter (Agni). There are two contexts of offering, the para (pertaining to Devas) and apara (pertaining to Pitris). The presiding deities of these two kinds of offerings are Svāha and Swaha respectively. These are the two consorts of Agni. The offerings to Devas and Pitris are made through these two.

## **Phala**

The result of a sacrifice ensues from the results of each of the subsidiary rites, combined with the result of the main rite.

Each rite creates a unique result, in terms of visible or invisible effect. This is called apurva. The total of unique results of all the rites of a sacrifice cause the grand unique final result of the sacrifice, called Mahāpurva.

Different schools hold different opinions on the results of nitya karmas. According to Prabhākara School it is said that there is no additional benefit or fruit of performing nitya karmas but there is a loss of merit or righteousness in not performing those. According to Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, there will be an additional merit even in the performance of nitya karmas. In case of kāmya rites, since they are optional, there is only an additional result in performing those.

There are two kinds of results of a sacrifice – visible (pratyakṣa) and invisible (ālaukika). Pratyakṣa is the visible gain that results from performing the sacrifice, material or otherwise. Alaukika result can be like begetting heaven in pravṛtti and mukti in nivṛtti (through karma nivṛtti).

## **Prayoga**

Literally prayoga means performance. It is the performance of sacrifice, the application of text to perform yajña. The injunctions to perform the sacrifice or vidhi are found in Brahmana portion of Veda. Kalpa Sūtrās explain the prayoga part further.

There are different stages in performing a sacrifice. It begins with cleaning the place and building the altar. Then the dravya is acquired. Then the priest is invited to officiate. Following that the altar is decorated and Agni invoked. Then the purification of each of the dravya is done. Then the homas (in the fire) and danas (alms etc) are done. The sacrifice concludes with cleaning up the place and taking the fruit of sacrifice.

## **Yajña Dravya and Homas**

Agni karya forms the core of a sacrifice. It includes purification rites and the homas. The ingredients used in a yajña are called dravya. There are six ingredients involved in performing an Agni Karya. They are:



Homa

- Sruk and Sruva (ladles used for making offering in fire)
- Idhma (wooden pieces/sticks used as fuel in the sacrifice – also called samidhas)
- Pātras (bowls)

There are three kinds of pātras used:

- the prokṣiṇi (used for purification)
- ājya (to hold the clarified butter)
- pūrṇa pātra (literally “complete”, the one used for completion of the rite)

Based on the dravya used and rites performed, there are two major classes of prayoga – Catuṣpātra (using four ingredients) and Ṣaṭpātra (using six ingredients). Ṣaṭpātra involves the usage all the six dravyas mentioned above. Catuṣpātra does not involve idhma and pūrṇa pātra. However, the regular rite that a brahmachari performs, does not mandatorily involve any pātra (though usage is not prohibited). Most of the prayogas nitya or otherwise, involve Ṣaṭpātra prayoga.

Some of the sacrifices are referred to variously as involving more than six primary ingredients. For instance marriage ritual in Āpastamba sāmpradāya is called dasa pātra (involving 10 ingredients). Major yāgas like Vajapeya use many more.

However all of them come under Ṣaṭpātra only and the additional dravya is classified as one of the six - idhma or ajya for instance.

In general, Catuṣpātra is sufficient for the regular homas to prajāpati, Indra Agni etc. In order to propitiate a specific deity, one has to perform Ṣaṭpātra. This involves additional dravya and homas. Dravya depends on the nature of rite. It could be rice, corn, specific samidhas, blades of grass, milk, curd etc. Fifty eight homas (to Prajāpati, Dikpālakas and Grahas Lokapālakas etc) inclusive of Cakṣur- homas (literally the homas of eyes - two homas with clarified butter poured in the fire circularly, as if they are the eyes of Agni) and done in the beginning of the sacrifice. Then oblations to the main deity of the sacrifice are offered. Jayādi homas (additional homas to propitiate various Devatas representative of faculties of consciousness, prāyaścitta homas etc) follow that, and it is concluded with Pūrṇāhuti (literally the “completion” oblation or the conclusive one).

These homas also include the prāyaścitta rites (expiation rites), as applicable. However prāyaścitta rites are common to Catuṣpātra and Ṣaṭpātra.

Participants of a Yāga

The primary participant of a sacrifice is the one who performs it – the owner or the yajamāni. A

dvija performs regular rites himself. However any major yāga requires the yajamāni to be accompanied by his consort, she should offer the fire (Āpastamba Sūtras). In case of a kāmya prayoga, a ṛtvija (priest) is involved.

In major yāgas, there are at least four ṛtviks involved. They are hota, adhvaryu, brahma and udgāta. Hota should be learned in Rig Veda, and chants the Ṛks.

Ādhvaryu is the one who performs the sacrifice (makes the yajamāni do it with instructions). He should be learned in Yajurveda. Udgāta sings the Sāma Veda. Brahma supervises the sacrifice.


## Yāga Sāla

The regular rites are conducted in a designated place in the house. Major yāgas are performed in premises meant for them, called yāga śālās.

Yāga sāla follows a specific architecture/layout. It has four entrances, representing the four Vedas. The four entrances have four gates, decorated with the leaves of four kinds of trees, or rather named after the four trees. They are Nyagrodha, Aswattha, Audumbara and Plaksha. In the four directions altars are built in shapes specified against those positions (they could be circular, square or following any other geometry according to the Śrauta Śūtras). The eight Dikpālakas preside over the eight (four directions and four corners) positions of the yāga sāla. Homas are performed in those designated places to the corresponding devatas, according to the rites of the respective Vedas.

There are positions designated for the yajamāni, each of the ṛtvijas, dravya and the audience. Besides there is a bali sthana, where the bali (sacrificial offering) is made.

## Classification of Agni



There are three types of Agni, grouped as "tretāgni"s.

- Gārhapatya (literally belonging to the gṛha pati or the owner of the house)

- Dakṣiṇa
- Āhavanīyā
- Gārhapatya is the origin of the other two, and all the three are worshiped regularly. Besides, Aupāsana is performed by gṛhasthas.

Agnis are also classified into two types:

- Viharaṇīyā (those that can be moved)
- Upastheya (those that are fixed/deposited at a place).

Each of these two have eight sub-categories and are positioned in different places in the premises where sacrifice is performed.

### The Viharaṇīyā Agnis are:

1. Vibhūraṣi Pravāhā, positioned near the Āgnīdhra's (one of the ṛtviks) place
2. Vahnirasi Havyavāhana, positioned near the Hota's abode
3. Śvātroṣi Praceta, at the place of Maitra Varuṇa (the place where these Devatas are invoked)
4. Tuthoṣi Viswaveda, invoked at the place of the ṛtvik designated as Brāhmaṇāccha
5. Uśi Gasi Kavi, positioned near ṛtvik designated Potru
6. Anghāri rasi jambhārī, near the ṛtvik designated Neṣṭru
7. Avasyurasi Duvasvān, near the ṛtvik called Acchāvāk
8. Śundhyūrasi Mārjālīya, near the ṛtvik called Mārjāla (the one who does mārjana or purification and consecration)

### The Upastheyas are:

1. Samrādasi Kṛuśānū, positioned at the secondary altar in the north. This is the Āhavanīyā Agni.
2. Pariśadyoṣi Pavamāna, positioned at Dhruva sthali
3. Pratakvāsi nabhasvān, positioned at the Cātvāla sthāna
4. Asamṛṣtoṣi Havyasūda, positioned at śamitra (the place of paśu)
5. Ṛtadhāmāsi Suvarjyoti, positioned at Audumbara (the ṛtvija who chants the Sāma Veda).
6. Brahmajyotirasi suvardhāma, positioned with the Brahma (chief ṛtvik) of the sacrifice
7. Ajoṣyepakāt, positioned at the sukhaśāla. This is the Gārhapatya.
8. Ahirasi budhniya, positioned with the Yajamāni.

### Types of Yajna

Yajñas can be classified in different ways. One of them is periodicity. Apart from the Panca Maha Yajñas, Aupāsana and Agnihotra are performed every day. Any other yajña is occasional – performed fortnightly, monthly, yearly or even once in a life time. Agnihotra is the homa done thrice a day. Darśa and Pūrṇamasa are done on new moon and full moon days. Parvani sraddha is done once a month.

Most of the other Yajñas can be done once a year or even in a lifetime. Another classification is the scale of the rite. The ones like Agnihotra are done in the house while the sacrifices like soma yāga or vājapeya need to be undertaken at a much bigger scale involving priests. The rites undertaken at a household level are called gṛhya rites. The ones performed at a collective level are called śrauta

rites.

### Samskāras

Samskāra is a rite that involves mantra. There are forty samskāras or rites performed in one's lifetime:

- Seven are paka Yajñas (aṣṭaka, sthālipāka, parvana, srāvaṇi, āgrahayani, caitri and āsvīyujī). They involve consecrating cooked items.
- Seven are Soma Yajñas (agnistoma, atyagnistoma, uktya, shodasi, vājapeya, atirātra and aptoryama). The yāgā that involves the extraction, utility and consumption of Soma (in the general sense nectar, but extract of a particular tree specifically) is called a Soma Yajña. Others are usually referred to as haviryāñnas.
- Seven are Havir Yajñas (agniyādhāna, agni hotra, Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa, āgrayana, cāturmāsya, niruudha paśu bandha, sautrāmaṇi). They involve offering havis.
- Five are the panca mahā Yajñās.
- Four are Vedavratas, which are done during Vedic education.
- Remaining ten are one-time samskāras that are done at different stages in life. They are garbhādhānā, pumsavana, sīmanta, jātakarma, nāmakaraṇa, annaprāsana, caula, upanayana, snātaka and vivāha. These are specified by the gṛhya sūtrās.

### The Concepts Involved Anna (Food)

Anna or food is the basis of life. Life is sustained by the consumption of life, and this is the inherent principle of nature. And sustenance of life is the highest principle. At the same time, consumption of life defeats the same principle (for other creatures). Harming any living being is against that principle. Thus there arises the need for reconciliation between the principle of consumption and the principle of sustenance. This is explained by the concept of sacrifice.

Body is called anna-maya kosha or the sheath of food. It is the upādhi, the basis for every rite, through performance of which the purpose of life is fulfilled. The rite undertaken for sustaining the upādhi, namely consumption, is one of the most sacred and important ones. However, this means that only the consumption, done with the sense of sacrifice, or with the sense of sustaining the upādhi, is considered sacred. Superfluous consumption of life, is against the principle of sustenance.

Most of the offerings in a Sacrifice are edible offerings. Havis offered in a sacrifice is the food for Devatas. In turn, they bring prosperity to man. Offering and consuming are the two sides of a sacrifice. However, each participant offers as well as consumes.

Thus while explaining violence/consumption to be inherent in nature, it is sought to be minimized by the same principle that makes it inevitable.

When eating is performed as a rite, there are two aspects in food - consecration and consumption. Consumption of life involves consuming the karma samskāra of the creature being consumed. Therefore the food is first consecrated, offered to Īśvara who is the ultimate absolver of every samskāra. Anna is called sāda. With consecration, the food becomes prasāda, a remain/fruit of sacrificial offering. In fact consumption is also done with the sense that Īśvara the essence of each being is consuming the food in the form of the oneself.

The Smritis give guidelines for the preparation consecration and consumption of food, along with what kind of food is to be taken. This depends on many factors. Some of them are

- Varṇa of the person - practicing brahmins should be vegetarians in general and consuming specific vegetables in particular. However this has exceptions.
- The kind of Dīkṣa undertaken - one should be particular about diet during specific Dīkṣās like Maṇḍala Dīkṣa or Cāturmāsya.
- The Devata being worshiped - each Devata is propitiated with a specific kind of food, cooked with specific ingredients to the like of the Devata. The same is consecrated and consumed.

## **Bali (Sacrifice)**

Bali or sacrifice is the most controversial topic in yajña, because of its implications. Broadly, there are two ways to look at it: the literal sacrifice and symbolic sacrifice. Literal sacrifice involves sacrificing an animal. In symbolic sacrifice, a piṣṭa paśu is offered. This could be kūṣmānda (ash gourd) or any other consumable. Yajñas mostly involve symbolic sacrifice (piṣṭa paśu) and seldom involve a literal sacrifice.

Bali in a sacrifice is part of the optional rites, one of the offerings involved in kāmya rites. The Bali sthana of the yāga śāla is designated for this, where there is a Yupa (pillar) positioned. Vedic injunctions regarding sacrifices, such as “saptadasa prājāpatyān paśūn ālabhet” are explicit in their message. However, such injunctions are interpreted in different ways. One of them is the symbolic interpretation of “paśu” as the one that is bound by pāśa (binding), and making sacrifice symbolic. The other is the literal interpretation, where a symbolic bali (piṣṭa paśu) is offered.

The history of yajña shows that Yajñas rarely involved animal sacrifices and that they were always a matter of inconvenience to the Vedic seers. There is a story in the Purāṇa that tells how animal sacrifice is made redundant in yajñas. The ṛṣis had an argument with the Devatas that they would offer only symbolic sacrifice and not animals. The Devatas did not like it. Ṛṣis mandated that animals will not be offered in yajña, and king Vasu conducted a sacrifice by inviting the ṛṣis as ṛtviks for the sacrifice, in which he made only symbolic sacrifices, and mandated that Devatas should not make it obligatory for yajñas to involve animal sacrifices. Appreciative of this, the ṛṣis mandated that in every sacrifice the havis after pūrṇāhuti should go to Vasu. To this day major sacrifices involve havis to Vasu starting with the mantra “Vasordhāra juhoti”.

The fact that Vasordhāra is performed, makes it clear that the sacrifice is not intended to be literal, from the ṛṣis’s perspective. Seers like Sankara have taken the path of advocating symbolic bali in temples and interpreting ritual itself in a symbolic way in case of personal worship.

## **Texts**

The samhita portion of the Veda contains the mantras used for yajña. The Brahmana portion of the Veda deals with Karma kānda. Specifically, out of the four Vedas, Yajurveda is the primary Veda concerned with yajña. It is called Yajurveda because it is composed of Yajus or the mantras used for yajña.

Kalpa Sūtrās deal with the rules, regulations and austerities of yajña, the geometry of altars, and the rites to be undertaken at each stage of life.

Pūrva Mīmāṃsa deals extensively with the philosophy of yajña, how to understand the mantra and brahmana portions, and their application in sacrifice. This is also called Karma Mīmāṃsa. The text expounding Karma Mīmāṃsa is Jaimini's Mīmāṃsa Sūtras. This is divided into 12 chapters, called lakṣaṇās. It is primarily an inquiry into the Brahmana portion of the Veda and deals with various sacrifices, their purposes and methods. The authentic commentary on Pūrva Mīmāṃsa is Śābara Bhāṣya. In turn, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Tantra Vārtika is a commentary of Śābara Bhāṣya. Jaimini also wrote a four-chapter supplement to Mīmāṃsa, called Sankarsha Kānda. It is also called Madhyama Mīmāṃsa, Madhyama Kānda, Devata Kānda and Upāsana Kānda. It deals with the purpose of mantras, the nature and essence of devatas, and the purpose of worshiping devatas.

### Yajña in the four Ashramas

In all the four ashramas, nitya and naimittika rites should be performed. However the prescribed rites are different in each ashrama.

In brahmacarya, the principal rite to be performed is svadhyaya - Vedic learning. This is apart from other rites like daily oblations to Agni and service of Guru.

In grhastha ashrama, one should perform the panca maha yajñas (or nitya karma astaka as the school may be). Along with these, his family and social responsibilities as the smṛiti prescribes, form part of his main rites in grhastha ashrama.

In vānaprastha, many of the rites of grhastha ashrama become optional and even unnecessary. Nitya and naimittika karmas should be performed. Raising children as an injunction is no longer relevant here. However pitru tarpana is still done during vānaprastha. Teaching should be done. In sanyāsa, there is no compulsion on karma, though minimal nitya karma is performed. A sanyāsi also undertakes naimittika rites such as Caturmasya (four-month austerity undertaken in a year). Even teaching is optional for him.

### Yajña in the Daily life of Gṛhastha: The Panca Maha Yajñas

A Gṛhastha is supposed to do five yajñas every day. These are called panca mahayajñas. These are offerings to Devatas, Ṛṣis, Pitris (departed fathers), creatures and men. They are called deva yajña, ṛishi yajña, pitṛ yajña, bhūta yajña and manuṣya yajña respectively.

Man has four debts, to Devatas, pitris, ṛishis and fellow-men. These are called deva ṛna, ṛṣi ṛna, pitṛ ṛna and manuṣya ṛna. By doing the above yajñas, man repays those debts and fulfills his purposes in life.

By praying to Devatas and offering oblations to them, and through sacrifices one clears his debts to Devatas. This is called deva yajña.

By gaining Vedic knowledge, by teaching, sharing and passing it on to subsequent generations one clears his debts towards the seers. This is called ṛṣi yajña.

By offering oblations to pitris, and by continuing the race by begetting progeny, raising them properly, by getting good name for the lineage, one clears his debt towards the pitris. This is called pitṛ yajña.

By showing compassion towards fellow men, by treating the guests well, by helping those in need, by excusing those by which one has been wronged, by doing actions that are beneficial to men, one clears his debts towards his fellowmen. This is called manuṣya yajña.

Bhūta yajña is showing compassion towards living beings in general. This includes abstaining from inflicting violence and killing, living as a part of nature without harming it.

### **Extension of the concept of Yajña**

Yajnic life is an ancient school, and over time, it became impractical to lead such life because of the rigorous discipline it requires. There are still people who perform regular sacrifice. But the concept of yajña has been extended in different ways, without losing its spirit.

### **Karma**

The widest application has been the karma concept in life. Many of the ideals seen today in learned men, such as being righteous, maintaining a moral code, doing actions without being particular about results, not harming anyone unnecessarily, being content and not greedy, fulfilling desires in a righteous way, keeping righteousness above desires, and doing every action as a sacrifice, follow directly from yajnic principles. Leading a life with these ideals is treated as equal to living a yajnic life, and causing liberation through karma nivṛtti. The karma yoga that many of the men live (though they are not into the path of worship) is a reflection of the yajnic ideal in their lives.

The yajnic ideal thus has wide impact, and positively influences a moral social order. Smārta which developed after Śrauta, has also based its ideal on the same ideal of dharma.

### **Symbolic Yajña**

The other extension of the concept of yajña is found in its yogic interpretation, as being performed in the subtle body. Śrī Sūkta of Rig Veda khila portion is used in sacrifices and also in Sri Vidya. Saubhagya Lakshmi Upanishad explains the yogic import of Śrī Sūkta. Yāga becomes antaryāga (the inner sacrifice) – performing homa in the svādhiṣṭhāna agni.

In Mantra Vidyas mantra sadhana is likened to yajña. In fact this is supported explicitly by smṛiti, for instance Manusmṛiti says that a dvija becomes dvija by mantra japa alone, even if he cannot perform the panca maha yajñas. Smārta, the religion of smṛiti, follows the Smārta Sūtras (Dharma Sūtras and Gṛhya Sūtras), part Vedanga Kalpa. Smārta and Śrauta are so closely associated that they are usually referred to as the combination Smārta-Śrauta. Smārta prescribes japa, homa, tarpana and sandhyavandana as part of nitya karma, the eight daily rituals to be performed. These are from Brahmana as well as Aranyaka portion. For instance the Sandhya Vandana prakarana itself is found in Taittirīya Aranyaka (Maha Narayana Upanishad). Dharma Sūtrās add one more category to the three classical kinds of karma (nitya, naimittika and kāmya) – the prāyaścitta or expiation rites.

Thus in the general sense mantra japa, kundalini yoga etc are sacrifices, but the sacrificial approach to the same aim differs from the yogic approach. For instance, mantra japa itself is the sacrifice to be done, and devata is a result of the sacrifice. In yogic terms this is described differently: mantra is the means to achieving yoga with the devata.

Temple, the institution that made religion reachable to common man, is a replica of yajña śāla (the place where yajña is conducted) – in its major components as well as concept. The rites of a temple as prescribed by Āgamās are four-fold, (nitya, naimittika, kāmya and prāyaścitta) the same as that in Śrauta/Smārta.

## **Jnāna and Karma Approaches**

Jnāna Mārga is expounded in Vedānta and thus, Vedānta treats yajña/karma to be a means of purification, a preparation for acquiring jnāna. Beyond that, in jnāna mārga, spiritual knowledge is the means of liberation, and not worship. The different categories of yajña, such as vedic ritual, the subtle body yogas such as mantra yoga and kundalini yoga are acknowledged in jnāna mārga as means to attain the necessary state for pursuing the path of knowledge.

This is in contrast with all the karmic and yogic paths, where performing each of those rites at their highest level is the means for liberation. For instance, in karma yoga, karma nivṛtti begets liberation. In mantra yoga realizing para vak is the final realization. In laya yoga dissolving the individual consciousness in the cosmic consciousness is liberation. In kundalini yoga the gross and the subtle unite with the causal being through the movement of kundalini. All these involve different upādhis of the subtle body – mind, prāna and nādis.

Detachment and consecration, the two approaches of jnāna and karma respectively, reflect in the rituals prescribed in these paths. For instance, while anger is sought to be overcome in the former, it is praised as a divine inspiration in the latter.

Jnāna mārga involves nididhyasana, which is the intellectual's approach – the path of discrimination. Through contemplation (on the import of mahavakyas) one learns to discriminate between ātma and non-ātma (ātma-anātma vivecana). And realizing one's identity as ātma, as different from anātma, is liberation – because ātma is always liberated. Jīva is bound because he does not identify himself as ātma but identifies himself with various upādhis. Jnāna mārga is about discriminating these upādhis from self.

Adi Sankara reconciles karma with jnāna approach by categorizing karma as the preparatory stage for acquiring jnāna. In jnāna mārga, liberation is possible only through jnāna. In fact the self is always liberated, and the state of liberation for a being is the knowledge of difference between self and non-self (ātma-anātma vivecana). Karma purifies and prepares the being for the state of knowledge/discrimination.

As the means to acquire the necessary purity and wisdom for pursuing this path, jnāna mārga acknowledges the performance of nitya karma. Beyond that, worship or ritual has no greater importance in jnāna mārga. Thus most of the yajnic procedures are redundant from the viewpoint of jnāna mārga.

However this only differentiates between the Karma and Jnāna approaches, and does not necessarily make one of them superior. Vedantic approach is prescribed for a person who is technically out of the social fold, whose righteousness does not depend much on fulfillment of responsibilities. Fulfilling one's responsibilities is the primary criterion for detachment, and without that one is not deemed fit for the path of knowledge. In the path of karma, such fulfillment with

dissociation brings about the necessary change for salvation.

## The concept of Rna

- *Rna* means debts, or duties or obligations that we have to perform or repay.
- According to the Vedic and the Upanishadic world-view, each man is bound by some duties and obligation in life.
- These duties are not just the mere boundations but real modes of social freedom.
- It has been said that, man is said to owe some debts or man is said to perform his duties towards Gods, men and animals.
- As per our Vedic traditions, no man is to touch his meals without offering parts of it first to his Gods, fathers, other men and animals.
- This is primarily done to inculcate the virtue of charity and unselfishness amongst people and to practice harmony within the world.
- These duties are distinguished into five levels, they are;
  - Man is said to owe debts to the Gods. It is mentioned in Taitariya Upanishad.
  - Man is said to owe debts to the Seers or Rishis.
  - Man is said to owe debts to Manes or Ancestors
  - Man is said to owe debts to other Men. It is mentioned in text, Sthathapratha Brahman.
  - Man is said to owe debts to those belonging to lower creations, for instance, animals. It is mentioned in Sthathapratha Brahman.
- In short, according to the Vedic and the Upanishadic world-view, life is a round of fulfilling duties and obligations.
- Hence, a man who discharges these owes and fulfils one's duties and obligations are called a virtuous man.

## The Five Debts or the Panca-Rna




Image of the Five Debts or the Panca-Rna

## **The first-three Rnas are of utmost importance.**

**Deva Rna:** or debt towards Gods, it can be repaid by performing sacrifices or yajnas to God. It belongs to both, Grihastha and Vanaprastha Ashrams.

**Rishi Rna:** or debt towards Seers, it can be repaid by studying the Vedas and practising Brahmacharya. It belongs to Brahmacharya Ashrama.

**Pitr Rna:** or debt towards Ancestors, it can be repaid by taking care of the family and carrying on the family lineage. It belongs to Grihastha Ashrama.

**Manushya Rna:** or debt towards other Men, it can be repaid by helping other men in need, for instance, by offering food, financial assistance, etc.

**Rna towards Lower Creation:** For example, debt towards Animals, it can be repaid by taking care of them, feeding them food, etc.

**According to Manu-smriti,** "a man can aspire to achieve moksha or liberation only when he has repaid the three Rnas."

## **The Concept of Duty**

### **Duty-based or Deontological ethics**

Deontological (duty-based) ethics are concerned with what people do, not with the consequences of their actions.

- Do the right thing.
- Do it because it's the right thing to do.
- Don't do wrong things.
- Avoid them because they are wrong.

Under this form of ethics you can't justify an action by showing that it produced good consequences, which is why it's sometimes called 'non-Consequentialist'. The word 'deontological' comes from the Greek word deon, which means 'duty'.

Duty-based ethics are usually what people are talking about when they refer to 'the principle of the thing'.

Duty-based ethics teaches that some acts are right or wrong because of the sorts of things they are, and people have a duty to act accordingly, regardless of the good or bad consequences that may be produced.

Some kinds of action are wrong or right in themselves, regardless of the consequences. Deontologists live in a universe of moral rules, such as:

- It is wrong to kill innocent people
- It is wrong to steal
- It is wrong to tell lies
- It is right to keep promises

Someone who follows Duty-based ethics should do the right thing, even if that produces more harm (or less good) than doing the wrong thing: People have a duty to do the right thing, even if it produces a bad result. So, for example, the philosopher Kant thought that it would be wrong to tell a lie in order to save a friend from a murderer.

If we compare Deontologists with Consequentialists we can see that Consequentialists begin by considering what things are good, and identify 'right' actions as the ones that produce the maximum of those good things.

Deontologists appear to do it the other way around; they first consider what actions are 'right' and proceed from there. (Actually this is what they do in practice, but it isn't really the starting point of deontological thinking.)

So a person is doing something good if they are doing a morally right action.

## **Good and bad points**

### **Good points of duty-based ethics**

- emphasises the value of every human being
- Duty-based ethical systems tend to focus on giving equal respect to all human beings.
- This provides a basis for human rights - it forces due regard to be given to the interests of a single person even when those are at odds with the interests of a larger group.
- says some acts are always wrong
- Kantian duty-based ethics says that some things should never be done, no matter what good consequences they produce. This seems to reflect the way some human beings think.
- Rossian duty-based ethics modified this to allow various duties to be balanced, which, it could be argued, is an even better fit to the way we think.
- provides 'certainty'
- Consequentialist ethical theories bring a degree of uncertainty to ethical decision-making, in that no-one can be certain about what consequences will result from a particular action, because the future is unpredictable.
- Duty-based ethics don't suffer from this problem because they are concerned with the action itself - if an action is a right action, then a person should do it, if it's a wrong action they shouldn't do it - and providing there is a clear set of moral rules to follow then a person faced with a moral choice should be able to take decisions with reasonable certainty.
- Of course things aren't that clear cut. Sometimes consequentialist theories can provide a fair degree of certainty, if the consequences are easily predictable.
- Furthermore, rule-based consequentialism provides people with a set of rules that enable them to take moral decisions based on the sort of act they are contemplating.
- deals with intentions and motives
- Consequentialist theories don't pay direct attention to whether an act is carried out with good or bad intentions; most people think these are highly relevant to moral judgements.
- Duty-based ethics can include intention in at least 2 ways...
- If a person didn't intend to do a particular wrong act - it was an accident perhaps - then from a deontological point of view we might think that they hadn't done anything deserving of

criticism. This seems to fit with ordinary thinking about ethical issues.

- Ethical rules can be framed narrowly so as to include intention.

### **Bad points of duty-based ethics**

- absolutist
- Duty-based ethics sets absolute rules. The only way of dealing with cases that don't seem to fit is to build a list of exceptions to the rule.
- allows acts that make the world a less good place
- Because duty-based ethics is not interested in the results it can lead to courses of action that produce a reduction in the overall happiness of the world.
- Most people would find this didn't fit with their overall idea of ethics: ...it is hard to believe that it could ever be a duty deliberately to produce less good when we could produce more...

### **A C Ewing, The Definition of Good, 1947**

- hard to reconcile conflicting duties
- Duty-based ethics doesn't deal well with the cases where duties are in conflict.

### **Kantian duty-based ethics**

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was arguably one of the greatest philosophers of all time. Kant thought that it was possible to develop a consistent moral system by using reason. If people were to think about this seriously and in a philosophically rigorous manner, Kant taught, they would realise that there were some moral laws that all rational beings had to obey simply because they were rational beings, and this would apply to any rational beings in any universe that might ever exist: The supreme principle of morality would have an extremely wide scope: one that extended not only to all rational human beings but to any other rational beings who might exist - for example, God, angels, and intelligent extraterrestrials.

### **Samuel J. Kerstein, Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality, 2002**

Kant taught (rather optimistically) that every rational human being could work this out for themselves and so did not need to depend on God or their community or anything else to discover what was right and what was wrong. Nor did they need to look at the consequences of an act, or who was doing the action.

Although he expressed himself in a philosophical and quite difficult way, Kant believed that he was putting forward something that would help people deal with the moral dilemmas of everyday life, and provide all of us with a useful guide to acting rightly.

### **What is good?**

Although Kantian ethics are usually spoken of in terms of duty and doing the right thing, Kant himself thought that what was good was an essential part of ethics. Kant asked if there was anything that everybody could rationally agree was always good. The only thing that he thought satisfied this test was a good will: It is impossible to conceive anything in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without limitation, save only a good will.

## **Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals**

All Kant means is that a good will alone must be good in whatever context it maybe found. It is not good in one context and bad in another. It is not good as a means to one end and bad as a means to another. It is not good if somebody happens to want it and bad if he doesn't. Its goodness is not conditioned by its relation to a context or to an end or to a desire.

## **H J Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 1948**

Other things that we might think of as good are not always good, as it's possible to imagine a context in which they might seem to be morally undesirable. Kant then pondered what this meant for human conduct. He concluded that only an action done for 'a good will' was a right action, regardless of the consequences.

But what sort of action would this be? Kant taught that an action could only count as the action of a good will if it satisfied the test of the Categorical Imperative.

## **Kant's Categorical Imperative**

Kant's version of duty-based ethics was based on something that he called 'the categorical imperative' which he intended to be the basis of all other rules (a 'categorical imperative' is a rule that is true in all circumstances.)

The categorical imperative comes in two versions which each emphasise different aspects of the categorical imperative. Kant is clear that each of these versions is merely a different way of expressing the same rule; they are not different rules.

## **Moral rules must be universalisable**

The first one emphasises the need for moral rules to be universalisable. Always act in such a way that you can also will that the maxim of your action should become a universal law. To put this more simply: Always act in such a way that you would be willing for it to become a general law that everyone else should do the same in the same situation.

This means at least two things:

- if you aren't willing for the ethical rule you claim to be following to be applied equally to everyone - including you - then that rule is not a valid moral rule. I can't claim that something is a valid moral rule and make an exception to it for myself and my family and friends. So, for example, if I wonder whether I should break a promise, I can test whether this is right by asking myself whether I would want there to be a universal rule that says 'it's OK to break promises'.

Since I don't want there to be a rule that lets people break promises they make to me, I can conclude that it would be wrong for me to break the promise I have made.

- if the ethical rule you claim to be following cannot logically be made a universal rule, then it is not a valid moral rule.

So, for example, if I were thinking philosophically I might realise that a universal rule that 'it's OK to break promises in order to get one's own way', would mean that no-one would ever believe another person's promise and so all promises would lose their value. Since the existence of

promises in society requires the acceptance of their value, the practice of promising would effectively cease to exist. It would no longer be possible to 'break' a promise, let alone get one's own way by doing so.

### **Moral rules must respect human beings**

Kant thought that all human beings should be treated as free and equal members of a shared moral community, and the second version of the categorical imperative reflects this by emphasizing the importance of treating people properly. It also acknowledges the relevance of intention in morality. Act so that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in that of another, always as an end and never merely as a means....man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end...

### **Immanuel Kant, The Categorical Imperative**

Kant is saying that people should always be treated as valuable - as an end in themselves - and should not just be used in order to achieve something else. They should not be tricked, manipulated or bullied into doing things.

This resonates strongly with disapproving comments such as "he's just using her", and it underpins the idea that "the end can never justify the means".

Here are three examples of treating people as means and not ends:

- treating a person as if they were an inanimate object
- coercing a person to get what you want
- deceiving a person to get what you want

Kant doesn't want to say that people can't be used at all; it may be fine to use a person as long as they are also being treated as an end in themselves.

### **The importance of duty**

Do the right thing for the right reason, because it is the right thing to do. Kant thought that the only good reason for doing the right thing was because of duty - if you had some other reason (perhaps you didn't commit murder because you were too scared, not because it was your duty not to) then that you would not have acted in a morally good way.

But having another reason as well as duty doesn't stop an action from being right, so long as duty was the 'operational reason' for our action.

If we do something because we know it's our duty, and if duty is the key element in our decision to act, then we have acted rightly, even if we wanted to do the act or were too scared not to do it, or whatever.

### **Rossian duty-based ethics**

Kantian ethics seems pretty uncompromising and not really suited to the untidiness of many moral choices that people have to make.

The 20th Century philosopher W. D. Ross [Sir David Ross] (1877-1971) suggested that it would be helpful to look at two kinds of duty:

- Prima facie duties
- Actual duties

### **Prima facie duties**

- are self-evident and obvious duties (prima facie is a Latin expression meaning 'on first appearances' or 'by first instance') can be known to be correct if a person thinks about them and understands them:
- when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself

### **W D Ross, The Right and the Good, 1930**

- should be promoted, "all things considered"
- can be outweighed by other prima facie duties.

### **Actual duties**

This is the duty people are left with after they have weighed up all the conflicting prima facie duties that apply in a particular case: the ground of the actual rightness of the act is that, of all acts possible in the circumstances, it is that whose prima facie rightness in the respects in which it is prima facie right most outweighs its prima facie wrongness in any respects in which it is prima facie wrong.

### **W D Ross, The Right and The Good, 1930**

Ross listed seven prima facie duties:

- Fidelity
- Reparation
- Gratitude
- Justice
- Beneficence
- Self-improvement
- Non-maleficence (avoiding actions that do harm)

Calling these 'duties' may be a bit misleading, as they are not so much duties as "features that give us genuine (not merely apparent) moral reason to do certain actions".

Ross later described prima facie duties as "responsibilities to ourselves and to others" and he went on to say that "what we should do (our duty proper [our actual duty]) is determined by the balance of these responsibilities."

## **Problems with the Rossian approach**

Ross's idea still leaves some problems:

- How can we tell which prima facie duties are involved in a particular case?
- How can we compare and rank them in order to arrive at a balance which will guide us as to our actual duty?

Ross thought that people could solve those problems by relying on their intuitions.

## **Karma Yoga**

Karma yoga is one of the four classical schools of yoga alongside Jnana (knowledge or self-study), Bhakti (devotion) and Raja (meditation), each offering a path to moksha (spiritual liberation) and self-realization.

Derived from the Sanskrit term for "action", karma is understood by both Hindu and Buddhist traditions to be the sum of a person's deeds in past, present and future states of existence. In yoga, karma is known as the path of action, or selfless service towards others.

Karma yoga is considered to be one of the most practical and effective means of spiritual development.

## **Explanation Karma Yoga**

Karma yoga was first outlined in the Bhagavad Gita, the 700-verse Hindu scripture estimated to date back to somewhere between the 5th and 2nd centuries B.C.E. The Bhagavad Gita offers several approaches to liberation from suffering, self-realization and connection with the Divine, of which Karma yoga is arguably the most practical.

The text highlights the importance of selfless action, in which service is offered from the heart, with full attention and awareness. Attachment to the outcome of one's actions is said to bring suffering, particularly when something is expected in return. In order to truly practice Karma yoga, the practitioner must act with no expectations and serve others without thinking of the results. As such, Karma yoga diminishes the ego and helps to dissolve any sense of separation between self and other. Acting in this way is believed to purify the mind, and it is considered the most virtuous approach to service.

Although volunteering one's time and effort is a common example of Karma yoga, the concept teaches that all actions, even the most mundane, can become part of one's spiritual path. It is considered the attitude to the action, rather than the action itself, which makes something Karma yoga.

As such, the essence of the practice is to act with the right motives, in the right way, to the best of one's ability whilst surrendering attachment to the outcome.

To Karma yogis, selfless action is a form of prayer and connection with the Divine. Some teachings even suggest mantra chanting whilst engaging in Karma yoga, in order to purify the mind and develop a selfless mindset.

Practicing Karma yoga also involves fully accepting one's dharma (duty in life) in order to let go of selfish desires.

## **Svadharmā**

**Svadharmā** (Skt., sva, 'own', + dharma, 'duty, right'). In Hinduism, one's own right, duty, or nature; one's own role in the social and cosmic order. Svadharmā is relative to one's caste and stage of life (cf. varṇāśramadharmā), and to one's situation (cf. āpaddharmā). Svadharmā or relative dharma often conflicts with sādharma, universal dharma, or sanātana dharma, absolute or eternal dharma. For example, to kill is a violation of eternal dharma, yet a warrior's svadharmā (own duty, nature) is to kill.

## **Explanation Svadharmā**

Dharma embraces every type of righteous conduct covering every aspect of life essential for the sustenance and welfare of the individual and society and includes those rules which guide and enable those who believe in the Divine. At the pragmatic level it transforms into right action. Then the question that arises is 'what is right action?' Indian philosophical frameworks give a series of direction for the same as well.

Right action is one that is governed by one's svadharmā, kuladharmā, āśrama dharma, varṇa dharma and rāshtriya dharma. Thus there is a series of dharma in hierarchical order starting from the individual level to the national level. It also goes beyond that to the global level pertaining to the cosmic period to which we belong, called the yuga dharma.

- Svadharmā is the action determined by one's nature, spiritual temperament and essential character. It is the natural instinct in all of us that stimulates us to act at a subconscious level, without thinking. One's nature is in turn determined by one's physical, pranic and mental constitutions, namely triguṇas (sattva, rajas, tamas) and body constituency (vata, pitta, kapha). More on svadharmā a little later.
- Kula dharma is political, social, and community-related activities, which are based upon unselfishness, satya (Truth), ahimsā (non-violence), and moral and ethical values.
- Āśrama dharma is determined by the stage in life we belong to. The four āśramas laid out in the Vedas are brahmacharya, gṛhastha, vanaprastha and sannyasa. Each stage in life has its own set of norms and values to uphold in order to sustain one's own identity and the family and society at large. Widely these are considered as four stages of life, while a differing perspective is that these are four options that are open for one to choose to live through his life. Thus one can choose to live as a brahmachari all through his life while one might take the path of sannyasa quite early in life like Sankara. These choices are again guided by one's svadharmā.
- Varṇa dharma pertains to the personality type to which one belongs. Even though the Vanashrama has been highly distorted and grossly abused in form of the caste system, in its original form it was an efficient social system that prescribed professions to individuals based on their qualities and natural temperaments and traits. Each varṇa (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra) has its own nature (dharma). Knowing it to suit one's career is the ancient form of 'personality-job fit'. The story of Satyakama Jabala in the Upanishads stand testimony to this, where Satyakama who was born to Jabala, a woman who did not know who his father was, was initiated into brahmanhood by a rishi because he stood for truth, which was the quality of a brahmin.

- Rashtriya dharma governs the conduct of each one of us as a responsible citizen of our nation.
- Yuga dharma that which sustains the universe at each yuga. There is a vedic analogy of dharma as a cow with four legs, where each leg is an aspect of kala - a yuga. In the first phase, satya yuga, the cow (dharma) was hale and healthy with all its four legs intact. When time transited into the second phase, dvapara yuga, it limped with three legs, denoting slow degenerating of values (dharma). In its third phase, treya yuga, it almost became immobile with just two legs. In its current phase, kali yuga, it is crippled and close to collapse with just one leg left. Prophetically, Bhishma says in the Mahabharata that in the kali yuga 'dharma will become adharma and adharma dharma'. Subsequently Krishna says in the Gita that whenever such an erosion of dharma happens through the ages he will come again and again to reinstate the rightful place of dharma.
- Following one's dharma helps us align our body, mind and self with nature and eventually the divine. By establishing a hierarchy of dharmas it is ensured that no one acts arbitrarily at their own whims but act responsibly considering various factors into account.

## **lokasamgraha**

Western models and constructs have dominated research in leadership. Cross-cultural research in leadership has questioned the validity of western models, but because of its focus on ethics or universals, it has not provided much insight to managers in non-western cultures. We need to develop indigenous models of leadership that can provide insights to guide people's daily behavior in work and social settings. To fill this lacuna, a small step is taken, and an Indian model of leadership is presented. The construct of lokasamgraha is derived from the bhagavadgita, and its relevance for leadership is examined. The construct of lokasamgraha is further analyzed in the context of Indian concept of self, stages of life (varNAzrama dharma), and the four objectives of life (puruSArthas).

This approach results in a rich cultural model of leadership. The construct of lokasamgraha proposes that not only leaders but also their followers should act so that all their actions are for the greater public good. In other words, leadership is about serving others. All actions, thus, are to be performed without hankering after the outcomes or fruits of one's efforts, which is the doctrine of niSkAma karma proposed in the bhagavadgita. The model is grounded in the idea that willy-nilly we are all on a spiritual journey. Implications of this model for global psychology and future research are discussed.

## **Apurva**

Apurva literally means 'not existing previously'. The word 'apurva' is a technical term employed by the Purva-mīmāṃsā system of philosophy which advocates the performance of all the prescribed Vedic rituals as the only means of obtaining the summum-bonum of life.

Vedic sacrifices are said to produce results such as attaining heaven. The doubt that naturally arises is :

- How can an act performed here and now produce a result much later and somewhere else?
- Does it not violate the law of cause and effect?

This objection is answered by the Purvamimāṃsā system by formulating the theory of śakti (potential energy). Just as a seed possesses in it the imperceptible power with the help of which it

can produce the sprout, so does the soul possess the power to manifest the results of Vedic rituals. These rituals, as soon as completed, generate in the soul that śakti or power. Since this power did not exist previously (a-purva = not existing previously) but is generated as a result of the rites, it is termed as 'apurva.' This apurva gets exhausted after producing its results.

## **Explanation Apurva**

The term Mīmāṃsā in the title stands for Pūrvamīmāṃsā (PM). PM is the biggest of the six orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy (IP) which may be renamed as Indian Hermeneutics in modern idioms. It is so because the system concerned itself with the interpretation of the Veda and evolved principles of sentence- interpretation for this purpose. Jaimini, for the first time, systematized these principles by composing the Mīmāṃsāsūtras. In other words, the Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini (JS) are nothing but rules and principles of interpreting the Veda. These were evolved out of the need to interpret the whole Veda meaningfully. This arose because of the questions and objections of the heterodox systems regarding the authenticity and authority of the Veda. Actually the Veda was the basis of the ritual culture, prevalent in the then society. According to the view of the heterodox systems, the Veda contained many meaningless sentences, many non-understandable, ambiguous, ridiculous and also contradictory sentences.

Such a text, in their opinion, could not be the basis of a culture. This was the main point of the opponents. To answer these questions and to establish the authority of the Veda beyond all possible doubt, it was necessary to interpret the whole Veda and to show that it contained no redundant sentences. It was a challenging task which Jaimini took up and achieved the goal of the system by composing twelve chapters of Mīmāṃsādarśana. He started with some presuppositions. They were:

1. The Veda is eternal. It is not a creation of any human being i.e. it is self-valid or autonomous.
2. It is also not created by God. No God is required to be postulated for this purpose.
3. Action (i.e. ritual) is the meaning of the Veda. This means the Veda is meant for inducing a human being into an activity which leads to his good.
4. The action, in other words, is the duty (Dharma) of human beings, which can be understood only from the Veda.

Along with these basic assumptions many criteria were evolved to establish that there was no lacuna in the Vedic texts and as such the Veda must be accepted by the society as the source and basis of the ritual culture. In the light of the first presupposition that the Veda is autonomous, the PM system held that the Veda had to be interpreted on the basis of itself. As far as possible, for this purpose, no help of any source should be taken which is external to the Veda. As such many questions were answered taking recourse to the Veda itself. Vedic sentences were classified into five categories: vidhi (injunction), mantra (incantation), nāmadheya (name of a rite), niṣedha (negative injunction) and arthavāda (narratives).

In the light of the third presupposition above that action is the meaning of the Veda, injunctive sentences which prescribed different acts to be taken up or which refrained the human being from taking up a particular act were treated as the most important sentences among the five types. It was accepted that the injunctive sentences primarily prescribe an act as a means of obtaining desired result or refrain a human being from an act which may lead to some undesired result. Here one important logical difficulty was to explain the cause and effect relationship between the ritual

and the result it was supposed to yield. To solve this difficulty, PM evolved the concept and theory of Apūrva.

First understand the exact difficulty in accepting the cause and effect relationship between the yāga and its result and then look into the point how the concept of Apūrva could overcome this difficulty. The yāga was defined as 'offering an oblation in the fire with reference to some deity'. Offering is an act. For accomplishing the main act of offering there were many preparatory and subsidiary acts which formed the part and parcel of the yāga in the sense that they contributed towards the main offering. Thus, yāga was a collection of many small acts along with the main act. An act is a momentary phenomenon so, yāga also being an act is momentary. It vanishes in the thin air as soon as it is performed. The result of the yāga, such as heaven would occur quite late after the performance, when it does not exist anymore. To produce the effect it is required that the cause should be present before the effect and also at the time when it is produced. In other words, both cause and effect should be collocated. To show the collocation of the cause and the effect in the present case, there are two options: either it should be said that the yāga continues to exist until the effect of the yāga is produced or it should be accepted that even if yāga is destroyed it produces its effect.

However, both these options are not acceptable as none of them stands logical. As the yāga is an act it cannot continue to exist until the effect is produced because an act is momentary and it also is not logical to say that the destroyed and hence absent yāga produces its effect later because it is not possible for the dead parents to produce a son. Thus, both the options are rejected because they do not stand logically consistent. Here, Pārthasārathī Mishra brings in the concept of Apūrva. The argument is: the yāga, no doubt, gets destroyed when performed but it produces something before getting destroyed. This something is given the name Apūrva.

Apūrva means that which was not there before the performance of yāga. So this is the logic behind accepting the concept of Apūrva. Pārthasārathī Mishra puts in a single verse: *Vinaṣṭasyasatastavāt na kāryārambhasambhavafi; Kṣaṇikatvena siddhasya navasthānām ca yuktimat. Atafi Apūrvam eva kalpayitavyam.*

### **What is Apūrva?**

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa answers this question as follows: *Karmabhyafi prāg ayogyasya karmaṇafi puruṣasya vā Yogyatā śāstrāgamya ya para sa'pūrvamiṣyate.* This means: the potential which was absent before the performance of the act and which is produced after the performance that (potency or potential) is known as Apūrva. (vide *Tantravārtika* (TV) of Kumārila, on the *Bhāṣya* of Sābara (SBh), on the JS II.1.5). Kumārila explains: Before the ritual is performed it cannot be the means of (obtaining) heaven and the performer also is not in a position (is not compatible) to obtain the result like svarga. So one has to accept that performance of a ritual generates some potential. Because if there is no such potency then it will mean the performance and the non-performance of the rite are the same.

Therefore, the potential in the performer as well as in the performance is named as Apūrva in this (i.e. PM) system. (TV on SBh on JS II.1.5.) The next question is: What is the means of knowing Apūrva? Kumārila answers: There is only one means of knowing it and that is śrutarthāpatti. Arthāpatti means implication or presumption. Kumārila explains, perception etc. cannot be the means of knowing Apūrva. It has to be known by implication. He says: *śrutarthāpattirevaika*

pramāṇam tasya veśyate.

(Ibid) To elaborate, the Vedic sentence which enjoins that a sacrifice leads to heaven and the subsidiaries (of the sacrifice) help the main sacrifice, must also accept (by default) that the acts have the potency of generating the effect only because those acts which have no potency, cannot produce the effect. Further, an act is momentary and also not perceptible. Hence it can never be simultaneous with the effect it produces. Kumārila argues, this is true with reference to a single act, what to talk of the rites like darśapurṇamāsa which consist of many acts and are also separated by time. (Darśa and Purṇamāsa are performed on new-moon-day and fullmoon-day respectively.

Thus, they are separated from each other by a fortnight. They consist of three main rites each.) So if it is accepted that without generating any potency in the performer, the rites simply vanish then the person will be the same before and after the performance. But if the Apūrva is accepted to come into being after each and every performance then the performer will become capable of enjoying the result of his action. Another advantage would be, even if the acts do not exist one can explain the simultaneity of the subsidiary acts on one hand and that of the main act and the result on the other. Thus, by now two points are clear that Apūrva is a potency produced by the act taken up by the performer and it is to be known by implication.

### **Where is Apūrva produced and where does it reside?**

Kumārila's answer to this is: Ātmaiva cāśrayas tasya kriyāpyatraiva ca sthitā (ibid). The Apūrva is produced and resides in the self (ātman) because kriya, the act also resides there. It is the self who resolves to perform the act and through this resolution he alone is accepted to be the agent of all acts and hence when they get vanished, they do so after generating the potency of enjoying the results like heaven etc. in the (ātman of the) performer. Here a question may be asked how come the act gets vanished but its potency remains even after? The answer that Kumārila gives is: had the potency inhered in the act itself then certainly it would have vanished along with the act but if it is accepted that the potency resides in the performer, there is no question of its getting destroyed. Then further there may arise the question: how is it that the potency of one (that of the act) resides in another (in the performer)?

Kumārila says, the performer and the act are not absolutely different from each other. Moreover, the potency, or the śakti i.e. Apūrva is inferred on the basis of its effect and it has to be accepted to reside in the substratum where it will be utilized to bring about the effect. Such a substratum could be the same or different, it does not matter. The only point is, it should be a substratum which is capable of bringing about the result. This is why Apūrva is accepted to reside in the ātman. This will explain how the result is collocated with the cause.

### **How many Apūrvas are to be postulated?**

Kumārila's straight forward answer is: At first one Apūrva is accepted on the basis of presumption. To explain, without Apūrva it is not possible to explain why the injunctions like, darśapurṇamāsaḥ svargakāmo yajeta explicitly state that the yāga is instrumental in bringing about heaven. Thereafter, to explain this very fact that the yāga is the cause and svarga the effect through Apūrva; one may accept more Apūrvas.

To quote Kumārila: Arthāpatter ihapūrvam Pūrvam ekam pratīyate. Tatastāt siddhaye bhūyafi syādapūrvāntara-kalpanā. (Ibid) The purport of this statement is: As the main yāga generates the

final result, only one (main) Apūrva is accepted at first. But as the main yāga consists of many subsidiaries, it is necessary to accept more Apūrvas to explain how the main Apūrva is produced through the subsidiaries. In other words, for contributing to the main yāga and also to the main Apūrva all the subsidiary rites must have sahitya i.e. togetherness and also there has to be simultaneity or togetherness between the subsidiaries and the main rite for which it is necessary to postulate more Apūrvas. Thus there will be many Apūrvas.

Nevertheless, there are grounds to postulate them. Kumārila asserts, Pramāṇavadyadr̥ṣṭāni kalpyante subahunyapi; Adr̥ṣṭasatabhāgo'pi na kalpyo hy apramāṇakafi. (Ibid) What Kumārila means is this: one may postulate many or good many Apūrvas if there is a reason to accept them. But without a ground one should never accept even one hundredth of Adr̥ṣṭa. Here he has used the term Adr̥ṣṭa. Adr̥ṣṭa is another name for Apūrva. We shall come to this point later.

What one gathers from the statement of Kumārila is the fact that basically one Apūrva is accepted to explain the cause and effect relationship between the ritual and its result but when it comes to look into the fact about how that one Apūrva is produced, it becomes necessary to postulate more Apūrvas.

To explain: Apūrva is the intermediate causal link between the performance of the ritual and its result. It is known from an injunctive sentence of the Veda, such as darśapurṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta that the performance of the rite is the instrument and heaven is the effect, we have already seen. Apūrva is accepted to be the link between the two to explain their relationship. True. But, a ritual, again, consists of many subordinate acts. A ritual is a conglomeration of many acts. If it is so, then the same question persists regarding all these acts. The fact that each and every act is momentary does not change.

Hence, just as there is a need of a link between the main performance and the result, so also there is a need of a link between any two acts being performed. This becomes clear by the example that we have seen above. The two rituals, darśa and purṇamāsa consist of three rites each and are performed on new-moon and full-moon-days respectively. The point is, the dual number in darśapurṇamāsābhyām says that these are two rituals. The performance of these two leads to heaven. Here also the question of togetherness of these two rituals arises and also there arises a question of togetherness of all subsidiaries which are required to be performed to complete these two rituals as well as even to complete one single act.

Accordingly, one has to postulate more Apūrvas to solve the question of togetherness of all acts. This is the intention of Kumārila. This is how one finds in the later texts of PM different types of Apūrva explained elaborately. To continue with the example of darśapurṇamāsa, it is accepted that each of the subsidiaries generates one Apūrva (angapūrva) all the Apūrvas produced by the subsidiaries contribute to produce utpattyapūrva, utpattyapūrvas, again, contribute to produce two samudāyapūrvas, which, in turn, contribute towards generating the pradhānapūrva. This main potency would reside in the performer until the result is produced. This pradhānapūrva is also called paramapūrva or caramapūrva or phalapūrva because, it is the main and final Apūrva which would produce the phala when it is due to the sacrificer. So we have seen some main types of Apūrva here. Thus, the PM theory of Apūrva has filled in the apparent gap between the cause and its effect. In the absence of this theory it would not have been possible to accept the cause and effect relation between the ritual performance and the future effect on one hand and it would have been impossible to establish the authority of the injunctive sentences of the Veda on the other.

Injunctions of the Veda, both positive and negative, are the most important parts of the Veda which guide a human being to take up right acts and to avoid the wrong ones respectively.

How is this theory connected with the Karma theory? Let us look into the significance of the Mīmāṃsā theory of Apūrva in the context of the karma theory of IP. The origin of the karma theory is the Veda. In the Śatapatha Brahmaṇa (IV.4.1.2) it is mentioned that everyone is born in this world fashioned by himself. The Kaṭhōpaniṣad says, one enters the womb of a mother and attains a bodily form, another goes to a plant, each of these as per his or her own deeds and knowledge (Kaṭha Upa V.7).

### **The Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad asserts:**

Just as one acts and behaves, so will he be born. He becomes holy by holy deeds and he becomes evil by evil deeds. (Sādhukāri sādhu bhavati, pāpakāri pāpo bhavati. Puṇyafi puṇyena karmaṇa, pāpafi pāpakena. Bṛh Upa- IV.4.5). From these and such references it is clear that a good act leads to a good result and a bad one to an evil one. The acts are primarily divided into Worldly and Vedic. The above theory is true in both the divisions of acts. In other words, any type of act, when it does not produce its verifiable result immediately, does produce some potency which remains with the agent and yields its fruit at the proper time, only because the act itself, being an act, is momentary and perishes immediately after it is performed.

The question here is: do we call the potency produced by the worldly acts like studies or drinking ghee or agriculture by the name Apūrva? Or is there any other name for it?

Etymologically, it is possible to call any such potency by the name Apūrva but Kumārila does not accept it to be so. In his opinion, in case of worldly acts also one has to accept that they produce some śakti, some potency because only on that basis can one explain their results on a later date. But he categorically denies the name Apūrva to be given to such worldly potency. He argues, this potency is not called Apūrva because the acts are not Vedic.

So, it seems that according to him, the potency generated by the worldly act (laukika karman) may be known as adṛṣṭa. Adṛṣṭa literally means unseen. It is understood that such potency is not visible or verifiable but it certainly exists because it is inferred on the ground of the result that it later produces.

Kumārila asserts:

Laukikām cāpi yat karma phale kālāntarodgatau; Tatrāpi śaktirevāste na tv apūrvamiheṣyate. (Ibid) This means, even in the case of a worldly act, where the result comes later, one has to accept the potency (generated by the act) but the same is not known as Apūrva. He further explains his point with the help of examples we have mentioned earlier, i.e. studies or drinking ghee or agriculture.

These are worldly acts the results of which are not seen as soon as the acts are performed. The results are certainly seen at a later date.

Observations:

From whatever we have discussed so far, it is clear that the theory of Apūrva which is a contribution of PM, was originally evolved to explain the cause and effect relation between a performance of ritual and its result. This, in other words, is a logical postulation to bridge the

apparent gap between them. It may be considered as a function (vyāpāra) of the ritual which is instrumental in bringing about the final result. Its nature is that of a potency, generated by the performance.

Later on, this theory is extended to all good and bad acts to explain the happiness and suffering of a human being. A human being goes on accumulating good and bad potency through his good and bad acts respectively. The same leads him towards happiness or suffering. This theory, most significantly, puts the responsibility of human happiness and suffering on the shoulders of one's own acts. Nobody or nothing else is responsible for the state of affairs in which a person finds himself. In other words, a fate of man is earned by himself. PM holds that this world has no beginning. The cycle of the universe is anādi and hence human life also is anādi. This means, a human being is and has always been engaged in some act or the other. (The Bhagavadgītā III.5 says Na hi kaścit kṣaṇamapi jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt.) If the act is good one accumulates good potency (puṇya), and if it is bad one obtains evil potency (pāpa). This is Adṛṣṭa. This has been going on beginninglessly. The Nyāya system, which accepts God as the creator of the universe and does not accept the world to be beginningless, has accepted Adṛṣṭa as the cause of human happiness or suffering. God simply monitors the phenomenon of the results distributed to all as per their Adṛṣṭa.

Even God cannot go beyond Adṛṣṭa. Here the theory of Adṛṣṭa saves God from the blame of not being equal to all. Udayana, in his Nyāyakusumāñjali, has accepted Adṛṣṭa as the cause of difference (vaicitrya) in the world. Hence, it is one's Adṛṣṭa (puṇya or pāpa) that is responsible for one's happiness or suffering. Thus, the original theory of Apūrva, when applied to the karma theory, is capable of explaining all apparent gaps and disparities in the world.

## **Sadhya and Sadhana**

The characterising feature of human beings, that distinguishes them from other species of animals, is the presence of a comparatively much more developed intelligence and the capability to think beyond the very basic activities of eating, sleeping, mating and defending, which can be found in all the species of animals on the earth, in the water and in the sky. All individuals, regardless of their circumstances, are sure to set some goal for their life. The Vedic literatures and the previous sages have mentioned three goals that humans can strive for, and the respective paths that can be adopted to attain those goals have also been elaborately described in the Vedas. The Goal, known as 'Sadhya' in Sanskrit, and means to achieve it, or 'Sadhana', are very important and one should ascertain the Sadhya of their life and the Sadhan, performing which shall lead them to the attainment of the Sadhya.

The first of the three Sadhyas mentioned in the Vedas is Bhukti, or material enjoyment, and the means to attain it is given in the Karma Khanda section of the Vedas. These generally include performing sacrifices, giving charity, performing social service, building wells and hospitals, serving guests, and leading a pious lifestyle among other such activities. These activities result in the person enjoying a comfortable life and being promoted to some higher planet after death, where he may be able to enjoy better quality of material enjoyment. This Sadhya is recommended for those who are not yet eligible for striving for a better Sadhya. However, since the result, Bhukti, of these pious activities is not eternal and one falls down from his position of better sense enjoyment in the higher planets after his pious merits have been exhausted, it cannot be considered to be the highest Sadhya. By following this path one does not attain freedom from the

cycle of repeated birth and death in this material world full of miseries. It is therefore considered to be the lowest of all the Sadhyas. However, one who is eligible to follow this path and does so sincerely, following the injunctions of the Sahstras and leads a pious life, may, due to some great good fortune, come into contact

with a great personality and, due to their association, develop eligibility for a higher Sadhya. The second Sadhya mentioned is Mukti, or liberation from material bondage, and the Sadhana, or path to be followed for attaining it, is mentioned in the Jnan Khanda section of the Vedas. The Sadhana for attaining Mukti includes Pranayam, Ashtanga Yoga and other Yoga practises for restraining the senses from their objects and endeavouring to merge one's identity into that of the Brahma Jyoti or impersonal Brahman. The Panchopasana system also falls into this category of Sadhana. The resultant Sadhya attained by following this path, which, according to the Supreme Lord Krishna as stated by Him in the Bhagawat Gita, is wrought with troubles, is merging of the soul into Brahman. This is, however, also not the highest Sadhya as it is also not eternal. Attainment of Mukti, or liberation, is something which happens once and is not an eternal and ongoing truth. Although praised in the Jnan Khanda section of the Vedas, the bhaktas of Bhagawan condemn this idea of merging into the impersonal feature of the Lord as it is almost the same as spiritual suicide, for they give up their individuality and cease to exist. Only by some great good fortune, when a Jnani comes into the association of a bhakta of bhagawan, can they come to the platform of striving to attain the ultimate Sadhya.

The third and the only Sadhya that does not lead to a higher stage of understanding, as it is itself the highest, is Bhakti, or devotional service rendered to the Lord. The Sadhana or means of attaining Bhakti have been mentioned in the Vedas delineating the path of Bhakti, and Srimad Bhagwatam is the best amongst all these Vedic literatures describing the process of Bhakti yoga. The practices performed on this path include Shravanam, Kirtanam, Vishnu smaranam, pada sevanam and so on. The resultant Bhakti transports one to the eternal abode of the Lord, where the devotee renders transcendental loving service to the Supreme Personality of Godhead, thus enjoying eternal life, full knowledge and unlimited bliss. The lesser goal of Mukti is automatically attained by the Bhaktas as they are always transcendental to the material nature, being situated in the transcendental abode, far away from the external energy of the Lord. The followers of this most glorious path worship the Personalised feature of the Lord, who is complete with all transcendental qualities and the abode of wonderful loving pastimes.

One should, therefore, very carefully analyse the various Sadhyas, ascertaining their goal of life, and follow the respective Sadhana. It is only by great good fortune that one takes to the path of Bhakti and strives to achieve the best of all Sadhyas. One who does so is the only person who has understood his true position and the real purpose of life. Having ascertained Bhakti to be one's Sadhya, the sadhaka, or the practitioner should associate with the advanced devotees of the Lord and endeavour to make rapid progress on the path back home, back to Godhead.

## **Sadhana**

Sadhana (Sanskrit: साधन) is a Sanskrit term used to refer to a daily spiritual practice. Sadhana represents a disciplined surrendering of the ego, in which the practitioner uses tools such as asana, pranayama, meditation and chanting on a daily basis.

Anything that is practiced with awareness, discipline and the intention of spiritual growth can be

considered as sadhana, but it must be practiced alone and for the sake of the individual. As such, it does not need to be a physical activity; even daily self-study of yogic or spiritual scriptures is a form of sadhana.

Sadhana is also a means of forging a ritual connection with God or universal energy. It encourages the practitioner, known as the sadhaka, to use self-discipline in order to achieve power over the ego and maintain connection with universal oneness. With regular daily practice, the practitioner continually realigns his or her inner self, slowly progressing toward the very ultimate expression of consciousness known as samadhi.

## **Explanation of Sadhana**

The term sadhana comes from the Sanskrit root, sadhu, meaning “go straight to a goal”. Routinely applying mind, body and spirit in the pursuit of a spiritual goal is the most natural and efficient way to surrender the ego, to find relief from suffering and to attain peace.

For this reason, sadhana is the cornerstone of the discipline of yoga. Yoga provides a huge variety of tools for this purpose, ranging from physical practices, such as asana (postures) and pranayama (breathing techniques), to more introspective applications, such as svadhyaya (self-study) and meditation.

With intention, awareness, discipline and daily practice, almost anything can be considered as sadhana. When formulating your own sadhana, it is important to choose practices that work for you, in order to provide the best conditions for you to stay committed with ease. It may be useful to vary the practices used for sadhana from time to time, so as to keep the practice from becoming an automated or obligatory routine. Ancient Hindu and Buddhist texts, such as Sadhanamala, offer suggestions for hundreds of sadhana practices designed for various results.

Discipline is arguably the most important facet of sadhana, so it does help to practice at the same time each day. The time of day itself is not important - for some, practicing sadhana soon after awakening helps them to keep up the practice without distraction or excuses, whereas for others, evenings allow them more focus or concentration.

Although sadhana is centred around an ultimate spiritual goal, the practice itself should be undertaken without any specific goal in mind. Sadhana should be practiced for the sake of maintaining the practice, and as a means of cultivating discipline. To focus the mind on a goal during sadhana will bring ego into the practice, rather than the sense of surrender that is required.

## **Itikartavyatā**

Itikartavyatā literally means ‘mode of performing a duty’. It is a technical term used in the Purvamimāṃsā Sūtras. and answers the question as to how a thing is to be accomplished.

When someone is hungry, he has to prepare food and eat it. For this he has to cook the raw rice which again needs the necessary vessels and fire using fuel sticks. Similarly, if a person wants to perform a Vedic sacrifice, he must be given detailed instructions. This is called ‘itikartavyatā’. Itikartavya (acts): The Itikartavyata denotes the type of kartavya prakar or kriyaprakar. Elements like Abhidhana, Bodha and Jijnasa fall under the them Itikartavyata. Mimamsa philosophy considers Abhidhana, bodha, and jijnasa as byapar (business). The bhavakas are involved in byapar (work) like

Abhidhana, bodha, and jijnasa.

## **Karma**

According to the basic Sanskrit definition of karma, it simply means “action”. Laws of karma are all about the positive or negative valance of our words, thoughts, and deeds.

In essence, everything we do creates a corresponding energy that comes back to us in some form or another. Difficult karmic experiences catalyze learning and growth, and can later lead to good karma if we work towards positive change.

Everything we do is linked to our karma:

- How we treat others;
- How we see our own role in the world;
- The way we use resources;
- How we develop our characters.

## **Law of Karma**

The Law of Karma is infallible and everyone invariably is subjected to it. Sometimes we are oblivious to the fact that most of our lifetime is spent in undergoing destiny which is created by our karmas or deeds in our past births. As per the law of karma, every positive deed which we do, generates a ‘merit’; while every negative deed results in a ‘demerit or sin’ which subsequently we need to repay by enduring happiness or unhappiness. All major events in our life are predestined – for instance the family that we are born into, to whom we will get married etc. During our day-to-day interactions, we are either settling an old account or creating a new one. If an account is not settled in the present birth it is carried over to the next birth. Although, we are not consciously aware of the give-and-take karmic accounts generated in our previous births. In our subsequent births, we may or may not be equipped to settle our destiny and the paradox is that at the same time we are creating new karmic accounts. Thus, this loop of karma and destiny binds us and we remain entangled in it. The only way through which we can nullify our give and take account and destiny is through sustained and regular spiritual practice. In understanding the Law of Karma, we can see how spiritual practice can be useful to even those of us who have absolutely no spiritual interest and who only wish to be immersed in worldly pursuits. Even for those worldly relations to be fruitful they need to be insulated from destiny.

## **The 12 Laws Of Karma**

As we explore the 12 distinct laws of karma, think about how we've previously seen these laws come into play in your own life. Consider, too, how we can use our knowledge of these laws to create good karma that supports our dreams and goals. Understanding all of these types will help us design our own karma busting mantra or affirmation, should we feel we need it.

As noted above, the key to moving beyond apparently “bad” karma is to live in a way that shows we are learning from past mistakes. So, any mantra we recite should reflect this.

### **1. The Great Law**

Sometimes called “the Law of Cause and Effect”, the Great Law tells us that in order to get the things we want, we must also embody those things.

The message here is similar to that of the Law of Attraction. In other words, whatever you give out is also what you will receive, whether it is positive or negative. So, if you want love in your life, be loving. If you want to enjoy financial abundance, be generous. And if you want to have honest, open relationships then you need to offer authenticity and honesty to the people you care about as well.

## **2. The Law of Creation**

According to the Karmic Law of Creation, we need to be active participants in our lives if we want to get what we desire. We cannot simply wait for things to happen to us. We should aim to surround ourselves with what we want in our lives and look to our environments for clues about what we need.

A major part of understanding the Law of Creation is seeing that things outside ourselves tell us what's going on inside. So, if you don't like the way your life looks right now, look within and ask yourself what needs to change.

## **3. The Law of Humility**

Out of the 12 laws of karma, Buddhism can be seen as often emphasizing the importance of the Law of Humility. What you need to remember about this karmic rule is that you need to accept the true reality of something before you'll ever be able to change it.

For example, if you constantly blame others for things that you created or you see anyone who disagrees with you as a villain, you're out of step with reality. You will, therefore, find it very difficult to make the shifts you need. Consistent self-reflection can help you make the most of the Law of Humility.

## **4. The Law of Growth**

If you've ever heard the famous saying "Wherever you go, there you are", you've already thought about the Law of Growth in a certain sense.

The message here is that you need to expect a change of yourself before you expect it of the world around you (or indeed the people in the world around you). Ultimately, you only have control over yourself. Therefore, it is how you use this control that shapes how the universe responds to you.

So, focus on your development before trying to control or change others; let them come to their own conclusions about what needs to change.

## **5. The Law of Responsibility**

In terms of meaning, karma is often thought of in terms of The Law of Responsibility. In particular, it's helpful to remember that you are the source of what happens throughout your journey. What is happening around you is a mirror for what is happening within you; that is the sense in which you are responsible for all of your life experiences, whether fantastic or unpleasant.

Like the Law of Growth, this karmic law aims to teach you that you should be looking to take ownership of the good and bad things you create, rather than constantly looking outside yourself to find excuses.

## **6. The Law of Connection**

If you reached this guide because you were wondering how to remove bad karma of past life experiences, remembering the Law of Connection can help you. This law emphasizes the interconnected nature of the past, present, and future, and reminds us that our control over the present and future can help us to obliterate the bad energy of the past (whether it is from our current life or a previous life).

Another point made by the Law of Connection is that it takes time to redress karmic wrongs from the past. However, each small step can have unexpectedly powerful effects.

## **7. The Law of Focus**

According to the Law of Focus, you will do better in life if you can follow a single train of thought to the exclusion of others. Our minds are not equipped to follow multiple trains of thought with equal competency. So, if you have several important goals, try to follow them in a linear, ranked order rather than giving each goal only a fraction of your energy.

Another vital lesson here is that if you focus on your higher values; you won't be able to focus on "lower" emotions or thoughts like those that come from resentment, anger or possessiveness.

## **8. The Law of Giving and Hospitality**

In Hindi, karma meaning is closely tied to the Law of Giving and Hospitality. This law teaches that if you believe a certain thing, then you will naturally be called upon at some stage to demonstrate your commitment to that truth. The focus here is on the link between belief and practice. It suggests and encourages the importance of ensuring that your actions reflect your deeper beliefs.

This law is also about the way in which the universe will "test" you. Life gives us opportunities to put learned lessons into practice (and showing you when you need to do further work on some aspect of your character).

## **9. The Law of Here and Now**

As noted above, in Buddhism, karma is connected to ideas about accepting the truth of your reality. Equally, Buddhists typically link karma to the theme of truly living in the present moment. If you cling too hard to past feelings, experiences, and beliefs, you will always have one foot in the past. Likewise, if you focus on anxiety or on greed, you will always have one foot in the future. Following the Law of Here and Now means reminding yourself that the present is all you really have and that it is there to be fully engaged with and enjoyed.

## **10. The Law of Change**

When you think about the Law of Change, you connect with the message that the universe gives us what we need. So, you will find that history continually repeats itself until you demonstrate that you've learned what you need to in order to create a different future.

If you notice that you seem to be stuck in a loop, this is because there's something fundamental that has not yet been addressed. Meanwhile, if things around you begin to change in sudden and dramatic ways, take this as a sign that you have recently taken significant steps in your growth.

## **11. The Law of Patience and Reward**

To put it succinctly, the Law of Patience and Reward claims that all of your greatest successes require consistent hard work. This means that you need to be patient, regardless of your goals in life.

If you expect immediate results, you will ultimately be disappointed; your successes will be minor in comparison to what you're capable of achieving. Instead, look to figure out your true purpose. Act in accordance with that purpose and enjoy the reward of knowing you are doing what you are supposed to with your current life. In time, associated successes (emotional and material) will follow.

## **12. The Law of Significance and Inspiration**

Last but not least, the Law of Significance and Inspiration is a good law to reflect on when you need a motivational boost or start to feel like you don't matter.

This particular aspect of karma stresses that every contribution you make will influence the Whole, however small or great that contribution may be. Whenever you make creative, loving contributions to the world around you, your act inspires similarly positive behavior from others and attracts more positivity back into your life.

You may not always feel significant, but you always are. Without your presence, the energy of the universe would be fundamentally altered.

## **Ethical implications**

Ethical implications consider the impact or consequences that psychological research has on the rights of other people in a wider context, not just the participants taking part in the research.

As globalization intensifies and the world becomes increasingly interconnected, it behooves us to understand how Asians tend to understand themselves, others, and the world they inhabit. Inquiring into Asian cultural orientations in general and into Buddhism in particular offers us the opportunity to deepen our understanding of our own worldview by questioning our philosophical presuppositions. Furthermore, looking into Asian conceptions of ethics and karma will help us facilitate not only relations with Asian people – who account for roughly one third of the world's people – but also help us attenuate conflict before it reaches a critical stage.

Dealing strictly in general tendencies, as particular strains of thought are too profuse to accommodate in this presentation, I will suggest that recent work in Ch'an Buddhism by Buddhist scholar Peter D. Hershock offers a compelling view of karma that takes ethical training into account without reducing karma to a function of morality and without necessarily tying karma and ethical training to reincarnation or any other appeal that remains outside the scope of our ordinary experience. As a heterodox philosophical practice emerging in Northern India, Buddhism not only disavows the external authority of the Vedas and Brahmanic ritualism but also insists upon our investigation of and trust in our own experience. That is to say, the Buddha relocates authority in the individual person.

Buddhist philosophy, especially ethics, is based upon the Four Noble Truths. Just as the first three truths (the Truth of Craving, the Truth of the Origins of Craving, and the Truth of the Cessation of

Craving) inform the Eightfold Path, so the trainings of concentration (mindfulness, effort, concentration) and wisdom (view and thought) inform ethical training (speech, action, and livelihood). In general, Buddhism suggests that the suffering we experience stems from our ignorance of the way things are: impermanent, empty of intrinsic essence, interdependent, and irreducibly karmic. Furthermore, ignorance of the way things are leaves one vulnerable to the three poisons: hatred, delusion, and anger. The combination of ignorance and action has deleterious effects on our thoughts and actions, creating impressions upon the mind that cause suffering. In Vedanta and some forms of Buddhism, these impressions have a direct effect upon rebirth.

## **Ethics & Ethical Training**

There are at least two obstacles to understanding the working relationship between ethics and karma:

- (1) we tend to reduce ethics to either restraint or obedience; and
- (2) we tend to take the full significance of ethical training for granted.

What Brannigan has called —the tyrannies of space and time suggest that we confuse or limit our view of ethical training by an uncritical attachment to the local order of things, believing —that only the local is real and —that only the moment matters (2005, 7). The latter belief is especially troublesome for Westerners and for many Buddhists because —the moment is usually construed as a past, present, or future moment, thereby implying that there is a discrete self-existence unimplicated in change.

Freeing ourselves from these limiting views, according to Brannigan, allows us to grasp the fuller significance of ethical training and living an ethical life. Some Buddhist points of view maintain that ethical principles are derived from an awareness of the desire on the part of singular, sentient beings to experience happiness and avoid suffering by adopting a deeply penetrating equanimity, and not the other way around. With meditative and careful attentiveness, I am able to notice the awareness of equanimity arising in my own mind. Acknowledging and acting upon such awareness of suffering generates compassion, allowing space for my own happiness and the extension of good will to others and contributing to the welfare of all sentient beings (Tsering 2005, 26). This stands in stark contrast to dominant Western ethical views, which generally insist that our awareness of a moral obligation to others is based on a rational or pararational<sup>1</sup> experience of the Good, mediation by a deity, the formal operations of rationality, following rules, or experiencing feelings of sentiment or sympathy.

Generally speaking, ethical training in Mahayana, pre-Mahayana, and Theravada Buddhism is a foundation for the higher order operations of concentration and wisdom. In Buddhism, the Eightfold Noble Path is practiced as the three trainings: ethics (right speech, action, and livelihood), concentration (right effort, mindfulness, and concentration), and wisdom (right view and thought) (Tsering 2005, 125). All three trainings are, like all phenomena, interdependent. Thus, ethical training serves concentration and wisdom by allowing one to view things as they are rather than how we desire them to be. All trainings are mutually implicated, ongoing, and contextually provisional. The question of the relation between ethical training and karma still remains, however. Does ethical training simply function as a tactic of restraint, that is to say, function negatively? In the classical Indian traditions, especially Samkhya and Yoga, this is especially true.

Buddhism depends on an important change in view about ethical training and its relation to karma.

## **Ethics & Karma**

We are all aware of the historical fact that not only do the Vedic traditions precede Buddhism, but also that Buddhism adopts many of the concepts and practices from the Vedic traditions. Regarding ethical training and karma, however, Buddhism makes important substantive changes. In this section, I'll sketch a view of ethics and karma from the Vedic background to Buddhist thought and then I will consider two Buddhist traditions. In doing so, however, I am going to bracket two aspects of karma that appear in several Buddhist traditions (probably adopted from the Vedic world) and Action Karma Daoism:

1. karmic connection, either in kinship relations or with an ascetic/saint, and
2. ritualistic or other-powered practices that help the dying focus their minds and erase karmic obstacles to a salutary rebirth.

In the Vedic traditions<sup>3</sup> ethical training functions primarily to help students gain control of their senses. Ethical training is the practice of restraining the senses through negative restraints or yamas (—non-violence, non-lying, non-stealing, non-craving for sexual pleasure and nonpossessiveness), in order to stabilize the mind (Malhotra 2001, 38). Recall the second aphorism of Patanjali's Yoga Sutras: —Yoga is the stilling of all mental fluctuations. Ethical training in yogic traditions attempts to guide the psychophysical self's shift from an evolutionary entanglement with nature to an involitional disentanglement from nature. Once the mind is calm, concentration deepens and wisdom emerges.

Thus, ethical training serves a limited function, albeit a necessary one. In the works of Vedantists, the place of ethics is strictly tied to karma and reincarnation. Yet, Vedantists from Shankara forward developed the idea of karma beyond the individual moral benefits of controlling the senses. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan writes that —all acts [or karma] produce their effects which are recorded both in the organism and the environment<sup>||</sup> (1932, 218). Thus, karma, in the Vedantist account, is both natural and unnatural. Natural karma is sedimented into the evolutionary history of the organism and environment while unnatural or moral effects, *sanskara*, —are worked into the character of the self<sup>||</sup> (218). *Sanskara* are —impressions [or] deposits of previous experiences and become the most important factors in determining the course of present and future experience. The mind is constantly creating and gathering such impressions in the course of its experiences<sup>||</sup> (Baba 1987, 32). Ethical training, then, serves the practice of renunciation: Renunciation may be external or internal. External, or physical, renunciation consists in giving up everything to which the mind is attached — home, parents, marriage, children, friends, wealth, comforts, and gross enjoyments. Internal, or mental, renunciation consists in giving up all cravings, particularly the craving for sensual objects.

Ethical training and its relation to karma, therefore, —is not so much a principle of retribution as one of continuity (Radhakrishnan 1932, 218). Rejecting a simplistic position, the Vedantists neither accept a doctrine of predestination nor suggest that karma is deterministic. They insist on —continuity with the past and creative freedom of the self (219). While unnatural karma can be erased by ethical training, natural karma is near impossible for human beings to erase. Natural karma must either fade through evolutionary development or by the compassionate intervention on the part of a *sadguru* or —perfect master.<sup>||</sup> As the Buddhist traditions that developed after the

Buddha's passing converge into what I call the Classical Theravada tradition, some elements of the Vedic view of ethics and karma persisted in somewhat altered form. Perhaps the most significant emendation of Vedic theories of ethical training and its relation to karma is the elimination of the distinction between natural and unnatural karma. Instead, karma falls under the skandhas and specifically the aggregate of mental formations. As Walpola Rahula points out, the group of mental formations, encompassing –52 such mental activities, includes –all volitional activities both good and bad [my emphasis] (1974, 22–23). This last phrase is especially important given popular accounts of karma. While a limited and highly qualified distinction can be made between –good and –bad karma, all karma leads to eventualities or outcomes that continue to bind the individual to suffering.

Furthermore, Rahula is insistent that karma is not an effect; rather, actions that are akusala (–bad) produce bad effects and actions that are kusala (–good) produce good effects. This is to say that karma is the binding and not the effects. At our peril and in our ignorance, we judge the effects –good or –bad. In the habitual and habituating pattern of suffering, we cannot control the effects and so it can only be a matter of chance that things turn out well. The goal of karmic ethical training is to generate outcomes that escape the samasara continuity of ironic consequences. Buddhism construes ethics or morality (sila) as founded on loving kindness and compassion for all sentient beings – another difference from the Vedic traditions, especially Brahmanic ritualism, which slaughtered animals in order to bring about beneficial relations with a particular deity or deities. Ethical training, Rahula writes, –aims at promoting a happy and harmonious life both for the individual and for society. This moral conduct is considered as the indispensable foundation for all higher spiritual attainments. No spiritual development is possible without this moral basis (1974, 47). Key to such spiritual development in the Buddhist traditions is the doctrine of anatman or non-essentiality. From a Buddhist point of view, ideational, sensual, perceptual, and corporeal constructions of self, the self of the five aggregates, is the ultimate hindrance to liberation.

With the development of the Mahayana traditions, the emphasis of ethical training shifted from the individual and society (the emphasis on the social dimension of Classical Theravada thought as enunciated in the Pali canon focuses heavily on the workings of statecraft and the appropriate orientation of rulership) to an ideal of personhood, entailing actions that benefit all sentient beings; hence, the figure of the bodhisattva takes center stage in much of the Mahayana traditions' discourse on ethics and karma.<sup>4</sup> To develop the capacity of a bodhisattva, however, one must penetrate to the deepest levels of awareness in order to understand the –complete equality among all sentient beings (Tsering 2005, 26).

Furthermore, what distinguishes the bodhisattva<sup>5</sup> from the arhat of Classical Theravada is the bodhisattva's penetration of the emptiness of all things. It is the bodhisattva's grasp of emptiness that generates compassion. Ethical training is not an end in itself, i.e. nirvana, but a means of developing a one-pointed mind. This leads to wisdom on which the individual may act without ironic consequences, thereby benefiting all sentient beings. Geshe Tashi Tsering observes, –Living ethically by practicing [right speech, right action, and right livelihood] definitely gives us the foundation to do the other practices, whereas living without them, in an undisciplined way, causes all sorts of obstacles to developing concentration or wisdom (130). Ethical training, then, is tied in the Madhyamaka tradition to higher practices that will eventually lead to one's birth as a bodhisattva. From the perspective of the Madhyamaka tradition of Vajrayana Buddhism, such training takes place across kalpas of countless rebirths.

Among the profusion of Buddhist perspectives, the Vajrayana Traditions go farthest in offering a phenomenology of the aggregate of mental formations by which mind grasps phenomena and establishes itself in ignorance. Gen Lamrimpa explains that conceptualizing and then forgetting we have done so leads to reification. It is –an erroneous mental process in which –the object itself appears in a mistaken way (1999, 49). He writes, –that mind that mistakenly grasps onto phenomena is called ignorance. Ignorance always entails reification. In this way we grasp onto the true existence of ourselves, and similarly, when focusing on an adversary, we grasp onto that person as truly existent. This is how attachment and aversion arise automatically (49). Phenomena grasped in ignorance lead to suffering if mental actions are agitated by mental afflictions, which are forms of conceptualization: Mental afflictions are primary, for in their absence, karma does not ensue. There are a variety of mental afflictions – including pride, attachment, anger, competitiveness, and jealousy – but the one root for all of them is ignorance. If we eliminate this ignorance, the other mental afflictions will vanish. In order to cut ignorance, or ‘non-awareness,’ at its very root, the Three Higher Trainings are taught, namely, ethical discipline, meditative concentration, and wisdom.

### **Hershock’s Ch’an View of Ethical Training & Karma**

Since the 1990s, Peter Hershock, coordinator of the Asian Studies Development Program at the East–West Center in Honolulu, Hawai\_i, has been developing a Ch’an Buddhist response to important elements of contemporary life in an increasingly interdependent world. In works such as *Liberating Intimacy* (1996), *Reinventing the Wheel* (1999), his edited volume *Changing Education* (2008), and various essays published in the *Journal of Buddhist Ethics and Philosophy East and West*, Hershock, true to both his Buddhist and Western philosophical trainings, has addressed the pressing issues of technology, education, ecology, globalization, and authority. His primary purpose has been not only to engage in creative and interpretative crosscultural philosophizing but also to show how we can respond to suffering by availing ourselves of the ancient teachings of Buddhism. Hershock shows how the Buddhist themes of interdependence, critical engagement, complex relationality, virtuosic performativity, and impermanence are directly relevant today. Complex interdependence, however, calls for complex treatment. Hershock’s approach is to –clarify the values, intentions, and practices animating prevailing ways of thinking about and responding to these emergent realities and reflecting on what it would mean to endanger a value coordinating redirection of the interdependencies constitutive of both the public sphere and of our lived experiences within it.

In one sense, Hershock’s work represents the patterns of accommodation and advocacy that typically occur when a thought pattern recurs in a new setting. His understanding is both consistent with traditional Theravāden and Mahayana views of ethical training and karma and inconsistent with classical texts and meanings insofar as the time and place of his work is different. In his most recent work, *Buddhism in the Public Sphere*, Hershock is careful to note that the global challenges facing us today also pose challenges to Buddhist practitioners.

Hershock observes that there are –no traditional Buddhist discourses on environmental protection, institutional health care, technological change, media ethics, global economics, human rights, or the privatization and commoditization of education.

His task, then, is a hermeneutic one: improvisational and creative interpretation of ancient Buddhist texts in light of contemporary situations. By creatively inventing concepts in a Buddhist

key such as improvisational virtuosity, effective relationality, live engagement, and dramatic maturity, Hershock interprets urgent questions in national and international public life and proposes a Ch'an point of view given Ch'an's emphasis on impermanence, emptiness, and interdependence. An important element of his project is rethinking karma.

Instead of simply reducing karma to a pattern of causality obtained in mind-body activity, Hershock shows how karma is a complex interaction among our values, intentions, and actions. He notes that –most Western Buddhists (and many contemporary Buddhists outside the West) do not take karma with the seriousness it deserves (2006, 9). The focus on karma as a mechanism of change is the strength of this work. Whether he is writing about the environment, trade, development, governance, or education, Hershock shows that subtle shifts in our karma can make an enormous difference in the way we relate to others and the world. On this basis, we can conclude that interdependence is both a coordinated and coordinating relationality based not on sameness but on difference. By contrast, Enlightenment virtues of tolerance and cooperation, insist – however inadvertently or ironically – on a degree of homogeneity. –In a karmically ordered world, Hershock explains, –importantly and fundamentally shaped by values and intentions, no situation – regardless of appearances to the contrary – shaped by karma are continuously open to meaningful revision. Indeed, in such a world, it is the differences in our karma that enable us each to make a difference (2006, 9). Such a view of karma is both empowering and challenging. It encourages each of us to make a difference that truly makes a difference. What is notable in Hershock's conception of karma is the insistence upon individual values, intentions, and actions as well as the interplay with the socio-political settings in which we inevitably find ourselves. Hershock extends the concept of karma into both the private and public domains. He observes: We live in a karmic world in which our interdependence is irreducibly meaningful and in which responding effectively to experienced troubles or difficulties – whether in the realm of the private or the public – ultimately entails recognizing their roots in competing or conflicting values, intentions, and practices. Succinctly stated: seeing our world as karmic is seeing that all experienced eventualities arise as outcomes/opportunities that are meticulously consonant with patterns of our own values-intentions-actions.

Karmic liberation, then, need not be the Vedic moksa or kaivalya or the pre-Mahayana arhat's attainment of nirvana or tantric reincarnation. It can be considered an attainable eventuality in which no situation is intractable.

While he does not eschew the traditional role of ethics as a coordinating practice foundational to higher order awareness, Hershock emphasizes the importance of developing skillful means (upaya) of carrying out our lives. On Hershock's account, our world and our life is –a world and a life shaped by karma [that is] continuously open to meaningful revision. To add value to one's life and the world takes skill, nuance, and exibility that conventional ethics training is not designed to foster. Hershock comments from a Ch'an viewpoint on general tendencies in both Western and Eastern ethics when he observes that –ethics is not a matter of realizing predetermined ends but rather one of creatively revising the quality and meaning (direction) of our situation as it has come to be. It is not grounded on the exercise of duty or appeals to fixed standards but rather on liberating appreciation.

Hershock effectively connects ethics and karma when he notes that –karmic opportunity includes refraining –from conduct in accord with the values- intentions-actions that led to the occurrence of the present, intensifying –existing karma or pattern[s] of values-intentions-actions, and developing

or improvising — karma that will lead to new kinds of relationship. In this sense, then, ethics become part of karma as — karmic opportunity and not simply a foundation or ancillary component of a wider path. If one is to both appreciate and contribute to others and the world we live in, one must not only be good, one must create opportunities without ironic consequences.

## **ṚTA**

ṚTA (Skt., "cosmic order") represents the Vedic notion of an impersonal and powerful force upon which the ethical and physical worlds are based, through which they are inextricably united, and by which they are maintained. Ṛta is the universal truth that gives effective strength to Vedic ritual practices, that serves as the foundation for proper social organization, and that preexists even the Vedic gods themselves, who find in it the very source and essence of their power. In many ways, ṛta stands as the Vedic antecedent for the notion of dharma (the established order of things, proper behavior, fitting truth), a concept of central importance not only to the various forms of Hinduism but also to the teachings of Buddhism, Jainism, and other South Asian religious systems.

The term ṛta is based on the Sanskrit verbal root ṛ ("go, move"), which itself reflects the Indo-European verbal root \*ar ("fit together properly").

Thus ṛta signifies the cosmic law that allows the universe to run smoothly, the dynamic structure in which every object and all actions have their proper place and in which all parts support and strengthen the whole in a flowing symbiosis. The word is related through \*ar to the Greek *harmos*, from which the English *harmony* derives, and to the Latin *ars* ("skill, craft"), the source of the English *art* and *artist*. Accordingly, the term ṛta connotes the experience of a "finely tuned" universe whose laws can give creative power to those gods and cultic specialists who understand its structures.

The Ṛgveda (c. 1200 bce) commonly assigns to the gods such epithets as "he who possesses ṛta," "he who grows according to ṛta," or "he who is born of ṛta," descriptions representing the Vedic notion that the gods derive their strength from their adherence to cosmic law. If they—or humans, for that matter—were to go against the structures of ṛta, they would then be said to be *anṛta*, a common synonym for *vṛjina* ("crooked, wrong") and even *asatya* ("untrue"). Thus even the gods must obey the laws of ṛta. The principles of ṛta (like those of the Zand Avestan *asha*, a Zoroastrian notion to which ṛta is linguistically and conceptually related) function in eternal opposition to any principle of disjunctive or disintegrative power (*druh* ; Av., *druj* ) as well as to those personal demons and humans who seek to disrupt impersonal cosmic order by means of harmful magical practices (*yātu*).

Throughout the Vedic period ṛta was understood to be an impersonal law and was never personified or hypostatized into a deity. Characteristically, the primary agent or guardian of the laws of ṛta is the god *Varuna*, who—in Vedic times at least—was an ethical sky god whose omniscient judgment the Vedic cult admired and feared.

As the impersonal source of cosmic and ethical order, ṛta includes important creative aspects. The gods find their ability to create the world precisely in their ability to recognize the principles of ṛta. These creative dimensions appear frequently in Vedic salutatory depictions of natural processes. Thus the wonderful facts that the sun rises in the east every morning and that water runs downhill

are trustworthy cosmic events because they reflect the truth of cosmic harmony (see Ṛgveda 1.105.12). Furthermore, Vedic tradition held that the very structures of ṛta allow the human community access to the powers that drive the universe itself. This is most apparent in the performance of the ritual: since proper cultic activity embodies the structures and processes of cosmic law, the incorrect performance of the ritual would signal the collapse of cosmic order and would be devastating to the Vedic community as it would be if the sun were not to rise or rivers not to flow.

### **Ṛta Reference**

Terms ṛta and satya are closely connected with the forms of dharma. The word ṛta has been profusely used in the Ṛgveda and the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda. The word form Ṛta indicates a straight or direct line followed according to the universal laws of nature. It denotes a straight conduct-based truth referred as dharma morally.

### **Satya Reference**

Dharma denotes inner awareness which means truth. It is based on the scriptural teachings and the duties performed by a person. When this awareness and duties express itself through words and actions, it becomes satya.

### **Rta: The Eternal Cosmic Order, The Path to Truth**

The word 'ṛta' has been used in Vedas quite frequently, but in later scriptures its use dwindled. In its place words like 'satya', truth, and 'dharma' have been used more frequently, often carrying the same connotation as 'ṛta'.

'Ṛta' has, of course, been also used in the Vedas to convey many different ideas. The word 'ṛta' is derived from the root 'ṛ'— its meaning in the Rig Veda being 'to go the right way, be pious or virtuous'; so 'ṛta' means 'fixed or settled order, law, rule' or 'the cosmic order'. In the Mahabharata, the Bhagavata, and some other sacred texts 'ṛta' means 'true', and at times 'truth personified'.

In the Panchatantra and again in the Mahabharata, 'ṛta' is used to mean truth in general, and also righteousness. In the Manu Samhita the term is used to mean the right means of livelihood for a brahmana, as opposed to, for example, agriculture which is anṛta for him. Sayanacharya explains the term रतय दीदददवम (Rig Ved 1.1.8) as "avaśyam̐bhāvinafi karmaphalasya", which means that 'ṛta' is something that would always produce results.

This production of results by 'ṛta' is not like the inevitable cause-and-effect relationship of the material world, according to which every cause would definitely produce an effect, but it is more like the successful harvest of a crop in which the farmer obtains the full yield instead of any other result.

The Nighantu — defines satya as having six synonyms, one of which is 'ṛta'. According to this, 'ṛta' is truth and 'anṛta' is the opposite, as in the mantra :

सत्यदमद वा उ तं वयदमन्द्रं सतवाम नात्र्तम~ (Rig Ved 8.62.12) "let us extol Indra who is in truth, and not in untruth " In the Vedas 'ṛta' has also been used to mean 'yajña', sacrifice, 'satya', truth, and 'dharma', moral code. Many scholars believe that these terms originally referred to one and the same concept—a belief that continues till today. This has made many general readers translate ṛta

as truth, which is not always correct, as can be seen in the following Vedic mantra :

सत्यं बृहद ऋतं उग्रं दीक्षा तपो ब्रह्म यज्ञः पृथर्वी धारयन्तन्त ~ (Atharva Ved 12.1.1)

These are the virtues that nourish and sustain this world : सत्यं बृहद, the great truth ; ऋतं उग्रं, formidable order; दीक्षा, consecration, initiation ; tapas, austerity; ब्रह्म, prayer, spiritual exaltation; and यज्ञः, sacrifice.

The distinct use of 'satya' and 'ṛta' in the above mantra shows that Vedic sages gave different connotations to these two terms. Therefore , 'satya' and 'ṛta' do not imply the same thing in all contexts. The same principle applies to the triad of 'yajña', 'dharma', and 'ṛta'—they do not refer to the same concept, as can be verified from the following examples.

श्रद्धया सत्यमाप्यते ; ~ (Yajur Ved 19.30)  
" one attains the truth through faith. "

This attainment of truth through 'śraddhā' is a unique concept never ascribed to 'ṛta'.

रतं च सत्यं चाभीद्धात तपसोऽध्यजायत । ~ (Rig Ved 10.190.1)

" from the blazing tapas was born ṛtam, eternal order, and truth. "

In a shanti mantra of the Taittiriya Upanishad we come across 'ṛtam vadiṣyāmi, satyam vadiṣyāmi; I shall call you righteousness, I shall call you truth'. Here also satya and ṛta are not one and the same. While commenting on this, Acharya Shankara differentiates the two by explaining that ṛta is an idea fully ascertained by the intellect in accordance with the scriptures and in conformity with practice', and satya 'is that which is reduced to practice through speech and bodily action'.

According to this explanation, ṛta is an ideal state, whereas satya is the state of actuality. The concept of ṛta as the eternal law, that deserved utmost respect, was so ingrained in the Vedic sages that they thought of two gods as its custodians.

The sages believed that wherever ṛta is successfully observed, it is due to the sternness of the twin gods Mitra and Varuna: 'mitrafi satyo varuṇo dharmapatīnām; Mitra for true-speaking (satya), Varuna for the sway of law's (dharma's) protectors.'

In this mantra, truth and dharma have been entrusted separately to Mitra and Varuna, who otherwise are together responsible for ṛta. This indicates that in the Vedas ṛta is conceived from truth and dharma conjointly. The importance of yajna, sacrifice, and its close connection with ṛta and satya is hinted in this shloka :

सत्यं च मे श्रद्धा च मे जगच्च मे धनं च मे दक्ष च  
मे महेश्च मे क्रीडा च मे मोदश्च मे जातं  
च मे जदनष्यमाणं च मे सून्त च मे  
सुकुतं च मे यज्ञेन कल्पन्ताम् ~ (Yajur Ved 18.5)

" May my truth and my faith, and my activities and my wealth, and my world and my glory, and my play and my enjoyment, and my children and my future children, and my hymns and my pious acts prosper through sacrifice. "

The power of truth and ṛta increases in the world through the practice of sacrifices. In the 'Purusha Sukta' the very act of Creation has been described as ayajna performed by the devas and in which Purusha, God, himself is sacrificed.

This shloka also suggests that though these three terms— ṛta, satya, and yajña— are closely connected, by all means they are not the same.

'Ṛta' has also been used quite often to denote what today is understood by dharma. In fact, later scriptures replaced 'ṛta' with dharma. Let us see some examples.

परर दचन मतो दरदवणं ममन्याद रतय पथा नमसादववासेत । ~ (Rig Ved 10.31.2)

" let a man think well on wealth and strive to win it by the path of law / truth and worship. "

रतय पन्ां न तरन्तन्त दुष्क तः ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 9.73.6)

" the evil doers do not travel on the path of the eternal law "

रतवाके न सत्येन शरद्धया तपसा सुत इन्द्रायेन्दो परर सरव ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 9.113.2)

" pressed with words of law and truth, with faith and devotion, O Indu, flow towards Indra. "

रतं शंसन्त रजु दीध्याना ~ (Rig Ved 9.113.2)

" praising the eternal law, thinking straight (the sons of Angirasa held the rank of sages). "

As we shall see later, there is a close link between 'ṛta' and 'dharma', though they are not precisely the same.

### **Ṛta: The Eternal Law that Regulates Everything :**

Coming closer to understanding ṛta, we find that the Vedas use the term to mean the divine law that makes everything in the universe behave the way it should :

रतय रन्तिमनुयच्छमाना भद्रम-भद्रं करतुमस्मासु धेदह । ~ (Rig Ved 1.123.13)

"obedient to the rein of the law eternal, give us every blissful thought".

The eternal law, in producing the cosmic order, also produces beauty, symmetry, and symphony. Living beings and the world of matter participate in a beautiful orderly life through the power of the eternal and sacred law, ṛta, working in and through them.

Rig Ved 4.23.8-10 :

रतय दह शुरुधः सन्तत पूवीर रतय धीदतर वदजनादन हन्तत ।  
रतय शलोको बधरा ततद कणा बुधानः शुचमान आयोः ॥

" The eternal law has varied food that strengthens ; thought of the eternal law removes transgressions.The praise-hymn of the eternal law, arousing, glowing,has opened the deaf ears of the living. "

रतय दग्ढहा धरुणादन सन्तत पुरुदण चद्रा वपुषे वपूंदष ।  
रतेन दीरम् इषणन्त पक्ष रतेन गाव रतम आ दववेशुः ॥

" Firm-seated are the eternal law's foundations ; In its fair form are many splendid beauties. By the sacred law long lasting food they bring us ; by the sacred law have cows come to our worship. "

रतं येमान रतम इद वनोत्य रतय शुष्मस तुरया उ गवुः ।  
रताय पथ्वी बहुले गभीरे रताय धेनू परमे दुहाते ॥

" Fixing the eternal law he, too, upholds it; Swift moves the might of law and wins the booty.To the law belong the vast deep earth and yonder sky : milch cow supreme, to the law their milk they render. "

मधु वाता रतायते मधु कषरन्तन्त दसन्धवः ।  
माध्वीनः सन्वोषधीः ॥

~ (Rig Ved 1.90.6)

" The winds waft nectar, the rivers pour nectar for the person who keeps the law :so may the plants be honeyed for us. "

As mentioned earlier, Mitra and Varuna are held jointly responsible for the upkeep of ṛta, for which they are praised by the sages. It is further stressed that both individuals and society gather strength by adjusting to ṛta, the divine law:

ता वां दक्ष्य गोपा देवा देवेषु यदज्ञ ।  
रतावाना यजसे पुतदक्षसा ॥

~ (Rig Ved 8.25.1)

" I worship you—devas, holiest among the devas—who guard this all ; you, faithful to the law, whose power is sanctified. "

रतावाना दन षेदतुः साम्राज्याय सुक्रतू ।  
धतव्रता कषदिया कषिमशतुः ॥

~ (Rig Ved 8.25.8)

" They, true to the law, exceeding strong, have set themselves down for sovereignty; valiant heroes, whose laws stand fast, they have obtained their sway."

रतय देवा अनु वरता गुभवत पररदियौन भूम ।  
वधन्तीमापः पन्वा सुदशदशवं रतय योना गभे सुजातम ॥

~(Rig Ved 1.65.2)

" The Devas follow after him the law of the workings of Order. He stands encompassing all as heaven the earth. The Waters make him grow increasing in his bulk by their toil, [Or, by their chant,] the Flame well-born in their womb, in the abode of the Law / Truth. "

सोमो न वेधा रतप्रजातः पशुन दशक्षा दवभुदूरेभाः ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 1.65.5)

" He is like the sage Soma, born of the eternal Order and a creator. He is like a cow with her newborn. He is wide-spreading and his light is seen from afar.

रतय परेषा रतय धीदतदवक्षायुदवक्षे अपांस चक्रुः । ~ (Rig Ved 1.68.3)

" He is the urgings of the Law, the thinking of the Law, the universal life by whom all do the works. " Here it is stressed that strength comes to one who is true to the law. And the same applies to social laws, which the king is the guardian of. What Mitra and Varuna are to the divine law, the king or the government is to society. If it is important to observe the commands of religion, it is equally important to follow the social code of conduct as set by the community. To gain worldly prosperity and also spiritual well-being one has to hold on to the law, both divine and social, which are but aspects of ṛta. Ṛta has also been perceived as the supreme Reality in the form of ṛta-sat—dweller in ṛta :

नषद वरसद रतसद वयोमसद अब्जा गोजा रतजा अद्रजा रतम ॥ ~ (Yajur Ved 10.24 and Rig Ved 4.40.5)

God and his laws are inseparable, and by observing the injunctions of the scriptures one follows God's commands. This identity of the law and the law-giver can be further seen in the following mantra:

अयमन्तस्म जररतः पश्य मेह दवक्षा जातान्यभ्यन्तस्म मन्वा ।  
रतय मा परददशो वधयन्त्यादददरो भुवना ददरीदम ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 8.100.4)

" Indra says: 'I exist, O singer! Look upon me here; all that exists I surpass in splendour. The eternal law's commandments make me mighty. When I rend, I rend asunder the worlds. "

This mantra depicts the sage filled with the realization of the Divine—here Indra stands for the Divine—in the form of splendour and ṛta; while later spiritual aspirants had the vision of the Divine in anthropomorphic forms.

Another interesting shloka hints that God himself reveals the mantras in the hearts of the sages, and that ṛta—here it might mean 'rites'—can be born anew. It seems that there is no end to the discovery of new laws pervading the universe :

वयूणोदत हदा मदतं नवो जायतां रतं ~ (Rig Ved 1.105.14)

" he reveals the hymn in the heart, let ṛta be born anew."

इन्द्राग्नी अपसस पयप पर यन्त धीतयः ।  
रतय पथ्या अनु ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 3.12.7)

" To Indra-Agni reverent thoughts go forward from the sacred duty. Along the path of sacred Law."

रतं ददकव रतम इच ददकव्य रतय धारा अनु तन्ध पूवीः । ~ (Rig Ved 5.12.2)

" Mark the Law, you who know, yes, observe it : send forth the full streams of eternal order. "

य ई ददके त गुहा भवन्तमा यः ससाद धारां रतय ।  
द्व ये चतस्य रता सपन्त आददद वसूदन पर ववाचास्मै ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 1.67.4)

" He who has perceived him when he is in the secret cave, he who has come to the stream of the Truth, those who touch the things of the Truth and kindle him, - to such a one he gives word of the Riches. "

राजन्तमध्वराणां गोपां रतय दीदददवम । ~ (Rig Ved 1.1.8)

" To Agni, protector of sacrifices, luminous guardian of the Order; "

रतय पन्म अन्व एदत साधु परजानतीव न ददशो दमनादत ॥ ~ (Rig Ved 5.80.4)

" Her color changing, she doubly brilliant, displays her body from the east, And follows to perfection the path of Rita, and, as one who knows all, strays not from the quarters. "

It is the Divine that reveals the law to the sages, and when these revelations are recorded and handed over from generation to generation they become known as scriptures. Therefore, the rishis have emphasized the need to live up to the words and spirit of the scriptures for individual and social upliftment, both material and spiritual.

And since everything in the universe is regulated by this principle of 'ṛta', it is the duty of Dharma to keep an eye on the proper flow of the world order. Whenever something is done against this universal rhythm it is considered 'anṛta', opposite to the natural law. This violation of 'ṛta' destabilizes the inner order of things.

According to Vedanta, tattva is 'that which is'; satya has the same meaning too; whereas dharma means 'that which holds'. Conversely, the nature of ṛta is connected with 'is-ness' and with 'holding together' as well. This means that in essence ṛta is one with satya and dharma taken together. In a wider sense tattva, satya, dharma, and ṛta are intrinsically interconnected, though their applied connotations are different. As we have seen, in the Vedas ṛta has been identified with different ideas according to context.

These different connotations are not contradictory but complementary in nature. Material sciences attempt to access ṛta from the perspective of the physical universe; the science of yajna is a similar pursuit from the perspective of religion; ṛta translated into social conduct is considered dharma; and the philosophical dimension of ṛta is called satya. Creation is brought about through certain principles, although the Creator itself is beyond these principles.

The fundamental principles underling this Creation, and also permeating it, are collectively called ṛta, which is one with the Divine. As quoted earlier, the way to power, peace, and goodness lies in

abiding by ṛta, in observing those fundamental principles experienced by the sages and later recorded in the scriptures.

## Satya

Satya is a Sanskrit word that describes a virtue present in many different Indian religions. When translated to English, it means "truth."

Satya is used in a religious context to denote being honest and truthful in actions, speech and thought. This is one of the five yamas, or rules for living in an ethical manner, according to the yogic philosophy outlined by Patanjali in the Yoga Sutras.



## Explanation Satya

Satya is considered essential for a balanced and harmonious existence in the universe. When truthfulness is present, the universe operates in the way that it should. Everything in the world depends on satya to function correctly.

Opening one's mind during sessions of yoga is a wonderful way to embrace the eternal wisdom of satya and the power of truthfulness. In spiritual yoga practice, satya is one of the yamas that the practitioner should abide by. In addition to being truthful to the world and to others, a yogi must also be truthful to him/herself. This requires honoring the body and its limitations during physical practice. Practicing yoga may also bring the individual closer to the ultimate Truth.

## Satya Reference

Dharma denotes inner awareness which means truth. It is based on the scriptural teachings and the duties performed by a person. When this awareness and duties express itself through words and actions, it becomes satya.

## Ashtanga yoga

In Sanskrit "Ashta + anga" is ashtanga. "Ashta" means Eight and "Anga" is limbs so it means Eight Limb path, Ashtanga yoga is based on Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali. The asanas, Pranayamas or the dharana which we have studied earlier or the yama and niyama are based on the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. Hence, we will acquaint ourselves with the fundamentals as stated by Patanjali first.

## HISTORY OF ASHTANGA YOGA

Yoga has its roots about 5000 years BC as described in Vedic Philosophy and Tantras. Patanjali , great sage composed this path into a Darshan(Philosophy) in his Book Patanjali Yoga Sutra. In which he has formulated Yoga as a Eight Limbs or Eight Fold path.

## EIGHT LIMBS OF ASHTANGA YOGA

1. Yama (Principles or moral code)
  - Ahimsa - A principle of non-violence
  - Satya - A principle of Truthfulness
  - Asteya - A principle of non stealing
  - Brahmacharya - Continence / Celibacy
  - Aparigraha - A principle of non-hoarding or non possessiveness
2. Niyama (Personal Disciplines)
  - Shoucha - Purity
  - Santosh - Contentment
  - Tapa - Endurance
  - Swadhyaya - Self study
  - Eshwar Pranidhan – Dedication
3. Asana (Yoga Positions or Yogic Postures)  
A stable and comfortable posture which helps attain mental equilibrium.
4. Pranayama (Yogic Breathing)  
Extension and control of breath.
5. Pratyahara (Withdrawal of Senses)  
A mental preparation to increase the power of mind.
6. Dharana (Concentration on Object)  
Concentration of mind on one object and its field.
7. Dhyana (Meditation)  
With drawing mind from all external objects and Focusing it on one point and meditating on it.
8. Samadhi (Salvation)  
State of Super bliss, joy and merging individual consciousness in to universal consciousness.  
Union between Jivatman and Paramatman. Union of Shiva and

Shakti in Sahasrar Chakra (the top of the head). Realizing the Bramhan (pure consciousness) or Realization of God is the ultimate achievement of Human Birth.

## Jainism

Jainism is an ancient religion from India that teaches that the way to liberation and bliss is to live lives of harmlessness and renunciation.

The essence of Jainism is concern for the welfare of every being in the **universe** and for the health

of the universe itself.

- Jains believe that animals and plants, as well as human beings, contain living souls. Each of these souls is considered of equal value and should be treated with respect and compassion.
- Jains are strict vegetarians and live in a way that minimises their use of the **world's resources**.
- Jains believe in **reincarnation** and seek to attain ultimate liberation - which means escaping the continuous cycle of birth, death and rebirth so that their immortal soul lives for ever in a state of bliss.
- Liberation is achieved by eliminating all **karma from the soul**.
- Jainism is a religion of self-help.
- There are no **gods** or spiritual beings that will help human beings.
- The three guiding principles of Jainism, the '**three jewels**', are right belief, right knowledge and right conduct.
- The supreme principle of Jain living is non violence (**ahimsa**)
- This is one of the **5 mahavratas** (the 5 great vows). The other mahavratas are non-attachment to possessions, not lying, not stealing, and **sexual restraint** (with celibacy as the ideal).
- **Mahavira** is regarded as the man who gave Jainism its present-day form.
- The texts containing the teachings of Mahavira are called the **Agamas**.
- Jains are divided into **two major sects**; the Digambara (meaning "sky clad") sect and the Svetambara (meaning "white clad") sect.
- Jainism has no priests. Its professional religious people are **monks and nuns**, who lead strict and ascetic lives.

Most Jains live in India, and according to the 2001 Census of India there are around 4.2 million living there. However, the Oxford Handbook of Global Religions, published in 2006, suggests that census figures may provide lower than the true number of followers as many Jains identify themselves as Hindu. The Handbook also states that there are around 25,000 Jains in Britain.

**Jainism**, along with **Buddhism** and **Charvaka**, is considered part of the heterodox systems (also referred to as heresies) of Indian **philosophy**. Its philosophy is grounded in the doctrine of the Yajur-**Veda** but it was systematized by **Vardhamana** (also known as **Mahavira**) who substituted the authority of **the Vedas** with logic and experience and also reinterpreted most of the key ideas available in Indian philosophy at that time.

Vardhamana was born into the Kshatriyas caste (the warrior rulers caste) in northeastern **India** in about the 6th century BCE, a time of profound political and social change. Tradition says Vardhamana was born as a prince, the second son of the king, and lived a life of luxury and wealth but from an early age he was interested in spiritual matters and soon became dissatisfied with the life that surrounded him: increasing inequalities, **warfare** and social conflict. Around the age of 30, when his parents died, he gave up his kingdom and royal privileges and for the next 12 years he wandered around as an ascetic, someone who denies himself physical pleasures in a quest for spiritual progress mainly through fasting and meditation. At the age of 42, Vardhamana gained full enlightenment and became a Jaina, "conqueror", and he was known as Mahavira, a title meaning "the great hero", and became the leader of Jainism.

According to Jain tradition, Vardhamana was the 24th and the last Tirthankara, "ford-finder". Jains see the world as a river of suffering and misery and ford-finders find a way to cross it: they do not

build the bridge, they simply get across it and the rest have to follow the path. The word Jain means "a follower of the Jainas". During the rest of his life, Vardhamana taught others about what he had learned. He accepted the doctrine of samsara (reincarnation), but with a small change, which, nevertheless, made a big difference to his approach to life. It was widely accepted by Indian society that animals, humans and gods had a soul, but Vardhamana went even further, claiming that nearly everything is alive.

Everything is made up of Jiva "living intelligence", trapped in matter. Living beings (almost everything, according to Vardhamana's view) were divided into different categories.

- Beings with five senses, including humans and major animals.
- Beings with four senses, they cannot hear (wasps, flies, butterflies)
- Beings with three senses, they can neither hear nor see (ants, moths, fleas)
- Beings with two senses, they can only taste and touch (worms, leeches, shellfish)
- Beings with only one sense, they only have the sense of touch (plants, microscopic organisms, wind, fire, water)

This last category is the largest and what all these beings have in common is that they can all feel pain: their entire existence is to be able to feel pain. This view on living beings could be summarized with the words of an Indian scholar:

Thus the whole world is alive. In every stone on the highway a soul is locked, so tightly enchained by matter that it cannot escape the careless foot that kicks it or cry out in pain, but capable of suffering nevertheless. When a match is struck a fire being, with a soul which may one day be reborn in a human body, is born, only to die a few moments afterwards. In every drop of rain, in every breath of wind, in every lump of clay, is a living soul. (Pruthi, p.50)

An ancient Jain document invites us to imagine the infinite number of times that we were hunted as deer, gutted as fish, beaten again and again when we were iron and chopped into pieces when we were trees. Jainism believes in an infinite number of eternal souls, caught in this eternal cycle of agony and misery. There was a way out of this cycle according to Vardhamana, and this was explained through his vision of **karma** (cosmic justice) and moksha (liberation). Karma was almost a material quality: cruel actions and thoughts attracted heavy karma, while kind acts made the soul lighter, so it could move up the ladder of existence.

By not causing suffering, one's soul could eventually be free from samsara. It is interesting to note that Vardhamana came from the warrior caste, where there was always the element of military and political **conquest**. Instead, Vardhamana proposes spiritual conquest through arduous discipline and commitment.

Jainism attempts to be rational and consistent: the metaphysics leads to the ethics. In other words, if it is believed that the whole world is alive and nearly everything is capable of feeling pain, then the Jain way of living makes sense. Vardhamana would allow mosquitoes to feed on his blood and while other ascetics would carry sticks with them to scare off the dogs, Vardhamana would allow the dogs to bite him. This principle of extreme non-violence is known in Jainism as Ahimsa "non-violence", a key term in this tradition. Vardhamana takes this principle so far that in time he decides to wear no clothes since during its manufacturing process a number of beings had to suffer. Large, bad karma comes when large animals are eaten, small karma comes when small

animals are eaten and no karma comes when nothing at all is eaten. At the age of 72, consistent with his ideas, Vardhamana took the Ahimsa doctrine to the extreme, finally starved himself to death and achieved nirvana (liberation).

Jainism has a set of five vows: nonviolence, truth-speaking, non-stealing, no sexual immorality and non-attachment to worldly things. Self-denial, self-mortification and austerity are the ways by which the karma of all past actions is exhausted and one can get into nirvana after death. This is explained in a Jain text:

As a large pond, when its influx of water has been blocked, dries up gradually through consumption of water and evaporation, so the karmic matter of a monk, which has been acquired through millions of births, is annihilated by austerity—provided there is no further influx. (Campbell, p.234)

Jainism may be considered extreme, but this extremism is directed to one's self and not to others. We sometimes come across traditions where devotion is shown by killing other people or persecuting them in the name of god. The devotion in Jainism is directed only to one's self.

In the Jain tradition there is a philosophical critique on ordinary epistemology. There are a number of Jain philosophers that have done a lot of analysis concerning this issue and they developed the idea of "many sidedness", which acknowledges that the world is complex, and there are multiple viewpoints possible, each of them partially valid, within a particular context. Truths are relative to a certain standpoint. All judgments are tentative. Reality cannot be comprehended from a single perspective. Human understanding is merely probable and partial, and all predictions are relative because reality is multiple. Nothing is true in the strict sense of the word, except from one point of view.

Vardhamana is credited with a famous story that illustrates this idea: Six blind men laid hands on different parts of an elephant; he who held the ear thought that the elephant was a great winnowing fan; he who held the leg said the animal was a big, round pillar and so on.

According to Jainism, there are no gods. It is not necessary to assume a Creator or First Cause - for then who created the creator or what caused the first cause? This view states that it is more logical to believe the universe has always existed, and that it has undergone an infinite number of changes. These changes are driven not by the influence of a deity but rather by nature itself. As a result of a sky empty of gods, Jainism did not have any type of creation stories.

There are essentially two paths in Jainism in order to achieve nirvana. The ordinary path, which seeks to reduce as much as possible the bad karma by living a good life and move up gradually. There is also the extraordinary path (the one a monk or a nun would take), which seeks to end the samsara in this life by taking the Ahimsa principle and the Jain vows to the extreme: no family, celibacy, no attachment to a place, they beg for food, they usually wear no clothes, they suffer insults without response and they may choose to starve to death. Because Vardhamana did not believe in the concept of Brahman (World Soul or Infinite Being) the Jain interpretation of the state of nirvana (liberation) is different from the traditional view in the orthodox Indian traditions. In Jainism, nirvana is a state in which the soul, released from samsara, has four attributes: infinite knowledge, infinite perception, infinite energy and infinite bliss.

## Samvara:

It is seen in the foregoing discussions that āsrava and bandha are the cause of bondage of the jīva. Because of these two the self comes under the cycle of birth and death. The self does not attain the ultimate aim of life, i.e., liberation, because the self is affected by the karma-matter. Attainment of liberation is not possible as long as the karma-particles exist in the self. When the influx of karmamatter stops, then the self attains liberation. So, for the attainment of liberation, it is necessary to stop the influx of karma-matter into the self.

Prabhācandra holds that for the attainment of liberation, the influx of new karma-matter into the self must be stopped. The new karma-matter enters into the self through āsrava or influx. This stoppage of the influx of karma-matter is called samvara.

Samvara is also of two kinds, viz., (i) bhāvasamvara or subjective stoppage and (ii) dravyasamvara or objective stoppage. The checking of the modifications of consciousness of the self which is the cause of the influx of karma-matter is known as bhāvasamvara, while dravyasamvara means that state where the influx of karmamatter is stopped. Thus, bhāvasamvara is the cause of dravyasamvara.

According to Prabhācandra, bhāvasamvara is again divided into six categories, viz.,

- samiti i.e. carefulness;
- gupti i.e. restraint;
- dharma i.e. observance;
- anuprekṣā i.e. thought;
- parīṣahajaya i.e. victory over troubles and
- cāritra i.e. conduct.

Each of these is again divided into various sub-classes. These are the steps of stopping the influx of karma-matter.

The first way of stopping the influx of karma-matter refers to outward behavior, which is known as samiti. It means that people must be careful about their conduct in order to avoid injury to all the living beings in this world. It is of five kinds, viz.,

- (i) ṛyā-samiti i.e. observance of the greatest care about the rules of walking;
- (ii) bhāṣā-samiti i.e. to be careful about the rules of speech;
- (iii) eṣaṇāsamiti i.e. to be careful about the rules of eating;
- (iv) ādānanikṣepaṇa-samiti i.e. to be careful about the rules of keeping some portion of the alms for the performance of religious duties and
- (v) utsarga-samiti i.e. observance of carefulness about the rules of performing bodily evacuations in a spot.

Gupti or restraint is the second way of stopping the influx of karma-matter. Gupti means the rules for controlling yoga of the mind, body and speech. So it is of three kinds, viz.,

- (i) kāya-guṭṭi i.e. bodily restraint;
- (ii) vāg-guṭṭi i.e. verbal restraint and
- (iii) mana-guṭṭi i.e. mental restraint.

By the observance of ten kinds of dharma, the influx of karma-pudgala must be stopped. That means, by the performing of dharmas, the jīva becomes free from all kinds of sorrows and attain excellent pleasure. These are:

- (i) uttama-kṣamā (excellent forgiveness);
- (ii) uttama-mārdava (excellent humility);
- (iii) uttamaārjava (excellent simplicity);
- (iv) uttama-śauca (excellent cleanliness);
- (v) uttamasaṭya (excellent truth);
- (vi) uttama-saṃyama (excellent restraint);
- (vii) uttamatapasa (excellent penance);
- (viii) uttama-tyāga (excellent renunciation);
- (ix) uttamaākiñcana (excellent indifference) and
- (x) uttama-brahmacarya (excellent sex-control).

The influx of karma-matter can also be stopped by keeping the twelve kinds of thoughts or anuprekṣā. One should always bear these twelve kinds of thoughts in mind for the stoppage of karma-pudgala into the self. These are:

- (i) anityānuprekṣā,
- (ii) aśaraṇānuprekṣā,
- (iii) saṃsārānuprekṣā,
- (iv) ekatvānuprekṣā,
- (v) anyatvānuprekṣā,
- (vi) aśucitvānuprekṣā,
- (vii) āsravānuprekṣā,
- (viii) samvarānuprekṣā,
- (ix) nirjarānuprekṣā,
- (x) lokānuprekṣā,
- (xi) bodhidurlabhānuprekṣā and
- (xii) dharmānuprekṣā.

Anityānuprekṣā is thinking that everything is transient. Aśaraṇānuprekṣā means that there is no shelter except truth. Saṃsārānuprekṣā means about the cycle of birth and death. Ekatvānuprekṣā means that one is responsible for his own deeds. Anyatvānuprekṣā means that the self is separate from the body. Aśucitvānuprekṣā is thinking that the body and its relation to everything are impure. Āsravānuprekṣā is about the influx of karman. Samvarānuprekṣā is about the stoppage of influx of karma-matter. Nirjarānuprekṣā is about the destruction of influx of karma-matter that has already entered into the body of the self. Lokānuprekṣā means about the self, the matter and the substances of the world. Bodhidurlabhānuprekṣā means about the difficulty of attaining true vision-knowledge-conduct. Dharmānuprekṣā means about the essential principles of this world.

For the stoppage of the influx of karma-matter and the attainment of liberation, one has to follow pariśahajaya i.e. victory over hardships or troubles. The twenty-two hardships are:

- the feeling of hunger (kṣudhā),
  - the feeling of thirst (pipāsā),
  - the feeling of cold (śīta),
  - the feeling of heat (uṣṇa),
  - troubles by mosquito (daṃśamaśakā),
- (i) the feeling of shame for nakedness (nagna),
  - (ii) the feeling of dissatisfaction through hunger, thirst, cold, heat etc.(arati),
  - (iii) the feeling of emotions caused by women (strīṭ),
  - (iv) the feeling of tiredness for journey (caryā),
  - (v) the desire of moving from a fixed posture in meditation (niṣadyā),
  - (vi) the desire to have a bed for take some rest (śayyā),
  - (vii) the feeling of anger when insulted (ākrośa), the feeling of fight against an enemy who comes to kill (vadha),
  - (viii) the desire of asking anything in great need (yācnā)
  - (ix) the feeling of satisfaction (alābha),
  - (x) the feeling of pain caused by a disease (roga),
  - (xi) the feeling of pain caused by some thorns (tṛṇasparśa),
  - (xii) the feeling of displeasure for dirtiness (mala),
  - (xiii) the desire to get some reward or honour (satkāra-puraskāra),
  - (xiv) the feeling of pride for one's learning (prajñā),
  - (xv) the feeling of despair for failure to obtain knowledge (ajñāna)and
  - (xvi) the feeling of despair for failure to attain something (adarśana).

One who controls over these hardships or troubles becomes free from all kinds of sorrows. One should also observe five kinds of cāritra or conduct for stopping theinflux of karma-pudgala. These are:

- (i) sāmāyika,
- (ii) cchedopasthāpanā,
- (iii) parihāraśuddhi,
- (iv) sūkṣmasaṃparāya and
- (v) yathākhyāta.

- Sāmāyika means one should always give up bad deeds and take up gooddeeds.
- Cchedopasthāpanā means repentance for doing all kinds of wrong deeds in front of the preceptor.
- Parihāraśuddhi means one should obtain purity by abstention from injuryto living being.
- Sūkṣmasaṃparāya means one should control of the subtle from ofpassions.
- Yathākhyāta means thinking for liberation after the control of all thepassions.

Moreover, the influx of karma-pudgala can also be stopped out by vow. It is offive kinds, viz.,

- ahiṃsā i.e. abstention from injury;
- anṛta i.e. abstention from falsehood;
- asteya i.e. abstention from stealing;
- brahmacarya i.e. abstention from sexual pleasure and
- aparigraha i.e. abstention from worldly things.

All of these are the ways of stopping the influx of new karma-pudgala into the self. When all of these ways are successfully followed, then the influx of karma-pudgala is stopped.

### **Nirjarā:**

The destruction of old karma-pudgala is called nirjarā. Samvara stops the influx of fresh karmans. But the self is not free from the karma-pudgalas which have already entered into the self. So, Prabhācandra holds that for the attainment of liberation, it is also necessary to destroy the karma-matters that have already entered into the body of the self. This destruction is only possible through nirjarā i.e. it consists in the annihilation of already entered karmans. Prabhācandra says that it is of two types, viz.,

- upakrama-nirjarā and
- anupakrama-nirjarā. Upakramanirjarā is destroyed through twelve kinds of penances, while the anupakramanirjarā is destroyed in proper time after the fruits of such karman are enjoyed.

According to another view, nirjarā is of two kinds, viz.,

- bhāva-nirjarā and
- dravya-nirjarā.

Bhāva-nirjarā is again of two types, viz.,

- savipāka and
- avipāka.

The natures of savipāka-nirjarā and avipāka-nirjarā are the same with the natures of anupakrama-nirjarā and upakrama-nirjarā.

By the twelve kinds of penances, the karma-matters are destroyed. Of them, the six are external penances and the remaining six are internal ones. The six external penances are: anaśana (fasting); uṇadaṛī (less eating); vṛttiparisamkṣepa (limiting quantity of food); rasa-tyagā (abstaining from eating ghee, sweet etc.); kāya- kleśa (torturing the body) and saṃlinatā (avoidance of temptation by control the senses, mind etc.). On the other hand, the six internal penances are: prāyaścitta (confession of crime and performance of penances for its atonement); vinaya (respect to the ascetics); vaiyāvacca (service to the ascetics, the poor etc.); svādhyāya (study of scriptures); vyutsarga (giving up all the internal and external things of the mundane world) and dhyāna (meditation). All of these are the means of destroying the karma-pudgalas that have already entered into the self.

Thus, from the above point of discussion it has been seen that the self comes under the bondage

of karma-pudgala because of āsrava and bandha. So, it becomes impure and cannot attain liberation. The self becomes free from all of the karma-pudgalas through samvara and nirjarā. So, after the destruction of all the karma-pudgalas, the self becomes fit for liberation.

### **The Three Jewels of Jainism**

The three jewels of Jainism are also known as three gems and three refuges. They are different from the three jewels of Buddhism. They constitute the core practice of Jainism for both the ascetics and the laity. The three jewels are interdependent and yet independent. They prepare the followers to practice the vows they have to undertake as a part of their religious obligation.

Jainism is a very austere religion, which demands a high degree of commitment from its followers, in which one has to be willing to forego everything to achieve liberation, including one's life. While the laity is given some freedom to practice the law, no lenience is given to those who have chosen to become the ascetics and follow the path in letter and spirit. The three jewels which are common for both groups are cultivation of 1. Right perception (samyak darshana), 2. Right knowledge (samyak jnana) and 3. Right conduct (samyak charitra). These three jewels are discussed in detail below.

### **Right Perception (Samyak Darsana) (Tri-ratna)**

Right Perception (samyak charitra) is also translated into English as right vision, and right view. It is actually all these and even more. Perception is not a mere physical act. There is a mental process behind it and it is very much influenced by the attitude and the background of the preceptor. Right Perception comes with the ability to discriminate correctly between right and wrong, good and bad, right belief and wrong belief, right knowledge and wrong knowledge, and between truth and untruth.

Right Perception comes from right thoughts, right insight, right knowledge, right understanding, right faith, right relationships and right attitude. In a traditional sense, right perception comes from having right beliefs and right thinking about the thirthankaras and their teachings, and by knowing the difference between the Jiva, the embodied soul and Ajiva, the inert matter. In a negative sense, right perception also means not having the wrong perception, which is acquired by not believing in false prophets, not following wrong scriptures, not believing in the wrong knowledge and not indulging in wrong practices.

Right perception leads to contentment (prasanna), detachment (nirveda), spiritual yearning for liberating, (samvega), kindness (anukampa) and faith in the path (astikaya). It also results in freedom from eight kinds of pride, namely pride in family, physical strength, beauty, knowledge, wealth, authority, relationships and spiritual progress. Cultivation of right perception requires a great deal of inner discipline and assiduous practice which demands the following requirements.

- Faith without doubts,
- Complete renunciation of desire for worldly comforts,
- Respect for believers on the path,
- Absence of likes and dislikes,
- Disinterest in wrong paths,
- Bringing non-believers to the path,
- Cultivation of right faith, and

- Spreading the knowledge Jainism

### **Right knowledge (Samyak Jnana)**

Right knowledge (samyak jnan) comes with right perception, right understanding, right discrimination and by knowing the true doctrine. Knowledge that is gained through external agencies is liable to error whereas knowledge gained directly through the faculties of the soul cannot be wrong. The true test of right knowledge lies in its ability to help us in getting what is good for us and in avoiding what is sinful. Right knowledge is useful and reliable because it is a true representation of what is.

Jainism acknowledges eight types of knowledge. Of them five constitute right knowledge. They are mati (mental knowledge), sruti (acquired knowledge), avadhi (distant knowledge), manahparyaya (paranormal knowledge) and kevala (absolute knowledge). The remaining three types of knowledge constitute false knowledge (mithya jnan). They are invalid knowledge, erroneous knowledge and wrong knowledge.

Mati jnana (mental knowledge) is ordinary perception obtained through the normal faculties of the mind such as perception, cognition, analysis and memory. It is further divided into smriti (remembrance), pratyabhijna or samjna (recognition), curita or tarka (inductive logic) and abhinibodha or anumana (deductive logic). According to another classification, it is divided into upalabdhi (end result), bhavana (feelings and emotion) and upayoga (usefulness). Matijnana comes to us mainly through the sense organs (indriyas). So sensory knowledge always precedes mental knowledge. Sruti jnana is verbal and non verbal knowledge acquired through signs, symbols and words. Study and hearing are the usual methods of obtaining srutijnana.

While matijnana is acquired through primary contact srutijnana is acquired through secondary contact or another source. Srutijnana is of four types depending upon how it is acquired: labdhi (contact), bhavana (attention), upayoga (utility) and naya (perspective). The difference between sruti and mati is very subtle because in case of srutijnana also perception, cognition and understanding play an important role. Matijnana is the raw material from which comes srutijnana as a finished product. The former is based on personal experiences and perceptions while the latter is based on other people's knowledge and experiences that has been borrowed through communication.

Avadhi jnana is clairvoyance or knowledge of distant and remote things acquired through higher faculties, without the use of the senses or study. It comes either from birth (bhava) because of previous karma or from virtues (gunas) acquired by doing good karma and destroying bad karma.

Manahparyaya jnana is the knowledge acquired psychically through other people's minds using the paranormal faculty of mind reading or telepathy. People endowed with this faculty have the ability to actually see the thought forms and mental impressions of other people and know instantly what they are thinking. Manahparyaya jnana is acquired because of previous good karma or virtue acquired in the present life by removing impure karma. Manahparyaya is a kind of avadhijnana but it is limited to the extent of other people's minds and what is going on in them. In comparison, avadhijnana extends to every thing and everywhere. Secondly both human beings and others can acquire avadhijnana, but manahparyaya is possible only in case of humans.

Kevala jnana is the "Only" knowledge or the absolute knowledge. It is also described as the perfect knowledge and the ultimate knowledge. Kevalajnana is not subject to standpoints or perspectives because it contains all view points and perspectives simultaneously. It is omniscient, omnipresent, indescribable, unlimited, eternal and transcendental to which the limitations of space and time do not apply. It is acquired only when a person has achieved nirvana.

Knowledge obtained by these five means is divided into both direct knowledge (pratyaksha) and indirect knowledge (paroksha). Direct knowledge is that knowledge which is acquired directly without the intervention of an external agency. Of the five types of knowledge, the first two are considered indirect and hence reliable while the last three are direct and more reliable. Indirect knowledge is susceptible to error, invalid conclusions, and falsehood, whereas direct knowledge is perfect.

From right perception comes right knowledge. From right knowledge comes right conduct and the power of discrimination. As karma is gradually removed from the embodied self, it begins to acquire different types of right knowledge. First comes perceptual knowledge. From it arises the desire to study and acquire the sruti knowledge. From the study of the doctrine and its practice comes clairvoyance or knowledge of distant objects and telepathy. These extraordinary powers enable the jiva to come into contact with higher beings from whom it gains more knowledge leading to its further purification. As the Jiva becomes adept in different types of knowledge, it gradually moves on the path of liberation and achieves kevala jnana or the highest knowledge. Ultimately, in the transcendental state, the Jiva gains perfect knowledge and becomes complete.

### **Right conduct (Samyak Charitra)**

The three jewels are interconnected and work in tandem. One cannot have right conduct without right knowledge and one cannot have right knowledge without right perception. Right conduct comes from the awareness of what is right and what is wrong and by doing what is right. It is practicing right knowledge as revealed by the thirthankaras and the jinas. At the core of their teachings is the practice of non-violence as a solution to the problem of karma. However ahimsa has to be practiced in conjunction with other teachings. A follower of Jainism should not have any doubt about the teachings of the Jinas. From faith comes the conviction and the resolve to remain committed to the path. Faith in the doctrine is therefore the first commitment expected of each follower. The conviction is further cemented by the 12 vows or vratas, which each initiate into Jainism has to undertake to begin his or her journey on the path. Of the 12 vows five are main vows or maha vratas and the rest are supplementary vows or anuvratas. Jain scriptures provide ancillary information on how to practice each of the main vows.

### **Five vows (Mahavratas)( Panch-vrata)**

In Jainism, the five main vows are an important part of spiritual practice to achieve liberation. They are meant for both lay followers and ascetics. The five main vows are stated below.

**Ahimsa- non-injury** or non-violence, to be practiced by not piercing, not binding, not overloading, not causing pain and not starving beings. Ahimsa should be practiced positively by practicing non-violence and negatively by refraining from violence

**Satya - truthfulness**, to be practiced by not spreading false doctrine, not back-biting, not doing forgery, not betraying secrets and not breaking promises. Satya should be practiced positively by

practicing truthfulness and negatively by not speaking lies

**Asteya - not to steal**, to be practiced by not encouraging others to steal, not receiving stolen property, not acquiring things against law, not adulterating and not using false weights or measurements, use or what is obtained legitimately and not to take what is not given. Asteya should be practiced positively by using what one has and negatively by not taking what has not been given.

**Brahmacharya - chastity** or celibacy, to be practiced by not indulging in extramarital relationships, not indulging in unnatural sex, not indulging in lewd behavior, not showing excessive passion for one's spouse and not associating with sexually immoral people. Brahmacharya should be practiced positively by observing celibacy and negatively by refraining from sensual pleasure.

**Aparigriha - renunciation** or detachment, to be practiced by limiting one's possessions through three progressive levels of reduction: at a level higher than what one has, at a level equal to what one actually has and at a level less than what one has. Aparigriha should be practiced positively by giving away and negatively by not seeking worldly things.

The five vows are called mahavrata or great vows when they are practiced rigidly. In case of ordinary people who may not be able to practice them strictly, they are called anuvratas or minor vows. Those who have taken to asceticism are expected to observe them all the time mentally, verbally and physically. For example, the vow of ahimsa should be practiced by not injuring others mentally, verbally and physically. The laity are also advised to refrain from associating themselves with people who are not sincere on the path and who violate the vows habitually. Ascetics are advised to keep a vigil over themselves all the time while practicing the vows with firm resolve, cultivating 10 more virtues, namely kshama (forgiveness), mardava (humility), arjava (honesty), satya (truth), soucha (purity), samyam (self-restraint), tapas (penance), tyaga (sacrifice), akinchanya (non-attachment) and brahmacharya (celibacy).

## **Buddhism**

Buddhism is a path of practice and spiritual development leading to insight into the true nature of reality. Buddhist practices like **meditation** are means of changing yourself in order to develop the qualities of awareness, kindness, and wisdom. The experience developed within the Buddhist tradition over thousands of years has created an incomparable resource for all those who wish to follow a path — a path which ultimately culminates in Enlightenment or Buddhahood. An enlightened being sees the nature of reality absolutely clearly, just as it is, and lives fully and naturally in accordance with that vision. This is the goal of the Buddhist spiritual life, representing the end of suffering for anyone who attains it.

Because Buddhism does not include the idea of worshipping a creator god, some people do not see it as a religion in the normal, Western sense. The basic tenets of Buddhist teaching are straightforward and practical: nothing is fixed or permanent; actions have consequences; change is possible. So Buddhism addresses itself to all people irrespective of race, nationality, caste, sexuality, or gender. It teaches practical methods which enable people to realise and use its teachings in order to transform their experience, to be fully responsible for their lives.

Buddhism is a faith that was founded by Siddhartha Gautama ("the Buddha") more than 2,500 years ago in India. With about 470 million followers, scholars consider Buddhism one of the major world religions. Its practice has historically been most prominent in East and Southeast Asia, but its influence is growing in the West. Many Buddhist ideas and philosophies overlap with those of other faiths.

## **Buddhism Beliefs**

Some key Buddhism beliefs include:

- Followers of Buddhism don't acknowledge a supreme god or deity. They instead focus on achieving enlightenment—a state of inner peace and wisdom. When followers reach this spiritual echelon, they're said to have experienced nirvana.
- The religion's founder, Buddha, is considered an extraordinary man, but not a god. The word Buddha means "enlightened."
- The path to enlightenment is attained by utilizing morality, meditation and wisdom. Buddhists often meditate because they believe it helps awaken truth.
- There are many philosophies and interpretations within Buddhism, making it a tolerant and evolving religion.
- Some scholars don't recognize Buddhism as an organized religion, but rather, a "way of life" or a "spiritual tradition."
- Buddhism encourages its people to avoid self-indulgence but also self-denial.
- Buddha's most important teachings, known as The Four Noble Truths, are essential to understanding the religion.
- Buddhists embrace the concepts of karma (the law of cause and effect) and reincarnation (the continuous cycle of rebirth).
- Followers of Buddhism can worship in temples or in their own homes.
- Buddhist monks, or bhikkhus, follow a strict code of conduct, which includes celibacy.
- There is no single Buddhist symbol, but a number of images have evolved that represent Buddhist beliefs, including the lotus flower, the eight-spoked dharma wheel, the Bodhi tree and the swastika (an ancient symbol whose name means "well-being" or "good fortune" in Sanskrit).

## **Founder of Buddhism**

Siddhartha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism who later became known as "the Buddha," lived during the 5th century B.C.

Gautama was born into a wealthy family as a prince in present-day Nepal. Although he had an easy life, Gautama was moved by suffering in the world.

He decided to give up his lavish lifestyle and endure poverty. When this didn't fulfill him, he promoted the idea of the "Middle Way," which means existing between two extremes. Thus, he sought a life without social indulgences but also without deprivation.

After six years of searching, Buddhists believe Gautama found enlightenment while meditating under a Bodhi tree. He spent the rest of his life teaching others about how to achieve this spiritual state.

## Buddhism History

When Gautama passed away around 483 B.C., his followers began to organize a religious movement. Buddha's teachings became the foundation for what would develop into Buddhism.

In the 3rd century B.C., Ashoka the Great, the Mauryan Indian emperor, made Buddhism the state religion of India. Buddhist monasteries were built, and missionary work was encouraged. Over the next few centuries, Buddhism began to spread beyond India. The thoughts and philosophies of Buddhists became diverse, with some followers interpreting ideas differently than others.

In the sixth century, the Huns invaded India and destroyed hundreds of Buddhist monasteries, but the intruders were eventually driven out of the country.

Islam began to spread quickly in the region during the Middle Ages, forcing Buddhism into the background.

## Types of Buddhism

Today, many forms of Buddhism exist around the world. The three main types that represent specific geographical areas include:

- **Theravada Buddhism:** Prevalent in Thailand, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Laos and Burma
- **Mahayana Buddhism:** Prevalent in China, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Vietnam
- **Tibetan Buddhism:** Prevalent in Tibet, Nepal, Mongolia, Bhutan, and parts of Russia and northern India

Each of these types reveres certain texts and has slightly different interpretations of Buddha's teachings. There are also several subsets of Buddhism, including Zen Buddhism and Nirvana Buddhism.

Some forms of Buddhism incorporate ideas of other religions and philosophies, such as Taoism and Bon.

## Dharma

Buddha's teachings are known as "dharma." He taught that wisdom, kindness, patience, generosity and compassion were important virtues.

Specifically, all Buddhists live by five moral precepts, which prohibit:

- Killing living things
  - Taking what is not given
  - Sexual misconduct
  - Lying
  - Using drugs or alcohol
- Four Noble Truths

The Four Noble Truths, which Buddha taught, are:

- The truth of suffering (dukkha)
- The truth of the cause of suffering (samudaya)
- The truth of the end of suffering (nirhodha)
- The truth of the path that frees us from suffering (magga)

## Eightfold Path

The Buddha taught his followers that the end of suffering, as described in the fourth Noble Truths, could be achieved by following an Eightfold Path.

In no particular order, the Eightfold Path of Buddhism teaches the following ideals for ethical conduct, mental discipline and achieving wisdom:

- Right understanding (Samma ditthi)
- Right thought (Samma sankappa)
- Right speech (Samma vaca)
- Right action (Samma kammanta)
- Right livelihood (Samma ajiva)
- Right effort (Samma vayama)
- Right mindfulness (Samma sati)
- Right concentration (Samma samadhi)

## Buddhist Holy Book

Buddhists revere many sacred texts and scriptures. Some of the most important are:

- **Tipitaka:** These texts, known as the “three baskets,” are thought to be the earliest collection of Buddhist writings.
- **Sutras:** There are more than 2,000 sutras, which are sacred teachings embraced mainly by Mahayana Buddhists.
- **The Book of the Dead:** This Tibetan text describes the stages of death in detail.

## Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama is the leading monk in Tibetan Buddhism. Followers of the religion believe the Dalai Lama is a reincarnation of a past lama that has agreed to be born again to help humanity. There have been 14 Dalai Lamas throughout history.

The Dalai Lama also governed Tibet until the Chinese took control in 1959. The current Dalai Lama, Lhamo Thondup, was born in 1935.

## Upaya

*Upaya* is a Sanskrit term referring to limitless possibilities. It is often used with *upaya-kausalya*, meaning “skillful means.” *Upaya* finds mention in Mahayana Buddhism as an aspect of guidance that recommends practitioners to follow their own specific techniques according to a prevailing situation in order to achieve enlightenment.

Using skillful means is considered as one of the attributes of a *bodhisattva*, which refers to those who tread the path toward achieving *Buddhahood*.

## Explanation Upaya

To put it simply, *upaya* is starting from where you are and working with what you have in order to start creating. *Upaya* can involve unconventional methods that do not find mention in Buddhist doctrines, the only rule being that the action must involve compassion and wisdom. It is also essential that the action is the need of the moment.

"Lotus Sutra," which is considered one of the most influential texts of Buddhism, elaborates on the importance of upaya. The second chapter in the text highlights the importance of upaya, while in the third chapter, Buddha explains upaya with the following illustration: "A man returns home to find his house in flames with his children inside playing happily, not realizing the consequences of the fire. The man calls his children to come out, but being involved in their game, the children refuse to do so. With no other option to bring them out, the father tells them that he has brought them beautiful carts that are drawn by goats, deer and bullock. His statement made the children come out immediately, but only to find nothing their father had promised. However, the relieved father soon got them more than what he had told them to make them get out of the house on fire." Buddha tells his disciples that though the father uttered a false statement, it cannot be considered faulty as it was his earnest attempt to save his children. The father had applied upaya that fit the situation to bring his children out of danger.

### **Upāya-Kaushal**

The concept of 'skilful means' is one of the leading ideas of Mahayana Buddhism and was first used extensively in The Lotus Sutra and other writings treated below. In Mahayana Buddhism the various forms of Buddhist teaching and practice are declared to be provisional means, all skilfully set up by the Buddha for the benefit of the unenlightened. A Buddhist who makes progress himself comes to recognise this provisional quality in the forms of his religion, and though using the means provided for him he has to learn not to be wrongly attached to them. He leaves them behind, like a raft left lying on the bank by a man who has crossed a stream and needs it no more. An advanced follower of Buddhism, usually named by Mahayana Buddhists a bodhisattva, continues to use such provisional means in order to lead other living things towards nirvana.

A bodhisattva is skilled in allowing the Buddhist religion to be spelled out in all its detail, while not being ensnared by the false discriminations of the unenlightened. 'Skilful means' is a conflated term which is based on Chinese and Japanese usage, as explained later, and which refers to the overall spectrum of meanings with which we are concerned. Since 'skilful means' is about the way in which the goal, the intention, or the meaning of Buddhism is correlated with the unenlightened condition of living beings, it brings out particularly clearly how Mahayanists thought Buddhism, as a system, is supposed to be understood.

Once established, the term continued to be used down to the present day, admittedly with some vagaries. It is fair to say that the method of thought and practice summed up by the concept of skilful means is one of the fundamental principles of Buddhism as a working religion. Indeed a Japanese writer has claimed that it is hardly possible to discuss Mahayana Buddhism at all without reference to it.

Strangely enough the matter has never been the subject of extended study in the west. 'Nirvana', 'bodhisattva', 'emptiness' (Skt. *śūnyatā*) and so on have all been considered in this way and that, but apart from occasional references and brief definitions 'skilful means' has scarcely been attended to at all.

A concept which has been used to explain the very existence of Buddhism as a functioning religious system demands closer attention. Even in the east there do not seem to have been any extended studies, and this may be partly due to the fact that Mahayanists have rather tended to take

'skilful means' for granted as a natural principle with which to regulate their religion. In recent times there have been a few shorter articles in Japanese, which have been quite useful to the present writer.

However even the Japanese have rather tended to deal with it en passant in their voluminous commentaries, and this has prevented the concept from emerging as one of central importance to Buddhist thought, in its own right. When some years ago the writer visited the splendid headquarters of one of the lively new religions of modern Japan he was duly impressed with the architecture, the furnishings and the technology, the constant flow of people for counselling and devotions, the accessory organisations and the managerial efficiency, the obvious emphasis on cheerful prosperity and on daily personal well-being. It was radically unlike the dimly lit temples in the old style, their cemeteries crowded and overgrown, their mournful bells echoing the half-understood and half-forgotten secrets of traditional Buddhism.

These notes of transience and quiescence were far from the minds of the coachloads of well-dressed and optimistically chattering housewives attending their modern mecca in central Tokyo. Their concern was rather with family affairs, schooling, cultural and leisure pursuits, and the elimination of factors inconsistent with well-being. Nevertheless beneath all the usual appurtenances of a modern religion this particular movement was concerned, my guide explained, to teach 'true Buddhism'. In reality there was here, he went on, no so-called 'new' religion at all, but an ancient one. Then how was the coexistence of these seemingly diverse directions to be understood? That, it was explained, is a matter of skilful means.

This account was no modern simplification or sectarian perversion. The Lotus Sutra, a Mahayana Buddhist text dating from about two thousand years ago, explained that the Buddha himself uses 'innumerable devices' to lead living beings along and to separate them from their attachments.

Such devices are formulated in terms of the relative ignorance and the passionate attachments of those who need them, but they turn and dissolve into the Buddhist attainment of release. Similarly the great celestial bodhisattvas or buddhas-to-be are characterised not only by their penetrating insight into the true nature of reality but also by a great compassion for suffering beings. They too deploy a range of methods for the salvation of the multitude, skilfully tuning them to a variety of needs yet consistently intimating the intention of nirvana.

The release of all sentient beings is guaranteed in the nirvana of any one bodhisattva, a nirvana postponed and yet assured. For one thing the great vow of a bodhisattva bears all suffering beings along with him. For another thing, to imagine that one being or some beings could attain nirvana, and not others, would fall some way short of the radical teaching that all phenomena are equally void of persistent ontological status, or that, as The Lotus Sutra puts it, all things are nirvanic from the beginning.

The path of a bodhisattva is to know this, and at the same time to keep on playing the game of skilful means to save people from themselves. This style of thinking, in which insight (Skt. prajñā) and means (Skt. upāya) are inextricably related, is the key to understanding the proliferation of new forms which the Mahayana has woven across half Asia. It is also possible to look at skilful means not from the side of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas who invent them, but from the side of the sentient beings who need them, that is, from the point of view of human beings ignorantly entangled in the apparently ceaseless round of birth and death (Skt. saṃsāra). Indeed Sawada

Kenshd reflected a common Japanese assumption about the matter when he concluded in a short article that there are two basic meanings to be remembered.

- The first is skilful means as invented by the Buddha for the benefit of sentient beings.
- The second is skilful means as used by sentient beings for the attainment of nirvana or release. The means themselves are the same, of course, whichever idea is uppermost. Whether considered as working downwards or upwards the skilful means are above all provisional. They not only need to be established from above but also to be superseded from below. As the beneficiaries become enlightened the expedients become redundant. This process may be a rather rough dismantling and debunking as in some corridors of the Zen tradition, or it may be a smooth transference from one level of meaning to another. Since the skilful means are initially tuned in to the needs of beings entangled in ignorance and samsara, it is quite natural that release from these involves a subtle change in the significance or status of the very means which bring it about.

In this sense the concept of skilful means involves the paradox that Mahayana Buddhism elaborates and proliferates itself without end as a religion of salvation and at the same time it tends towards its own dissolution. Indeed the Mahayanists claim, and not without some justice, that 'skilful means' is the key to the understanding of Buddhism in general. Perhaps the most suggestive passages in this connection are those which narrate the Buddha's initial decision to teach at all. Without this decision the Buddhist religion would never have developed any articulate form whatever. It is therefore of great importance that Mahayanists interpret it in terms of the Buddha's skilful means. For them this key concept is the appropriate way in which to understand any phase of Buddhism which is supposed to derive from the Buddha's initiative, whether it be abstractedly conceptual, concretely narrative, or expressed as meditational practice.

The 'answers' which Buddhism apparently offers, such as the teaching of cessation (Skt. *nirodha*) or nirvana, are devised entirely in terms of the problem and they are not intended to have any particular meaning beyond the attainment of the solution. Thus 'Buddhism', as a specific religion identifiable in human history, is a skilful means.

## **Brahma-vihāra**

The *brahma-viharas*, or "sublime attitudes," are the Buddha's primary heart teachings—the ones that connect most directly with our desire for true happiness. The term "brahma-vihara" literally means "dwelling place of brahmas." Brahmas are gods who live in the higher heavens, dwelling in an attitude of unlimited goodwill, unlimited compassion, unlimited empathetic joy, and unlimited equanimity. These unlimited attitudes can be developed from the more limited versions of these emotions that we experience in the human heart.

In Buddhism, there are *four states of mind* called the "Brahma-vihara" or "four divine states of dwelling." Buddha taught these values to monks. The four divine states are also known as the "Four Immeasurables" or the "Four Perfect Virtues." In many Buddhist traditions the four states are cultivated through *meditation*. They are also interrelated and support one another.

### **The four states are:**

- *metta* (loving kindness)
- *karuna* (compassion)

- *mudita* (sympathetic joy or empathy)
- and *upekkha* (equanimity).

It's important to understand that these mental states are not emotions. It takes practice and dedication to establish these states of mind, and even then it's a constant journey. One cannot simply make up in your mind that you will be loving, compassionate, empathetic and balanced at the flick of a switch. These four states requires intentional dwelling and altering how you experience and perceive yourself and others. Becoming aware of and loosening the bonds of the ego are especially important in this practice.

## **Metta (Loving Kindness)**

Metta is the practice of cultivating *universal* love, friendliness, or lovingkindness. Metta is benevolence toward all beings, without discrimination or selfish attachment. Metta can be compared to the *unconditional love* that a mother would have for her children. This love does not discriminate between benevolent people and malicious people. It is a love in which "I" and "you" disappear, and where there is no possessor and nothing to possess. By practicing Metta, one can overcome anger, ill will, hatred and aversion.

The practice progresses in **five stages**. As we use Metta during meditation, **we cultivate Metta for:**

- Ourselves
- A good friend
- A "neutral" person – someone we don't have any strong feelings for
- A "difficult" person – someone we have conflicts with or feelings of illwill towards
- All sentient beings

In your practice, you can access Metta through meditation and identifying someone at each of the stages. Learning to accept all for how they are will give you the freedom to love and forgive.

## **Karuna (Compassion)**

Karuna is active sympathy extended to all sentient beings. Karuna is combined with *prajna* (wisdom), which in Mahayana Buddhism means the realization that all sentient beings exist in each other and take identity from each other (see shunyata). The terms "we are all one" is reflective in the practice of Karuna.

Theravada scholar Nyanaponika Thera said, "It is compassion that removes the heavy bar, opens the door to freedom, makes the narrow heart as wide as the world. Compassion takes away from the heart the inert weight, the paralyzing heaviness; it gives wings to those who cling to the lowlands of self."

## **Mudita (Sympathetic Joy)**

Mudita is taking sympathetic or altruistic joy in observance of the happiness of others. Mudita is the ability to take active delight in others' good fortune or good deeds as a way to develop and maintain calmness of mind. People also identify mudita with empathy. Some teachers believe the cultivation of mudita is a prerequisite for developing metta and karuna. The antithesis of mudita is jealousy and envy.

By being happy when good things happen to others, your opportunities for delight are greatly

increased. Practice Mudita when you observe the success and happiness in others.

### **Upekkha/Upeksha (Equanimity)**

Upekkha is a mind in balance, free of discrimination yet rooted in insight. In Upekkha non-attachment, non-discrimination, even-mindedness or letting go is practiced, however it does not mean that the mind is indifferent. Equanimity is a state of psychological stability and composure. The mind remains undisturbed by experience of or exposure to emotions, pain, or other phenomena that may cause others to lose the balance of their mind.

In yoga we cultivate Upekkha through the acceptance of what is and to let what is be. When we dwell on what should be or what shouldn't be, we lose this mind balance and composure. It becomes polluted with expectations and emotions.

### **Bodhisattva**

**A bodhisattva** is a Buddhist deity who has attained the highest level of enlightenment, but who delays their entry into Paradise in order to help the earthbound. The bodhisattva, known in Sanskrit as Avalokiteśvara, takes both male and female form and is associated with the qualities of mercy and compassion; its Chinese incarnation, Guanyin – who is always represented as female – translates as the 'perceiver of sounds'. Guanyin, Buddhists believe, can recognise the cries of all those who suffer on earth and guide them towards salvation.

The earliest source for the doctrines of Avalokiteśvara is in the 25th chapter of the Lotus Sutra, one of the foundation texts of Mahayana Buddhism, which originated in India around the beginning of the first century AD. Other sources claim that the sun and the moon were born of this bodhisattva's eyes. Ideas and images associated with Avalokiteśvara have been of particular influence on Chinese and Japanese literature, such as *The Tale of Genji*, written by the 11th-century noblewoman Murasaki Shikabu, which tells the romantic, picaresque story of the son of an ancient Japanese emperor. Some scholars have argued that it has claim to be the first novel.

This statue of Avalokiteśvara, now on display in the St Louis Art Museum, depicts the bodhisattva seated, with legs folded as if meditating. It is made of a single woodblock, decorated with quartz and carnelian, and was made in China at the time of the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127).

**A bodhisattva** is literally a living being (sattva) who aspires to enlightenment (bodhi) and carries out altruistic practices. The bodhisattva ideal is central to the Mahayana Buddhist tradition as the individual who seeks enlightenment both for him- or herself and for others. Compassion, an empathetic sharing of the sufferings of others, is the bodhisattva's greatest characteristic. It is shown in the following incident from the Vimalakirti Sutra which concerns a prominent lay follower of the Buddha who had fallen ill. When questioned about his illness, Vimalakirti replied, "Because the beings are ill, the bodhisattva is ill. The sickness of the bodhisattva arises from his great compassion."

It is held that the bodhisattva makes four vows expressing a determination to work for the happiness of others: "However innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to save them; however inexhaustible the passions are, I vow to master them; however limitless the teachings are, I vow to study them; however infinite the Buddha-truth is, I vow to attain it."

The vows, each of which commits the bodhisattva to the open-ended pursuit of a continually receding goal, may seem daunting. Buddhism asserts, however, that the path of the bodhisattva is not an otherworldly undertaking for people with unique gifts of compassion or wisdom. Rather, the life-condition of bodhisattva is inherent in the lives of ordinary men and women, and the purpose of Buddhist practice is to strengthen that state until compassion becomes the basis of all our actions.

In addition to compassion, the vows reflect the bodhisattva's commitment to self-mastery, to study and learning, to the attainment of wisdom. None of these, however, is pursued in a vacuum, merely to improve or adorn the self; at the base of all these efforts is always the determination to remove the sufferings of others, and to replace them with joy.

For the followers of Nichiren Buddhism, bodhisattva practice is subsumed in the twin, mutually reinforcing aspects of "practice for oneself and others." The core of practicing for oneself is the recitation of Nam-myoho-renge-kyo (the "daimoku" of the Lotus Sutra) along with key passages from the sutra. The purpose of this practice is to revolutionize one's inner life, to develop the qualities of the Buddha: courage, wisdom, compassion and abundant vitality or life-force.

While many people may at first be inspired to practice Buddhism by the desire for personal happiness, to overcome illness or some other seemingly insurmountable challenge, as their life-state expands, they naturally develop a deeper concern for the happiness of others. Perceiving the interconnectedness of all beings, they take compassionate action, including sharing with others the insights of Buddhism, so they may also tap into the same rich inner resources that lie within their lives.

Bodhisattvas are thus naturally engaged in society, actively struggling both to change themselves and make the world a better, more humane place for all people. This explains why members of the SGI strive to be valuable participants in society, and to contribute as much as possible to their family, workplace and community.

## **Hedonism**

The term "hedonism," from the Greek word ἡδονή (*hēdonē*) for pleasure, refers to several related theories about what is good for us, how we should behave, and what motivates us to behave in the way that we do. All hedonistic theories identify pleasure and pain as the only important elements of whatever phenomena they are designed to describe. If hedonistic theories identified pleasure and pain as merely two important elements, instead of the *only* important elements of what they are describing, then they would not be nearly as unpopular as they all are. However, the claim that pleasure and pain are the *only* things of ultimate importance is what makes hedonism distinctive and philosophically interesting.

Philosophical hedonists tend to focus on hedonistic theories of value, and especially of well-being (the good life for the one living it). As a theory of value, hedonism states that all and only pleasure is intrinsically valuable and all and only pain is intrinsically not valuable. Hedonists usually define pleasure and pain broadly, such that both physical and mental phenomena are included. Thus, a gentle massage and recalling a fond memory are both considered to cause pleasure and stubbing a toe and hearing about the death of a loved one are both considered to cause pain. With *pleasure* and *pain* so defined, hedonism as a theory about what is valuable for us is intuitively appealing.

Indeed, its appeal is evidenced by the fact that nearly all historical and contemporary treatments of well-being allocate at least some space for discussion of hedonism. Unfortunately for hedonism, the discussions rarely endorse it and some even deplore its focus on pleasure.

### **Hedonism of Charvaka Philosophy:**

The Carvakas reject virtue and liberation as the ends of life. They regard sensual pleasure as the supreme end. It is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. Pleasure arising from the embrace of a woman and other objects of enjoyment is the highest good. Sensual pleasure does not cease to be good because it is mixed with pain. Pleasure only should be enjoyed. Pain that inevitably accompanies pleasure should be avoided as far as possible. Unavoidable pain that accompanies pleasure should be experienced for the sake of pleasure.

A person should separate bones and scales from the fish to enjoy the pleasure of eating it. He should not discard it because it has scales and bones. He should take the trouble of separating the husk from the paddy to enjoy the pleasure of eating fine rice.

He should not discard rice because he has to separate it from the husk. It is foolish not to sow seeds of corns because there are wild animals, which may devour the corns. It is foolish not to cook food because beggars may pester us for a share of food.

It is improper to discard pleasure through fear of pain that inevitably accompanies it. One who rejects sentient pleasure, which is actually experienced, for fear of its accompanying pain is as stupid as a beast.

It is foolish to think that pleasure should be relinquished, which is produced by the intercourse of the senses with their objects, because it is attended with pain. Hedonistic calculus has to be employed. The maximum of sensual pleasure with the minimum of pain is the highest good. There is no supra-mundane happiness. Injunctions and prohibitions should be discarded.

Wealth is a means to pleasure. It ought to be acquired for instrumental value. Pleasure and wealth both constitute the human good. This is the view of the authors of Nitisastra and Kamasastra. It is accepted by the Carvakas, who deny the other-worldly good. Virtue consists in the enjoyment of sensual pleasure due to the gratification of desires. It is the highest virtue. Supreme happiness springs from the gratification of desires.

Rightness consists in conduciveness to sensual pleasure. Wrongness consists in conduciveness to bodily pain. An action, which gives excess of pleasure over pain, is right. An action, which gives excess of pain over pleasure, is wrong.

The Carvakas advocate gross egoistic hedonism. The Brahmanas, who are consummate in the art of fraudulence and who composed the Vedas, delude foolish people to think that certain articles of food and drink are permitted while others are forbidden.

They enjoin bodily austerities on the gullible people in the vain expectation of happiness in heaven which is never perceived. They produce in the ignorant people foolish other-worldly madness of religion.

'Eat, drink, and be merry.' The past is dead and gone, It never returns. Youth never returns, make the most of the present youth. Bodily pleasures of this world are perceptible and certain. 'The pleasures of heaven attainable through the mortification of the body are imperceptible, uncertain and illusory.

Pursuit of distant, uncertain, and supersensible heavenly happiness at the cost of certain, immediate, perceptible earthly pleasures is foolish. Penances are deprivations of pleasure. Religious rites are childish play. Enjoy all kinds of pleasures attainable from earthly objects. After death nothing remains. The body is a fortuitous combination of the material elements. There is no pre-existence nor future life nor rebirth.

The body is not due to the merits and demerits acquired in the past birth. Pleasure and pain are not due to the maturation of the merits and demerits of the past birth. They are due to the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. The fortuitous conjunction of the material elements is liable to destruction at any moment. The present is certain; the 'past is gone; the future is uncertain. So enjoy pleasures of the present moment disregarding the past and the future. Enjoy the maximum of bodily pleasure with the minimum of pain disregarding the next world. Thus the Carvakas advocate gross egoistic hedonism.

But Vatsyayana, the author of Kama Sutra, makes a distinction between higher pleasures and lower pleasures, rational pleasures and sensual pleasures. He regards happiness (kama), wealth (artha), and virtue (dharma) as the supreme ends of life.

Wealth and happiness should be pursued in harmony with virtue. They should not be cultivated at the sacrifice of one another. Harmony of happiness, wealth and virtue is the highest good. One who pursues the triple ends (trivarga) enjoys supreme happiness on earth and in heaven after death. Wealth is superior to happiness. Happiness is superior to virtue.

When there is a conflict among them, the former should be pursued at the sacrifice of the latter, but the latter should not be pursued at the sacrifice of the former, since the former are superior to the latter. If there is no incompatibility among the three ends, all should be pursued. This is the best course. If they are not realizable at the same time owing to their incompatibility, then two of them should be attained.

This is the middle course. If even the two ends cannot be realized simultaneously owing to their incompatibility, only one of them should be achieved. This is the worst course. Excessive charity is conducive to virtue; but it exhausts wealth, and thwarts happiness. Excessive penance sacrifices happiness, undermines health, and destroys the capacity for earning wealth. Excessive hoarding of wealth sacrifices happiness and virtue.

Excessive indulgence in sexual pleasure sacrifices, wealth and virtue. So these should be avoided. When an action is conducive to one end and repugnant to the others, its comparative merits and demerits should be considered.

Wealth, happiness and virtue should be pursued in harmony with one another; they should not be pursued as destructive of one another. There are sixty-four fine arts (kala) which yield refined pleasure. Both sensual pleasure and refined pleasure should be pursued. So Vatsyayana is an advocate of refined egoistic hedonism.

The Bhagavata Purana refers to persons who pursue the three ends of wealth, happiness and virtue (traivargika), and are averse to God, Jayamangala interprets Vatsyayana's doctrine as refined egoistic hedonism, which regards wealth and virtue as means to happiness. Vatsyayana regards happiness as the only intrinsic value, and wealth and virtue as instrumental and extrinsic values.

# MCQs

1. Which of the following are called Purusharth?

- a) Dharma
- b) Artha
- c) Karma and Moksha
- d) All the above

Answer: (d)

2. The four fold varna system became strong system became strong and rigid during the period of

- a) Early Vedic age
- b) Later vedic age
- c) Kushans
- d) Nandas

Ans: (b)

3. Which type of rna in vedic tradition can be repaid by performing yajna?

- a) Rsirna
- b) Devarna
- c) Pitrna
- d) Prthvarna

Ans: b

4. Which of the following texts assumes the process of creation in the form of yajna?

- a) Purusa Sukta
- b) Nasadiya Sukta
- c) Hiranyagarbha Sukta
- d) Taittiriya Brahmana

Ans: a

5. According to the law of karma, every karma leads to \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Moksha
- b) Phala
- c) Dharma
- d) all these

Ans: b

6. Which one of the following is not acceptable to Jain Philosophy?

- a) Realistic and relativistic pluralism.
- b) 'Dravya' and 'Guàa' are inseparable.
- c) We can know an object in all its aspects.
- d) Keval-Jnana is unlimited and absolute knowledge.

Answer: (c)

7. Given below are Assertion (A) and Reason (R). Consider them and select the correct code given

below, in the context of Buddhism:

**Assertion (A):** There is suffering in the world.

**Reason (R):** It is not created by us.

**Code:**

- a) (A) and (R) both are true and is the correct explanation of (A).
- b) (A) and (R) both are true and is not the correct explanation of (A).
- c) (A) is false and (R) is true.
- d) (A) is true and (R) is false.

Answer: (d)

8. Rta in Vedic tradition was identified with:

- a) Satya only
- b) Dharma only
- c) Karma only
- d) Satya and Dharma

Answer: (d)

9. The Direct knowledge of the thoughts of other, according to Jain Philosophy is:

- a) Avadhi
- b) Manahpariyaya
- c) Mati
- d) Kevala

Answer: (b)

10. Which one of the following systems of Indian Philosophy designated Moksha as Nirvana?

- a) Jainism
- b) Buddhism
- c) Yoga
- d) Samkhya

Answer: (B)

11. Who says that the function of Philosophy is wholly critical?

- a) Aristotle
- b) Ayer
- c) Plato
- d) Hegel

Answer: (A)

12. All the following orders of the Purusharthas are wrong except:

- a) Dharma, Artha, Kāma, Moksha
- b) Artha, Kāma, Moksha, Dharma
- c) Dharma, Kāma, Artha, Moksha
- d) Dharma, Moksha, Artha, Kāma

Answer: (A)

13. Tirthankar means

- a) follower of a faith

- b) propounder of faith
  - c) A neutral man
  - d) None of the above
- Answer: (B)

14. "Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation" is advocated by

- a) G.E. Moore
  - b) Bradley
  - c) Kant
  - d) Rashdul
- Answer: (A)

15. Which of the following paths was advocated by Buddha?

- a) Shreya
  - b) Madhyampratipada
  - c) Kaivalya
  - d) Preya
- Answer: (B)

16. Svadharma is advocated by

- a) Krishna.a
  - b) Rāvan.a
  - c) S tā
  - d) All the above
- Answer: (A)

17. Which one of the following is known as Triratna?

- a) Shravan. a, Manana, Nididhyāsana
  - b) Darshan, Jñāna, Chāritra -
  - c) Maitr, Kāmnā, Muditā
  - d) Sagha, Dhamma, Buddha
- Answer: (B)

18. R. ta of the Vedic world was closer to

- a) Legal order
  - b) Truth
  - c) Karma
  - d) Social order
- Answer: (B)

19. Karma in Mahābhārata, was more concerned with

- a) Deva-r.n.a
  - b) Pit.ri-r.n.a
  - c) Mitra-r.n.a
  - d) Bhuta-r.n.a
- Answer: (Wrong question)

20. Which one of the following sets, in the context of ashrama dharma, is not matching?

- a) Gandhi – Brahmacharya and Grihastha
- b) Śākara – Brahmacharya and Sanyas
- c) Yājñavalkya – Grihastha and Sanyas
- d) Vivekānanda – Brahmacharya and Grihastha

Answer: (D)

21. Brahmavihāras include the following

- a) Maitrī, Karuṇā, Vinaya, Upekṣā
- b) Maitrī, Karuṇā, Muditā, Upekṣā
- c) Vinaya, Karuṇā, Muditā, Upekṣā
- d) Maitrī, Muditā, Upekṣā, Vinaya

Answer: (B)

22. The system which holds the view that scripture is stronger than perception is

- a) Jaina
- b) Bauddha
- c) Advaita Vedāntā
- d) Nyāya

Answer: (C)

23. In Kantian ethics 'an objective principle of action' is called

- a) A maxim
- b) A rule
- c) A practical law
- d) An imperative

Answer: (A)

24. The definition which proceeds by simply showing what is intended is called

- a) Norms definition
- b) Wide definition
- c) Extensive definition
- d) Ostensive definition

Answer: (D)

25. Virtti according to nyaya is a relation between:

- a) Two Padas
- b) Two Padarthas
- c) Pada and Padartha
- d) Pada and Vakya

Answer: (c)

26. Given below are one Assertion (A) and a Reason (R). Consider them and select the correct code in the context of Carvaka philosophy.

(A) Pratyakṣa is the only pramāna

(R) Anumāna is not a pramāna

**Code:**

- a) Both (A) and (R) are true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A).
- b) Both (A) and (R) are true and (R) is not the correct explanation of (A).
- c) (A) is true and (R) is false.
- d) (A) is false and (R) is true.

Answer: (2)

27. Atma, according to the Naiyayikas can be:

- a) Knower only
- b) Known only
- c) Knowledge only
- d) Knower and known

Answer: (4)

28. What type of Karana the colour of the threads is in respect of the colour of the cloth according to the vaishesikas?

- a) Samavayi
- b) Asamavayi
- c) Nimitta
- d) Upadana

Answer: (2)

29. Which type of hetvabhasa is committed by the following anumana? Select the correct code: vahni, anusna, dravyatvat

- a) Asrayasiddha
- b) Badhita
- c) Viruddha
- d) Satpratipaksa

Answer: (2)

30. Which philosophy says "Do not care to know various theories about God and Soul; do good and be good; that will take you to whatever truth there is" ?

- a) Sankhya
- b) Buddhism
- c) Vedanta
- d) Jainism

Ans: B

31. Which of the following philosophies are most tilted to individualism?

- a) Jainism
- b) Samkhya
- c) Buddhism
- d) None of these

Ans: A

32. Who says that space and time are empirically real but transcendently ideal?

- a) Pythagoras
- b) Spinoza

- c) Kant
  - d) Hegel
- Answer: (C)

33. Which theory of the following holds that 'universal' means universal concepts and not anything external to our minds?

- a) Realism
- b) Nominalism
- c) Conceptualism
- d) Resemblance theory

Answer: (C)

34. The first part of Yoga Sutra is

- a) Kaivalyapāda
- b) Sādhana-pāda
- c) Vibh-utipāda
- d) Samādhipāda

Answer: (D)

35. Hinduism is

- a) a family of traditions with some important characteristics in common
- b) a monolithic religion
- c) only practiced in India
- d) a religion that began in the first centuries of the Common Era

Ans: a

36. Which of these describes atman?

- a) a way of being in the world
- b) one's eternal soul or self
- c) the ritual of death
- d) the karma each person takes on

Ans: b

37. The repeating pattern of rebirth-death-rebirth continues because humans are ignorant of the true nature of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) reality
- b) god
- c) moksha
- d) trimurti

Ans: a

38. The essential realization that leads to moksha is \_\_\_\_.

- a) one's dharma
- b) one's karma determining an individual's destiny
- c) when there is a proper relationship between god and atman
- d) the oneness of God and nature

Ans: c

39. What is the most common form of worship in Hinduism?

- a) Vaishnavism
- b) bhakti, devotion to a particular deity
- c) kama, or pleasure of several kinds, including sensory, sexual, and aesthetic
- d) artha, or accumulation of material wealth and worldly success

Ans: b

40. Hindu philosophies presuppose the authority of what texts?

- a) the Upanishads
- b) the Ramayana
- c) the Mokshas
- d) the Vedas

Ans: d

41. The \_\_\_\_\_ school of Hindu philosophy sees the world as dualistic, that is, consisting of two kinds of stuff or essences: spirit and matter.

- a) Samkhya
- b) Yoga
- c) Shankara
- d) Vedanta

Ans: a

42. The Laws of Manu contain which of these?

- a) a. the philosophic writings of Manu
- b) the only treatise on the Vedas
- c) legal and moral treatises
- d) the Hindu creation myth In the Bhagavad-Gita,

Ans: c

43. Arjuna's charioteer advises him to join the battle without a desire for the results of the action, for it is Arjuna's \_\_\_\_\_ as a warrior to fight.

- a) dharma
- b) karma
- c) moksha
- d) samsara

Ans: a

44. Which Hindu god is described as destructive and creative, menacing and benign, sensual and ascetic, male and female, solitary and familial?

- a) Shiva
- b) Devi
- c) Vishnu
- d) Hanuman

Ans: a

45. Which of these is not named in the Yoga Sutra as one of the turnings of thought, whether corrupted or immune to the forces of corruption?

- a) conceptualizati

- b) sleep
  - c) rationality
  - d) memory
- Ans: c

46. What is the name for lines of poetry by the ninth-century poet Antal, a woman Hindu mystic with a gift for capturing in verse her experiences of the divine?

- a) sacred knowledge
- b) secret sorrows
- c) secret garden
- d) secret garland

Ans: d

47. Which text includes instructions on how to correctly conduct the ritual of cremation so the deceased can journey to his or her ancestors?

- a) Upanishads
- b) Puranas
- c) Rig-Veda
- d) the Yoga Sutra

Ans: c

48. Who is depicted as a great battle queen and demon slayer with many arms, each of which wields a weapon?

- a) Sati
- b) Durga
- c) Pri'ti
- d) Kali

Ans: b

49. Who created the Hindu school of philosophy called Advaita Vedanta?

- a) Shankara
- b) Krishna
- c) Shiva
- d) Gandhi

Ans: a

50. Who is the god of fire featured in the Vedas?

- a) Krishna
- b) Shiva
- c) Indra
- d) Agni

Ans: d

51. For the Hindu sage Patanjali, physical control is only a \_\_\_ of inner spiritual perfection.

- a) precondition
- b) detriment
- c) necessary stopping point on the journey
- d) blockage

Ans: a

52. One of the most impressive and formidable goddesses of the Hindu pantheon is \_\_\_\_.

- a) Durga
- b) Kali
- c) Sita
- d) Mahisa

Ans: a

53. One of the most impressive and formidable goddesses of the Hindu pantheon is \_\_\_\_.

- a) Durga
- b) Kali
- c) Sita
- d) mahisa

Ans: a

54. What text dramatizes an unorthodox view of how people may achieve release from samsara through bhakti?

- a) the Bhagavad Gita
- b) the Vedas

Ans: A

55. The meaning and use of Om is explained is explained by \_\_\_\_.

- a) the Vedas
- b) Upanishads
- c) the Sutras
- d) the Ramayana

Ans: b

56. \_\_\_\_\_ Yoga accepts as right knowledge

- a) Scripture
- b) arthapathi
- c) anupalbthi
- d) tapas

Ans: A

57. Yoga accepts \_\_\_\_\_ as right knowledge

- a) Inference
- b) Yayama
- c) yama
- d) Niyama

Ans: a

58. \_\_\_\_\_ is an erroneous idea

- a) Viparyaya
- b) perception
- c) cognition
- d) maya

Ans:A

59. Smriti means

- a) Memory
- b) dream
- c) repetition
- d) rytham

Ans:A

60. The recollection of the object through previous experience is -----

- a) Observance
- b) abstention
- c) Detachment
- d) desire

Ans:B

61. Vairagya means -----

- a) Passionlessness
- b) passion
- c) detachment
- d) enimity

Ans:A

62. The trace of rajas is -----

- a) Pravrtti
- b) niyama
- c) yama
- d) sadhana

Ans:A

63. Yama means -----

- A) Abstention
- B) detachment
- C) desire
- D) body

Ans:B

64. Niyama means -----

- a) Observance
- b) abstention
- c) detachment
- d) desire

Ans:B

65. Yoga accepts ----- as eight fold method

- a) Niyama
- b) Vairagya
- c) viparya

d) citta

Ans: A

66. Asana means -----

a) Posture

b) sleep

c) play

d) breath

Ans:A

67. Pranayama means -----

a) Regulation of breath

b) posture

c) sleep

d) D)dyana

Ans:A

68. Yoga accepts----- as eight fold path

a) Prathyahara

b) citta

c) vritti

d) vikalpa

Ans:A

69. Prathyahara means -----

a) Withdrawal of senses

b) sleep

c) dream

d) posture

Ans:A

70. Dhyana means -----

a) Concentration

b) abstention

c) attachment

d) prayer

Ans:A

71. Contemplation means ----- in Sanskrit

a) Dharana

b) B) dhyana

c) C) Samadhi

d) D) pratyahara

Ans:A

72. Which one is an eight fold method in Yoga?

a) vikalpa

b) Samadhi

c) vritti  
d) Vinaya  
Ans: B

73. Dhyana means -----

a) abstention  
b) Attention  
c) contemplation  
d) concentration  
Ans: B

74. Which one is not eight links of Yoga?

a) yama  
b) niyama  
c) Vicharana  
d) pratyahara  
Ans: C

75. In ancient India the concepts of dharma and karma were central to the \_\_, and the same is true today.

a) dalit  
b) education system  
c) social structure  
d) caste system  
Ans: c

76.. Which one among the following codes includes a means which is not of Śaktigraha?

a) Upamāna, Kośa, Aptavākya, Vyākaraṇa  
b) Aptavākya, Upādhinirasa, Vyākaraṇa, Kośa  
c) Upamāna, Aptavākya, Prasiddhapada, Sānnidhya, Vṛddhavyavahāra  
d) Vyākaraṇa, Vṛddhavyavahāra, Upamāna, Kośa  
Answer: (B)

77. Which of the theories given below holds the position that 'object of knowledge owes its existence as well as its properties to the creative activity of the knowing mind'?

a) Absolute Idealism  
b) Phenomenalism  
c) Metaphysical Idealism  
d) Epistemological Idealism  
Answer: (D)

78. Husserlian expression 'Epoche' means

a) Suspension of Reality  
b) Suspension of World  
c) Suspension of Judgement  
d) Suspension of Experience  
Answer: (C)

79. The theory which restricts our knowledge to phenomenal appearances of an inaccessible reality is

- a) Phenomenology
- b) Subjective Idealism
- c) Phenomenalism
- d) Absolute Idealism

Answer: (C)

80. Match List – I with List – II and select the correct answer from the codes given below:

List – I

- a) Subjective Idealism
- b) Commonsense Realism
- c) Absolute Idealism
- d) Critical Idealism

List – II

- i. Kant
- ii. Thomas Reid
- iii. Hegel
- iv. Berkeley

Codes:

a b c d

- a) iv iii ii i
- b) i ii iii iv
- c) iv ii iii i
- d) iii ii iv i

Answer: (C)

81. If 'O' is false, find out the true option as given below:

- a) I and E are true and A is false.
- b) I and A are true and E is false.
- c) A and I are false and E is true.
- d) O is true but E and I are false.

Answer: (B)

82. Find out the false statement as given below: Statements:

- a) Converse of 'A' is 'I'.
- b) If 'A' is false, then 'O' is true.
- c) Obverse of 'O' is 'I'.
- d) Obverse of 'E' is 'I'.

Answer: (D)

83. Which of the Philosophers noted below stated? "Utility means the property of any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered."?

- a) James Mill
- b) J.S. Mill
- c) Hume
- d) Jeremy Bentham

Answer: (D)

84. Which of the philosophers noted below propounded ethical gradation of the springs of action?

- a) Cadworth
- b) Sidgewick
- c) Butler
- d) Martineau

Answer: (D)

85. Consider the following statements with regard to Bentham and choose the correct code:  
Statements:

1. Bentham dismissed ethics of asceticism as an inverted hedonism.
2. Bentham is an ethical hedonist by virtue of his employment of the pleasure principle as the standard for conduct.
3. Intuitionist ethics was criticized by Bentham for it provides no more than a subjective feeling.

Codes:

- a) Only 1 and 3 are true.
- b) Only 1 and 2 are true
- c) 1, 2 and 3 are true.
- d) Only 2 is true.

Answer: (C)

86. Hypothesis is a

- a) Free flight of mind
- b) Discovery
- c) Supposition
- d) A provisional supposition to explain a problematic event.

Answer: (D)

87. According to Shankar Brahman is away from which of the following three distinctions?

- a) Homogenous distinction, Heterogenous distinction, internal distinction
- b) Waking experience, Dreaming experience, Dreamless experience
- c) Experimental contradiction, Logical contradiction, illogical contradiction
- d) None of above

Answer: (A)

88. Select the correct descending order of Tirthankaras in the context of their period:

- a) R. abhanātha, Anantanatha, Shantinātha, Nemināth, Mahāveera
- b) Anantanatha, Shantinātha, R. abhanātha, Mahāveera, Nemināth
- c) Padmaprabha, Ajitanatha, Mallinātha, R. abhanātha, Shantinātha
- d) R. abhanātha, Anantanatha, Sambhavanātha, Ajitanatha, Mahavira

Answer: (A)

89. Reality has no assets beyond appearances and if appearances alone to its credit it will be bankrupt.' is a statement of

- a) Green
- b) Hegel
- c) Bradley
- d) Plato

Answer: (C)

90. 'Appearances are the appearances of reality' is a statement of

- a) Kant
- b) Bradley
- c) Hegel
- d) Green

Answer: (B)

91. 'Die to live' is a statement of

- a) Kant
- b) Hegel
- c) Berkeley
- d) Mill

Answer: (B)

92. Who has said – 'My Station and its Duties'?

- a) Plato
- b) Berkeley
- c) Kant
- d) Bradley

Answer: (D)

93. What does Shankara's Satkaryavada known as?

- a) Vijnan-Vivartvada
- b) Brahma-Vivartvada
- c) Prakriti-Parinamvada
- d) Brahma-Parinamvada

Answer: (B)

94. 'Free-will' in ethics means

- a) The individual is free to do anything
- b) The individual is not free to do anything
- c) The individual is free to act keeping in view of some norms
- d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

95. Who highlighted the problem of personal identity first in modern western philosophy?

- a) Strawson
- b) Locke
- c) Kripke
- d) Descartes

Answer: (B)

96. Who is the author of 'The Essential Unity of all Religions'?

- a) Radhakrishnan
- b) Tagore
- c) Bhagwandas
- d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

97. Cardinal virtues according to Plato,

- a) Right speech, Right action, Rightmindedness
- b) Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice
- c) Intellectual virtues and Moral virtues
- d) Truth, Non-violence, Celibacy, Non-Stealing

Answer: (B)

98. Eudaemonism means

- a) Well being
- b) Hedonism
- c) Utilitarianism
- d) Perfectionism

Answer: (A)

99. What is the \_\_\_\_\_ Samavāyikāra of a table?

- a) Table itself
- b) Colour of the table
- c) The parts of the table
- d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

100. "Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation" is advocated by

- a) G.E. Moore
- b) Bradley
- c) Kant
- d) Rashdul

Answer: (A)

101. Which one of the following statements according to Advait Vedanta is true to knowledge of Brahman?

- a) Both Pratyaksha and Anuman give us knowledge of Brahman
- b) Arthapatti alone gives us knowledge of Brahman
- c) Sruti is the only source of knowledge of Brahman
- d) Both Arthapatti and Anuplabdhi give us knowledge of Brahman

Answer: (C)

102. According to Nyaya 'Shell is Silver' is a false cognition because

- a) Silver is present any where
- b) Silver shines
- c) Silver is supplied through memory
- d) Perceiver is a silversmith

Answer: (C)

103. According to Nyāya Philosophy, Pramāis

- a) Yathārtha anubhava
- b) Manifestation of an object

- c) That which is practicable
- d) Knowledge of an unknown object

Answer: (A)

104. According to Nyaya Philosophy, 'Water looks cold' is an example of

- a) Janalaksana Pratyaksa
- b) Samanya Lakshana Pratyaksa
- c) Yogaja Pratyaksa
- d) Laukika Sannikarsa

Answer: (A)

105. According to Naiyāyikas Śabda-artha Sambandha is

- a) Natural
- b) Conventional
- c) Both (A) and (B)
- d) Neither (A) nor (B)

Answer: (B)

106. The name of the theory advocated by Prabhakara School regarding sentence meaning

- a) Abhihitānvayavāda
- b) Anvitabhīdhānavāda
- c) Tatparyavāda
- d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

107. Nyay Theory of Knowledge is an example of

- a) Absolute Idealism
- b) Realism
- c) Subjective Idealism
- d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

108. The following inference is an example of: 'No non-soul is animate. All living beings are animate. Therefore all living beings have souls'.

- a) Kevalanvayi
- b) Kevala vyatireki
- c) Anvaya-vyatireki
- d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

109. "Woman is not born, but made" is the statement of

- a) Mary Wollstonecraft
- b) Emma Goldman
- c) Simone de Beauvoir
- d) Luce Irigaray

Answer: (C)

110. Who among the following Philosophers has propounded the concept of 'Becoming'?

- a) Pythagoras
  - b) Thales
  - c) Heraclitus
  - d) Democritus
- Answer: (C)

111. Which of the following paths was advocated by Buddha?

- a) Shreya
  - b) Madhyampratipada
  - c) Kaivalya
  - d) Preya
- Answer: (B)

112. Which theory of the following holds that 'universal' means universal concepts and not anything external to our minds?

- a) Realism
  - b) Nominalism
  - c) Conceptualism
  - d) Resemblance theory
- Answer: (C)

113. Essential feature of the phenomenological method is

- a) Intentionality
  - b) Doubting the world
  - c) Technique of bracketing
  - d) None of the above
- Answer: (C)

114. Which of the philosophers given below made a distinction between grammatical interpretation and psychological interpretation?

- a) Dilthey
  - b) Heidegger
  - c) Schleiermacher
  - d) Gadamer
- Answer: (C)

115. Consider List – I with List – II and select the code correctly matched:

- | List – I   | List – II (Praman) |
|------------|--------------------|
| a) Nyaya   | i. Two             |
| b) Bauddha | ii. Four           |
| c) Carvaka | iii. Three         |
| d) Samkhya | iv. One            |

Codes:

a b c d

- a) ii i iv iii
- b) iii ii iv i
- c) iv i iii ii

d) i ii iii iv

Answer: (A)

116. Brahmacharya is the means to meet

a) R.i a

b) Pit a

c) Deva a

d) Manusya na

Answer: (A)

117. According to Śa kara tattvamasi' establishes use identify of Jīva with Brahman through

a) Its primary meaning

b) Its secondary meaning

c) Both its primary and its secondary meaning

d) Neither its primary nor its secondary meaning

Answer: (B)

118. According to Rāmānuja, the individual soul is

a) Only j ātā

b) J ātā and Kartā

c) Kartā and Bhoktā

d) J ātā, Kartā and Bhoktā

Answer: (D)

119. According to the Naiyāyikas vyatirekāvyaṅgya between hetu and sādhyā obtains when

a) All cases of Hetu are cases of absence of Sādhyā.

b) Some cases of Hetu are cases of Sādhyā

c) Some cases of Sādhyā are cases of Hetu

d) All cases of absence Sādhyā are cases of absence of Hetu

Answer: (D)

120. Consider the statements of J.S. Mill given below and mark the correct code:

1. J.S. Mill's theory is Altruistic hedonism and qualitative utilitarianism.

2. Mill uses pleasure and happiness synonymously.

3. Mill regards virtue, health, love of honour and the like as intrinsic values.

Codes:

a) 1, 2 and 3 are true.

b) 1 and 2 are true.

c) 1 and 3 are true.

d) Only 2 is true.

Answer: (B)

121. In Russell's philosophy, logical atomism and theory of truth go together

a) Correspondence

b) Pragmatic

c) Coherence

d) Semantic

Answer: (A)

122. Who said that “where of one cannot speak, there of one must be silent”?

- a) Husserl
- b) Heidegger
- c) Wittgenstein
- d) Ayer

Answer: (C)

123. Consciousness according to Nyāya is

- a) A contingent attribute of self
- b) An eternal attribute of self
- c) An eternal substance
- d) A non-eternal substance

Answer: (A)

124. The correct sequence of four parts of Vedas is:

- a) Samhitā, Āranyaka, Brāhmana, Upanisad.
- b) Samhitā, Brāhmana, Āranyaka, Upanisad.
- c) Upanisad, Āranyaka, Brāhmana, Samhitā.
- d) Samhitā, Brāhmana, Upanisad, Āranyaka.

Answer: (B)

125. What is the Upanishadic view of Mukti?

- a) Knowledge of Atman
- b) Knowledge of Brahman
- c) Unity of Brahman and Atman
- d) None of the above

Answer: (A)

126. Which one of the following is an example of Arthavāda?

- a) Āmnāyasyakriyarthatvāt
- b) Swargakamoyajet
- c) Saptadvipavasumati
- d) Agninasinchet

Answer: (C)

127. Ramanuja’s theory of causation is known as

- a) Vivartavāda
- b) Prakritiparināmavāda
- c) Brahma parināmavāda
- d) Asatkāryavāda

Answer: (C)

128. The main objective of mimāmsā system is

- a) To establish the authority of the Brahman sutras.
- b) To establish the authority of the Vedas.
- c) To establish the authority of the Tripitak.

d) To establish the authority of the Bhagwad Gita.

Answer: (B)

129. 'Sarvamdukkham' is the dictum upheld by:

- a) Jaina
- b) Sāṅkhya
- c) Buddha
- d) Yoga

Answer: (C)

130. Twelve causes of suffering in Buddhism are described in the

- a) First Noble Truth
- b) Second Noble Truth
- c) Third Noble Truth
- d) Fourth Noble Truth

Answer: (B)

131. Khyati according to Indian philosophy means

- a) Theory of error
- b) Theory of truth
- c) Theory of falsehood
- d) None of the above

Answer: (A)

132. Which is not the aim of the study of Vedānta scripture?

- a) Liberation from avidya
- b) Self realization
- c) Brahm realization
- d) Worldly prosperity

Answer: (D)

133. The knowledge of presence of the hetu in the pakṣa is known as:

- a) Pakṣadharmatājñāna
- b) Paramarsajñāna
- c) Vyaptijñāna
- d) Anumiti

Answer: (A)

134. According to the Vaiśeṣikas liberation (niḥśreyasa) is attained by

- a) Tattvajñāna alone
- b) Practicing the dharmas prescribed by God
- c) Tattvajñāna along with practicing the dharmas prescribed by God.
- d) None of the above.

Answer: (C)

135. The asamavayikāraṇa of the creation of the world according to the Vaiśeṣikas is:

- a) Paramanu
- b) Dvyanuka

- c) Paramanusamyoga
  - d) Trasarenu
- Answer: (C)

136. The imposition of some quality on a thing where it is not, is termed as:

- a) Avidyā
  - b) Adhyāsa
  - c) Akhyāti
  - d) None of the above
- Answer: (B)

137. The nature of man according to Cārvāka philosophy is

- a) The physical body
  - b) The consciousness
  - c) The self
  - d) None of the above
- Answer: (A)

138. The correct sequence of the avayavas of a pañcāvayavinjāya according to the Naiyāyikas is:

- a) Udāharana, pratijñā, hetu, upanaya and nigamana.
  - b) Pratijñā, hetu, udāharana, upanaya & nigamana.
  - c) Pratijñā, udāharana, hetu, upanaya & nigamana.
  - d) Pratijñā, hetu, upanaya, udāharana & nigamana.
- Answer: (B)

139. The view that Isvara is only the nimittakarana of the world is upheld by:

- a) The nyāya
  - b) The sāmkhya
  - c) The advaitavedānta
  - d) The mīmāṃsā
- Answer: (A)

140. Five types of Yama according to Patañjali are:

- a) Ahimsā, asteya, satya, brahmaçarya and asana.
  - b) Ahimsā, satya, asteya, brahmaçarya, and aparigraha.
  - c) Satya, asteya, brahmaçarya, aparigraha and dhyāna.
  - d) Asteya, brahmaçarya, satya, dhyāna and asana.
- Answer: (B)

141. The word 'māyā' to Sañkara means:

- a) Sat only
  - b) Asat only
  - c) Both sat and asat
  - d) Neither sat nor asat but indescribable
- Answer: (D)

142. Assertion (A): Śabda is a pramāna. Reason (R): Śabda can prove God.

- a) Both (A) and (R) are correct and (R) is the correct explanation of (A).

- b) Both (A) and (R) are correct but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A).
  - c) (A) is correct and (R) is not but (R) is the correct explanation of (A).
  - d) (A) is correct and (R) is not but (R) is not the correct explanation of (A).
- Answer: (B)

143. Which one of the following represents the correct sequence in the Advaitic tradition?

- a) Vyas, Śakara, Govindapāda, Goudapāda.
- b) Goudapāda, Vyas, Śakara, Govindapāda.
- c) Śakara, Vyas, Govindapāda, Goudapāda.
- d) Vyas, Goudapāda, Govindapāda, Śakara.

Answer: (D)

144. The originator of dialectics is \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Aristotle
- b) Plato
- c) Zeno
- d) Thales

Answer: (C)

145. In whose philosophy the name of God's demiurge?

- a) Parmenides
- b) Heraclitus
- c) Anaximander
- d) Plato

Answer: (D)

146. Socrates wrote \_\_\_\_\_ number of books/articles.

- a) Three
- b) Four
- c) One
- d) None

Answer: (D)

147. Who affirmed, "what is contradictory to thought cannot be real"?

- a) Plato
- b) Aristotle
- c) Parmenides
- d) Anaximander

Answer: (C)

148. Plato's dialectics come under \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Theory of knowledge
- b) Logic
- c) Metaphysics
- d) All these.

Answer: (D)

149. Who accepts that the agreement or disagreement of ideas is knowledge?

- a) Plato
- b) Aristotle
- c) Heraclitus
- d) Pythagoras

Answer: (B)

150. Who believed that spiritual and appetites are two sections of soul?

- a) Plato
- b) Aristotle
- c) Parmenides
- d) Anaximander

Answer: (A)

151. Founder of scientific logic is

- a) Plato
- b) Aristotle
- c) Pythagoras
- d) Parmenides

Answer: (B)

152. Who acclaimed that man is the highest creature in the world?

- a) St. Anselm
- b) St. Augustine
- c) St. Thomas Aquinas
- d) All the above

Answer: (B)

153. Stage of moral conversion as per Saint Augustine is

- a) Faith
- b) Hope
- c) Clarity
- d) All the three

Answer: (D)

154. The primary aim of Descartes is

- a) To explain the relation between body and mind.
- b) To prove the existence of God.
- c) To refute the reality of the external world.
- d) To reach clear and certain knowledge.

Answer: (D)

155. Who called God as Natura Naturata?

- a) Locke
- b) Kant
- c) Spinoza
- d) Hume

Answer: (C)

156. Descartes explains body-mind relation through

- a) Psycho-Physical Parallelism.
- b) Interactionism.
- c) Pre-established harmony.
- d) Epiphenomenalism.

Answer: (B)

157. Select the logical positivist among the following:

- a) Husserl
- b) Heidegger
- c) A.J. Ayer
- d) C.S. Pierce

Answer: (C)

158. The principle of sufficient reason was propounded by

- a) Locke
- b) Berkeley
- c) Leibnitz
- d) Plato

Answer: (C)

159. The philosopher that distinguishes between 'matters of fact' and 'association of ideas' is:

- a) Descartes
- b) Hume
- c) Leibnitz
- d) Spinoza

Answer: (B)

160. Who said that the relation between cause and effect is not logical, but only psychological?

- a) Hume
- b) Kant
- c) Russell
- d) Heidegger

Answer: (A)

161. David Hume's philosophical standpoint is:

- I. Empirical
- II. Positivistic
- III. Agnostic
- IV. All the above

Find the correct answer by using the code below:

- a) I and II are only correct.
- b) II and III are only correct.
- c) I and III are only correct.
- d) IV is correct.

Answer: (D)

162. Wittgenstein authored:

- I. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus
- II. Philosophical Investigations
- III. On certainty
- IV. Zettle

Select the correct answer by using the code:

- a) I and II are only correct.
- b) II and III are only correct.
- c) I and IV are only correct.
- d) I, II, III and IV are correct.

Answer: (D)

163. The following item consists of two statements: One labelled as the Assertion (A) and the other labelled as Reason (R).

Assertion (A): According to Locke, to start with mind is a tabula rasa.

Reason (R): Locke rejects Innate Ideas.

Select your answer, using the code given below.

- a) Both (A) and (R) are true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A).
- b) Both (A) and (R) are true but (R) is not a correct explanation of (A).
- c) (A) is true but (R) is false.
- d) (A) is false but (R) is true.

Answer: (A)

164. What is the correct sequence of the following?

- a) Thales, Protagoras, Plato, Thomas Aquinas.
- b) Leibnitz, Spinoza, Descartes, Locke.
- c) Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Descartes.
- d) Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Locke.

Answer: (A)

165. The root cause of sufferings according to Buddha is

- a) Janma
- b) Duhkha
- c) Trisnā
- d) Avidyā

Answers: (D)

166. The reference to Varna-dharma is found first in

- a) Manusmriti
- b) Bhagavad Gita
- c) Ramayana
- d) Purusha-sukta

Answers: (D)

167. Which of the following Purusharthas are included in Trivarga?

- a) Artha, Kama, Moksa
- b) Artha, Dharma, Kama
- c) Moksa, Dharma, Kama
- d) Artha, Dharma, Moksa

Answers: (B)

168. Shila is

- a) Means to Prajñā
- b) A kind of Pāramitas
- c) Means to Punya
- d) All the above

Answers: (D)

169. According to 'Antirepresentationalists',

- a) Picture and reality are synonymous.
- b) There is an absolute picture of reality.
- c) There is no one picture of reality.
- d) There is no picture of reality.

Answers: (D)

170. According to Aristotle the three kinds of soul are

- a) Ghost soul, animal soul, human soul
- b) God soul, ghost soul, human soul
- c) God soul, animal soul, plant soul
- d) Plant soul, animal soul, human soul

Answers: (D)

171. According to which of the following "theory of truth for a formal language could serve as a theory of meaning for natural language"?

- a) P.F. Strawson
- b) Ludwig Wittgenstein
- c) B. Russell
- d) Donald Davidson

Answers: (D)

172. Kant classifies categories of understanding fewer than four heads as

- a) Quality, spirit, modality and matter
- b) Quantity, quality, relation and modality
- c) Substance, matter, spirit and quality
- d) Relation, spirit, substance and quantity

Answers: (B)

173. Which one of the following is not true of Heidegger's Dasein?

- a) It is essentially self-conscious.
- b) It is engaged with the world.
- c) It is always an actuality and not possibility.
- d) It is always a possibility and not an actuality.

Answers: (C)

174. The proposition basic to idealism which Moore rejects is

- a) Cogito-ergo-sum
- b) The thing in itself is non-empirical
- c) esse est percipi
- d) Ideas are no less real than matter

Answers: (C)

175. The theory that objects are permanent possibilities of sensations is called

- a) Psychologism
- b) Phenomenalism
- c) Phenomenology
- d) Objectivism

Answers: (B)

176. Locke is a

- a) Realist
- b) Representative realist
- c) Idealist
- d) Representative idealist

Answers: (Wrong question)

177. According to Russell physical objects are

- a) Ideas
- b) Bogus entities
- c) Logical construction
- d) Illusions

Answers: (C)

178. Descartes' assertion, 'I have an idea of a most perfect being', is a premise in his

- a) Cosmological argument
- b) Ontological argument
- c) Argument from design
- d) Cosmological and ontological argument both

Answers: (B)

179. According to Sakara Vyāvahārika Sattāis falsified by

- a) Prātibhāsika Satta
- b) Pāramārthika Satta
- c) Both (A) and (B)
- d) Neither (A) nor (B)

Answers: (B)

180. Who holds that cit is as much a part of reality as cit is

- a) Rāmānuja
- b) Sankara
- c) Nāgārjuna
- d) None of the above

Answers: (A)

181. The relation of which pairs of related terms mentioned below is not Samavāya?

- a) Ghatarūpa and Ghata
- b) Ghatarūpa and Samavāya
- c) Ghatatva and Ghata
- d) Ghata and its halves

Answers: (B)

182. The first step of teaching of Pancaśāstra of Buddhism refrains from which of the following?

- a) Vikāla Bhojana
- b) Adinādāna
- c) Pranatipāta
- d) Mūsavādā

Answers: (C)

183. 'Fire is cold because it has coldness' the inference commits the fallacy of

- a) Anaikāntika
- b) Bādha
- c) Asiddha
- d) None of the above

Answers: (B)

184. Who holds knowledge as a substance?

- a) Samkhya and Advaita Vedānta
- b) Samkhya and Yoga
- c) Advaita Vedānta and Jaina
- d) Nyāya and Buddhist

Answers: (A)

185. Which one of the following pairs reflects two fundamental crises of Modern Culture according to Husserl?

- a) War and Terrorism
- b) Rationality and Technology
- c) Relativism and Scepticism
- d) Agnosticism and Scepticism

Answers: (C)

186. Who says "Consciousness is the whole or true self claiming to be legislative for its parts. Its claim is the claim of the self, as a conscious and rational being, to judge any particular manifestation of itself in voluntary action"?

- a) Whitehead
- b) Ross
- c) Muirhead
- d) Clark

Answers: (C)

187. Meditation is -----

- a) Internal Practice
- b) External Practice
- c) Action
- d) Dhyana

Ans:A

188 is internal practice

- a) Meditation
- b) Play
- c) Entertainment
- d) Sleep

Ans:A

189. Absorption is -----

- a) Internal Practice
- b) External Practice
- c) Body Movement
- d) Activity of Soul

Ans:A

190 is internal practice

- a) Absorption
- b) Citta
- c) Soul
- d) Action

Ans:A

191. Asana is -----

- a) Control of body
- b) Control of Soul
- c) Control of mind
- d) Control of Purusha

Ans:A

192. breath control leads to -----

- a) Concentration
- b) Eye Concentration
- c) Body Concentration
- d) Concentration of Purusha

Ans:A

193. Trait approach is to understand -----

- a) Personality
- b) Soul
- c) Body
- d) Purusha

Ans:A

194 is an approach to personality

- a) Trait approach
- b) Direct approach
- c) Silent approach
- d) Aggressive approach

195. Analysis approach is to understand ----

- a) Personality
- b) Body
- c) Soul
- d) prakriti

Ans:A

196----- is an approach to personality

- a) Analysis approach
- b) Talkative approach
- c) Synthetic approach
- d) Observational approach

Ans:A

197. Trait theory is -----

- a) Study of human personality
- b) Study of mind
- c) Study of body
- d) Study of self

Ans:A

198. Study of personality is known as -----

- a) Trait theory
- b) Self Theory
- c) Analytic Theory
- d) Synthetic Theory

Ans:A

199. Analytical approach is based on

- a) Analysis
- b) Thinking
- c) Synthetic
- d) Criticism

Ans:A

200. How many personalities are accepted by Yoga

- a) Five
- b) Four
- c) Two
- d) Three

Ans:A

201. The 'Right of Contract' is indispensable for

- a) Right to live
- b) Right to be free
- c) Right to property
- d) Right to education

Answers: (C)

202. As an empiricist, Locke claims that all our knowledge is derived either through sensation or

- a) Perception
- b) Reflection
- c) Thinking
- d) None of the above

Answers: (B)

203. The ideal of Niskāmakarma implies

- a) Motiveless action
- b) Desireless action
- c) Inaction
- d) Infatuated action

Answers: (B)

204. Who holds ūtārthapatti as a form of arthāpatti?

- a) Prābhākara Mimāṃsā and Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsā
- b) Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsā and Vedānta
- c) Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsā and Nyāya
- d) Prābhākara Mimāṃsā and Vedānta

Answers: (B)

205. Match List – I with List – II and select correct answer by using code given below:

List – I

- a) Buddhism
- b) Sākhya
- c) Nyāyavaiśeṣikā
- d) Jainism

List – II

- i. Both prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya are Swatah
- ii. Both prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya are Paratah
- iii. Swatahprāmāṇya and paratahprāmāṇya
- iv. Both prāmāṇya and aprāmāṇya are paratah (origin)

Codes:

a b c d

- a) iii i ii iv
- b) i ii iii iv
- c) ii iii i iv
- d) iii i iv ii

Answers: (A)

206. Who aims the objective study of consciousness?

- a) Phenomenalism
- b) Existentialism
- c) Phenomenology
- d) Idealism

Answers: (C)

207. According to Nyāya during the perception of Abhāva 'Indriyārtha- Sannikarsa' takes place though

- a) Samyoga
- b) Samavāya
- c) Viśesana – veśesa – bhāva
- d) Samveta – Samvāya

Answers: (C)

208. The anumāna 'Śabdahnityahk takatvāt', commits the hetvābhāsa knownas

- a) Satpratipaksa
- b) Asiddha
- c) Viruddha
- d) Bādhita

Answers: (C)

209. Pañcakalpanā, according to theBuddhists, is

- a) Nāma, jāti, guna, kriyā and avayava
- b) Nāma, jāti, guna, kriyā and dravya
- c) Nāma, jāti, guna, kriyā and svalaksana
- d) Nāma, sāmānyalaksana, guna, kriyā andsvalaksana

Answers: (B)

210. Who said that there is a central fire around which the earth, the sun, the moonand five planets move?

- a) Thales
- b) Heraclitus
- c) Pythagoras
- d) Anaximander

Answers: (C)

211. What are the objects ofSāmānyalaksana pratyaksa?

- a) Universal character of an individual
- b) Universal and the particular at the sametime
- c) All the individuals belonging to a class
- d) An individual characterised by itsuniversal.

Answers: (C)

212. Read following options and choose theright answer from given code:

Options:

1. The means may be linked to a seed andthe end to a tree.
2. There is no wall of separation betweenmeans and end.
3. The realisation of the goal is proportionalto the means employed.

Codes:

- a) 1 and 2
- b) 2 and 3

- c) 1 and 3
  - d) 1, 2, and 3
- Answers: (D)

213. Which one of the following pairs is incorrectly matched?

- a) Leibnitz – Pragmatic theory of truth
- b) Descartes – Correspondence theory of truth
- c) Spinoza – The self-evidence theory of truth
- d) William James – Coherence theory of truth

Answers: (C)

214. According to Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika, the non-existence of jar on the floor is perceived because

- a) The eye is in contact with the floor, which is qualified by the flooriness.
- b) The eye is in contact with the floor, which is qualified by non-existence of the jar.
- c) There is no jar qualified by flooriness.
- d) There is only floor not qualified by jariness.

Answers: (B)

215. According to Nyāya school anumiti is possible without

- a) Pakṣa jñāna
- b) Paramarajñāna
- c) Sādhyajñāna
- d) Udhāraajñāna

Answers: (C)

216. The view 'Truth of Cognition exists in its utilitarian value, is supported by

- a) Emotive theory
- b) Coherence theory
- c) Pragmatic theory
- d) Semantic theory

Answers: (C)

217. The conversational method of Socrates took place in the form of

- a) A Sceptic
- b) A Certainty
- c) A kind of Dialectic
- d) As a Verbal Jugglery

Answers: (C)

218. The first explanation about the Upanyaṇa contains in

- a) Satapatha Brahmana
- b) Vayupurana
- c) Vishnupurana
- d) Matsyapurana

Ans:(a)

219. What notion should be at the heart of ethical theory, according to virtue ethics?

- a) Duty.

- b) Intrinsic value.
- c) Moral character.
- d) Pleasure.

Ans: c

220. What is the relationship between duty and virtue, according to virtue ethics?

- a) Duty is defined as what a virtuous person would do.
- b) Virtue is defined as a character trait that leads us to do our duty.
- c) The two concepts are independent of one another.
- d) If one does one's duty, virtue is unnecessary.

Ans: a

221. What is a moral exemplar?

- a) A non-absolute moral rule.
- b) A person who serves as a role model.
- c) A situation that illustrates the consequences of a moral principle.
- d) A person to whom the moral rules do not apply.

Ans: b

222. Which of the following does virtue ethics have a hard time explaining?

- a) Moral complexity.
- b) Moral education.
- c) The role of emotions in morality.
- d) How we can know who our role models should be.

Ans: d

223. What does moral understanding require, according to virtue ethics?

- a) The application of absolute rules to particular cases.
- b) Calculation about the effects of one's actions.
- c) An exceptional amount of intelligence.
- d) Emotional maturity.

Ans: d

224. How did Aristotle think that virtue could be acquired?

- a) It is inborn.
- b) One must have a conversion experience in which one experiences the good directly.
- c) Virtue is acquired through education and training.
- d) It is impossible to become virtuous.

Ans: c

225. How do virtuous people differ from vicious people?

- a) In their behavior.
- b) In their thoughts.
- c) In their perceptions.
- d) All of the above.

Ans: d

226. What do people seek above all else, according to Aristotle?

- a) Eudaimonia.
- b) Ataraxia.
- c) Pleasure.
- d) Power.

Ans: a

227. What is a tragic dilemma?

- a) A situation in which one has two options, only one of which will have a good outcome.
- b) A situation in which a good person's life will be ruined, no matter what she does.
- c) A situation in which one must choose between self-interest and morality.
- d) A situation in which it is impossible to behave morally.

Ans: b

228. Which of the following is a statement of the priority problem?

- a) Virtue ethics wrongly defines duty in terms of virtue instead of vice versa.
- b) A person can be virtuous without having all her priorities straight.
- c) The consequences of an action sometimes have priority over one's intentions.
- d) Virtue ethics lacks a way of ranking moral principles in terms of importance.

Ans: a

229. According to the law of karma, every karma leads to \_\_\_\_.

- a) Moksha
- b) Phala
- c) Dharma
- d) all these

Ans: b

230. According to Ayer, ethical philosophy consists of:

- a) definitions of ethical terms.
- b) propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience.
- c) exhortations to moral virtue.
- d) all of the above.

Ans: a

231. Ayer objects to utilitarianism on the grounds that:

- a) there are many things besides happiness that have intrinsic value.
- b) it fails to account for the value of individual rights.
- c) it is not self-contradictory to say that it is sometimes wrong to do what causes the greatest happiness.
- d) all of the above.

Ans: c

232. Ayer's critique of ethics concerns:

- a) descriptive ethics.
- b) normative ethics.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Ans: b

233. On Ayer's view, evaluative claims are:

- a) statements of empirical fact.
- b) assertions of feeling.
- c) expressions of feeling.
- d) none of the above.

Ans: c

234. Ayer claims that utilitarianism and subjectivism are attractive because:

- a) they endorse tolerance and respect.
- b) they construe ethical assertions as ordinary empirical assertions.
- c) they allow that ethical claims are neither true nor false.
- d) they construe ethical claims as expressions of emotion.

Ans: b

235. In addition to expressing feelings, Ayer claims that ethical terms serve to:

- a) stimulate action.
- b) stimulate belief.
- c) stimulate imagination.
- d) all of the above.

Ans: a

236. Ayer would say that the claim "Stealing is wrong" is:

- a) true.
- b) false.
- c) neither true nor false.
- d) true for some people, but false for others.

Ans: c

237. What is business ethics?

- a) The study of business situations, activities, and decisions where issues of right and wrong are addressed
- b) Defined as decisions organisations make on issues that could be considered right or wrong
- c) Ethics that can be applied to an organisation's practises
- d) Ethical processes businesses use in order to achieve a good ethical standard

Answer: (a) The study of business situations, activities, and decisions where issues of right and wrong are addressed

238. Ethics & Law overlap. This is called...

- a) Yellow area
- b) White area
- c) Black area
- d) Grey area

Answer: (d) Grey area

239. The word "Ethics" comes from

- a) Ethos

- b) Eternity
- c) Elementary
- d) Essentiality

Answer: (a) Ethos

240. Business ethics are basically different from personal ethics

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: (b) False

241. All unethical practices are illegal.

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: (b) False

Incorrect - Not all unethical practices are illegal.

For example it is not illegal to include genetically modified ingredients in products sold in supermarkets.

242. Morals is the study of what is thought to be right in a society

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: (a) True

243. Normative ethics and morals are the same discipline

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: (b) False

244. Ethics is always Absolute

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: True.

Because ethics are never relative and have to be absolute so that it means same for every individual.

245. Ethics is populism

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: False.

Because ethics is never majority opinion

246. Our understanding of right and wrong is shaped by our culture hence ethics of persons from different culture may be in conflict

- a) True
- b) False

Answer: True.

Ideally ethics should be absolute but it is our conditioning from our birth and our culture that introduces different understanding of ethics

247. When they take sannyasi vows and become

- a) a monk
- b) When they are widowed
- c) As an act of worship for Yama, Lord of the Dead
- d) To act as a guide to help a deceased loved one cross over to a favorable rebirth

Answer: a.

When they take *sannyasi* vows and become a monk.

248. Scholars date the earliest parts of the Vedas to

- a) 900 b.c.e.
- b) 1200 b.c.e.
- c) 1500 b.c.e.
- d) 1700 b.c.e.

Answer: c 1500

249. In the Bhagavad Gita, taking up the path of devotion one

- a) Offers up the fruits of one's action to God
- b) Performs worship three times a day
- c) Recites the names of Krishna
- d) Studies the scriptures with a love in one's heart

Answer: a.

Offers up the fruits of one's action to God.

250. The arati ritual involves

- a) Fanning the icon with yak tail fans
- b) Bathing the icon in auspicious substances
- c) Carrying the icon in procession
- d) Waving lamps before the icon

Answer: d. Waving lamps before the icon.

251. The Hindu holiday that encourages mischief and mayhem is called

- a) Holi
- b) Diwali
- c) Navaratri
- d) Vijaya Dashami

Answer: a. Holi

252. The Indus Valley civilization reached its peak of development around

- a) 2300 b.c.e.
- b) 1700 b.c.e.
- c) 1500 b.c.e.
- d) 1200 b.c.e.

Answer: a. 2300 b.c.e..

253. The most important of the ancient Vedic gods, such as Indra and Agni,

- a) Play no part in later Hindu mythology
- b) Continue in later Hindu myth but have a subordinate status

- c) Are conquered by the later Hindu gods
- d) Continue to dominate the Hindu pantheon today

Answer: b.

Continue in later Hindu myth but have a subordinate status.

254. The funerary practice of Zoroastrians involve

- a) Exposing the corpse atop a tower to feed birds of prey
- b) Burial in an earthen pot
- c) Burial at sea
- d) Cremation in a large clay oven

Answer: a.

Exposing the corpse atop a tower to feed birds of prey.

255. The term "Sanskritization" describes when

- a) Sacred texts in the regional language are translated into Sanskrit
- b) Ancient government policies insisted that only Sanskrit be spoken
- c) Alternate religious ideologies are appropriated and adopted into Hinduism
- d) Sanskrit-language speakers displaced Dravidian-language speakers

Answer: c. Alternate religious ideologies are appropriated and adopted into Hinduism.

256. Dayananda Saraswati (1824–1883)

- a) Rejected caste in both its forms of varna and jati
- b) Rejected the epics and puranas as eroding the purity of the Vedas
- c) Founded the Ramakrishna Math
- d) All of the above

Answer: b.

Rejected the epics and *puranas* as eroding the purity of the *Vedas*.

257. Gandhi referred to the untouchables as

- a) Harijans
- b) Dalits
- c) Great souls
- d) Freedom fighters

Answer: a. *Harijans*

258. Hindu teachings on karma and reincarnation were first presented in the

- a) Vedas
- b) Brahmanas
- c) Upanishads
- d) Bhagavad Gita

Answer: c. *Upanishads*

259. Shiva was originally

- a) A wild and frightening deity
- b) A god of ascetics
- c) Associated with healing and disease
- d) All of the above

Answer: a.

A wild and frightening deity

260. Which of the following School challenges the authority of the Vedas as well as the hegemony the Brahman priests?

- a) Charvaka Philosophy of Materialism
- b) Ajivika School
- c) Purva Mimamsa
- d) Vedanta

Ans: A

261. Which School is originally called Sanatana Dharma?

- a) Nastika School
- b) Astika School
- c) Both of the above
- d) None of the above

Ans: B

262. Which of the following statement(s) is/are correct explanation of the the term "Jiva"?

- a) It is that state in which puruṣa is bonded to prakṛti in some form.
- b) To realize the puruṣa distinct from prakṛiti.
- c) It is immutable, eternal and conscious by its very nature.
- d) It evolves from subtle to gross, and manifests the visible world.

Ans: A

263. Select the correct statement (s) related to the Yoga

- I. Yoga accepts the twenty five principles of Sankhya school along with Isvara or God as the twenty-sixth. So it is more theistic.
- II. Yoga gives the practical steps to realize the puruṣa distinct from prakṛiti.
- III. Yoga system was founded by Hiranyagarbha and later systematized and propagated by the sage Patanjali.

Code:

- a) Only I
- b) Only II
- c) Both I & II
- d) I, II & III

Ans: D

264. Consider the following statement (s) is/are related to the Nyaya School

- I. Its methodology is based on a system of logic that has subsequently been adopted by the majority of the Indian schools, in much the same way as Aristotelian logic has influenced Western philosophy.
- II. The goal is to quiet one's mind and achieve kaivalya (solitariness or detachment).

Which of the above statement (s) is/are correct?

- a) Only I
- b) Only II
- c) Both I & II

d) Neither I nor II

Ans: A

265. Which of the following School accepted perception and inference as sources of valid knowledge?

- a) Nyaya School
- b) Vaisheshika
- c) Both A & B
- d) None of the above

Ans: B

266. Which of the following School is known as Lokayata. a term means Naturalist(Sanskrit) or Worldly (Pali)?

- a) Ajivika School
- b) Astika School
- c) Charvaka school
- d) None of the above

Ans: C

267. The four main divisions of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and\_.

- a) bioethics
- b) logic
- c) aesthetics
- d) categorical logic

Answer: b. logic

268. The study of reality in the broadest sense, an inquiry into the elemental nature of the universe and the things in it, is known as\_\_.

- a) metaphysics
- b) epistemology
- c) quantum physics
- d) axiology

Answer: a. metaphysics

269. Questions like "What is knowledge?" and "What is truth?" are mainstays in the branch of philosophy known as\_.

- a) logic
- b) metaphysics
- c) epistemology
- d) aesthetics

Answer: c. epistemology.

270. Who postulated "Religion began as early humans responded to the forces of nature (the sun, moon, tides, winds, etc.) by personifying them and attaching myths and rituals to them"?

- a) Max Muller
- b) Sigmund Freud
- c) Ninian Smart
- d) Peter Berger

Answer: a. Max Muller

271. Which of these scholars advocated that religion should be examined by how it handles certain archetypal notions such as the profane and sacred?

- a) Ninian Smart
- b) Mircea Eliade
- c) Emile Durkheim
- d) Paul Tillich

Answer: b

272. The visions of the Prophet Muhammad, the conversion of Paul, and the enlightenment of the Buddha are all examples of which dimension of religion?

- a) the mythic/narrative dimension
- b) the practical/ritual dimension
- c) the experiential/emotional dimension
- d) the doctrinal/philosophical dimension

Answer: c. the experiential/emotional dimension.

273. Which of these religious traditions teaches the supreme importance of harmony in the family, community, and state?

- a) Confucianism
- b) Judaism
- c) Hinduism
- d) Christianity

Answer: b

274. Who argued that "Religion arose from the early human's attempts to control nature through magic"?

- a) Karl Marx
- b) James Frazer
- c) Sigmund Freud
- d) Max Muller

Answer: b

275. Who theorized religion in this way: "People have imagined religion by projecting human desires, needs, or attributes onto imaginary deities"?

- a) Karl Marx
- b) Paul Tillich
- c) Ludwig Feuerbach
- d) Karl Barthes

Answer: c

276. Which of these is not one of the definitions for religion listed in the textbook?

- a) belief in Spiritual Beings
- b) what the individual does with his own solitariness
- c) that which is of ultimate concern
- d) belief in God

Answer: d

277. Merlin Stone did not base her claims about ancient religion on which of these?

- a) archeological evidence
- b) gods and goddesses of the oldest living religious tradition, Hinduism, in India
- c) ancient Sumerian text
- d) Wiccan traditions

Answer:d

278. Which scholar proclaimed religion is "the opium of the people"?

- a) Sigmund Freud
- b) Emile Durkheim
- c) Karl Marx
- d) Merlin Stone

Answer:c

279. Which of these best describes the noetic quality?

- a) love
- b) time
- c) knowledge
- d) emotion

Answer:c

280. William James studied which aspect of religion?

- a) religious experience
- b) religious symbolism
- c) religious myths
- d) religious rituals

Answer:a

281. The best method used by scholars to compare religions is to find

- a) similar symbols in each tradition that connote different meanings.
- b) the most similarities between two traditions and ignore the differences.
- c) common creation stories.
- d) dynamic equivalents between traditions.

Answer:d

282. Stories that are recognized by the relevant body of the faithful are considered

- a) myths.
- b) folklore.
- c) beliefs.
- d) canonical.

Answer:a

283. Which of these religious traditions teaches the supreme importance of harmony in the family, community, and state?

- a) Confucianism
- b) Judaism
- c) Hinduism

d) Christianity

Answer:a

284. Which of these is a way to study and write about religion that is considered a religious endeavor?

- a) theology
- b) moral philosophy
- c) religious studies
- d) biblical criticism

Answer:a

285. The material dimension includes which one of these?

- a) natural features of the world
- b) the doctrines of believers
- c) the act of meditation
- d) myths of creation

Answer: a. natural features of the world.

286. The Hindu Trinity does not include which of these gods?

- a) Brahma
- b) Vishnu
- c) Shiva
- d) Ganesh

Answer: d. Ganesh

287. The belief that everything (both living and inanimate) is animated by spirits is called

- a) Holy Ghost.
- b) Wicca.
- c) Animism.
- d) nature religion.

Answer: c. Animism..

288. Which of these is not one of the seven dimensions of religion?

- a) the practical dimension
- b) the emotional dimension
- c) the divine dimension
- d) the mythic dimension

Answer: c. the divine dimension.

289. The academic study of religion, called religious studies,

- a) remains neutral regarding the truth or justification of religious claims.
- b) makes claims about the veracity of each religion's ritual practices.
- c) is the same thing as theology.
- d) advocates for a secular society.

Answer: a. remains neutral regarding the truth or justification of religious claims..

290. Reasons for the spread of Buddhism included

1. Simplicity of religion

2. Special appeal for the down-trodden.
3. Missionary spirit of the religion
4. Use of local language.
5. Reinforcement of vedic spirit by philosophers.

Select the correct answer from the codes given below:

- a) 1, 2 and 3
- b) 2, 3 and 4
- c) 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d) 2, 3, 4 and 5

Answer: C

291. Who among the following was associated with formulation of the basic ideas of the Mahayan Buddhism?

- a) Nagarjuna
- b) Kashyapa Matanga
- c) Menander
- d) Kanishka

Answer: A

Solution :The fathers of the Mahayana were considered to be Nagarjuna, who lived between the first and second centuries of our era and founded what is known as the Madhyamika philosophy or philosophy of the Middle Way and Maitreyanatha who lived in the third century of our era. Maitreyanatha's philosophy was developed in the fourth century by two brothers, Asanga and Vasubandhu and was known as Yogacara or Vijñānavada philosophy.

292. In Buddhism, what does Patimokkha stand for? [2008-II]

- a) A description of Mahayana Buddhism
- b) A description of Hinayana Buddhism
- c) The rules of the Sangha
- d) The questions of King Menander

Answer: C

293. The \_\_\_\_\_ is/are at the heart of Buddha's system of teachings about the true nature of reality and how to live correctly to transcend it.

- a) Three Jewels
- b) Sixfold Path
- c) Four Baskets
- d) Four Noble Truths

Answer: d. Four Noble Truths.

294. In Buddhism, what does Patimokkha stand for? [2008-II]

- a) A description of Mahayana Buddhism
- b) A description of Hinayana Buddhism
- c) The rules of the Sangha
- d) The questions of King Menander

Answer: C

Solution :Pathnokka stands for the rules of the Sangha. Buddha Dhamma and Sangha are the three Jewels of Buddhism.

295. The \_\_\_\_\_ is/are at the heart of Buddha's system of teachings about the true nature of reality and how to live correctly to transcend it.

- a) Three Jewels
- b) Sixfold Path
- c) Four Baskets
- d) Four Noble Truths

Answer: d. Four Noble Truths.

296. Which of these is not included in the Four Noble Truths?

- a) Life is suffering.
- b) To banish suffering, banish desires.
- c) Suffering is caused by desires.
- d) Suffering is the righteous path.

Answer: d. Four Noble Truths

297. Which of these is the Second Noble Truth?

- a) The cause of suffering is selfish desire for things that we can never truly obtain.
- b) Life is suffering.
- c) Suffering is caused by karma accumulated before rebirth.
- d) The Eightfold Path is (pauses to google Eightfold Path) the heart of Buddhist practice.

Answer: d. Suffering is the righteous path..

298. Generally \_\_\_\_\_ holds that nirvana is attained through personal effort, with little or no help from Buddhas, bodhisattvas, or teachers.

- a) Mahayana
- b) Zen
- c) Theravada
- d) Koan

Answer: a. The cause of suffering is selfish desire for things that we can never truly obtain..

299. Which of these terms denotes Buddhism's core teachings systematized in the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path?

- a) samsara
- b) dharma
- c) moksha
- d) yoga

Answer: b. dharma.

300. The concept of 'Triratna' is the contribution of

- a) Charvaka
- b) Jainism
- c) Buddhism
- d) Nyaya

Ans: b

301. Which among the following is not a sect of Buddhism

- a) Svetambara
- b) Hinayana
- c) Mahayana
- d) Both Hinayana and Mahayana

Ans: a

302. Which among the following is a sect of Jainism

- a) a.Svetambara
- b) Digambara
- c) Both
- d) None

Ans: c

303. The liberated Soul according to Jain Philosophy is called

- a) Sarvajna
- b) Sarvatman
- c) Sarvasaktan
- d) Sarvavyapi

Ans: a

304. Which among the following is not a quality of Mukta

- a) Infinite Power
- b) Infinite Bliss
- c) Infinite Life
- d) Infinite Knowledge

Ans: c

305. Which among the following is not a way towards salvation according to Jainism

- a) Samyak Jnana
- b) Samyak Buddhi
- c) Samyak Darsana
- d) Samyak Charitra

Ans: b

306. Which among the following is not come under 'Triratna

- a) Samyak Jnana
- b) Samyak Dhyana
- c) c.Samyak Darsana
- d) Samyak Charitra

Ans: b

307. Nyaya System is

- a) Orthodox
- b) Heterodox
- c) Both
- d) None

Ans: a

308. Vaisesika System is

- a) Orthodox
- b) Heterodox
- c) Both
- d) None

Ans: a

309. The Term 'Nyaya' means

- a) Word
- b) Number
- c) Argumentation
- d) Particularity

Ans: c

310. The Term 'Vaisesika' means

- a) Vishayam
- b) Number
- c) Argumentation
- d) Particularity

Ans: d

311. Which one among the following is called 'Indian Logic'

- a) Nyaya
- b) Vaisesika
- c) Sankhya
- d) Yoga

Ans: a

312. Who among the following is the founder of Nyaya System

- a) Pathanjali
- b) Jaimini
- c) Gautama
- d) Kanada

Ans: c

313. Who among the following is the founder of Vaisesika System

- a) Pathanjali
- b) Jaimini
- c) Gautama
- d) Kanada

Ans: d

314. Who is the author of 'Nyaya Sutra'

- a) Vatsyayanan
- b) b.Prasasthpada
- c) Kapila
- d) Gautama

Ans: d

315. Who wrote 'Nyaya Bhashya'

- a) Vatsyayana
- b) b.Prasasthpada
- c) Kapila
- d) Gautama

Ans: a

316. Svadharma is advocated by

- a) Krishn.a
- b) Rāvan.a
- c) S tā
- d) All the above

Answer: (A)

317. Which one of the following is known as Triratna?

- a) Shravan. a, Manana, Nididhyāsana
- b) Darshan, J~nāna, Chāritra
- c) Maitr, Kāmnā, Muditā
- d) Sagha, Dhamma, Buddha

Answer: (B)

318. R. ta of the Vedic world was closer to

- a) Legal order
- b) Truth
- c) Karma
- d) Social order

Answer: (B)

319. Brahmavihāras include the following

- a) Maitr, Karun.ā, Vinaya, Upeks. ā
- b) Maitrī, Karun.ā,, Muditā, Upeks. ā
- c) Vinaya, Karun. a, Muditā, Upeks. ā
- d) Maitr, Muditā, Upeks. ā, Vinaya

Answer: (B)

320. The system which holds the view that scripture is stronger than perception is

- a) Jaina
- b) Bauddha
- c) Advaita Vedāntā
- d) Nyāya

Answer: (C)

321. The enjoyment of fruits of the Karma that not yet has been started is called

- a) Sa~ncītā Karma
- b) Sa~nc-iyamāna Karma
- c) Prārabdha Karma

d) Anārabdha Karma

Answer: (A)

322. Deva a can be repaid by

- a) Performing yaj~na
- b) Giving birth to a son
- c) Both (A) & (B)
- d) Neither (A) nor (B)

Answer: (A)

323. Which one of the following systems of Indian Philosophy designated Mok a as Nirvana?

- a) Jainism
- b) Buddhism
- c) Yoga
- d) Samkhya

Answer: (B)

324. Which one of the following is known as '\_\_\_triśara a' according to Buddhism?

- a) Sravana, Manana, Nididhyasana
- b) Darshana, Jnāna, Caritra
- c) Maitri, Karuna, Mudita
- d) Buddha, Dhamma, Sa gha

Answer: (D)

325. All the following orders of thePurusharthas are wrong except:

- a) Dharma, Artha, Kāma, Mok a
- b) Artha, Kāma, Mok a, Dharma
- c) Dharma, Kāma, Artha, Mok a
- d) Dharma, Mok a, Artha, Kāma

Answer: (A)

326. Hatred and attachment according toYoga School of Philosophy belong to

- a) Klesas
- b) Cittabhumis
- c) Yama
- d) Niyama

Answer: (A)

327. What is the moral criterion selectedby Charvaka?

- a) Intuitive
- b) Rationalistic
- c) Hedonistic
- d) Eudaemonistic

Answer: (C)

328. A man who seeks pleasure and fails to get it, is facing the paradox of

- a) Eudaemonism
- b) Hedonism

- c) Rigourism
- d) Altruism

Answer: (B)

329. Which one is the correct sequence of the four kinds of purusarthas?

- a) Artha, Kama, Dharma, Mok. sa
- b) Kama, Artha, Dharma, Mok. sa
- c) Dharma, Artha, Kama, Mok. sa
- d) Mok. sa, Dharma, Artha, Kama

Answer: (C)

330. The correct sequence of Asramadharmas is


- a) Garhastha, Vanaprastha, Brahmacharya, Sannyasa
- b) Vanaprastha, Garhastha, Brahmacharya, Sannyasa
- c) Brahmacharya, Garhastha, Vanaprastha, Sannyasa
- d) Brahmacharya, Vanaprastha, Sannyasa, Garhastha

Answer: (C)

331. The notion of Brahmvihara is found in

- a) Advaita Vedanta
- b) Dvaita Vedanta
- c) Both Dvaita and Advaita Vedanta
- d) Buddhism

Answer: (D)



**UNIT - 4**

Western Ethics

## **Concept of Good**

Good is anything that fulfills a need or satisfies a desire. Good can be more than one. Certain goods such as bodily goods, economic goods, and social goods are means to some higher goods. In a hierarchy of goods, at the top is the highest good, which is the ultimate end of human activity. To G.E. Moore, Good is indefinable because it is a simple notion and has no parts. Only that which has parts is definable. In Ethics, the word good is used both as an Adjective and as a Noun.

The word 'Good' is derived from the German word 'Gut'. It means anything valuable, useful or serviceable for some end or purpose, therefore desirable. As the term 'good' is too wide signifying anything that is desirable, one may use the expression 'morally good' to signify moral qualities. Hence, in ethics the word 'good' is used to express moral qualities.

It should be stated in this connection that the word 'good' is used both as an adjective and also as a noun. Thus when one speaks of 'material and immaterial goods', 'a relative good' and 'the absolute or the highest good' one evidently uses the word 'good' as a noun. Good/ used in this way implies 'an object of desire or pursuit', 'anything that is sought', e.g., wealth, health, courage etc.

In Ethics, a distinction is drawn between good as an end and good as a means. If, for instance, happiness be good, then wealth and health as means of attaining happiness are also good. Again, if health be a good, then regular exercise, regulation of taking diet, taking of good medicine are also good as means of securing good health. It will be easy now to understand the distinction between a relative good and the absolute or the highest good of man. A 'relative good' is a kind of good as a means, i.e., it is an object which is desired, not for itself, but for the sake of an ulterior end or good which, again, may be relative to a still higher end, and so on. 'Absolute good' means "the good which is desired for its own sake, and is not subordinate to any ulterior good." In short, it is not the concept of good as a means to a higher good; it is however, the highest good- the ultimate end of human activity. Every voluntary action is relative to an end or object of desire. And among ends, there is gradation, culminating in the supreme end or the highest good which is the goal of life.

Thus, the ultimate, absolute or highest good of man is intrinsically good in the sense that the same is desired for its own sake, and not desired for the sake of anything else. In other words, absolute good is not a means to attain any higher end or good. The highest good is the absolute good i.e. the supreme end. The subordinate goods are instrumental goods or relative goods.

## **G. E. MOORE'S CONCEPT OF GOOD AS INDEFINABLE**

G.E. Moore in his book 'Principia Ethica' sharply distinguishes between two questions of Ethics viz., (I) What is good, in the sense of 'that what is good' and (II) What is good, in the sense of 'goodness'. One must be careful not to confuse 'the good' or 'the things that are good' with goodness or the property of being good.

The meaning of 'good' to G.E. Moore involves the definition of good. According to Moore, a definition "states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole" and in this sense 'good' cannot be defined 'because it is simple and has no parts.' It is evident that the object of definition in Moore's analysis is not the word 'good' but the extra linguistic entity 'goodness.' The word 'Good' is indefinable because the quality 'goodness' is a simple, unanalysable and non-complex property.

According to Moore, Goodness is a non-natural quality. He says, it is completely wrong to define 'good' in terms of natural quality. Moore argues that to explain the meaning of good by reference to particular modes of existence or action or supersensible things, which may be more or less good, is to commit the 'naturalistic fallacy.' Hedonists commit this fallacy because they explain the meaning of 'good' by reference to pleasure which is a particular mode of experience. Pleasure may be more or less good, but it does not enable one to know what is really meant by good. 'Good' must be distinguished from things that are good. It may be mentioned that Naturalistic fallacy consists in identifying good with some natural property of what has goodness.

It may be pointed out that when Moore uses the word 'definition,' he means 'analysis.' If something is definable then that thing is analysable. If a thing is analysable then the thing must have certain parts. But one cannot name the parts of 'good.' It is so because "good" has no parts. According to Moore, "good" is a simple notion just as 'yellow' is a simple notion. Just as one cannot explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so one cannot explain by any manner or means what good is. Good denotes a simple and undefinable quality. Goodness has a unique meaning; it is simply goodness. Definitions are only possible when the object of notion in question is something complex. One can give definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which one can enumerate. But 'good' is not complex. It is a 'simple' notion composed of no parts, and so unanalysable. Unanalysable things are undefinable. Hence good is undefinable. Moore says that if a person is asked the question, 'how is good to be defined' - then his answer would be that it cannot be defined, and that is all that the person would have to say about it.

According to Moore, though goodness is undefinable yet it is possible for one to say which things are good. Though yellowness is undefinable yet, it is possible for one to say which things are yellow. Moore tries to offer proof for the undefinability of 'good' by means of a dilemma. Either 'good' is undefinable, or it is not undefinable. If it is not, it must be either a complex word the correct analysis of which defies a common agreement, or the word must mean nothing at all. Moore offers a particular argument to establish that 'good' is undefinable. This argument is called the open question argument. If one tries to define good as X, then it is always possible for one to raise the further question "Is X good"? It means good remains undefinable.

Moore's argument, however, could not satisfy all moral philosophers, Goodness, according to Moore, is a simple, unanalysable, non-natural property which is known in some kind of non-sensuous intuition. But the difficulty is that if anybody says that he does not have any such unique and simple object before his mind when he thinks of good, then one cannot refute him. By relying on intuition Moore makes ethical reasoning virtually impossible. Moore's view of goodness, therefore, has not satisfied all philosophers.

## **CONCEPT OF DUTY**

The word 'duty' means what is due, i.e., what one is bound to do, or under an obligation to do. In other words, a duty means what one ought to perform as a moral being.

The term 'duty' is sometimes used in a narrower sense to mean simply what is legally binding or obligatory upon an individual, and an individual is said to do more than his duty if he does more than what he is legally bound to do. In Ethics, however, the word 'duty' is taken in a wider and higher sense to signify every right act which one ought to perform, whether determinate or indeterminate, whether legally obligatory or not. Hence, from strictly moral or ethical point of view,

an individual can never be said to do more than his duty.

Duty comes to an individual with a claim; it is a thing laid upon an individual to do whether he likes it or not. A duty may thus be defined as the obligation of an individual to satisfy a claim made upon him by the community, or some other individual member or members of that community, in the name of common good.

If taken in a wide sense, the notion of duty is essentially implied in every system of morality and every ethical theory.

In Greek Ethics, moral life for the most part is presented as a good to be realised or a type of virtue or excellence to be attained. A man must be courageous, temperate and just, because in no other way can be achieved his good or true happiness. So long as the mode of presenting the moral life prevailed, the element of duty was completely absorbed into, and subordinated to, the thought of good or achievement.

It was only when, in Stoicism, (a school of thought whose famous maxim is 'Live according to Nature') this good was conceived to be determined by, and to be realized in, obeying a cosmic law of universal reason that the notion of duty emerged into a new distinctness. It was when morality came to be regarded mainly in the light of conformity to a law that the notion of duty became prominent. The Stoics asserted that virtue alone is good and man must be virtuous not for the sake of pleasure but for the sake of duty.

Kant says that an action has no moral worth unless it is done from a sense of duty. i.e. in the consciousness of its rightness. To Kant, nothing is absolutely good in this world or out of it except a good will. A will is good when it is determined by respect for the moral law, or the consciousness of duty. An act that is done from inclination, say from self-love or even sympathy, is not moral. What a man does from inclination to-day, he may likewise from inclination refuse to do to-morrow. The commands of duty do not wait upon man's inclination, or strike a bargain with man, the Imperative of duty in Kant's terminology, is a Categorical Imperative. The categorical imperative commands categorically, unconditionally, it does not say: Do this if you would be happy or successful or perfect, but: Do it because it is your duty to do it. Thus, according to Kant, actions are right only when they are done for the sake of duty - only in so far as they are performed for the sake of their rightness. 'Duty for duty's sake is the true rule of life-Duty should be performed whatever may happen.

This law or categorical imperative is a universal and necessary law, "a-priori", inherent in reason itself. It is present in the commonest man, though he may not be clearly conscious of it; it governs his moral judgments; it is his standard or criterion of right and wrong.

### **Classification of Duties**

When the various duties are regarded in an objective way, it is natural to seek for some kind of classification. Although it is difficult to find any satisfactory scheme of division, duties may commonly be classified into three classes.

1. Duties to self or self-regarding duties.
2. Duties to others or other-regarding duties.
3. Duties to God.

Duties to self or self-regarding duties: The term 'self-regarding duties' is to be taken in the sense of duties to oneself. It includes physical, economic, intellectual, aesthetic and moral duties. Physical duty means self-preservation, care for health and recreation. One should enjoy sound health which is necessary for moral strength.

Economic duty is to treat wealth which is an economic value, as an indispensable means to the attainment of higher values. One should earn a decent living by acquiring wealth. But one should not treat wealth as an end in itself but as a means to attain higher intrinsic values.

Intellectual duty is the cultivation of the intellect and acquiring knowledge. One should not leave the intellect undeveloped, because the development of intellect is indispensable for the development of personality.

Aesthetic duty is the cultivation of aesthetic taste by appreciating and creating beauty. Moral duty is to control one's instincts, appetites, desires and passions. Self-control and self-regard constitute one's moral duty. Thus, one should treat intellectual, aesthetic and moral values as intrinsic values. These are the duties to the self. Duties to others or Other regarding duties: Other-regarding duties include duties to the family, other persons in society, country and to humanity. It also includes duties to animals and plants i.e. environment.

Duties to the family mean that one should show love and respect to parents, show love to one's children by taking care of their health, education and character. Husband and wife should love and respect each other to make a good family.

Duties to society include mainly veracity, equity and benevolence. Veracity is truthfulness. One should speak the truth. Equity means justice and fair dealing. One should respect the personality of others. One should not interfere with other's freedom and property, and should not harm others by thought, word and deed. Benevolence means showing compassion to others in times of distress. One should do one's very best to relieve their distress. These are duties to others in society.

Duties to the country are to cultivate patriotism. One should show love for the country and should try one's best to improve its condition and feel glory in its achievements.

Duties to humanity is to show love to all human beings. One should cast off narrow patriotism, colour prejudice, and racial superiority. Duties to animals include taking care of domestic animals, giving them proper food and shelter and not being cruel to them. Duties to plants include taking care of plants by watering them and giving proper nourishment.

Duties to God: Worshipping God with single minded devotion and dedicating one's action to Him. But love for God should be expressed in terms of love for mankind.

### **Conflict of Duties**

The very classification of duties into distinct classes seems to imply that they may be mutually opposed and may at times come into conflict with one another. And at such times, we are bound to be confused. For example, the duties of benevolence, justice or veracity (truthfulness). It is our duty to be just, benevolent, truthful, law-abiding, courteous. But there are occasions when it is felt that

to tell the truth will amount to treachery, or lead to murder. In fact, the various moral principles, such as justice and mercy, benevolence and veracity, may conflict with one another. Duty to the family may conflict with duty to the state, or duty to the church (or religious institutions) or duty to God. This may be called conflict of duties.

The 'conflict of duties' arise when the mind is perplexed as to 'which duty is to be done' It is sometimes difficult to resolve such a conflict. One is pulled, so to speak, in opposite directions by rival claims of different moral principles or rules. This is also called 'moral conflict' or 'perplexity of conscience'.

It may be stated in this connection that 'moral conflict' or 'perplexity of conscience' arises from various sources. It sometimes arises from the influence of passions and inclinations. If a man or a woman is not inclined to help another, he or she may question the validity of the act. In many cases, perplexity arises because one is unable to understand "the precise character of a situation or the true scope and spirit of moral principles'.

How, then, can such cases of perplexity be settled? No definite rules can be laid down with regard to this. Moral problems should be solved by reference to concrete circumstances. Under every group of circumstances which forms a field of action there is but one act which is good and obligatory. As Prof. T.H.Green remarks, "There is no such thing really as a conflict of duties. A man's duty under any particular set of circumstances is always one, though the conditions of the case may be so complicated and obscure as to make it difficult to decide what the duty really is". (Prolegomena to Ethics p-355) Rightly understood, a duty is but one under a definite set of circumstances. One should always honestly try to decide questions of duty by reference to concrete circumstances.

Whenever there seems to be a conflict of duties one should fall back upon the great fundamental moral law. The fundamental moral law is 'Realise the rational self.' The particular laws are only fragmentary aspects of this fundamental law. Self-realisation is one's supreme duty; hence it is in the light of this that one should find out what course one should follow when the rules come into conflict.

## **CONCEPT OF VIRTUE**

The English word 'virtue' is derived from Latin Vir, a man or hero. It corresponds to Latin Virtus and Sanskrit Virya, meaning manliness, bravery, power, energy or excellence. Though the word virtue was used for excellence of any kind, generally the excellence referred to is an excellence belonging to man (man includes woman as well), so that the virtues may be described as the forms of human excellence. In ethics, 'virtue' is used with two different meanings –

- (a) A virtue is a quality of character, a general disposition or inclination of the self, to adapt its action to moral law. Virtue refers to the inner character and its excellence.
- (b) A virtue is also a habit of action corresponding to the quality of character or disposition. Regarding the concept of virtue different views have been put forward by different philosophers.

They are discussed below –

Socrates Concept of Virtue: To Socrates, 'Virtue is knowledge' - If a person fully understands the nature of the good, he could not fail to pursue it. On the other hand, if a person did not fully

understand the nature of the good he could not be moral except by accident. So, unless a man knows what virtue is, unless he knows the meaning of self-control and courage and justice and piety and their opposites, he cannot be virtuous; but by knowing what virtue is, he will be virtuous. Thus, knowledge constitutes the essence of virtue, according to Socrates "No man is voluntarily bad or involuntarily good" "No man voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature. "

To Socrates, knowledge of right and wrong was not a mere theoretical opinion but a firm practical conviction. It is a matter not only of the intellect, but of the will. The tendency of all honourable, useful and good actions is to make life painless and pleasant. To Socrates, Virtue and true happiness are identical.

**Plato's Concept of Virtue:** Like Socrates, Plato also says that 'Virtue is knowledge'. The individual is wise in whom reason rules over the other impulses of the soul. The ideal, therefore, is a well-ordered soul, one in which the higher functions rule the lower functions one which exercises the virtues of wisdom, courage, self-control and justice. A life of reason, which means a life of virtue, is the highest good. Happiness attends such a life, the just man is after all the happy man. Pleasure, however, is not an end in itself; - it is not the highest factor in the life of the soul, but the lowest.

In Plato's ethical teachings, he lays emphasis on the rational element in the soul. He believes that the irrational aspect should not only merely to be subordinated, but to be cast out. So, you have found the views of Socrates and Plato that 'Virtue is knowledge or wisdom'. This cannot however, be fully accepted. Knowledge of the good does not always lead to the choice of the good. Knowledge does not constitute virtue though it is an indispensable element of it.

**Aristotle's Concept of Virtue:** Aristotle defined virtue as a habit of choice, characteristic of which lies in the observation or of moderation of the mean relative to the abilities or circumstances of the individual concerned, as it is determined by reason or as the practically prudent man would determine it.

Many virtues stand midway between two extreme vices, one of which is an excess and the other a deficiency in the proper trait. The virtue of courage, for example, is the middle position or the "golden mean" between rashness and cowardice, and liberality is the middle position between extravagance and miserliness. Virtue does not consist in the choice of the absolute Mean, but of Mean relative to the individual's ability, temperament and circumstance.

There is a great deal of truth in Aristotle's view. The essence of Virtue lies in harmony between reason and sensibility. It lies in habit of taking the middle course. But this is a general statement. It requires modification to suit particular circumstances. Moderation under all circumstances is as much a vice as immoderation in all cases. Therefore, Virtue cannot be the golden mean.

At first sight it appears that the views of Socrates and Plato, 'Virtue is knowledge' is opposed to that of the view of Aristotle, 'Virtue is the habit of choosing and performing right actions.' But the habit of choosing and performing right actions presupposes knowledge of the good and duties in concrete situations. Socrates and Plato rightly say that Virtue is knowledge. Aristotle is also right when he says that Virtue is habit. Knowledge is meaningless if it does not express itself in actions. Again, knowledge is necessary for the performance of any action. Thus Virtue implies knowledge

or moral insight and a habit of performing duties. Prof.

John S. Mackenzie rightly observes, 'Virtue is a kind of knowledge, as well as a kind of habit.' (A Manual of Ethics, P.71). However, "Virtue is its own reward", even though there are different concepts of Virtues.

## **Cardinal Virtues**

Cardinal Virtues are the fundamental virtues on which the other virtues are based. The word 'Cardinal' is a derivative of the Latin word 'Cardo' meaning a hinge and the cardinal virtues are the virtues by which the moral life is supported by its hinges.

Plato's cardinal virtues- Plato recognised four cardinal virtues. Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice. Plato, in whose 'Republic' they first definitely appear, implies that they were already traditional in his day. Plato attempts to show that these virtues are primary or 'cardinal' because they correspond to the natural constitution of the soul, and therefore form the four sides of a symmetrical character. As the soul is composed of three powers- intellect, feeling and will- so corresponding to these are the virtues of wisdom, temperance and courage. These three qualities, however, have reference more particularly to the individual life. But as man is also part of an organism, justice is conceived as the social virtue- the virtue which regulates the others.

Wisdom: Wisdom is the Virtue of the rational part of the soul. It is an all- embracing virtue. It is moral insight into the duties in a concrete situation and performing them. It is practical wisdom which is implied in all moral actions. However, in a wide sense, wisdom should include care, foresight, prudence and decisiveness of choice.

Courage: Courage is the virtue of the emotional part of the soul. Courage is the power of resisting the fear of pain and the temptation of pleasure. It is not the mere facing of pain that is virtue, but the doing of what is right in the face of pain. Courage is the special virtue of the fighting class. In a wider sense courage should include both valour and fortitude. Valour is active courage, which forges ahead and braves danger and pain. Fortitude is passive courage which endures inevitable sufferings without wavering. Courage should include perseverance.

Temperance: Temperance is the Virtue which offers resistance to the allurements of pleasure. It is self-restraint or self-control. It denotes the will to choose the higher values and to reject the lower bodily values. Temperance is not merely a negative virtue engaged in repressing the appetites. Temperance does not merely restrain passions and desires, but it takes from reason guidance as to how far these desires should be satisfied. Temperance demands a reasonable moderation or a happy blending of the domination of reason with the other tendencies of human nature. Temperance is supremely a virtue which gives beauty to the moral life.

Justice: Justice is the harmonious functioning of intellect, emotion and desire under the guidance of reason. Wisdom, courage, and temperance are primarily virtues of an individual man. Justice is primarily a virtue of a society. In a good society justice demands that the lame man, however unworthy he is morally or however little he is able to do physically for the common good, should be provided with an artificial leg. Justice is impartiality to all in the face of personal prejudice, preference or self-interest. It comprehends all social virtues. Justice is the performance of social duties. It should include honesty, fidelity, benevolence, love, courtesy, cheerfulness and good humour. Impartiality precedes benevolence. These are social virtues. All virtues are forms of

practical wisdom. Plato's cardinal virtues can be adapted to the requirements of the modern society.

## **The Concept of Rights Rights and Justice**

Rights and justice are not really distinct issues, but the use of the term "rights" emphasizes (at least at the start) a different dimension from the use of the term "justice." When we mention justice we are usually concerned with how (according to what pattern) valuable things (benefits) and their opposites (burdens) are distributed. When we talk about rights, we think first of all of entities, usually human individuals, who supposedly possess or bear those rights.

John Rawls' principles of justice concern the distribution of benefits and burdens among individuals in a society (the liberties, for instance, are benefits while having to pay taxes would be a burden).

The link between rights and justice is duties. Principles of justice prescribe the ways in which benefits and burdens should be distributed. At one level, these are duties of public officials, but they also provide guidelines for laws, which the rest of us have duties to obey. Rights, as we shall see, can be explained in terms of the duties of others to the right-holder.

## **Definition of Rights**

A right is said to be an entitlement or justified claim to a certain kind of positive and [or?] negative treatment from others, to assistance from others or non-interference from others. (Many moral philosophers would put "or" in this definition after "positive," but others, with whom I agree, would put "and." See below: "the Alleged Distinctions between Negative and Positive Rights.")

A right is described as an entitlement or justified claim to a certain kind of positive and negative treatment from others, to support from others or non-interference from others. In other words, a right is something to which every individual in the community is morally permitted, and for which that community is entitled to disrespect or compulsorily remove anything that stands in the way of even a single individual getting it. Rights belong to individuals, and no organisation has any rights not directly derived from those of its members as individuals; and, just as an individual's rights cannot extend to where they will intrude on another individual's rights, similarly the rights of any organisation whatever must yield to those of a single individual, whether inside or outside the organisation. Rights are those important conditions of social life without which no person can generally realize his best self. These are the essential conditions for health of both the individual and his society. It is only when people get and enjoy rights that they can develop their personalities and contribute their best services to the society.

In simple words, rights are the common claims of people which every cultured society recognizes as essential claims for their development, and which are therefore enforced by the state.

1. According to Laski, "Rights are those conditions of social life without which no man can seek in general, to be himself at his best."
2. T. H. Green explained that "Rights are powers necessary for the fulfilment of man's vocation as a moral being."
3. Beni Prasad stated that "Rights are nothing more nor less than those social conditions which are necessary or favourable to the development of personality"

Other moral theorists like Isaiah Berlin defines rights in terms of positive liberties and negative

freedoms. A positive right is an entitlement to; A right to free expression, for instance, entitles one to voice opinions publicly. A negative right is a freedom from; Freedom of person is a right to be free of bodily interference. Most rights are both positive and negative.

## **Main features of Rights:**

1. Rights exist only in society. These are the products of social living.
2. Rights are claims of the individuals for their development in society.
3. Rights are recognized by the society as common claims of all the people.
4. Rights are rational and moral claims that the people make on their society.
5. Since rights are here only in society, these cannot be exercised against the society.
6. Rights are to be exercised by the people for their development which really means their development in society by the promotion of social good. Rights can never be exercised against social good.
7. Rights are equally available to all the people.
8. The contents of rights keep on changing with the passage of time.
9. Rights are not absolute. These always bear limitations deemed essential for maintaining public health, security, order and morality.
10. Rights are inseparably related with duties. There is a close relationship between them "No Duties No Rights. No Rights No Duties." "If I have rights it is my duty to respect the rights of others in society".
11. Rights need enforcement and only then these can be really used by the people. These are protected and enforced by the laws of the state. It is the duty of a state to protect the rights of the people.

## **Types of Rights:**

### **1. Natural Rights:**

Many researchers have faith in natural rights. They stated that people inherit several rights from nature. Before they came to live in society and state, they used to live in a state of nature. In it, they appreciated certain natural rights, like the right to life, right to liberty and right to property. Natural rights are parts of human nature and reason. Political theory maintains that an individual enters into society with certain basic rights and that no government can deny these rights. In classical political philosophy "natural right" denotes to the objective rightness of the right things, whether the virtue of a soul, the correctness of an action, or the excellence of a regime. Aristotle stated in Politics (1323a29-33) that no one would call a man happy who was completely lacking in courage, temperance, justice, or wisdom. A man who was easily terrified, unable to restrain any impulse toward food or drink, willing to ruin his friends for a trifle, and generally senseless could not possibly lead a good life. Even though chance may occasionally prevent good actions from having their normal consequences, so that sometimes cowards fare better than brave men, courage is still objectively better than cowardice. The virtues and actions that contribute to the good life, and the activities intrinsic to the good life, are naturally right.

The modern idea of natural rights grew out of the ancient and medieval doctrines of natural law, but for other scholars, the concept of natural rights is unreal. Rights are the products of social living. These can be used only in a society. Rights have behind them the recognition of society as common claims for development, and that is why the state protects these rights. John Locke (1632–1704), the most influential political philosophers of the modern period, argued that people

have rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property that have a foundation independent of the laws of any particular society. Locke claimed that men are naturally free and equal as part of the justification for understanding legitimate political government as the result of a social contract where people in the state of nature conditionally transfer some of their rights to the government in order to better ensure the stable, comfortable enjoyment of their lives, liberty, and property. Since governments exist by the consent of the people in order to protect the rights of the people and promote the public good, governments that fail to do so can be resisted and replaced with new governments.

## **2. Moral Rights:**

Moral Rights are based on human consciousness. They are supported by moral force of human mind. These are based on human sense of goodness and justice. These are not assisted by the force of law. Sense of goodness and public opinion are the sanctions behind moral rights.

If any person disrupts any moral right, no legal action can be taken against him. The state does not enforce these rights. Its courts do not recognize these rights. Moral Rights include rules of good conduct, courtesy and of moral behaviour. These stand for moral perfection of the people.

Moral rights were first acknowledged in France and Germany, before they were included in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1928. Canada recognized moral rights in its Copyright Act. The United States became a signatory to the convention in 1989, and incorporated a version of moral rights under its copyright law under Title 17 of the U.S. Code. There are two major moral rights under the U.S. Copyright Act. These are the right of attribution, also called the right of paternity and the right of integrity.

## **Legal Rights:**

Legal rights are those rights which are accepted and enforced by the state. Any defilement of any legal right is punished by law. Law courts of the state enforce legal rights. These rights can be enforced against individuals and also against the government. In this way, legal rights are different from moral rights. Legal rights are equally available to all the citizens. All citizens follow legal rights without any discrimination. They can go to the courts for getting their legal rights enforced. Legal Rights are of three types:

### **1. Civil Rights:**

Civil rights are those rights which provide opportunity to each person to lead a civilized social life. These fulfil basic needs of human life in society. Right to life, liberty and equality are civil rights. Civil rights are protected by the state.

### **2. Political Rights:**

Political rights are those rights by virtue of which inhabitants get a share in the political process. These allow them to take an active part in the political process. These rights include right to vote, right to get elected, right to hold public office and right to criticise and oppose the government. Political rights are really available to the people in a democratic state.

### **3. Economic Rights:**

Economic rights are those rights which provide economic security to the people. These empower all citizens to make proper use of their civil and political rights. The basic needs of every person

are related to his food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment. Without the fulfillment of these no person can really enjoy his civil and political rights. It is therefore essential, that every person must get the right to work, right to adequate wages, right to leisure and rest, and right to social security in case of illness, physical disability and old age.

### **Human and Legal Rights:**

There is some difference between moral or human rights and legal rights. Legal rights require for their justification an existing system of law. Legal rights are, roughly, what the law says they are, at least insofar as the law is enforced. Legal rights gain their force first of all through legislation or decree by a legally authorized authority. Those who support adoption of laws establishing legal rights often appeal to a notion of human rights. Laws against theft might appeal to notions of a moral right to own property. But human or moral rights must gain their validity through some other source other than legal rights, since people can appeal to human or moral rights to criticize the law or advocate changes in the law (or legal rights), and people could not do this if moral rights were based upon the law.

### **Contractual Rights**

Apart from human rights and basic legal rights there are contractual rights. Contractual rights derive from the practice of promise-keeping. They apply to particular individuals to whom contractual promises have been made. Contractual rights arise from specific acts of contract making. They normally come into being when the contract is made, and they reflect the contractual duty that another party has acquired at the same time. As a result of a contract, party A has a contractual duty, say, to deliver some good or service to party B, who has a contractual right to the good or service. (Contractual rights may be upheld by the law, and in that sense can rest upon legal rights, but it is possible to conceive of contracts made outside of a legal framework and to rest purely upon moral principles; however, such contracts are less secure than contracts made within a legal framework, for obvious reasons.)

### **A Fuller Understanding of Human or Moral Rights** Rights correspond to duties in three ways:

- a. Individual duties of forbearance (non-interference)
- b. institutional duties of assistance
- c. individual duties of assistance

Consider the right to property, conceived primarily as the right not to have one's personal property taken without one's consent. This implies that

- a. other individuals have a duty to forbear from taking a person's possessions without his or her consent.
- b. institutions, such as governments, should establish and enforce laws against theft and should do so in all neighborhoods where theft is a possibility.
- c. officials in the government have an individual duty, as officials, to support such laws and or enforce them.

The individual duties of assistance come into play in several ways: If the government were lax in this area, citizens might have a positive duty to pressure government to pass an appropriate law if one were missing or to enforce already existing laws.

Beyond that, individual citizens who are aware of persons with sticky fingers, as it were, have an obligation, where it could be done at reasonable cost to themselves, to thwart acts of theft.

### **Characteristics of human rights:**

1. Human Rights are Inalienable: Human rights are deliberated on an individual due to the very nature of his existence. They are innate in all individuals irrespective of their caste, creed, religion, sex and nationality. Human rights are conferred to an individual even after his death. The different rituals in different religions bear testimony to this fact.

2. Human Rights are essential and necessary: Human rights are needed to maintain the moral, physical, social and spiritual welfare of an individual. Human rights are also essential as they provide suitable conditions for material and moral upliftment of the people.

3. Human Rights are associated with human dignity: To treat another individual with dignity regardless of the fact that the person is a male or female, rich or poor is concerned with human dignity.

4. Human Rights are Irrevocable: Human rights are irrevocable as they cannot be taken away by any power or authority because these rights originate with the social nature of man in the society of human beings and they belong to a person simply because he is a human being. As such human rights have similarities to moral rights.

5. Human Rights are essential for the fulfilment of purpose of life: Human life has a purpose. The phrase "human right" is applied to those conditions which are essential for the fulfilment of this purpose. No government has the power to curtail or take away the rights which are sacrosanct, inviolable and immutable.

6. Human Rights are Universal: Human rights are not a domination of any privileged class of people. Human rights are universal in nature, without consideration and without exception. The values such as divinity, dignity and equality which form the basis of these rights are inherent in human nature.

7. Human Rights are never absolute: Man is a social animal and he lives in a civic society, which always put certain limitations on the enjoyment of his rights and freedoms. Human rights as such are those limited powers or claims, which are contributory to the common good and which are recognized and guaranteed by the State, through its laws to the individuals. As such each right has certain limitations.

8. Human Rights are Dynamic: Human rights are not stationary, they are dynamic. Human rights go on expanding with socio-economic and political developments within the State. Judges have to construe laws in such ways as are in tune with the changed social values.

9. Rights as limits to state power: Human rights infer that every individual has legitimate claims upon his or her society for certain freedom and benefits. So human rights limit the state's power. These may be in the form of negative restrictions, on the powers of the State, from violating the inalienable freedoms of the individuals, or in the nature of demands on the State, i.e. positive

obligations of the State.

### **Principles of human rights:**

- Universality
- Inviolable
- Inalienable
- Indivisible
- Interdependent
- Inter-related
- Universality
- Inviolable
- Inalienable
- Indivisible
- Interdependent
- Inter-related
- Equality
- Non-discriminatory

### **The Alleged Distinctions Between Negative and Positive Rights**

Many authors distinguish between negative rights and positive rights. Negative rights would correspond to duties of forbearance: if X has a negative right to V, then other's have a non-interference duty in relation to X's enjoyment of V.

Positive rights would correspond to duties of assistance: if X has a positive right to V, then others (perhaps government) have a (positive) duty to provide X with V.

It is frequently thought that the right not to be killed, not to be assaulted, not to be raped or kidnapped, and the right not to have one's property taken without one's consent are negative rights and not positive rights.

But this may be a mistake. We have seen that the right not to have one's property stolen corresponds both to negative and to positive duties, and the same would be true of other rights that people have supposed were purely negative.

### **The Basis of Rights**

There are several, mutually reinforcing ways that one can defend the existence of rights. One way is inspired by Immanuel Kant. Kant proposes that the essence of morality is captured by what has been called the Categorical Imperative. In a slight paraphrase, this reads: Act only on those rules of action that you could will to be universal laws.

The Categorical Imperative is a rule for testing rules of conduct. It will exclude as immoral any rule of conduct that implies that one person may do something but another, in relevantly similar circumstances, may not. In other words, it demands consistency. What's all right for me is all right for you if our relevant circumstances are similar. If I may throw my toxic waste into the river to save money for myself, then you may do so likewise. But of course I would not want you to do that, so it would be wrong for me.

This is relevant to human rights, because we think of human rights as universally applicable to human beings. And Kant says that what is morally permissible applies to all rational beings. It is also relevant that this test tends to endorse rules of action that protect our most basic interests, just the sorts of things that rights protect.

We could not endorse a rule that outlaws a particular religion because, if the rule were generalized, the religion we favor could be outlawed as well.

A second formulation of the Categorical Imperative is also important: "Always act so as to treat humanity (rational beings) as an end, never as a means only."

The point is that human beings, understood as beings capable of reasoning about their choices, are inherently valuable and worthy of respect for this reason. This sets strict limits upon what we are morally permitted to do to them, at least under normal circumstances.

It can also be used to defend securing for human beings what they need in order to function as rational beings.

Brian Orend, a Canadian philosopher, in his *Human Rights: Concept and Context*, develops this idea in the direction of human rights as follows: To respect human beings as an end is to respect their interests in being protected against grievous harm. (Harm is understood as loss or non-possession of the goods that fulfill vital human needs.)

Orend lists five vital needs that, he claims, are common to all human beings. If these needs were not met at a basic level, we could not function as rational beings. They are

- security,
- subsistence,
- freedom,
- equality, and
- recognition.

It would be interesting to compare this list with Martha Nussbaum's list of basic capabilities in her account of the things to which human rights entitle us.

Human rights, in a nutshell, are the entitlements we have in these five areas. Orend's approach helps explain the list of human rights found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations (including the United States) in the late 1940's. The list of human rights in the Universal Declaration is much larger than five, but most of those rights can be derived by further specification from Orend's basic five.

Orend's approach fits well with the idea that you cannot distinguish sharply between negative rights and positive rights because even the so-called negative rights (for example, the right not to be killed) are positive in the sense that they call upon institutions to aid potential victims and bystanders to do what they can, at least if the cost to themselves is absorbable.

### **Categories of Rights:**

Human rights can be grouped into following categories:

- Civil Human Rights
- Political Human Rights

- Economic Human Rights
- Social and Cultural Human Rights
- Development Oriented Human Rights

1. In the era of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the civil and political rights, were strengthened which assured civil and political liberties. The Civil and Political Human Rights are collectively known as 'Liberty Oriented Human Rights' because they provide, protect and guarantee individual liberty to an individual against the State and its agencies. Liberty rights also referred to as Blue Rights are the First Generation of Human Rights.

2. In the twentieth century, economic, social and cultural rights and the rights of minorities as well developed. The intent of these rights to promote the economic and social security through economic and social upliftment of the weaker sections of the society. These rights are essential for dignity of personhood as well as for the full and free development of human personality in all possible directions. These rights guarantee a minimum of economic welfare of the masses and their basic material needs, recognized by the society as essential to cultured living.

The economic, social and cultural rights, including the rights of the minorities are together called the "Security Oriented Human Rights" because these rights jointly provide and guarantee the essential security in the life of an individual. In the absence of these rights, the very existence of human beings would be in danger. These are also known as the "Second Generation of Human Rights". They are also called as Red Rights or also as positive rights. These rights along with the Civil and Political Rights were declared by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and later were recognized by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in December 1966.

3. The Development Oriented Human Rights were originated in the late twentieth century. These rights empower an individual to partake in the process of overall development and include environmental rights that enable an individual to enjoy the absolutely resources of nature, such as air, water, food and natural resources, free from pollution and contamination. These are known as the Third Generation of Human Rights or Green Rights. They are also called as Solidarity Rights, because their implementation depends upon international cooperation.

Solidarity rights have immense importance in developing countries, because these countries want the creation of an international order that will guarantee to them the right to development, the right to disaster relief assistance, the right to peace and the right to good government.

Brian Orend, a Canadian philosopher, in his Human Rights: Concept and Context, develops this idea in the direction of human rights as follows: To respect human beings as an end is to respect their interests in being protected against grievous harm.

Orend lists five vital needs that, he claims, are common to all human beings. If these needs were not met at a basic level, we could not function as rational beings. They are security, subsistence, freedom, equality, and recognition. It would be interesting to compare this list with Martha Nussbaum's list of basic capabilities in her account of the things to which human rights entitle us.

## **Human rights in India:**

Human rights are vital for all round development of individuals. The Constitution of India makes provisions for basic rights also known as Fundamental Rights for its citizens as well as for aliens. The Supreme Court of India is the guarantor of the rights according to the Constitution. The court takes into account fundamental duties while interpreting the constitutional right. In Indian constitution, Rights are classified mainly in three broad categories: (a) Civil (b) Political (c) Economic and Social. Fundamental Rights in India recognize certain civil rights. Certain Political and Economic and Social rights are recognized by other provisions in the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India recognizes Fundamental Right as "natural right" In Indian constitution, the Fundamental Rights are defined as the basic human rights of all citizens. These rights are defined in Part III of the Constitution regardless of race, place of birth, religion, caste, creed or sex.

Guha quoted that "The demand for a declaration of fundamental rights arose from four factors:

- Lack of civil liberty in India during the British rule.
- Deplorable social conditions, particularly affecting the untouchables and women.
- Existence of different religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups encouraged and exploited by the Britishers.
- Exploitation of the tenants by the landlords.

### **Fundamental Rights includes:-Right to Equality:**

The Right to Equality is one of the chief guarantees of the Constitution of India. Articles 14–18 of Constitution highlights the right to equality. It refers to the equality in the eyes of law irrespective of caste, race, and religion, place of birth or sex. When appraising Indian constitutional law, it can be stated that Article 14 guarantees equality before law as well as equal protection of the law to not only citizen of India but also to all the people within the territory of India. This includes the equal subjection of all persons to the authority of law, as well as equal treatment of persons in similar circumstances. The State cannot refuse this right. But no persons or group of persons can demand for any special treatment or any special privilege.

**Article 15** forbids discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them. This right applies only to inhabitants of India and can be enforced against the State as well as private individuals, individuals, regarding free access to places of public entertainment or places of public resort maintained partly or wholly out of State funds. The State has the right to make special treatment for women, children and for the development of backward class, scheduled caste or scheduled tribe people.

**Article 16** promises equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. It prevents the State from discriminating against anyone in respect of employment on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, and place of birth or place of residence. However, the State may provide special reservation to the people of backward classes, scheduled castes or scheduled tribes for the upliftment of the weaker sections as well as for a person professing that particular religion in case of religious institution.

**Article 17** abolishes the practice of untouchability. It has been declared an offence punishable by law. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 has been enacted by the Parliament which states punishments for not allowing a person to enter the place of worship and from taking water from a well or tank.

**Article 18** prohibits the State from granting any titles other than military or academic distinctions, distinctions, and even the citizens of India cannot accept titles from a foreign state. Thus, Indian aristocratic titles and titles of nobility given by the British have been abolished.

**Right to Freedom:**

The Right to Freedom is mentioned in Articles 19–22, with the view of guaranteeing individual rights. But some of the rights are subject to security of the State, friendly relation with foreign countries, public order, decency or morality and for which certain restrictions may be imposed by the State on individual liberty under specified condition.

**Article 19** assures the citizens of India the following six fundamental freedoms subject to certain restrictions:

- Freedom of Speech and Expression
- Freedom of Assembly
- Freedom of form Associations
- Freedom of Movement
- Freedom of Residence and Settlement
- Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade and Business.

**Article 20** provides protection from conviction for offences in certain respects, respects, including the rights against ex post facto laws, double danger and freedom from self-incrimination.

**Article 21** averts the encroachment /protection of life or personal liberty by the State. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

**Article 22** offers specific rights to arrested and detained persons, i.e., the rights to be informed of the grounds of arrest, arrest, consult a lawyer of one's own choice, be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest, and the freedom not to be detained beyond that period without an order of the magistrate. Article 22 also provides that when a person is detained under any law of preventive detention, the State can detain such person without trial for only three months, months, and any detention for a longer period must be authorised by an Advisory Board. The person being detained, has the right to be informed about the grounds of detention, and be permitted to make a representation against it, at the earliest opportunity.

Right against Exploitation: The Right against Exploitation, contained in Articles 23–24, lays down certain provisions to prevent exploitation of the weaker sections of the society by individuals or the State. Child labour and Begar is forbidden under the Right against Exploitation.

**Article 23** prohibits human trafficking and forced labour or any act of compelling a person to work without wages where he was legally entitled not to work or to receive remuneration for it. Any contravention leads to an offence. However, it permits the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes, including conscription and community service. The Bonded Labour system (Abolition) Act, 1976, has been enacted by Parliament to give effect to this Article.

**Article 24** prohibits the employment of children below the age of 14 years in factories, mines and other hazardous jobs. Parliament has enacted the Child Labour (Prohibition (Prohibition and Regulation) Regulation) Act, 1986, providing regulations for the abolition of, and penalties for

employing, child labour, as well as provisions for rehabilitation of former child labourers. The Employment of Children Act, 1938 was the first act to prevent Child Labour.

### **Right to Freedom of Religion:**

The Right to Freedom of Religion, enclosed in **Articles 25–28**, provides religious freedom to all citizens and ensures a secular state in India. According to the Constitution, there is no official State religion, and the State is required to treat all religions impartially and neutrally.

**Article 25** promises all persons the freedom of conscience and the right to preach, practice and propagate any religion of their choice. This right is, however, subject to public order, morality and health, and the power of the State to take measures for social welfare and reform. The right in this article shall not affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making new law.

**Article 26** guarantees all religious denominations or any sections, subject to public order, morality and health; to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, religion, set up or manage institutions of their own for charitable or religious purposes, and own, acquire and manage property in accordance with law. These provisions do not derogate/deviate from the State's power to acquire property belonging to a religious denomination.

**Article 27** guarantees freedom for payment of taxes. No person can be compelled to pay taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious institution.

**Article 28** forbids religious instruction in a wholly State-funded educational institution, and educational institutions receiving aid from the State cannot compel any of their members to receive religious instruction or attend religious worship without their consent or their guardian's consent in case of minor.

**Cultural and Educational Rights:** The Cultural and Educational rights stated in Articles 29 and 30, are measures to protect the rights of cultural, linguistic and religious minorities, by enabling them to conserve their heritage and protecting them against discrimination.

**Article 29** grants any section of citizens having a distinct language, script culture of its own, and the right to conserve and develop the same, and thus defences the rights or interest of minorities by preventing the State from imposing any external culture on them. It also prohibits discrimination against any citizen for admission into any educational institutions maintained or aided by the State, on the basis of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Nonetheless, this is subject to reservation by the State for socially and educationally backward classes, as well as reservation of up to 50 percent of seats in any educational institution run by a minority community for citizens belonging to that community.

**Article 30** promises the right of minorities to set up and administer educational institutions of their choice in order to preserve and develop their own culture, and prohibits the State, while granting aid, from discriminating against any institution on the basis of the fact that it is administered or managed by a religious or cultural minority.

### **Right to constitutional remedies:**

The Right to Constitutional Remedies is covered in Article 32. It empowers inhabitants to approach the Supreme Court of India to seek enforcement, enforcement, or protection against infringement,

of their Fundamental Rights. Article 32 provides a guaranteed remedy for enforcement of all the other Fundamental Rights, and the Supreme Court is designated as the protector of these rights by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has been empowered to issue writs, namely habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warrant, for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, while the High Courts have been empowered under Article 226 - which is not a Fundamental Right in itself.

## **The concept of justice**

The concept of justice has generated serious controversies in the realm of political philosophy because of the complexities and intricacies involved within the concept itself. Indeed, among all the evocative ideas, that of justice appears to be one of the most eminent and the most hopelessly confused. The very attempt to define justice has become a very risky venture partly because of the ambiguity inherent in the concept itself and partly because of the various interpretations of the concept by different philosophers at different times. From the time of Plato down to the present day no consensus and no satisfactory definition of justice could emerge due to its abstract, universal and all pervasive characteristics. In all the normative disciplines which directly or indirectly govern action in regard to others -whether it be law or political philosophy, ethics or religion, justice constitutes a central value.

### **Justice: Meaning & Definition:**

Justice is a complex concept and touches almost every aspect of human life. The word Justice has been derived from the Latin word *Jungere* meaning 'to bind or tie together'. The word 'Jus' also means 'Tie' or 'Bond'. In this way Justice can be defined as a system in which men are tied or joined in a close relationship. Justice seeks to harmonise different values and to organise upon it all human relations. As such, Justice means bonding or joining or organising people together into a right or fair order of relationships.

### **Some popular definitions of Justice:**

"Justice means to distribute the due share to everybody." -Salmond

"Justice protects the rights of the individual as well as the order of society." -Dr. Raphael

"Justice consists in a system of understandings and a procedure through which each is accorded what is agreed upon as fair." -C.E. Merriam

In other words, Justice means securing and protecting of rights of all in a fair way. It stands for harmony among all the people, orderly living and securing of rights of all in a just and fair way.

## **ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE**

There is wide divergence in the prevalent notions of justice. Philosophers like **Plato** and **Aristotle** regard justice as a supreme virtue, the source of all others and encompassing within itself the whole of morality. For **Kant** and **Rawls** justice is a very important aspect of human existence, the first virtue of society. Hume, and Marx and Engels denigrate the concept of justice; and for them it is unnecessary if not entirely irrelevant. Nonetheless, the very charge of inadequacy or redundancy or superfluity against justice presupposes its meaningfulness and worth otherwise, all the charges would be irrelevant.

Common usage continues to treat justice, despite all its inadequacies and limitations, as denoting some of the greatest human needs. Man's longing for justice is explained as the active process of preventing or remedying what would arouse the sense of injustice.

This consciousness of injustice arises in society in the context of a prevailing system of human relationship. The origin of justice therefore, is traced to man's consciousness of injustice in society and consequently to his urge for change in the situation towards a better and desirable one. In other words man's craving for what is good and what ought to be is the perennial experience that gives rise to the concern for justice.

Justice presupposes the existence of conflict and it is called upon to harmonise antinomies. It is only in the realm of moral that the synthesis and perfect harmony between personal and transpersonal values is possible, but in actual world they are in intense conflict. And it is precisely this hiatus between the harmony of the moral ideal and the disharmony of reality that gives rise to the problem of justice. Justice harmonises the conflicting interests and tends to bring out a balance. Justice in its true and proper sense is a principle of coordination between subjective beings and the idea of justice only manifests and can manifest itself in relation to persons but not between objects of any kind. Justice and injustice are meaningful and relevant only in context of a society i.e., justice and civil society can be said to go together.

Hence, justice primarily, is a social concept which has its origin in man's life in society. Justice being social is not a static and abstract concept, rather it is a concrete and dynamic one to be understood in terms of the changing social relation of man. It implies an idea of interpreting social relation of man in relation to ethics. R. W. Baldwin remarks that justice being essentially a quality of the behaviour of one man to another, that is of man in society, all justice is social justice and the adjective is otiose.<sup>3</sup> Morris Ginsberg also subscribes to the same view and repudiates the metaphysical deduction of justice from the concept of self-consciousness only.<sup>4</sup> Justice, thus involves an element of desirability or goodness in social life through alleviating some of the gross injustice of a society.

## **Principles of Justice Introduction**

**Selecting Principles of Justice.** Different principles of distributive justice are proposed by different philosophers. Does that mean that we may choose any one of them with equal justification? A "yes" answer to this question would make disputes about fairness impossible to settle. To avoid this, we must find some non-arbitrary method of selecting among proposed principles of justice.

**The Uses of Tradition.** One method for resolving this issue might be to follow the traditions of various practices that have grown up over time. For example, the practice of grading students for their performance in academic courses now includes a merit principle for determining most grades: the grade a student receives should reflect the quantity and quality of her work. It might be said in defense of such traditions that they have survived because they have proven more satisfactory to the parties affected, considered collectively, than other conceivable alternatives, such as giving everyone the same grade or handing out grades in accordance with the student's ability to pay. To argue this way would be to reinforce the argument from tradition ("we've done it that way for a long time") by a kind of Utilitarian argument ("let's optimize society's satisfaction").

**The Problem of Radically Unjust Traditions.** But traditions can be oppressive and unjust. Activities that take place within unjust social systems can themselves be unjust, in spite of their traditional

nature. Thus a practice of giving a person that which is "his" can be unjust. Suppose this rule is included within a system of slave property, the "property" in question is a slave, and the practice would require someone meeting an escaped slave to return the slave to his or her master. The fact that the slave system is unjust raises doubts about the justice of activities that occur within that system, such as returning escaped "property" to its "owners." What is needed is a way to determine when social systems, or the rules of justice that govern society as a whole, are just: Such an approach to the selection of rules of distributive justice is provided by John Rawls. Rawls' approach is not Utilitarian and it does not rely heavily on arguments from tradition.

## **John Rawls' Method**

We are to imagine ourselves in what Rawls calls the Original Position. We are all self-interested rational persons and we stand behind "the Veil of Ignorance." To say that we are self-interested rational persons is to say that we are motivated to select, in an informed and enlightened way, whatever seems advantageous for ourselves.

To say that we are behind a Veil of Ignorance is to say we do not know the following sorts of things: our sex, race, physical handicaps, generation, social class of our parents, etc. But self-interested rational persons are not ignorant of (1) the general types of possible situations in which humans can find themselves; (2) general facts about human psychology and "human nature". Self-interested rational persons behind the Veil of Ignorance are given the task of choosing the principles that shall govern actual world. Rawls believes that he has set up an inherently fair procedure here. Because of the fairness of the procedure Rawls has described, he says, the principles that would be chosen by means of this procedure would be fair principles.

A self-interested rational person behind the Veil of Ignorance would not want to belong to a race or gender or sexual orientation that turns out to be discriminated-against. Such a person would not wish to be a handicapped person in a society where handicapped are treated without respect. So principles would be adopted that oppose discrimination.

Likewise, a self-interested rational person would not want to belong to a generation which has been allocated a lower than average quantity of resources. So (s)he would endorse the principle: "Each generation should have roughly equal resources" or "Each generation should leave to the next at least as many resources as they possessed at the start."

The corollary of this, in rights terms, is that all generations have the same rights to resources, future as well as present.

## **John Rawls' principles of justice.**

Rawls argues that self-interested rational persons behind the veil of ignorance would choose two general principles of justice to structure society in the real world:

1. **Principle of Equal Liberty:** Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all. (Egalitarian.)
2. **Difference Principle:** Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity.

- is egalitarian, since it distributes extensive liberties equally to all persons.

(2b) is also quite egalitarian, since it distributes opportunities to be considered for offices and positions in an equal manner.

(2a) is not egalitarian but makes benefit for some (those with greater talents, training, etc.) proportionate to their contribution toward benefiting the least advantaged persons.

(1) obviously echoes, without exactly duplicating, libertarianism in its commitment to extensive liberties. What does the Difference Principle mean? It means that society may undertake projects that require giving some persons more power, income, status, etc. than others, e.g., paying accountants and upper-level managers more than assembly-line operatives, provided that the following conditions are met:

(a) the project will make life better off for the people who are now worst off, for example, by raising the living standards of everyone in the community and empowering the least advantaged persons to the extent consistent with their well-being, and

(b) access to the privileged positions is not blocked by discrimination according to irrelevant criteria.

The Difference Principle has elements of other familiar ethical theories. The "socialist" idea that responsibilities or burdens should be distributed according to ability and benefits according to need is partly contained within the Difference Principle. We may reasonably assume that the "least advantaged" have the greatest needs and that those who receive special powers (hinted at under "social inequalities") also have special responsibilities or burdens. However, the merit principle that the use of special skills should be rewarded is also included in the Difference Principle.

What (2a) does not permit is a change in social and economic institutions that makes life better for those who are already well off but does nothing for those who are already disadvantaged, or makes their life worse.

Example: policies that permit nuclear power plants which degrade the environment for nearby family farmers but provide jobs for already well-paid professionals who come in from the big cities.

## **Beyond Rawls**

Rawls' theory of justice was set forth in his book *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press, 1971). Since then it has been much discussed, and attempts have been made to improve and clarify it, not least by Rawls himself. One of those attempts at improvement is that of Martha C. Nussbaum (*Women and Human Development*), who has reinterpreted Rawls' argument from the perspective of Substantial Freedom, an idea she gets from Amartya Sen.

For Nussbaum the liberties mentioned in the Principle of Equal Liberty, if they are to be meaningful at all, are capabilities or substantial freedoms, real opportunities based on natural and developed potentialities as well as the presence of governmentally supported institutions, to engage in political deliberation and planning over one's own life.

Likewise, for Nussbaum, the concern of the Difference Principle to raise up those who are least advantaged must be clarified in light of substantial freedoms. What is needed, in her view, is a commitment by citizens and governments to a threshold of real opportunities below which no human being should fall if she is able to rise above it.

## **Kinds of Justice**

The concept of justice and its administration can be of the following types:

### **1) Public justice and Private justice**

Public justice is basically that kind of justice which the state administers through its tribunals and courts. It explains the relationship between courts and citizens of a state. Courts usually enforce laws that the states make under public justice.

On the other hand, private justice regulates the legal relationship between individuals. It is limited to people enforcing concepts of justice amongst each other without approaching courts. For example, let's imagine that A and B entered into a business transaction in which A paid money to B as promised. B, instead of selling goods to A for the money, refused to fulfill his obligation. If A and B decide to settle their dispute through means of arbitration or negotiation, it is private justice. However, if A approaches a court and sues B, we refer to that as public justice.

### **2) Civil justice and Criminal justice**

In terms of the subject matters of justice, we can categorize it as civil and criminal. Civil justice generally refers to private wrongs that affect specific people or entities.

For example, breach of a contract between two parties will affect only one of them. Trespassing of property is another example. The remedy of such civil wrongs is generally to approach civil courts. Criminal justice, on the other hand, affects society in general even if specific people are victims. For example, the murder affects specific victims only but the law treats it as a crime against society.

Another feature of criminal justice is that it relates to laws made by a legislature. Only acts that are defined as crimes can be the subject matter of criminal justice.

## **Social Justice:**

In contemporary times a large number of scholars use prefer to describe the concept of Justice as Social Justice. Social Justice is taken to mean that all the people in a society are to be equal and there is be no discrimination on the basis of religion, caste, creed, colour, sex or status.

However, various scholars explain the concept of Social Justice in different ways. Some hold that social justice is to allot to each individual his or her due share in the social sphere. According to some others, distribution of social facilities and rights on the basis of law and justice constitutes social justice.

## **What is Social Justice?**

"Social justice is another name for equal social rights." "Social Justice aims to provide equal opportunities to every individual to develop his inherent qualities."- Barker

"By social justice we mean ending all kinds of social inequalities and then to provide equal

opportunities to everyone.”-C.JP.B. Gajendragadkar

Social democrats and modern liberal thinkers define social justice as the attempt to reconstruct the social order in accordance with moral principles. Attempts are to be continuously made to rectify social injustice. It also stands for a morally just and defensible system of distribution of reward and obligations in society without any discrimination or injustice against any person or class of persons.

In the Indian Constitution several provisions have been provided with a view to secure social economic and political justice. Untouchability has been constitutionally abolished. Every citizen has been granted an equal right of access to any public place, place of worship and use of places of entertainment.

The state cannot discriminate between citizens on the basis of birth, caste, colour, creed, sex, faith or title or status or any of these. Untouchability and apartheid are against the spirit of social justice. Absence of privileged classes in society is an essential attribute of social justice.

## **2. Economic Justice:**

Economic Justice is indeed closely related to social justice because economic system is always an integral part of the social system. Economic rights and opportunities available to an individual are always a part of the entire social system.

Economic justice demands that all citizens should have adequate opportunities to earn their livelihood and get fair wages as can enable them to satisfy their basic needs and help them to develop further. The state should provide them economic security during illness, old age and in the event of a disability.

No person or group or class should be in a position to exploit others, nor get exploited. There should be fair and equitable distribution of wealth and resources among all the people. The gap between the rich and the poor should not be glaring. The fruits of prosperity must reach all the people.

There are present several different views regarding the meaning of economic justice. The liberals consider open competition as just and they support private property. On the other hand, the socialists seek to establish complete control of society upon the entire economic system. They oppose private property. Whatever be the ideology or the system, one thing is clear and that is that all citizens must be provided with basic necessities of life. All citizens must have their basic needs of life fulfilled (Food, clothing, shelter, education, health and so on).

## **3. Political Justice:**

Political justice means giving equal political rights and opportunities to all citizens to take part in the administration of the country. Citizens should have the right to vote without any discrimination on the basis of religion, colour, caste, creed, sex, birth or status. Every citizen should have an equal right to vote and to contest elections.

Legal justice has two dimensions-the formulation of just laws and then to do justice according to the laws. While making laws, the will of the rulers is not to be imposed upon the ruled. Laws should be based on public opinion and public needs. Social values, morality, conventions, the idea of just

and unjust must be always kept in view.

When the laws do not meet the social values and rules of morality, citizens neither really accept nor abide by laws. In this situation, the enforcement of laws becomes a problem. Laws are just only when these are accepted not out of fear of external power but when inspired by internal feeling for the laws being good, just and reasonable.

Legal Justice means rule of law and not rule of any person. It includes two things: that all men are equal before law, and that law is equally applicable to all. It provides legal security to all. Law does not discriminate between the rich and the poor. Objective and due dispensation of justice by the courts of law is an essential ingredient of legal justice.

The legal procedure has to be simple, quick, fair, inexpensive and efficient. There should be effective machinery for preventing unlawful actions. "The aim of law is the establishment of what is legitimate; provide legal security, and prevention of unjust actions. -Salmond'.

Thus, Justice has four major dimensions: Social Justice, Economic Justice, Political Justice and Legal Justice. All these forms are totally inter-related and inter-dependent. Justice is real only when it exists in all these four dimensions. Without Social and Economic Justice there can be no real Political and Legal Justice.

Presence of social and economic inequalities always leads to a denial of political and equal justice. An oppressed and poor person is virtually unable to participate in the political process or to seek the protection of law and law courts. Likewise, without political rights and equal protection of law no person can really get his social and economic rights and freedoms protected. Further, Justice needs the presence of rights, liberty and equality in society and only then can it really characterise life in society.

### **Key Features of Justice:**

- Justice is related to mutual relationships of persons living in society.
- Justice is based on values and traditions of society.
- Justice is related to all aspects of human behaviour in society. Laws are made and courts are set up with this aim in view.
- Aim of Justice is to provide equal rights, opportunities and facilities to all in a fair way.
- The function of Justice is to harmonise individual interests with the interests of society.
- Justice is a primary value and it is inseparably related to other values like Liberty, Equality and Property.
- Justice is the principle of balancing or reconciling human relations in society in such a way as enables each one to get his due rights, towards and punishments.
- Justice has several dimensions: Social Justice, Economic Justice, Political Justice and Legal Justice.

### **The concept of obligation**

The conceptual foundation of obligation traces as far back to ancient Roman law which defines obligation as a means of an undertaking or legally binding relationships where one party promises

the other party to perform some acts or to do something. Ancient well-known Roman lawyers defined obligations based on their personal opinion, which as a result has developed the concept of obligation.

Year Gay, a Roman jurist, defines obligation as 'a means of personal claim brought against another in order to force him before us to give us so as to we are able to enforce our rights. Gay also classifies obligation in terms of contract, quasi- contract, delict, and quasi-delict Pavel year also understood obligation as an undertaking not by Roman citizens to perform some acts or to do or to give or to render rights to non-roman citizens regarding to give, to do, or to render some rights to roman citizens.

The concept of obligation by both classical legal scholars was unilateral in character and discriminatory in nature since it imposes obligation to do, to give or to render rights only on non-roman citizens not the Romans.

However, the institute of Justinian defines obligation as a legally binding relations when Roman citizens undertake to perform certain acts or to do something in accordance with the Roman law.

Obligation defined in the institute of Justinian, differed from the obligations defined in the classical Roman jurists in that the institute defines obligation in the aspect that Roman citizens to carry out. In general the concept of obligation can clearly be expressed as;

- a. Obligation to give or not to give
- b. Obligation to do or not to do
- c. Obligation to render rights to others to do something.

### **Definition of Obligations**

Black's law dictionary defines obligation as 'a legal duty or moral duty to do or not to do something'. Common-law scholars such as Fredrick Pollock defines obligation in its popular sense as merely synonym for 'duty'. In its legal sense derived from roman laws 'an obligation is the bond of legal necessity or *vinculum juris* which binds together two or more determinate individuals'.

John Salmond (year) defined obligation in its more general acceptance as 'something the law or morals command a person to do a command that is made effective by the imposition of sanction if a person failed to comply such a command' In the modern legal systems and currently existing legal materials, there is no exact or single whole definition of obligation. However, some scholars define it based on their own legal system For instance French judges define the term obligation as a legally binding relations to another party is obliged to give or to do or not to do something.

Likewise the Ethiopian civil code, in the book IV of the code uses the term obligations without defining what it means. However, like French judges who define obligations indirectly from article 1101 of the French civil code of the term contract as an agreement whereby two or more persons as between themselves create, vary or extinguish obligations of proprietary nature.

### **Sources of obligations**

According to Gay, Roman jurist, the fundamental source of obligation can be classified into two:

- a. Contract

## b. Beyond the contract

Those obligations, which arise beyond the contract, are divided into unjust enrichment (quasi-contract), unlawful acts (delict) and causing physical injury to the person or causing damage to property of person (quasi-delict).

In modern time, the laws of different countries clearly express the sources of obligation. For instance, French civil code classifies the source of obligation as;

- Obligation that arises from contract
- Obligations that arise beyond the contract
- Obligation that arises from the unlawful acts
- Obligations that arise from the causing of physical injury or causing material damage
- Obligations arising from law

In Ethiopian legal system, there are no clearly stated classifications of sources of obligations. But Art.1675 of Ethiopian civil code generally expresses obligations as arising from contractual agreements.

However, the close readings of the provisions of the civil code show that there are other sources of obligations-like those arising from non-contractual relationships (from Art.2027-2178), obligations arising from unlawful acts or obligation that arises from the causing of physical injury or obligation arising from the causing of material damage (from Art.2027-2161) and finally, obligations arising from unjust enrichment (from Art.2162-2178).

In so far as an obligation arising from the law is concerned, it happens in situations when law imposes obligations on persons to give or not to give, to do or not to do some acts recognized in almost all-legal systems.

Obligation arising from the law is a unilateral obligation imposed on citizens or contracting parties without their consent. It includes among other things

- Obligation to pay income taxes
- Obligation to render military services
- Obligations of creditors
- Obligation of debtors
- Obligations of families to their children, etc.

## **Types of Obligations**

Obligations can be classified based on the nature of activities, and the number of parties legally bound by the obligation. Accordingly, they can be classified into:

### **1) Divisible obligation**

This is one whereby a party undertakes to perform its obligations by dividing into parties. For instance, if A and B owed C 1,000 BIRR such parties to the obligation perform or discharge the obligations by paying half (part) of the debt to C, which is 500 each.

## **2) Indivisible obligations**

In this type of obligation, the performance of the obligation undertaken cannot be divided into parts. Hence, in this type of obligation partial performance is impossible given the conditions and circumstances of its formation, which does not allow the performance of obligation by dividing into parts.

## **3) Positive obligation**

This is a situation where a person's obligation is to do or to give some thing to another. It requires an action from the debtor.

## **4) Negative obligation.**

This is a situation where a person's obligation does not to do some thing or it refrains from doing some thing. Such obligations are also called obligations not todo.

**Example,** company A may agree with company B in which company A under takes an obligation not to produce or sell certain goods in the same market.

Based on the number of parties legally bound, obligations can be classified into unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral obligations.

- a. Unilateral obligation arises from contract in which two parties are participate. However, only one of the parties is legally bound by the contract for the benefit of the other contracting party. Example, donations
- b. Bilateral obligation arises from a contract entered into by two parties in which these contracting parties are bound legally to each other on equal terms. Accordingly, there are two promisors and two promises.
- c. Multilateral obligation. This is a case where more than two persons undertake to perform an obligation. Such obligations can be classified into three:
  - 1) Simple joint obligation
  - 2) Joint obligations
  - 3) Several and joint obligations

### **1) Simple joint obligation**

In this type's obligation, parties who are bound by such obligation are not jointly liable for the total debts, but each debtor is liable for its own share with the exception of Art.1917 of the Ethiopian civil code

### **2) Joint obligations**

It arises from the contractual obligation in which more than two parties participate and debtors are jointly liable for the debt secured as a result of the obligation entered into with the creditor or creditors.

### **3) Several and joint obligations**

In this kinds obligations the co-debtors shall be jointly and severally liable unlike joint obligation where the debtors are jointly obliged to undertake a given obligation, in the several and joint obligation, the creditor may require all the debtors or one of them to discharge the obligation in

whole or in part.

## Eudaimonism

**Eudaimonism** (or **Eudaemonism** or **Eudaimonia**) is a moral philosophy that defines right action as that which leads to the "**well-being**" of the individual, thus holding "well-being" as having essential value. It makes up part of the system of Virtue Ethics propounded by the ancient Greek philosophers, in which a lifetime of practicing the **virtues** ("arête") in one's everyday activities, subject to the exercise of practical wisdom ("phronesis") to resolve any conflicts or **dilemmas** which might arise, will allow the individual to flourish and live the good life ("eudaimonia").

The **term** "eudaimonia" is a classical Greek word, commonly translated as "**happiness**", but perhaps better described as "**well-being**" or "**human flourishing**" or "**good life**". More **literally** it means "having a good guardian spirit". Eudaimonia as the ultimate goal is an objective, not a subjective, state, and it characterizes the well-lived life, irrespective of the emotional state of the person experiencing it.

In more general terms, Eudaimonism can be thought of as any theory that puts personal happiness and the complete life of the individual at the center of ethical concern. It can therefore be associated with ethical Individualism and Egoism.

*Eudaimonia* is often translated as "happiness," but that's a bit misleading. Eudaimonia comes from two Greek words:

*Eu-*: good

*Daimon*: soul or "self." A difficult word to translate into English.

In Greek philosophy, Eudaimonia means achieving the best conditions possible for a human being, in every sense—not only happiness, but also virtue, morality, and a meaningful life. It was the ultimate goal of philosophy: to become better people—to fulfill our unique potential as human beings. Aristotle wrote about the idea the most, and it was important to many Greek philosophers, from Socrates, the father of Greek philosophy, through to Stoicism, a late-Greek philosophy.

You can achieve Eudaimonia, Aristotle argued, by working hard, cultivating your virtues, and excelling at whatever tasks nature and circumstances come to you. However, Aristotle also wrote that living in the right kind of place and balancing your activities with wisdom are essential to achieving Eudaimonia as well.

## History of Eudaimonism

The concept came to fruition in Aristotle's "*Nicomachean Ethics*", which dates from the 4<sup>th</sup> Century B.C., although the earlier thinkers Democritus, Socrates and Plato described a very similar idea. Socrates, as represented in Plato's early dialogues, held that **virtue** is a sort of **knowledge** (the knowledge of good and evil) that is required to reach the ultimate good, or eudaimonia, which is what all human desires and actions aim to achieve.

Plato noted that even "evil" people feel **guilt** at doing something which is clearly wrong, and, even when there is no fear of punishment, doing what is wrong simply makes people **miserable**. He further **refined** the idea of eudaimonia, claiming that the **rational** part of the soul or mind must

govern the **spirited, emotional** and **appetitive** parts in order to lead all desires and actions to eudaimonia, the principal constituent of which is **virtue**.

According to Aristotle, eudaimonia is constituted, not by honor, wealth or power, but by **rational activity** in accordance with **virtue** over a complete life, what might be described today as **productive self-actualization**. This rational activity, Aristotle judged, should manifest as **honesty, pride, friendliness, wittiness, rationality** in judgment; mutually beneficial friendships and scientific knowledge.

Epicurus (and subsequent Hedonists) agreed with Aristotle that happiness, or eudaimonia, is the highest good, but he identified this with **pleasure**, on the grounds that pleasure is the only thing that people **value for its own sake**, and that its presence or absence is something which is **immediately apparent** to everyone. He also noted that it may be necessary to forgo **short-term** pleasure if that will ultimately lead to greater pleasure in the **long-term**.

The Stoics also believed to some extent that eudaimonia was the highest good, although for them virtue and well-being consist of living according to Nature and, even if perfect virtue is actually **unachievable**, the least we can do to is to act "**befittingly**", in the hope of approaching or **approximating** eudaimonia.

St. Augustine of Hippo later adopted the concept as "**beatitudo**", and St. Thomas Aquinas worked it out into a **Christian** ethical scheme, where eudaimonia is found ultimately in a direct perception of God, or complete blessedness.

Immanuel Kant was an important **opponent** of Eudaimonism. He **rejected** the view that happiness is the highest good, and insisted that happiness can be an **ingredient** of the highest good, but only if it is deserved. Still later, Existentialism rejected Eudaimonism on the grounds that happiness is just a bourgeois fantasy.

## **Socrates on Eudaimonia**

Socrates, like Plato, believed that *virtue* (or *arête*, the very idea of virtue) was a form of knowledge—specifically, a knowledge of good and evil (Bobonich, 2010). That is, he saw numerous **virtues**—justice, piety, courage as united. That is, all were one, and they were all knowledge.

Socrates viewed this knowledge as required for us as humans to achieve the 'ultimate good', which was eudaimonia. And by 'us', Socrates meant the individual (Waterman, 1993; Deci & Ryan, 2006).

## **Plato and Eudaimonism**

In a somewhat similar vein, Plato believed that individuals naturally feel unhappiness when they do something they know and acknowledge to be wrong (Price, 2011). Eudaimonia, according to Plato, was the highest and ultimate aim of both moral thought and behavior.

Nonetheless, while Plato was believed somewhat to have refined the concept, he offered no direct definition for it. As with Socrates, he saw virtue as integral to **eudaimonia**.

One thing is worth noting at this point. If this idea of an 'ultimate goal' for individuals is beginning to sound familiar, rest assured that there is good reason for thinking so. The similarities between eudaimonia and concepts such as Maslow's **self-actualization** (1968) are indeed widely accepted

in the psychological literature (Heintzelman, 2018). We know Plato mentored Aristotle

## **Aristotlean Eudaimonia**

Numerous interpretations have been offered for Aristotle's eudaimonia, with a general consensus on the idea that eudaimonia reflects "*pursuit of virtue, excellence, and the best within us*" (Huta & Waterman, 2014: 1426). That is, he believed eudaimonia was rational activity aimed at pursuing 'what is worthwhile in life'.

Where Aristotle diverged from Plato and some other thinkers is in his belief about what is 'enough' (roughly) for eudaimonia. For the latter, virtue was enough for the ultimate good that is eudaimonia. For Aristotle, virtue was required, but not sufficient (Annas, 1993). In layperson's terms, we can't just act with virtuous, but we have also to intend to be virtuous, too.

I will return to this a little later when looking at Aristotle's ethics. But for now, he believes that happiness and well-being come from how we live our lives. And that's not in pursuit of material wealth, power, or honor. Rather, eudaimonic happiness is about lives lived and actions taken in pursuit of eudaimonia.

Also at this point, you probably understand why some translations are argued to fall a little flat when it comes to describing Aristotle's philosophical concept. Where rational activity is required to pursue an ultimate goal, beings such as plants—which do 'flourish'—don't qualify.

Where these **rational activities** include "*pride, wittiness, friendships that are mutually beneficial, pride and honesty among others*", neither do lots of other creatures (Hursthouse, 1999).

## **A Look at Aristotle's Concept of Happiness and Well-Being**

If you could ask Aristotle himself what happiness is, this is exactly what he'd say:

*"...Some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity...it is not probable that...these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects."* Aristotle, Nichomacean Ethics, Book I,

Happily, we also have more concise and straightforward excerpts that reveal how we go about it.

## **Happy Life According to Aristotle**

To be honest, a lot of Nichomacean Ethics is about what happiness *isn't*. 'Satisfying appetites', Ryan and Singer argue is akin to "life suitable to beasts", according to the philosopher (2006: 16). The pursuit of political power, material wealth, even fun and leisure, he saw as "laughable things", inferior to "serious things".

Instead, happiness is an 'intermediate', or a 'golden mean' between deficiency and excess (Ryff & Singer, 2008). One example of virtue as a mean between two extremes is *courage* – as a virtue, it's halfway between recklessness and cowardice (Kings College London, 2012).

Here, we see the 'rational activity' aspect of eudaimonia coming back to the fore. When we are faced with situations, therefore, it can be argued that Aristotle isn't giving prescriptive advice. He is, however, telling us how he believes the rational, virtuous pursuit of eudaimonia might look in an

everyday setting.

## **Role of Externalities**

So, what if you're very, very unlucky? If you've read Nichomacean Ethics (maybe only skimmed partway through), this question is not an unreasonable one. After all, Aristotle argued:

*"He is happy who lives in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life."* – Aristotle, Nichomacean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 10 (excerpt from Nothingistic.org, 2019).

Basically, yes, Aristotle acknowledged that fate or luck can play a role in our happiness. Nonetheless, he also believed that this task of 'individual self-realization' is how we go about it with our 'own disposition and talent' (Ryff & Singer, 2008: 17).

This excerpt also suggests that we should be aiming for 'all of the virtues', so it's worthwhile considering Aristotle's stance on being **virtuous**.

## **The Philosophy Behind Aristotle's Ethics**

As we can now see, Aristotle's eudaimonia is a moral happiness concept. It is very much about living a life in accordance with virtues (Hursthouse, 1999).

But what are these virtues, then?

Of course, there is a large subjective element to what 'virtue' is. What one person holds to be virtuous isn't always going to ring with that of others. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Professor Peter Adamson gives some brilliant examples in this Kings College London video:

One of these is 'piety', which was mentioned in the earlier look at Socrates. For example, can you be too pious? Some would argue yes, others, no.

From what we've already discussed, however, we know Aristotle believes happiness is not about pursuing eudaimonia through various means in order to be happy. This is, he argues, is founded in instrumentality. Happiness, he might be seen as arguing, is once again the *rational activity in pursuit of virtue* itself.

These virtues won't necessarily be cut in stone. But, if we ask ourselves what we believe is good, or how we should live our lives, virtue ethics would argue that we have at least some starting points (Hursthouse, 1999).

## **Modern Psychology and Eudaimonia**

So far, we've looked a little bit at subjectivity, flourishing, happiness, wellbeing, and actualization. All in a philosophical context. Hopefully, it provided some context. Because, naturally, eudaimonia thus has myriad implications for psychologists with an interest in subjective wellbeing (SWB), and psychological wellbeing (PWB). And positive psychology is all about human flourishing and **happiness**.

## **Overview of Psychological Research on Eudaimonia**

As a very concise overview of how the concept appears within psychology, here are some aspects

that have been studied:

- Definition – not only conceptualizing the idea of eudaimonia in terms of psychology, wellbeing, and happiness, but also trying to operationalize the concept (e.g. Waterman, 1993; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Keyes, 2002; Bauer et al., 2008; Ryff & Singer, 2008; Waterman et al. 2008);
- Measurement – lots of these attempts at operationalization are a preliminary step to measuring human experiences of eudaimonia.
- There are actually a fair few of these scales. The best-known actually measures a similar concept of psychological wellbeing (PWB), made famous by Professor Ryff (1989);
- Distinctiveness and relation to other happiness/wellbeing concepts – with the most popular earlier studies looking at eudaimonia alongside hedonia (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Huta & Waterman, 2014);
- This was accompanied by empirical and statistical analyses of the same (Chen et al., 2013); and
- Studies have also looked at how eudaimonia is related (or not) to PWB and SWB (e.g. Chen et al., 2013).
- Of course, this is far from an exhaustive list, and as interdisciplinary interest grows, we can expect the same from the broader body of research.

### **Plato on Eudaimonia**

As mentioned above, Plato never distinctly referred to eudaimonia by that term. A lot of what we know about his stance on the same comes from *Republic (Amazon)*, his work on justice. In it, he writes of three friends who talk about what a 'just' republic would look like, and he premised four virtues (Bhandari, 1999; VanderWeele, 2017):

- Temperance (moderation) – or self-regulation, to avoid the vices and corruption caused by excess;
- Courage (or fortitude) – to stand up for what we believe is right and good;
- Justice – a social consciousness that plays a key part in maintaining societal order; and
- Wisdom (practical wisdom, or prudence) – the pursuit of knowledge.

He believed that happiness was about living in pursuit of these virtues, and thus virtue is central to flourishing.

### **Socrates and Eudaimonia**

Socrates, as discussed, saw eudaimonia as an 'ultimate' goal. Like Aristotle after him, Socrates emphasized the role and importance of *arête* very heavily—in fact, he believed it was both a means and an end to human happiness. In pursuit of what we now commonly refer to as 'flourishing', he encouraged people to ask themselves, and others, what was 'good' for our souls (Cooper, 1996).

He believed, it is argued, that eudaimonia was 'justly living well', and that in doing so, we seek not experiential pleasure or 'honor' in isolation, but a good and happy life, guided by our virtues (Cooper, 1997; Bobonich, 2010; Brown, 2012).

### **3 Examples of Eudaimonic Well-Being**

A couple of millennia later, the teachings of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle continue to shape how we study flourishing and well-being.

Modern conceptions of Eudaimonic Well-being (EWB) are, on the whole, shaped by literature reviews, critical analyses, and empirical examinations of their texts. Coupled with modern research into quality of life and subjective well-being (SWB), we have come as far as being able to develop measures for the construct.

EWB is defined by Waterman and colleagues (2010: 41) as: *“quality of life derived from the development of a person’s best potentials and their application in the fulfillment of personally expressive, self-concordant goals (Sheldon, 2002; Waterman, 1990; 2008)”*

In their study, they give several examples of EWB (Norton, 1976; Waterman et al., 2010). Here are a few:

1. *“Knowing who you really are”* – Examples of this self-discovery might include the self-identity knowledge that comes from meditating on your core beliefs. Or, it could be a good understanding of your personal character strengths and qualities. It could even be the self-knowledge that comes from reflecting on your personal development or the values that you hold important.
2. *“Developing these unique potentials”* – Someone who scores high on EWB (according to the Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-being) makes a persistent, committed effort to building on this self-knowledge. A little more on the ‘how’ and the QEWB is covered very shortly.
3. *“Using those potentials to fulfill your life goals”* – Someone who is committed to this pursuit, over the long term, would be a prime example.

These describe some of the EWB concepts on which one well-known measure of EWB is based.

## **Teleological theories**

Teleological theories are a particular kind of axiological theory. As we shall see, however, authors disagree about the exact defining characteristics. Indeed, we shall uncover four different characterizations of teleological theories. Almost all (if not all) authors require that a theory maximize the good in order to be teleological. As we shall see, most impose further requirements, but some do not. Nozick and at least in certain passages, Rawls, characterizes teleological theories as theories that direct the agent to maximize the good, where the goodness in question may be that of the action’s outcome, of its anticipated outcome and the like, or even of the action itself – no matter how this is evaluated (e.g., even if it is in terms of the agent’s motives). This, then, is one way of characterizing teleological theories.

Call theories that direct the agent to maximize the good goodness maximizing. Most authors are more specific in their characterization of teleological theories. They require not merely that the theory direct the agent to maximize the good, but rather that they direct the agent to maximize the goodness of their outcomes, or of their intended, anticipated, or reasonably anticipatable outcomes.

For brevity, let us use the term ‘quasi-outcome’ as a generic name for outcomes, intended outcomes, anticipated outcomes, reasonably anticipatable outcomes, and the like. A second way of characterizing teleological theories, then, is as theories for which there is a specified kind of quasi-outcome such that an action is judged permissible just in case its specified quasi-outcome is maximally good. Let us call such theories quasi-outcome-teleological. Many authors’ are even

more specific in that they require the theory direct the agent to maximize the goodness of (objectively determined) outcomes – as opposed to the intended, anticipated, or reasonably anticipatable outcomes. Let us call such theories outcome-teleological. This, then, is a third way of characterizing theories. There is yet another condition that is sometimes, but not always, invoked in the characterization of teleological theories:

that the viewpoint from which the goodness of the outcomes is assessed be agent-invariant, i.e., the same no matter who the agent is. Classical act utilitarianism (which directs the agent to maximize the goodness of outcomes from the viewpoint of the universe as a whole) satisfies this condition, but ethical egoism (which directs the agent to maximize the goodness of outcomes from his/her viewpoint) and community utilitarianism (which directs the agent to maximize the goodness of outcomes from the viewpoint of his/her community) do not. The distinction between teleological theories for which the viewpoint of evaluation is agent-invariant and those for which it is not is a special case of a more general (and more important) distinction between theories that are agent-sensitive and those that are not.

A theory (teleological or not) is agent-sensitive just in case its permissibility conditions make an essential reference to the agent qua agent. Agent-sensitive theories may make the permissibility of actions depend in a special way on how they affect the agent and/or those bearing special relationships to the agent (e.g., friends, family, neighbors, etc.).'

Teleological theories are agent sensitive just in case their viewpoint for the evaluation of outcomes is agent invariant. As we saw above, some teleological theories are agent-sensitive (e.g., ethical egoism), and some are not (e.g., classical utilitarianism), likewise, some non-teleological theories are agent-sensitive and some are not. For example, a theory that forbids the agent to kill or allow to die any member of his/her family is agent-sensitive, whereas a theory whose sole injunction forbids killing or allowing anyone to die is not. Traditionally, agent-insensitivity has not been a defining characteristic of teleological theories. Ethical egoism (which is agent-sensitive) has generally been considered to be teleological.' Some authors, such as Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler, do, however, impose the requirement of agent-sensitivity.

A fourth way, then, of characterizing teleological theories is as theories that judge an action permissible just in case its outcome is maximally good from an agent-invariant view point.

Call such theories agent-insensitive teleological. To sum up: We have seen that teleological theories have been characterized in the following four ways:

1. as goodness maximizing theories, i.e., as theories that judge an action permissible just in case it maximizes the good (no matter how this is determined);
2. as quasi-outcome-teleological theories, i.e., as theories for which there is a specified type of quasi-outcome (outcome, intended outcome, anticipated outcome, reasonably anticipatable outcome, etc.) such that the theory judges an action permissible just in case its specified quasi-outcome is maximally good;
3. as outcome-teleological theories, i.e., as theories that judge an action permissible just in case its outcome (as opposed, e.g., to its anticipated outcome) is maximally good;
4. as agent-insensitive teleological theories, i.e., as theories that judge an action permissible just in case its outcome is from an agent-invariant view point maximally good.

## Deontological theories

Act utilitarianism is a paradigm teleological theory, and The Divine Command Theory and Kant's moral theory are paradigm deontological theories. It is unclear, however, which of the many features of these theories are the defining characteristics of teleological and deontological theories respectively. In order to assess the importance of the teleological/deontological distinction, we need first to clarify the nature of the distinction. Start therefore by examining some of the different characterizations that have been given. Often authors (e.g., Rawls 2) characterize deontological theories simply as theories that are not teleological. So characterized, the nature of deontological theories depends on how teleological theories are characterized. In a later section we shall examine some of the characterizations of teleological theories. In this section we shall examine some of the characterizations of deontological theories that are in dependent of the characterization of teleological theories. It is often claimed that deontological theories – but not teleological theories – are rule-based, i.e., assess the permissibility of actions in terms of whether they conform to some specified set of rules. The problem with this characterization of deontological theories is that all theories other than those that merely specify prima facie considerations are rule-based. Act utilitarianism, for example, is rule based, since it assess the permissibility of actions in terms of whether they conform to the rule "Maximize the goodness of consequences!". Both deontological and teleological theories may be (and generally are) rule-based.

The difference between the two lies in the kinds of rules that they invoke. In a similar vein it is sometimes claimed that deontological theories, or at least one type thereof, are absolutist in that they claim that there are certain kinds of actions that are absolutely obligatory or forbidden (i.e., such that all actions of that There type are obligatory two problems or forbidden with this respectively.) claim.

First of all, without some restriction on the admissible action-types all theories are absolutist in this sense, since all theories hold that all actions of the type "is permissible" are permissible. Secondly, even if an appropriate restriction is placed on the admissible action- types to avoid this trivialization (perhaps allowing only non-normative action types). the claim is still false.

Act utilitarianism, a paradigm non-deontological theory, is absolutist in this sense. This is because any action that falls under the description "does not have consequences that contain as much happiness as is feasible" is judged forbidden – no matter what its other characteristics are.

Furthermore, Ross's intuitionist theory, a paradigm deontological theory, is non- absolutist, because it provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the permissibility of action, but only prima facie considerations that must somehow be weighed together. The characterization of deontological theories as absolutist is thus inadequate. A closely related characterization of deontological theories is as theories for which there are certain kinds of actions that are always (or never) forbidden, where whether or not a given action is of the specified kinds does not depend on what its outcome is.

The distinction between theories that base the permissibility of actions on their outcomes and those that do not is an important distinction. The outcome of an action is a state of affairs that would be realized if the action were performed. It is objectively determined in that its determination is independent of what the agent, or anyone else, believes (e.g., about what would happen if the action were performed). Theories that do not base the permissibility of actions on their outcomes

generally base it on their intended, anticipated, or reasonably anticipatable outcomes.

Unlike (objective) outcomes, neither intended nor anticipated outcomes are objectively determined, since what they are depends only on the agent's mental state (what he/she intends or believes), and not on what would happen if the action were performed. And the reasonably anticipatable outcome is neither objectively determined, nor determined on the basis of the agent's mental state, but rather on the basis what it would be (inter subjectively) reasonable to anticipate happening.

Characterizing deontological theories as theories for which the permissibility of actions does not depend on their outcomes, however, is intuitively inadequate. The Ten Commandment Theory – a paradigm deontological theory, according to which an action is permissible just in case it conforms to the Ten Commandments – contains the injunction “Do not kill!”, and therefore grounds the permissibility of actions in their outcomes. Whether or not an action is a killing depends on what its outcome is, and not, for example, on what its anticipated or intended outcome is. The above characterization mistakenly classifies The Ten Commandment Theory as non-deontological. Furthermore, a form of utilitarianism that grounds the permissibility of actions in the goodness of their anticipated outcomes, a paradigm non deontological theory, does not ground the permissibility of actions in features of their outcomes, but rather in features of the agent's mental state. The above characterization of deontological theories mistakenly classifies it as deontological. Another closely related characterization of deontological theories is as theories that ground the permissibility of actions in and only in their intrinsic nature.

The problem here is that it is not clear what it might mean to say that a particular feature is part of the “intrinsic nature” of an action. One possibility is that the intrinsic nature of an action consists of its “relatively immediate” features. <sup>6</sup>There are various sorts of reasonably intuitive ways of interpreting ‘immediate’. One notion of immediacy that has received a fair amount of attention recently is that implicit in the distinction between what the agent “brings about” and what he/she merely “allows to happen”.

Roughly speaking an agent brings about a state of affairs just in case it would not have been realized, if the agent had been passive, i.e., if he/she had not intervened into the “normal course of events”. For example, under normal circumstances, if an agent pushes someone off a high cliff and the person dies, then his/her death is something that the agent brings about. On the other hand, if the agent stands by and “does nothing” as the person falls off the edge of the cliff, his/her death is something that the agent merely allows to happen. Although this is but one notion of immediacy, it seems clear that there is something to the distinction between theories that ground the permissibility of actions solely in their relatively immediate features and those that do not. This distinction does not, however, capture the intuitive deontological, non-deontological distinction.

A theory that judges an action permissible just in case its immediate outcome (however construed) is maximally good grounds the permissibility of actions solely in their immediate features, but intuitively is not a deontological theory. Furthermore, a theory that consists of the injunction “Don't bring about or allow the extinction of any species!” does not ground the permissibility of actions solely in their immediate features (since what one allows to happen in the distant future is presumably not an immediate feature), but intuitively is a deontological theory.

Similar counterexamples could, I suggest, be found for other interpretations of immediacy. Another possibility is that the intrinsic nature of an action consists of its non comparative features, i.e., those features that it has independently of the features that its alternatives have. On this interpretation the feature of being a killing is the type of feature that can be part of the intrinsic nature of an action, but the feature of having maximally good consequences is not. So interpreted, however, the characterization of deontological theories (or even one type thereof) as theories that ground the permissibility of actions in and only in their intrinsic nature is intuitively inadequate. Minimal act utilitarianism – according to which an action is permissible just in case its consequences are not bad (e.g., the net level of happiness is not negative) – grounds the permissibility of an action in and only in its non comparative features, but intuitively it is not deontological. And a theory whose sole injunction is “Don’t kill unless it is necessary to save the life of a close friend or family member!”, does ground the permissibility of an action in features of its alternatives (on whether there is an alternative that saves the life of a close friend or family member, without killing anyone else), but intuitively is deontological. So far, then, we have judged the following characterizations of deontological theories to be inadequate:

1. as rule-based,
2. as absolutist,
3. as not grounding the permissibility of actions in their outcomes,
4. as grounding the permissibility of actions in and only in their intrinsic nature, where the intrinsic nature of action is understood as
  - a. its “relatively immediate” features, or
  - b. its non-comparative features.

A feature common to all of these characterizations of deontological theories is that they do not impose any requirement concerning how the good and the right are related. Let us now examine some characterizations that do impose some such requirement.

Sometimes, deontological theories are characterized as theories for which the right is prior to the good, i.e., for which the good depends on the right. <sup>8</sup> This characterization, however, is too narrow to be adequate. Theories for which the right is prior to the good (such as Kant’s) are indeed intuitively deontological, but they are not the only theories that are deontological. There are at least two kinds of theories for which the right is not prior to the good which are intuitively deontological.

(1) Theories that make the right and the good independent of each other are generally considered to be deontological. For example, a theory that assesses the goodness of states of affairs in terms of the total amount of happiness they contain, and that judges an action permissible just in case it conforms to The Ten Commandments is intuitively deontological. It does not, however, make the right prior to the good.

(2) Theories for which the right is not prior to the good, but rather depends on considerations of goodness, but does not depend solely on such considerations are generally considered to be deontological. For example, a theory that assesses the goodness of states of affairs in terms of the total amount of happiness they contain, and which directs the agent to produce the best consequences subject to a constraint against killing is intuitively deontological. It does not, however, make the right prior to the good.

A more adequate characterization of deontological theories is as theories that do not make the right depend solely on considerations of goodness. None of the intuitive paradigms of deontological theories (e.g., Kant's theory, The Divine Command Theory, The Ten Commandment Theory, and Ross's non-absolutistic theory) ground the permissibility of actions solely in considerations of goodness. And all of the intuitive paradigms of non-deontological theories (e.g., forms of utilitarianism based on the goodness of outcomes, anticipated outcomes, or reasonably anticipatable outcomes, and minimal act utilitarianism) do ground the permissibility of actions solely in considerations of goodness. The distinction between theories that ground the permissibility of actions solely in considerations of goodness and those that do not is an important distinction.

Indeed, I shall argue that it is more important than any of the traditional teleological/non-teleological distinction. First, however, let us take a closer look at the feature of making the right depend solely on consideration of goodness. Following Michael Stocker's call such theories axiological.

### **Fundamental classificatory distinctions**

The teleological/deontological distinction is generally assumed to be the fundamental classificatory distinction for moral philosophy. Under the 'teleological/deontological distinction' title we have uncovered the axiological/deontological distinction and four teleological/non-teleological distinctions. I shall now argue that none of these distinctions is the fundamental classificatory distinction, because the presupposition that there is a unique fundamental distinction is false. There are rather several fundamental distinctions. Furthermore, I shall argue that none of the four teleological/non-teleological distinctions is even fundamental. The axiological/deontological distinction is significantly more important than any of them.

To say that a distinction is fundamental is to say that it is not significantly less important than any other distinction. Fundamental distinctions are ones that most ultimately matter. The importance of a distinction, I assume, is relative to a set of interests and purposes. Here we are concerned with the importance of distinctions relative to our interest in the assessment of moral theories. The importance of a distinction relative to these interests is determined by something like the usefulness of the role it plays, or would play on reflection, in the criticism and justification of moral theories.

The first question, then, is that of whether there is a unique fundamental classificatory distinction, i.e. a distinction that is significantly more important than any other. In order to answer this question, we need to determine whether there is a feature, the presence or absence of which is, relative to our interests in the assessment of moral theories, significantly more important than the presence or absence of any other feature.

A survey of some of the criticisms made of teleological theories supports fairly conclusively the thesis that there is no unique fundamental classificatory distinction. There are rather several distinct features that ultimately matter for theory assessment. For example, Ross<sup>21</sup> criticizes certain kinds of teleological theories for making the right depend solely on considerations of goodness. Moore replies at length to the criticism of his utilitarian theory that it bases the permissibility of actions on their outcomes, as opposed to the agent's motives (intended outcome), or the reasonably foreseeable outcome. Williams<sup>23</sup> criticizes certain kinds of teleological theories for making the permissibility of actions depend not only on what the agent

“brings about”, but also on what the agent allows to happen. Nagel criticizes certain kinds of teleological theories for being agent-insensitive. Scheffler criticizes certain kinds of teleological theories for being too demanding, in that they leave the agent too little liberty. Nozick criticizes certain kinds of teleological theories for failing to respect the separateness of persons, in that they allow the interests of one person to be traded off against those of others. Mabbott and other retributivists criticize certain kinds of teleological theories for being insensitive to the past. Each of these authors identifies a specific feature and then criticizes certain kinds of teleological theories for having (or lacking) that feature. Each holds that such teleological theories are inadequate because they have (or lack) the feature in question. Indeed, each author holds that any theory – be it teleological or not – that has (or lacks) the feature in question is inadequate. Thus, each of these features provides the basis for a classificatory distinction that is important for the assessment of moral theories. Surely, at least two (if not most, or even all) of these distinctions are fundamental, i.e. not significantly less important than any other distinction. There is, that is, no unique fundamental classificatory distinction, but rather several of them. As a minimum, then, the teleological/deontological distinction – however interpreted – has been overemphasized. Even if it is a fundamental distinction, it is not the only one. But are any of the teleological/deontological distinctions that we have identified fundamental? The above survey of some of the features that ultimately matter for the justification and criticism of moral theories strongly supports a negative answer with respect to the four teleological/non-teleological distinctions. Moral philosophers do not criticize theories simply for being (or failing to be) teleological (in any of the four senses). They criticize them for having (or failing to have) more basic features, such as those identified above. Consider, for example, the distinction between theories that are agent-insensitive teleological and those that are not. This is not a fundamental distinction, because being agent-sensitive teleological is not a feature that is invoked at the most basic level of criticism and justification of moral theories. Each of the following distinctions, for example, is significantly more important:

- (1) that between theories that are agent-sensitive and those that are not; \
- (2) that between theories that make the right depend solely on considerations of goodness and those that do not; and
- (3) that between theories that make the right depend solely on their outcomes (and not, e.g., on their anticipated outcomes) and those that do not.

For the four teleological/non-teleological distinctions, the broader the characterization of teleological theories, the more it focuses on a feature of theories that matters in an ultimate way, and the more important the corresponding teleological/non-teleological distinction is. The distinction between theories that are goodness maximizing and those that are not is the most important of the four distinctions. Even it, however, is not a fundamental distinction. Both

1. the distinction between theories that make the right depend solely on considerations of goodness and those that do not, i.e., the axiological/deontological distinction, and
2. the distinction between comparative and non-comparative theories are significantly more important.

The axiological/deontological distinction, on the other hand, is quite plausibly a fundamental distinction. As previously argued, the feature of making the right depend solely on considerations of goodness is a feature that figures in a basic way in the justification and criticism of moral theories.

## Egoism

Unlike other theories that prescribe how we ought to behave, egoism is a descriptive principle (Pollock, 2007) that does not tell us necessarily how we ought to behave, but rather why we behave the way we do. It infers that the person who acts in an egotistical manner does so because it is natural to act in this way, and therefore it is a moral action unto itself.

According to the tenets of egoism, the core reason that someone does any action is self-serving by bringing happiness or some other benefit to him- or herself. If someone performs an action that appears to be altruistic, the action was likely performed to give the actor gratification in some way. This may come in many forms; for example in the form of positive media attention, or just feeling good about oneself.

The following example may illustrate how a heroic act by law enforcement officers may be viewed differently through the lens of egoism. On June 10, 2014, Vancouver police detectives witnessed a shooting on the seawall in Yale town. A gunfight ensued in which the suspect was able to escape via bicycle. Armed and reloaded, the suspect pedaled away and was followed by one of the detectives. The suspect fired at the pursuing detective, narrowly missing her. The detective pursued the suspect while being shot at until other police officers arrived who shot the suspect in an exchange of gunfire.

Most people would look at this case and believe that the detective was selflessly trying to apprehend a dangerous suspect before anyone else was shot. While this may be true, proponents of egoism would suggest that the detective acted in her own self-interest because capturing the suspect would satisfy her happiness, that she wanted media attention, or that she thought her actions would look good to her colleagues, thereby making her happy. This is a cynical view of her actions, but may help us understand why some people act in a way that puts them in danger.

Another way to demonstrate egoism is to place yourself in a situation in which you see someone who requires help. Suppose you decide that not assisting would cause you to feel guilty, thereby troubling you. As a response, you assist the person. From an outsider's perspective, you were acting selflessly and in the interest of the person who was requiring assistance. The end result of your actions, though, was twofold:

1. Your actions assisted the person in need.
2. Your actions made you feel good, allowing you to rid yourself of that troubling feeling resulting from guilt.

### **Q. How can egoism assist law enforcement in moral dilemmas?**

Egoism does not suggest that police officers should act in their own self-interest; certainly this would not be appropriate for law enforcement personnel. Where egoism may help is to better understand why people do things that may appear selfish. This may help us develop empathy for the suspects that appear to be selfish and allow us to better understand that their actions are driven by egoism. Egoism may also assist us in understanding the motives of others, allowing us to look at these motives with more skeptically than we would otherwise.

Egoism can also provide explanations of misconduct among law enforcement officers. Officers who abuse the trust placed on them by society and abuse their authority could be said to be acting

in an egoistic state (Souryal, 2011). In this sense, law enforcement officers are acting in their own self-interest and not in the interest of their agency, the individual citizen who was the target of and officer, and society in general. Ultimately, the end result of bad behaviour by law enforcement personnel, according to Souryal (2011, p.275), is "arguably feeding one's ego."

In a broader sense, ethical egoists may also view everything we do as an extension of a desire to live at peace in a society that respects all; every positive action we take is actually selfish activity, so that we can make a better society to live in. In this way, egoists can be positive in their actions making what are apparent good and ethical decisions. However proponents of the egoist theory would suggest that the decisions are at their root self-serving, and therefore egoist in nature.

## **Criticisms of Egoism**

Egoism is an attempt at explaining how we naturally behave with our own interests as a central focus, and that we ought to behave in this way. However, it is an overly cynical perspective on how humans behave. There are plenty of examples of selfless acts that are committed every day and go without notice. While it is true that many donations are made and good deeds done with the expectation that positive publicity will be generated for the giver, this does not necessarily mean that the giver's sole purpose is to gain publicity. It is possible that publicity is a by-product of giving. Furthermore, while it is in the interests of people to make decisions that will better society, there is no evidence that everyone makes these decisions based on self-interest (Rachels, 2006). If these decisions were universalized, then the world would be a markedly poorer place to live in.

## **Importance**

Common sense and folk psychology assumes that people tend to act in their own interests. Today's culture reflects an interest in self-improvement, self-esteem, and self-gratification. The "X-generation" has also been called the "Me-generation," as rampant consumerism focuses young people on immediate gratification and reflects no example of community responsibility or consideration for others. In fact, the American market economy is founded on the assumption that self-interested, competing parties will produce the greatest good.

Yet, interestingly, our culture provides examples of both self- and other-centered paradigms. There are countless examples of people who act in the interests of others, sacrificing their own comfort and safety, to help fellow human beings, living creatures, or the physical environment. The acts of kindness, rescuing, generosity, self-sacrifice, and advocacy cover the spectrum of needs. Firefighters risked their lives, indeed some died, in the September 11, 2001, tragedy in the United States. In addition, a wave of financial gifts to victims and their families followed, as well as volunteers ready to help at the Ground Zero and Pentagon sites of devastation. Mother Teresa tended to the needs of the poor and sick in India - washing, feeding, bathing, and loving the least valued people in Calcutta's society. Princess Diana Spencer used her fame and status to advocate for the banning of land mines; she donated her clothing to raise funds for several social causes.

## **Ties to the Philanthropic Sector**

Theories of egoism attempt to explain human motivation; understanding what motivates one toward serving the interests of others is key to understanding giving and philanthropic activity. The American spirit of giving has been expressed in concrete ways over the past two hundred years. "Major universities have been founded, hospital and medical centers have been built, and social change agencies have come into being" (Russo 1991, 1). Philanthropic gifts of time, talent, and

treasure may result from complex motivations (ranging from the feeling of satisfaction that one has helped another to the tax-deduction gained from a financial contribution).

What is important to consider is that it does not have to be an either/or kind of proposition. People's behavior is not purely egoist or purely altruist. Actions can result from a blend of altruistic and egoist motives. Indeed our own American tradition has evolved from this apparent contradiction - we believe in individualism and serving the interests of self, **and** we have a tremendous history of giving to others in need.

## Key Related Ideas

**Ethics** is a field of philosophy that is concerned with morality, recommending right and wrong behavior. Egoism is a philosophical theory in ethics, which has at least three subtypes, **descriptive egoism, normative egoism** and **conditional egoism**.

*Descriptive egoism*, also known as psychological egoism, contends that people always act in self-serving ways, though they may try to disguise their selfish motives. *Normative egoism*, also termed ethical egoism, claims people should act in self-serving ways because it is morally right. Modern philosophers have added a third, conditional egoism, which asserts that egoism is morally right and acceptable if it leads to morally acceptable ends; self-motivated actions can be considered morally acceptable, if they lead to the betterment of society and the public as a whole.

Adam Smith, in *Wealth of Nations*, offers an example of conditional egoism. Borrowing ideas from Mandeville's, *Fable of the Bees*, Smith wrote:

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.

## Altruism

Altruism is when we act to promote someone else's welfare, even at a risk or cost to ourselves. Though some believe that humans are fundamentally self-interested, recent research suggests otherwise: Studies have found that people's first impulse is to cooperate rather than compete; that toddlers spontaneously help people in need out of a genuine concern for their welfare; and that even non-human primates display altruism.

Evolutionary scientists speculate that altruism has such deep roots in human nature because helping and cooperation promote the survival of our species. Indeed, Darwin himself argued that altruism, which he called "sympathy" or "benevolence," is "an essential part of the social instincts." Darwin's claim is supported by recent neuroscience studies, which have shown that when people behave altruistically, their brains activate in regions that signal pleasure and reward, similar to when they eat chocolate (or have sex).



This does not mean that humans are more altruistic than selfish; instead, evidence suggests we have deeply ingrained tendencies to act in either direction. Our challenge lies in finding ways to evoke the better angels of our nature.

Altruism is acting to help someone else at some cost to oneself. It can include a vast range of behaviors, from sacrificing one's life to save others, to giving money to charity or volunteering at a soup kitchen, to simply waiting a few seconds to hold the door open for a stranger. Often, people behave altruistically when they see others in challenging circumstances and feel empathy and a desire to help.

Altruism also builds social connections. For example, studies show that people who are altruistic tend to be happier, to be healthier, and to live longer.

So, while altruism leads us to do what's best for others, it also makes us feel good in the process.

### **Why Altruism Is Important?**

Altruistic urges and behaviors are an important part of the glue that binds families and social groups together, helping them to cooperate and thrive. Individuals who go out of their way to aid others often receive something in return—whether it's an intangible reward, such as admiration and respect, or material support at a later time. Altruistic impulses and the reciprocation of kind deeds help ensure all members of a tight-knit group have backup when they need it.

### **Prosocial Behavior and Altruism**

Altruism is one aspect of what social psychologists refer to as prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior refers to any action that benefits other people, no matter what the motive or how the giver benefits from the action.<sup>3</sup> Remember, however, that pure altruism involves true selflessness.

While all altruistic acts are prosocial, not all prosocial behaviors are completely altruistic. We might help others for a variety of reasons such as guilt, obligation, duty, or even for rewards.

### **Explanations for Why Altruism Exists**

What is it that inspires people to give their time, energy, and money for the betterment of others, even when they receive nothing tangible in return? Psychologists have suggested a number of different explanations for why altruism exists.

### **Evolution**

Kin selection is an evolutionary theory that proposes that people are more likely to help those who

are blood relatives because it will increase the odds of gene transmission to future generations.<sup>2</sup> The theory suggests that altruism towards close relatives occurs in order to ensure the continuation of shared genes. The more closely the individuals are related, the more likely people are to help.

## Psychic Rewards

Altruism activates reward centers in the brain. Neurobiologists have found that when engaged in an altruistic act, the pleasure centers of the brain become active.

One 2014 study published in the journal *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience* found that engaging in compassionate actions activates the areas of the brain associated with the reward system, including the dopaminergic ventral tegmental area and the ventral striatum.<sup>4</sup> The positive feelings created by compassionate actions then reinforce altruistic behaviors.

## Environment

A Stanford study suggested that interactions and relationships with others have a major influence on altruistic behavior.<sup>4</sup> Psychologists have long debated whether some people are just born with a natural tendency to help others, a theory that suggests that altruism may be largely controlled by genetics.

The study called this theory into question, finding that socialization had a serious impact on altruistic actions in one- and two-year-old children. Kids who observed simple reciprocal acts of altruism were far more likely to exhibit altruistic actions, whereas friendly but non-altruistic modeled actions did not show the same results.

Such research suggests that modeling altruistic actions can be an important way to foster prosocial and compassionate actions in children.

## Social Norms

Society's rules, norms, and expectations can also influence whether or not people engage in altruistic behavior. The norm of reciprocity, for example, is a social expectation in which we feel pressured to help others if they have already done something for us.

For example, if your friend loaned you money for lunch a few weeks ago, you'll probably feel compelled to reciprocate when they ask if you if they can borrow \$100. They did something for you, now you feel obligated to do something in return.

## Incentives

While the definition of altruism involves doing for others without reward, there may still be cognitive incentives that aren't obvious. For example, we might help others to relieve our own distress or because being kind to others upholds our view of ourselves as kind, empathetic people.<sup>2</sup> Other cognitive explanations include:

- **Empathy:** Researchers suggest that people are more likely to engage in altruistic behavior when they feel empathy for the person who is in distress, a suggestion known as the *empathy-altruism hypothesis*.<sup>4</sup> Researchers have found that children tend to become more altruistic as their sense of empathy develops.

- **Helping relieve negative feelings:** Other experts have proposed that altruistic acts help relieve the negative feelings created by observing someone else in distress, an idea referred to as the *negative-state relief model*. Essentially, seeing another person in trouble causes us to feel upset, distressed, or uncomfortable, so helping the person in trouble helps reduce these negative feelings.

## Comparing the Theories

The underlying reasons behind altruism, as well as the question of whether there is truly such a thing as "pure" altruism, are two issues hotly contested by social psychologists. Do we ever engage in helping others for truly altruistic reasons, or are there hidden benefits that guide our altruistic behaviors?

Some social psychologists believe that while people do often behave altruistically for selfish reasons, true altruism is possible. Others have instead suggested that empathy for others is often guided by a desire to help yourself. Whatever the reasons behind it, our world would be a much sadder place without altruism.

## Universalism in Ethics

One distinctive understanding of universalism in ethics is that ethical principles are principles for everybody. They prescribe obligations for everybody, define rights for everybody, list virtues for everybody. The most minimal version of ethical universalism is a claim about the form of ethical principles or standards. It is the claim that ethical principles hold for all and not merely for some, that is, for everybody without exception.

A second conception of universalism in ethics emphasizes the content as well as the form and scope of principles. Principles which hold for everybody will prescribe or recommend the same for everybody (same obligations, same rights, same virtues and so on). Advocates of universal principles see this as a merit: they see equality of requirement and entitlement as ethically important. For example, discussions of universal human rights emphasize not only that all humans have rights, but that they all have the same rights.

The charge that ethical principles which prescribe the same for all abstract from differences between cases is true, but not damaging. No principle of action - whether of universal or non-universal form, whether of cosmopolitan or lesser scope - can prescribe with total specificity; even very explicit principles abstract from many circumstances. It follows that principles of action can always be satisfied in varied ways. A principle such as "Tell the truth" does not prescribe what we must say to whom or when; a principle such as "Pay your debts" does not determine the means or manner of repayment. Principles of action, including ethical principles, constrain action or entitlements, rather than picking out a single, wholly determinate line of action. Abstract principles can therefore guide action yet allow for flexible interpretation or application that takes account of differences between cases. So an ethics of universal principles can readily avoid both barren formalism and doctrinaire rigorism.

[Some] conceptions of universalism in ethics combine views of the form, scope and sameness of content principles with ambitious claims that a single fundamental principle provides the basis for all derivative ethical principles and ultimately for ethical judgment of particular cases.

Often the proposed fundamental principle is a version of a "golden rule." Various formulated golden rules are found in Hindu and Confucian sacred texts, and in many other traditions.... One well known golden rule is Christian with Jewish antecedents "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you". Others are prohibitions rather than injunctions, such as "Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you."

These would-be foundational principles have been criticized for linking ethics too closely to agents' desires or consent. Why should willingness to be on the receiving end of like action make it permissible? If masochists are willing to suffer others' sadism, would that make sadism right? More generally, can acceptance of being on the receiving end of like action legitimate anything?

### **Fundamental principles: Kantian universalizability**

An alternative conception of universalism in ethics rejects golden rules and seeks to anchor all ethical justification in a more formal fundamental universal principle, which does not refer to desires or consent to fix the content of ethics. The most famous and most ambitious attempt to go further is Kant's categorical imperative, of which the best known version runs: Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ([1785] 1903: 421). Kant claims to show that all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one imperative as their principle (421). He insists that in such derivations no reference be made either to anyone's happiness or desires, consent or agreement, and that the categorical imperative is not a version of a golden rule (which he dismisses as trivial, 430, footnote). Kant's views have been influential: a German scholar recently commented that "Kant succeeded with his objection almost in invalidating the golden rule and disqualifying it from future discussion in ethics".

English language philosophy has been less convinced that Kant undermined golden rule approaches. J.S. Mill was neither the first nor the last to think that Kant's claim to derive all principles of duty from the categorical imperative was complete nonsense. He wrote of Kant when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur. (1861: 207; original emphasis)

There has been widespread scepticism about Kant's supposed claim to show that 'immoral rules of conduct' are self-contradictory. However, he in fact makes the more circumspect modal claim that we should not act on principles which we cannot simultaneously "will as universal laws". An example of such a principle is that of false promising. Kant holds that false promisers who try (incoherently) to will false promising as a universal law thereby will the destruction of the very trust on which their own attempts to promise falsely must rely. Hence when we try to act on such principles Kant holds that we in fact do not will that our maxim (principle) should become a universal law - since this is impossible for us - but rather that its opposite should remain a law universally: we only take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves (or even just for this once). ([1785] 1903: 424; original emphasis)

In "deriving" an "actual principle of duty" from the categorical imperative, Kant takes it that agents not only seek principles of universal form and cosmopolitan scope which prescribe the same for all, but shun any principles which cannot be "willed for all". Kantian justifications of such principles, unlike golden rule justifications, do not appeal to either the desires, the happiness or the

acceptance of those on the receiving end, nor indeed to actual or hypothetical desires of any or of all agents. The distinctive modal character of Kantian universalizability is its appeal to what can be willed for all (rather than to what actually is or hypothetically would be willed by all). It remains a matter of considerable controversy whether a strictly Kantian approach can be used to construct an account of specific principles of duty, virtue or entitlement, or whether it is indeed too formal and minimal to sustain these derivations.

## Cultural Relativism vs. Universalism

The Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism debate has existed in legal scholarship for decades, and is increasingly entering public discourse on international law and human rights. Universalism refers to the notion that human rights are universal and should apply to every human being. Cultural Relativists object, and argue that human rights are culturally dependent, and that no moral principles can be made to apply to all cultures. They argue that the principles embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) are the product of Western political history. Indeed, the origins of the Universal Declaration are rooted in political landmarks in Western history, such as the Magna Carta of the United Kingdom (1215), the French Revolution (1789) and the American Bill of Rights (1791). Cultural Relativists argue that Universalism, in its attempt to extend a Western ideal to the rest of the world, is a form of cultural imperialism. As the establishments of post-conflict ad-hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990's and the International Criminal Court in 2002 illustrate, universalism is steadily being put into force. Cultural Relativists are critical of the validity, relevance and effect of these tribunals and of the ICC especially. Instead, Cultural Relativists are generally supportive of 'traditional' or local approaches to justice, as they believe these will contribute more to post-conflict reconciliation. This page will follow how this theoretical debate plays out in practice, through a series of case studies.

## Subjectivism

There ain't no sin and there ain't no virtue. There's just stuff people do. "John Steinbeck, *Grapes of Wrath*"

Subjectivism teaches that there are no objective moral truths out there.

- There are no objective moral facts. Therefore 'murder is wrong' can't be *objectively* true
- Many forms of subjectivism go a bit further and teach that moral statements describe how the speaker feels about a particular ethical issue.
- Moral statements are just factual statements about the attitude *the speaker* holds on a particular issue
- So if I say "Lying is wrong", all I'm doing is telling you that I disapprove of telling lies
- Some forms of subjectivism generalise this idea to come up with:
- Moral statements are just factual statements about the attitude *normal human beings* hold on a particular issue And this may ultimately lead us to this conclusion about moral truths:
- Moral judgements are dependent on the feelings and attitudes of the persons who think about such things

Subjectivism is the theory that perception (or consciousness) is reality, and that there is no underlying, true reality that exists independent of perception. It does not, however, claim that "all is illusion" or that "there is no such thing as reality", merely that the nature of reality is dependent on the consciousness of the individual. In an extreme form, it may hold that the nature and

existence of every object depends solely on someone's subjective awareness of it.

Subjectivism has its philosophical basis in the writings of René Descartes ("*Cogito Ergo Sum*"), and the Empiricism and Idealism of George Berkeley is a more extreme form of it.

It is very similar to the doctrine of Solipsism and is related in some ways to metaphysical Relativism. The antithesis of Subjectivism is Objectivism, which holds that reality exists wholly independent of the mind. Another concept related to Subjectivism is that of Panpsychism, the view that all parts of matter involve mind, that everything is sentient and that there are either many separate minds, or one single mind that unites everything that is.

## **Good points of subjectivism**

### **Reflects the subjective elements of morality**

- it reflects the close relationship between morality and people's feelings and opinions - indeed it can cope with the contradictory moral views we often find ourselves wrestling with

### **Reflects the evaluative elements of moral statements**

- moral statements in everyday life make judgements ("lying is wrong"), factual statements ("cats have fur") don't

### **Shows that moral judgements communicate dis/approval**

- it reflects the communication of approval and disapproval that seems to go along with the everyday making of moral statements

### **May clarify what people are arguing about**

- subjectivism may enable people disagreeing over the rightness or wrongness of some issue to see that the real dispute is not about objective truth but about their own preferences

### **Reflects the persuasive intentions behind ethical discussions**

- subjectivism may also enable people engaging in moral argument to realise that they are not arguing about objective truths but trying to persuade their opponent to adopt their point of view

## **Bad points of subjectivism**

The problem with subjectivism is that it seems to imply that moral statements are less significant than most people think they are - this may of course be true without rendering moral statements *insignificant*.

### **"If I approve of something, it must be good"**

- Subjectivism seems to tell us that moral statements give information only about what we feel about moral issues.
- If the simplest form of subjectivism is true then when a person who genuinely approves of telling lies says "telling lies is good" that moral statement is unarguably true. It would only be untrue if the speaker didn't approve of telling lies.
- So under this theory it seems that all the speaker has to do to prove that lying is good is to show lots of evidence that *they do indeed approve of lying* - perhaps that they tell lots of lies and feel

good about it, indeed are surprised if anyone criticises them for being a liar, and that they often praise other people for telling lies.

- Most people would find this way of approaching ethics somewhat unhelpful, and wouldn't think it reflected the way in which most people talk about ethical issues.

### **Moral statements seem more than statements about feelings**

- By and large if a person says something is wrong we usually get the message that they disapprove of that something, but most of us probably think that the other person is doing more than just telling us about their feelings.

### **How can we blame people if moral truths are always subjective?**

- If moral statements have no objective truth, then how can we blame people for behaving in a way that 'is wrong', i.e. if "murder is wrong" has no objective truth, then how can we justify punishing people for murder?
- One answer is that we can justify punishment for murder on the basis of the objective truth that most normal people in society disapprove of murder. If we do this, we should not pretend that our justification is based on anything other than the majority view.

## **Types of Subjectivism**

- Metaphysical Subjectivism is the idea (as described above) there is no underlying, true reality that exists independent of perception or consciousness.
- Ethical Subjectivism (or Moral Subjectivism) is the meta-ethical belief that ethical sentences reduce to factual statements about the attitudes and/or conventions of individual people, or that any ethical sentence implies an attitude held by someone. It is therefore a form of Moral Relativism in which the truth of moral claims is relative to the attitudes of individuals. The opposite position is that of Moral Objectivism or the more extreme Moral Absolutism.

## **Cultural relativism**

Cultural relativism refers to the idea that the values, knowledge, and behavior of people must be understood within their own cultural context. This is one of the most fundamental concepts in sociology, as it recognizes and affirms the connections between the greater social structure and trends and the everyday lives of individual people.

The Cross-Cultural Relationship is the idea that people from different cultures can have relationships that acknowledge, respect and begin to understand each others diverse lives. People with different backgrounds can help each other see possibilities that they never thought were there because of limitations, or cultural proscriptions, posed by their own traditions. Traditional practices in certain cultures can restrict opportunity because they are "wrong" according to one specific culture. Becoming aware of these new possibilities will ultimately change the people that are exposed to the new ideas. This cross-cultural relationship provides hope that new opportunities will be discovered but at the same time it is threatening. The threat is that once the relationship occurs, one can no longer claim that any single culture is the absolute truth.

Cultural relativism is the ability to understand a culture on its own terms and not to make judgments using the standards of one's own culture. The goal of this is promote understanding of cultural practices that are not typically part of one's own culture. Using the perspective of cultural

relativism leads to the view that no one culture is superior than another culture when compared to systems of morality, law, politics, etc. [11] It is a concept that cultural norms and values derive their meaning within a specific social context. This is also based on the idea that there is no absolute standard of good or evil, therefore every decision and judgment of what is right and wrong is individually decided in each society. The concept of cultural relativism also means that any opinion on ethics is subject to the perspective of each person within their particular culture. Overall, there is no right or wrong ethical system. In a holistic understanding of the term cultural relativism, it tries to promote the understanding of cultural practices that are unfamiliar to other cultures such as eating insects, genocides or genital cutting.

### **There are two different categories of cultural relativism:**

- **Absolute:** Everything that happens within a culture must and should not be questioned by outsiders. The extreme example of absolute cultural relativism would be the Nazi party's point of view justifying the Holocaust.
- **Critical:** Creates questions about cultural practices in terms of who is accepting them and why. Critical cultural relativism also recognizes power relationships.

Absolute cultural relativism is displayed in many cultures, especially Africa, that practice female genital cutting. This procedure refers to the partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or any other trauma to the female reproductive/genital organs. By allowing this procedure to happen, females are considered women and then are able to be married. FGC is practiced mainly because of culture, religion and tradition. Outside cultures such as the United States look down upon FGC, but are unable to stop this practice from happening because it is protected by its culture.



A Chinese woman with her feet unbound

Cultural relativism can be seen with the Chinese culture and their process of feet binding. Foot binding was to stop the growth of the foot and make them smaller. The process often began between four and seven years old. A ten foot bandage would be wrapped around the foot forcing the toes to go under the foot. It caused the big toe to be closer to the heel causing the foot to bow. In China, small feet were seen as beautiful and a symbol of status. The women wanted their feet to be **“three-inch golden lotuses”** It was also the only way to marry into money. Because men only wanted women with small feet, even after this practice was banned in 1912, women still continued to do it. To Western cultures the idea of feet binding might seem torturous, but for the

Chinese culture it was a symbol of beauty that has been ingrained the culture for hundreds of years. The idea of beauty differs from culture to culture.

## **Origins and Overview**

The concept of cultural relativism as we know and use it today was established as an analytic tool by German-American anthropologist Franz Boas in the early 20th century. In the context of early social science, cultural relativism became an important tool for pushing back on the ethnocentrism that often tarnished research at that time, which was mostly conducted by white, wealthy, Western men, and often focused on people of color, foreign indigenous populations, and persons of lower economic class than the researcher.

Ethnocentrism is the practice of viewing and judging someone else's culture based on the values and beliefs of one's own. From this standpoint, we might frame other cultures as weird, exotic, intriguing, and even as problems to be solved. In contrast, when we recognize that the many cultures of the world have their own beliefs, values, and practices that have developed in particular historical, political, social, material, and ecological contexts and that it makes sense that they would differ from our own and that none are necessarily right or wrong or good or bad, then we are engaging the concept of cultural relativism.

## **Examples**

Cultural relativism explains why, for example, what constitutes breakfast varies widely from place to place. What is considered a typical breakfast in Turkey, as illustrated in the above image, is quite different from what is considered a typical breakfast in the U.S. or Japan. While it might seem strange to eat fish soup or stewed vegetables for breakfast in the U.S., in other places, this is perfectly normal. Conversely, our tendency toward sugary cereals and milk or preference for egg sandwiches loaded with bacon and cheese would seem quite bizarre to other cultures.

Similarly, but perhaps of more consequence, rules that regulate nudity in public vary widely around the world. In the U.S., we tend to frame nudity in general as an inherently sexual thing, and so when people are nude in public, people may interpret this as a sexual signal. But in many other places around the world, being nude or partially nude in public is a normal part of life, be it at swimming pools, beaches, in parks, or even throughout the course of daily life (see many indigenous cultures around the world).

In these cases, being nude or partially nude is not framed as sexual but as the appropriate bodily state for engaging in a given activity. In other cases, like many cultures where Islam is the predominant faith, a more thorough coverage of the body is expected than in other cultures. Due in large part to ethnocentrism, this has become a highly politicized and volatile practice in today's world.


## **Why Recognizing Cultural Relativism Matters**

By acknowledging cultural relativism, we can recognize that our culture shapes what we consider to be beautiful, ugly, appealing, disgusting, virtuous, funny, and abhorrent. It shapes what we consider to be good and bad art, music, and film, as well as what we consider to be tasteful or tacky consumer goods. The work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu features ample discussion of these phenomena, and the consequences of them. This varies not just in terms of national cultures but within a large society like the U.S. and also by cultures and subcultures organized by class, race, sexuality, region, religion, and ethnicity, among others.

**Supernaturalism:** the *theological belief* that a force or power other than man or nature is ultimate.

1. This supernatural force (God) *regulates* both man and nature, making both of them *subordinate* to it. (God as creator.)
2. Man is considered to be higher than the rest of nature.

### Consequent Spiritual Ideals:



Supernaturalism

Symbol Legend:

G=God

M=Man

N= Nature

- How human beings should act is largely a matter of knowing and *doing God's will*.
- Hence, human beings must transcend themselves and *not trust their instinct*

### Supernaturalism (God-based ethics)

This theory makes ethics depend on God. It teaches that:

- the only source of moral rules is God
- something is good because God says it is
- the way to lead a good life is to do what God wants

### Can God be the ultimate source of good?

Throughout history one puzzle has made it difficult to base ethics on God: Is a thing good because God desires it? or Does God desire a thing because it is good?

The Ancient Greek philosopher Plato concluded that God desires a thing *because it is good*. God's desire doesn't make a thing good - the thing would be good regardless of God.

If Plato is right then the supernaturalism theory is pretty unhelpful, because it doesn't reveal what makes something good or bad.

God's desire would be at best a useful way of discovering what is good and what is bad, but wouldn't tell us anything more than that.

And here's another problem:

If God desired something that everyone thinks is bad - would that make it good?

### **Atheists and supernaturalism Ethical atheists and supernaturalism**

If supernaturalism is true, how can atheists behave in a consistently moral way? If religion is the only basis of ethics, it would seem that people who have no faith can have no basis for their moral judgements, and nowhere to turn for guidance on how to live.

But atheists do behave in a consistent moral way, so where do such people get their morality from?

And since atheists and believers totally disagree on the foundations underpinning moral rules, it's surely strange that they so often agree on matters of right and wrong - since they have no common basis for moral judgements, any agreement on moral rules must be coincidence. One response the supernaturalist might offer is that the atheist does derive his or her ethics from God, even though they are unaware of it. The supernaturalist might say that not believing in God does not mean the atheist would have no awareness of a God-based ethics, and hence their agreement can be explained despite the atheist's different beliefs.

### **Constructionism devalues God-based ethics**

Some who are observant followers of a religion accept that God is a human construction and not a supernatural being.

If this is so, then God-based ethics are no different from humanly constructed ethics based on cultural traditions and rituals.

### **Different Gods leads to moral disagreement**

Since there are many different religions, with different understandings of God and different moral codes, God-based ethics is bound to produce moral disagreement.

God-based ethics provides no way of dealing with ethical conflicts between different religions.

### **Fearing God as a basis for good behaviour**

People may follow the rules of God-based ethics because they are fearful of being punished by God in this life or in some afterlife.

Many theologians teach that a fear- and power-based relationship with God is an inappropriate relationship to have with a loving God and leads to a bad spiritual life.

Many theologians and ethicists argue that such a relationship with God provides a bad model for human power and family relationships.

People may follow the rules of God-based ethics simply because they wish to behave in a way that pleases God.

This is a more helpful model for human power and family relationships.

## Discovering what is good

Even if people accept that things are good because God desires them they still face the problem of discovering what God desires. Strictly speaking this does not count against Supernaturalism as an intellectual position - it may be just beaccepted that moral truths are hard to discover - but it does highlight the difficulties.

## Discovering God's will

There are several ways in which believers try to find out God's will in ethical matters:

- reading scripture - both to see what God says, and to find relevant examples
- listening to religious teachers
- prayer and meditation
- seeing what is consistent with God's general advice on how to live
- listening to the inner, God-driven, voice
- discussion with teachers and followers of the religion concerned

Many religious people use a combination of these in their approach to moral problems. It is accepted by many believers that the ways of discovering God's will set out above don't give *direct* access to God's will, but involve working through intermediaries. Hence the information is passed through social, cultural, religious and psychological filters that can distort it.

Many hold that God's will is only directly known through revelation: God actually communicating his/her will to the person concerned. However, revelation as a source of ethics still presents a problem for certainty: how is the person to know that the revelation they have received has actually come from God?

## Ethical Realism

'Happiness is good.' 'We shouldn't punish innocents.' 'Generosity is a good character-trait.'

Ethical realists say that ethical claims such as these are objectively true: their truth does not depend on anyone's particular opinions, beliefs, preferences, or characteristics. That is, realists believe that there are right answers in ethics.

They reject relativism, according to which there are only non-objective ethical facts, and they reject nihilism, according to which there are no ethical facts (a theory sometimes called 'error theory'), and maybe even no ethical assertions of any kind (a theory sometimes called 'non-cognitivism').

Here, I first lay out several reasons in favor of ethical realism and then respond to several famous criticisms of the position.

## In Favor of Ethical Realism

Ethical realism was more-or-less taken for granted throughout most of the history of philosophy. Today, most experts agree that it's true. Consider three types of argument for realism.

### A. Common Sense or Intuition

It seems to lots of us as if suffering is bad; the claim is obvious, plausible, commonsensical, and self-evident. Arguably, everyone at-least-tacitly considers appearances to be evidence. Similarly, it seems as if stealing is wrong, even if you like to steal, and even if you trick someone into believing

that stealing isn't wrong. So there's plenty of intuitive evidence that these ethical truths are objective: their truth doesn't vary based on any particular person's situation or preferences.

### **B. Ethical Normativity and Epistemic Normativity**

If you think that moral facts are suspect in some way, then you might have to worry that facts about evidence are suspect for analogous reasons. There's a similarity between moral claims, about what we ought to do from the perspective of morality, and epistemological claims, about what we ought to do from the perspective of knowledge and evidence. Both seem normative: they're telling us that some course of action or belief is the correct one, or better than others, or that there is good evidence for something. Therefore, arguments that target normativity in general may undermine themselves. They may apply just as well, or better, to the idea that some theories are simply more objectively rational or justified or supported-by-the-evidence than other theories. And so if you reject normativity, you're rejecting the idea that your own position is justified.

### **C. Indispensability**

Arguably, much of our discourse is committed to the existence of genuinely normative properties and facts. Compare the case of mathematics, which might be a discourse about abstract objects that don't clearly have any direct causal contact with people's minds. Mathematicians continue to make progress and devise theories that can be applied to many particular projects. Maybe mathematicians are talking about nonexistent objects—numbers—and somehow, coincidentally, all this talk has paid off. But maybe mathematics is so successful because it's making true statements about numbers. Similarly, much of our discourse seems to assume the existence of ethical truths, and maybe the best explanation for this fact is that some of these truths really exist.

## **Defending Realism**

Ethical realism inspires many counter-arguments. We have space to survey three. Throughout, we should continually consider a general reply that Moorean realists have offered: that any argument against ethical realism, in order to justify us in rejecting the claim (e.g.) 'you shouldn't kill every living thing in the world, even if you want to,' will have to be such that all of its premises have more overall-evidence than 'you shouldn't kill everyone in the world, even if you want to.' One might offer this Moore-Bambrough-Huemer-style response to each of the three anti-realist arguments, but I'll also gesture at other objections.

### **A. Strangeness**

'Ethical properties would be strange.' Objections: It's not clear what strangeness is, why it should matter (given how many other things are strange), nor why ethical properties would be strange; indeed, goodness and badness seem normal and familiar.

### **B. Disagreement**

'There's too much disagreement about ethics for there to be facts about it.' Objections: Many apparently ethical disagreements are merely descriptive disagreements in disguise; just because people disagree about something, that doesn't normally mean there's no fact of the matter (compare the disagreement about whether Earth is the center of the Solar System); and such arguments run the risk of generalizing too far.

### **C. Evolutionary Debunking**

'Our ethical intuitions are the product of evolution, and are therefore a priori unlikely to

produce true beliefs.' Objections: If commonsense morality is true, then we should expect a reliable faculty of moral knowledge to be adaptive; thus the debunker at least can't assume that accurate moral beliefs are non- adaptive. In addition, if moral truths are known through reason, then it's to be expected that we would have the ability to learn these truths, even if it wasn't adaptive; compare calculus, which didn't help our ancestors survive. This argument, like others, may also prove too much.

#### **D. A Note on Epistemic Justification**

As noted, all three of these objections can also be seen to inspire arguments targeting epistemic justification in general, with the consequence that the objector must admit that her position is no more justified than its denial. And as the Moorean will argue, if, for each anti-realist argument, we are more justified in affirming 'You shouldn't kill everyone in the world, even if you want to,' then we are arguably justified in putting more confidence in ethical realism than in nihilism.

### **Intuitionism**

Intuitionism teaches three main things:

- There are real objective moral truths that are independent of human beings.
- These are fundamental truths that can't be broken down into parts or defined by reference to anything except other moral truths.
- Human beings can discover these truths by using their minds in a particular, intuitive way.

Intuitionism does not mean that all moral decisions are reached by relying on intuition. Intuition enables the discovery of the *basic* moral truths, and everyday moral decision-making then involves thinking about the choices available and making moral judgements in an ordinary sort of way. A leading UK intuitionist was the Cambridge philosopher G E Moore (1873-1954) who set out his ideas in the 1902 book *Principia Ethica*.

If I am asked, What is good? my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked How is good to be defined? my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. But disappointing as these answers may appear, they are of the very last importance.

My point is that good is a simple notion, just as yellow is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is.

### **G E Moore, Principia Ethica**

Or to put it at its simplest: 'Good' means 'good' and that's all there is to say about it. Moore objected to something called 'the naturalistic fallacy', which states that moral truths can be analysed in terms of physical or psychological things which exist in the natural world. Moral truths were moral truths, and that was that.

Moore was a university professor, and his idea of what things were good, such as friendship and the appreciation of beauty, was limited by his quiet and academic life. His writings didn't demonstrate that his theory was likely to help deal with serious ethical dilemmas. Other leading intuitionists were H A Pritchard (1871-1947) and W D Ross (1877- 1971).

## **Bad points of intuitionism**

Philosophers object to intuitionism because:

- they don't think that objective moral truths exist
- they don't think that there is a process of moral intuition
- there's no way for a person to distinguish between something actually being right and it merely seeming right to that person
- if intuitionism worked properly, everyone would come to the same moral conclusions, but they don't

## **Objective moral truths don't exist**

Many philosophers don't think that there are such things as objective moral truths. For them, moral statements are not factual statements about how the world is.

Furthermore, it might be claimed that we could never *know* the truth, even if it existed objectively, because knowledge requires testing in a properly scientific fashion, and that is not available for moral statements.

## **Moral intuition doesn't exist**

The idea that human beings have something called moral intuition is superficially attractive, but doesn't easily stand up to inspection.

Is it another sense like sight or hearing? Probably not, since the moral truths that moral intuition should detect don't seem to be out in the physical world.

Nor is it a process of reasoning, because intuitionists usually rule that out, too. Perhaps it shows itself in moral emotions, like feelings of guilt? But although human beings certainly have such feelings, the feelings could be the result of breaking internal mental rules of conduct or breaching cultural rules, rather than of breaking objective moral rules.

## **Seeming right may not be the same as being right**

When an intuitionist ponders a problem the only things they have to work with are their feelings, thoughts and attitudes.

Working with these entirely subjective things the intuitionist arrives at moral intuitions, which he then puts forward as objective truths.

But how does the intuitionist get from the subjective to the objective?

## **People reach different ethical conclusions**

If there are real objective moral truths, then they are presumably the same for everyone. Yet different people come to different conclusions faced with the same ethical problems.

Some people say that these moral truths are 'self-evident', but this just leaves the problem of different things being self-evident to different selves.

## Intuitionism: Advantages Vs Disadvantages

Advantages	Disadvantages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acknowledges cultural relativism</li> <li>• Acknowledges that morality isn't dependent on the material world.</li> <li>• Although Prichard's theory fails to establish moral guidelines to help us with moral choices; Ross's concept of 'Prima Facie' succeeds in clearing this up.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can we trust our intuition when there subject to individuals' own beliefs &amp; values?</li> <li>• Where does our intuition actually originate from? Is it unique to our upbringing and culture? If so, then that would mean it's not universal as they differ across societies.</li> <li>• Prichard=How can we distinguish conclusions to actions when our intuitions differ?</li> <li>• Moore=He fails to provide any empirical evidence of our innate intuition being true.</li> <li>• Ross=What if one uses the the prima facie duties inappropriately thinking it's right? I.e. If one assumes it's just to kill a murderer to better society; this is still wrong=murder; intrinsically wrong.</li> <li>• Prichard=Not everybody can use their sense of intuition-as not everyone owns the same level of</li> </ul>

intuition=subject to one's beliefs and opinions

### Evaluation

Although such weaknesses are evident within this theory it is overall a strong theory because.

### Kant's Moral Theory

Like Utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant's moral theory is grounded in a theory of intrinsic value. But where the utilitarian take happiness, conceived of as pleasure and the absence of pain to be what has intrinsic value, Kant takes the only thing to have moral worth for its own sake to be the good will. Persons, conceived of as autonomous rational moral agents, are beings that have intrinsic moral worth. This value of persons makes them deserving of moral respect. Kant's moral theory is often referred to as the "respect for persons" theory of morality.

Kant's moral theory is organized around the idea that to act morally and to act in accordance with reason are one and the same. In virtue of being a rational agent (that is, in virtue of possessing practical reason, reason which is interested and goal-directed), one is obligated to follow the moral law that practical reason prescribes. To do otherwise is to act irrationally. Because Kant places his emphasis on the duty that comes with being a rational agent who is cognizant of the moral law, Kant's theory is considered a form of deontology (*deon*— comes from the Greek for "duty" or "obligation").

Like his theoretical philosophy, Kant's practical philosophy is *a priori*, formal, and universal: the moral law is derived non-empirically from the very structure of practical reason itself (its *form*), and since all rational agents share the same practical reason, the moral law binds and obligates everyone equally. So what is this moral law that obligates all rational agents universally and *a priori*? The moral law is determined by what Kant refers to as the Categorical Imperative, which is the general principle that demands that one respect the humanity in oneself and in others, that one not make an exception for oneself when deliberating about how to act, and in general that one only act in accordance with rules that everyone could and should obey.

Although Kant insists that the moral law is equally binding for all rational agents, he also insists that the bindingness of the moral law is *self-imposed*: we *autonomously* prescribe the moral law to ourselves. Because Kant thinks that the kind of autonomy in question here is only possible under the presupposition of a transcendently free basis of moral choice, the constraint that the moral law places on an agent is not only consistent with freedom of the will, it requires it. Hence, one of the most important aspects of Kant's project is to show that we are justified in presupposing that our morally significant choices are grounded in a transcendental freedom (the very sort of freedom that Kant argued we *could not* prove through mere "theoretical" or "speculative" reason; see 2gii above).

This section aims to explain the structure and content of Kant's moral theory (5a- b), and also Kant's claims that belief in freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul are necessary "postulates" of practical reason (5c). (On the relation between Kant's moral theory and his aesthetic theory, see 7c below.)

## **A Problem for the Enlightenment**

To understand Kant's moral philosophy, it's crucial to be familiar with the issues that he, and other thinkers of his time, were dealing with. From the earliest recorded history, people's moral beliefs and practices were grounded in religion. Scriptures, such as the bible and the Quran, laid out moral rules that believers thought to be handed down from God: *Don't kill. Don't steal. Don't commit adultery*, and so on. The fact that these rules supposedly came from a divine source of wisdom gave them their authority. They were not simply somebody's arbitrary opinion, they were God's opinion, and as such, they offered humankind an objectively valid code of conduct.

Moreover, everyone had an incentive to obey these codes. If you "walked in the ways of the Lord," you would be rewarded, either in this life or the next. If you violated the commandments, you'd be punished. As a result, any sensible person brought up in such a faith would abide by the moral rules their religion taught.

With the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries that led to the great cultural movement known as the Enlightenment, these previously accepted religious doctrines were increasingly challenged as faith in God, scripture, and organized religion began to decline among the intelligentsia—that is, the educated elite. Nietzsche famously described this shift away from organized religion as "the death of God."

This new way of thinking created a problem for moral philosophers: If religion wasn't the foundation that gave moral beliefs their validity, what other foundation could there be? If there is no God—and therefore no guarantee of cosmic justice ensuring that the good guys will be rewarded and the bad guys will be punished—why should anyone bother trying to be good? Scottish moral philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre called this "the Enlightenment problem." The solution moral philosophers needed to come up with was a secular (non-religious) determination of what morality was and why we should strive to be moral.

## **Three Responses to the Enlightenment Problem**

- **Social Contract Theory**—One answer to the Enlightenment Problem was pioneered by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who argued that morality was essentially a set of rules

that human beings agreed upon amongst themselves in order to make living with one another possible. If we didn't have these rules—many of which took the form of laws enforced by the government—life would be absolutely horrific for everyone.

- **Utilitarianism**—Utilitarianism, another attempt to give morality a non-religious foundation, was pioneered by thinkers including David Hume (1711-1776) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1742). Utilitarianism holds that pleasure and happiness have intrinsic value. They are what we all want and are the ultimate goals that all our actions aim toward. Something is good if it promotes happiness, and it is bad if it produces suffering. Our basic duty is to try to do things that add to the amount of happiness and/or reduce the amount of misery in the world.
- **Kantian Ethics**—Kant had no time for Utilitarianism. He believed in placing the emphasis on happiness the theory completely misunderstood the true nature of morality. In his view, the basis for our sense of what is good or bad, right or wrong, is our awareness that human beings are free, rational agents who should be given the respect appropriate to such beings—but what exactly does that entail?

### **The Problem With Utilitarianism**

In Kant's view, the basic problem with utilitarianism is that it judges actions by their consequences. If your action makes people happy, it's good; if it does the reverse, it's bad. But is this actually contrary to what we might call moral commonsense? Consider this question: Who is the better person, the millionaire who gives \$1,000 to charity in order to score points with his Twitter following or the minimum-wage worker who donates a day's pay to charity because she thinks it's her duty to help the needy?

If consequences are all that matter, then the millionaire's action is technically the "better" one. But that's not how the majority of people would see the situation. Most of us judge actions more for their motivation than by their consequences. The reason is obvious: the consequences of our actions are often out of our control, just as the ball is out of the pitcher's control once it's left his hand. I could save a life at the risk of my own, and the person I save could turn out to be a serial killer. Or I could accidentally kill someone in the course of robbing them, and in doing so might unwittingly save the world from a terrible tyrant.

### **The Good Will**

Kant's "Groundwork" opens with the line: "The only thing that is unconditionally good is a good will." Kant's argument for this belief is quite plausible. Consider anything you think of in terms of being "good"—health, wealth, beauty, intelligence, and so on. For each of these things, you can also likely imagine a situation in which this so-called good thing is not good after all. For instance, a person can be corrupted by their wealth. The robust health of a bully makes it easier for him to abuse his victims. A person's beauty may lead her to become vain and fail to develop emotional maturity. Even happiness is not good if it is the happiness of a sadist torturing unwilling victims.

By contrast, goodwill, says Kant, is always good—in all circumstances. What, exactly, does Kant mean by goodwill? The answer is fairly simple. A person acts out of goodwill when they do what they do because they think it is their duty—when they act from a sense of moral obligation.

### **Duty vs. Inclination**

Obviously, we don't perform every little action from a sense of obligation. Much of the time, we're

simply following our inclinations—or acting out of self-interest. There's nothing intrinsically wrong with that, however, no one deserves credit for pursuing their own interests. It comes naturally to us, just as it comes naturally to every animal.

What is remarkable about human beings, though, is that we can, and sometimes do, perform an action from purely moral motives—for example, when a soldier throws himself on a grenade, sacrificing his own life to save the lives of others. Or less dramatically, I pay back a friendly loan as promised even though payday isn't for another week and doing so will leave me temporarily short of cash.

In Kant's view, when a person freely chooses to do the right thing simply because it is the right thing to do, their action adds value to the world and lights it up, so to speak, with a brief glow of moral goodness.

## **Knowing Your Duty**

Saying that people should do their duty from a sense of duty is easy—but how are we supposed to know what our duty is? Sometimes we may find ourselves facing moral dilemmas in which it's not obvious which course of action is morally correct.

According to Kant, however, in most situations duty is obvious. If we're uncertain, we can work out the answer by reflecting on a general principle that Kant calls the "Categorical Imperative." This, he claims, is the fundamental principle of morality and all other rules and precepts can be deduced from it.

Kant offers several different versions of this categorical imperative. One runs as follows: "Act only on that maxim that you can will as a universal law."

What this means, basically, is that we should only ask ourselves, *How would it be if everyone acted the way I'm acting? Could I sincerely and consistently wish for a world in which everyone behaved this way?* According to Kant, if our action is morally wrong, the answers to those questions would be no. For instance, suppose I'm thinking of breaking a promise. Could I wish for a world in which everyone broke their promises when keeping them was inconvenient? Kant argues that I could not want this, not least because in such a world no one would make promises since everyone would know that a promise meant nothing.

## **The Ends Principle**

Another version of the Categorical Imperative that Kant offers states that one should "always treat people as ends in themselves, never merely as a means to one's own ends." This is commonly referred to as the "ends principle." While similar in a way to the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," it puts the onus for following the rule on humankind rather than accepting the strictures of divine influence.

The key to Kant's belief regarding what makes humans moral beings is the fact that we are free and rational creatures. To treat someone as a means to your own ends or purposes is to not respect this fact about them. For instance, if I get you to agree to do something by making a false promise, I am manipulating you. Your decision to help me is based on false information (the idea that I'm going to keep my promise). In this way, I have undermined your rationality. This is even more obvious if I steal from you or kidnap you in order to claim a ransom.

Treating someone as an end, by contrast, involves always respecting the fact that they are capable of free rational choices which may be different from the choices you wish them to make. So if I want you to do something, the only moral course of action is to explain the situation, explain what I want, and let you make your own decision.

### **The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself**

According to Kant, moral principles must be objective, meaning they must apply to all rational beings without exception (G 4:389)<sup>1</sup>. To satisfy this criterion, moral principles must be based on reason alone. This is because reason abstracts from everything that does not hold for all rational beings, such as desires or inclinations and the features of human nature. Human beings do not necessarily determine their will, or act, according to moral principles because their will is subject to the influence of reason as well as inclinations that can be contrary to reason. Kant claims that because the human will is imperfect in this way, it is subject to a formula called a “categorical imperative” which presents moral principles to it as absolutely necessary, or unconditional, requirements (G 4:413-4). There is only one categorical imperative but Kant provides several versions of it to represent the different features that a moral principle must have. The second version, the FHE, represents the end that a moral principle must have (G 4:436).

Kant defines an end as “that which serves the will as the objective ground of its selfdetermination” (G 4:427). This is commonly understood to mean that an end is something for the sake of which a rational being acts or refrain from acting (Korsgaard 185; Wood Kant’s Ethical Thought 116). For example, in going to the gym, one’s end might be health; one acts for the sake of one’s health. In refraining from going out at night, one’s end might be self-preservation; one refrains from acting for the sake of one’s self-preservation<sup>2</sup>. Before Kant identifies the end of moral principles, he claims that it must be a specific type of end called an “end in itself” (G 4:428). An end in itself is an objective end, meaning that it can be held by all rational beings because it is determined by reason alone. Kant ultimately identifies the end of moral principles, or the end in itself, to be humanity. Thus, in acting on moral principles, one must act or refrain from acting for the sake of whatever is referred to by “humanity”. The FHE represents this in the command to “act [so that] you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as means” (G 4:429). In the following two sections, I argue that Kant identifies the end in itself with a good will, and thus, takes “humanity” to refer to a good will.

### **Kant’s Concept of Enlightenment**

In his famous essay “What is Enlightenment?” Kant defines the principle as “man’s emancipation from his self-imposed immaturity.” What does this mean, and what does it have to do with his ethics?

The answers go back to the problem of religion no longer providing a satisfactory foundation for morality. What Kant calls humanity’s “immaturity” is the period when people did not truly think for themselves, and instead, typically accepted moral rules handed down to them by religion, tradition, or by authorities such as the church, overlord, or king. This loss of faith in previously recognized authority was viewed by many as a spiritual crisis for Western civilization. If “God is dead, how do we know what is true and what is right?”

Kant’s answer was that people simply had to work those things out for themselves. It wasn’t something to lament, but ultimately, something to celebrate. For Kant, morality was not a matter of

subjective whim set forth in the name of god or religion or law based on the principles ordained by the earthly spokespeople of those gods. Kant believed that “the moral law”—the categorical imperative and everything it implies—was something that could only be discovered through reason. It was not something imposed on us from without. Instead, it's a law that we, as rational beings, must impose on ourselves. This is why some of our deepest feelings are reflected in our reverence for the moral law, and why, when we act as we do out of respect for it—in other words, from a sense of duty—we fulfill ourselves as rational beings.

## **Kant's three postulates of morality**

### **Immortality of the Soul**

Kant states in his critique, “the belief in God and another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment.” The postulate of immortality was that the belief in immortality has to be based on the moral disposition and not one hope of future rewards. Kant bases his first argument for immortality. As ‘nothing is purposeless’ each organ into the world has its own specific claim that human life as whole is an end not in this life but in a future life. The moral arguments for the immortality of the soul as stated by Kant:

1. The highest good is a necessary object of the will.
2. Holiness, or complete fitness of intentions to the moral law, is necessary condition of the highest good.
3. Holiness cannot be found in a sensuous rational being.
4. The highest good can be made real.

Kant also makes it clear that the postulate of immortality is that which cannot be known but can only be thought and furnish us with only practical and objective truth that can give rise to action-motives worthy of achieving highest good.

### **Freedom of the Soul**

Freedom is one of the postulates, which is considered as logically possible and practically useful and it is the key stone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even speculative reason. Freedom provides a conception of ourselves which motivates us to obey the moral law. As freedom of will can't be given empirical or theoretical evidence, Kant's thought on freedom of the will can be seen to pass the following phases.

- Human actions are those that have internal rather than external causes.
- Human actions which are not dictated by deterministic laws of nature cannot be proved.
- Human freedom's existence can be proved and thereby proving that moral law applies to us.
- The freedom of will form the undeniable fact of our religion.

Kant says that freedom desires both itself and the freedom of others.

### **The existence of God**

The God postulated by Kant is not the God of religion. The postulate of God is a need or requirement of our moral consciousness or a moral necessity which is subjective and no way connected to the consciousness of our duty. The divine will is the motive to action, not ground of it. The possibility of the existence of a certain object is explained by this hypothesis explained

appropriately as a faith and indeed a faith of reason.

Kant stresses that the properties of Omnipotence, Omniscience and Omnipresence can be assigned to God to play his moral role of guaranteeing the possibility of the highest good. God is not a metaphysical concept, original being, that functions in the thinking of a moral agent and exercise a real influence on his/her actions.

## The Good Will

### Good Will, Moral Worth and Duty

Kant's analysis of commonsense ideas begins with the thought that the only thing good without qualification is a "good will". While the phrases "he's good hearted", "she's good natured" and "she means well" are common, "the good will" as Kant thinks of it is not the same as any of these ordinary notions. The idea of a good will is closer to the idea of a "good person", or, more archaically, a "person of good will". This use of the term "will" early on in analyzing ordinary moral thought prefigures later and more technical discussions concerning the nature of rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important commonsense touchstone to which Kant returns throughout his works. The basic idea, as Kant describes it in the Groundwork, is that what makes a good person good is his possession of a will that is in a certain way "determined" by, or makes its decisions on the basis of, the moral law. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who is committed only to make decisions that she holds to be morally worthy and who takes moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something we all highly value, Kant thought. He believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By this, we believe, he means primarily two things.

First, unlike anything else, there is no conceivable circumstance in which we regard our own moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to obtain some desirable object. By contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or cleverness, can be diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances: Courage may be laid aside if it requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if it requires cruelty. There is no implicit restriction or qualification to the effect that a commitment to give moral considerations decisive weight is worth honoring, *but only under such and such circumstances*.

Second, possessing and maintaining a steadfast commitment to moral principles is the very condition under which anything else is worth having or pursuing. Intelligence and even pleasure are worth having only on the condition that they do not require giving up one's fundamental moral convictions. The value of a good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and maintaining a good will. Indeed, since a good will is good under any condition, its goodness must not depend on any particular conditions obtaining. Thus, Kant points out that a good will must then also be good *in itself* and not in virtue of its relationship to other things such as the agent's own happiness, overall welfare or any other effects it may or may not produce. A good will would still "shine like a jewel" even if it were "completely powerless to carry out its aims" (G 4:394).

In Kant's terms, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or, as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings inevitably feel this Law as a constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings, are imperatives and

duties. A human will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of *duty*. A *holy* or *divine* will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty because such a will does not have natural inclinations and so necessarily fulfills moral requirements without feeling constrained to do so. It is the presence of desires that *could* operate independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an essential element of the idea of “duty.” So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we *might* not want to simply from the thought that we are morally required to do so.

Kant confirms this by comparing motivation by duty with other sorts of motives, in particular, with motives of self-interest, self-preservation, sympathy and happiness. He argues that a dutiful action from any of these motives, however praiseworthy it may be, does not express a good will. Assuming an action has moral worth only if it expresses a good will, such actions have no genuine “moral worth.” The conformity of one’s action to duty in such cases is only related by accident to morality. For instance, if one is motivated by happiness alone, then had conditions not conspired to align one’s duty with one’s own happiness one would not have done one’s duty. By contrast, were one to supplant any of these motivations with the motive of duty, the morality of the action would then express one’s determination to act dutifully out of respect for the moral law itself. Only then would the action have moral worth.

Kant’s views in this regard have understandably been the subject of much controversy. Many object that we do not think better of actions done for the sake of duty than actions performed out of emotional concern or sympathy for others, especially those things we do for friends and family. Worse, moral worth appears to require not only that one’s actions be motivated by duty, but also that no other motives, even love or friendship, cooperate. Yet Kant’s defenders have argued that his point is not that we do not admire or praise motivating concerns other than duty, only that from the point of view of someone deliberating about what to do, these concerns are not decisive in the way that considerations of moral duty are. What is crucial in actions that express a good will is that in conforming to duty a perfectly virtuous person always would, and so ideally we should, recognize and be moved by the thought that our conformity is morally obligatory.

The motivational structure of the agent should be arranged so that she always treats considerations of duty as sufficient reasons for conforming to those requirements. In other words, we should have a firm commitment not to perform an action if it is morally forbidden and to perform an action if it is morally required. Having a good will, in this sense, is compatible with having feelings and emotions of various kinds, and even with aiming to cultivate some of them in order to counteract desires and inclinations that tempt us to immorality. Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s claims about the motive of duty go beyond this basic point (Timmermann 2007; Herman 1993; Wood 1998; Baron 1995).

Suppose for the sake of argument we agree with Kant. We now need to know what distinguishes the principle that lays down our duties from these other motivating principles, and so makes motivation by it the source of unqualified value.

### **The Categorical Imperative**

If a good will is one that forms its intentions on the basis of correct principles of action, then we want to know what sort of principles these are. A principle that commands an action is called an

"imperative." Most imperatives are "hypothetical imperatives," that is, they are commands that hold only if certain conditions are met. For instance: "if you want to be a successful shopkeeper, then cultivate a reputation for honesty." Since hypothetical imperatives are conditioned on desires and the intended consequences of actions, they cannot serve as the principles that determine the intentions and volitions of an unconditionally good will. Instead, we require what Kant calls a "categorical imperative." Where hypothetical imperatives take the form, "if y is desired/intended/sought, do x," categorical imperatives simply take the form, "do x." Since a categorical imperative is stripped of all reference to the consequences of an action, it is thereby stripped of all determinate content, and hence it is purely *formal*. And since it is unconditional, it holds *universally*. Hence a categorical imperative expresses only the very form of a universally binding law: "nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law" (4:402).

To act morally, then, is to form one's intentions on the basis of the very idea of a universal principle of action.

This conception of a categorical imperative leads Kant to his first official formulation of the categorical imperative itself: "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law" (4:421). A maxim is a general rule that can be used to determine particular courses of actions in particular circumstances. For instance, the maxim "I shall lie when it will get me out of trouble" can be used to determine the decision to lie about an adulterous liaison. The categorical imperative offers a decision procedure for determining whether a given course of action is in accordance with the moral law. After determining what maxim one would be basing the action in question on, one then asks whether it would be possible, given the power (in an imagined, hypothetical scenario), to choose that everyone act in accordance with that same maxim. If it is possible to will that everyone act according to that maxim, then the action under consideration is morally permissible. If it is not possible to will that everyone act according to that maxim, the action is morally impermissible. Lying to cover up adultery is thus immoral because one cannot will that everyone act according to the maxim, "I shall lie when it will get me out of trouble." Note that it is not simply that it would be *undesirable* for everyone to act according to that maxim. Rather, it would be *impossible*. Since everyone would know that everyone else was acting according to that maxim, there would never be the presupposition that anyone was telling the truth; the very act of lying, of course, requires such a presupposition on the part of the one being lied to. Hence, the state of affairs where everyone lies to get out of trouble can never arise, so it cannot be willed to be a universal law. It fails the test of the categorical imperative.

The point of Kant's appeal to the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative is to show that an action is morally permissible only if the maxim on which the action is based could be affirmed as a universal law that everyone obeys without exception. The mark of immorality, then, is that one makes an exception for oneself. That is, one acts in a way that they would not want everyone else to. When someone chooses to lie about an adulterous liaison, one is implicitly thinking, "in general people should tell the truth, but in this case I will be the exception to the rule." Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative describes it in terms of the very form of universal law itself. This formal account abstracts from any specific *content* that the moral law might have for living, breathing human beings. Kant offers a second formulation to address the material side of the moral law. Since the moral law has to do with actions, and all actions are by definition teleological (that is, goal-directed), a material formulation of the categorical imperative will require an appeal to the "ends" of human activity. Some ends are merely instrumental, that is, they are sought only because they serve as "means" towards further ends. Kant argues that the

moral law must be aimed at an end that is not merely instrumental, but is rather an end *in itself*. Only rational agents, according to Kant, are ends in themselves. To act morally is thus to respect rational agents as ends in themselves. Accordingly, the categorical imperative can be reformulated as follows: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (4:429). The basic idea here is that it is immoral to treat someone as a *thing* of merely instrumental value; *persons* have an intrinsic (non- instrumental) value, and the moral law demands that we respect this intrinsic value. To return to the example of the previous paragraphs, it would be wrong to lie about an adulterous liaison because by withholding the truth one is manipulating the other person to make things easier for oneself; this sort of manipulation, however, amounts to treating the other as a thing (as a mere means to the comfort of not getting in trouble), and not as a person deserving of respect and entitled to the truth.

The notion of a universal law provides the *form* of the categorical imperative and rational agents as ends in themselves provide the *matter*. These two sides of the categorical imperative are combined into yet a third formulation, which appeals to the notion of a "kingdom of ends." A kingdom of ends can be thought of as a sort of perfectly just utopian ideal in which all citizens of this kingdom freely respect the intrinsic worth of the humanity in all others because of an autonomously self-imposed recognition of the bindingness of the universal moral law for all rational agents. The third formulation of the categorical imperative is simply the idea that one should act in whatever way a member of this perfectly just society would act: "act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends" (4:439). The idea of a kingdom of ends is an *ideal* (hence the "merely possible"). Although humanity may never be able to achieve such a perfect state of utopian coexistence, we can at least strive to approximate this state to an ever greater degree.

## **A Theory of Duty**

Some terminology to consider:

**Moral agent:** *An agent is a person who performs an action; a moral agent is a person with the capacity to act morally*

**Maxim:** *rule or principle*

**Will:** *the faculty of deciding, choosing, or acting*

Deontological theories differ from utilitarian theories in several key ways. The most notable difference is utilitarianism aims at a goal of greatest happiness (or the best consequence) and justifies any act that achieves that goal. Deontological theories hold that some acts are always wrong, even if the act leads to an admirable outcome. Actions in deontology are always judged independently of their outcome. An act can be morally bad but may unintentionally lead to a favorable outcome.

Kant is responsible for the most prominent and well-known form of deontological ethics. Kant's moral theory is based on his view of the human being as having the unique capacity for rationality. No other animal possesses such a propensity for reasoned thought and action, and it is exactly this ability that requires human beings to act in accordance with and for the sake of moral law or duty. Kant believes human inclinations, emotions and consequences should play no role in moral

action; therefore, the motivation behind an action must be based on obligation and well thought out before the action takes place. Morality should, in theory, provide people with a framework of rational rules that guide and prevent certain actions and are independent of personal intentions and desires.

According to Kant, the moral worth of an action is determined by the human will, which is the only thing in the world that can be considered good without qualification. Good will is exercised by acting according to moral duty/law. Moral law consists of a set of maxims, which are categorical in nature – we are bound by duty to act in accordance with categorical imperatives.

## **Utilitarianism**

Utilitarianism is an ethical theory that determines right from wrong by focusing on outcomes. It is a form of consequentialism.

Utilitarianism holds that the most ethical choice is the one that will produce the greatest good for the greatest number. It is the only moral framework that can be used to justify military force or war. It is also the most common approach to moral reasoning used in business because of the way in which it accounts for costs and benefits.

However, because we cannot predict the future, it's difficult to know with certainty whether the consequences of our actions will be good or bad. This is one of the limitations of utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism also has trouble accounting for values such as justice and individual rights. For example, assume a hospital has four people whose lives depend upon receiving organ transplants: a heart, lungs, a kidney, and a liver. If a healthy person wanders into the hospital, his organs could be harvested to save four lives at the expense of one life. This would arguably produce the greatest good for the greatest number. But few would consider it an acceptable course of action, let alone the most ethical one.

So, although utilitarianism is arguably the most reason-based approach to determining right and wrong, it has obvious limitations.

## **THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY**

I. Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility<sup>[1]</sup> recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light. But enough of metaphor and declamation: it is not by such means that moral science is to be improved.

II. The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what is meant by it. By the principle<sup>[2]</sup> of

utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever. according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

**III.** By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

**IV.** The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what is it?— the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.

**V.** It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual.[3] A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.

**VI.** An action then may be said to be conformable to then principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to utility, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish it.

**VII.** ' A measure of government (which is but a particular kind of action, performed by a particular person or persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency which it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any which it has to diminish it.

**VIII.** When an action, or in particular a measure of government, is supposed by a man to be conformable to the principle of utility, it may be convenient, for the purposes of discourse, to imagine a kind of law or dictate, called a law or dictate of utility: and to speak of the action in question, as being conformable to such law or dictate.

**IX.** A man may be said to be a partizan of the principle of utility, when the approbation or disapprobation he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is determined by and proportioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility.

**X.** Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and wrong and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have none.

**XI.** Has the rectitude of this principle been ever formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.

**XII.** Not that there is or ever has been that human creature at breathing, however stupid or perverse, who has not on many, perhaps on most occasions of his life, deferred to it. By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle, without thinking of it: if not for the ordering of their own actions, yet for the trying of their own actions, as well as of those of other men. There have been, at the same time, not many perhaps, even of the most intelligent, who have been disposed to embrace it purely and without reserve. There are even few who have not taken some occasion or other to quarrel with it, either on account of their not understanding always how to apply it, or on account of some prejudice or other which they were afraid to examine into, or could not bear to part with. For such is the stuff that man is made of: in principle and in practice, in a right track and in a wrong one, the rarest of all human qualities is consistency.

**XIII.** When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself.[4] His arguments, if they prove any thing, prove not that the principle is wrong, but that, according to the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is misapplied. Is it possible for a man to move the earth? Yes; but he must first find out another earth to stand upon.

**XIV.** To disprove the propriety of it by arguments is impossible; but, from the causes that have been mentioned, or from some confused or partial view of it, a man may happen to be disposed not to relish it. Where this is the case, if he thinks the settling of his opinions on such a subject worth the trouble, let him take the following steps, and at length, perhaps, he may come to reconcile himself to it.

1. Let him settle with himself, whether he would wish to discard this principle altogether; if so, let him consider what it is that all his reasonings (in matters of politics especially) can amount to?
2. If he would, let him settle with himself, whether he would judge and act without any principle, or whether there is any other he would judge an act by?
3. If there be, let him examine and satisfy himself whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; or whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom expresses neither more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded sentiments; that is, what in another person he might be apt to call caprice?
4. If he is inclined to think that his own approbation or disapprobation, annexed to the idea of an act, without any regard to its consequences, is a sufficient foundation for him to judge and act upon, let him ask himself whether his sentiment is to be a standard of right and wrong, with respect to every other man, or whether every man's sentiment has the same privilege of being a standard to itself?
5. In the first case, let him ask himself whether his principle is not despotic, and hostile to all the rest of human race?
6. In the second case, whether it is not anarchial, and whether at this rate there are not as many different standards of right and wrong as there are men? and whether even to the same man,

the same thing, which is right today, may not (without the least change in its nature) be wrong tomorrow? and whether the same thing is not right and wrong in the same place at the same time? and in either case, whether all argument is not at an end? and whether, when two men have said, "I like this," and "I don't like it," they can (upon such a principle) have any thing more to say?

- If he should have said to himself, No: for that the sentiment which he proposes as a standard must be grounded on reflection, let him say on what particulars the reflection is to turn? if on particulars having relation to the utility of the act, then let him say whether this is not deserting his own principle, and borrowing assistance from that very one in opposition to which he sets it up: or if not on those particulars, on what other particulars?
- If he should be for compounding the matter, and adopting his own principle in part, and the principle of utility in part, let him say how far he will adopt it?
- When he has settled with himself where he will stop, then let him ask himself how he justifies to himself the adopting it so far? and why he will not adopt it any farther?
- Admitting any other principle than the principle of utility to be a right principle, a principle that it is right for a man to pursue; admitting (what is not true) that the word right can have a meaning without reference to utility, let him say whether there is any such thing as a motive that a man can have to pursue the dictates of it: if there is, let him say what that motive is, and how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce the dictates of utility: if not, then lastly let him say what it is this other principle can be good for?

## Footnotes

1. Greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle: this for shortness, instead of saying at length that principle which states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as being the right and proper, and only right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action: of human action in every situation, and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries exercising the powers of Government. The word utility does not so clearly point to the ideas of pleasure and pain as the words happiness and felicity do: nor does it lead us to the consideration of the number, of the interests affected; to the number, as being the circumstance, which contributes, in the largest proportion, to the formation of the standard here in question; the standard of right and wrong, by which alone the propriety of human conduct, in every situation, can with propriety be tried. This want of a sufficiently manifest connexion between the ideas of happiness and pleasure on the one hand, and the idea of utility on the other, I have every now and then found operating, and with but too much efficiency, as a bar to the acceptance, that might otherwise have been given, to this principle.
2. The word principle is derived from the Latin principium: which seems to be compounded of the two words primus, first, or chief, and cipium a termination which seems to be derived from capio, to take, as in mancipium, municipium; to which are analogous, auceps, forceps, and others. It is a term of very vague and very extensive signification: it is applied to any thing which is conceived to serve as a foundation or beginning to any series of operations: in some cases, of physical operations; but of mental operations in the present case. The principle here in question may be taken for an act of the mind; a sentiment; a sentiment of approbation; a sentiment which, when applied to an action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it by which the measure of approbation or disapprobation bestowed upon it ought to be governed.

3. Interest is one of those words, which not having any superior genus, cannot in the ordinary way be defined.

'The principle of utility, (I have heard it said) is a dangerous principle: it is dangerous on certain occasions to consult it.' This is as much as to say, what? that it is not consonant to utility, to consult utility: in short, that it is not consulting it, to consult it. Addition by the Author, July 1822. Not long after the publication of the Fragment on Government, anno 1776, in which, in the character of all-comprehensive and all-commanding principle, the principle of utility was brought to view, one person by whom observation to the above effect was made was Alexander Wedderburn, at that time Attorney or Solicitor General, afterwards successively Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and Chancellor of England, under the successive titles of Lord Loughborough and Earl of Rosslyn. It was made—not indeed in my hearing, but in the hearing of a person by whom it was almost immediately communicated to me. So far from being self-contradictory, it was a shrewd and perfectly true one. By that distinguished functionary, the state of the Government was thoroughly understood: by the obscure individual, at that time not so much as supposed to be so: his disquisitions had not been as yet applied, with anything like a comprehensive view, to the field of Constitutional Law, nor therefore to those features of the English Government, by which the greatest happiness of the ruling one with or without that of a favoured few, are now so plainly seen to be the only ends to which the course of it has at any time been directed. The principle of utility was an appellative, at that time employed by me, as it had been by others, to designate that which, in a more perspicuous and instructive manner, may, as above, be designated by the name of the greatest happiness principle. 'This principle (said Wedderburn) is a dangerous one.' Saying so, he said that which, to a certain extent, is strictly true: a principle, which lays down, as the only right and justifiable end of Government, the greatest happiness of the greatest number—how can it be denied to be a dangerous one? dangerous it unquestionably is, to every government which has for its actual end or object, the greatest happiness of a certain one, with or without the addition of some comparatively small number of others, whom it is matter of pleasure or accommodation to him to admit, each of them, to a share in the concern, on the footing of so many junior partners. Dangerous it therefore really was, to the interest—the sinister interest—of all those functionaries, himself included, whose interest it was, to maximize delay, vexation, and expense, in judicial and other modes of procedure, for the sake of the profit, extractible out of the expense. In a Government which had for its end in view the greatest happiness of the greatest number, Alexander Wedderburn might have been Attorney General and then Chancellor: but he would not have been Attorney General with £15,000 a year, nor Chancellor, with a peerage with a veto upon all justice, with £25,000 a year, and with 500 sinecures at his disposal, under the name of Ecclesiastical Benefices, besides et cæteras.

- I. Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends that the legislator has in view; it behoves him therefore to understand their value. Pleasures and pains are the instruments he has to work with: it behoves him therefore to understand their force, which is again, in other words, their value.
- II. To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances:
  1. Its intensity.
  2. Its duration.
  3. Its certainty or uncertainty.
  4. Its propinquity or remoteness.

III. These are the circumstances which are to be considered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of them by itself. But when the value of any pleasure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating the tendency of any act by which it is produced, there are two other circumstances to be taken into the account; these are,

1. Its fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind: that is, pleasures, if it be a pleasure: pains, if it be a pain.
2. Its purity, or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind: that is, pains, if it be a pleasure: pleasures, if it be a pain.

These two last, however, are in strictness scarcely to be deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself; they are not, therefore, in strictness to be taken into the account of the value of that pleasure or that pain. They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced; and accordingly are only to be taken into the account of the tendency of such act or such event.

IV. To a number of persons, with reference to each of whom to the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: to wit, the six preceding ones; viz.,

1. Its intensity.
2. Its duration.
3. Its certainty or uncertainty.
4. Its propinquity or remoteness.
5. Its fecundity.
6. Its purity.

And one other; to wit:

Its extent; that is, the number of persons to whom it extends; or (in other words) who are affected by it.

V. To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any act, by which the interests of a community are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and take an account,

1. Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which appears to be produced by it in the first instance.
2. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it in the first instance.
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the first pain.
4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be produced by it after the first. This constitutes the fecundity of the first pain, and the impurity of the first pleasure.
5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance, if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of that individual person; if on the side of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole.
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be concerned; and repeat

the above process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the whole. Take the balance which if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same community.

**VI.** It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, however, be always kept in view: and as near as the process actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, so near will such process approach to the character of an exact one.

**VII.** The same process is alike applicable to pleasure and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether it be called good (which is properly the cause or instrument of pleasure) or profit (which is distant pleasure, or the cause or instrument of, distant pleasure,) or convenience, or advantage, benefit, emolument, happiness, and so forth: to pain, whether it be called evil, (which corresponds to good) or mischief, or inconvenience or disadvantage, or loss, or unhappiness, and so forth.

**VIII.** Nor is this a novel and unwarranted, any more than it is a useless theory. In all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to. An article of property, an estate in land, for instance, is valuable, on what account? On account of the pleasures of all kinds which it enables a man to produce, and what comes to the same thing the pains of all kinds which it enables him to avert. But the value of such an article of property is universally understood to rise or fall according to the length or shortness of the time which a man has in it: the certainty or uncertainty of its coming into possession: and the nearness or remoteness of the time at which, if at all, it is to come into possession. As to the intensity of the pleasures which a man may derive from it, this is never thought of, because it depends upon the use which each particular person may come to make of it; which cannot be estimated till the particular pleasures he may come to derive from it, or the particular pains he may come to exclude by means of it, are brought to view. For the same reason, neither does he think of the fecundity or purity of those pleasures. Thus much for pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, in general. We come now to consider the several particular kinds of pain and pleasure.

### **Sanction Utilitarianism**

So far, Mill's various claims about duty are largely consistent with direct utilitarianism, and, hence, act utilitarianism. However, Chapter V of *Utilitarianism* introduces claims about duty, justice, and rights that are hard to square with either.

For the truth is, that the idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it—if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency. (V 14)

Here Mill defines wrongness and, by implication, duty, not directly in terms of the nature of the action or its consequences but indirectly in terms of appropriate responses to it. He appears to believe that one is under an obligation or duty to do something just in case failure to do it is wrong and that an action is wrong just in case some kind of external or internal sanction—punishment, social censure, or self-reproach—ought to be applied to its performance. This test distinguishes duty from expediency (V 14, 15). Not all suboptimal or inexpedient acts are wrong, only those to which one ought to apply some sort of sanction (at least, self-reproach).

Justice is a proper part of duty. Justice involves duties that are perfect duties— that is, duties that are correlated with rights (V 15). An act is just if and only if it is not unjust, and it is unjust just in case it is wrong and violates someone's rights (V 23). Someone has a right just in case she has a claim that society ought to protect by force of law or public opinion (V 24).

Notice that these relationships among duty, justice, and rights do not yet introduce any utilitarian elements. But Mill does think that whether sanctions ought to be applied to an action—and hence whether it is wrong—and whether society ought to enforce an individual's claim—and hence whether she has a right—both depend upon the utility or expediency of doing so (V 25). He does not say precisely what standard of expediency he has in mind. In particular, he does not say whether the relevant test for whether something is wrong requires that sanctions be optimal or merely beneficial. To fix ideas, let us assume that an action is wrong if and only if it is optimal to sanction it.

Because this account of duty defines the rightness and wrongness of an act, not in terms of its utility, as act utilitarianism does, but in terms of the utility of applying sanctions to the conduct, it is an indirect form of utilitarianism. Because justice is a species of duty, it inherits this indirect character (also see Lyons 1994). Because it makes the deontic status of conduct depend upon the utility of sanctioning that conduct in some way, we might call this conception of duty, justice, and rights *sanction utilitarianism*. Because sanction utilitarianism is a species of indirect utilitarianism, it is inconsistent with act utilitarianism. The introduction of indirect utilitarian ideas in Chapter V of *Utilitarianism* into an account of utilitarianism that otherwise looks act utilitarian reveals a fundamental tension in Mill's thought about duty.

### **Act vs. Sanction Utilitarianism**

Given Mill's ambivalence between direct and indirect utilitarianism, it is natural to inquire whether one view is more plausible than the other. Some of Mill's claims in Chapter V suggest a possible advantage that sanction utilitarianism might have. In articulating sanction utilitarianism, Mill claims that it allows him to distinguish duty and expediency and claim that not all inexpedient acts are wrong; inexpedient acts are only wrong when it is good or optimal to sanction them. This suggests that sanction utilitarianism may be preferable to act utilitarianism, because it has a more plausible account of the relation among different deontic categories.

Commonsense moral thinking recognizes a familiar fourfold deontic distinction.

- a. wrong or forbidden
- b. permissible
- c. obligatory

#### d. supererogatory

The act utilitarian seems unable to account for this fourfold distinction. It implies that I do wrong every time I fail to perform the optimal act, even when these suboptimal acts are very good. Because it makes the optimal obligatory and the suboptimal wrong, it appears to expand the domain of the forbidden, collapse the distinction between the permissible and the obligatory, and make no room for the supererogatory. If the optimal is already one's duty, there appears to be no room for the supererogatory. By contrast, sanction utilitarianism does not appear to have these problems. It offers a distinct account of each category.

- a. Wrong or forbidden acts are those whose performance it is optimal to blame.
- b. Permissible acts are those whose performance it is not optimal to blame.
- c. Obligatory acts are those whose omission it is optimal to blame.
- d. Supererogatory acts are permissible acts that are especially expedient.

In this way, sanction utilitarianism appears to respect this common deontic categorization and, in particular, to make room for the supererogatory.

However, the direct utilitarian can and should distinguish between the moral assessment of an act and the moral assessment of the act of praising or blaming that act. Each should be assessed, the direct utilitarian claims, by the utility of doing so. But then it is possible for there to be wrongdoing (a suboptimal act) that is blameless or even praiseworthy. But then the direct utilitarian can appeal to the same distinctions among praiseworthiness and blameworthiness that the sanction utilitarian appeals to, while denying that her own deontic distinctions track blame and praise. So, for instance, there can be acts that are wrong, because suboptimal, that it would nonetheless be wrong to blame, because this would be suboptimal. If so, it is unclear that sanction utilitarianism enjoys any real advantage here over act utilitarianism.

Moreover, sanction utilitarianism appears to have disadvantages that act utilitarianism does not. One such problem derives from its *hybrid* structure. Sanction utilitarianism is impurely indirect. For while it provides an indirect utilitarian theory of duty, the account it provides of when sanctions should be applied to conduct is direct—it depends upon the consequences of applying sanctions. Sanction utilitarianism provides an indirect utilitarian account of the conditions under which an action—any action—is right or wrong. This general criterion is that any action is wrong to which one ought to attach sanctions. But imposing sanctions is a kind of action, and we can ask whether the imposition of a particular sanction would be right or wrong. The general criterion implies that we should answer this question about the rightness of applying sanctions in sanction-utilitarian terms, namely, by asking whether it would be right to sanction the failure to apply sanctions. This introduces a second-order sanction, whose rightness we can now ask about. We seem to be off on an infinite regress of sanctions. Sanction-utilitarianism avoids the regress because it provides a direct utilitarian answer to the question when to apply the first-order sanction. It says that a sanction should be applied iff doing so is optimal. Though this avoids a regress, it appears to render sanction utilitarianism internally inconsistent.

1. Any act is right iff and because it is optimal to apply sanctions to its omission (the indirect claim).
2. Applying sanctions is right iff and because doing so is optimal (the direct claim).

(2) is inconsistent with (1).

The different strands in Mill's utilitarian conception of duty require disentangling. In his central exposition of the utilitarian standard in Chapter II, Mill commits himself to act utilitarianism in multiple passages. In that same chapter, he focuses on the felicific tendencies of actions and assigns a significant role to rules within moral reasoning, both of which have been taken to commit him to a rule utilitarian doctrine. However, these claims are reconcilable with direct utilitarianism and so provide no good reason to depart from a traditional act utilitarian reading of that chapter. But in Chapter V Mill does introduce indirect utilitarian ideas in the doctrine of sanction utilitarianism. It is hard to reconcile these direct and indirect elements in Mill's conception of duty.

### **The Sanctions of Utility**

In Chapter III of *Utilitarianism* Mill addresses the question of the ultimate sanction of the principle of utility. He understands this alternately as a question about "the motives to obey it" and the "source of its obligation ... [or] binding force" (III 1).

Mill recognizes a potential worry about the sanctions of utilitarianism that apparently has its source in prudence or self-interest.

He [an agent] says to himself, I feel that I am bound not to rob or murder, betray or deceive; but why am I bound to promote the general happiness? If my own happiness lies in something else, why may I not give that the preference? (III 1)

But this worry about potential conflicts between the agent's own interests and utilitarian moral demands seems to arise for any conception of morality that recognizes other-regarding moral demands. For this reason, Mill seems to think that it poses no special problem for utilitarianism (III 1, 2, 3, 6).

Is Mill right that there is no special threat to utilitarianism here? One might wonder whether utilitarianism makes greater demands on agents than other moral theories. Contemporary writers have argued that utilitarianism seems to be potentially very demanding, much more so than commonsense morality. For instance, reformist utilitarians, such as Peter Singer (1972), have argued that utilitarianism entails extensive duties of mutual aid that would call for significant changes in the lifestyles of all those who are even moderately well off. And critics of utilitarianism have treated the demandingness of utilitarianism as one of its principal flaws. Rawls (1971) has argued that the sort of interpersonal sacrifice that utilitarianism requires violates the strains of commitment in a well-ordered society. And Bernard Williams (1973) has argued that the demandingness of utilitarianism threatens the sort of personal projects and partial relationships that help give our lives meaning. The common complaint here is that utilitarianism's demands threaten to offend against a requirement of *psychological realism*, according to which the demands of an acceptable moral theory must be ones that can be incorporated into a reasonable and satisfying life plan.

This worry about the demands of utilitarianism is not easy to assess. One might wonder how to interpret and whether to accept the psychological realist constraint. If the constraint is relative to people's actual psychologies, then it represents a potentially conservative constraint on moral theorizing that one might well reject. If the constraint is relative to possible or ideal psychology,

then it is not clear that even a highly revisionary moral theory need flout the constraint. Then there is a question about how demanding or revisionary utilitarianism actually is. Mill and Sidgwick thought that our knowledge of others and our causal powers to do good were limited to those near and dear and other associates with whom we have regular contact, with the result that as individuals we do better overall by focusing our energies and actions on associates of one kind or another, rather than the world at large (*U* II 19; Sidgwick, *Methods* 361–69). On this view, utilitarianism can accommodate the sort of special obligations and personal concerns to which the critics of utilitarianism appeal. But it is arguable that even if this sort of utilitarian accommodation was tenable in nineteenth century Britain, technological development and globalization have rendered utilitarian demands more revisionary. Our information about others and our causal reach are not limited as they once were. Given the high benefit-to-cost ratio of many modern relief agencies, it is hard to resist something like Singer's conclusions about the reformist demands of utilitarianism. So even if Mill was right to think that the motivational demands of utilitarianism were not so different from those of other moral theories at the time he wrote, that claim might need to be reassessed today.

## **MORAL PRINCIPLES: THEIR JUSTIFICATION**

The problem of how, if at all, we could set about justifying assertions about what we ought to do in various practical situations is one that has been the major concern of moral philosophers. Such basic questions are indeed endemic in most branches of philosophy. We ask not only if we can ever know what we ought to do but whether we can justify our claims to knowledge of an external world, how we can know the truth of statements about the past, or whether we can ever be sure of the existence of minds other than our own. But in ethics the problem seems more recalcitrant and, indeed, to many nonphilosophers at least, more real. For while skepticism about the existence of an external world or of other minds may seem difficult to refute, to most it is impossible to embrace, whereas skepticism about the possibility of claiming knowledge of any objective truths about what we ought to do is not so rare, either among men in general or those who would wish to characterize themselves as philosophers.

It is not, of course, surprising that this should be so. Ethical attitudes vary much more, from society to society and even between individuals, than do our beliefs about the external world or other people's feelings. The patent fact of ethical disagreement forces us to reexamine the bases of our moral beliefs. Furthermore, the disagreements we encounter concerning moral issues often seem to involve deep matters of principle that leave no common ground between the disputants. This is sometimes referred to as the problem of disagreement about ultimate moral principles. It is this problem—whether ultimate moral principles are susceptible of rational justification—that will be examined in this article.

Most philosophers would agree that the particular way in which a philosophical problem is formulated will make a great deal of difference to what solution is possible to it or, indeed, whether any solution is possible. It will be necessary therefore to set out in detail what is meant by a disagreement about ultimate moral principles and to defend this way of expressing the issue against certain objections before a possible solution is set out.

### **Moral Principles**

A "man of principle" is sometimes thought of, with distaste, as a man who acts in accordance with a fixed set of rules, ignoring the complexities of the situation and failing to adapt his behavior to changing circumstances. The morality of principles and rules is sometimes contrasted with the

morality of sensibility, which emphasizes such virtues as sympathy and integrity as against a rigid code of behavior. In either kind of morality, however, particular judgments will have to be made, based on a view of the situation in which the agent acts, and some factors in the situation will have to be regarded as reasons for acting in one way rather than another. There is, therefore, a more general sense of "moral principle," which can be regarded as common to both views, in which a moral principle indicates some factor that is generally relevant to what ought to be done.

Moral principles can then be regarded as statements picking out those factors of situations that can be appealed to as moral reasons. "Lying is wrong" suggests that the fact that a statement is known to be false is a reason for not making it to someone. "Adultery is wrong" suggests that the fact that someone is married is a reason for his refraining from sexual intercourse with any person who is not his spouse. And, again, "One ought to be kind" suggests that there are reasons for performing kind actions rather than unkind ones. Asserting a moral principle of this kind and denying the suggestion about reasons results in paradox. Thus, for example, if somebody says "Lying is wrong, but the fact that a statement constitutes a lie is no reason whatsoever for not making it," he seems to have taken back in the second half of his sentence what he asserted in the first.

If saying that someone ought to do something commits one to claiming that there is some fact in the situation that is a reason for doing the thing in question, then this reason must be subject to the requirement that reasons in general must satisfy: that anything that is a reason in any one case must be a reason in every case unless there are other special reasons for ignoring it. This applies to reasons generally, not just to moral reasons. For example, if the fact that it is raining is a reason for saying Smith will get wet, it is a reason for saying anyone else will unless there are some relevant differences in their cases, such as being indoors or carrying an umbrella. It is this that leads to the claim that moral principles must be universal, at least to the degree that they pick out factors that are universally relevant to what we ought to do, although not necessarily universally determining what we ought to do in every particular case. Thus it would seem that the correctness of the universal moral principle involved—or, in other words, that what is appealed to as a reason should indeed be a reason—is a necessary although not a sufficient condition of the correctness of the particular judgment about what ought to be done.

### **Justification of moral judgments**

If the correctness of universal moral principles is a condition of the correctness of particular moral judgments, then obviously the first question we must ask in investigating how our particular moral judgments can be justified is, How can we justify claiming that certain moral principles are correct? There are, however, some objections to this way of treating the problem that must be considered.

It may be pointed out that value judgments in other areas do not seem to require justification by reference to some universally relevant factors. And if we are willing to allow that in other realms of value there are judgments that do not require to be backed by universal principles, why not in morals? For example, there are very considerable difficulties in representing judgments about the value of a work of art as being backed by or dependent on principles at all. It may be impossible, when we say some work of art is good, to indicate any feature the possession of which is bound to make any other work of art good. (One might be tempted to say that beauty is such a feature. But this is unconvincing because one is using the term either narrowly, in which case there are plenty of good works of art that one would never describe as beautiful, or so widely that it means only "good

in the way that a work of art is good.") Surely, however, it must be agreed that the goodness of anything, including a work of art, depends on what qualities it has, however difficult it may be to say in a given case precisely what qualities it has that make it good. And in order to begin to justify the judgment that something is good, one must refer to its qualities; one cannot draw anyone's attention to the goodness itself. If it is proper to refer to these qualities to back one's claim that the object is good, then it is at least to the point to ask why something else, which has the same qualities, is not good. If such a question is to the point, it shows that we accept that the possession of certain qualities is being put forward as a general reason for saying that the object is good.

Even if this is correct, however, it is clear that the features by virtue of which any given work of art is judged to be good tend to be many, complicated, and organically related. Although any feature pointed to in support of a judgment that a work of art is good must also be relevant to the criticism of other works of art, there may be in every other case many other relevant factors that alter the situation completely. The same thing might be claimed for moral cases. It may be said that every human situation is infinitely complicated, so that however many relevant features one may pick out in a particular case, there will always be a host of others that can be set against them. Such considerations would lead not so much to a denial of the universality of morally relevant features as to doubt about the utility of stating the problem in terms of principles. To this there are two answers.

First, it would be against common sense to claim, for example, that the wanton murder of children is not wrong. Even where other features that are regarded as morally relevant are also present—such as that one had promised one's old mother on her deathbed to try to exterminate the Jews—few would regard them as justifying child murder. So anyone who persists in claiming that it is always possible that such actions as child murder may be justified because of the complex character of every particular human situation is, at best, someone who has an unusual moral outlook, and this means that his very claim that every situation is so complicated that no general principles can be admitted is dependent on his having a different set of moral principles from most people's. So even to consider whether this objection is correct, we still have to ask which general principles are justifiable.

Second, we have already remarked that moral principles will be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the correctness of our particular moral judgments. Although on their own they may never be sufficient to solving all moral problems, they will certainly be necessary to our having any moral problems at all. This may be illustrated in terms of a case mentioned by Jean-Paul Sartre. A young man has a dilemma. Should he join the French Resistance, or should he stay at home and look after his aging mother? Sartre points out that no rehearsal of general principles would ever serve to solve such a problem. This is no doubt true, but it does not show that the correctness of such principles is not relevant. For why is the young man worried about only those two possibilities? There are plenty of other things he could do. He could learn tightrope walking or set up as an ice-cream vendor or enlarge his earlobes with brass rings. But these are obviously of no importance, whereas looking after the old mother and joining the resistance are important. Why is Sartre's case serious and dramatic and the other suggestions frivolous and silly? Why does it matter what the young man does, to himself or to anyone? There can surely be no problem at all unless such things as joining the resistance (defending one's country) or looking after the old mother (kindness to a dependent) are morally relevant features of the situation—unless they are things that it is reasonable to consider in deciding what to do. And if there are morally relevant

features in the situation, there are corresponding moral principles. If these principles are not correct (and, indeed, there are those who would question patriotic principles), then there is no problem, or at least not the same problem.

A different kind of objection can be disposed of very briefly. It is that as a matter of experience, we do not think in terms of principles. Rather, on particular occasions we simply know instinctively what is right. Now this may very well be true or perhaps true for a number of people. However, the question at issue is not a psychological one about the kind of process that goes on before a moral judgment is made; it is a philosophical one about how we may justify making the moral judgments we do make, by whatever psychological process we make them. Whatever goes on in the heads of mathematicians, it is still Euclid's proofs alone that can justify Euclid's theorems.

### **Ultimate Moral Principles**

Moral principles in the sense adumbrated above will be of varying degrees of generality, and some will be held to be more fundamental than others. For example, the principle that one ought not to commit adultery may be defended on the ground that adultery is inimical to the stability of the family. In terms of reasons for acting, this can be put as follows. The fact that someone is married is held to be a reason for his refraining from sexual intercourse with anyone other than his spouse. But why is this a reason? Because, it might be said, *in fact* sexual infidelity is apt to break up the unity of the family. Such an argument would, of course, presuppose that the fact that something is apt to disrupt the family is a reason for avoiding it or, in other words, that one ought not to disrupt the family. Thus the principle "One ought not to commit adultery" would be regarded as less fundamental than the principle "One ought not to disrupt the unity of the family." In the process of trying to justify particular moral judgments, we will usually find ourselves trying to show that certain necessary conditions of their correctness, our moral principles, have further necessary conditions in terms of more fundamental moral principles. The process will usually be much more complicated than I have represented it; in justifying a less fundamental moral principle, we will usually find a variety of more fundamental moral principles coming into play. But however complicated such a process may be, it is obvious that we cannot suppose it to go on forever. At some point we should reach some principles that we regard as the most fundamental. For example, we might want to say that we do not claim that one ought to be kind because this follows from some further principle; we ought to be kind because we ought, and that is an end to the matter. These we may call ultimate moral principles, and their correctness is a necessary condition of the correctness of all other moral judgments. Unless some such ultimate moral principles can be shown to be justifiable, no other moral judgments can be shown to be justifiable.

Some philosophers hold that this representation of the matter is utterly mistaken and, indeed, that it is precisely because of this "justificationist" view that so many philosophers despair of finding an answer and become ethical skeptics. If, it is argued, moral principles are regarded not as first premises from which a moral system is deduced but as conjectures that can be altered and amended by subsequent moral experience, we at least have a method of correcting our moral attitudes that will justify us in claiming that they are more or less rationally defensible. It will not be possible to do this view justice in a small space. It can only be said here that the major difficulty with this view is that the test of the moral principle is taken to be the particular judgments we are inclined to make, particular judgments that conflict with the supposed principle and thus refute it. But what is now the test of the correctness of the particular judgment? The suggested method would seem to be a way of finding out, by examining someone's particular judgments, what his moral principles are rather than a way of finding out which moral principles are correct.

Furthermore, it has not been claimed in this article that moral principles are first premises from which whole moral systems can be deduced but only that moral principles are statements of relevant moral factors. Their correctness is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of the correctness of moral judgments.

Nevertheless, the charge is certainly well founded that this way of setting out the problem is a most plausible invitation to ethical skepticism. For it would on the face of it appear that the very statement of the problem precludes its solution. If we look on more and more general moral principles as representing a regress of necessary conditions of the correctness of moral judgments, then either this regress is viciously infinite or there is a point at which it must stop. But any attempt to justify some principle as a stopping point would appear to start the whole process off again. To acquiesce in some stopping point would be to accept an ultimate principle and, it would seem, to accept that nothing further could be said in its justification. It looks then as if this way of putting the problem makes inevitable the conclusion that ultimate principles are unjustifiable.

### **Autonomy and Objectivity of Moral Principles**

One way to put the problem is to regard it as a conflict between the autonomy and the objectivity of moral principles. The demand that ethics be regarded as autonomous originated with Immanuel Kant, in the view that an action is not moral unless it is determined by the agent's rational will rather than by something external to that will, such as a desire, or the will of another (a king, a friend, the state, God). Here the concern is with the determination of action, not directly with the determination or, rather, justification of moral judgment. The autonomy of moral principles, with which we are concerned, is not, however, entirely unconnected with Kant's sense of autonomy. It is the idea that a moral judgment can never depend for its correctness entirely on factors that are nonmoral; that is, that in the justification of any moral judgment one must have recourse to a moral principle, which must in turn be justified in terms of some more general moral principle and so on. In other words, a moral judgment or principle is never deducible from any set of premises that contain no moral judgment or principle.

The demand that morality be regarded as objective was also emphasized by Kant. A moral act for Kant was one that could be willed by an autonomous, rational will; its character as a moral act depended not on the particular nature or desires of the willing agent but on the nature of a rational will as such. For Kant a maxim is objective when it is valid for any rational being. Again, Kant's concern was with the determination of action rather than the justification of judgment. But once again our sense of objectivity is not unconnected with Kant's. When someone's judgment is stigmatized as subjective rather than objective, this means that some idiosyncratic factors such as the hopes and fears or special interests of the speaker have affected his judgment; an objective judgment, however, is one not affected by such idiosyncratic factors but one that any reasonable and unbiased person would form in the circumstances. Obviously, we can speak of objective matters only in respect of matters that are publicly determinable, where we can talk of what would be judged by any reasonable and careful observer rather than what appears to be the case to some individual because of some peculiarities of his own. Thus, we might say with Kant that objectively true judgments are those that are "valid for all rational beings" rather than what merely seems to be so to certain individuals. The demand of objectivity in ethics may then be put at its most minimal as the demand that the truth of any moral judgment shall not depend on the peculiarities of the person making it but, rather, that it shall be determinable by any rational observer who is apprised of the facts. Its truth will not depend on the fact that it is judged so by some one person

rather than another but on objective considerations.

The conflict between the demands of objectivity and autonomy is now not difficult to see. For how can ultimate principles, which cannot be based on any further considerations, be based on objective considerations? How can we claim that they are matters that are publicly determinable when it would seem that, if they were autonomous, no considerations beyond themselves would make their truth determinable at all?

Henry Sidgwick, impressed by the utilitarian moral system but despairing of the kinds of argument put forward by earlier utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill to justify their ultimate principle, substituted instead the doctrine of intuition, a doctrine that was accepted by many other philosophers who were very far from being utilitarians. It was thought that the problem of justification in ethics was parallel to similar problems in other fields of knowledge and that in each case one would find oneself with incorrigible starting points, truths known directly, without inference or the necessity or possibility of further justification. Thus, in our knowledge of the world we might be thought to begin with direct awareness of our experience; in mathematics, with the direct perception of mathematical relationships. In ethics we begin simply with the perception of universal ethical relationships, between what is right or fitting and certain states of affairs. Whatever the difficulties in this general epistemological theory, in ethics there is the additional difficulty that the commonsense roots of the problem of justification—the inescapable fact of disagreement on fundamental ethical matters—are untouched by the doctrine of intuitionism. The appeal to intuition in the face of this disagreement leaves no way of rationally resolving it.

## **Transcendental Arguments**

It is possible, however, that an account of the justification of ultimate principles can be given that avoids both an infinite regress of justifying principles and any arbitrary stopping point. Kant's demands for autonomy and objectivity amount to the requirement that a morally good action be rationally chosen in accord with a law that is valid for all rational beings universally and that is determined by nothing beyond itself. The difficulties in making the demands of autonomy and objectivity compatible, so that this requirement becomes a feasible one, seem capable of only one kind of solution, which was the one adopted by Kant. If moral principles cannot be justified by considerations outside themselves yet must be regarded as objectively justifiable, then it seems that certain moral principles must somehow be demanded by the formal character of morality itself; certain rules must be required by any morality that is to satisfy the two demands.

Kant's particular solution has not seemed very satisfactory, but if a solution is to be found at all, it must be in the same direction. To put the point in more contemporary language, the only kind of solution that seems possible is one that shows that certain moral principles must be regarded as correct if moral discourse is to be possible at all, at least as an autonomous and objective form of practical discourse. An argument to this effect may be called a transcendental argument. If such arguments can be constructed, it should be easy to see how they solve the problem we have been considering. For a principle can be shown to be objectively true, without appealing to factors outside itself, if it can be shown that the form of discourse of which the principle is an example is impossible without presupposing the principle. That is, by showing that no one can claim to be using a form of autonomous, practical, and objective discourse unless he at the same time accepts the principle in question.

Three arguments of this kind can be advanced to establish three ultimate principles, which we may call the principles of impartiality, rational benevolence, and liberty. It is important that throughout it should be borne in mind that these arguments are intended to establish ultimate principles—that is, factors of the most general moral relevance, which will be necessary, but by no means sufficient, to establishing any correct moral theories, rules, or particular judgments. Even given that these arguments establish the ultimate principles of impartiality, rational benevolence, and liberty, there will still remain the difficult problem of their application in practice.

## **Impartiality**

As far as we are concerned with a form of discourse in which we objectively judge actions right or wrong, so that a correct practical judgment is one that could in principle be reached by anybody, such judgments must be made in terms of features that the actions or the situations in which they are done possess and not on any other factors arbitrarily introduced by the person making the judgment. Thus, any feature picked out as relevant must be one that is always relevant unless there is some special explanation, for a feature that is relevant in one case and not in another, where there is no further difference, is one that is not relevant at all in any ordinary sense and forms no guide to action. It follows that any action that it is right or wrong for one person to do is right or wrong for every person to do unless there are some special factors present in the other cases. And from this demand of universality it follows, insofar as morality is practical, that one ought to act in accordance with it: What anyone ought to do in any given set of circumstances is what anyone else ought to do, as long as his case is not relevantly different, and anything one ought to do on any given occasion is what one ought to do on every occasion unless again there are factors present that are relevantly different. That one ought to treat similar cases similarly is obviously a general case of the particular requirement of justice toward men, that any form of treatment that is thought to be right for one man must be right for all others, unless the others are significantly different.

## **Rational benevolence**

The principle of rational benevolence is that stated by Sidgwick, that one ought in action to consider the interests of all beings in the universe. That this is a most impractical injunction is important, but not fatal, for how in practical situations we may apply any ultimate principle is another, though admittedly difficult, question.

The principle may be justified as follows. The demand of objectivity is that what is right or wrong should be determinable at least in principle by all rational beings. This requires that moral discourse should be a form of public discourse, in which the relevance and force of any consideration is dependent on its content and not on the will or status of whoever puts it forward. That is, the remark of any rational being may be relevant to the question whether some action is right or wrong. The ideal of this form of discourse therefore requires that it should be possible for any rational being to participate in it as an interlocutor; if any is excluded arbitrarily then all may be, and the form of discourse as a public institution would be impossible. This does not mean that other forms of discourse may not be constructed in which certain possible interlocutors are excluded by fiat, but this would not then be the fully rational, autonomous, and objective form of discourse we require. A parallel may be found in scientific discourse. As far as it is objective, considerations must be dealt with on their merits and not in terms of the will or status of whoever puts them forward. If any arbitrary exclusion of possible interlocutors is made, then we do not have public objective scientific discourse but a sort of game in which arbitrarily selected players alone are entitled to make certain moves and in which what is determined in the outcome is who

has won rather than what is true.

If moral discourse is to be public and objective, then it must allow for the participation of any possible rational interlocutor. Now let us define an interest as that which any rational being should seek for himself insofar as he considers the effects of his actions on himself and not on others except insofar as what affects others also affects him (for example, if it is rational for anyone to avoid pain, then it is in my interest to seek those actions that avoid pain to myself but not necessarily those that avoid pain to others except insofar as the pain of others causes pain to me or prevents my achieving some other end that it would be rational for me to choose for myself). Now it is by definition necessary that every rational being should seek his own interests as far as possible. It would be irrational for any being to participate in a form of discourse the practical effect of which would be to deny his interests; hence, it would be irrational for anyone to adopt moral discourse without further justification if from the beginning his interests were to be ruled out. But this means that anyone who wishes to adopt moral discourse must allow that any possible interlocutor must not have his interests ruled out of consideration from the beginning, and any rational being is in principle a possible interlocutor. It follows that as far as public objective moral discourse is to be possible, it is presupposed that what is determined by such means will not neglect the interests of any rational being—that is, that in deciding what I ought to do, or what anyone ought to do, the interests of all rational beings whatsoever must be taken into account.

### **liberty**

The principle of liberty is that one ought not to interfere, without special justification, in the chosen course of any rational being or impose on any rational being conditions that will prevent him from pursuing his chosen courses of action. Moral discourse is a form of discourse in which we try to guide action rationally. We try to determine action on the basis of a rational consideration of the nature of the action and its context, not by some other means such as violence. Any interference with the chosen course of a rational being is a determination of his action by force or at least a limit imposed by force on the extent to which his actions may be rationally determined. Such interference must then be presupposed as absent in public objective practical discourse in which action is determined by reason, and hence in using such discourse, in participating in it as an institution, one is presupposing that one ought not to interfere by force, but only by rational persuasion, in the chosen course of any rational being.

The arguments given for these three principles are very much oversimplified, and it could not be claimed that they have the force of demonstrations. But enough has been said to show that the type of argument they represent is at least a possible one and hence that the apparent conflict between autonomy and objectivity is not a real one and that the problem of the justification of ultimate principles may not be insoluble.

### **Completeness and application of principles**

Two important problems remain. The first we may deal with briefly. It is one that was very important to Kant, with regard to both theoretical and practical principles. How can we be sure that we have achieved completeness in any list of principles? If ultimate principles can be established only by transcendental arguments, we have at least some clue to the answer to this problem; for the rest it might be argued that the problem is not so urgent as some have thought.

A transcendental argument is one that depends on an account of what is necessary to a given

form of discourse; in ethics we are concerned with what is necessary to a form of discourse that is practical, universal, objective, and autonomous. We are, that is, dependent on a consideration of the formal characteristics of the form of discourse. This gives at least some negative criterion for deciding what principles may be justified as ultimate. Thus, it would be most implausible to suggest, for example, that "One ought not to drink alcoholic liquor on Sundays" could be justified as an ultimate moral principle. For it is reasonably obvious that no direct connection could be established between the purely formal characteristics of any form of discourse and such particular matters as are picked out by the concepts of the principle in question. Such a principle would have to be, if justifiable at all, one that would depend on matters beyond the purely formal characteristics of practical reason. It is always possible, however, though in this case surely a fantastic suggestion, that someone with sufficient ingenuity might show that some apparently low-level principle is in fact justifiable as an ultimate one by a transcendental argument. And this may disturb us, for how can we be sure that we are not failing to take account of such principles all the time? We should not, however, be much disturbed, for two reasons. First, if a principle is a necessary condition of the possibility of moral discourse, one would expect to find it as a pervasive explicit or implicit principle of most moral codes (allowing for the resources of human confusion), and this is true for the three principles— justice, benevolence, and liberty—we have mentioned. Second, when it is suggested that there is a reason for acting in one way rather than another, the suggestion requires justification, in the absence of which the suggestion may be reasonably ignored. The onus of proof is on anyone who suggests that a certain principle is correct; until such proof is at least suggested, the fear that there may be quite unknown principles, which are not generally accepted but which could, with sufficient ingenuity, be justified transcendently, is an idle one.

The second difficulty that we face at this point is of the utmost importance; indeed, one might fairly say that out of it all the really important and difficult questions of substance in ethics arise. It is the problem of the application of these principles to particular situations, both in themselves and in relation to one another. Unless it is possible to show that these principles can be rationally applied, then no amount of rational demonstration of the ultimate principles will enable us to show that the particular moral judgments we make can be rationally justified.

## **Types of utilitarianism**

Theories of right and wrong have to be about something, that is, have to have a focus. Usually, at least in recent centuries, they have focused on actions, attempting to answer the questions, 'Which actions are right?', and, 'What makes those actions right?'. The ancients also asked these questions, but were concerned also to focus on lives, characters, dispositions and virtues. Nearly all forms of utilitarianism have focused on actions, but in recent decades there has been some interest in utilitarianism as applied to motives, virtues and lives as a whole.

Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. But it is important to note that, since utilitarians can attach intrinsic moral importance to acts (especially, of course, the act of maximizing itself), there are problems in attempting to capture the nature of utilitarianism using the act/consequence distinction. A recent alternative has been to employ the 'agent-neutral'/'agent-relative' distinction. Agent-neutral theories give every agent the same aim (for example, that utility be maximized), whereas agent-relative theories give agents different aims (say, that *your* children be looked after). Logically, however, there is nothing to prevent a utilitarian's insisting that *your* aim should be that *you* maximize utility. Though this theory would be practically equivalent to an agent-neutral theory, its possibility suggests there may be problems with attempting to use the agent-

neutral/agent-relative distinction to capture the essence of utilitarianism.

What clearly distinguishes utilitarianism from other moral theories is what it requires and why, so we should now turn to that. The commonest, and most straightforward, version of utilitarianism is *act-utilitarianism*, according to which the criterion of an action's rightness is that it maximize utility. Act-utilitarians might offer two accounts of rightness. The objectively right action would be that which actually does maximize utility, while the subjectively right action would be that which maximizes expected utility. Agents would usually be blamed for not doing what was subjectively right.

Another distinction is between *total* and *average* forms. According to the total view, the right act is the one that produces the largest overall total of utility. The average view says that the right action is that which maximizes the average level of utility in a population. The theories are inconsistent only in cases in which the size of a population is under consideration. The most common such case occurs when one is thinking of having a child. Here, the average view has the absurd conclusion that I should not have a child, even if its life will be wonderful and there will be no detrimental effects from its existence, if its welfare will be lower than the existing average.

But the total view also runs into problems, most famously with Derek Parfit's 'repugnant conclusion' (1984), which commits the total view to the notion that if a population of people with lives barely worth living is large enough it is preferable to a smaller population with very good lives. One way out of this problem is to adopt a *person-affecting* version of utilitarianism, which restricts itself in scope to existing people. But there are problems with this view. Recently, certain writers have suggested that one way to avoid the 'repugnant conclusion' would be to argue that there are *discontinuities* in value, such that once welfare drops below a certain level the loss cannot be compensated for by quantity. There is a link here with Mill's view of the relation of higher pleasures to lower.

Imagine being an act-utilitarian, brought up in an entirely act-utilitarian society. You will have to spend much time calculating the utility values of the various actions open to you. You are quite likely to make mistakes, and, being human, to cook the books in your own favour.

For these reasons, most act-utilitarians have argued that we should not attempt to put act-utilitarianism into practice wholesale, but stick by a lot of common sense morality (see Common-sense ethics). It will save a lot of valuable time, is based on long experience, and will keep us on the straight and narrow. Act-utilitarians who recommend sole and constant application of their theory as well as those who recommend that we never consult the theory and use common sense morality can both be called *single-level* theorists, since moral thinking will be carried on only at one level. Most utilitarians have adopted a *two-level* theory, according to which we consult utilitarianism only sometimes – in particular when the principles of ordinary morality conflict with one another.

The main problem with two-level views is their psychology. If I really accept utilitarianism, how can I abide by a common sense morality I know to be a fiction? And if I really do take that common sense morality seriously, how can I just forget it when I am supposed to think as a utilitarian? The two-level response here must be that this is indeed a messy compromise, but one made to deal with a messy reality.

Act-utilitarianism is an extremely demanding theory, since it requires you to be entirely impartial between your own interests, the interests of those you love, and the interests of all. The usual example offered is famine relief. By giving up all your time, money and energy to famine relief, you will save many lives and prevent much suffering. Utilitarians often claim at this point that there are limits to human capabilities, and utilitarianism requires us only to do what we can. But the sense of 'can' here is quite obscure, since in any ordinary sense I can give up my job and spend my life campaigning for Oxfam.

The demandingness objection seems particularly serious when taken in the context of widespread non-compliance with the demands of act-utilitarian morality. Most people do little or nothing for the developing world, and this is why the moral demands on me are so great. An argument such as this has been used to advocate *rule-utilitarianism*, according to which the right action is that which is in accord with that set of rules which, if generally or universally accepted, would maximize utility. (The version of the theory which speaks of the rules that are *obeyed* is likely to collapse into act-utilitarianism; see Lyons 1965.)

Unlike act-utilitarianism, which is a *direct* theory in that the rightness and wrongness of acts depends directly on whether they fit with the maximizing principle, rule-utilitarianism is an *indirect* theory, since rightness and wrongness depend on rules, the justification for which itself rests on the utilitarian principle.

The demandingness of act-utilitarianism has not been the main reason for adopting rule-utilitarianism. Rather, the latter theory has been thought to provide support for common sense moral principles, such as those speaking against killing or lying, which appear plausible in their own right.

Rule-utilitarianism has not received as much attention as act-utilitarianism, partly because it detaches itself from the attractiveness of maximization. According to rule-utilitarianism there may be times when the right action is to bring about less than the best possible world (such as when others are not complying). But if maximization is reasonable at the level of rules, why does it not apply straightforwardly to acts?

## **Moral theories of Bentham**

At the outset of the nineteenth century, an influential group of British thinkers developed a set of basic principles for addressing social problems. Extrapolating from Hume's emphasis on the natural human interest in utility, reformer Jeremy Bentham proposed a straightforward quantification of morality by reference to utilitarian outcomes. His *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) offers a simple statement of the application of this ethical doctrine.

Bentham's moral theory was founded on the assumption that it is the consequences of human actions that count in evaluating their merit and that the kind of consequence that matters for human happiness is just the achievement of pleasure and avoidance of pain. He argued that the hedonistic value of any human action is easily calculated by considering how intensely its pleasure is felt, how long that pleasure lasts, how certainly and how quickly it follows upon the performance of the action, and how likely it is to produce collateral benefits and avoid collateral harms. Taking such matters into account, we arrive at a net value of each action for any human being affected by it.

All that remains, Bentham supposed, is to consider the extent of this pleasure, since the happiness of the community as a whole is nothing other than the sum of individual human interests. The principle of utility, then, defines the meaning of moral obligation by reference to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people who are affected by performance of an action. Similarly, Bentham supposed that social policies are properly evaluated in light of their effect on the general well-being of the populations they involve. Punishing criminals is an effective way of deterring crime precisely because it pointedly alters the likely outcome of their actions, attaching the likelihood of future pain in order to outweigh the apparent gain of committing the crime. Thus, punishment must "fit" the crime by changing the likely perception of the value of committing it.

## **Moral theories of J. S. Mill**

The ethical theory of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) is most extensively articulated in his classical text *Utilitarianism* (1861). Its goal is to justify the utilitarian principle as the foundation of morals. This principle says actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote overall human happiness. So, Mill focuses on consequences of actions and not on rights nor ethical sentiments.

### **Mill's Theory of Value and the Principle of Utility**

Mill defines "utilitarianism" as the creed that considers a particular "theory of life" as the "foundation of morals" (CW 10, 210). His view of theory of life was monistic: There is one thing, and one thing only, that is intrinsically desirable, namely pleasure. In contrast to a form of hedonism that conceives pleasure as a homogeneous matter, Mill was convinced that some types of pleasure are more valuable than others in virtue of their inherent qualities. For this reason, his position is often called "qualitative hedonism". Many philosophers hold that qualitative hedonism is no consistent position. Hedonism asserts that pleasure is the only intrinsic value. Under this assumption, the critics argue, there can be no evaluative basis for the distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Probably the first ones to raise this common objection were the British idealists F. H. Bradley (1876/1988) and T. H. Green (1883/2003).

Which inherent qualities make one kind of pleasure better than another, according to Mill? He declares that the more valuable pleasures are those which employ "higher faculties". The list of such better enjoyments includes "the pleasures of intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments". These enjoyments make use of highly developed capacities, like judgment and empathy. In one of his most famous sentences, Mill affirms that it "is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" (CW 10, 212). This seems to be a surprising thing to say for a hedonist. However, Mill thought that we have a solid empirical basis for this view. According to him, the best obtainable evidence for value claims consists in what all or almost all people judge as valuable across a vast variety of cases and cultures. He makes the empirical assertion that all or almost all people prefer a "manner of existence" (CW 10, 211) that employs higher faculties to a manner of existence which does not. The fact that "all or almost all" who are acquainted with pleasures that employ higher faculties agree that they are preferable to the lower ones, is empirical evidence for the claim that they are indeed of higher value. Accordingly, the best human life ("manner of existence") is one in which the higher faculties play an adequate part. This partly explains why he put such great emphasis on education.

### **1. Morality as a System of Social Rules**

The fifth and final chapter of *Utilitarianism* is of unusual importance for Mill's theory of moral

obligation. Until the 1970s, the significance of the chapter had been largely overlooked. It then became one of the bridgeheads of a revisionist interpretation of Mill, which is associated with the work of David Lyons, John Skorupski and others.

Mill worked very hard to hammer the fifth chapter into shape and his success has great meaning for him. Towards the end of the book he maintains the “considerations which have now been adduced resolve, I conceive, the only real difficulty in the utilitarian theory of morals.”

At the beginning of *Utilitarianism*, Mill postulates that moral judgments presume rules. In contrast to Kant who grounds his ethical theory on *self-imposed* rules, so-called maxims, Mill thinks that morality builds on *social* rules. But what makes *social* rules *moral* rules? Mill’s answer is based on a thesis about how competent speakers use the phrase “morally right” or “morally wrong”. He maintains that we name a type of action morally wrong if we think that it should be sanctioned either through formal punishment, public disapproval (external sanctions) or through a bad conscience (internal sanctions). This is the critical difference between “morality and simple expediency” (CW 10, 246). Wrong or inexpedient actions are those that we cannot recommend to a person, like harming oneself. But in contrast to immoral actions, inexpedient actions are not worthy of being sanctioned.

Mill differentiates various spheres of action. In his *System of Logic* he names morality, prudence and aesthetics as the three departments of the “Art of Life” (CW 8, 949). The principle of utility governs not only morality, but also prudence and taste (CW 8, 951). It is not a moral principle but a meta-principle of practical reason.

There is a field of action in which moral rules obtain, and a “person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill” them (CW 10, 246). But there are also fields of action, in which sanctions for wrong behavior would be inappropriate. One of them is the sphere of self-regarding acts with which Mill deals in *On Liberty*. In this private sphere we can act at our convenience and indulge in inexpedient and utterly useless behavior as long as we do not harm others.

It is fundamental to keep in mind that Mill looks into morality as a social practice and not as autonomous self-determination by reason, like Kant. For Kantians, moral deliberation determines those actions which we have the most reason to perform. Mill disagrees; for him, it makes sense to say that “A is the right thing to do for Jeremy, but Jeremy is not morally obliged to do A.” For instance, even if Jeremy is capable of writing a brilliant book that would improve the life of millions (and deteriorate none), he is not morally obliged to do so. According to Mill, our moral obligations result from the *justified* part of the moral code of our society; and the task of moral philosophy consists in bringing the moral code of a society in better accordance with the principle of utility.

## **2. The Role of Moral Rules (Secondary Principles)**

In *Utilitarianism*, Mill designs the following model of moral deliberation. In the *first step* the actor should examine which of the rules (secondary principles) in the moral code of his or her society are pertinent in the given situation. If in a given situation moral rules (secondary principles) conflict, then (and only then) can the *second step* invoke the formula of utility (CW 10, 226) as a first principle. Pointedly one could say: the principle of utility is for Mill not a *component* of morality, but instead its *basis*. It serves the validation of rightness for our moral system and allows – as a meta-rule – the decision of conflicting norms. In the introductory chapter of *Utilitarianism*, Mill maintains that it would be “easy to show that whatever steadiness or

consistency these moral beliefs have attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognized" (CW 10, 207), namely the principle of utility. The tacit influence of the principle of utility made sure that a considerable part of the moral code of our society is justified (promotes general well-being). But other parts are clearly unjustified. One case that worried Mill deeply was the role of women in Victorian Britain. In "The Subjection of Women" (1869) he criticizes the "legal subordination of one sex to the other" (CW 21, 261) as incompatible with "all the principles involved in modern society".

Moral rules are also critical for Mill because he takes human action in essence as to be guided by dispositions. A virtuous person has the disposition to follow moral rules. In his early essay "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy" (1833) he asserts that a "man is not really virtuous", unless the mere thought of committing certain acts is so painful that he does not even consider the possibility that they may have good consequences. He repeats this point in his *System of Logic* (1843) and *Utilitarianism*:

[T]he mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love virtue in this manner – as a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual instance, it should not produce those other desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of which it is held to be virtue.

It is one thing to say that it could have optimal consequences (and thus be objectively better) to break a moral rule in a concrete singular case. Another is the question as to whether it would facilitate happiness to educate humans such that they would have the disposition to maximize situational utility. Mill answers the latter in the negative. Again, the upshot is that education matters. Humans are guided by acquired dispositions. This makes moral degeneration, but also moral progress possible.

### **Henry Sidgwick's *The Methods of Ethics***

Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) was an English philosopher who taught at Trinity College, Cambridge from 1859-1900. His writings included *The Methods of Ethics* (1874) and *Principles of Political Economy* (1883).

*The Methods of Ethics* defines three basic methods of ethics: (1) egoistic hedonism, (2) intuitionism, and (3) universalistic hedonism. The analysis of these methods attempts to determine the extent to which they are compatible or incompatible. Sidgwick describes how each method may provide its own definition of the ultimate goal of ethical conduct. Thus, for egoistic hedonism, the private happiness of each individual is the ultimate good. For intuitionism, moral virtue or perfection is the ultimate good. For universalistic hedonism, the general happiness of all individuals is the ultimate good. Sidgwick describes how each of these methods defines rational principles of conduct, and how they each interpret moral duty differently.

Methods of ethics are rational procedures that enable us to determine what we should voluntarily do (or what it is right for us to do) in a particular situation. Ethics is a study of the principles that govern right action or conduct. It is different from politics, because it is concerned with what is right for each individual, while politics is concerned with what is right for society. It is also a philosophical rather than a scientific inquiry, because it is mainly concerned with what *ought* to be, rather than with what *is*. However, judgments about what *ought* to happen in a particular situation often depend upon judgments about what actually *is* happening in that situation, and thus ethical

judgments often depend upon scientific judgments.

Psychological hedonism should be distinguished from ethical hedonism, says Sidgwick. Psychological hedonism affirms that the motives of human action are to be found in the pursuit of pleasure or in the avoidance of pain. Ethical hedonism, on the other hand, asserts that actions are good insofar as they produce pleasure or prevent pain. Psychological hedonism is a theory of psychological motivation, while ethical hedonism is a theory of ethical conduct. Psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism may be combined or separated as methods of defining the ultimate goal of moral conduct.

Ethical hedonism may be divided into egoistic hedonism (including Epicureanism) and universalistic hedonism (including utilitarianism). While egoistic hedonism affirms that each individual should aim to promote his/her own private happiness, universalistic hedonism affirms that each individual should aim to promote the happiness of all individuals.

Egoistic and universalistic principles may be combined in ethical hedonism, because individuals may rightly or wrongly believe that promoting their own private happiness will promote the general happiness of all individuals. However, the egoistic principle that the private happiness of each individual is more important than the general happiness of all individuals may conflict with the universalistic principle that an individual should sacrifice some of his/her own happiness for the sake of the happiness of other individuals. The egoist may consider his own private happiness to be the ultimate good, but the universalist (or utilitarian) may consider the general happiness of all individuals to be the ultimate good.

Ethical intuitionism affirms that proper conduct is defined by rules or principles that may be known intuitively. It affirms that the rightness or wrongness of actions may be known intuitively, even if the consequences of those actions have not been determined.

Ethical intuitionism, according to Sidgwick, may be divided into three phases: (1) perceptual, (2) dogmatic, and (3) philosophical. Perceptual intuitionism affirms that some ethical truths may be intuitively apprehended. Dogmatic intuitionism affirms that some ethical truths may be accepted without being intuitively apprehended. Philosophical intuitionism affirms that some ethical truths may be intuitively apprehended without being undeniably or absolutely self-evident.

Insofar as some actions may be judged intuitively to be right or wrong, those actions may be judged as right or wrong on the basis of their motives or other intrinsic qualities. Intuitionism affirms that some actions may be intrinsically right or wrong, regardless of their consequences. It also affirms that some actions may be judged as right or wrong, regardless of how those actions compare with actions required by moral duty.

Sidgwick defines a moral duty as a right action for which a moral motive is at least occasionally necessary.<sup>1</sup> A duty is an action that is obligatory and that is owed to someone or something. Types of moral duty include duty to one's family, duty to one's friends, duty to one's community, duty to one's country, duty to those from whom one has received help, duty to those who are in need, and duty to those who are suffering.

Sidgwick defines virtue as a praiseworthy quality that is exhibited in right conduct and that extends beyond the limits of moral duty. Practical wisdom and rational self-control are intellectual virtues,

while benevolence and common humanity are moral virtues. Justice, good faith, veracity, gratitude, generosity, courage, and humility are other moral virtues.

An important question to be considered by any method of ethics is whether some actions are intrinsically good or whether they are merely good as a means to attain an ultimate good. Another important question is whether there is a reliable way of deciding what action should be performed in a particular situation in order to achieve the ultimate goal of moral conduct. Another important question to be considered is how to determine the ultimate goal of moral conduct. Ethical hedonism defines the highest good as the greatest amount of happiness that is attainable by an individual or society. It affirms that the greatest amount of happiness that is attainable by an individual or society is equal to the sum of the greatest amount of pleasure or pain that may be produced by the actions of that individual or society. However, the quantitative method of empirical hedonism may not always be reliable in determining what action is the best means to attain an ultimate good.

Egoistic hedonism and universalistic hedonism may be described as intuitive methods of ethics if they intuitively accept the principle that the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the only rational aims of human action. They may intuitively rely on psychological hedonism as a theory of motivation, but they do not necessarily have to rely on it, and they may also disagree with the intuitionist principle that the rightness or wrongness of some actions does not depend on the consequences of those actions.

Sidgwick explains that universalistic hedonism should be clearly distinguished from egoistic hedonism. Universalistic hedonism affirms that all individuals have an equal right to be happy and that there is no individual whose happiness is more important than that of any other individual. It also affirms that the rightness or wrongness of actions depends on whether they promote universal happiness. Moral virtues such as benevolence, generosity, and good citizenship may be better promoted by universalistic hedonism than by egoistic hedonism, says Sidgwick.

However, Sidgwick admits that a problem with universalistic hedonism is that an individual may have to decide whether an action is right or wrong by estimating not only how much personal happiness will be produced by that action but also how much general happiness will be produced by that action. An individual may have to be able to compare the pleasures or pains of other individuals with his/her own pleasures or pains. Thus, an individual may have to be able to estimate the total amount of his/her own pleasure or pain, and may have to be able to estimate the total amount of the pleasure or pain that may be experienced by other individuals.

Another problem with utilitarianism is that there may be many ways of determining how the greatest possible amount of happiness should be distributed among the greatest number of individuals. There may be many ways of distributing happiness among all the individuals who are to benefit from a given action.

Sidgwick criticizes Kant's concept of a "categorical imperative" for being ambiguous and misleading. The categorical imperative is to "act only in such a way that you can will that the maxim of your action should become a universal law."<sup>2</sup> Sidgwick argues that the categorical imperative fails to distinguish between subjective and objective moral duty. An individual may subjectively feel that he/she is acting rightly by complying with the categorical imperative, but may objectively be wrong.

Sidgwick also criticizes Kant's concept of free will for failing to distinguish between freedom and rationality. For Kant, the moral freedom of an individual depends on the degree to which the individual is able to act rationally. If an individual is acting rationally, then he/she will act according to the categorical imperative, and the maxim of each of his/her actions will be capable of becoming a universal law of morality. However, Sidgwick argues that moral freedom is the freedom to choose between right and wrong, and that it may be the freedom to act rationally or irrationally. Thus, there may be confusion as to what constitutes "true" freedom. According to Sidgwick, Kant's interpretation of free will is ambiguous in its conclusions as to whether "rational" freedom is the same as, or different from, "moral" freedom, and this ambiguity is also present in Kant's concept of the autonomy and heteronomy of the will.

## **Theories and Kinds of Punishment**

The immediate consequence that follows a criminal act is known as punishment. Thus, punishment is defined as suffering, loss, pain, or any other penalty that is inflicted on a person for the crime by the concerned authority. There are different theories of punishment in law.

## **Theories of Punishment**



## **Theories and Kinds of Punishment**

There are different kinds of punishment that a person can face. In order to understand them, first, we need to understand the theories of the punishment. There are majorly four theories of punishment.

These theories are the deterrent theory, retributive theory, preventive theory, and reformatory theory. We will discuss these theories in length below.

## **Deterrent Theory**

The retributive theory assumes that the punishment is given only for the sake of it. Thus, it suggests that evil should be returned for evil without taking into consideration any consequences. There are two theories in which this theory can be divided further. They are specific deterrence and general deterrence.

In specific deterrence, punishment is designed such that it can educate the criminals. Thus, this can reform the criminals that are subjected to this theory. Also, it is maintained that the

punishment reforms the criminals. This is done by creating a fear that the punishment will be repeated.

While a general deterrence is designed to avoid future crime. So, this is done by making an example of each defendant. Thus, it frightens the citizens to not do what the defendant did.

### **Retributive Theory**

Retribution is the most ancient justification for punishment. This theory insists that a person deserves punishment as he has done a wrongful deed. Also, this theory signifies that no person shall be arrested unless that person has broken the law. Here are the conditions where a person is considered as an offender are:

- The penalty given will be equivalent to the grievance caused by the person.
- Performed a crime of certain culpability.
- That similar persons have been imposed for similar offenses.
- That the action performed was by him and he was only responsible for it. Also, he had full knowledge of the penalty system and possible consequences.

### **Preventive Theory**

This theory has used a restraint that an offender if repeats the criminal act is culpable for death, exile or imprisonment. The theory gets its importance from the notion that society must be protected from criminals. Thus, the punishment here is for solidarity and defense.

The modern criminologists saw the preventive theory from a different view. They first realized that the social and economic forces should be removed from society. Also, one must pay attention to individuals who show anti-social behavior. This is because of psychological and biological handicaps.

### **Reformative Theory**

Deterrence and retributive are examples of classical and non-classical philosophies. The reformative theory was born out of the positive theory that the focal point of crime is positive thinking. Thus, according to this theory, the objective of punishment needs to be reformation by the offender.

So, this is not a punishment virtually but rather a rehabilitative process. Thus, this process helps in making a criminal a good citizen as much as possible. Furthermore, it makes the citizen a meaningful citizen and an upright straight man.

### **Cognitivism**

Cognitivism is the view that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false (i.e. they are truth-apt). Thus, moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world.

A proposition in Epistemology is, roughly speaking, an assertion or a declarative sentence (as opposed to an interrogative, exclamatory or imperative sentence). Thus, an ethical statement which is a valid proposition (e.g. "Mary is a good person") is able to bear truth values, and one can say of it "that is true" or "that is false". Two people may disagree on its truth or falsity, but it

has at least the capacity for truth.

The opposite view is that of Non-Cognitivism, the view that moral statements lack truth-value and do not assert propositions.

### **Types of Cognitivism**

Moral Realist doctrines in Meta-Ethics, such as Ethical Naturalism and Ethical Non-Naturalism, implicitly assume that ethical statements are truth-apt propositions.

However, it is also possible for Moral Anti-Realist theories to accept that ethical sentences can be true or false, even if there are no natural, physical or in any way real entities or objects to make them true or false. Hilary Putnam (1926 - ) argues in his 2004 book *"Ethics without Ontology"* that ethical (and for that matter mathematical) sentences can be true and objective without there being any real world objects to make them so.

Thus, some Moral Anti-Realist theories like Ethical Subjectivism and the Error Theory variant of Moral Nihilism also assume Cognitivism.

### **Non-Cognitivism**

Non-Cognitivism is the meta-ethical view (or family of views) that moral utterances lack truth-value (i.e. they are neither true nor false) and do not assert propositions. Therefore, if moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, Non-Cognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible, and moral truths are not the kind of truths that can be known.

A proposition in Epistemology is, roughly speaking, an assertion or a declarative sentence (as opposed to an interrogative, exclamatory or imperative sentence). Thus, an ethical statement which is a valid proposition (e.g. "Mary is a good person") is able to bear truth values, and one can say of it "that is true" or "that is false". Two people may disagree on its truth or falsity, but it has at least the capacity for truth.

The opposite view to Non-Cognitivism is that of Cognitivism, that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false (i.e. they are truth-apt).

### **Arguments For and Against Non-Cognitivism**

Non-Cognitivism is largely supported by the Argument from Queerness: that ethical properties, if they existed, would be different from any other thing in the universe, since they have no observable effect on the world, and there is no way of discerning (and no actual evidence for) the existence of ethical properties. It focuses on the function of normative statements in practice, arguing that they are more likely to merely express approval or disapproval, or to exhort or persuade in a prescriptive way, than to make definitive assertions of truth or falseness. Non-Cognitivists argue that the burden of evidence is on cognitivists who want to show that in addition to expressing disapproval, for example, the claim "Killing is wrong" is also true.

One argument against Non-Cognitivism is that it ignores the external causes of emotional and prescriptive reactions (e.g. if someone says, "John is a good person," then something about John must have inspired that reaction). It is also argued that, if ethical statements do not represent cognitions (as Non-Cognitivism assumes), then how is it possible to use them as premises in an

argument, in which they follow the same rules of syllogism as true propositions (e.g. "Killing an innocent human is always wrong. All fetuses are innocent humans. Therefore, killing a fetus is always wrong")?

## Types of Non-Cognitivism

The following doctrines can be considered Non-Cognitive:

- **Emotivism:** the view, defended by A.J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson (1908 -1979) among others, that ethical sentences serve merely to express emotions of approval or disapproval, and ethical judgments are primarily expressions of one's own attitude, although to some extent they are also imperatives meant to influence or change the attitudes and actions of other listeners.
- **Prescriptivism (or Universal Prescriptivism):** the view, propounded by R.M. Hare (1919 - 2002), that moral statements function as imperatives which are universalizable (i.e. applicable to everyone in similar circumstances) e.g. "Killing is wrong" really means "Do not kill!"
- **Expressivism:** the view that the primary function of moral sentences is not to assert any matter of fact, but rather to express an evaluative attitude toward an object of evaluation. Therefore, because the function of moral language is non-descriptive, moral sentences do not have any truth conditions.
- **Quasi-Realism:** the view, developed from Expressivism and defended by Simon Blackburn (1944 - ), that ethical statements behave linguistically like factual claims, and can be appropriately called "true" or "false" even though there are no ethical facts for them to correspond to. Blackburn argues that ethics cannot be entirely realist, for this would not allow for phenomena such as the gradual development of ethical positions over time or in differing cultural traditions.
- **Projectivism:** the view that qualities can be attributed to (or "projected" on) an object as if those qualities actually belong to it. Projectivism in Ethics (originally proposed by David Hume and more recently championed by Simon Blackburn) is associated by many with Moral Relativism, and is considered controversial, even though it was philosophical orthodoxy throughout much of the 20th Century.
- **Moral Fictionalism:** the view that moral statements should not be taken to be literally true, but merely a useful fiction. This has led to charges of individuals claiming to hold attitudes that they do not really have, and therefore are in some way insincere.

## Emotivism

Emotivism is no longer a view of ethics that has many supporters. Like subjectivism it teaches that there are no objective moral facts, and that therefore 'murder is wrong' can't be objectively true.

### Emotivists teach that:

- Moral statements are meaningless.
- This means that the first half of the statement 'it was wrong to murder Fred' adds nothing to the non-moral information that Fred has been murdered.

- Moral statements only express the speaker's feelings about the issue.

**Later emotivists added this idea to Emotivism:**

- By expressing the speaker's feelings about a moral issue moral statements may influence another person's thoughts and conduct.

**Moral statements are meaningless**

In Emotivism a moral statement isn't literally a statement about the speaker's feelings on the topic, but expresses those feelings with emotive force.

When an emotivist says 'murder is wrong' it's like saying 'down with murder' or 'murder, yecch!' or just saying 'murder' while pulling a horrified face, or making a thumbs-down gesture at the same time as saying 'murder is wrong'.

At first sight this seems such a bizarre idea that you might wonder if anyone had ever seriously thought it. One of the great philosophers of the 20th century certainly did:

The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.'

In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks.

The tone, or the exclamation marks, adds nothing to the literal meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show that the expression of it is attended by certain feelings in the speaker.

**A J Ayer, Critique of Ethics and Theology**

The reasons why some philosophers thought this are technical - they thought that ethical statements could not be converted into statements that could be empirically tested, and thus failed the verifiability criterion of meaning - which meant that they were meaningless.

Emotivism pays close attention to the way in which people use language and acknowledges that a moral judgement expresses the attitude that a person takes on a particular issue. It's like shouting "hurray", or pulling a face and going "ugh".

That's why this theory is called Emotivism, because it's based on the emotive effect of moral language.

**Influence**

**Moral statements attempt to influence people**

Later theories of Emotivism taught that it was about more than just an expression of emotion - the speaker is also trying to have an effect on the person they're talking to.

The American philosopher C. L. Stevenson said that the major use of ethical judgements.....is not

to indicate facts, but to create an influence. Instead of merely describing people's interests, they change or intensify them.....For instance: When you tell a man that he oughtn't to steal, your object isn't merely to let him know that people disapprove of stealing. You are attempting, rather, to get him to disapprove of it. Your ethical judgment has a quasi- imperative force which, operating through suggestion, and intensified by your tone of voice, readily permits you to begin to influence, to modify, his interests...

### **Mind, 1937**

So when people disagree about an ethical issue, Emotivism makes it clear that each is trying to persuade the other to adopt their attitude and follow their recommendations as to how to behave, rather than giving information that might be true or false.

### **Emotivism versus Subjectivism**

This version of emotivism gets round one of subjectivism's biggest problems. Consider this example:

When one subjectivist says lying is bad, they're giving the information that they disapprove of lying. If another subjectivist says lying is good, they're giving the information that they approve of lying.

Since, according to the subjectivist view, both are reporting their own personal feelings, there isn't actually anything that they disagree about.

But since people do sincerely disagree about moral issues, there must be more going on than pure subjectivism allows, and this is included in Emotivism: When an Emotivist says lying is bad they're giving the instruction "don't tell lies", while an Emotivist who says lying is good is giving the instruction "do tell lies" - and we can see that there is a clear disagreement between them.

### **Bad points of Emotivism**

Emotivism has become unpopular with philosophers because the theory that led the Emotivists to think that moral statements were *meaningless* has fallen from favour.

Less technically, if expressing moral judgements is really no more than expressing one's personal opinion there doesn't seem any useful basis for arguing about moral judgements. In practical terms, Emotivism falls down because it isn't very satisfying. Even (most) philosophers think moral statements are more than just expressions of feeling.

And it's perfectly possible to imagine an ethical debate in which neither party has an emotion to express.

Non-philosophers also think there is more to ethics than just the expression of an attitude or an attempt to influence behaviour. They want a better explanation and foundation for shared standards of morality than Emotivism can provide.

### **Prescriptivism**

Prescriptivism is the attitude or belief that one variety of a language is superior to others and should be promoted as such. It is also known as linguistic prescriptivism and purism. An ardent promoter of prescriptivism is called a prescriptivist or, informally, a stickler. A key aspect of traditional grammar, prescriptivism is generally characterized by a concern for good, proper, or

correct usage. The term is the antonym (opposite) of descriptivism.

In a paper published in *Historical Linguistics 1995, Volume 2*, Sharon Millar—in an essay title, "Language prescription: a success in failure's clothing?"—defined prescriptivism as "the conscious attempt by language users to control or regulate the language use of others for the purpose of enforcing perceived norms or of promoting innovations." Common examples of prescriptive texts include many (though not all) style and usage guides, dictionaries, writing handbooks, and the like.

## Observations

"[Prescriptivism is the] policy of describing languages as we would like them to be, rather than as we find them. Typical examples of prescriptivist attitudes are the condemnation of preposition stranding and of the split infinitive and a demand for *It's I* in place of the normal *It's me*." – R.L. Trask.

"A prescriptive grammar is essentially a manual that focuses on constructions where usage is divided and lays down rules governing the socially correct use of language. These grammars were a formative influence on language attitudes in Europe and America during the 18th and 19th centuries. Their influence lives on in the handbooks of usage widely found today, such as *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage* (1926) by Henry Watson Fowler (1858-1933), though such books include recommendations about the use of pronunciation, spelling, and vocabulary as well as grammar." – David Crystal,

"I think sensible prescriptivism ought to be part of any education." – Noam Chomsky,

## Verbal Hygiene

"[T]he overt anti-prescriptive stance of linguists is in some respects not unlike the prescriptivism they criticize. The point is that *both* prescriptivism *and* anti-prescriptivism invoke certain norms and circulate particular notions about how language ought to work. Of course, the norms are different (and in the case of linguistics they are often covert). But both sets feed into the more general arguments that influence everyday ideas about language. On that level, 'description' and 'prescription' turn out to be aspects of a single (and normative) activity: a struggle to control language by defining its nature. My use of the term 'verbal hygiene' is intended to capture this idea, whereas to use the term 'prescriptivism' would just recycle the opposition I am trying to deconstruct." – Deborah Cameron

## Language Wars

"The history of prescriptions about English—of grammar texts, manuals of style and '*O tempora o mores*'-type laments—is in part a history of bogus rules, superstitions, half-baked logic, groaningly unhelpful lists, baffling abstract statements, false classifications, contemptuous insiderism, and educational malfeasance. But it is also a history of attempts to make sense of the world and its bazaar of competing ideas and interests. Instinctively, we find the arbitrariness of existence hard to accept. Our desire to impose order on the world, which means inventing the forms of language rather than discovering them, is a creative act. Furthermore, the quarrel between descriptivists and prescriptivists ... is a sort of mad confederacy: each party thrives on lambasting the other." – Henry Hitchings.

## The Problem With Prescriptivists

"[G]eneral ignorance of grammar allows prescriptivists to impose nonsensical mandates and allows test-makers and test-takers to focus primarily on a superficial error in language use."

## Descriptivism

Moral language and descriptive language share the same syntactic structure. "Sam is good" predicates a kind of goodness to Sam just as "Sam is four-legged" predicates having four legs to her. "Being good" as in "being good is being able to bear one's own scrutiny" and "having four legs" as in "having four legs is not required of being a dog" are both noun-like phrases. Again, to say, "If Sam is good, then she will be able to bear her own scrutiny," illustrates that moral predication could be embedded to form a compound sentence just as descriptive predication could. We use both parts of language with an equal ease. Almost all of us are proficient in using moral language. Most of us understand what others express with it; and, we are expected to have understood what moral language means. Few people would apply the term "morally permissible" to an apparent case of wanton cruelty. Furthermore, moral language is governed by the same fundamental rules of logic as descriptive language. For instance, one and the same action cannot be good and bad at the same time. (The philosophical rejection of moral facts remains popular, although this focal reliance on the logico-linguistic aspect of the moral practices is no longer fashionable.

From this, must we then infer that there are entities like "moral goodness" and "obligation" to which moral language refers in the world? Are the three characteristics of structural similarity between moral and descriptive languages, the equal ease with which we employ them, and the logical interplay between them good enough reasons for thinking that there are moral facts? Is it not possible that our ways of influencing others and ourselves are exactly where syntax and semantics of our language betray us and, consequently, that moral language suffers from a lack of referents analogous to terms such as "nothing," the "present king of France," do?

Either moral language describes (or, it is intended to describe accurately) the world or it does not. According to descriptivists, moral language describes the world. The descriptivist position has been thought as the mark of moral realism, while the non-descriptivist position as that of antirealism. This is captured as follows:

(C1) S is a moral realist if and only if S is a moral descriptivist.

So while one may hold that there are no moral facts, according to C1, one may not at the same time hold that moral language describes or is intended to describe the world. Again, one may not hold both that there are moral facts but that our languages about them do not describe the world. For if C1 were true, being a moral realist and being a descriptivist about moral language are logically equivalent. So any non-descriptivist realism and any descriptivist antirealism would show that C1 is false. The possibilities will be discussed shortly in §2 and §3. Descriptivism and, hence, the truth-aptness of moral language, is discussed in more detail in what follows. (Ignored for the moment is what Blackburn calls "quietism" according to which "at some particular point the debate is not a real one, and that we are only offered, for instance, metaphors and images from which we can profit as we please" 1984, 146. One may claim quietism to be present in pretty much any important and interesting philosophical dispute, like "primary versus secondary, fact versus value, description versus expression, or of any other significant kind" 1998, 157. Quietism about whether moral language describes the world, if true, would render the traditional realism/antirealism debate over descriptivism as a dispute over no difference where there is

nothing more than “the celebration of the seamless web of language” 1998, 157.)

Descriptivism in meta-ethics is a cognitivist view, according to which moral language describes (or, is intended to describe) the world. (Cf. Horgan and Timmons 2000, 124. This rough definition, according to them, falls under the dogma of the “[mistaken] semantic assumption: All genuinely cognitive content is descriptive content.” Conflating descriptivism with cognitivism is, according to them, “a largely unquestioned dogma.”) An inevitable corollary of descriptivism is that moral language is apt to truth evaluation; that is, statements express moral judgments that are either true or false. We may say alternatively that moral sentences express propositions without affecting the result of the discussion. As Nicholas Sturgeon puts it, “moral [sentences] typically express [statements] capable of truth and falsity” (1986, 116). Strictly speaking, then, descriptivism says little about, and remains neutral with respect to, the two views in moral epistemology: there are moral statements that are known to be true. Descriptivism does not tell us whether there is any moral statement known to be true. Nor does it tell us anything about the things by virtue of which moral statements are true when they are true. (Cf. Skorupski 1999. He thinks that descriptivism in conjunction without a substantial theory of truth is no descriptivism at all. There is just a terminological difference, and the descriptivism in conjunction with a substantial theory of truth will be discussed in section 2.)

The moral descriptivist believes that moral statements express moral judgments, and that they are either true or false. If every sentence that is capable of truth-value describes the world, then so does every moral statement. Moral language describes the world because every truth-apt sentence describes, or is intended to describe the world. The non-descriptivist denies that. The non-descriptivist believes that moral statements do not express moral judgments. Rather, the non-descriptivist believes that moral judgments are expressed by commands or prescriptions. Neither commands nor prescriptions are truth-apt, and as a result they typically are not meant to describe the world. Moral language does not describe the world, according to the non-descriptivist. That is, it represents our wishes, preferences, emotions, and so on, but it represents nothing over and above them. Figure 1 illustrates the disagreement between the descriptivist and the non-descriptivist. (Definite antirealist positions are marked with the dotted boxes in the figures that follow. An oval box will mark definite realist positions. See figure 5.)




Figure 1

Non-descriptivists disagree about exactly what moral language accomplishes, while they are unanimous about what it does not. G. E. Moore’s open question argument supports emotivism, a

non-descriptivism contrary to his intention in the beginning of the 20th century. A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson argue that moral judgments express feelings of approval or disapproval, or that making moral judgments is equivalent to emoting in reference to behaviors of others and ours. (See Ayer 1952 and Stevenson 1937, 1944, and 1963.) Stevenson says that, "Mr. G. E. Moore's familiar objection about the open question is chiefly pertinent in this regard. No matter what set of scientifically knowable properties a thing may have (says Moore, in effect), you will find, on careful introspection, that it is an open question to ask whether anything having these properties is good," (1937, 18). R. M. Hare's universal prescriptivism, according to which "'ought'-judgments are prescriptive like plain imperatives, but differ from them in being universalizable" (1991, 457) emphasizes that moral language facilitates ways of prescribing actions for all of us. The norm-expressivism of Allen Gibbard has renewed arguments for non-descriptivism recently. Rejecting emotivism, Gibbard, 1990, holds that moral judgments are concerned about rational-to-have or justified moral sentiments, not just about feelings or preferences one has. Apparently, he holds that some moral feelings can be called rational-to-have or justified. It is when "one's acceptance of norms that permit the feeling" (Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton: 1992, 150-51) is expressed, a feeling may be called rational-to-have. So while moral judgments (and moral language) are expressive of what we accept as norms, namely, a state of mind, they are not about describing the world, namely, non-descriptivism about moral judgment and language. Blackburn's projectivism seems difficult to classify one way or another especially when it is considered in conjunction with his quasi-realism (Blackburn: 1984, 1993, and 1998). Moral language according to the projectivist lets us spin our own story onto the world. Non-descriptivists agree, nonetheless, that moral language is the tool of choice when we are panting for help, recommending a course of actions, passing judgments on what others do, and so on, but it is never the tool for describing the world.

The views discussed above can be illustrated with an example. Consider the moral sentence, "Petal ought to avoid eating too much." The utterance of the sentence expresses the speaker's judgment about Petal and perhaps about her tendency to the excessive consumption of food. The cognitivist holds that the speaker's judgment is of the same kind as ordinary beliefs, that is the cognitivist holds that the speaker's moral judgment is a cognitive state. Beliefs are representations of how things are, namely, possible states of affairs; and, language typically expresses beliefs. According to the cognitivist, then, the moral sentence that expresses the moral judgment represents a possible state of affairs. We may say that the descriptivist maintains that the moral sentence describes what ought to be the case about Petal and her tendency toward food. Petal could be instantiating the property of the "oughtness" of avoiding the excessive consumption of food, although this is not the only cognitivist way of maintaining her descriptivism about moral language. Just as the morning star refers to Venus, the linguistic item "ought to avoid eating too much" may refer to a moral property. It might even be maintained that there obtains the referential relation between moral expressions and the things in the world that they are supposed to pick out. Non-cognitivists hold that the speaker's judgment in saying, "Petal ought to avoid eating too much," is not of the same kind as cognitive states. Some noncognitivists go further and deny that the moral sentence represents a possible state of affairs. That is, some noncognitivists are non-descriptivists as well. The non-descriptivists maintain that the surface structure of moral language—and the logical interplay it displays within our use of it—is not a good guide in understanding what moral language does for us (and what we intend to do with it). The word "nothing" picks out no object whatsoever, although it serves as a grammatical subject; the definite description the "present King of France" refers to no one, although its article "the" indicates a unique satisfier of the description, and so on. These are familiar cases (of our language betraying us ontologically). So, part of the non-descriptivist claim is that moral language ontologically

manipulates us just as “nothing” and the “present king of France” do. The merit of the view according to which there lurks a deeper structure (or meaning) to our moral language must be judged on how successful the non-descriptivist construal of the sentence about Petal is.

The non-descriptivist construal of “Petal ought to avoid eating too much” varies. Emotivism construes it as the way of emoting the speaker’s disapproval of Petal’s excessive consumption of food, or the way of informing Petal of her feeling. The expressivist construes it as the speaker’s way of expressing her preference with regard to Petal’s eating habit. The prescriptivist construes it as the way of commanding Petal to not eat excessively. The norm-expressivist construes it as the way of expressing the speaker’s non-acceptance of the norms that allow such a consumption of food. Perhaps the projectivist would construe the statement about Petal as a way of “objectifying” the speaker’s disapproval. However, all reject that there is a dyadic relationship of reference or correspondence, between the moral sentence and how the world is. The dyadic relation has all but been reduced to the monothetic relation of showing/manifesting the speaker’s psychological state. (The truth of this does not entail that people do not believe in moral principles. A. J. Ayer says that “[t]o say...that these moral judgments are merely expressive of certain feelings, feelings of approval or disapproval, is an over simplification” 1954, 238.) Figure 2 diagrams the non-descriptivist positions.




Figure 2

The contrast between descriptivism and non-descriptivism seems inapt for Gilbert Harman’s relativism because his relativism is a definite moral antirealist position. He rejects the objective status of moral facts. (See his 1977, 1986, and 2000; see also Harman and Thomson 1996 in which an interesting discussion of reasons both for and against moral objectivity is presented.) The relativist maintains that there are some ethical questions that can be correctly answered with “yes” for one, and “no” for another. Her claim implies nothing concerning for what moral language is meant. Error theorists maintain that moral judgments systematically err by positing moral facts. (For instance, Mackie says that “[t]he assertion that there are objective values or intrinsically prescriptive entities or features of some kind, which ordinary moral judgments presuppose is, I hold it not meaningless but false” 1977, 40.) That is, moral language aims to get the world right, but it always misses the mark. Mackie’s error theory in this respect occupies an important niche between the sides of the descriptivism divide and the sides of the moral realism divide. Figure 3 incorporates projectivism, relativism, and error theories, into figures 1 and 2.




Figure 3

The ontological ramification of accepting descriptivism (or, cognitivism) is not inevitably moral realism. Figure 3 indicates that descriptivism is not sufficient for moral realism. Mackie’s error theory is discussed in §2 in establishing the insufficiency. Blackburn’s projectivism, and John Skorupski’s “irrealist cognitivism” will be very briefly discussed as well. Descriptivism is nonetheless necessary for moral realism. The necessity is argued in §3 when Bruce Waller’s “megaethical level” is considered and rejected. That is, a conjunct of C1 will be shown to be false while the other conjunct of C1 will be shown to be true, thereby making the conjunction C1 false; more specifically, it will be shown that “if S is a moral descriptivist, then S is a moral realist” is false and it will be shown that “S is a moral realist only if S is a moral descriptivist” is true.

# MCQs

1. Ethics is concerned precisely with the \_\_\_\_\_ to decide the right/wrong in human conduct.

- a) will
- b) norms
- c) imagination
- d) laws

Answer: b

2. The \_\_\_\_\_ word 'mores' is the root of the word 'morality'.

- a) Greek
- b) English
- c) French
- d) Latin

Answer: d

3. The term 'ethics' is derived from a/an \_\_\_\_\_ word.

- a) Latin
- b) Greek
- c) Spanish
- d) English

Answer: b

4. Summum Bonum refers to the \_\_\_\_\_ good.

- a) personal
- b) social
- c) supreme
- d) lower

Answer: c

5. \_\_\_\_\_ is not a positive science.

- a) Ethics
- b) Sociology
- c) Physics
- d) Biology

Answer: a

6. Ethics as a normative science deals with the \_\_\_\_\_ of human conduct.

- a) ideas
- b) standards
- c) betterment
- d) None of these

Answer: b

7. A desire that continues to be effective can be termed a \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) will
- b) motive
- c) wish
- d) intention

Answer: c

8. Human desire is \_\_\_\_\_ animal appetite.

- a) different from
- b) similar to
- c) the same as
- d) not distinguishable from

Answer: a

9. A human being may be hungry and yet not \_\_\_ food.

- a) take
- b) provide
- c) like
- d) desire

Answer: d

10. \_\_\_ is a formed habit.

- a) Custom
- b) Desire
- c) Wish
- d) Character

Answer: d

11. The force of will leads to \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) action
- b) inaction
- c) result
- d) wish

Answer: a

12. \_\_\_ may be outer or inner.

- a) Desire
- b) Wish
- c) Intention
- d) All these

Answer: c

13. \_\_\_ induces us to act in a certain way.

- a) Wish
- b) Motive
- c) Will
- d) Desire

Answer: b

14. The motive of an action is a part of the\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) intention
- b) will
- c) wish
- d) none of these

Answer: a

15. \_is a representative ofhedonist ethics.

- a) Bentham
- b) J. S. Mill
- c) Both (a) and (b)
- d) Neither (a) nor (b) 2

Answer: c

16. 'Character' refers to the completesystem constituted by the acts of \_\_\_of a particular kind.

- a) wish
- b) desire
- c) intention
- d) will

Answer: d

17. \_exactly corresponds tocharacter.

- a) Wish
- b) conduct
- c) Will
- d) Desire

Answer: b

18. If human actions are completely determined by\_\_\_\_, it is not free will.

- a) reason
- b) moral imperative
- c) circumstances
- d) All these

Answer: c

19. Find out the items in the List B thatmatch those in the List A.

List A

- 1. Hedonism
- 2. Freewill
- 3. Wish
- 4. Evolutionary morality

List B

- 1.A selected desire
- 2. Herbert Spencer
- 3Pleasure as moral standard
- 4. Higher humanfaculty

- a) 3, 4, 1, 2
- b) 2, 3, 1, 4
- c) 1, 4, 3, 2
- d) 3, 4, 2, 1

Answer: a

20. Pleasure/pain is the norm of moralevaluation in\_\_\_\_.

- a) Intuitionism
- b) Virtue ethics
- c) Hedonism
- d) All these

Answer: c

21. "Men always do seek pleasure". Thisposition is called\_\_\_\_hedonism.

- a) psychological
- b) ethical
- c) egoistic
- d) universalistic

Answer: a

22. Universalistic hedonism is also called \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) ethical
- b) psychological
- c) utilitarianism
- d) altruism

Answer: c

23. It is wrong to break a promise becauseas a moral law it cannot be universalized. This illustrates the ethical position of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Kant
- b) J. S. Mill
- c) Bentham
- d) Spencer

Answer: a

24. Ethical hedonism is the view that humanbeings\_\_\_\_seek pleasure.

- a) always do
- b) ought to
- c) shall not
- d) ought not

Answer: b

25. \_hedonism refers to thepleasure of each individual.

- a) Egoistic
- b) Psychological
- c) Universalistic
- d) none of these

Answer: a

26. \_hedonism refers to thepleasure of all human beings.

- a) psychological
- b) egoistic
- c) ethical
- d) universalistic

Answer: d

27. The ethics of \_\_\_\_\_ is precisely termed utilitarianism.

- a) Kant
- b) Spencer
- c) J. S. Mill
- d) T. H. Green

Answer: c

28. All conduct either promotes or hinders the organism's adaptation to the environment. This implies the \_\_\_\_\_ theory of morality.

- a) hedonist
- b) evolutionary
- c) intuitionist
- d) none of these

Answer: b

29. Adjustment of internal relations to external relations is the basic postulate of the ethical theory of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Bentham
- b) J. S. Mill
- c) Kant
- d) Herbert Spencer

Answer: d

30. According to \_\_\_\_\_, moral life makes the inherent rational/spiritual principle more and more explicit.

- a) J. S. Mill
- b) T. H. Green
- c) Herbert Spencer
- d) Bentham

Answer: b

31. According to Kant, moral imperative is \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) evolutionary
- b) hypothetical
- c) categorical
- d) all these

Answer: c

32. According to \_\_\_\_\_, conscience is

- a) Butler
- b) Bentham
- c) J. S. Mill
- d) Spencer

Answer: a

33. Kant accepted \_\_\_\_\_ as the final authority in moral life.

- a) pleasure
  - b) reason
  - c) freedom
  - d) pain
- Answer: b

34. Find out the items in the List B that match those in the List A.

- | List A            | List B        |
|-------------------|---------------|
| 1. Utilitarianism | 1. Spencer    |
| 2. Evolutionism   | 2. Education  |
| 3. Intuitionism   | 3. Hedonism   |
| 4. Human rights   | 4. Conscience |

- a) 2, 3, 1, 4
  - b) 3, 1, 4, 2
  - c) 4, 3, 1, 2
  - d) 3, 1, 2, 4
- Answer: b

35. Both Bentham and Mill share the the supreme authority in human nature. \_\_\_Principle of morality.

- a) pleasure
  - b) evolutionist
  - c) both (a) and (b)
  - d) neither (a) nor (b)
- Answer: a

36. \_is the author of Methods of Ethics.

- a) Kant
  - b) T. H. Green
  - c) Butler
  - d) Sidgwick
- Answer: d

37. According to hedonists, pleasure is the only thing that is\_\_.

- a) possible
  - b) avoidable
  - c) visible
  - d) desirable
- Answer: d

38. Desire and \_\_\_\_\_are frequently used as synonymous.

- a) pleasure
  - b) intention
  - c) wish
  - d) will
- Answer: c

39. Find out the mismatching pair.

- a) Kant/hedonism
- b) Ethics/normative science
- c) Intuitionism/conscience
- d) Evolutionism/adaptation

Answer: a

40. According to \_\_\_\_\_, conscience is superior to self-love.

- a) Bentham
- b) J. S. Mill
- c) Butler
- d) Spencer

Answer: c

41. Actions are right/wrong according to their intrinsic nature. This is the position of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Intuitionists
- b) Hedonists
- c) Utilitarians
- d) None of these

Answer: a

42. According to Kant, an action is good/bad \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) with reference to some external standard
- b) according to the pleasure/pain it produces
- c) in itself
- d) extrinsically

Answer: c

43. 'The moral principle that guides your action should become a universal law'. This is the view of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) J. S. Mill
- b) Bentham
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

Answer: d

44. The ethical theory of \_\_\_\_\_ shows a close affinity with Darwin's theory of evolution.

- a) J. S. Mill
- b) Herbert Spencer
- c) Immanuel Kant
- d) None of these

Answer: b

45. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the dictum of \_\_\_\_\_ hedonism.

- a) egoistic
- b) psychological
- c) universalistic
- d) all these

Answer: c

46. Sidgwick argued that \_\_\_\_\_ keeps us impartial in the choice of pleasure.

- a) ego
- b) reason
- c) passion
- d) society

Answer: b

47. Psychological hedonism recognizes \_\_\_\_\_ as the object of desire.

- a) pleasure
- b) reason
- c) pain
- d) law

Answer: a

48. According to J. S. Mill, some pleasures are more desirable on account of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) quantity
- b) quality
- c) appetite
- d) beauty

Answer: b

49. Sidgwick tried a synthesis between \_\_\_\_\_, J. S. Mill and Kant.

- a) Bentham
- b) Spencer
- c) Butler
- d) None of these

Answer: c

50. The author of The Data of Ethics is \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Kant
- b) Spencer
- c) Bentham
- d) J. S. Mill

Answer: b

51. Perfection or self-realization is the \_\_\_\_\_ of moral evolution.

- a) beginning
- b) content
- c) law
- d) ideal

Answer: d

52. The view that moral development is directed towards a specific goal is \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) universalistic
- b) teleological
- c) legal

d) all these

Answer: b

53. \_is the author of Prolegomena to Ethics.

a) Bentham

b) Aristotle

c) T. H. Green

d) J. S. Mill

Answer: c

54. A\_\_\_action 'tends to bring about what is good'.

a) bad

b) right

c) wrong

d) legal

Answer: b

55. \_argued that if conscience had strength and authority, "it would absolutely govern the world".

a) T. H. Green

b) J. S. Mill

c) Butler

d) Immanuel Kant

Answer: c

56. Avoiding injury either to oneself or to another's physical well-being implies the Respect for\_\_\_.

a) Life

b) Character

c) Freedom

d) Property

Answer: a

57. Respect for life corresponds to the right to\_\_\_.

a) Property

b) Freedom

c) Education

d) Life

Answer: d

58. Mackenzie defines\_\_\_\_\_as 'The science of the ideal in human conduct'.

a) Character

b) Ethics

c) Hedonism

d) Utilitarianism

Answer: b

59. The Greek term from which \_\_\_\_\_ is derived means 'custom or 'habit'.

a) morality

b) psychology

- c) education
- d) ethics

Answer: b

60. The subject matter of ethics is\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) human conduct
- b) ultimate truth
- c) knowledge
- d) reality

Answer: a

61. Butler's term for intuitive moral faculty is\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) appetite
- b) desire
- c) purpose
- d) conscience

Answer: d

62. The right of the child to education corresponds to the parents' \_\_\_to ensure it.

- a) interest
- b) duty
- c) right
- d) capacity

Answer: b

63. Education is a practical means that corresponds to the\_\_\_theory of punishment.

- a) Deterrent
- b) Retributive
- c) Reformative
- d) None of these

Answer: c

64. The right to freedom is essential to\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Hedonism
- b) Democracy
- c) Dictatorship
- d) All these

Answer: b

65. Deterrent theory of punishment is\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) preventive
- b) reformative
- c) educative
- d) none of these

Answer: a

66. Retributive theory of punishment involves\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) education

- b) reformation
- c) revenge
- d) conversion

Answer: c

67. Capital punishment cannot be justified according to \_\_\_\_\_ theory of punishment.

- a) Retributive
- b) Reformative
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

Answer: b

68. The right to \_\_\_\_\_ is recently included in the fundamental rights in India.

- a) life
- b) freedom
- c) education
- d) property

Answer: c

69. \_\_\_\_\_ is not a proponent of hedonism.

- a) Kant
- b) T. H. Green
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

Answer: c

70. Social Darwinism refers to the position of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Kant
- b) J. S. Mill
- c) Bentham
- d) Spencer

Answer: d

71. Those phenomena of conduct in these highest creatures, with which Morality is concerned, also conform to the laws of evolution. \_\_\_\_\_ said this.

- a) Herbert Spencer
- b) Charles Darwin
- c) Bentham
- d) T. H. Green

Answer: a

72. Find out the matching pairs.

1. Bentham/hedonism
2. Reformative view of punishment/the penalty of death
3. T. H. Green/utilitarianism
4. Kant/Critique of Practical reason

- a) Only 4

- b) 1 and 4
- c) 2 and 3
- d) Only 1

Answer: b

73. According to Sidgwick, 'nothing is desirable in itself except\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) pain
- b) pleasure
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

Answer: b

74. Rights and duties are the \_\_\_\_\_ constituents of the citizen's life.

- a) opposite
- b) contradictory
- c) invalid
- d) complementary

Answer: d

75. Right to \_\_\_\_\_ is the most fundamental right.

- a) property
- b) freedom
- c) education
- d) life

Answer: d

76. \_theory of punishment is more humanitarian.

- a) Retributive
- b) Reformative
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

Answer: b

77. Ethics deals with the " \_\_\_\_\_ of human beings living in societies."

- a) conduct
- b) duties
- c) rights
- d) desires

Answer: a

78. Who among the following has identified three types of Justice – Distributive, Retributive, Commutative?

- a) Plato
- b) Aristotle
- c) Hobbes
- d) Locke

Answer: (b)

79. 'Men are not hanged for stealing horse so that horse may not be stolen by others' can be attributed to:

- a) Retributive theory of punishment
- b) Reformatory theory of punishment
- c) Theory of capital punishment
- d) Deterrent theory of punishment

Answer: (d)

80. 'Either freedom of will is a fact or moral judgement a delusion' is a statement of:

- a) Hobbes
- b) Martinie
- c) Kant
- d) Hegel

Answer: (b)

81. Which one of the following statements appropriately represents the position of Nietzsche?

- (a) He equates the will to truth with the will to power.
- (b) The distinction between good and evil is based on the will to power.
- (c) The distinction between good and evil is rooted in objectivity.
- (d) All life and all happiness are governed by the will to power.

Code:

- a) Only (a) and (b) are true
- b) Only (c) and (d) are true
- c) Only (a), (b) and (d) are true
- d) Only (b) and (d) are true

Answer: (c)

82. According to Kant, Moral Laws are:

- a) Apriori based on reason
- b) Apriori not based on reason
- c) Aposteriori not based on reason
- d) Aposteriori based on reason

Answer: (a)

83. 'The goodness of an action is determined by its consequence' is the theory attributed to:

- a) Descriptive
- b) Deontological
- c) Prescriptive
- d) Teleological

Answer: (d)

84. Which among the following is the distinctive feature of ethical judgements, according to Stevenson?

- a) Statement of Command
- b) Approval of the Consequence of an act
- c) Statement of Fact
- d) Disagreement in Attitude

Answer: (d)

85. It has been pointed out that Mill's arguments for Utilitarianism Suffer from the fallacy of:

- a) Illicit major
- b) Illicit Minor
- c) Undistributed Middle term
- d) Figure of Speech

Answer: (d)

86. 'Either freedom of will is a fact or moral judgement a delusion' is a statement of:

- a) Hobbes
- b) Martinie
- c) Kant
- d) Hegel

Answer: (b)

87. 'Treating equals equally and unequals unequally' is the view of:

- a) Socrates
- b) Bentham
- c) Aristotle
- d) Mill

Answer: (3)

88. Who among the following has said that "Personality and property go together"?

- a) Kant
- b) Hegel
- c) Ross
- d) Rawls

Answer: (2)

89. Consider the following statements with regard to Bentham and choose the correct code:  
Statements:

1. Bentham dismissed ethics of asceticism as an inverted hedonism.
2. Bentham is an ethical hedonist by virtue of his employment of the pleasure principle as the standard for conduct.
3. Intuitionist ethics was criticized by Bentham for it provides no more than a subjective feeling.

Codes:

- a) Only 1 and 3 are true.
- b) Only 1 and 2 are true
- c) 1, 2 and 3 are true.
- d) Only 2 is true.

Answer: (C)

90. Which of the Philosophers noted below stated? "Utility means the property of any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered."?

- a) James Mill

- b) J.S. Mill
- c) Hume
- d) Jeremy Bentham

Answer: (D)

91. Which of the philosophers noted below propounded ethical gradation of the springs of action?

- a) Cadworth
- b) Sidgewick
- c) Butler
- d) Martineau

Answer: (D)

92. 'Free-will' in ethics means

- a) The individual is free to do anything
- b) The individual is not free to do anything
- c) The individual is free to act keeping in view of some norms
- d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

93. Who highlighted the problem of personal identity first in modern western philosophy?

- a) Strawson
- b) Locke
- c) Kripke
- d) Descartes

Answer: (B)

94. The four moral sanctions by Bentham are

- a) Natural, Cultural, Political, Social
- b) Natural, Political, Social, Religious
- c) Natural, Economical, Political, Religious
- d) Natural, Economical, Cultural, Religious

Answer: (B)

95. Aristotle identified good as

- a) Happiness
- b) Perfection
- c) Utility
- d) Self-respect

Answer: (A)

96. Consider the statements of J.S. Mill given below and mark the correct code:

1. J.S. Mill's theory is Altruistic hedonism and qualitative utilitarianism.
2. Mill uses pleasure and happiness synonymously.
3. Mill regards virtue, health, love of honour and the like as intrinsic values.

Codes:

- a) 1, 2 and 3 are true.
- b) 1 and 2 are true.

c) 1 and 3 are true.

d) Only 2 is true.

Answer: (B)

97. In Russell's philosophy, logical atomism and theory of truth go together

a) Correspondence

b) Pragmatic

c) Coherence

d) Semantic

Answer: (A)

98. Which of the following statements are true with regard to 'Will theory' of Human Rights Discussion?

a) It argues that the principal function of Human Rights is to protect and promote certain essential human interests.

b) It attempts to establish the validity of Human Rights based on the unique human capacity for freedom.

c) (B) above is true and (A) is false.

d) Both (A) and (B) above are true.

Answer: (C)

99. Scepticism is the

a) Starting point of Hume's philosophy

b) Conclusion of Hume's philosophy

c) Both of these

d) None of these

Answer: (B)

100. Ontological Dualism is a theory which held \_

a) Mind and body are different entities acting together.

b) Mind and matter are independent of each other.

c) There are two ultimate realities which act together in coherent manner.

d) There are two ultimate realities independent of each other.

Answer: (D)

101. W.V.O. Quine is an ontological relativist because he believes in

a) Inscrutability of reference

b) Picture theory of meaning

c) Forms of life

d) Family resemblances

Answer: (A)

102. "What kind of world we perceive and experience depends upon what kind of beings we are." This is the conclusion of

a) Kant

b) Descartes

c) Aristotle

d) Spinoza

Answer: (A)

103. Truth of reason is justified by

- a) Law of contradiction and principles of sufficient reason
- b) Principles of sufficient reason alone
- c) Law of contradiction alone
- d) Laws of intuitive imagination

Answer: (C)

104. Within a scientific system of propositions

- a) All propositions can be proved and all terms can be defined.
- b) Not all propositions can be proved but all terms can be defined.
- c) All propositions can be proved but not all terms can be defined.
- d) Not all propositions can be proved and not all terms can be defined.

Answer: (D)

105. Human Right presupposed

- a) Dignity of human being
- b) Proper living condition of a human being in a particular setup
- c) Rights of human being in a particular society
- d) Universal Rights of human being in a particular society

Answer: (A)

106. Which one of the options of the followings correctly matches with moral obligation?

- a) Physical compulsion
- b) Self-imposition
- c) External authority
- d) None of these

Answer: (B)

107. According to Kant, moral duty is

- a) A command of God
- b) Given by one's intuition
- c) The imperative of pure reason
- d) Determined by morality

Answer: (C)

108. "We have no right to commit suicide because our life is a joint property of our own and others."

This sentence falls under the domain of

- a) Our duty towards our society
- b) Our duty towards our family
- c) Our duty towards ourselves
- d) Our duty towards all of these

Answer: (D)

109. Which one of the following statements is an incorrect statement?

- a) J.S. Mill does not offer a reasonable explanation of moral obligation.
- b) Sidgwick is a hedonist in his view of the highest good.

- c) Moral judgement depends upon moral sentiments.  
d) According to Aesthetic-Sense- Theory, Beauty is the Ultimate Standard of morality.  
Answer: (C)

110. Emotivism upholds that ethical statements do not express

- a) Truths or falsehoods
- b) Ontological states
- c) Rational states
- d) Effective states

Answer: (A)

111. 'Naturalistic fallacy' is

- a) The outcome of naturalism
- b) The outcome of naturalized epistemology
- c) The outcome of natural theology
- d) The outcome of identifying an ethical concept with natural concept

Answer: (D)

112. Nominalism is a theory which says

- a) That universals are not real but are only names or words.
- b) The universals are not names.
- c) That universals are established on reason.
- d) That universals are concepts.

Answer: (A)

113. Which one of the following is not a statement of value?

- a) Honesty is the best policy.
- b) We believe honesty to be the best policy.
- c) Never indulge in dishonesty.
- d) let us all be honest.

Answer: (B)

114. According to Kant knowledge consists of

- a) Synthetic a priori judgements
- b) Synthetic a posteriori judgements
- c) Analytic judgements
- d) None of the above

Answer: (A)

115. Which one of the following is NOT the work of Bertrand Russell?

- a) Discourse on method
- b) Our knowledge of the external world.
- c) An inquiry into meaning and truth.
- d) Human knowledge: Its scope and limits.

Answer: (A)

116. Who said: God is dead?

- a) Nietzsche

- b) Wittgenstein
  - c) Heidegger
  - d) C.S. Pierce
- Answer: (A)

117. Which one of the following is not implied by Kant's, Copernican revolution?

- a) Rejection of Naive realism
  - b) Blindness of sensible intuition without concepts
  - c) Rejection of transcendental idealism
  - d) Emptiness of thought or concepts without sensible intuition.
- Answers: (C)

118. Which one of the following provides the metaphysical ground of morality?

- a) Cardinal Virtue
  - b) Freedom and Responsibility
  - c) Immortality of Soul
  - d) Growth of Character
- Answer: (C)

119. Two basic kinds of justice are distributive and:

- a) Social
  - b) Legal
  - c) Economic
  - d) Retributive
  - e) Collaborative
- Answer: d. Retributive

120. In the excerpt from Plato's Republic, Glaucon asserts that one way justice and injustice have been described is as:

- a) Kind and mean
  - b) Right and wrong
  - c) Good and evil
  - d) Beautiful and ugly
  - e) Praising and censuring
- Answer: c. Good and evil.

121. Adam Smith argues that the division of labor results from:

- a) Human differences
  - b) Deliberate human planning
  - c) Public ownership
  - d) Legislation
  - e) Independence
- Answer: a. Human differences.

122. As discussed in the Latin Trade article, Wal-Mart is sometimes criticized for:

- a) Lying to its employees
- b) Deceptive advertising practices
- c) Paying low wages overseas

- d) Violations of antitrust law
  - e) Selling low-quality products
- Answer: c. Paying low wages overseas.

123. Ciulla states that ethically, we must be aware that we can barter our:

- a) Consent
- b) Happiness
- c) Service
- d) Belongings
- e) Freedom

Answer: e. Freedom.

124. John Rawls is concerned about social and economic inequalities, but NOT that they are:

- a) Chosen behind a veil of ignorance
- b) Based upon the wisdom of history
- c) Attached to positions and offices open to all
- d) Compatible with liberty
- e) Merely hypothetical

Answer: b. Based upon the wisdom of history.

125. Robert Nozick argues that to make sense of the idea of justice in owning property, we must be able to explain all of the following, but NOT how:

- a) Property is transferred from one owner to another
- b) Ownership is compatible with freedom
- c) Ownership rights are originally acquired
- d) Distributive justice can be achieved
- e) Wilt Chamberlain can get people to pay extra for watching him play

Answer: d. Distributive justice can be achieved.

126. Peter Singer explains the idea of absolute poverty as NOT including:

- a) A life expectancy one-third lower than the average.
- b) A 60 percent lower adult literacy rate
- c) An infant mortality rate eight times higher than average
- d) Increased violence
- e) Acceptable nutrition levels

Answer: e. Acceptable nutrition levels.

127. Rawls conceives of the original contract as one to:

- a) enter a particular society.
- b) set up a particular form of government.
- c) establish the principles of justice for the basic structure of society.
- d) establish the content of morality.

Answer: c. establish the principles of justice for the basic structure of society..

128. The purpose of the veil of ignorance is to:

- a) prevent contractors from adopting principles of justice that unfairly advantage themselves.
- b) make the decision of which principles of justice to adopt simpler and easier.
- c) ensure that the principles of justice selected are not too complicated for ordinary people to

follow.

d) all of the above.

Answer: a. prevent contractors from adopting principles of justice that unfairly advantage themselves..

129. Rawls argues that parties in the original position would not accept utilitarianism because:

a) it is too difficult to determine which policies would maximize happiness.

b) doing so would be too risky.

c) it requires us to do unjust things, such as executing innocent people.

d) they would be behind the veil of ignorance and thus would never have heard of utilitarianism.

Answer: b. doing so would be too risky..

130. According to Rawls, the two parts of his theory:

a) are interdependent: You cannot accept one part without accepting the other.

b) are independent: You can accept either part without accepting the other.

c) are provable from self-evident premises.

d) cannot be justified via rational means.

Answer: b. are independent: You can accept either part without accepting the other..

131. According to Rawls, we can enter the original position:

a) only by leaving society and remaking social institutions from scratch.

b) at any time, by simply following a certain procedure.

c) only if we somehow forget who we are, which is very rare.

d) none of the above.

Answer: b. at any time, by simply following a certain procedure..

132. Rawls claims that students with few native assets (such as intelligence) should be given:

a) more attention and resources than those with more native assets.

b) the same level of attention and resources as those with more native assets.

c) less attention and fewer resources than those with more native assets.

d) virtually no educational resources.

Answer: a. more attention and resources than those with more native assets..

133. Rawls claims that a conception of justice should be justified by:

a) deducing it from self-evident premises.

b) direct acquaintance via moral intuition.

c) the mutual support of many considerations, which it fits into one coherent view.

d) none of the above.

Answer: c. the mutual support of many considerations, which it fits into one coherent view..

134. Rawls claims that when his two principles come into conflict:

a) neither takes precedence over the other.

b) the first principle (concerning liberty) takes precedence over the second (concerning inequality).

c) the second principle (concerning inequality) takes precedence over the first (concerning liberty).

Answer: b. the first principle (concerning liberty) takes precedence over the second (concerning inequality)..

135. are distinct forms of 'Justice' in Indian constitution.

- a) Justice, empowerment, well being
- b) Social, economical, political
- c) Social, Psychological, emotional
- d) Social, educational, judicial

Answer: b

136. Social Problems are treated with Social reform and.....

- a) Social legislation.
- b) Social work
- c) Social science
- d) Social service

Answer: a

137. Social justice is the balance between.....

- a) Individual's rights and social control
- b) Society and individual
- c) Fundamental rights and judicial system
- d) Individual and family

Answer: a

138. According to the Supreme Court of India, social justice....

- a) as a living concept of revolutionary import
- b) judicial mechanism
- c) social control measure
- d) Social defense

Answer: a

139. The primary goal of a welfare state is to achieve

- a) Social Justice
- b) Freedom to all
- c) Employment to all
- d) Political justice

Answer: a

140. The concept of social justice has emerged out of a process of ?

- a) Individual rights
- b) Social practices
- c) social norms, order, law and morality
- d) Religion, caste and community

Answer: c

141. The term social justice was first used in the year

- a) 1840
- b) 1856
- c) 1948
- d) 1950

Answer: a

142. Social welfare policies were first introduced in India in the year\_.

- a) 1972
- b) 1951
- c) 1947
- d) 1851

Answer: a

143. The term social justice was first used by

- a) Sicilian priest, Luigi Taparelli d'Azeglio,
- b) M. Gandhi
- c) Dr. BR. Ambedkar
- d) Raja ram Mohan Roy

Answer: a

144. The concept of social justice is a .....which provides meaning and significance to life and makes the rule of law dynamic.

- a) revolutionary concept
- b) old age concept
- c) young old concept
- d) new concept

Answer: a

145. justice' was used as equivalent to 'Righteousness'

- a) true
- b) false
- c) partially true
- d) partially wrong

Answer: a

146. What does Social justice denotes?

- a) equal treatment of all citizens without any social distinction
- b) equal distribution of wealth
- c) equal participation of women in politics
- d) equal employment opportunities between men and women

Answer: a

147. Which one of the following is called as a foundation stone of Indian Constitution?

- a) Preamble
- b) Legislations
- c) Articles
- d) Social justice

Answer: d

148. What was the percentage of literate people at the time of independence?

- a) 12%
- b) 14%
- c) 16%
- d) 18%

Answer: b

149. Minimum needs programme was introduced during the\_\_.

- a) fifth five year plan
- b) second five year plan
- c) fourth five year plan
- d) sixth five year plan

Answer: a

150. Which one of the following is not an objective of social justice?

- a) To ensure that 'Rule of Law' prevails in society
- b) To ensure equality of outcome
- c) To prevent abuse and exploitation of weaker and vulnerable sections.
- d) To form social legislations to only marginalized groups

Answer: a

151. Match the followings

- |                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| a) The principle of human dignity   | i) demands of upholding and defending human dignity              |
| b) The principle of respect for     | ii) all the conditions of society and the goods human life       |
| c) The principle of rights and      | iii) proscriptive and cautionary ways responsibilities           |
| d) The principle of the common good | iv) human beings are presumed to be free and responsible persons |

Codes

- a) a-iii, b-iv, c-i, d-ii
- b) a-ii, b-i, c-iv, d-iii.
- c) a-iii, b-ii, c-i, d-iv
- d) a-i, b-ii, c-iii, d-iv

Answer: a

152. Distributive justice is combination of .....?

- a) rights and duties
- b) constitutional remedies and social system
- c) social and economical justice
- d) community and society

Answer: c

153. When was the World Summit for Social Development held?

- a) 1999
- b) 1986
- c) 1995
- d) 2001

Answer: c

154. Which summit was adopted the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action?

- a) World social justice summit
- b) International summit for social development
- c) World Summit for Social Development

d) World Summit for international justice

Answer: c

155. The term weaker section, or backward classes are use for the people who are \_\_\_\_\_

a) socially or educationally backward

b) socially or economically backward

c) social or political backwardness

d) social or culture backwardness

Answer: a

156. Which Articles in Indian constitution refers the concept of Distributive justice?

a) Articles 38 and 39

b) Articles 33 and 34

c) Articles 44 and 45

d) Articles 58 and 59

Answer: a

157. "The existence of opportunities for meaningful work and employment" is called as

a) Social equality

b) Social equity

c) Economical and social equity

d) Economic justice

Answer: d

158. The term "The qualities on 'just' (or virtuous) man" is related .....

a) Orthodox concept of social justice

b) Ancient concept of social justice

c) Neo-modern concept of social justice

d) Modern concept of social justice

Answer: a

159. The term a 'just-society' is related to which one of the followings?

a) Orthodox concept of social justice

b) Western concept of social justice

c) British Indian concept of social justice

d) Modern concept of social justice

Answer: d

160. Which are the terms related to justice in ancient Indian tradition?

a) Charity and Dhanda

b) Dandaniti and Dharma

c) Village court and public justice

d) Labour and wage

Answer: b

161. Which one of the following is related to 'Law and punishment' in modern notions?

a) Dharma

b) Dandaniti

- c) Modern laws
- d) Legal enforcement

Answer: b

162 is another name of code of duties and justice in Indian tradition.

- a) Dharma
- b) Constitution
- c) Rights
- d) Fundamental duties

Answer: a

163. State the two important approaches which are related Modern Approach for Social Justice?

- a) Marxist and Liberal's approach
- b) Social and economical approach
- c) Legal and fundamental approach.
- d) Marxist and social approach

Answer: a

164. Liberal justice focuses on .....

- a) rights of individuals
- b) rights of marginalized groups
- c) rights of female
- d) rights of old age

Answer: a

165. Who developed the concept of modern Liberal justice?

- a) John Locke
- b) Max Webber
- c) John miller
- d) Karl Marx

Answer: a

166. Who was a pioneer of the movement for social justice in India?

- a) M. Gandhi
- b) J Nehru
- c) Dr. B R Ambedkar
- d) L B Shastri

Answer: a

167. Kalin defines ethical egoism as the view that

- a) persons ultimately aim at their own self-interest.
- b) it is morally permissible for a person to act in his own self-interest, even when his self-interest conflicts with the self-interest of another.
- c) it is morally permissible for a person to act in his own self-interest, unless his self-interest conflicts with the self-interest of another.
- d) none of the above.

Answer: b. it is morally permissible for a person to act in his own self-interest, even when his self-interest conflicts with the self-interest of another..

168. Kalin uses "self-interest" as a synonym for

- a) personal happiness.
- b) personal welfare.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Answer: c. both a and b..

169. Kalin maintains that the egoist has an obligation to promote the welfare only of those

- a) he likes or loves.
- b) he needs.
- c) he can use.
- d) all of the above.

Answer: d. all of the above..

170. Kalin maintains that the enlightened egoist will

- a) pursue his present interests.
- b) pursue his immediate interests.
- c) pursue his short-term interests.
- d) pursue his long-run interests.

Answer: d. pursue his long-run interests..

171. According to Kalin, the egoist must hold his position

- a) openly.
- b) silently.
- c) only under certain circumstances.
- d) come what may.

Answer: b. silently..

172. Kalin claims the egoist should

- a) not enter into moral discussions sincerely.
- b) enter into moral discussions, but only those he is sure to win.
- c) enter into moral discussions, but only those he is sure to lose.
- d) not enter into moral discussions at all.

Answer: a. not enter into moral discussions sincerely..

172. Kalin notes that, concerning the moral community, the egoist will be

- a) included.
- b) welcomed.
- c) excluded.
- d) isolated.

Answer: d. isolated..

173. According to Kalin, the egoist should not teach \_\_\_ to his children.

- a) egoism
- b) utilitarianism
- c) Kantianism
- d) all of the above

Answer: a. egoism.

174. Kalin argues the egoist is unable to engage in

- a) intrapersonal reasoning.
- b) interpersonal reasoning.
- c) prudential reasoning.
- d) theoretical reasoning.

Answer: b. interpersonal reasoning..

175. What is ethical egoism?

- a) The theory that every human action aims at some personal benefit.
- b) The theory that altruism is impossible.
- c) The theory that actions are morally right just because they promote one's self-interest.
- d) The theory that it is permissible, but not obligatory, to value oneself over others.

Answer: c

176. Which of the following accurately describes the relationship between ethical egoism and psychological egoism?

- a) If psychological egoism is true, this supports ethical egoism.
- b) If ethical egoism is true, psychological egoism must be true.
- c) They are competing theories about what we ought to do.
- d) They are competing theories about the way humans actually behave.

Answer: a

177. What would an ethical egoist say about a situation in which self-interest and morality conflict?

- a) One should do what morality demands.
- b) One should do what self-interest demands.
- c) One should sometimes do what morality requires and sometimes pursue self-interest.
- d) Such a situation is impossible, according to ethical egoism.

Answer: d

178. Which of the following rights do we have, according to ethical egoism?

- a) A right to not be physically assaulted.
- b) A right not to have our property taken from us.
- c) A right to pursue our own self-interest.
- d) All of the above.

Answer: c

179. According to the text, what is wrong with the Self-Reliance Argument?

- a) It is not true that all would be better off if everyone tended to his or her own needs.
- b) The egoist cannot endorse the claim that we ought to do what benefits everyone.
- c) Both a. and b.
- d) Nothing; the argument is sound.

Answer: c

180. What is the relationship between libertarianism and ethical egoism?

- a) If libertarianism is true, ethical egoism must be true.
- b) Libertarianism supports ethical egoism but does not require it.

- c) Ethical egoism supports libertarianism but does not require it.
- d) Libertarianism and ethical egoism are inconsistent.

Answer: d

181. According to the text, what is the best argument for ethical egoism?

- a) Our moral obligations give us reasons, and all reasons come from self-interest.
- b) Everyone would be better off if everyone were an ethical egoist.
- c) Libertarianism is true, and libertarianism requires ethical egoism.
- d) None of the above.

Answer: a

182. Which of the following is a problem for ethical egoism?

- a) It falsely claims that altruism is impossible.
- b) It violates core moral beliefs.
- c) It cannot explain why we have reason to be moral.
- d) All of the above.

Answer: b

183. According to ethical egoism, how should we regard the basic needs of others?

- a) They are just as important as our needs.
- b) They are important but less important than our needs.
- c) We should completely discount them.
- d) We should seek to thwart them whenever possible.

Answer: c

184. Which of the following claims about ethical egoism is not true?

- a) It cannot allow for the existence of moral rights.
- b) It claims that everyone always behaves selfishly.
- c) It arbitrarily makes one's own interests all-important.
- d) It may require us to do things that seem like paradigmatic cases of immorality.

Answer: b

185. What makes someone a good person, according to the natural law theory?

- a) Obeying the laws of the land.
- b) Obeying God's commands.
- c) Fulfilling his or her true nature.
- d) Doing whatever maximizes happiness.

Answer: c

186. Which of the following is natural law theory thought to explain?

- a) The objectivity of morality.
- b) The origins of morality.
- c) The possibility of moral knowledge.
- d) All of the above.

Answer: d

187. What is an empirical truth?

- a) A truth that couldn't possibly have been false.

- b) A truth that can be known simply by understanding it.
- c) A truth that can be known only by using the senses.
- d) A scientific hypothesis that is regarded as true but has not been proven.

Answer: c

188. How do we come to have moral knowledge, according to natural law theory?

- a) By consulting religious texts.
- b) By careful scientific study.
- c) By reflecting on the idea of morality.
- d) Moral knowledge is impossible, according to natural law theory.

Answer: b

189. Which of the following claims best describes Hobbes's conception of human nature?

- a) People are inherently selfish and competitive.
- b) People are inherently cooperative and altruistic.
- c) People are inherently moral but are quickly corrupted by society.
- d) People are inherently blank slates, neither naturally selfish nor naturally altruistic.

Answer: a

190. What two models of natural purposes are discussed in the text?

- a) The Efficiency Model and the Fitness Model.
- b) The Pleasure Model and the Desire Satisfaction Model.
- c) The Natural Law Model and the Positive Law Model.
- d) The Empirical Model and the Conceptual Model.

Answer: a

191. What is it for a term to be ambiguous?

- a) It is clear and precise.
- b) It has more than one meaning.
- c) It is meaningless.
- d) It plays a key role in an argument.

Answer: b

192. How do moral laws differ from natural laws?

- a) They can be broken.
- b) They do not describe how we actually behave.
- c) They are not used to predict future behavior.
- d) All of the above.

Answer: d

193. According to the text, what is wrong with the Argument from Humanity?

- a) It is invalid.
- b) One of the premises is clearly false.
- c) One of the key terms is ambiguous.
- d) All of the above.

Answer: c

194. According to the text, what is the role of nature in moral theory?

- a) Nature determines what is right or wrong.
- b) Nature is completely irrelevant to morality.
- c) Nature sets the outer bounds of morality.
- d) None of the above.

Answer: c

195. Which of the following is not part of "altruism"?

- a. Compassion
- b. Empathy
- c. Self-interest
- d. Selflessness

answer is: c. Self-interest

196. Biological altruism states that . . .

- a. We need to be altruistic toward animals
- b. Altruism applies only to one's offspring and immediate relatives
- c. Altruism exists as a product of human genetics and/or culture
- d. All of the above

answer is: c. Altruism exists as a product of human genetics and/or culture

197. "You should help others because in the long run it will benefit you." This is an argument for . . .

- a. biological altruism
- b. enlightened self-interest
- c. proto-altruism
- d. self-compassion

answer is: b. enlightened self-interest

198. This thinker supported the idea of altruism, but many people interpreted his ideas as anti-altruistic:

- a. Thomas Jefferson
- b. Aristotle
- c. Charles Darwin
- d. All of the above

answer is: c. Charles Darwin

199. According to the introduction, humans inhabit a world constructed out of

- a) concrete material
- b) social institutions
- c) ideas
- d) physical objects

Answer: c

200. Ideas

- a) structure how we live
- b) structure what we believe
- c) structure our reality
- d) a, b, and c
- e) all of the above

Answer: e

201. Philosophy is a rational activity that

- a) clarifies concepts
- b) determines the truth
- c) justifies action
- d) exposes lies

Answer: a

202. According to Mike W. Martin, ethical theories aspire to present moral ideas and issues

- a) in black and white terms
- b) clearly
- c) consistently
- d) in comprehensive frameworks
- e) b, c, and d
- f) all of the above

Answer: e

203. The philosopher's laboratory is

- a) society
- b) the mind
- c) social institutions
- d) all of the above

Answer: b

204. The two approaches to morality that seek to avoid making judgments about the actions and choices of others are

- a) subjectivism and personalism
- b) ethical relativism and existentialism
- c) subjectivism and ethical relativism
- d) utilitarianism and subjectivism

Answer: c

205. Ethical subjectivists assert that

- a) judgment is a matter of taste
- b) each individual creates their reality
- c) we deserve what we get
- d) a, b, and c
- e) a and b
- f) all of the above

Answer: e

206. Ethical relativism and subjectivism are inadequate approaches to morality because

- a) they open up the moral conversation to too many options
- b) they fail to take into account the multiple varying perspectives of individuals
- c) they can be used to justify the morally unjustifiable
- d) none of the above

Answer: c

207. Which are considered the "Big Three" of ethical theories?

- a) feminist ethics, Kantianism, and utilitarianism
- b) virtue ethics, Kantianism, and utilitarianism
- c) virtue ethics, feminist ethics, and utilitarianism
- d) virtue ethics, Kantianism, and feminist ethics

Answer: b

208. Utilitarianism directs us to ask

- a) What kind of person should I be?
- b) What happens if I perform this action?
- c) What is the least harm that I can do?
- d) none of the above

Answer: b

209. The following can be said about utilitarianism

- a) it is egalitarian
- b) it makes no reference to God as a source of moral command
- c) it claims to be scientific
- d) all of the above
- e) none of the above

Answer: d

210. The idea that "Hockey is as good as opera" refers to the idea that in utilitarianism

- a) pleasure is of the highest importance
- b) the pleasures of an important person are no less important than the pleasures of the least important person
- c) no distinction is made between sources of pleasure
- d) a and b
- e) b and c
- f) none of the above

Answer: e

211. "The Greatest Happiness Principle" can be attributed to

- a) Jeremy Bentham
- b) John Stuart Mill
- c) Aristotle
- d) Immanuel Kant

Answer: b

212. The greatest strength of Kantianism is that it

- a) emphasizes the subjectivity of truth
- b) warns us against using people as a means to an end
- c) successfully reconciles pain with pleasure
- d) encompasses justice and dignity

Answer: d

213. Which statement below is an example of Kant's "categorical imperative"?

- a) Keep promises.
- b) If you want to have a comfortable retirement, you should start saving money early.
- c) Drink milk.
- d) a and c
- e) all of the above

Answer: a

214. Kant's theory, by virtue of its formulation, excludes

- a) slaves
- b) women
- c) animals
- d) all of the above

Answer: c

215. Virtue ethics takes what as its primary focus?

- a) character
- b) relationships
- c) power
- d) emotion
- e) all of the above

Answer: a

216. Virtue ethics draws on the philosophy of

- a) Socrates
- b) Plato
- c) Aristotle
- d) Immanuel Kant

Answer: c

217. The one thing that Aristotle believes is ultimately desired for itself and not as a means to anything else is

- a) pleasure
- b) power
- c) happiness
- d) amusement

Answer: c

218. An ethics of care has the following features

- a) it values emotions and promotes a human relation between self and other
- b) it values emotions and focuses on meeting the needs of those we are responsible for
- c) it values emotions and attempts to advocate for those without power
- d) all of the above

e) a and b

f) b and c

Answer: e

219. The philosopher is like the scientist, in that he or she constructs theories, tests hypotheses, and looks at the evidence that can be given in support of any particular position being advanced.

a) True  
b) False  
Answer: c

220. An ethical dilemma occurs whenever we must make a decision and none of the possible courses of action open to us is entirely satisfactory because each violates a value we think important.

a) True  
b) False  
Answer: a

222. Modern ethical relativism has its roots in the discoveries of sociologists.

a) True  
b) False  
Answer: b

223. We *can* engage in the task of thinking and talking about ethics if we believe that ethical relativism or subjectivism is correct.

a) True  
b) False  
Answer: b

224. Kantianism requires us to ask, "Is this action right or wrong, morally speaking, regardless of the consequences?"

a) True  
b) False  
Answer: a

225. According to \_\_\_\_\_ theory there are no universal moral principles Options:

a) Ethical Relativism  
b) Ethical Realism  
c) Ethical Intuitionism  
d) All of these ...  
Answer: A

226. According to \_\_\_\_\_ ethical theory, moral values are intrinsic or an end in-itself

a) Ethical Objectivism  
b) Ethical Realism  
c) Ethical Intuitionism  
d) All of these  
Answer: A

227. \_\_\_\_\_ is also known as Moral Platonism Options:

a) Ethical Relativism  
b) Ethical Realism  
c) Ethical Intuitionism  
d) Plato's ethical theory  
Answer :B

228. \_\_\_\_\_ ethical theory is also known as "God based ethics"

- a) Ethical Supernaturalism
- b) Ethical Naturalism
- c) Ethical Supra-naturalism
- d) None of these

Answer: A

229. Moral Intuitionism is a form of

- a) Cognitivism
- b) Non-cognitivism
- c) Realism
- d) Supernaturalism

Answer: A

230. According to Kant, laws of nature are laws according to which \_\_\_\_, and laws of freedom are laws according to which \_\_\_\_.

- a) everything will happen; everything will happen
- b) everything will happen; everything ought to happen
- c) everything ought to happen; everything will happen
- d) everything ought to happen; everything ought to happen

Answer: b

231. According to Kant, moral laws are:

- a) necessary and apply to all rational beings.
- b) contingent and apply only to human beings.
- c) culturally relative.
- d) grounded in God's commands.

Answer: a

232. According to Kant, the moral worth of an action depends on:

- a) the moral character of the agent who performs it.
- b) the consequences of the action.
- c) the maxim that is acted on.
- d) all of the above.

Answer: c

233. Kant claims that the natural purpose of reason is to:

- a) produce happiness.
- b) produce pleasure.
- c) produce knowledge.
- d) produce a good will.

Answer: d

234. According to Kant, morality requires us to:

- a) perform the action that leads to the greatest total happiness.
- b) act only on maxims that we can will to become universal laws.
- c) behave only in such a way as a perfectly virtuous person would behave.

d) place the interests of others above the interests of ourselves.

Answer: b

235. According to Kant, the supreme principle of morality is:

a) analytic and a priori.

b) analytic and a posteriori.

c) synthetic and a priori.

d) synthetic and a posteriori.

Answer: c

236. Kant claims that the moral law is given to each person by:

a) society.

b) one's own will.

c) God.

d) Nature.

Answer: b

237. According to Kant, the basis of morality is the concept of:

a) charity.

b) fairness.

c) piety.

d) freedom.

Answer: d

238. According to Kant, laws of nature are laws according to which \_\_\_\_, and laws of freedom are laws according to which \_\_\_\_.

a) everything will happen; everything will happen

b) everything will happen; everything ought to happen

c) everything ought to happen; everything will happen

d) everything ought to happen; everything ought to happen

Answer: b

239. Kant claims respect is

a) a feeling

b) a desire.

c) an inclination.

d) all of the above.

Answer: a

240. According to Kant, moral laws are

a) necessary and apply to all rational beings.

b) contingent and apply only to human beings.

c) culturally relative.

d) grounded in God's commands.

Answer: a

241. Kant claims that an action is morally good only if

a) it conforms to the moral law.

- b) it is done for the sake of the moral law.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Answer: c

242. According to Kant, perfect duties

- a) prescribe policies.
- b) prescribe goals.
- c) admit of no exceptions.
- d) admit of some exceptions.

Answer: c

243. According to Kant, the only thing that is good without qualification is

- a) pleasure.
- b) character.
- c) wisdom.
- d) a good will.

Answer: d

244. Kant claims that acting (as opposed to having an involuntary spasm) presupposes that one acts

- a) for a reason.
- b) on a desire.
- c) to promote the good.
- d) in accordance with God's will.

Answer: a

245. In Kant's terminology, a maxim is

- a) a principle on which one acts.
- b) a moral duty.
- c) an action that brings about more good than any other available action.
- d) a bit of folk wisdom.

Answer: a

246. According to Kant, morality requires us to

- a) perform the action that leads to the greatest total happiness.
- b) act only on maxims that we can will to become universal laws.
- c) behave only in such a way as a perfectly virtuous person would behave.
- d) place the interests of others above the interests of ourselves.

Answer: b

247. Kant claims that the dictates of morality are

- a) contractarian imperatives.
- b) hypothetical imperatives.
- c) categorical imperatives.
- d) consequentialist imperatives.

Answer: c

248. According to Kant, the supreme principle of morality is

- a) analytic and a priori.
- b) analytic and a posteriori.
- c) synthetic and a priori.
- d) synthetic and a posteriori.

Answer: c

249. According to the humanity formulation of the categorical imperative, we should always act

- a) so as to treat humanity as an end in itself.
- b) so as to treat humanity as a means.
- c) so as to maximize the well-being of humanity.
- d) so as to put the interests of humanity before our own interests.

Answer: a

250. Kant claims that the moral law is given to each person by

- a) society.
- b) one's own will.
- c) God.
- d) nature.

Answer: b

251. Kant refers to a will that is determined by things outside of itself as

- a) compelled.
- b) heteronomous.
- c) contradictory.
- d) debased.

Answer: b

252. According to Kant, the basis of morality is the concept of

- a) charity.
- b) fairness.
- c) piety.
- d) freedom.

Answer: d

253. Mill defines "utility" as:

- a) usefulness for some craft.
- b) usefulness to society.
- c) pleasure and the absence of pain.
- d) it promotes the interests of all and does not harm anyone.

Answer: c

254. When faced with the complaint that utilitarianism is a doctrine worthy of swine, Mill responds that pleasures differ in:

- a) purity.
- b) quality.
- c) species.
- d) weight.

Answer: b

255. Mill claims that a happy life is one of:

- a) tranquility.
- b) excitement.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Answer: c

256. Mill claims that in deciding how to act:

- a) we should always calculate the expected consequences of our action.
- b) we should depend on rules of thumb derived from the principle of utility.
- c) we should consult tradition.
- d) we should consult scripture.

Answer: b

257. Mill claims that the principle of utility:

- a) can be proven from self-evident principles.
- b) can be proven from principles that are known empirically.
- c) cannot be proven, and this is a unique problem for the theory.
- d) cannot be proven, but this is common to all first principles.

Answer: d

258. Mill argues that virtue:

- a. is not desirable.
- b. is desirable only as a means to one's own happiness.
- c. is desirable only as a means to the happiness of others.
- d. is desirable as part of one's happiness.

Answer: d

259. Mill claims that one of the strongest objections to utilitarianism is drawn from the idea of:

- a) duty.
- b) justice.
- c) virtue.
- d) supererogation.

Answer: b

260. Mill claims that the distinction between justice and other moral obligations corresponds perfectly to the distinction between:

- a) perfect and imperfect obligations.
- b) positive and negative duties.
- c) strong and weak duties.
- d) absolute and relative obligations.

Answer: a

261. Bentham claims that nature has placed mankind under two sovereign masters:

- a) pain and pleasure.
- b) good and evil.

- c) God and the devil.
- d) duty and self-interest.

Answer: a

262. According to Bentham, the principle of utility is appropriately applied to:

- a) individuals.
- b) governments.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Answer: c

263. According to Bentham, considerations of pain and pleasure determine:

- a) what we ought to do.
- b) what we will do.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Answer: c

264. Concerning the relationship between morality and theology, Bentham claims that:

- a) we must first know whether something is right before we can know whether it conforms to God's will.
- b) we must first know whether something conforms to God's will before we can know that it is right.
- c) God exists, but does not concern himself with matters of morality.
- d) God does not exist.

Answer: a

265. According to Bentham, a moral sanction is:

- a) pleasure or pain inflicted by chance members of the community.
- b) pleasure or pain inflicted by a judge in accordance with a rule.
- c) pleasure or pain that it is permissible to inflict on someone.
- d) none of the above.

Answer: a

266. Bentham defines the fecundity of a pleasure or pain as:

- a) its chance of occurring.
- b) the degree to which it is felt.
- c) its chance of being followed by sensations of the same kind.
- d) how long it lasts.

Answer: c

267. Bentham claims that actions are right or wrong in virtue of:

- a) the motives behind them.
- b) their consequences.
- c) both a and b.
- d) neither a nor b.

Answer: c

268. Bentham claims that utilitarian calculations:

- a) should be performed prior to each action.
- b) need not be performed before each action, but should always be kept in mind.
- c) are merely a formal device, and do not have practical application.
- d) are fundamentally flawed.

Answer: b

269. Which of the following is not a requirement on the definition of "legal punishment"?

- a) It must be for an offense against legal rules.
- b) It must involve unpleasant consequences.
- c) It must not necessarily be of an actual or supposed offender.
- d) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender.

Answer: c

270. According to consequentialist theories of punishment, a lawbreaker should be punished only if:

- a) the punishment would likely produce as much overall intrinsic value as would any other alternative punishment
- b) the punishment is consistent with treating the person as an end in himself
- c) the punishment is proportional to the wrongness of the crime
- d) all of the above

Answer: a

271. According to Nathanson, criminals who commit murder forfeit their right to:

- a) life
- b) respect
- c) privacy
- d) humane treatment

Answer: c

272. One message that Nathanson argues we can send by abolishing the death penalty is that:

- a) we respect the dignity of human life
- b) there are some penalties worse than death
- c) there is no punishment that is proportional to murder
- d) none of the above

Answer: a

273. van den Haag thinks that we can't know whether or not a murderer who receives the death penalty:

- a) is justly punished
- b) suffers more than the victim
- c) is morally degraded
- d) is punished excessively

Answer: b

274. Reiman suggests that the refusal to execute criminals teaches:

- a) the wrongfulness of murder
- b) that the death penalty is a better deterrent than life imprisonment
- c) that criminals already face the risk of death
- d) that criminals are usually undeterred by the chance of receiving the death penalty

Answer: a

275. Which of the following is not one of the potentially negative consequences of imposing the death penalty?

- a) the prevention of future murders
- b) great financial cost
- c) the incitement effect
- d) the execution of innocent persons

Answer: a

276. The consequentialist approach to punishment is at odds with:

- a) retributive theories of punishment
  - b) perfectionist theories of punishment
  - c) legal theories of punishment
  - d) preventive theories of punishment
- In response to the argument that the death penalty does not deter murderers,

Answer: a

277. van den Haag claims that:

- a) he is still confident that the threat of the death penalty at least sometimes prevents murder
- b) criminal law is supposed to protect the innocent over murderers
- c) the severity and finality of the death penalty is appropriate to the seriousness and finality of murder
- d) all of the above

Answer: d

278. Nathanson proposes a form of retributivism that requires all of the following except:

- a) a list of crimes ranked according to their seriousness
- b) a scale of punishments that correspond to the seriousness of certain crimes
- c) treating criminals humanely
- d) the death penalty for the most serious crimes

Answer: d

279. One of the messages Nathanson believes we can send by abolishing the death penalty is that:

- a) criminals deserve inhumane treatment
- b) killing in self-defense is never morally justified
- c) we should have respect for the dignity of human beings
- d) murderers should be killed by the state

Answer: c

280. van den Haag responds to the "miscarriages of justice" objection by claiming that:

- a) miscarriages of justice are offset by the moral benefits and usefulness of doing justice
- b) there have been no miscarriages of justice, in the sense used in the objection
- c) miscarriages of justice are inevitable and so irrelevant
- d) none of the above

Answer: a

281. Reiman could be described as:

- a) a consequentialist
- b) a believer in the principle of equality
- c) an abolitionist
- d) a retentionist

Answer: c

282. Which of the following is a common type of error that occurs in capital cases?

- a) suppression of evidence by the defendant
- b) incompetent counsel for the defense
- c) incompetent judges
- d) suppression of evidence by the defense attorney

Answer: b

283. Which of the following is a likely implication of the central findings about the error rates in capital cases?

- a) The costs of reviewing capital cases will increase.
- b) The public's faith and confidence in the courts will decline.
- c) Criminals convicted of a capital offense will remain on death row for 10 years.
- d) The public's support for the death penalty will increase.

Answer: b

284. Which one of the following upholds the view that, 'ought', 'right', 'good' and the like have meaning only when defined in terms of pleasure?

- a) J.S. Mill
- b) C.S. Pierce
- c) Aristotle
- d) Bentham

Answer: (D)

285. Kant's Conception of the 'Kingdom of Ends' approximates to the Gita's Conception of \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Asceticism
- b) Solidarity of humanity
- c) Humanism
- d) Atheism

Answer: (B)

286. Ontological Dualism is a theory which holds \_

- a) Mind and body are different entities acting together.
- b) Mind and matter are independent of each other.
- c) There are two ultimate realities which act together in a coherent manner.
- d) There are two ultimate realities independent of each other.

**Answer: (D)**

287. "What kind of world we perceive and experience depends upon what kind of beings we are."

This is the conclusion of

- a) Kant
- b) Descartes
- c) Aristotle



- a) Rigorism
  - b) Emotivism
  - c) Intuitionism
  - d) Utilitarianism
- i. Moore
  - ii. Kant
  - iii. Butler
  - iv. Ayer
- Codes:  
a b c d

- a) i ii iii iv
- b) ii iv i iii
- c) ii iv iii i
- d) i iv iii ii

**Answer: (C)**

295. Match List – I with List – II and mark correct answer from given code:

- |                              |                           |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| List – I                     | List – II                 |
| a. Self is Real              | i. Justice                |
| b. Respect for World Harmony | ii. Postulate of Morality |
| c. Cardinal Virtue           | iii. Duty                 |
| d. Retributive Theory        | iv. Punishment            |

Codes:

a b c d

- a) ii iv i iii
- b) iii ii iv i
- c) i iii ii iv
- d) ii iii i iv

**Answer: (D)**

296. Emotivism upholds that ethical statements do not express

- a) Truths or falsehoods
- b) Ontological states
- c) Rational states
- d) Effective states

**Answer: (A)**

297. 'Naturalistic fallacy' is

- a) The outcome of naturalism
- b) The outcome of naturalized epistemology
- c) The outcome of natural theology
- d) The outcome of identifying an ethical concept with natural concept

**Answer: (D)**

298. Nominalism is a theory which says

- a) That universals are not real but are only names or words.
- b) The universals are not names.
- c) That universals are established on reason.
- d) That universals are concepts.

**Answer: (A)**

299. Which one of the following is not a statement of value?

- a) Honesty is the best policy.
- b) We believe honesty to be the best policy.
- c) Never indulge in dishonesty.
- d) let us all be honest.

**Answer:** (B)

300. Which one of the following is not a synthetic a priori judgement, according to Kant?

- a) All bodies have weight.
- b) All bodies have specific gravity.
- c)  $9 + 7 = 16$
- d) Every change has a cause.

**Answer:** (Wrong question)

301. In Kantian ethics 'an objective principle of action' is called

- a) A maxim
- b) A rule
- c) A practical law
- d) An imperative

**Answer:** (A)

302. According to Kant, moral duty is

- a) The command of God
- b) Imperative of pure reason
- c) Determined by majority
- d) Given by one's intuition

**Answer:** (B)

303. Which one of the following upholds that, "society must not exist for society's sake" but for "a type of being who is able to raise himself to its higher task and to a higher state of being"?

- a) Hegel
- b) Nietzsche
- c) Sri Aurobindo
- d) Marx

**Answer:** (B)

304. Match List – I with List – II and select the correct answer from the codes given below:

List – I

- a. Subjective Idealism
- b. Commonsense Realism
- c. Absolute Idealism
- d. Critical Idealism

a b c d

List – II

- i. Kant
- ii. Thomas Reid
- iii. Hegel
- iv. Berkeley

Codes:

- a) iv iii ii i
- b) i ii iii iv
- c) iv ii iii i
- d) iii ii iv i

**Answer: (C)**

305. Which of the Philosophers noted below stated? "Utility means the property of any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness or to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered."?

- a) James Mill
- b) J.S. Mill
- c) Hume
- d) Jeremy Bentham

**Answer: (D)**

306. Consider the following statements with regard to Bentham and choose the correct code:  
Statements:

- 1. Bentham dismissed ethics of asceticism as an inverted hedonism.
- 2. Bentham is an ethical hedonist by virtue of his employment of the pleasure principle as the standard for conduct.
- 3. Intuitionist ethics was criticized by Bentham for it provides no more than a subjective feeling.

Codes:

- a) Only 1 and 3 are true.
- b) Only 1 and 2 are true
- c) 1, 2 and 3 are true.
- d) Only 2 is true.

**Answer: (C)**

307. 'Free-will' in ethics means

- a) The individual is free to do anything
- b) The individual is not free to do anything
- c) The individual is free to act keeping in view of some norms
- d) None of the above

**Answer: (C)**

308. Who highlighted the problem of personal identity first in modern western philosophy?

- a) Strawson
- b) Locke
- c) Kripke
- d) Descartes

**Answer: (B)**

309. The four moral sanctions by Bentham are

- a) Natural, Cultural, Political, Social
- b) Natural, Political, Social, Religious
- c) Natural, Economical, Political, Religious
- d) Natural, Economical, Cultural, Religious

**Answer: (B)**

310. Match List – I with List – II and select the correct answer code from below:

List – I

List – II

- |                                |               |
|--------------------------------|---------------|
| a. Rational Utilitarianism     | i. G.E. Moore |
| b. Quantitative Utilitarianism | ii. Sidgwick  |
| c. Ideal Utilitarianism        | iii. Bentham  |
| d. Qualitative Utilitarianism  | iv. J.S. Mill |
- Codes:  
a b c d

- a) i iv ii iii
- b) iii i iv ii
- c) ii iv i iii
- d) ii iii i iv

**Answer:** (D)

311. Consider the statements of J.S. Mill given below and mark the correct code:

1. J.S. Mill's theory is Altruistic hedonism and qualitative utilitarianism.
2. Mill uses pleasure and happiness synonymously.
3. Mill regards virtue, health, love of honour and the like as intrinsic values.

Codes:

- a) 1, 2 and 3 are true.
- b) 1 and 2 are true.
- c) 1 and 3 are true.
- d) Only 2 is true.

**Answer:** (B)

## **UNIT – 5**

### Contemporary Indian Philosophy

## **Vivekananda: Practical Vedanta Introduction**

His philosophy is vedantic based on the beliefs that God alone is real, that man is God his self, and that this realization of divinity in oneself and others is the goal of life. Vivekananda, however, modifies what he considered to be classical Vedanta. He refused to believe that vedantas is theoretical and held that it is practical. He did not agree with the view that Vedanta teaches quietism and renunciation. He did not also reconcile himself the view of individual salvation where the rest of humanity groaned and sighed in misery and held that vedanta could be practiced in this very world. Two points deserve mention in this connection. One is that inspite of the best motive the second point is that Vedanta in the hands of Vivekananda becomes as instrument for revitalizing and regulating India by the masses strong, selfreliant and great. In the philosophy of Vivekananda, contemplation and activity, Nirvakalpa Samadhi and humanitarians work, God and the world run parallel to each other. Neither spirituality is abandoned nor social service is neglected but they are synthesized.

## **Words of Swami Vivekananda**

- It is a tremendous error to feel helpless. Do not seek help from anyone. We are our own help. If we cannot help ourselves, there is none to help us.
- The one theme of the Vedanta philosophy is the search after unity.
- If I do a good action, there is no power in the universe which can stop its being good results.
- Nothing else is necessary but these Love, Sincerity & patience.

## **Vedanta**

The philosophy of Vedanta has been evolved from the Upanishads which occur at the end of the Vedas. Its key-note is strength, and unity in variety its immortal theme. It demonstrates the essential unity of all religions, recognizing them all as so many paths of the same Truth. It accepts all the great prophets, teachers, and sons of God, for it holds that all are manifestations of the one Godhead; and accepting all, it does not attempt to make converts. It does not inculcate dogmas but offers a rational basis for the principles and practices common to religions everywhere. Therefore its teaching appeal to men and women irrespective of race, nationality and religious persuasion. In the light of its teaching the followers of different religions have a better understanding of their respective religions, and of other religions as well. The practice of Vedanta is usually called Yoga, a general name for the practical techniques by which the theoretical knowledge of the philosophy is realized. It is a much more comprehensive scheme of life than the posture and breathing exercises which sometimes pass for yoga. It is concerned not so much with the subnormal and the abnormal, as with the normal and its evolution into the supernormal.

## **Practical Vedanta**

Vivekananda, the person who could perform the colossal feat of finishing the first eleven volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica (out of a total of twenty) had a passionate urge to experience directly the ecstatic absorption with the subject objectless (asamprajanta) beatific supernal state. The late Brajendra Nath seal testifies to the deep and restless passion of Vivekananda to apprehend the highest truth from his early young days. Although the Swami was a revered teacher of the monistic Vedanta, still the devotional mood characteristic of the great Vedantic Acharyas, like Madhava and Vallabha – was also prominent in his person. The world knows him as a gigantic mind who employed his stupendous will power and energy to bring about a regeneration of India. This monk, social energies and humanist philanthropist wanted, as he said, to fall on the society

like an avalanche. He was a pilgrim of the city of god and a warrior for the cause of the suppressed. Hence the Swami's personality was notable for its comprehensiveness and deep sensitiveness to the evils prevalent in the socio- economic and moral structure of the country. He preached both monistic asceticism and social service. His intellectual vision was immensely clear and he could easily penetrate into the currents and cross currents that were manifested in the history of India. Vivekananda advocated the monism of the Upanishads as systematized by Badarayana and Samkara. The ever - conceit blissful reality was to him the supreme extent and the eternal real and could be realized as a result of philosophic thinking and living. The world, according to the view of samkara, is the vivarta of Brahma. But Vivekananda did not wholly deny the reality of the cosmos, although he was bound to do so philosophically. He was inspired by his great teacher who believed in the "motherhood" of the governing principle of universe, a tantric doctrine and formula, which in its incipient forms is also found in the religious systems of the ancient Indus valley and western Asia.

Vivekananda has pointed out in his American lectures that the vedantic metaphysics. Which teaches spiritual equality is the real guarantee of an equal treatment to the vast masses. The French revolution taught liberty and equality, but it degenerated into the despotic imperialisms of Napoleons 1 and 111 and the Russian slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat is now the slogan of the dictatorship of a manipulating group, 'the vanguard' because these explosive movements were not ethically inspired. After all, genuine ethics and social morality are meant for good behavior and the development of freedom, right, self-consciousness and good in the world. The vedantic metaphysics does not neutralize the subjective disposition to ethical life because of its Mayavada but strengthens moral action by providing to that a rock-like spiritual foundation.

### **Vedanta: Three fundamental truths**

1. That man's real nature is divine.
2. That is the aim of man's life on earth to unfold and manifest his Godhead, which is eternally existent within him, but hidden.
3. That truth is universal.

### **Fundamental Truths of Vedanta According to Swami Vivekananda**

1. The inherent divinity of man.
2. The non-duality of the Ultimate Reality, of Brahman or Atman.
3. The ultimate Reality as Brahman or the Absolute of Philosophy, is also the Intimate Reality as Iswara or God, of religion.
4. The Ultimate Reality as the Atman becomes capable, of not just a belief in Him, but of the realization or experience or anubhava of Him, by man.
5. Such anubhava, and the struggle towards it, constitutes dynamic spirituality, and the true meaning of religion, and not just a belief in His existence and a static piety based on it.
6. Such dynamic spirituality means the steady spiritual growth of man, or his growth in his spiritual dimension, by developing increasing awareness by him of his inborn divine nature.
7. Such spiritual growth is to be achieved by man in the context of his life and work by the comprehensive spiritual technique of Yoga as taught in the Bhagavad Gita, which bridges the gulf between the secular and the sacred, between life and religion.

## **Conclusion**

Swami Vivekananda explored Indian philosophy and drew ethical Systems on the basis of Advaita Vedanta, offering solution for the salvation of humankind. He recognized the energy of individual human as a form of divinity and built a tremendous positive psychology for humankind. He applied philosophy of Advaita Vedanta to build humanity and spirituality. It all reflected his practical Vedanta idealism. Vivekananda was as a great philosopher of Advaita Vedanta and social reformer in colonial India. The spiritual thoughts of Vivekananda have their moorings in the Vedanta philosophy, which is a systematic exposition of the Upanishads. However, he gives a modern interpretation of the ancient ideas to make them practical. He says, The Vedanta, therefore, as a religion must be intensely practical. We must be able to carry it out in every part of our lives.

## **Universality of Religion**

Swami Vivekananda views on universality of religion are one of the finest examples of gallic grace in intellectual culture. The stunning revelation in this digital age is that religion is a matter for the future far more than for the past. "Religion" for Vivekananda, is synonymous with "Universalism" of the spirit. For Vivekananda, religion should be universal in spirit and it should be maintained. Some people say that religion or spiritual ideas are dying out, but it is not true. On the contrary they have just begun to grow. In the past religion was confined into the hands of priests, temples, churches, rituals and dogmas, but that is not true religion. To be true and universal religion it should be free from these shackles. Only that religion is real and living which pervades our nature, our life and our society. Such a religion will always do well to all. All religions must have understanding and should in teach tolerance. On the other hand religion should work as a cementing force to unite the mankind. It can be done by a fair co- ordination of spiritual and materialistic thought, as in the present age science cannot be neglected. The true essence of religion is really coming out, as now people have become more realistic and reasonable. The true and universal religion is in the offering which is very natural, real and living. This will do good not of the individual only but of the whole society. Swami Vivekananda quoted "To devote your life to the good of all and to the happiness of all is religion. Whatever you do for your own sake is not religion." Religion was made to ask people to lead a virtuous life. It is also used to run the society in the right way where people should use their rights and perform their duties. That is why religion had the concepts of praise and punishment. Due to fear of God, people did their duties in the right direction. It went on smoothly for long but then it lost its way. Due to materialist progress people lost faith in religious rituals and dogmas. Now the people have developed better reasoning and they started asking questions about the existence of God and his creation. The paper aims to depict about the universality of religion as preached by Swami Vivekananda and will enlighten the true concept of religion and shed away many cobwebs that have been woven around it by those who misinterpret religion for the narrow, short-term vested interests.

Today we recall with pride and reverence the hallowed memory of Swami Vivekananda who occupies a unique place in the shining galaxy of the illustrious sons of modern India. Swami Vivekananda was an Indian nationalist among nationalists. But his contacts with the West had made him an internationalist with true concept of universality of religion.

Religion is deeply rooted in man and from time immemorial it has been running through his blood. It has been a dominating factor in man and his way of thinking and behaviour. In many ways, religion has been a very intimate matter in man and his life. Indian philosopher Swami Vivekananda has discovered a unique explanation to the concept of religion. He argued for the necessity of a universal religion. For him, religion is not just a talk on doctrines or theories, neither

lives in sects and societies. It is a relationship between soul and god. He explained that religion does not consist in erecting temples or building churches and attending public worship, also not available in the books or in words or in lectures or in organizations. Religion consists of realization. Religion does not consist in subscribing to a particular creed or faith but in spiritual realization. Therefore spiritual realization is a religion. To create a peaceful co-existence within global society, acceptance of true religion is essential.

The spirit of Swami Vivekananda's message may be brought out by quoting some of his memorable assertions. He wanted Indians to be strong; he did not believe that real religion could flourish on empty stomachs. It would do well to remember what he said: "Our young men must be strong; Religion will come afterwards. Be strong, my young friends, that is my advice to you. You will be nearer to Heaven through football than through the study of Gita. You will understand Gita better with your biceps, your muscles a little stronger. You will understand the mighty genius and the mighty strength of Krishna better with a little strong blood in you. You will understand the Upanishads better and the glory of the Atman when your body stands firm on your feet and you feel yourselves as men."

Swami Vivekananda pointed out the different people in the world approach spiritually in different ways. He asserted that man and his true nature is already divine. But that divinity is hidden. Therefore, the realization of that divinity is the purpose of life which is the essence of religion. To realize that religion, according to Vivekananda, man should have to practice four yogas. Those are the yoga of knowledge, control of mankind, selfless work and love of God. Therefore religion is the essence of human life and it has the great motivating power in one's life including his social, economic and political aspect.

This paper will analyze Swami Vivekananda's concept of universal religion, as a universal love or universal brotherhood. Vivekananda reflected on the necessity of the concept of universal religion for the society. He realized the nature of man, according to which mankind in the whole world has been trying to look beyond in the quest of his ultimate destiny or search for God. Therefore, whole of the world community is expecting a religion, which is acceptable to all.

Different social organizations are representing different needs of the man, and they endeavor to practice humaneness in society. Religions, on the other hand, represent the spiritual aspirations and struggles of mankind. The unpleasant reality is that various world religions have been indulging in mutual criticisms. Some religions in the world, claiming universal empire in the field of religion over all mankind, have engaged themselves in ruthless wars and bloodshed to achieve this end. Vivekananda has observed these two mutually opposing aspects of religion, which he explains in the following words:

"There is nothing that has brought to man more blessings than religion, yet at the same time, there is nothing that has brought more horror than religion. Nothing has made more for peace and love than religion; nothing has engendered fiercer hatred than religion. Nothing has made the brotherhood of man more tangible than religion; nothing has bred more bitter enmity between man and man than religion. Nothing has built more charitable institutions, more hospitals for men, and even for animals, than religion; nothing has deluged the world with more blood than religion."<sup>1</sup> Thus Vivekananda deeply felt the importance of religion, as well its crucial role in the human life. To improve this situation, some intellectuals and peace workers are searching a way to establish peace among the religions. Vivekananda said that "we must understand all of those religions have

proved their strength, their worth, and their necessity for mankind.”<sup>2</sup> Therefore, he underscored the equal status of all the religions in human society. Thus he brought out the weakness of conventional orthodox religion. He brought out this idea very picturesquely, when he adopted the simile of silkworms and said, “we make the thread out of our own substance and spin the cocoon and in course of time are imprisoned inside.”

Swami Vivekananda identified the need for universal religion and searched for the way to form that universal religion. He realized that the universal religion cannot be established with any one of the world religions, converting the followers of all other religions into it. Universal religion is possible only to the extent that there is a place for all religions suited to different types of humanity. Therefore, he gave due consideration to the phenomenon of diversity among the humanity in the world. Vivekananda continued:

“As human mind broadens, its spiritual steps broaden too. The time has already come when a man cannot thought without its reaching all corners of the earth; by merely physical means we have come into touch with the whole world; so the future religions of the world have to become as universal and as wide. The religious ideals of the future must embrace all that exists in the world and is good and great, and at the same time, have infinite scope for future development.”<sup>3</sup>

In this manner, Vivekananda’s point of view of Religion is both a means as well as end to human life.

Swami Vivekananda gives a thorough picture of the essentials of religions. He gives a very rational exposition of the necessity of religion and points out that ‘religion, as a science, as a study, is the greatest and healthiest exercise that the human mind can have.’ Religion is the greatest motive power for realizing that infinite energy which is the birthright and nature of every man. In building up character, in making for everything that is good and great, in bringing peace to others and peace to one’s own self, religion is the highest motive power.

This paper is meant to understand Vivekananda’s identification of the concept of universal religion and its application to the modern global world. During the past 150 years we have discussed the philosophical importance of the concept of universal religion. Now it is clear that we have to implement this concept in the world rather than discussing it. Following Swami Vivekananda we may conclude that we have only one solution for this multi-cultural and multi-religious world. It is the concept of one universal religion, the essence of Swami Vivekananda’s vision to the world. This universal ideal can be practiced not only by believers of different religions but equally by non-believers for it is founded on the ideal of oneness of humanity and it is geared for human self-realization which is not a monopoly of any particular religion. This truly global vision can form the foundation for peaceful co-existence of all in the globe.

## **Religious experience**

According to Vivekananda religious experience is the outcome of our deep realization of divinity in everything. He states “The nearer we approach to God, the more do we begin to see that all things abide to him, our heart will become a perennial fountain of love. Man is transformed in the presence of this light of love and realizes at least the beautiful and inspiring truth that love, lover and beloved one really one.” Religious experience, according to him is the feeling of oneness with all creatures. It is an attitude of oneness with all life and beyond that with the universe along with awareness of the unique entity of the self. The religious consciousness is closely related to the

experience of breaking down individual and feeling one with the all.

Vivekananda recognized the force of religious experience or spiritual development which states with the recognition of oneself as the source of potential divinity, such realization is the first mark to be religious man. To Vivekananda, religion is not mere metaphysical conversation. Its experience is spiritual, to break down avidya or maya. Religious experience is the feeling of oneness with every existence. When a man become truly religious, man transcends his individual existence and realized that the truth, that 'love' 'lover' and 'beloved' are really one. There is no barrier of space time in religious experience. Man becomes the part of the Absolute which is eternal. In religious experience we shall find that we are in the real, everything is real, and that reality is God, and this God is our own true nature. To quote Vivekananda, "He is always in us, and with us. Let us live in him and stand in him. It is the only joyful existence. Live on the plane of the spirit."

Religious experience is mystic kind of experience. This mystic kind of experience is the root of at least all major religions of the world. It is a direct experience of God and realization of presence of God in every sphere of the world. The mysticism has two tendencies. These are—first of all, within mysticism there is a negative tendency. Within mysticism we find revolt against the barriers of space and time. The second is positive tendency. The positive tendency is the tendency to rise up from the limitations imposed by space and time.

Swami Vivekananda like a mystic realized that man is bound by the order of space, time and causation. Though freedom is the very urge of every individual but his will is severely bound by the law of causation. Both the body and the will are bound by the laws of causality. His idea of freedom aspires to attain the highest, the absolute, which is permanent and unchangeable. Man struggles for freedom, and consequently man gains it in the Zenith of religious experience, when everyone becomes one with all other existence. In this state one feels everywhere the breath of God.

The concept of religious experience of Vivekananda is akin to the view of other neo-vedantin Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. He states religious experience as God realization. He says, "It is the displacement of ignorance, avidya, unawareness by knowledge, vidya or awareness. This attainment of vidya, badhi, wisdom or enlightenment makes for power. It results in a complete of one's nature, which is assimilated to new inward dimension." Vivekananda says that, mysticism is not an accidental phase of religious development. In mysticism, there is reliance on constant intuition, meditation or concentration. He writes "you see the power of meditation, intensity of thought. These men churn up their own souls. Great truth come to the surface and become manifest. Therefore the practice of meditation is the great scientific method of knowledge."

Further he delivered that meditation is the highest state, when the mind is doubtful that is not its great state. Its great state is meditation. It looks upon things and see things, not identifying itself with anything else. Vivekananda opines that as long as we feel pain, we have identified our self with the body. But the high state is a balanced state when we look pleasure or pain as the same. He says that in perfect concentration the soul becomes indeed free from the bonds of the gross body. It knows itself. We suffer because we identify our self with mortal body. The free soul knows God and then becomes God. Nothing is impossible to such a free soul. There is no more birth and death for him. Such a soul is free forever. Such kind of religious experience "The great truth of spirituality regarding oneness of existence and the divinity of men find their unique expression in

the times of these three spiritual luminaries; Shri Ramakrishna, Holy mother and Vivekananda. From Sri Ramakrishna we learn that through great longing and renunciation we can have the direct experience of God. In Holy mother we see this realization of oneness manifests itself in all embracing impartial love for all beings. And from Swamiji we understand that by serving the divine dwelling within each and every person, we can attain to the same state of realization that the saint, immersed in meditation, attains through his spiritual practices.”

Vivekananda opines that all religious experiences are not mystic experience. There are varieties of religious experience. These are visionary experience; numinous experience and mystic experience etc. Visionary experience plays an important role in the same religion. For example vision of the virgin or Jesus is common in Christianity. Such visionary experience is found in Mahayana Buddhism too, where one can find visionary experiences of the Bodhisattvas. The second type of religious experience is numinous experience. It is overwhelmed by vital and active power. As a power numinous experience is so great that one is reduced to insignificance in its presence. In numinous experience one encounters unfathomable mystery. It is dreadful as well as fascinating. Numinous experiences are sometimes focused on a human being, sometimes on a sacred place, some natural object etc. Rudolf Otto in his book 'The Idea of Holy' has given a broad analysis of this numinous experience.

## **Religion and Reason**

In his philosophical expositions of religion Swami Vivekananda pays first reverence to Reason. In a statement, he asserts- 'Is religion to justify itself by the discoveries of reason, through which every other science justifies itself? Are the same methods of investigation, which we apply to sciences and knowledge outside, to be applied to the science of Religion? In my opinion this must be so, and I am also of opinion that the sooner it is done the better. If a religion is destroyed by such investigation, it was then all the time useless unworthy superstition; and the sooner it goes the better. I am thoroughly convinced that its destruction would be the best thing that could happen.' Depending on the results of such investigations he confidently adds, "All that is dross will be taken off, no doubt, but the essential parts of religion will emerge triumphant out of this investigation. Not only will it be made scientific-as scientific, at least, as any of the conclusions of physics or chemistry-but will have greater strength, because physics and chemistry has no internal mandate to vouch for its truth, which religion has." Thus it has been understood from the above lines of Vivekananda that he wanted religion to be based on reason. In his view if any religion fails to justify its validity through reason then it will be useless for us. Such a religion is unworthy superstition.

Regarding the question how exactly speaking religion satisfies reason, Vivekananda points out that the first principle of reasoning is that the particular is explained by the general until we come to the universal. A second explanation of knowledge is that the explanation of the thing comes from inside and not outside. Elucidating the second principle further he says, "...what is meant by science is that the explanations of things are in their own nature, and that no external beings or existences are required to explain his phenomenon. The chemist never requires demons, or ghosts, or anything of that sort to explain his phenomenon. The physicist never requires anyone of these to explain the things he knows, nor does any other scientist. ... Every science wants its explanation from inside."

In his opinion religion can satisfy both these essential principles of rationality- (1) the principle of generalization, and (2) the principle of immanent change. As to how the first principle is satisfied

he says that the generalization principle ought to be satisfied along with the principle of evolution. We have to come to an ultimate generalization. This ultimate generalization will not only be the most universal of the generalizations, but out of which everything else must come. It is Vivekananda's conviction that the Brahman of the Vedanta fulfills that condition, because Brahman is the last generalization to which we can come to. Brahman has no attributes but Existence, Knowledge and Bliss. "Existence", he explains, "... is the very ultimate generalization which the human mind can come to." What we mean by knowledge is what we see in the universe as the essential unity of things. This oneness is the one fact that is being proved by modern science. Thus Vedanta satisfied the first principle of generalization.

So far as the second principle is concerned, he says that Vedanta satisfied this principle also. According to him the explanation of a thing comes from within itself is completely satisfied by Vedanta. The Brahman of Vedanta has nothing outside of Himself; nothing at all. All this indeed is He. He is the whole universe or He is the universe Himself. Therefore all the change that is perceived by us in the universe is only immanent, that is manifestations of the Brahman.

Thus Vivekananda's concept of religion which is based on Vedanta satisfies completely the principles of reasoning so that it may be acceptable to all in the modern age. This concept is revolutionary in the sense that it meets all the challenges of modern science and principles of reasoning. It is certainly a revolutionary concept that religion itself is a science.

### **Conclusion (concept of Religion)**

From the above discussion it has been seen that according to Vivekananda religion is the manifestation of the divinity already in man. So it is his conviction that man is already divine. The essence of religion is to realize God in our heart and to realize the same god in others. We have to know that we all are children of God that we have come from God, and going back to God. It is significant to mention here that Vivekananda did not restrict this divinity to man only. From the lowest worm to the highest creature-man, all are expression of the same divine. But this divinity is not manifested equally in all. There is difference in manifestation, but this difference is not in kind, but in degree. Divinity is manifested more in the highest than to that of the lower creatures. So in man this divinity is manifested supremely, as man is the highest creature. But he asserted that this divinity is one unifying principle prevailing in the whole universe.

Thus in Vivekananda's philosophy religion is nothing except the manifestation of the divinity already within man. Therefore, it is not necessary to have doctrines or dogmas and intellectual argumentation. It is realization in the very heart of man. Religion is the realization of the truth that 'I am a spirit' in relation with the universal spirit and all its great manifestations. Plainly speaking, Vivekananda's way of understanding of religion is that man must realize God, feel God, see God, and talk to God. That is the religion. To him material prosperity and wealth is not an important thing. It is the wealth of the spiritual thought in brain that is more needed to the human progress. Religion has been a great healer as well as cruel killer. True religion has the capacity to heal evil thoughts in human mind. Similarly the false religion has the capacity to bring darkness in human mind and thus leads to the destruction of the human society. Vivekananda's message was that man must occupy the highest place. Hence, the welfare of man in the true sense of the term is his predominant impulse, and a true religion is the only agent for that purpose. He further said that the supreme reality is the only source of happiness and true religion teaches us that the goal of life has to be sought in Atman.

Vivekananda asserts that though man is already divine, this divinity is hidden. The purpose of religion is to make man realize his divinity. To realize that man should practice four yogas. Those are the yoga of knowledge, or control of mind, or of selfless work, or of love of God. Vivekananda had laid down also what religion is not. According to him religion is not dogmas, doctrines, rites, rituals and other externals. But, Vivekananda did not outright reject dogmas, doctrines etc. According to him, these externals are helpful at the initial stage of religion. But man must soon cross this stage and come to the higher stage when he realizes- 'spirit as spirit'. He has given us a religion which is monistic, spiritualistic, humanistic as well as pragmatic.

Another point has to be mentioned here that Vivekananda was not a religious preacher. Though he tried to give his own concept of religion, his intention was not to establish a new religion with a new sect. In his eyes all religions of the world have equal validity. To be one with God he prescribed for four Yogas. Every individual, no matter what his religion, caste, sex is, can follow the path. According to him, diversity of religions will remain. But we must realize that the different religions will co-exist as diverse ways of worship of the one infinite. The result is not a uniform pattern of religion for diverse people but the accordance of all religions as true by all.

The central theme of his religion is the divinity of man. It is Vivekananda's conviction that the knowledge of this divinity is the secret of man's development, secular as well as spiritual. This knowledge of divinity gives him infinite faith in himself and the awareness that he has infinite potentialities. He is thus invested with great strength which finds expression in creativeness of various types and dimensions enriching the society also.

Swami Vivekananda has introduced a universal form of worship. Since every human being has the same divinity in him, we can worship God by serving man. He says "You may build a temple in which to worship God, and that may be good, but a better one, already exists, the human body." This religion is new in the sense that it does not depend on persists, churches, temples, books, dogmas, ceremonials and rituals. It dispenses with all these auxiliaries prone to be misused.

At last we must mention that Vivekananda never tried to be a preacher of Hinduism or any other such religion. In our first chapter we have seen that the miserable condition of the Indian masses has given birth to the philosophy of Vivekananda. Vivekananda urged on the people of India to realize their own true self so that they could get self-confidence. He had another intention in his mind. He was convinced that if the higher class peoples, specially those belonged to the well-to-do and literate families, realized the presence of God in everyone, they would come forward to help the helpless. But this was not his selfish motive. He just preached what was the truth.

### **Swami Vivekananda: Three basic parts of religion**

Swami Vivekananda knew that religions of the world differ from each other. He has taken into consideration the three basic parts of religion. In every great religion there are three parts-. First, there is the philosophy which presents the whole scope of that religion; setting forth is basic principles, the goal, and the means of reaching it. The second part is mythology, which is philosophy made concrete. It consists of legends relating to the lives of men, or of supernatural beings, and so forth. It is the abstractions of philosophy concretized in the more or less imaginary lives of men and supernatural beings. The third part is the ritual. This is still more concrete, and is made up of forms and ceremonies, various physical attitudes, flowers and incense, and many other things that appeal to the senses. In these consists the ritual. All recognized religions have these three elements. Some lay more stress on one, some on another.

We now take into consideration these three parts one by one.

**(i) Philosophy-**

Vivekananda says that there is no universal philosophy. Philosophy of a certain religion is that which presents the whole scope of that religion, its basic principles, the goal as well as the means to realize the goal etc. Each religion brings out its own doctrines, and insists upon them as being the only true ones. And not only does it do that, but it thinks that he who does not believe in them must go to some horrible place. Some will even draw the sword to compel others to believe as they do. This is not through wickedness, but through a particular disease of the human brain called fanaticism.

**(ii) Mythology-**

Again according to Vivekananda there is no universal mythology accepted by all religions. All religions have their own mythology, only each of them says, 'My stories are not mere myths.' Vivekananda explains this point with example of different religions. The Christian believes that God took the shape of a dove, and came down to earth. To him this is history, and not mythology. The Hindu believes that God is manifested in the cow. Christians say that to believe so is mere mythology, and not history, that it is superstition. The Jews think that if an image be made in the form of a box, or a chest, with an angel on either side, then it may be placed in the Holy of Holies, but if the image be made in the form of a beautiful man or woman, they say 'This is a horrible idol; break it down!' Thus there is no universally accepted mythology. Each religion has its own cult-God, often jealous of other deities, and of prophets, incarnations etc., to whom their votaries are fanatically devoted. What certain religions claims as historical truth is only mythological, and in all world religions various combinations of mythology and history are treated as sacred literature, and dogmas are based on them.

**(iii) Rituals:**

Next comes the rituals. Every religious sect has its own rituals. One sect has one particular form of ritual, and thinks that is holy, while the rituals of another sect are simply arrant superstition. If one sect worships a peculiar sort of symbol, another sect denies it as horrible. Take for instance a general form of symbol. The phallus symbol is certainly a sexual symbol, but gradually that aspect of it has been forgotten, and it stands now as a symbol of the creator. Those nations which have this as their symbol never think of it as the phallus; it is just a symbol. But a man from another race or creed sees in it nothing but the phallus, and begins to condemn it; yet at the same time he may be doing something which to the so-called phallic worshipers appears most horrible. Vivekananda takes two points for illustration, the phallus symbol and the sacrament of the Christians. To the Christians the phallus is horrible, and to the Hindus the Christian sacrament is horrible. The Hindus say that the Christians sacrament, the killing of a man and eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood to get the good qualities of that man is cannibalism. This is what some of the savage tribes do; if a man is brave, they kill him and eat his heart, because they think that it will give them the qualities of courage and bravery possessed by that man. Even such a devout Christians as Sir John Lubbock admits this, and says that the origin of this Christiansymbol is in this savage idea. The Christians, of course, do not admit this view of its origin; and what it may imply never comes to their mind. It stands for a holy thing, and that is all they want to know. So even in ritual there is no universal symbol, which can command general recognition and acceptance.

From the above discussion it has been understood that that according to Vivekananda there is no universally accepted philosophy, mythology or rituals. Every religion has its own philosophy,

mythology and rituals. There may be some similarities, but this philosophy, mythology and rituals are not universally accepted by the peoples of different religions of the world. So it is hard to find any universal features in regard to religion.

*"Rituals are the kindergarten of religion. They are absolutely necessary for the world as it is now; only we shall have to give people newer and fresh rituals. A party of thinkers must undertake to do this. Old rituals must be rejected and new ones substituted"*. — Swami Vivekananda in

## **Theory of Evolution**

Theories of evolution can broadly be classified into two different ways. Scientists discuss theory of evolution from a naturalistic point of view on the basis of wide observation of facts. In scientific framework evolution provides a rationale to explain the origin of different species, the physical environment, changes in nature etc. Biologists explain the various variations and the causes of annihilation of species. Social scientists also explain the evolution of social institutions, evolution of languages, political ideals, state etc. Philosophers on the contrary discuss evolution on the basis of some assumption, postulates of metaphysical speculations. Great thinkers like Hegel, Bergson, and Alexander have given different theories of evolution. Sri Aurobindo has also presented a metaphysical view of evolution. Each of these thinkers presume something as absolute in their scheme of explanation. Hegel takes spirit or Reason, Bergson takes Elan Vital (Vital impulse), Alexander considers space-Time and Sri Aurobindo conceives consciousness to be absolute being in order to account for a meaningful explanation of evolution. In case of scientific view of evolution we do not come across incompatible doctrines where in case of metaphysical theories we find mutually incompatible views as they are based on assumption and subjective postulates of the philosopher.

Sri Aurobindo is a metaphysical thinker and in the contemporary philosophical idiom can be characterized as a revisionary metaphysician. His metaphysical system presents a theory of evolution which is very significant in his scheme of thought. His metaphysics and theory of evolution as well is based on his notion of reality. Sri Aurobindo's position can be characterized as spiritualistic or in a technical sense intergalactic. He rejects materialism as a metaphysical doctrine. Materialism has been expressed in different ways but its essential assumption is that matter is the ultimate ontological reality which Sri Aurobindo denies. He does not accept any illusionistic account of the world nor does accept the unreality of matter. He takes Reality as Sacchidananda, Sat (existence), Chit (Consciousness), and Ananda (Bliss). He takes Reality as supremely spiritual just as the concept of Brahman is conceived in Vedanta philosophy. Brahman is infinity in the sense that it is not categorized by space and time. To be spatiotemporal means to be finite, but since the ultimate reality is not conditioned by space and time, it is infinite. Further reality is the cosmic consciousness not in the sense of being an attribute of anything but consciousness as such. It is something transcendental. It is construed as being the Divine Force. So also the reality is conceived as something blissful. Similarly, to the idea of theistic God, that is, omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent, so too Sri Aurobindo conceives of the Ultimate Reality as infinite existence, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. Keeping this metaphysical speculation of reality as envisaged by Sri Aurobindo, now we shall proceed to explain his theory of evolution. Sri Aurobindo's theory of evolution is spiritualistic for spirit or consciousness projects itself out of itself. Consciousness plays the most significant role in every step of evolution. Evolution is the manifestation of consciousness. Sri Aurobindo explains evolution with another presupposition which is called involution. He believes that there is evolution because prior to evolution there is some involution. Evolution and involution are reverse process. If evolution is considered to be a

state of ascent, then it can be understood by the idea of being adescent. Ascent is evolution and descent is involution. In the evolutionary process the unconscious matter is at the bottom. Evolution starts from matter and its goal is to reach the state of Life Divine that is at the top. The process of cosmic evolution begins with matter.

Matter evolves into life and life evolves into mind. Evolution is at present at the state of mental plane. In the process of creation there has been immanent movement of consciousness or the Absolute to successive lower ones and finally to the inconscient matter. If the matter evolves and gives rise to life and life evolves again and gives rise to mind that is because consciousness has descended to mind, then to life and finally to matter. Since there is an inherent presence of involution of consciousness down the life from the Absolute to the inconscient matter, there is evolution from matter in an upward direction. In the words of Sri Aurobindo evolution is the inverse action of involution. What is an ultimate and last derivation in involution is the first to appear in evolution. If Absolute consciousness is the primal existence which comes descending to the level of matter, then it is matter that starts evolving and its ultimate goal is to reach the state of absolute consciousness.

This grand speculation of evolution involution has been further substantiated with many descriptions in minor details. He takes evolution to be a triple process of widening, heightening and integration. Before the emergence of a higher conscious principle the lower one must become receptive, adaptive and sublime to change to the higher. For example, before emergence of life from matter, matter must undergo a qualitative change of self-differentiation. It must be receptive to take a leap to the higher condition. Similarly evolution is not only a process of widening it is also a process of heightening. Evolution of a higher principle of complexity takes place when the conscious force becomes explicit and fully manifests.

Apart from these two processes of widening and heightening, integration is another feature of evolution. In evolution when a higher principle manifests from the lower the higher principle also changes the lower one. In every ascent all the lower get transformed and turned to the new ones. With the emergence of life, matter does not cease to evolve, rather it is transformed to cope with the new situation. So too when mind emerges matter and life also become transformed, matter becoming more sensitive and life more creative in human being. With the emergence of higher principle or consciousness, all the lower principle get transformed and turned to the system. This is the integral ascent in Sri Aurobindo's vision of evolution. Sri Aurobindo maintains that cosmic evolution at present is at the mental plane. But beyond the mental plane there are higher grades of consciousness which have not yet been evolved. In the past there might be some stray cases where some men attained a height of higher consciousness. The saints, Yogis, seers, by spiritual contemplation might have ascended to a state of higher conscious plane but that vanish with the death of the individual.

The spiritual consciousness has not become an integral part or permanent with man. But Sri Aurobindo intends to take evolution ahead of the present condition and make it permanent. Sri Aurobindo speculates that beyond the mental level there are higher goods of consciousness leading to the apex height of supramental consciousness. He further imagines that there are transcendental states between the mental consciousness and supramental consciousness. So the ascent of man from mental consciousness to supramental consciousness will not happen all on a sudden, but by different grades of existence. In his model the mental consciousness will be transformed to a psychic state. With the outcome of the psychic transformation self-discipline

begins from within so that a craving is created for the realization of all that is true and noble. In this state mind becomes repulsive to what is false, obscure and undivine.

After the psychic transformation, there will be a higher state that would change the psychic personality to a spiritual personality. In this state the individual will be more elevated towards spiritual consciousness. But his state is not the final state in the evolutionary ladder. This will be followed by a supramental transformation, the apex state in the process of evolution. With the emergence of the supramental being the physical, vital and mental existence will not be annihilated but they will undergo an important change so as to cope with higher level of existence. Sri Aurobindo speculates that in case of any higher emergence, the lower is not rejected, but there happens an integral ascent and they are harmoniously turned together. The realization of supramental consciousness similarly will establish a perfect harmony in all the states of a being. The physical, vital, mental, psychic and spiritual states will harmoniously be turned together and would exhibit wider and fuller harmony than was open to them when they were living upon their own. There will be perfect adoption of all the beings and states in this spiritual evolution. The whole scheme of conceiving evolution as the reverse process of involution presents a hierarchical ascent and descent. The descent starts from the Divine coming to the supramental, to spiritual, to psychical to mental, to vital and lastly to physical.

This is Sri Aurobindo's notion of creation coming from the Divine to the physical. So evolution starts from the physical and ascending the ladder would reach the Divine through the intermediary stages. The process of creation is a Divine act or lila and evolution is the spirit's return unto itself. Sri Aurobindo's model of explaining a theory of evolution is metaphysical as it has nothing to do with empirical facts. But within a metaphysical framework it is neither mechanical nor cyclical. In mechanical evolution, evolution proceeds without any purpose or design. In a mechanical evolution the future is neither predictable nor designed. In cyclical theory of evolution, evolution and dissolution are cyclic processes one following the other. The Sankhya theory of evolution, though a metaphysical doctrine, is cyclic in nature.

Sri Aurobind's theory of evolution is teleological as he believes a divine life from man. Achievement of divine life is the creative fulfillment of man's life on earth. Again the highest achievement of this condition is not the individual fulfillment as conceived in liberation but is divinization of the collective humanity. Sri Aurobindo believes that the divinization of life would be a new birth for humanity as it can wipe out all evil from the world. Achievement of supramentalhood would establish identity among the individual selves. They will realize that they are the integral part of the universal spirit. This can be explained by an analogy. Just as one ocean embraces countless waves, so too the one universal spirit will embrace the plurality of finite individual selves. The sense of self-differentiation of the finite selves change into self-awareness of the many as eternally linked with the one spirit.

Thus Sri Aurobindo's contention is that man is not the highest reality nor is the mental consciousness the highest achievement of evolution. Beyond the mental state, there are higher planes of consciousness which can evolve and elevate manhood to supermanhood. Mind is the medium for the manifestation of the Divine. At this stage of evolution man is an imperfect image of the highest Being but man by achieving supermanhood can be the perfect image of the Divine. Further it must be pointed out that Sri Aurobindo's concept of superman is not to possess some extraordinary quality as some individuals in human history have achieved. There are some persons who had some extraordinary ability or some rare virtues which are not found in ordinary mortals.

Such person may be called superman but it has nothing to do with Sir Aurobindo's notion of superman. His notion of superman is a divinized being overpassing the level of mental consciousness. His whole assumption is that man is the last product of the evolutionary design of nature. Man will evolve to the state of superman and will go achieving higher levels of consciousness.

Again Sri Aurobindo assumes that the future evolution will be affected as a result of man's aspiration. Evolution from inorganic matter to his state has been the result of automatic operation of the nature. Sri Aurobindo holds that man's aspiration combined with the Divine grace can usher in the process of evolution. In the pre-human stage nature acted automatically for evolution of life and mind. But at this stage man's conscious endeavour would help transform his consciousness to the higher levels. Sri Aurobindo believes that mankind towards a new race. In the processes higher power of consciousness will be manifested progressively till evolution reaches its ultimate goal.

Thus Sri Aurobindo's theory of evolution as explained above is spiritual, teleological, integral and cosmic. But the entire approach is not grounded on any empirical finding. It is a metaphysical thesis based on many gross assumptions. Not only it is based on unfounded assumptions but also it contains many mystic elements. It also sounds very utopian and unrealistic. It is out and out speculative and non-naturalistic.

### **Mind and Supermind**

Sri Aurobindo provides us with a synopsis of the characteristics of mind in comparison with supermind: "Mental nature and mental thought are based on a consciousness of the finite; supramental nature is in its very grain a consciousness and power of the Infinite. Supramental nature sees everything from the standpoint of oneness and regards all things, even the greatest multiplicity and diversity, even what are to the mind the strongest contradictions, in the light of that oneness; its will, ideas, feelings, sense are made of the stuff of oneness, its actions proceed upon that basis. Mental nature, on the contrary, thinks, sees, wills, feels, senses with division as a starting-point and has only a constructed understanding of unity; even when it experiences oneness, it has to act from the oneness on a basis of limitation and difference. But the supramental, the divine life is a life of essential, spontaneous and inherent unity."

In terms of action, the mind tries to construct a set of rules or a framework of understanding which cannot possibly contain within it an understanding of the basis for action of the supramental consciousness. "supramental nature does not act by mental idea or rule or in subjection to any inferior impulse: each of its steps is dictated by an innate spiritual vision, a comprehensive and exact penetration into the truth of all and the truth of each thing; it acts always according to inherent reality, not by the mental idea, not according to an imposed law of conduct or a constructive thought or perceptive contrivance."

The supramental action, based in unity, and encompassing the entire universe of forms and multiplicity of energies, "arises naturally and inevitably out of a harmonic identity of the truth which is felt in the very substance of the conscious being, a spiritual substance which is universal and therefore intimately one with all that is included in its cognition of existence."

## **SRI AUROBINDO'S CONCEPT OF MIND AND ITS DIFFERENT STAGES**

### **The Higher Mind and its origin in over mind and Supermind:**

"Our first decisive step out of our human Intelligence, our normal mentality is an ascent into a higher Mind, a mind no longer of mingled light and obscurity or half-light, but a large clarity of the Spirit. Its basic substance is a unitarian sense of being with a powerful multiple dynamisation capable of the formation of a multitude of aspects of knowledge, ways of action, forms and significances of becoming, of all of which there is a spontaneous inherent knowledge. It is therefore a power that has proceeded from the over mind, -- but with the supermind as its ulterior origin, -- as all these greater powers have proceeded: but its special character, its activity of consciousness is dominated by Thought; it is a luminous thought-mind, a mind of Spirit-born conceptual knowledge."

### **Contrast between Higher Mind and Thinking Mind and Ordinary Intuition:**

"But here in this greater Thought there is no need of a seeking and self-critical ratiocination, no logical motion step by step towards a conclusion, no mechanism of express or implied deductions and inferences, no building or deliberate concatenation of idea with idea. In order to arrive at an ordered sum or outcome of knowledge: for this limping action of our reason is a movement of Ignorance searching for knowledge, obliged to safeguard its steps against error, to erect a selective mental structure for its temporary shelter and to base it on foundations already laid and carefully laid but never firm, because it is not supported on a soil of native awareness but imposed on an original soil of nescience. There is not here, either, that other way of our mind at its keenest and swiftest, a rapid hazardous divination and insight, a play of the searchlight of intelligence probing into the little known or the unknown."

### **The Higher Mind in its aspect of Cognition:**

"This higher consciousness is a Knowledge formulating itself on a basis of self-existent all-awareness and manifesting some part of its integrality, a harmony of its significances put into thought-form. It can freely express itself in single ideas, but its most characteristic movement is a mass ideation, a system or totality of truth-seeing at a single view; the relations of idea with idea, of truth with truth are not established by logic but pre-exist and emerge already self-seen in the integral whole. There is an initiation into forms of an everpresent but till now inactive knowledge, not a system of conclusions from premises or data; this thought is a self-revelation of eternal Wisdom, not an acquired knowledge. In the end there is a great totality of truth known and experienced but still a totality capable of infinite enlargement because there is no end to the aspects of knowledge, *nastyanto vistarasyame*."

### **The Higher Mind in its aspect Will:**

"This is the Higher Mind in its aspect of cognition; but there is also the aspect of will, of dynamic effectuation of the Truth: here we find that this greater more brilliant Mind works always on the rest of the being, the mental will, the heart and its feelings, the life, the body, through the power of thought, through the idea force. It seeks to purify through knowledge, to deliver through knowledge, to create by the innate power of knowledge. The idea is put into the heart or the life as a force to be accepted and worked out; the heart and life become conscious of the idea and respond to its dynamisms and their substance begins to modify itself in that sense, so that the feelings and actions become the vibrations of this higher wisdom, are informed with it, filled with the emotion and the sense of it: the will and the life impulses are similarly charged with its power and its urge of self-effectuation; even in the body the idea works so that, for example, the potent thought and

will of health replaces its faith in illness and its consent to illness, or the idea of strength calls in the substance, power, motion, vibration of strength; the idea generates the force and form proper to the idea and imposes it on our substance of Mind, Life or Matter. It is in this way that the first working precedes; it charges the whole being with a new and superior consciousness, lays a foundation of change, prepares it for a superior truth of existence."

### **These higher forces are limited in the realm of Ignorance:**

"It has here to be emphasized, in order to obviate a natural misconception which can easily arise when the superior power of the higher forces is first perceived or experienced, because they can appear dizzying and give a vast sense of possibilities. But in the lower world the situation is not the same as in their own realm. Sri Aurobindo explains that these higher forces are not in their descent immediately all-powerful as they would naturally be in their own plane of action and in their own medium. In the evolution in Matter they have to enter into a foreign and inferior medium and work upon it; they encounter there the incapacities of our mind and life and body, meet with the unreceptiveness or blind refusal of the Ignorance, and experience the negation and obstruction of the Inconscience."

### **The Cognitive Mind resists the Illumination of the Higher Mind**

"Thus the higher Idea descending into the developed mental intelligence has even there to overcome the barrage of a mass or system of formed ideas which belong to the Knowledge-Ignorance and the will to persistence and self-realization of these ideas; for all ideas are forces and have a formative or self-effective faculty greater or less according to the conditions, - even reducible to nil in practice when they have to deal with inconscient Matter, but still potential. There is thus ready-formed a power of resistance which opposes or minimizes the effects of the descending Light, a resistance which may amount to a refusal, a rejection of the Light, or take the shape of an attempt to impair, subdue, ingeniously modify or adapt or perversely deform the light in order to suit it to the preconceived ideas of the Ignorance."

### **Resistance by the Vital and the Subconscious**

"In the lower levels of the being, in the heart and life and body, the same phenomenon recurs and on a more intense scale; for here it is not ideas that have to be met but emotions, desires, impulses, sensations, vital needs and habits of the lower Nature; these, since they are less conscious than ideas, are blinder in their response and are more obstinately self-assertive: all have the same or a greater power of resistance and recurrence, or take refuge in the circum-conscient universal Nature or in our own lower levels or in a seedstate in the sub-conscient and from there have the power of new invasion or resurgence. This power of persistence, recurrence, resistance of established things in Nature is always the great obstacle which the evolutionary Force has to meet, which it has indeed created in order to prevent a too rapid transmutation even when that transmutation is its own eventual intention in things."

### **Overcoming the resistance to the transformation:**

"This obstacle will be there, -- even though it may progressively diminish, -- at each stage of this greater ascent. In order to allow at all to the higher Light an adequate entry and force of working, it is necessary to acquire a power for quietude of the nature, to compose, tranquillize, impress a controlled passivity or even an entire silence on mind and heart, life and body: but even so a continued opposition, overt and felt in the Force of the universal Ignorance or subliminal and obscure in the substance-energy of the individual's make of mind, his form of Life, his body of Matter, an occult resistance or a revolt or reaffirmation of the controlled or suppressed energies of

the ignorant nature, is always possible and, if anything in the being consents to them, they can resume dominance. The power of the spiritual Higher Mind and its idea-force, modified and diminished as it must be by its entrance into our mentality, is not sufficient to sweep out all these obstacles and create the gnostic being, but it can make a first change, a modification that will capacitate a higher ascent and a more powerful descent and further prepare an Integration of the being in a greater Force of consciousness and knowledge.”

### **The Illumined Spiritual Mind:**

Sri Aurobindo says the power of the spiritual Higher Mind...prepare(s) an Integration of the being in a greater Force of consciousness and knowledge. “This greater Force is that of the Illumined Mind, a Mind no longer of higher Thought, but of spiritual light. Here the clarity of the spiritual intelligence, its tranquil daylight, gives place or subordinates itself to an intense luster, a splendor and illumination of the Spirit: a play of lightning of spiritual truth and power breaks from above into the consciousness and adds to the calm and wide enlightenment and the vast descent of peace which characterize or accompany the action of the larger conceptual-spiritual principle, a fiery ardor of realization and a rapturous ecstasy of knowledge.”

“The Illumined Mind does not work primarily by thought but by vision; thought is here only a subordinate movement expressive of sight. The human mind, which relies mainly on thought, conceives that to be the highest or the main process of knowledge, but in the spiritual order thought is a secondary and a not indispensable process. As the Higher Mind brings a greater consciousness into the being through the spiritual idea and its power of truth, so the Illumined Mind brings in a still greater consciousness through a Truth-sight and Truth-light and its seeing and seizing power. In the transformation by the Illumined Mind there would be a similar fulfillment for the seer, the illumined mystic, those in whom the soul lives in vision and in a direct sense and experience: for it is from these higher sources that they receive their light and to rise into that light and live there would be their ascension to their native empire.”

### **The Intuitive Spiritual Mind:**

This is region of higher consciousness, which would seem to pertain more to a very high stage of realization far beyond ordinary nonduality, rather than intuition in the ordinary sense of the term. There is the Non-dual Absolute and equivalent states of Realization, then the Higher and Illumined Mind, and then Intuition. It is described by Sri Aurobindo (in “The Life Divine”). Intuition is always an edge or ray or out leap of a superior light; it is in us a projecting blade, edge or point of a far-off supermind light entering into and modified by some intermediate truth-mind substance above us and, so modified, again entering into and very much minded by our ordinary or ignorant mind-substance; but on that higher level to which it is native its light is unmixed and therefore entirely and purely veridical, and its rays are not separated but connected or massed together in a play of waves of what might almost be called in the Sanskrit poetic figure a sea or mass of “stable lightnings”. “Intuition has a fourfold power.

A power of revelatory truth-seeing, a power of inspiration or truth-hearing, a power of truth-touch or immediate seizing of significance, which is akin to the ordinary nature of its intervention in our mental intelligence, a power of true and automatic discrimination of the orderly and exact relation of truth to truth, these are the fourfold potencies of Intuition. Intuition can therefore perform all the action of reason, -- including the function of logical intelligence, which is to work out the right relation of things and the right relation of idea with idea, -- but by its own superior process and with steps that do not fail or falter. The intuitive light and power may be hampered in

its task because it is the edge of a delegated and modified supermind, but does not bring in the whole mass or body of the identity-knowledge. The basis of Inconscience in our nature is too vast, deep and solid to be altogether penetrated, turned into light, and transformed by an inferior power of the Truth-nature.”

**Sri Aurobindo’s concept of Adhimanas (over mind):**

State of consciousness beyond individual mind, beyond even universal mind in ignorance; it carries in itself a first, direct, masterful cognition of cosmic truth. It is a creator of truth, not of illusions or falsehood. Over mind takes each aspect of power and gives to it an independent action. It is the protective Double, a delegate of the Supermind consciousness. It has not the integrality of the supramental truth but it is well aware of the essential truth of things. Thus, over mind gives to the Sachchidananda Brahman the character of a teeming infinite of possibilities which can be developed into worlds or one world. It is a sort of delegation from the Supermind (this is a metaphor only) which supports the present evolutionary universe in which we live here in matter. Over mind sees calmly, steadily, in great masses and large extensions of space and time and relation, globally; it creates and acts in the same way—it is the world of the great Gods, the divine Creators.

An Over mind that covers as with the wide wings of some creative Oversoul this whole lower hemisphere of Knowledge- Ignorance, links it with that greater Truth- Consciousness while yet at the same time with its brilliant golden Lid it veils the face of the greater Truth from our sight, intervening with its flood of infinite possibilities as at once an obstacle and a passage in our seeking of the spiritual low of our existence, its highest aim, its secret Reality. The integrity of the Supermind keeps always the essential truth of things, the total truth and the truth of its individual self-determinations clearly knit together; it maintains in them an inseparable unity and between them a close interpenetration and a free and full consciousness of each other: but in Over mind this integrality is no longer there. Over mind Energy proceeds through an illimitable capacity of separation and combination of the powers and aspects of the integral and indivisible all-comprehending Unity.

It takes each Aspect or Power and gives to it an independent action in which it acquires a full separate importance and is able to work out, we might say, its own world of creation. “In Over mind we have the origin of the cleavage, the trenchant distinction made by the philosophy of the Sankhyas in which they appear as two independent entities, Prakriti able to dominate Purusha and cloud its freedom and power reducing it to a witness and recipient of her forms and actions, Purusha able to return to its separate existence and abide in a free self- sovereignty by rejection of her original overclouding material principle. In Over mind the separateness is still founded on the basis of an implicit underlying unity; all possibilities of combination and relation between the separated powers and Aspects, all interchanges and mutualities of their energies are freely organized and their actuality always possible.”

Over mind gives to the One Existence-Consciousness- Bliss the character of a teeming of infinite possibilities which can be developed into a multitude of worlds or thrown together into one world in which the endlessly variable outcome of their play is the determinant of the creation, of its process, its course and its consequence.

“The Over mind is a principle of cosmic Truth and a vast and endless catholicity is its very spirit; its energy is an all- dynamism as well as a principle of separate dynamisms: it is a sort of inferior

Supermind,—although it is concerned predominantly not with absolutes, but with what might be called the dynamic potentials or pragmatic truths of Reality, or with absolutes mainly for their power of generating pragmatic or creative values, although, too, its comprehension of things is more global than integral, since its totality is built up of global wholes or constituted by separate independent realities uniting or coalescing together, and although the essential unity is grasped by it and felt to be basic of things and pervasive in their manifestation, but no longer as in the Supermind their intimate and ever-present secret, their dominating continent, the overt constant builder of the harmonic whole of their activity and nature.”

“A pure experience of truth, Knowledge, Delight, imperishable existence would here be itself a contradiction of the truth of things. The Non-Existence is a concealed Consciousness, the insensibility a masked and dormant Ananda, these secret realities must emerge; the hidden Overmind and Supermind too must in the end fulfill themselves in this apparently opposite organization from a dark Infinite.”

Supermind cannot manifest itself as the Creator Power in the universe from the beginning, for it did, the Ignorance and Inconscience would be impossible or else the slow evolution necessary would change into a rapid transformation scene. “Yet at every step of the material energy we can see the stamp of inevitability given by a supramental creator, in all the development of life and mind the play of the lines of possibility and their combination which is the stamp of overmind intervention. As Life and Mind have been released in Matter, so too must in their time these greater powers of the concealed Godhead emerge from the involution and their supreme Light descend into us from above.”

## **The Supermind**

Supermind in Sri Aurobindo's philosophy refers to the infinite unitary truth-consciousness or truth-idea simultaneously transcendent and immanent to planes of matter, life, and mind. Supermind is the dynamic form of Sachchidananda (being-consciousness-bliss), and the necessary conduit, mediator or linkage between Sachchidananda and the manifest Creation.

"The super mind, the Truth-consciousness, the RealIdea which knows itself and all that it becomes." The objective and final stage of integral yoga is to actualise the Supermind within one's being, this would constitute a divinisation of matter itself or a realisation of its inherent primordial propensity, and usher in a completely new, 'divine' way of existing. "The term above is the unitarian or indivisible consciousness of pure Sachchidananda in which there are no separating distinctions; the term below is the analytic or dividing consciousness of Mind which can only know by separation and distinction and has at the most a vague and secondary apprehension of unity and infinity,—for, though it can synthesize its divisions, it cannot arrive at a true totality. Between them is this comprehensive and creative consciousness, by its power of pervading and intimately comprehending knowledge the child of that self-awareness by identity which is the poise of the Brahman and by its power of projecting, confronting, apprehending knowledge parent of that awareness by distinction which is the process of the Mind".

"Above, the formula of the One eternally stable and immutable; below, the formula of the Many which, eternally mutable, seeks but hardly finds in the flux of things a firm and immutable standing-point; between, the seat of all trinities, of all that is being, of all that becomes Many-in-One and yet remains One-in-Many because it was originally One that is always potentially Many. And shall we not say that its very existence points back to something beyond our supreme perception of the

ineffable Unity, - - Something ineffable and mentally inconceivable not because of its unity and indivisibility, but because of its freedom from even these formulations of our mind, – Something beyond both unity and multiplicity? That would be the utter Absolute and Real which yet justifies to us both our knowledge of God and our knowledge of the world”.

## **Sri Aurobindo: Integral yoga**

### **Central purpose of the Integral Yoga**

Transformation of our superficial, narrow and fragmentary human way of thinking, seeing, feeling and being into a deep and wide spiritual consciousness and an integrated inner and outer existence and of our ordinary human living into the divine way of life.

### **Integral yoga**

This yoga accepts the value of cosmic existence and holds it to be a reality; its object is to enter into a higher Truth-Consciousness or Divine Supramental Consciousness in which action and creation are the expression not of ignorance and imperfection, but of the Truth, the Light, the Divine *Ananda (Bliss)*. But for that, the surrender of the mortal mind, life and body to the Higher Consciousness is indispensable, since it is too difficult for the mortal human being to pass by its own effort beyond mind to a Supramental Consciousness in which the dynamism is no longer mental but of quite another power. Only those who can accept the call to such a change should enter into this yoga.

### **Sâdhanâ of the Integral Yoga**

The *Sâdhanâ* [practice] of the Integral Yoga does not proceed through any set mental teaching or prescribed forms of meditation, mantras or others, but by aspiration, by a self-concentration inwards or upwards, by a self-opening to an Influence, to the Divine Power above us and its workings, to the Divine Presence in the heart and by the rejection of all that is foreign to these things. It is only by faith, aspiration and surrender that this self-opening can come.

### **Integral method**

The method we have to pursue is to put our whole conscious being into relation and contact with the Divine and to call Him in to transform our entire being into His, so that in a sense God Himself, the real Person in us, becomes the *sâdhaka* of the *sâdhana*\* as well as the Master of the Yoga by whom the lower personality is used as the centre of a divine transfiguration and the instrument of its own perfection. In effect, the pressure of the *Tapas*, the force of consciousness in us dwelling in the Idea of the divine Nature upon that which we are in our entirety, produces its own realisation. The divine and all-knowing and all-effecting descends upon the limited and obscure, progressively illumines and energises the whole lower nature and substitutes its own action for all the terms of the inferior human light and mortal activity.

\* *Sâdhana*, the practice by which perfection, *siddhi*, is attained; *Sâdhaka*, the Yogin who seeks by that practice the *siddhi*.

### **Aim of the Integral Yoga**

It is not merely to rise out of the ordinary ignorant world-consciousness into the divine consciousness, but to bring the supramental power of that divine consciousness down into the ignorance of mind, life and body, to transform them, to manifest the Divine here and create a divine

life in Matter.

## **Conditions of the Integral Yoga**

This yoga can only be done to the end by those who are in total earnest about it and ready to abolish their little human ego and its demands in order to find themselves in the Divine. It cannot be done in a spirit of levity or laxity; the work is too high and difficult, the adverse powers in the lower Nature too ready to take advantage of the least sanction or the smallest opening, the aspiration and *tapasyâ* (concentration of the will) needed too constant and intense.

## **Method in the Integral Yoga**

To concentrate, preferably in the heart and call the presence and power of the Mother to take up the being and by the workings of her force transform the consciousness. One can concentrate also in the head or between the eye-brows, but for many this is a too difficult opening. When the mind falls quiet and the concentration becomes strong and the aspiration intense, then there is the beginning of experience. The more the faith, the more rapid the result is likely to be. For the rest one must not depend on one's own efforts only, but succeed in establishing a contact with the Divine and a receptivity to the Mother's Power and Presence.

## **Key-methods**

### **The way to devotion and surrender.**

It is the psychic movement that brings the constant and pure devotion and the removal of the ego that makes it possible to surrender.

### **The way to knowledge**

Meditation in the head by which there comes the opening above, the quietude or silence of the mind and the descent of peace etc. of the higher consciousness generally till it envelops the being and fills the body and begins to take up all the movements.

### **Yoga by works**

Separation of the *Purusha* from the *Prakriti*, the inner silent being from the outer active one, so that one has two consciousness or a double consciousness, one behind watching and observing and finally controlling and changing the other which is active in front. The other way of beginning the yoga of works is by doing them for the Divine, for the Mother, and not for oneself, consecrating and dedicating them till one concretely feels the Divine Force taking up the activities and doing them for one.

### **Object of the Integral Yoga**

The object of the Integral Yoga is to enter into and be possessed by the Divine Presence and Consciousness, to love the Divine for the Divine's sake alone, to be tuned in our nature into the nature of the Divine, and in our will and works and life to be the instrument of the Divine.

### **Principle of the Integral Yoga**

The whole principle of Integral Yoga is to give oneself entirely to the Divine alone and to nobody else, and to bring down into ourselves by union with the Divine Mother all the transcendent light, power, wideness, peace, purity, truth- consciousness and Ananda of the Supramental Divine.

## Fundamental realisations of the Integral Yoga

The psychic change so that a complete devotion can be the main motive of the heart and the ruler of thought, life and action in constant union with the Mother and in her Presence. The descent of the Peace, Power, Light etc. of the Higher Consciousness through the head and heart into the whole being, occupying the very cells of the body. The perception of the One and Divine infinitely everywhere, the Mother everywhere and living in that infinite consciousness.

## Iqbal: Self

Iqbal's philosophy is often described as the philosophy of *Khudi*, or the 'Self'. For him, the fundamental fact of human life is the absolute and irrefutable consciousness of one's own being. For Iqbal, the advent of humanity on earth is a great and glorious event, not an event signifying human sinfulness and degradation. He points out that according to the Qur'an, the earth is humanity's '*dwelling-place*' and '*a source of profit*' to it. Iqbal does not think that having been created by God, human beings were placed in a super-sensual paradise from which they were expelled on account of an act of disobedience to God. Pointing out that the term 'Adam' functions as the symbol of self-conscious humanity rather than as the name of an individual in the Qur'an, Iqbal describes the 'Fall' as a transition from: '*a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience*'.

For Iqbal, Adam's story is not the story of the 'First Man' but the ethical experience, in symbolic form, of every human being. Following the Qur'anic teaching that though human beings come from the earth, God's spirit has been breathed into them, Iqbal holds on the one hand that human beings are divinely created, and on the other hand that they have evolved from matter. Unlike dualists, Iqbal sees no impassable gulf between matter and spirit, nor does he see human beings as a mere episode or accident in the huge evolutionary process. On the contrary, the whole cosmos is there to serve as the basis and ground for the emergence and perfection of the '*Ego*'. Humanity's evolution has not come to an end, for the destiny of human beings lies '*beyond the stars*'.

The purpose of life is the development of the Self. In order that they may achieve the fullest possible development, it is essential for human beings to possess knowledge. Following the Qur'an, Iqbal maintains that there are two sources of knowledge: the inner consciousness of human beings and the outer world of nature. Starting with the intuition of the Self, human beings become aware of the '*Not-Self*', the confronting '*other*' which provides a constant challenge for them. Nature, however, does not confront God in the same way as it confronts humanity, since it is a phase of God's consciousness. God is immanent since God comprehends the whole universe, but also transcendent since God is not identical with the created world. All life is individual. There is a gradually rising scale of self-ness running from the almost inert to God, who is the Ultimate Ego. God is not immobile nor is the universe a fixed product; God is constantly creative and dynamic and the process of Creation still goes on. The Qur'anic saying, 'Toward God is your limit' (Surah 53: 42), gives Iqbal an infinite worldview, and he applies it to every aspect of the life of humanity and the universe.

Iqbal distinguishes between two aspects of the Self, the efficient and the appreciative. The efficient self is that which is concerned with, and is itself partially formed by, the physical world. It apprehends the succession of impressions and discloses itself as a series of specific, and consequently numerable states. The appreciative self is the deeper self, of which one becomes aware only in moments of profound meditation when the efficient self is in abeyance. The unity of the appreciative self is that in it, each experience permeates the whole. The multiplicity of its

elements is unlike that of the efficient self. There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. Corresponding to the two aspects of the Self are the two levels of time, serial time and pure duration. Serial time is spatial or clock time, whereas pure duration is a ceaseless continuous flow in which all things live and move and have their being. As human beings perfect their ego-hood, they cast off the girdle of serial time and gain a measure of eternity.

Iqbal believes ardently that human beings are the makers of their own destiny and that the key to destiny lies in one's character. He constantly refers to the Qur'anic verse, '**Verily God will not change the condition of a people till they change what is in themselves**' (Surah 13: 12). Humanity's mission on earth is not only to win greater freedom but also to gain immortality, which according to Iqbal: *'is not ours by right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it'*.

Though humanity is the pivot around which Iqbal's philosophy revolves, yet as pointed out by Schimmel, Iqbal's '**revaluation of Man is not that of Man qua Man, but of Man in relation to God**' (Schimmel 1963: 382). Iqbal's '**ideal person**' is the servant of God. The relation between humanity and God is a personal one; hence the great importance of prayer in the thought of Iqbal. The belief in the one living God gives humanity freedom from all false deities and fortifies it against forces of disintegration. Iqbal sees his concept of the '**ideal person**' realised in the Prophet of Islam, whose life exemplifies all the principles dearest to Iqbal's heart. In his view art, religion and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of the '**Self**'. That which strengthens the '**Self**' is good and that which weakens it is bad. Iqbal does not admit the absolute existence of evil but regards it as being necessary for the actualization of moral purpose as vital activity in the world. His Iblis (or al-Shaytan, Satan) is the counterpart to his '**Ideal Person**'.

### **Iqbal's Conception of God**

Muhammad Iqbal's lifelong project can be summarised as follows:

"The task of restoring God to the public and the private spheres, not in the way it is visualized and enacted nowadays, but in the more subtle and time-tested manner of elucidating the essential relationship between the human and the Divine; reaching for the human heart through his wisdom poetry and, through the medium of his Urdu and English prose, removing obstacles which make it difficult or impossible for the mind to understand."

This is indeed the case. Even a cursory examination of Iqbal's poetic and prosaic works reveal the "center" of his thought, i.e., a pragmatic God. Understood as a reality touching the heart, God is the "life-blood" of his thinking.

Commenting on various definitions of religion, Professor H.J. Paton in his illuminating book *The Modern Predicament: A study in the Philosophy of Religion* (1955) asserts; "For any serious view of religion, it is always possible to find another equally serious, which seems to be its precise opposite".

The same goes for the plurality of views of The Divine. While the existence of a supernatural, sovereign Divine power is rarely called into question and challenged by adherents of various religious systems, their conceptions as to its nature are as obscure and indefinite as are the definitions of the phenomena religion itself. Of course there are many religions, and each will have its distinctive approach. For my part, I will focus exclusively on Muslim religious thought.

Mostly, we have directed insufficient attention to the conception of God in which we believe, and to the manner in which our thoughts and beliefs are influenced by the concept of God we sincerely hold. This is unfortunate, because, as Iqbal makes clear, God is the life-blood of our most intimate convictions. Let us turn to him.

Iqbal recognizes that, for us Muslims, belief in the Diving Being is the the edifice of life (deen). Our very character and conduct of life depend deeply on our convictions about God: how we understand God's nature, God's power, God's relationship to human beings, God's guidance, and how we understand our own place in a wider universe embraced by God. Accordingly, if we are Muslim theologians and philosophers, Iqbal encourages us to to ask following significant questions:

- Do our images of God, The Divine Self, encourage (what Iqbal describes as) a “higher humanity”? Or do they promote and generate sectarianism/fragmentation?
- Do our convictions in God promote planetary well-being or destruction?
- Do our beliefs about God encourage justice, equality, solidarity, freedom and dignity or do belief in God inspire hatred and ill will towards our fellow beings? Is God portrayed as a Creator who works through cohesive, unilateral power (leaving no room for creaturely agency) or through persuasion and mutual partnership?
- Finally yet importantly, does our concept of God create a humanistic focus or a ritualistic one? In order to reform the ossified theological thought in Islam, these questions need adequate and sufficient answers.

### **Turn, then, to how Iqbal himself answered these questions. The Ultimate Ego**

One of the important tasks of modern Islamic theology is to define an adequate concept of God and God's relation to the natural and the human world. Iqbal's aim is to form just such a theistic-naturalistic worldview.

To understand his approach, we can consider Iqbal's **The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam**, which consists of various lectures delivered at different universities in British India. This book reflects Iqbal's intellectual and theological climax, in which he forms a comprehensive system by creative synthesis. Here Iqbal's interpretations of God's omnipotence (all-powerful), omniscience (all-knowing) and God-man relationship differ in a significant way from the orthodox, mystical understanding in Muslim history handed down from one generation to another.

According to Iqbal, God is the Ultimate Ego, the Ultimate Reality, the Perfect Self, the Supreme Ego, the Absolute Self, presented both as immanent and transcendent. God is immanent (in space-time) since God manifests God's very self in the visible domain of nature, as a creative impulse/push towards relative perfection. Says the Scripture (Qur`an): “Unto God belongs the East and the West. Wherever you go, whichever way you turn, there is God's Countenance”.

Yet, God transcends the spatio-temporal arena and exists externally as its ground.

Iqbal, in the third chapter of his *Reconstruction*, says: “The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him”. God is permanent in His essence, eternal (not infinity of temporal points but a scale of timelessness), yet in the natural world (serial time) every day a new aspect of His creativity and glory is demonstrated and presented to our view.

## God and Omniscience

In classical theology and theism, God is conceived as omniscient being. If omniscient (Divine knowledge) entails “a single indivisible act of perception which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history, regarded as an order of specific events, in an eternal now, then, this, according to Dr. Iqbal, indicates a “closed universe, a fixed futurity, a predetermined, unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior faith, has once for all determined the directions of God’s creative activity”. If we accept the notion of the Divine Will as dependent on an order of specific predetermined events, would not then such a notion be antithetic to God’s living incessant creative activity? And, would not this idea undermine man’s power of free-will? Divine omniscience, according to Iqbal, does not imply a timeless vision of the futurity in its actuality (complete knowledge about what will happen in the future). On the contrary, God knows the actual (the existent) as actual, while the future exists as possibilities to be actualized. Iqbal asserts: “The future certainly pre-exists in the organic whole of God’s creative life, but it pre-exists as an open-possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines.” Engaged with the notion of Divine knowledge, Iqbal provides the reader (audience) with an illustration to help us in comprehending what he means. He goes on to say:

“... Suppose, as sometimes happens in the history of human thought, a fruitful idea with a great inner wealth of applications emerges into the light of your consciousness. You are immediately aware of the idea as a complex whole; but the intellectual working out of its numerous bearings is a matter of time. Intuitively all the possibilities of the idea are present in your mind. If a specific possibility, as such, is not intellectually known to you at a certain moment of time, it is not because your knowledge is defective, but because there is yet no possibility to become known...”

In other words: God does not know the future in its complete actuality. God does not fully know what the result of any specific event or encounter will be in its totality until it materialises and unfolds wholly in the future. The knowledge of the Divine evolves and “grows” in relationship to the ongoing evolution of the universe. Nevertheless, if a specific possibility or future-knowledge is not known by God at a definite moment of time, then, this does not signify God’s defective omniscient. Rather, it only means, according to Iqbal, that there is yet no future- knowledge to be known because the future events are still in becoming and not wholly settled series of actuality. Such a conception of omniscience does justice to the elements of spontaneity and novelty (freedom) inherent in the make-up of finite egos.

If the future were pre-determined at a higher cosmic level by God then novelty, creativity, human freedom and spontaneity of life would be oxymoronic. Humanity would have been reduced to a fully determined entity, machinelike. Is Iqbal suggesting that God voluntarily circumscribes this scope of foreknowledge of future encounters in order to let freedom exist? This, then, would tend to make omniscience a matter of possessing a quality or potential to know rather than having specific foreknowledge.

We note that Iqbal is sharply departing from the classical notion of God’s omniscience, which portrays the Divine Being both as knower of the visible as well as the invisible. And, since God surpasses the divisible time, to God there is only an “eternal now/present”. Hence, we, the planetary beings, only know what the future holds as the future becomes our present moment. Divine omniscience does not limit future free actions in any way because human beings are capable of utilizing their power of freedom to make decisions. God knows that I will do x or y tomorrow, but God will in no way choose for me when more than one course of action are open to

me.

## God and Omnipotence

Muhammad Iqbal's interpretation of Divine omnipotence is significantly different from the orthodox, traditional understanding. The conventional understanding of divine power states that "nothing happens apart from divine determination or permission, even that which appears to be contrary to God's will for humankind and the world". In other words, God is portrayed as the Ultimate Controlling Power (id est, God controls every single detail of the world's causal process). In the words of Iqbal, "omnipotence, abstractly conceived, is merely a blind, capricious power without limits."

Humankind learns definitions through lived/actual experience. The idea of God as a willful despot and as exercising unilateral power may have historical antecedents. Briefly stated, humanity's notion of God being a capricious and tyrannical power developed under the imperial form of government. Under the monarchic form of organization, the monarchs were mostly tyrannical, vagarious and repressive. The imperial rulers exhibited their capability of power and rule in a whimsical fashion, devoid of order, rhyme or reason. Their dominance over the masses was unilateral, which left no room for mutual partnership. A king could penalize his subjects with no reason other than demonstrating his absolute power and control -- and that, too, in an arbitrary way. Human beings brought up in such fortuitous and dreadful environments associated power, control, authority and sovereignty with tempestuousness, irresponsibility and whimsicality -- the basic properties of tyrants. If these rulers represented the absolute power in human capacity, then, what to say about God? Unfortunately, the masses also considered God as a hyperbolized and glorified king -- the ultimate representation of an absolute, irresponsible and unaccountable ruler destroying everything in its furious course.

Another central point in relation to God and God's omnipotence is the external, natural world. Could such a God provide any inducement for humans to pursue the task of understanding the world, its order and its fixed laws of cause and effect which governed the world's natural courses (scientific development)? Or, ethically speaking, could such a God give human beings the incentive to discover a universal humanism based on equality of the human race, justice, unity, freedom and self-affirmation? In one word, could such a God emancipate humanity rather than enslave it?

I cannot help but to quote a pregnant remark by Professor Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), a prominent British philosopher considered as the intellectual father of Christian process theology. Discussing the problematic idea of God as a controlling power, Whitehead writes: "... The church gave unto God the attributes which belonged to Caesar." This is equally true with traditional Islamic theology: the Muslim priests gave unto God the attributes that belonged to kings and monarchs, thus warped the Qur'anic God as a "law-abiding God". This understanding of God still lingers in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community.

Iqbal, as astute and perceptive he was, saw the paralyzing and tragic effects of the "dictator God" in human societies and saw the need to emancipate the Islamic concept of God from the fashioning of God in the image of tyrants and imperial rulers. Relying on the authority of the Qur'an, Iqbal views divine omnipotence not as a blind and unlimited force, but as "intimately related to Divine Wisdom (Hikmah)", and finds the infinite power of God "revealed, not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular, and the orderly." He goes on to say: "at the same time, the Qur'an conceives God as holding all goodness in His hands." In other words, the Divine Will

does not operate in isolation. Rather, it is an aspect of the Divine ego. God's will, an aspect of His personality, is not destructive and impersonal, but a Will of a God who is good, wise, benevolent and compassionate.

The point, then, is that Iqbal firmly and sincerely believes in our freedom of choice. Freedom of choice and will is not a mere hypothesis but a fact of human existence and consciousness. The psychological argument in favor of human autonomy says: "we intuitively perceive that we are free to choose and act."

In his fourth lecture in the **Reconstruction** (The human ego – his freedom and immortality), Iqbal asserts: "... The ego is a free personal causality". This signifies the finite ego's (human beings) partial self-determination. The human being is not a predetermined creature; determinism does not prevail in the sphere of finite egos, which reigns only in the natural world. For instance, in the natural world (al-khalq), all physical objects and beings are bounded by immutable, permanent natural laws (Kalimàt Ullah). We constantly witness the order, harmony, purpose and regularity exhibited in the natural world (afaq).

As an illustration, please direct your attention to our beautiful solar system: all of the celestial bodies are moving in their prescribed orbits. The planet Earth moves around the sun in its gravitational field. The planets revolve according to set calculations. They will never move and revolve in a haphazardly way. Says the Qur'an: "There is no changing in the Kalimàt of Allah" (10, 64). Turning back to our man, Muhammad Iqbal, he finds sufficient support for his belief in human freedom in the following Qur'anic verse: "If ye do well to your own behoof will ye do well; and if ye do evil against yourselves will ye do it" (17, 7).

As far as human beings are concerned, we are free to choose any course of action, based on his own free will. In other words, in the domain of human beings, the Divine Will ceases to function as a controlling force. Our actions are not determined by an external agency. Rather, we are free to choose between the numbers of possibilities open to him. On this point, an important question arises: If the Divine Will ceases to be a controlling agency in the sphere of humans, does it mean that God's omnipotence and His freedom is confined? Let Iqbal provide the answer. He puts it this way:

"No doubt, the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation on the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power, and freedom".

Put differently, God is not limited by any external ontologically independent being, confronting God as His "other". The only limitation that can be assigned to God is self-imposed limitation, in accordance with God's wisdom and goodness. This self-limitation is a permanent law born out of God's creative freedom.

Therefore, The Divine Self does not lose divine power and freedom by binding itself in divinely chosen laws. Such a God can be relied upon because the divinely chosen laws demonstrate order, permanence and reliability. Despite possessing unlimited power and freedom, God, through self-limitation, does not suspend or break these set calculations. The edifice of science and the predictions we make in the sphere of natural world is a direct result of the permanence and

inflexibility of God's natural laws. God, by these permanent laws, upholds and conserves the world in its being, which gives us control over our external environment and sufficient scope for self-development. Turning to the realm of humans, there are laws controlling the development or debasement of his ego (Khudi). However, man is gifted with freedom of will to either obey or disobey the laws (the law of requital/as you sow so shall you reap). The finite entity is an autonomous self, hence, in the words of Dr. Iqbal "capable of doubt and disobedience". As humans are equipped with freedom, which signifies "private initiative", "God cannot feel, judge and choose for me when more than one course of action are open to me". By this line of thought, Iqbal demolishes the conception of fatalism (determinism) altogether.

Another important question arises on this point: Humanity has partial self-determination, the Divine will does not control his actions. Fine. But, does this imply that human beings are left to fumble in darkness – without any Divine guidance? The deists of the 18th century held and preached such belief. In Iqbal, we find the answer to this important question. Discoursing on the two ways in which the creative activity of God manifests itself to us, he states: "... Khalq is creation and Amr is direction". As stated previously, khalq signifies creation (controlling power in the physical world). Amr, on the contrary, signifies God's directive agency in the domain of human agents. Stated differently, God's amr is His guidance. This guidance is provided in the Revelation, the Qur'an. Says the Scripture: "This is Allah's Amr which He has revealed unto you" (65, 5).

Several points are important to reiterate here. First, to conceive God as a Self/Ultimate Ego signifies that God is a personality and not a principle or abstraction. God is not an object but rather a subject; not a thing but rather a person. Second, God is immanent (in time), which is another way of stating the notion that nature is God's "creative self-expression". Expressed in Iqbalian terminology: "the revelation of the Great I Am". The physical world (in which determinism prevails) is Divine will – an aspect of God – involved in revealing the infinite creativity and riches of His being. Third, The Ultimate Ego also exists outside the spatio-temporal order as its ground. As Professor Mustansir Mir states in his book Iqbal (2008): ... "what is revealed in nature is the symbols, not the person, of God, who, therefore, can also be said to transcend nature since nature points to Him".

Here Iqbal's interpretation of God's omniscience differs from the conventional thinking, which affirms that God has unchanging knowledge (passive omniscience) of the universe and its process. God knows the entire history at a single glance or act of perception; an unchanging eternal "now". For Iqbal, the future preexists in the Divine life but not as a complete actuality (predetermined order of events) but rather as an open possibility.

Finally, Divine omnipotence is not a blind, capricious and unlimited power, but intimately connected with Divine Wisdom and goodness. God, by God's own creative freedom, has limited unlimited power in the domain of autonomous egos in order to let humans exercise their partial freedom of will. Says Prof. Mir in Iqbal (2008): "...The freedom of the human ego implies, equally, the ego's ability to choose good and evil..." Right actions (birr) generates enrichment of his Self, whereas harmful actions (sharr/ithm) hampers his creative self-actualization.

Divine unilateral control robs the finite ego's capability of freedom (rihun), and reduces him to the status of a mechanical object. Such a view is diametrically opposed to the Qur'anic notion of human autonomy, which involves also moral accountability as every calculated act (high degree of ego-involvement) affects his personality (according to set laws of cause and effect/Qanoon-E-

mukafat-E-amal). Hence, taqdeer is not to be understood in the sense of fatalism (necessity), which negates human freedom, morality and transformation, but the range of possibilities open to man which he is free to select between.

The concept of God presented by Iqbal radically departs from the one advanced by traditionalists in various historical socio-political contexts. In the beginning I used the term pragmatic to describe Iqbal's reformed God. The use of the term entails that the Qur'an fixes its gaze on the concrete realities of human life and not on mere universals or intellectualism. Put differently, the Qur'anic God is not a God "in the heavens" or the abstract God of the philosophers' mental activity.

Iqbal remarks: "... A mere intellectual belief in God does not count for much in Islam." Rather, says Dr. Iqbal, "... The wisdom of Islam consists in exploiting the idea of God in the interest of Man ..."

In his **Reconstruction of Modern Religious Thought**, Iqbal adds details to this idea by pointing out that "... tawhid is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind." It also demands "... loyalty to God, not to thrones." Loyalty to God implies adherence to the Revelation of God (the Qur'an), which is a book (al-kitab) comprising "basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis."

### **Iqbal, God and Reformation**

The Muslim peoples in the Western world are on a daily basis confronted with questions concerning the ability of Islam in meeting out the exigencies of the constantly changing environments of human life, and if Islam is compatible with the spirit of democracy and human rights.

Regarding the issue of Islam and reform, Iqbal boldly affirms the belief in the capacity of Islamic Law to evolve with altering conditions of life. This affirmative reply is grounded on his conception of God, which paved the way for the "principle of movement in the structure of Islam". The principle he is referring to is *ijtihad*, translated as "the hermeneutical principle of creative, independent reasoning", an indispensable tool in the system of Islamic socio-political economic life. God, the Ultimate Reality, is "the spiritual basis for all life," He has a permanent aspect (His essence) and a changeable aspect revealed in the universe. Iqbal goes on to say in his *Reconstruction*:

"a society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Qur'an, is one of the greatest "signs" of God tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature."

Stated differently, the democratic activity is integral in the Islamic collective life. However, in order for that democratic, *ijtihadic* activity to play its essential role, we need to understand the nature of Sharia. Sharia, far from being a divinely formulated body of Islamic law, inflexible and changeless, is only a human construction in understanding the Divine Will enshrined in the Holy Scripture. There is nothing divine about Shariah. The dysfunctionality of the Islamic Law is due to the exclusion of the category of "change" and a blind adherence to bygone historical scriptural interpretations. Hence the ossified religious thought and behavior of Muslim peoples, incapable of growth and creative transformation.

An attentive reading of Dr. Iqbal's book **The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam**, his wisdom poetry, letters, masterly written articles and statements on various topics, reveal his highly humanistic and democratic view of Islam as a God-centered and creature-centered living, firmly grounded in the Holy Scripture, the prime source of his life-enhancing voice. The aim of Islam as a living principle is the perfection of humanity as a whole by joining God in His process of creative transformation.

Muhammad Iqbal played his active part in the life of his Maker. He challenged the detrimental and highly entrenched religious conservatism, the deleterious socio-political and economic structures of his times by propagating the Qur'anic message of interconnectedness of all life and an Islamic humanism based on man's innate dignity. Iqbal made it crystal clear that humans are the shapers of their own destiny; that God is the God of the progressive human beings. It is up to us now to carry on, despite hostile forces, the torch of human dignity, freedom and creative unfolding within time.

### **Iqbal's concept of man**

In *Payam-I-Mashriq*, Iqbal draws a fine picture of man's creation in a famous poem "Taskin-Fitrat" (Conquest of nature). The first section of poem is titled "Milad-I-Adam" (The birth of Adam), he points that the creation of man generated excitement and commotion in the universe. Man made of clay is, in fact a centre of creativity and dynamism and gifted with forces of action, appreciation and intelligence. The glory of man, Iqbal lies in fresh activities while as other creation of the universe are busy in routine activities. In Iqbal's philosophical order, man becomes perfect or immortal when he knows his innate potentialities by taking the initiative to bring about changes in nature as well as in the social and moral world around him. In the *Javid Nama*, the voice of God addresses man thus:

Life is both mortal immortal.  
It is all creativity and eagerness.  
Man of truth! Be sharp and incisive.  
And become the destiny of their own world.

Iqbal evaluates the idea that the sincere endeavor of man is to see the truth face to face, through introspection to contemplate ultimate reality including the world and even beyond. The utility and vitality of man, Iqbal lies in his strength and power, *ya Qavi* (the most powerful) is itself God's Attribute. According to Iqbal, the human ego, in its development towards perfection, has to pass through three stages:

1. Obedience to the law.
2. Self control i.e. the highest form of self consciousness.
3. Divine vicegerency.

Obedience to the law and self-control, according to Iqbal, play a great role in the development and fortification of the human ego, but he preferred to regard them as representing mile stone on the upwards march towards the goal of attaining the state of perfect man, or superman. Obedience to the law, along with other favourable, tends, to train the ego for the second evolutionary phase where it attains perfect self-control, in its turn prepares the ego for the third and last stage of human development i.e. divine vicegerency.

According to Iqbal the third stage in the development of the self is *Niyabat-I-Ilahi* (the vicegerency

of God). Although man already possesses the germ of vicegerency (Quran 2:28) “not man as he is now, but man purified through obedience, self dominion and detachment, can reach the high station of divine vicegerency”.

Iqbal describes the perfect man in superlative, he is the completest ego, the goal of humanity, of the life, both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. This highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom of God on earth.

Nature must undergo long and painful travels to bring to birth the perfect man. The vicegerent is a creator and interpreter of values he is “the goal of life’s Caravan” the ruler of all things that God created. Man is the deputy of God on earth. And over the elements his rule is fixed.

Iqbal’s perfect man, then though a co-worker with God, is not a breaker of divine law. He is the master of all things but a slave to God.

According to Iqbal, the moral and religious ideal of man is not self annihilation but self-realization. He can attain this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. Prophet Muhammad (SAW) said, “Takhallaqu Bi-akhlaq Allah” create in yours self the attributes of God. Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique individual i.e. God. To him, physically and spiritually man is as self-contained center, but he is not yet a complete individual. The greater his distance from God, the smaller his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completes person but he is not finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, he absorbs God into himself. The perfect man not only absorbs the world of matter, rather, by mastering it, only absorbs the God himself into his ego.

Iqbal believes that the strength of a perfect man is paramount and supernatural. He draws a fresh vigor and vitality from his faith, and God’s will and might are on his side. Mountains cannot block his path, nor can oceans offer a hindrance. Describing the perfect man, Iqbal says:

A perfect man’s hand is the hand of God,  
Dominant, creative resourceful, efficient,  
Human but angel like in disposition, servant with the masters attributes.  
His carefree heart is  
in different to the riches of either world.

He is reasons last goal; he is the harvest of love. In the wide world, he sets all spirits ablaze. In Iqbal’s view, man can transfer both his being and his surroundings according to his own desires and inspirations. In fact, he makes improvements upon God’s creation. For instance, God created night, man made the lamp, God created clay, and out of it he made the cup. God created deserts, mountains and forests, and he made parks, flower gardens and groves. Its man, who turned stone into a mirror and it, is he who turned poison into an antidote. God creates the world, but man made it more beautiful. To Iqbal, the perfect man is ultimate goal of the evolutionary process of the world, and he is to develop out of his present stuff (self) just as the full moon is developed out of the crescent. Iqbal’s Mardi-Momen (The perfect man) possesses immense power and strength, and can change the destiny of people so, in a challenging mood, he asked and exclaimed:

Who can imagine the strength of his arm (perfect man)  
Destines are changed at the mere glance of a perfect man.

Again he says God intoxicated Duwamish is neither of the East nor of the West. His home is neither Delhi, nor Isfahan nor Samarqand. Unlike Plato, Iqbal's Man is not a man of the world of ideas. His perfect man belongs to this world of reality. He was not satisfied with merely converting kings into philosophers and philosophers into king; rather, his goal was to turn every man into perfect man, who may establish the kingdom of God on earth. Iqbal's Mard-I-Kamil (perfect man) is much more than Plato's philosopher and king combined together. For, while Plato's philosopher king was a representative at a state and belonged to an aristocrat class, Iqbal's Mard-I-Kamil was a Divine vicegerent of God on earth and a true representative of man kind. Iqbal man is superior to Plato's philosopher – king, as he is the real representative of socialism and humanism. As Iqbal was interested in the reconstruction of society, so he believed that an ideal man (perfect man) is also must in the formation of an ideal society or world community. Iqbal's Mard-i-Kamil (perfect man) is a man of this world, and belonged to all man kind and lived in all time and clime, as he is an impartial being. He is a true representative or viceregent of God on earth.

Iqbal's wisdom visualizes a new man of future society, a comprehensive all round develop personality. His future man is indeed Mard-i-Mumin (man of faith), God fearing with aesthetic tastes and the ability to create of a just social order. This personality for Iqbal is Sawar-I-Ashab (white rider horse of time) and deadeye Imkan Biya (splendid eye of future) where emergence from innumerable deserts is the message of glorious future. Allama Iqbal enhances this perfection in the finality of prophet of Islam P.U.H.

Its flames burned a hundred Abrahams:  
That the lamp of one Muhammad (SAW) might be lighted.

### **NIETZSCHE, IQBAL AND POST-MODERNISM: Concept of superman**

German thinker and writer, Nietzsche, was a multi-faceted genius who initiated the idea of ontological post-modernism. His conception of Superman is a declaration of a post-modern age and the end of the era of Man. His theory of "will to power" influenced philosophers and writers such as Heidegger, Jasper, Jean-Paul Sartre and the poet Rilke. He was not only influential in Western culture; his impact is visible on Eastern culture as well.

Allama Iqbal was basically an Eastern poet-philosopher but he was inspired by the idea of Superman presented by Nietzsche. According to him, man is not the ultimate goal of history and his value cannot be determined without the meaning of Superman. Superman is a guiding star of the entire world. The centrality of Man was challenged by him and the highest achievement is Superman.

Iqbal's conception of the perfect man was an idea of history and culture. He was inspired by Rumi and Nietzsche, and presented his idea of the perfect man. Iqbal was not satisfied by the status of Man. He was moving towards the idea of Superman and his idea was extremely limited. The transcendental element is absent from Nietzsche's idea of Superman. Iqbal admires Nietzsche and his powerful Superman, but he adds spirituality to the idea.

In his famous book *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, Nietzsche says "Be faithful to Earth". But Iqbal's view

is the unification of Eastern and Western values. In the East, Man's spirituality is as important as his material being and Superman is Man plus the spiritual and transcendental elements. His Superman goes beyond the earthly bounds and touches the highest peak of perfection that is known as *Insan-i-Kamil*. Iqbal's famous line is as under:

اے سوارِ اشہبِ دورانِ بیا  
اے نروغِ دیدہ امکاں بیا

Iqbal's Superman is the realization of the highest possibility of being, and the spiritual elements make him the crown of the universe.

This very conception of Superman inspired Derrida, Heidegger and Foucault. The post-modern era is basically the era of the Superman. The centrality of Man was challenged by post-modernists and they presented a philosophy of the new cultural phenomena, Literature, anthropology, aesthetics and all other important disciplines deviated from the idea of Man. Post-modern's include other topics such as legendary figures, myth and other areas of imagination.

*Insan-i-Kamil* or perfect man is basically a concept of the Muslim thinker, Al-Jili, According to him, the perfect man revealed himself in prophetic grace and Iqbal's view of Superman was a combination of Nietzsche and Al-Jili, and according to Iqbal, the Prophet of Islam (Peace be upon him) was a complete and perfect being who inspired history, culture and the entire humanity. He is an exemplary perfect man for the entire humanity, as he writes:

آدمی یا جوہرے اندر وجود  
آن کہ آزد گاہے گاہے در وجود

Apart from his Islamic view of Man, Iqbal's Superman is the conqueror of time and space. The rider on the horse of time and the light of possibility who makes Iqbal conscious of his absolute necessity for the evolution of history and Man. It is omega point for the spiritual evolution of Man.

Post-modern thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault believe in the superiority of coming Man or post-modern Man, as he is the ultimate goal of history and culture, and post-modern culture is basically a culture of Superman. Iqbal's thought is partly post-modern, but he does not agree with the post-modernists who deny the spiritual element and transcendental reality as the guiding star for humanity.

According to post-modern philosophers, the idea of Man presented by the Renaissance thinkers cannot be a model for historical development and the cultural evolutionary process. Man was their basic concern, and not the entire universe, including all beings. Iqbal and his philosophical message of selfhood or *khudi* is not limited to Man and his mode of existence. *Khudi* is universal and all the beings are moving towards perfect *khudi*, according to their different status of being, as Iqbal says:

خودی کی زد میں ہے ساری خدائی

Iqbal's post-modernism is basically spiritual, ontological and contains an idealistic element. The objectives of *khudi* are not limited. They are as infinite as the ideal Man who never realizes and does not take the objective form, but moving towards the infinity or the absolute being, as Iqbal says:

خودی کا سر زہاں ال الہ بالابلا  
خودی ہے نیرغ نساں ال الہ

According to Iqbal, the birth of *Khudi* is the first ontological event and this ontological process in the universe makes all things move. And this process does not terminate in the being of Man, but moves on and on. Life and death are just passing phases, and not the objectives of *Khudi*.

حیات و موت زہوں البذات کے النور  
نہیظ خودی ہے خودی کی نگاہ کا مقصود

Idealism of the self is the shining star of the creation and is a permanent incentive to human imagination. The literary and creative process is inspired by his ideal of *Khudi*, and human imagination realizes the essence hidden in human imagination.

**Note:** This assertion, often encountered in the facile writings in Iqbal Studies, can hardly stand the test of verification through Iqbal's works and a deeper study of Nietzsche's own ideas. Facing a similar objection, Iqbal himself dismissed the possibility by pointing out to the critic that he had not read Nietzsche when he wrote the verses that are usually interpreted as harbouring a concept of man that, apparently, resembled Nietzsche's idea of the superman.

## Intellect And Intuition According To Iqbal

*Move beyond the Intellect, as this Light,  
Merely illumines the path, but is not the destination*

*Aql* or Intellect, a faculty which has amazed man from his first realization of being in possession of it, has been the source and cause of much debate amongst Muslim philosophers for the past 13 centuries or so. The Neoplatonic philosophers called it NOUS, the first thing emanating from the First Cause, i.e God. Muslim Philosophers took the ideas of the Greek philosophers to a new level by scrutinizing it in light of the Quran and hadith and attuning it accordingly.

According to a hadith of the Prophet (SAW) of Islam, the first thing created by God was the Pen. Muslim Scholars are generally in agreement that the Pen here is synonymous with the Intellect, thus collaborating with the Greek/Neoplatonic belief of the Intellect as the first thing created.

The word *Aql* comes from the root *ql* which means to bind. The intellect or *Aql* actually serves to bind an individual to God by furnishing him with true knowledge, a knowledge of reality, and endowing him with the ability to distinguish between Reality and Falsehood. The Stoics called it "Natural Light," by which one can distinguish between the good and the bad, while Muslim scientists like Ibn Sina and Al Farabi were of the opinion that *Aql* must lead to praiseworthy conduct, therefore an individual of bad character, no matter how sagacious, is not an *Aqil*, *Aql* here pertaining to wisdom, hence *Aql* has also been referred to as *fitrah* and *tabiah*, an inherent, integral part of the soul.

Generally, when we refer to *Aql* or Intellect we appear to be referring to a rational means of attaining knowledge. There is, however, a more direct and immediate method for acquisition of knowledge which surpasses reason, a faculty generally known as intuition and referred to in

Muslim philosophy as *hads, basirah, nazar, fouad*, etc. The seat of intuition is purely the heart or *qalb*, where it receives direct participation in Divine knowledge or *ilm* without the aid of rationality.

However, intellect and intuition must not be seen as two different faculties but as sub-faculties of *aql*, being two different modes of knowledge procurement. Islam, being a proponent of Unity in all faculties, has never seen dichotomy between the intellect and intuition, but sees both as part of a hierarchy of methods used in the acquisition of knowledge.

While Intellect or rational thought may be seen as that rational part of consciousness that assists us in our practical life – all cognitive processes include and comprise thought, Intuition goes a step further. It provides thought with the flight it needs to discover the Ultimate Truth – instead of remaining caged up within mechanical mental processes.

Iqbal in his works has dwelled incessantly upon the topic of the intellect and intuition in Islam and the meaning and importance it holds in the life of an individual. Iqbal defines knowledge as “sense-perception elaborated by understanding.” According to him, there are two modes of acquiring this knowledge, one is by creating a connection with the external Reality through sense perception, through the sensual and the rational; while the other is through direct association with Reality as it reveals itself at an internal level, within the heart of the individual.

Intellect... in the words of the great mystic poet of Islam, “only waylays the living heart of man and robs it of the invisible wealth of life that lies within.” (Reconstruction, Lecture 2)

In the interests of securing a complete vision of Reality, therefore, sense-perception must be supplemented by the perception of what the Qur’an describes as *Fu’ād* or *Qalb*, i.e. heart.

The “heart” is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rūmī, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is, according to the Qur’an, something which “sees”, and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false. (Reconstruction, Lecture 2)

Throughout his works, especially his poetical works, Iqbal describes an ongoing struggle and tussle between Intellect and Intuition, the former referred to as *Aql*, while the latter as it emanates directly from the heart, referred to as *Ishq* not only by Iqbal but in most Sufi literature as well, including Rumi. Love, heart and intuition have been used interchangeably in Sufi Islamic poetry, just as we see it throughout Iqbal’s works.

The perpetual struggle between *Aql* and *Ishq* is due to the fact that reason and intuition oftentimes tend to lead a person in opposite directions, both in their colliding interests, reason putting fetters on the individual and his thought, while intuition bestows upon thought the wings to fly, turning it into Imagination. Sometimes, according to Iqbal, true knowledge is not possible without that leap of faith which one can take only under the guidance and assistance of intuition and love, compelled by the heart.

*Love is the first guide for the Intellect, Heart and Vision,  
In the absence of love religion and dogma are mere idols of illusion!*

In his Persian work *The New Garden of Mystery*, Iqbal asks nine fundamental questions about life

and existence, the first being about Thought, which encompasses both rational thought and intuition.

*What Light there is within the heart of Man,  
A light that is manifest in spite of its invisibility.  
I saw it in the constancy of change,  
I saw it both as light and fire.  
Sometimes its fire is nourished by argumentation and reasoning,  
Sometimes its light is derived from the breath of Gabriel*

Hence, for Iqbal both Intellect and Intuition apparently belong to the single faculty of thought, which when taking in ground realities appears as rational thought and when lifted by the wings of imagination turns into intuition.

Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness... In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect. (Reconstruction, Lecture 1)

Islam and Islamic thought essentially focuses on unity of phenomena, and therefore sees rational thought and Intuition both as a continuation of thought, merely different modes of knowledge procurement, or apprehending Reality, which form a hierarchy, much like a ladder – as the individual ascends the steps, he or she utilises increasingly superior modes of knowledge acquisition.

*One leap of faith ended this pothole,  
I had imagined the cosmos to be boundless!*

It is in fact, Modern science that has created a dichotomy between Intellect and Intuition, seeing a wide chasm between the two. Attributing all mental and cognitive processes to the brain and thus as the organ from which thought arises, modern science has completely negated the role of the heart which has been referred to as the seat of “wisdom” and “intuition” by the Quran and all mystic and Sufi literature.

Very interestingly, however, neuroscientists have quite recently discovered the heart to possess its very own nervous system, quite independent of the brain, and capable of not only making its own decisions but also of “influencing” the decisions made by the brain. So there we have it – “intuition” not only assisting, but actually influencing “thought.” This discovery may serve to reaffirm the role assigned by the Quran to the heart as the seat of true knowledge, wisdom, intuition and love.

### **Tagore: Religion of man**

Tagore sets forth a new religion, which he calls the "Religion of Man." The Religion of Man differs radically from most organized religions, in the way it defines God; in its views on the origins of man and the cosmos, on revelation, and on authority; and in its commandments.

God is defined as the Universal Spirit, the Spirit of Life, the Eternal Spirit of human unity beyond our direct knowledge, the Super Soul that permeates all moving things, the Supreme Person, Man the

Eternal. This God dwells not in the heavens but in the heart of every human being.

The creation myth of this religion is the story of evolution. The first stage of Life's evolution was the physiological process, which seems to have reached its finality in man. The second stage of evolution, the spiritual process, is continuing. The evolutionary process has as its ultimate goal, not the attainment of Heaven or of nirvana or satori, but the release of each individual's consciousness from the illusory bond of the separate self and the realization of the spiritual unity of all human beings.

Truth in the Religion of Man is not that which was revealed only to a chosen few in the distant past. It is not reached through the analytical process of reasoning. It does not depend for proof on some corroboration of outward facts or the prevalent faith and practice of a group of people. Rather, the truth is revealed to every person every day, if we but listen. Truth comes like an inspiration and brings with it an assurance that it has been sent from an inner source of divine wisdom. This truth comes through an illumination, almost like a communication of the universal self to the personal self.

Every human being is capable of experiencing such illumination (the mystical experience). Although some people are more successful at actualizing this potentiality than others, most people have had at one time or another at least a partial vision of the universal unity. Furthermore, we can each increase our power of realization through "disciplined striving"--through our participation in nature, literature, arts, legends, symbols, and ceremonials, and through the remembrance of heroic souls who have personified this truth in their lives.

The truth, Tagore says, is inside us, like a song which has only to be mastered and sung. It is like the morning which has only to be welcomed by raising the screens and opening the doors.

Tagore calls Zarathustra the first prophet of the Religion of Man. Zarathustra, who spiritualized the meaning of sacrifice, was the first to address his words to all humanity, regardless of distance of space or time. He emancipated religion from the exclusive narrowness of the tribal God, the God of a chosen people, and offered it to the Universal Man.

The only commandment in the Religion of Man is that the individual who has realized the Divine Truth accept his or her responsibility to communicate this truth in word and deed to others.

Tagore stresses that his understanding of the Religion of Man came to him through his personal experience of the holy, not from knowledge gathered or through any process of philosophical reasoning. However, he acknowledges that certain factors enabled him to be receptive to these visions. One was the feeling of intimacy with Nature that he had from early childhood. Another formative experience was the songs he heard from wandering village singers, belonging to a popular sect of Bengal, called Bauls. The Bauls, who have no images, temples, scriptures, or ceremonials, express in their songs an intense yearning of the heart for the divine which is in Man. In addition, from childhood, he was immersed in the philosophy of the Upanishad, which holds that the world is pervaded by one supreme unity and that true enjoyment can be found only through the surrender of our individual self to the Universal Self.

Tagore believed that the task of the poet and artist is to direct our attention to the Infinite and to remind us that it ever dwells within each of us.

## **Rabindranath Tagore on education**

As one of the earliest educators to think in terms of the global village, Rabindranath Tagore's educational model has a unique sensitivity and aptness for education within multi-racial, multi-lingual and multi-cultural situations, amidst conditions of acknowledged economic discrepancy and political imbalance. Kathleen M. O'Connell explores Rabindranath Tagore's contribution.

**Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941)**, Asia's first Nobel Laureate, was born into a prominent Calcutta family known for its socio-religious and cultural innovations during the 19th Bengal Renaissance. The profound social and cultural involvement of his family would later play a strong role in the formulation of Rabindranath's educational priorities. His grandfather Dwarkanath was involved in supporting medical facilities, educational institutions and the arts, and he fought for religious and social reform and the establishment of a free press. His father was also a leader in social and religious reform, who encouraged a multi-cultural exchange in the family mansion Jorasanko. Within the joint family, Rabindranath's thirteen brothers and sisters were mathematicians, journalists, novelists, musicians, artists. His cousins, who shared the family mansion, were leaders in theatre, science and a new art movement.

The tremendous excitement and cultural richness of his extended family permitted young Rabindranath to absorb and learn subconsciously at his own pace, giving him a dynamic open model of education, which he later tried to recreate in his school at Santiniketan. Not surprisingly, he found his outside formal schooling to be inferior and boring and, after a brief exposure to several schools, he refused to attend school. The only degrees he ever received were honorary ones bestowed late in life.

His experiences at Jorasanko provided him with a lifelong conviction concerning the importance of freedom in education. He also realized in a profound manner the importance of the arts for developing empathy and sensitivity, and the necessity for an intimate relationship with one's cultural and natural environment. In participating in the cosmopolitan activities of the family, he came to reject narrowness in general, and in particular, any form of narrowness that separated human being from human being. He saw education as a vehicle for appreciating the richest aspects of other cultures, while maintaining one's own cultural specificity. As he wrote:

I was brought up in an atmosphere of aspiration, aspiration for the expansion of the human spirit. We in our home sought freedom of power in our language, freedom of imagination in our literature, freedom of soul in our religious creeds and that of mind in our social environment. Such an opportunity has given me confidence in the power of education which is one with life and only which can give us real freedom, the highest that is claimed for man, his freedom of moral communion in the human world.... I try to assert in my words and works that education has its only meaning and object in freedom—freedom from ignorance about the laws of the universe, and freedom from passion and prejudice in our communication with the human world. In my institution I have attempted to create an atmosphere of naturalness in our relationship with strangers, and the spirit of hospitality which is the first virtue in men that made civilization possible. I invited thinkers and scholars from foreign lands to let our boys know how easy it is to realise our common fellowship, when we deal with those who are great, and that it is the puny who with their petty vanities set up barriers between man and man.

As well as growing up in a household that was the meeting place for leading artists and intellectuals from India and the West, Rabindranath had a further experience which was unusual for someone of his upbringing. In the 1890s, he was put in charge of the family's rural properties in East Bengal.

His first experiments in adult education were carried out there as he gradually became aware of the acute material and cultural poverty that permeated the villages, as well as the great divide between the uneducated rural areas and the city elites. His experiences made him determined to do something about rural uplift, and later at Santiniketan, students and teachers were involved with literacy training and social work and the promotion of cooperative schemes. As an alternative to the existing forms of education, he started a small school at Santiniketan in 1901 that developed into a university and rural reconstruction centre, where he tried to develop an alternative model of education that stemmed from his own learning experiences.

Rabindranath composed his first poem at age eight, and by the end of his life, had written over twenty-five volumes of poetry, fifteen plays, ninety short stories, eleven novels, thirteen volumes of essays, initiated and edited various journals, prepared Bengali textbooks, kept up a correspondence involving thousands of letters, composed over two thousand songs; and – after the age of seventy – created more than two thousand pictures and sketches. He dedicated forty years of his life to his educational institution at Santiniketan, West Bengal. Rabindranath's school contained a children's school as well as a university known as Visva-Bharati and a rural education Centre known as Sriniketan.

## **Key ideas**

Rabindranath did not write a central educational treatise, and his ideas must be gleaned through his various writings and educational experiments at Santiniketan. In general, he envisioned an education that was deeply rooted in one's immediate surroundings but connected to the cultures of the wider world, predicated upon pleasurable learning and individualized to the personality of the child. He felt that a curriculum should revolve organically around nature with classes held in the open air under the trees to provide for a spontaneous appreciation of the fluidity of the plant and animal kingdoms, and seasonal changes. Children sat on hand-woven mats beneath the trees, which they were allowed to climb and run beneath between classes. Nature walks and excursions were a part of the curriculum and students were encouraged to follow the life cycles of insects, birds and plants. Class schedules were made flexible to allow for shifts in the weather or special attention to natural phenomena, and seasonal festivals were created for the children by Tagore. In an essay entitled "A Poet's School," he emphasizes the importance of an empathetic sense of interconnectedness with the surrounding world:

We have come to this world to accept it, not merely to know it. We may become powerful by knowledge, but we attain fullness by sympathy. The highest education is that which does not merely give us information but makes our life in harmony with all existence. But we find that this education of sympathy is not only systematically ignored in schools, but it is severely repressed. From our very childhood habits are formed and knowledge is imparted in such a manner that our life is weaned away from nature and our mind and the world are set in opposition from the beginning of our days. Thus the greatest of educations for which we came prepared is neglected, and we are made to lose our world to find a bagful of information instead. We rob the child of his

earth to teach him geography, of language to teach him grammar. His hunger is for the Epic, but he is supplied with chronicles of facts and dates...Child-nature protests against such calamity with all its power of suffering, subdued at last into silence by punishment. (Rabindranath Tagore, *Personality*, 1917: 116-17)

In Tagore's philosophy of education, the aesthetic development of the senses was as important as the intellectual—if not more so—and music, literature, art, dance and drama were given great prominence in the daily life of the school. This was particularly so after the first decade of the school. Drawing on his home life at Jorasanko, Rabindranath tried to create an atmosphere in which the arts would become instinctive. One of the first areas to be emphasized was music. Rabindranath writes that in his adolescence, a 'cascade of musical emotion' gushed forth day after day at Jorasanko. 'We felt we would try to test everything,' he writes, 'and no achievement seemed impossible...We wrote, we sang, we acted, we poured ourselves out on every side.' (Rabindranath Tagore, *My Reminiscences* 1917: 141)

In keeping with his theory of subconscious learning, Rabindranath never talked or wrote down to the students, but rather involved them with whatever he was writing or composing. The students were allowed access to the room where he read his new writings to teachers and critics, and they were encouraged to read out their own writings in special literary evenings. In teaching also he believed in presenting difficult levels of literature, which the students might not fully grasp, but which would stimulate them. The writing and publishing of periodicals had always been an important aspect of Jorasanko life, and students at Santiniketan were encouraged to create their own publications and put out several illustrated magazines. The children were encouraged to follow their ideas in painting and drawing and to draw inspiration from the many visiting artists and writers.

Most of Rabindranath's dramas were written at Santiniketan and the students took part in both the performing and production sides. He writes how well the students were able to enter into the spirit of the dramas and perform their roles, which required subtle understanding and sympathy without special training.

As Rabindranath began conceiving of Visva-Bharati as a national centre for the arts, he encouraged artists such as Nandalal Bose to take up residence at Santiniketan and to devote themselves full-time to promoting a national form of art. Without music and the fine arts, he wrote, a nation lacks its highest means of national self-expression and the people remain inarticulate. Tagore was one of the first to support and bring together different forms of Indian dance. He helped revive folk dances and introduced dance forms from other parts of India, such as Manipuri, Kathak and Kathakali. He also supported modern dance and was one of the first to recognize the talents of Uday Sankar, who was invited to perform at Santiniketan.

The meeting-ground of cultures, as Rabindranath envisioned it at Visva-Bharati, should be a learning centre where conflicting interests are minimized, where individuals work together in a common pursuit of truth and realise 'that artists in all parts of the world have created forms of beauty, scientists discovered secrets of the universe, philosophers solved the problems of existence, saints made the truth of the spiritual world organic in their own lives, not merely for some particular race to which they belonged, but for all mankind.' (Tagore 1922:171-2) To encourage mutuality, Rabindranath invited artists and scholars from other parts of India and the world to live together at Santiniketan on a daily basis to share their cultures with Visva-Bharati. The Constitution designated Visva-Bharati as an Indian, Eastern and Global cultural centre whose goals

were:

1. To study the mind of Man in its realisation of different aspects of truth from diverse points of view.
2. To bring into more intimate relation with one another through patient study and research, the different cultures of the East on the basis of their underlying unity.
3. To approach the West from the standpoint of such a unity of the life and thought of Asia.
4. To seek to realise in a common fellowship of study the meeting of East and West and thus ultimately to strengthen the fundamental conditions of world peace through the free communication of ideas between the two hemispheres.
5. And with such Ideals in view to provide at Santiniketan a centre of culture where research into the study of the religion, literature, history, science and art of Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Zoroastrian, Islamic, Sikh, Christian and other civilizations may be pursued along with the culture of the West, with that simplicity of externals which is necessary for true spiritual realisation, in amity, good-fellowship and co-operation between the thinkers and scholars of both Eastern and Western countries, free from all antagonisms of race, nationality, creed or caste and in the name of the One Supreme Being who is Shantam, Shivam, Advaitam.

In terms of curriculum, he advocated a different emphasis in teaching. Rather than studying national cultures for the wars won and cultural dominance imposed, he advocated a teaching system that analysed history and culture for the progress that had been made in breaking down social and religious barriers. Such an approach emphasized the innovations that had been made in integrating individuals of diverse backgrounds into a larger framework, and in devising the economic policies which emphasized social justice and narrowed the gap between rich and poor. Art would be studied for its role in furthering the aesthetic imagination and expressing universal themes.

It should be noted that Rabindranath in his own person was a living icon of the type of mutuality and creative exchange that he advocated. His vision of culture was not a static one, but one that advocated new cultural fusions, and he fought for a world where multiple voices were encouraged to interact with one another and to reconcile differences within an overriding commitment to peace and mutual interconnectedness. His generous personality and his striving to break down barriers of all sorts gives us a model for the way multiculturalism can exist within a single human personality, and the type of individual which the educational process should be aspiring towards.

Tagore's educational efforts were ground-breaking in many areas. He was one of the first in India to argue for a humane educational system that was in touch with the environment and aimed at overall development of the personality.

Santiniketan became a model for vernacular instruction and the development of Bengali textbooks; as well, it offered one of the earliest coeducational programs in South Asia. The establishment of Visva-Bharati and Sriniketan led to pioneering efforts in many directions, including models for distinctively Indian higher education and mass education, as well as pan-Asian and global cultural exchange. One characteristic that sets Rabindranath's educational theory apart is his approach to education as a poet. At Santiniketan, he stated, his goal was to create a poem 'in a medium other than words.' It was this poetic vision that enabled him to fashion a scheme of education which was

all inclusive, and to devise a unique program for education in nature and creative self-expression in a learning climate congenial to global cultural exchange.

## **Rabindranath Tagore: Nation and Nationalism**

Before we examine Tagore's idea of nationalism, it would be prudent to first comprehend as what he intended by the very notion of nation. Nation according to Tagore was not defined by ethnicity, geography, language or any other external factor, as many of us would believe, but by a shared tradition, purpose and commonality of being (Chaudhuri 2017). There should be no ambiguity that he discarded the idea of a nation where the nation becomes more influential and greater against the people who created it. This idea of nation was often endorsed by the colonizer countries that saw the nation above its citizens. The European nationalism always placed the nation above people and therefore, nation not the people of the nation were at the helm of day to day affairs. Thus, national security, national pride, economy, power subsumed the interests of ordinary people such as their living conditions, health, education, etc. (Patnaik 2016). He saw the birth of nationalism in the various European countries as the result of technological advancement and modern science. He demonstrated various negative fallouts of the nationalism which took birth in Europe and impacted internally and at the international arena. In his legendary lecture on Nationalism which he delivered in 1916, he said that west's success in the field of science and technology has led to dehumanization and increasing greed for power.

Nationalism instilled unbridled lust for power and money within the society which resulted in continuous degradation of moral values, dignity and severe condition of the labor class. This race for power and money encouraged colonizers to move beyond their territory and search for colonies where they can exploit the resources to accomplish their unending lust for wealth (Chakrabarty 2009).

In a letter dated 1909-1910, he said, "And what is the harvest of your civilization? You do not see from the outside. You do not realize what a terrible menace you have become to man. We are afraid of you. And everywhere people are suspicious of each other. All the great countries of the west are preparing for war, for some great work of desolation that will spread poison all over the world. And this poison is within our own selves. They try and try to find some solution, but they do not succeed, because they have lost faith in personality of man" (Tagore, *The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore: A Miscellany* 1994).

In the Indian context, Tagore was convinced that there was no word like 'nation' in the Indian languages. Nationalism in India like in Europe was an urban phenomenon in the 19th century. He was fundamentally against any such attempt made in the name of nationalism, for nation or patriotism, to mobilize people for the so-called national cause. In a letter to his friend A.M Bose, he said, "Patriotism cannot be our final spiritual shelter. I will not buy glass for the price of diamonds and I will never allow patriotism to triumph over humanity as long as I live." (*Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore* 1997).

For him the fight that India was taking against the British rule was not the fight to take the nation back and decolonize the political authority; it was rather a spiritual fight, which aimed liberation of individuals from meshes of national pride, chauvinism, and national egoism. He gave more importance to freedom and wanted the realization of freedom to start flowing from the individual to community and then from community to universe, ultimately it will reach from the universe to infinity (Urwin 1968).

He opined that the very idea of nationalism is non-Indian or anti-Indian. He saw the seed of nationalism in India as an onslaught against Indian civilization which was religiously and culturally plural in nature. The story of 'Ghare Baire' demonstrates how nationalism led to disruption and decay of community life (Nandy 2006). He resolutely believed that this country had a unique personality which ought to be preserved. In his celebrated lecture 'Swadeshi Samaj' he contended that in the west it is the state which takes the central responsibility of welfare. People in the west are heavily dependent on the state. In contrast to this society in India is diverse, here the source of strength radiates from the society and the state. Things like health, education, and trade are primarily done in accordance with the 'dharma', which is acknowledged by the people and is not subject to the charity or benevolence of the ruler or king.

Consequently, it was the society and not the state that got priority and Tagore further elaborated the very nature of Indian society which was organic in nature. He said that if we look at the historical journey of different civilizations, it was the political and not social system which was predominant. However, in the case of India and China, the society took the dominant position and political system was subservient to it. Both these two countries flourished through the collective role of society (Gupta 2005). He emphasized the fact that it should be the society and not lust for power, resources, and colony that a nation should aspire for. Here Tagore noticeably indicates that India should restore its spiritual genius and should not run madly after the material things (Mehata 2015). Tagore acknowledged the fact that west has mastered the material realm very successfully, however, in the process of doing this west has also shattered the spiritual harmony resulting in the menace of imperialism everywhere.

Nationalism in the west created a chain of war and conflict and failed to establish a spiritual bonhomie. He wanted west to learn spirituality from the east because the menace of industrialization and imperialism has eroded the spiritual element from the western societies. He was of the opinion that west has succeeded materially but is living under acute spiritual poverty. However, it is because of values such as freedom, equality, and fraternity that despite being very critical about nationalism that took birth in the west and subsequently took the form of colonialism and imperialism, Tagore was very appreciative of what he calls the 'spirit of the west'.

He championed the idea of east-west dialogue instead of confrontation where both can learn from each other. In his different essays, Nationalism in Japan, Nationalism in the west and Nationalism in India, he marked a categorical distinction between 'spirit of West' and 'Nations of the West'. He saw an evident difference between western civilization and western nations. The 'extremist nationalists'<sup>2</sup> in India who were to an extent, inspired by the western nationalism could not impress him for the method and cause they were planning to embark on a struggle against the British authority to set this country free. When the split in Congress party occurred in 1907 in Surat Session, Tagore distanced himself from the extremist league. He found that extremist nationalists had no concerns for the real problems such as illiteracy; malnourishment and education in India (Mohanty 2015). What is important to note here that Tagore was in no way less patriotic to anyone, however, his patriotism was about the realization of potential by the country and not hatred for others.

"I am willing to serve my country, but my worship I reserve for right which is far greater than country. To worship my country as a God is to bring curse upon it," Tagore said in his famous novel 'The Home and the World' (Tagore, The Home and The World 1919).

One has to look for the reasons very carefully as to why the man, who penned down the National Anthem of this country, was against the prevailing conception of nationalism in India. Was he really opposed to any form of Nationalism? If we look at factors that worried most to Tagore and often found its place in the popular idea of nationalism, these were the exclusionary and self-aggrandizing features of which he was not at ease.

He was certainly against the militant and aggressive nationalism. Narrowly defined idea of nationalism and patriotism was not acceptable to Tagore. In his illustrious work, 'the Imagined communities' Anderson says that identity plays a very critical role in the consolidation of a group of people who in effect constitute a nation. Such identities are formed on the basis of language, territory, culture, and religion. When we talk of such things, we inherently create a space of we vs. they, our culture vs. their culture, our language vs. their language and likewise.

This exclusionary element in the whole project of nationalism made Tagore uncomfortable.

First, we create an atmosphere of we vs. they and then try to establish ourselves superior in every possible manner. Thus, the very project of nationalism got entangled with things like aggression, chauvinism, hate culture and animosity.

Doing this we often create an enemy to fulfill such things. The poet perceived such elements in nationalism abysmally poor and abhorred nationalism that is formed on the basis of such things.

Therefore, what we find is that Tagore was not against nationalism as long as it does not entail things like aggressive posturing, self-aggrandizement, feeling of hatreds and creating 'enemy within and outside.' He lamented Indian nationalism because, for many Indian nationalists and countrymen, nationalism was about driving British authority out of the country and have rule by Indian people over different institutions. Despite addressing Gandhi as a nationalist here, it should be noted here very categorically that Gandhi's idea of freedom was not merely to kick out British rule from India. Gandhi in his classical conception of 'Swaraj'<sup>3</sup> which includes Swaraj in economic, Political Individual- level have a very different idea of freedom which is not restricted to driving out British authority only, instead, he emphasized on things like self-restraint, duty over right and likewise.

If the nationalism was about boycotting foreign products and rule just because they were not Indian, Tagore certainly did not subscribe to such agenda. He had no quandary even if the British authority continues to rule in India. The only condition was that people from the lower strata of society and those who were marginalized, their condition should be alleviated. He saw that under British rule India had ceased to be creative in the cultural domain. He never championed the cause to oppose the British rule just because the English people were not Indian and that they were standing in the way of political freedom of India. Moderately he saw foreign rule good for the Indian people particularly to the lower caste people because the Englishmen started attempts to eradicate untouchability and accommodating in jobs and services. He was conscious of the fact that anti-west tendency which was very widespread in any Indian movement against the British authority would prove as an obstacle for India's cooperation with the rest of the international community. He as a result, discredited, Noncooperation movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi in 1920s.

Tagore found that this movement was full of blind national smugness and anti-west outlook. He was very much concerned and apprehensive about this anti-west propensity which was gaining currency day by day in India. For him if this happened and the country chooses the path of isolation, then India would be unable to find the prospect to be integrated with the mainstream of international transactions (Chakrabarti 2015). When Gandhi gave a call for Boycott of foreign goods and launched mass movements such as non-cooperation, civil disobedience to drive the British rule out of India, Tagore saw it as Gandhi and other leaders falling prey in the agenda of nationalism whose ultimate aim was merely to throw the foreigners out of the country.

His antipathy to this noncooperation movement was broadly due to four main reasons. First, as we already discussed he was not pleased with the idea of boycott of the government school in the absence of any other educational institution. Second, he was not impressed with the idea of burning of the foreign clothes and production of Khadi through spinning wheel. Thirdly, he was skeptical about the nature this movement was taking. He believed that this movement was being more and more focused on the sins of the British rule thus encouraging this spirit of isolation which according to him was not good for the broader view of humanity (Gupta 2005, 43). He has criticized three social groups who according to him had no love for this country and were merely serving the interest of their foreign masters. These three groups were western-educated political leaders, intellectuals and western-oriented rulers; mostly Zamindars. He found that Zamindars had accumulated wealth by exploiting the poor in India and were serving the interests of Englishmen. He was very critical about the leaders who were involved in the sycophancy of Britishers and crossed the limit. Instead of doing that, Tagore wanted them to establish a direct relationship with the mass. He tried to offer a new life to India through his efforts such as education and rural reconstruction.

The foundation of 'Visva Bharti' was led to the conviction that it would provide an alternative to the colonial education system and will facilitate people to realize the self. It was precisely this reason that when boycott movement was on its peak and political leaders gave a call for boycotting of government schools, Tagore abhorred this decision because there were no other alternative schools for education and boycotting the government schools tantamount to depriving the young children of education. In a letter to C.F Andrews he expressed his opinion as to why he does not consider the boycott of government-sponsored school is a good idea. He said by boycotting government schools, our students, 'are bringing their offering of sacrifice to what? Not to a fuller education but to a no education.'

"I remember the day, during the Swadeshi (freedom) movement in Bengal, when a crowd of young students came in the first floor hall of our Vichitra House. They said to me that if I would order them to leave their schools and colleges they would instantly obey. I was emphatic in my refusal to do so... the reason of my refusing to advise those students to leave their school was because the anarchy of mere emptiness never tempts me... I could not lightly take upon myself the tremendous responsibility of a mere negative programme which would uproot their life from its soil, however thin and poor that soil might be" (Bhattacharay 1997).

Nevertheless, Mahatma was convinced and justified the boycott movement and said government schools and colleges 'rendered us helpless and godless' because of the training imparted there in government schools and colleges. He worked on multiple fronts such as education, eradication of caste system, rural reconstruction. If someone is geared up to do such things in the name of nationalism, Tagore would merrily be part of that nationalist club. He was very much critical about

the western education. Not only that, but he was also against everything being derivative of the British fashion. According to him everything coming from the west is not good for this country and therefore the country must preserve its identity. He wanted India to adopt things from the west which were of pressing demands and suits this country.

Thus, what we find is an unprejudiced approach coming from Tagore regarding East-West debate. In his well-known satirical essay 'Kot and Chapakan' he called for national identity and wearing dress was part of that national identity. He also criticized all those Indians who were cheerfully wearing western dresses but not allowing their wives to do the same thing. At the time when Rammohan Roy was championing the cause of English as the language of instruction, Tagore asserted and supported the Bengali language as a medium of instruction. In an article titled as 'Engraj O Bharat Basi' expressed his dissatisfaction against the English rule on the ground that British has failed to make India their home, British people did not learn the language of this country. He was aggrieved by the kind of treatment British authority handed over to the Indians.

When Gandhi asked Tagore's opinion regarding use of Hindi as national language, he replied that Hindi was the 'only possible national language at the inter – provincial level subject to a period of preparation to 'pave the way towards its general use by constant practices as a voluntary acceptance of a national obligation' As a result, despite having much serious difference between them, both revered each other. Mahatma called him 'Gurudeva' and Tagore was the first to call Gandhi 'Mahatma'. Gandhi wrote a letter to Tagore and asked his message on the 'national struggle' in early April 1919. In reply, to this letter Tagore addressed Gandhi as 'Mahatma' and 'great leader of men'.

In his reply Tagore reaffirmed his faith and said that 'India will win freedom when she can prove that morally she is superior to the people who rule her by right of conquest'. What is interesting to note here is that fact that both Mahatma and the poet- philosopher collectively believed that nationalism was the offshoot of the western nation- state system. He himself was a modernist and therefore when Mahatma gave the call for use of Charkha (Spinning Wheel), Tagore questioned this proposal. He asked how long this country can afford to remain in isolation and kept away from world trade. In the light of this, Mahatma responded to Tagore's critique of his Charkha Program and said Tagore has rejected his excess of Charkha Program.

All he knows (Tagore), about this movement (Swadeshi Movement) is what he picked up from table talk. Further, poets have the 'poetic license' of exaggeration and consequently, his words should be taken literally. This exaggeration constituted the misunderstood notion that Gandhi was calling to use Charkha all the time. On the other hand, contrary to this, what Mahatma truly intended was the use of Charkha half an hour a day by those (employed and unemployed) who can afford other means of livelihood and not depend entirely on Charkha (Bhattacharay 1997).

Correspondingly on the issue of Indian Nationalism both Gandhi and Tagore differed with each other. Gandhi was of the view that to achieve internationalism one must go through nationalism first, in a similar way, war is indispensable before someone reaches to peace. Gandhi reiterated his firm faith that non- cooperation is simply a refusal to cooperate with British authority on their terms. "We say to them, come and co-operate with us on our terms, and it will be for us, for you and the world.' We must refuse to be lifted off our feet. A drowning man cannot save others. In order to be fit to save others, we must try to save ourselves. Indian nationalism is not exclusive, nor aggressive, nor destructive. It is health giving, religious and therefore humanitarian" (Gandhi 1921).

"It was love of foreign clothe that ousted the wheel from its position of dignity. Therefore, I consider it a sin to wear foreign cloth. I must confessthat I do not draw a sharp or any distinction between economics and ethics" (Pakhare 2015).

Additionally, Gandhi's call to use of Charkha should not be seen as isolation because Gandhi was not appealing for mere use of Charkha alone instead Charkhawas seen by Gandhi as an instrument that can lead to the path of rural cooperation and self-sufficiency. It was also seen by Gandhi as an instrument to restore dignity of individuals and strengthen their might against foreign system that crushed this indigenous wheel and those who operated it. Tagore was questioned by many who were enthusiastically involved in the national movement, on his views on Internationalism, when this nation itself was under the foreign yoke, how could someone talk about internationalism? However, suchcriticisms could not deter him of his views on Internationalism which was imagined for humanity at large and not for any particular country.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Tagore a person blessed with poetic, philosophical, and original thinking stood firmly against the mighty wind of nationalism blowing in the 19th century.

Regardless of having some fundamental differences with Mahatma, a towering figure in Indian national movements with a strong support base, Tagore never compromised what he believed about things like nation, Indian nationalism, idea of India, and methods that most political leaders were taking, and therefore he never desisted speaking against Gandhi and other political leaders. He was no lesspatriotic to anyone else; however, mere political freedom was never in his priority list. Wellbeing of the humanity (including east and west) was the paramount concern for him. His ideas and teachings are so profound that it still has all- inclusive global appeal. In the 21th century when the world is facing many grave humanitarian crises including forced migration, racial discrimination, genocides and ignorance to the cause of marginalized, it is high time for us to revisit what Tagore had to say. He fought till his last breath to shield the cause of suppressed and downtrodden. And hence, discarded the formation of any state whose agenda merely is to build up state power at the cost and ignorance of its citizens.

In India where despite many developmental and social efforts we are still witnessing unprecedented widening of the gap between rich and poor, discrimination based on caste, gender, and color, abysmal performance in health,education, and livelihood, this compelled us to think the Tagore's idea of India.

When the country is again debating on different aspects of nationalism at the costof ignorance of things previously mentioned, it is high time that we should march on the path guided by Tagore and bring back people to the center again. This is however not to say that India as the nation has botched completely. Without a doubt India has come a long way from where she was 70 years before; the only purpose to bring the idea of Tagore is to guide how as a nation we have to march forward. Things like hyper- nationalism about which Tagore had warned us is again tightening its grip all across, resulting in ethnic cleansing, degradation of human dignity, poor livelihood, and ignorance to the common cause. And therefore, not only in India, Tagore's messages are pertinent to the whole worldbecause for him, in the center, it is the concern for humanity at large.

## **The real idea of swaraj**

ON the day of India's Independence in August 1947, Mahatma Gandhi refused to join the nationwide festivities and remained in the riot-torn district of Noakhali in East Bengal to restore peace between Hindus and Muslims.

ON the day of India's Independence in August 1947, Mahatma Gandhi refused to join the nationwide festivities and remained in the riot-torn district of Noakhali in East Bengal to restore peace between Hindus and Muslims. That dark shadow of despair still haunts every time we think we need to celebrate our 'independence'. It was characteristic of Gandhi that he questioned the authenticity of independence in the aftermath of the Partition violence. But more importantly, he began to feel that colonisation had made deep inroads into the Indian mind and needed to be undone urgently.

He had written Hind Swaraj in 1909 as his manifesto for ideological independence when the attainment of swaraj was the immediate task facing colonial India.

Gandhi draws a subtle distinction between swaraj as self-rule and swaraj as self-government or home rule. Swaraj as self-rule is the rule of the self by the self or more precisely, the rule of the mind over itself and its passions. As swaraj is something that is capable of being experienced within oneself, the inner experience of self-rule enables the citizens to reinforce their political ethics by their conduct, in harmony with their native genius.

Gandhi was suspicious of the modern West primarily because of its obsessively materialistic world view. To him a culture, which did not have a theory of transcendence, could not be morally or cognitively acceptable. The legitimisation of the modern West as a superior culture came from an ideology, which viewed oriental societies as inferior to the occidental ones. With the acceptance of this ideology, the superiority of the West became an objective criterion of evaluation of other cultures. Even a liberal like JS Mill endorsed this civilisational partition of the world and used the very doctrine of liberty to justify the imperial rule over the world.

Gandhi felt that it was necessary to revitalise tradition to protect autonomy of the individual. Living through the era of British imperialism, and when the most insidious effects of colonialism were showing in India, he was anxious to teach the Indians that 'modern civilisation' posed a greater threat to them than did colonialism and that in any case colonialism itself was a product of modern civilisation. At the heart of Western modernity is the faith that reason alone will lead inevitably to a progressively better future. Gandhi held that the great weakness of modern civilisation was its failure to understand the nature and limits of reason. In his view modernity displaces other modes of thinking and moral points of reference, such as those found in religion and tradition which speak to the moral and cooperative nature of man and challenges the self-interests that are lodged in a person and in a society. Tradition was a resource, a source of valuable insights into the human condition, and part of a common human heritage. He therefore became a resolute critic of modernity.

Gandhi valorises traditional India for as much as it was able to maintain a certain openness of cultural boundaries, a permeability that allows new influences to flow in and be integrated as a new set of age-old traditions. These two processes of inflow and outflow, rather than a rigidly defined set of practices, determine Indian culture at a given point of time. Since Gandhi's Hinduism reaffirmed the non-canonical and the folk, his was a defence not of a religion or theology but of an

open-ended way of life on the assumption that, with such a base, Indians would cope better with modernity. His distrust of modernity has found echoes among many political and environmental movements around the world.

To be sure, there is nothing wrong in embracing elements of another culture, no matter how different it is from one's own. The point is that neither Western modernity nor indigenous tradition must be blindly accepted or rejected. Gandhi, one of the most original minds of the 20th century, did not want his house to be 'walled in on all sides and his windows to be stuffed'. He wanted the culture of all lands to be blown about his house as freely as possible but refused 'to be blown off' his feet by any.

In October 1931 the philosopher KC Bhattacharya delivered a lecture called 'Swaraj in Ideas', which echoed Gandhi's Hind Swaraj and warned against 'the so-called universalism of reason or religion' which, being the result of a rootless education, stood more than anything else in the way of 'swaraj in ideas'. He talks about 'cultural subjection' vitiating the very springs of our intellectual and moral life, which persists even today. According to Bhattacharya, 'there is cultural subjection only when one's traditional cast of ideas and sentiments is superseded without comparison or competition by a new cast representing an alien culture which possesses one like a ghost'. His lecture exhorts Indians to shake themselves free from it.

Bhattacharya concludes his lecture thus, 'we condemn the caste system of our country, but we ignore the fact that we who have received Western education constitute a caste more exclusive and intolerant than any of the traditional castes. Let us resolutely break down the barriers of this new caste, let us come back to the cultural stratum of the real Indian people and evolve a culture along with them suited to the time and to our native genius. That would be to achieve swaraj in ideas'. How the words ring true after seven decades of our Independence!

## **Concept of Philosophy**

K.C. Bhattacharyya's concept of philosophy cannot be understood by the accepted philosophical methods. There can be an approximate definition of his philosophy. In his philosophy, Bhattacharyya deals with pure self-subsistent object which has no spatio-temporal existence. For him, philosophy elaborates the concept of the self-subsistent object. In philosophy, the object has necessary reference to the subject which is not found in the case of science. For K.C. Bhattacharyya, philosophy is theoretic thinking. It does not deal with objects as fact but as self-subsistent realities. It is not related with facts like science.

Philosophy does not study facts or properties of object which are knowable or usable. Thus, for Bhattacharyya, the contents of philosophy are not literally thinkable. Philosophical thoughts are symbolic. Philosophy is the expression of theoretic consciousness or thoughts. Thus philosophical concepts are transcendental concepts which come from consciousness reflective attitude.

In his philosophy, Bhattacharyya distinguishes between grades of thoughts on which on the one hand, science or empirical thought and on the other hand, philosophy are located. Then he makes a distinction between grades of philosophic thoughts. They are –

- (a) empirical thought that involves reference to an object. Here content is distinct from the thought;
- (b) pure thought that has reference of content not distinguishable from it;
- (c) Philosophical concepts are transcendental concepts which emanates from consciousness's

reflective attitude.

Here content is not understood except the fact that it is spoken. So speakability is the necessary trait of philosophic thought.

Thus, Bhattacharyya confines contents of philosophy in to those which are speakable. In a real judgment, the predicate explicates the meaning of the believed subject. But in philosophical judgment, the subject is believed to be the self-evident elaboration of the predicate which is already believed as self-evident. So "philosophical judgments are self-evident elaboration of the self-evident which is spoken, not spoken of."

The central idea of K.C. Bhattacharyya seems to be that as we speak of everything including the Absolute, so everything is speakable. The speakable is of two kinds, the symbolically speakable and the literally speakable. The literally speakable comprises what is spoken of for information and symbolically speakable is what is only spoken, but not spoken of. What is only spoken is either as symbolized or as meant. Truth is only symbolically spoken, reality is literally spoken as symbolized, and self-subsistent is literally spoken as meant. None of these is spoken as information, while fact is spoken as information.

Thus K.C. Bhattacharyya takes, Truth, Reality, self-subsistent and fact as the four kinds of objects of speech. The difference between Truth and Reality is that while the latter is enjoyed, the former is not. Truth is believed as independent of speaking, as self-revealing. Truth is that in which there is nothing to be distinguished from, and is absolute in this sense. The absolute may be truth; it may also be freedom and value. Bhattacharyya's realization of freedom is a process of dissociation. For him, freedom is freedom from both 'being' and 'negation'.

Freedom is a process of dissociation of consciousness from the objective mode to the transcendental one. K.C. Bhattacharyya supports the philosophy of Abstract Monism. He does not attempt to interpret or expound Samkara's doctrine; but tries to defend its truth by a new approach through the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He is not satisfied with the agnosticism of Kant with regard to the ideas of Reason. According to Kant, none of the categories of understanding are applicable to the things in themselves and they are, therefore, unknowable. At this point, Bhattacharyya joins issue with Kant and follows the Upanisads which declare Brahman to be beyond speech and thought and yet not unknowable.

## **Concept of Freedom**

The concept freedom examined by K.C. Bhattacharyya is highly original. His concept of freedom has some resemblance with that of Advaita Vedanta and Kant. His style of description of the concept freedom expresses his creative thinking. His approach to freedom is not primarily social and ethical. It may be considered as ontological and epistemological. He describes gradual revelation of freedom in the world, in our relation to world of objects, within the contexts of psychological and psychical subjectivity and beyond them. He is in search of freedom as reality. K.C. Bhattacharyya does not consider physical and other aspects of freedom as unreal, but only as transitional, facilitative of real freedom.

Theory of the Subject In K.C. Bhattacharyya's philosophy the subject occupies an important place as he considers the subject as freedom. To make people clear about his concept of freedom, Bhattacharyya gives a very detailed and clear explanation of the subject as distinct from the

object. Like Advaita Vedanta, the subject or the self is conceived as consciousness and interpreted as free function or freedom. The subject is only known in itself and felt to be free from the object.

Bhattacharyya says, "The subject is said to be distinct and therefore distinguishable from all objects."<sup>2</sup> The subject has a being of its own, which from the ultimate standpoint has no relation with the object. He considers subject as an entity but not a meant entity like the object. The subject is the source of all « meanings. He translated 'meaning' in two different ways- one is that which refersto some object and the other is self-contained, which does not refer to any object other than itself. So it can be said that the subject's consciousness of the object is in a relative sense, free from the causal compulsion of the objective world. The subject is only known in itself and felt to be free or dissociated from the object.

This indicates that the subject can disengage itself from the objects of the causal world including other subjects.

So it is seen that in the philosophy of K.C. Bhattacharyya, the subject is taken to be distinct from the object. The subject is known in itself, but the object is known in relation to the subject. The object is not known with the same certainty as that of the subject. The subject appears as a known fact, only as it is spoken of through a personal pronoun. The subject is free from the object as it is known by itself. The subject is not related to the object either in the way of identity or distinction. In this regard, we can mention the name of Immanuel Kant who draws a distinction between "thinkable transcendental subject and the knowable empirical subject."<sup>3</sup> But Kant makes this distinction from the empirical standpoint. K.C. Bhattacharyya holds, "the subject is known though neither thought nor intuited."<sup>4</sup> For him, subject is known as we have some awareness of the subject. The subject is known by itself. It is not known as related to objects. So it is different from the subjects that understand. The subject knows itself as T without being meant by it. T indicates the depth of the subject. When the speaker expresses itself in T, it indicates freedom of the subject as it dissociates from the object. A subject as a self-expression of itself is a self evident fact. This subject is not found in introspection. The introspective awareness of the subject is not a subject as itself. Subject in introspection, being free, but not freedom itself as it is still the object of the process of introspection. Thus subject's expressing of itself as T is indicative of freedom of the subject. Subject symbolizing its freedom in 'I'. It is freedom which has no being, but not expressible as negation of being. It is absolute freedom. This subject is absolutely unobjective or freedom itself. The subject is definitely positive.

Spiritual freedom means the realization of the subject as free. The cultivation of such freedom is in the subject's being itself. The subjective function of knowing which is not known as a fact has to be known as a self evidencing reality of the subject itself. This involves modes of freedom from the object.

The stages of freedom or different grades of subjectivity are-

- (1) the bodily subjectivity
- (2) psychical and
- (3) spiritual subjectivity.

## **Bodily Subjectivity**

For K.C.Bhattacharyya, freedom is attained not in a spontaneous manner, but through gradual stages. There is no freedom in the subject so long it remains identified with the external body. There are three stages within the subject when identified with the body. Firstly, the subject remains identified with the physical body. Secondly, the subject gets identified with the internally felt body. Thirdly, the subject remains one without identification with its body.

In the first stage, the body as observed and felt is the subject in relation to the environment. One's own body has a unique singularity even as a member of the objective world. Objectivity of other perceived objects are constituted by their position relative to the percipient's body; the percipient's own body cannot be taken to be so constituted. One's own body is uniquely different from other perceived object. If the subject is taken as one's own perceived body, it involves knowledge of something that cannot be explained in terms of materialistic principle. He says, "It implies the mystic awareness of dissociation from the object in which bodily subjectivity consists."

One's own body is not only perceived from outside. One can sensuously be aware of it also from within in the feeling of the body. In body feeling, we are not aware of it as distinguished from the perceived body. In felt body, freedom or subject's dissociation from object is more manifest than in the level of the perceived body. There is more freedom in the level of the felt body than on the level of perceived body. The felt body is not a completely non-perceptual psychic fact. The felt body is a perceived body with some indefiniteness. Because, felt body cannot be conceived as occupying a definite position. The distinction between the perceived body and felt body can be compared to the distinction between perceived object and its presentation in some nonperceptual knowledge. In introspection of the psychic fact, the felt body begins to resolve into bodiless psychic feeling. The feeling of detachment from the object is the feeling of freedom and the first hint of this freedom is reached in the feeling of the body.

K.C.Bhattacharyya states, "The realization of freedom from the felt body is the pre-condition of all distinctive spiritual activity." K.C.Bhattacharyya also considers knowledge of absence as a present fact. Generally, objective facts are considered as present or absent. The objects that are present are present in a spatio-temporal situation. Those that are not present in spatio-temporal contexts are considered as absent. Bhattacharyya considers absence as present. So for Bhattacharyya, an object may even be 'present as absence'. Absence is present in a spatio-temporal context. Absence is known by conscious non-perception. Like the feeling of the body, there is also a feeling of detachment here. The direct knowledge of the present absence of an object is a detachment both from the perceived object and the perceived body but not from the felt body. The cognition of absence by the sense is not ordinary perception and is yet non-dissociated from it. There are two cases of direct cognition of absence in a locus- one, of the absence of an object in a locus, and the other, of an object being absent in a locus. In the one, perceived locus of absence is imagined in the very perception of it as without the absence, and the absence is thus felt to be dissociated from the locus. Absence is considered as being nowhere though it is believed to be an objective fact. Here there is no actual imagination of the position-less objective fact but only the feeling of detachment or absence from objective space. This sort of perception of absence may be called imaginative perception. In the other case, the knowledge of an object being absent is present with conscious imagination of the object as found distinct from it as absent.

## **Psychic Subjectivity**

At the second stage of subjectivity, the subject is quite detached from the body but remains identified with the image or thought. The image is the first stage in the realization of the subjective point of view or subjectivity. The image appears is presented as something substantive distinct from the perceptible object. Though image is a fact, it is not in the sense of an object. The image has no spatio-temporal position. Image is known to be without position. The image involves in the perception of object, in the perception of one's own body and in imaginative perception of absence is not felt to be dissociated from the percept. The image potentially dissociated from object is realized in thought. Introspective viewing of the image is understood as functional and substantive as Bhattacharyya points out, "Image is functional and yet does not cease to be substantive."<sup>7</sup> It is functional as the subject's distinguishing from the object remains identified with image. As image emerging from object, it negatively refers to object. From a subjective standpoint, image is to be understood as dissociated from object. The next psychic stage is thought. The idea of an object that cannot be defined or imagined is thought. Bhattacharyya states, "Thought is the awareness of the unimaginability of its specific content."<sup>8</sup> It involves complete dissociation from objectivity though it is about the object. He says, "Thought is still about the object but it is of something about the object that is definitely unobjective."<sup>9</sup> The content of thought is independent of space-time context. The thought possesses meaning, as thought cannot be unmeant. Meaning is within thought. It is definite in itself and is fixed in the mind by the images which strike the mind. It is not the pictorial thought which lies between the definite form and definite intelligence.

Object of thought is definitely presented as unpicturable meaning. Still it is something about the object and is called lower grade of thought. The thought involves a belief in its possible objectivity. It implies that thought has to make some reference to object. The term 'reference' is not to be taken as external or independent object. But Bhattacharyya has pointed out that objectivity of thought is to be understood, in terms of 'dissociation', not of reference. When thought is 'unobjective' and involves a complete detachment from objectivity, it is called higher grade of thought. Thought in its higher grade is detained in the mind by the word, not by its figurative representation. It is complete as dissociated altogether from time and is in this sense, eternal.

In this psychical stage, the subject may remain identified with the image or thought at the beginning and gradually this subject will try to achieve freedom from them. This identification with the image is the lowest stage of psychical existence of the subject. The subject takes itself to be an image or thought and then gradually realizes freedom from cognitive experiences. The subject dissociates itself from thought at a higher stage and realizes considerable freedom.

When the subject gets detached from its images and pictorial idea, then it identifies with non-pictorial ideas. The subject then attains a higher stage of freedom. At this stage, the subject remains identified with pure ideas. When the subject dissociates itself from ideas, it achieves a high degree of detachment and begins to have spiritual status.

## **Spiritual Subjectivity**

When the subject dissociates itself from ideas or concepts, then it reaches the third stage. This is the spiritual stage of subjectivity. The highest realization of the subject is achieved at this stage. Spiritual progress means realization of the subject as free. For K.C. Bhattacharyya, "To spiritual subjectivity, the psychical is objective and so to psychic subjectivity, the bodily and to bodily subjectivity the extra-organic is objective." There are three spiritual stages. At the first stage, the subject identifies with its feeling. Feeling is explicitly unobjective like thought, as there is no

objective reference here. Bhattacharyya says, unlike thought, it is "positive as subjective fact without any reference to objective fact." Thus feeling follows from the process of dissociation. It is introspective awareness of meaning. It is not however merely negative but positive as a subjective fact without any reference to objective fact. It is purely subjective in the sense that there is no conscious reference to object even in the sense of dissociation from it. So the content of feeling is not distinct from it, it is not known. Feeling is the positive consciousness of detachment from meaning. It is the awareness of content as unmeant. In introspection of feeling, the distinction of feeling from its presentative content is not definitely known but only felt and symbolized. Feeling as detached from meaning may be taken as implicitly introspective. Again unlike thought, feeling is never outside introspection as it has no content outside it.

There are two stages of feeling-

- lower stage and
- upper stage.

In the lower stage, there is the freedom from actual thought and in the higher stage there is the freedom from possible thought. The lower grade is the feeling of self-being and the higher grade is one of self-negation, here self is absent in a way. Possible thought is linked with actual thought. The feeling of self-negation is itself a feeling. Feeling may be its own content. It can be characterized as the feeling of feeling. There are forms of feeling beyond the range of thought. Through feeling, the subject may explore and attain another feeling of a deeper kind.

In the second stage subject identifies with introspection. Introspection is essentially possible detachment from all distinct being and is conscious identity without being of the self. Here the self is the first person 'I', the speaker who is not an object of introspection; it is simply the function of speaking. The word 'I' is neither meanable nor unmeanable. The word T has a meaning-function but not a meaning. It is the expression of introspection or the I-function. The word T has no meaning either to the speaker or to the hearer and yet it stands like any other word for the same thing to both. It indicates a grade of self-consciousness higher than our actual introspection. Actual introspection is unrealized knowledge because it is actually only self-evidencing to another and not self-evident to itself. This stage is one of the subject's identification with introspection. No mental states apart from subject exist here. The introspective subject is free from being or possible objectivity and is thus freedom itself.

In the last stage, the subject identifies with the stage beyond introspection. It is a stage in which self is realized not as self-evidencing to another but self-evident to itself. Here the self is intuited by oneself. The possibility of self enjoying T is intelligible when one is free from all subjective states. The absolute intuitable self is understood in a non-being state. For this, a spiritual discipline is necessary.

Then, the subject begins to have a spiritual status in which it transcends the level of spiritual introspection. Here subject realizes it as itself. When the subject dissociates itself from the stages beyond introspection, it is a stage of eternal freedom.

## **Subject as Freedom**

Thus, it is observed that 'freedom is subject as itself. The subject is understood as freedom that is real and is characterisable by no objective category, not even by the category of distinctness. To know the subject as actually itself is freedom. The awareness of the subject as absolutely

unobjective or freedom itself is not the awareness of mere negation or of an indefinite. In the stage of complete freedom, the experience of freedom also lapses or disappears. The subject is expressed as 'I' by the speaker. But K.C.Bhattacharyya's interpretation of the word T is very difficult to grasp. He tries to point out that T as a word is self-expressive. But it is not in the case of T's meaning. Because for Bhattacharyya, what 'I' means is not the word 'I', but 'I' as the subject, as self-expression, as the source of meanings.

He makes a distinction between the linguistic 'I' and the ontological 'I'. He says that the meaning of 'I' as understood by the speaker is different from the meaning of 'I' as understood by the hearer. When the speaker says 'I' it indicates something which is not understood by the hearer. But the hearer can grasp though incompletely, what the speaker means by 'I'. The subject 'I' cannot be identified with the object. Though 'I' is individualized in the body, 'I' is not introspectively aware of it. K.C.Bhattacharyya tries to show the basic character of the subject in another way. Subject is known in itself, whereas object is known as distinguished from subject. Object is linked with the subject. Without subject, object has no meaning. But the subject is not linked with the object in the same way. Subject may be known by introspection, by inwardizing consciousness. This involves abstraction from object. But this abstraction is not total and therefore introspective self-knowledge remains in a way object-linked. K.C.Bhattacharyya says, "The reality of the subject is known in the direct understanding of the word T as used by a speaker, which is neither the understanding of its meaning nor a mystic intuition of an unspeakable content." No meanable truth is self-evidencing. It implies that meanable truth which cannot be denied to be truth has to be realized as self-evidencing by the spiritual cultivation of subjective attitude.

K.C. Bhattacharyya tries to realize subject as free reality not only by the spiritual cultivation of subjective attitude but also by different grades of nonperceptual knowledge, different modes of representation. He says that our bodily 'I' may be known from within and that knowledge need not be perceptual. The internally felt body is not an object of the observable world. Yet it is believed as observed body in the sense of its character of internality. Secondly, what our self is may be immediately apprehended from its absence. This cannot be said to be known by external perception at least in the ordinary sense but is known from its present absence in the spatio-temporal context. Thirdly, memory also enables us to grasp in a way what self or 'I' is. Fourthly, productive imagination can also help us to realize T, the subject proper. The subject in the productive imagination is not really concrete, but is available in the forms of glimpses only. Finally, there is the possibility of the inferential knowledge of the self or T. Inference is belief in the perceptible object as possessing unperceivable character of necessity. The path to freedom lies in and through transcendence of the perceptual modes of cognitive consciousness.

The Vedanta and K.C.Bhattacharyya do not accept the dualism between nature and freedom. Both the Vedanta and K.C.Bhattacharyya seek to overcome the perceptual dualism between nature and freedom. Although their approaches are different, they have some kind of an alliance in their basic positions. Vedanta takes external world as illusory not as real but K.C. Bhattacharyya does not consider external as illusory only tries to dissociate subject from the objective world. In Vedanta the distinction between the empirical and the transcendental is only apparent and is true so long as the empirical self is subject to Avidya. When the empirical self realizes the transcendental self, this distinction disappears. From this standpoint, the highest form of self-realization is not achievable by will, not even by rational will. Because the action that follows from these different kinds of will will generate some dispositions and propensities [vasanas, vrttis, samskaras, etc.] in us, due to which it is difficult for us to be free. For Advaita Vedanta, 'moksa' is not an ethical end. It

is like knowing the known.

K.C.Bhattacharyya has taken the distinction between the illusory, the empirical and the transcendental in his own way. He draws important distinction between what he calls objective fact, psychic fact and spiritual fact. The highest spiritual truth lends itself to be grasped on different, alternative but 'absolute' modes (anekanta) as truth, as rasa (aesthetic feeling), as objectless subjective spirituality or freedom. In short, he tries to show that object (nature) is an appearance to subject (psyche). K.C.Bhattacharyya does not accept subject-object duality of Kant and also the subject-object unity of Hegel. In his words, "The duality between subject and object is symbolic of their felt dissociation. Their unity is an intellectual revelation of their deep underlying identity." It implies that the duality between subject and object is the result of the felt dissociation of the subject from the object.

K.C.Bhattacharyya considers highest form of freedom as reality. In this, he disagrees with the phenomenologist. For the phenomenologist, the highest form of reality is knowledge in its essence. K.C.Bhattacharyya holds that like other objects, self's own body is open as a possible object of knowledge both from within and without. It is already mentioned that all human bodies possess a uniqueness which cannot be ignored. Due to stimulation from without, when one looks at one's own body, one feels a sense of uniqueness attached to it. But, it is true that the clear sense of uniqueness is the possession of one's own subjectivity and is not found in one's apprehension of other's subjectivity. The uniqueness of one's own is present even amidst other human beings of our own or of different cultures. Due to this self-identity we can gradually free ourselves from an alien sense of objectivity, and slowly acquire a sense of freedom as subjectivity in our own being.

K.C.Bhattacharyya holds freedom as disengagement. This disengagement will be possible if it is understood that there is no intimate relation between the subject and the objective world. To differentiate perceptual body from other objects, K.C.Bhattacharyya holds that although perceptual body is like other objects, it has a singularity, unique dissociatedness of its own. The individual's awareness of its singularity and dissociation is somehow mystical and it informs mystically of the underlying subjectivity. In understanding subject as freedom, K.C.Bhattacharyya makes a subtle distinction between perceptual and sensuous. In all cases, the sensuous need not be perceptual like in the case of body consciousness. Felt body is like a presentation which does not refer to any perceptual object. One's feeling of one's own body can thus be said to be nonperceptual. The difference between object and its representation is remarkable.

Another thing K.C.Bhattacharyya says in this connection is that felt body is to be distinguished not only from the objective representative fact, but also one feels a sense of uniqueness attached to it. But, it is true that the clear sense of uniqueness is the possession of one's own subjectivity and is not found in one's apprehension of other's subjectivity. The uniqueness of one's own is present even amidst other human beings of our own or of different cultures. Due to this self-identity we can gradually free ourselves from an alien sense of objectivity, and slowly acquire a sense of freedom as subjectivity in our own being.

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K.C.Bhattacharyya states, "The highest and enlarged forms of freedom are analogous to, and an outcome of, further deepened exploration of freedom from the felt body, from the level of sub-psychic consciousness."

In his attempt to realize the concept of freedom, K.C.Bhattacharyya has made a very subtle analysis of the subjective states. In this process, he makes a distinction between freedom at the level of thought and freedom at the level of image.

Although image is the creation of the mind, it has an intimate relation to objects. But thought has no direct relation to objects. Its relation to object is mediated by both image and sense percepts. All images, productive or creative are often found to be abstract. Even then, the objective reference to this type of image cannot be denied. But Bhattacharyya argues that unlike image, thought is self-contained in a strict sense. It has no place in the space-time position. Thought is meaningful as it is self-presentative and not representative of this or that fact.

The relation between imagination and thought is described in the Vedanta philosophy. It indicates gradual disengagement or detachment of the self-consciousness from its objective situation. Vedanta philosophy holds that sense-perception leaves behind them traces (samskara) to be found in our consciousness. With the passage of time, these traces tend to fade away. The vedantin holds that meditation and contemplation are more effective ways of removing these samskaras. This whole process of epistemic freedom implies that consciousness can disengage itself step by step from the material corporeality of the objective world. This process of disengagement leads to the attainment of the higher levels of consciousness of freedom.

Regarding thought, K.C.Bhattacharyya says that thought is not empty. It is fulfilled meaning. Thought is about the object and as such it should be called presentation. Beyond it is the region of spiritual subjectivity. It is marked by the absence of object or what is meant. But this subjectivity is not meaningless per se. It has meaning of its own which is quite different from objective meaning. Thought is eternal and spatial and temporal objectivity are distinguished from it. Despite its eternity, thought cannot be called pure subjective activity. Because, compared to the awareness of 'I', thought is objective. Bhattacharyya tries to differentiate T from the body. He states, when I say, 'I feel myself I do not stand for my body. Rather, T is different from my body. But T is not meaningless. It has a meaning of its own. Because, without giving any meaning to the word T, the derivative expression 'my bod/' cannot be given any meaning at all. Otherwise my identity, position, my relations with other subjects could not be determined. This indicates that the word T does have meaning. But the meaning of 'I' is unobjective or subjective. 'I' or subject is known in itself not as related to the object. This is the realization of freedom.

In his attempt to realize the subject as it is and in itself, K.C.Bhattacharyya tries to make the subject free from other minute subjective states. He says introspective awareness reveals that subjective fact is distinct in itself and at a level lower than feeling. It brings out the dissociations of the knowledge of the subjective fact from the object. At the level of feeling, one becomes conscious of this dissociation. Pure subjectivity is conscious absence and unmeant. In K.C.Bhattacharyya's word, "Introspection is a subjectivity that is detached both from being and from negation, being positive as freedom."<sup>15</sup> The unreality of the subject is inconceivable. In feeling, in the psychic fact, the distinction between 'I' and its felt body is present in a vague manner but not nullified. However, the possibility of complete detachment starts at this psychic level.

In this regard, K.C.Bhattacharyya tries to show the difference between Kant's approach to self and his own. For Kant, the self is the thinking function, thinking of a thought or 'accomplished meaning'. But for Bhattacharyya, the speaking or meaning function is more fundamental than thinking. The introspective self is not only detached from thinking and feeling, but also undeniably self-knowing. Another difference between Kant and K.C.Bhattacharyya is in their mode of denial of the objectivity of the self as first person T. Kant's denial of the self as object is total because, according to him, it is in the self that the very possibility or constitution of object is grounded. But when K.C.Bhattacharyya states that T is not unmeanable nor is it meant, it should be understood as - It is 'not meanable', in the way different objects and different bodies are meant. It is 'not unmeanable', i.e. meanable as it is self-expressive. Like Bhattacharyya, if meaning is taken as the 'thinnest presentation of object', then introspective self can be said to be meanable. For example, when as a speaker one calls oneself T, this word T is understood through the word, not through its meaning. The word here has a meaning function or 'I-function' but not a meaning as such.

In Kant's philosophy, T as thinking 'I' is said to be capable of thinking itself. But Bhattacharyya maintains, 'I' as an expression of linguistic use has nothing, not even negatively, to do with thought. In actual introspection as unrealized knowledge self is only self-evidencing to another and not self-evident to itself. This self-evident character of the self is indicative of the necessity of a spiritual effort for higher or the highest possible self-realization. Here self's self-evident character is not found. But it is possible for the self to grasp this higher level character of self-consciousness. In this process, the introspective self becomes conscious to know itself as subject, and cognitively goes up nullifying step by step its distinction from the bodily self, the psychic self and different grades obtained within them. This introspective awareness of the subject, essentially subjective in nature is neither thought nor meant, neither feeling nor is absence. It is not even to be taken as distinct as the subject, to which it reveals itself. It is not in the nature of negation, nor is it the awareness of an indefinite. As definite and positive, it cannot be said to be not known in the ordinary sense. As actually not dissociated from object, it cannot be claimed to be known either. Here, according to K.C.Bhattacharyya, "Only the awareness of dissociation provides glimpses of T, 'the subject' as the realm of possible freedom."

Again, K.C.Bhattacharyya points out that in the state of spiritual subjectivity beyond introspection, the self is self-evident to itself. It indicates the necessity of a spiritual stage for higher or highest possible self-realization. It is possible when the self dissociates itself from its content, a subjective self. Here, the self is as it is without any content; only the self's self-identity is here. In self's self-identity, the distinction between self and a subjective fact is unknown. This self-identity, when actually intuited is self-evident. But until and unless this intuited self-identity is attained, a faint distinction between self and its content is present in the self-revealing self. When one can overcome this distinction, then one can understand the conception of absolute self as freedom.

From all these explanation it can be said that Bhattacharyya's concept of subject as freedom has some resemblance with Husserl's concept of transcendental self. Husserl proposes phenomenology as the science of pure consciousness. For Husserl, transcendental self is not to be grasped from the standpoint of empirical psychology.

### **The Doctrine of Maya**

The world is regarded as maya in the Advaita System. The worldly objects undergo change and therefore are not real. Brahman alone is real. Samkara says: 'What is eternal cannot have a beginning, and whatever has a beginning is not eternal.' What is the relationship between the Brahman and the world? He is of the opinion that the question itself is not legitimate and therefore impossible to answer. When one has realized the absolute Brahman the question of relation of Brahman to the worldly objects does no more remain valid. Even logically, if Brahman alone exists, the question of relating Brahman to the world does not arise. A relation can be established only when two distincts exists, but the Advaita says nothing exists in the world except the Brahman. Explaining this Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says: 'Brahman and the world are non-different, so the question of the relation between the two is an admissible one. The world has its basis in Brahman. But the Brahman is and is not identical with the world. It is, because the world is not apart from Brahman; it is not because Brahman is not subject to mutations of the world.' The mind perceives the world as reality, but as soon as the reality of the Brahman is realized the world fades away.

Samkara holds that it is impossible to logically explain the relation between Brahman and the world. He examines different views and finds that all are unsatisfactory. To hold that infinite Brahman is the cause of the finite world and creates it, amounts to accepting that the infinite is subject to limitations of time. Cause and effect imply succession. If we say that Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect, it will tantamount to acceptance of two identities namely Brahman and the world. Moreover, how can the infinite unconditioned be the cause of the finite world? How can we ascribe action to the infinite? For him both are identical and it is a case of eternal co-existence in temporal sense. 'The effect is the manifested world beginning with akasa; the cause is the highest Brahman.

With this cause, in the sense of the highest reality, the effect is identical, having no existence beyond it. (Samkara Bhasya on Brahma Sutra, ii.1.14) The world seems to be so because of lack of insight.

Samkara does not hold the view that Brahman, either in whole or in part, changes into the world. If the whole changes, the Brahman is before our eyes and therefore there is nothing to seek. If it is the part only, then being capable of partition, it is not eternal. Scriptures hold that the Brahman is devoid of parts.

When either partially or totally it changes into the world, it becomes a different substance and therefore no longer independent. The absolute cannot be relative.

Samkara says that there are two types of causality. One is vivartopadana where the cause without undergoing any change produces effect. The other is parinamopadana where the cause itself is transformed in producing the effect. Vivarta means perversion. He brings out that the phenomenal world is the translation of the absolute Brahman at the plane of time and space. Silver appears to be present in the shell, though in fact it is not. Integrity of the the cause is not disturbed in this illustration. In the same manner the Brahman appears as the world of mutiplicity though it remains

unchanged.

Any effort to connect the Brahman with the phenomenal world is bound to end in failure. No system could logically establish the connection between the two.

Samkara says: ' To show how and why the universe is, so that finite existence belongs to it, is utterly impossible. That would imply understanding of the whole not practicable for a mere part.' Maya, thus, points out a gap in our knowledge.

### **Radhakrishnan: Intellect and intuition**

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan was in his time the most renowned interpreter of Indian philosophy to an international audience. In *An Idealist View of Life*, based on the Hibbert lectures he delivered at the universities of London and Manchester in 1929–30, he presents his thesis on the nature and meaning of life.

The book weaves a spiritual approach through its metaphysical argument, also adopting a scientific attitude, to produce a bold view of creative thinking.

Radhakrishnan exposes the inadequacy of existing religions and contrasts them with science, which “demands induction from facts and not deduction from dogmas”. Speaking amid the gathering storm of the impending war in Europe, he is disappointed by the moral inadequacy and destructive political consequences of established faiths, and states that “nothing is as hostile to religions as other religions”. If religion is ineffective, the new gods of atheism, agnosticism and authoritarianism are equally without worth, and he describes the modish sceptic as someone for whom nothing is serious and who “drifts along confusedly, hoping for the best, expecting little and believing in nothing very much”. This is not an inaccurate description of many scientists today, for whom the deeper meaning of science remains elusive in an ever-changing yet constant world.

According to Radhakrishnan, there are two forms of knowledge: intellectual and intuitive. Intellectual knowledge lies at the core of Western systems of philosophy and is based on critical analysis and logic. If all knowledge were purely intellectual, reason alone would suffice, eventually leading to hard-core reductionism. However, Eastern systems of philosophy, particularly Hinduism, believe in a higher form of knowledge built on intuition. Intuition is essentially synthesis, which in turn follows naturally from Hindu ideas of monism. According to Advaitic (non-dualistic) doctrine, one who knows the Absolute becomes the Absolute. Accordingly, ignorance of this knowledge is the root of all trouble.

It is understandable thus far. But Radhakrishnan then claims that the true test of knowledge is certainty, which is a characteristic of intuitive thinking, rather than communicability, which characterizes intellectual knowledge. He then argues that intuition does not oppose intellect but rather lies beyond it. In other words, intuitive knowledge, although it does not contradict the necessity of reason, questions the sufficiency of reason. Intuition is not illogical but super-logical. In summary, both intellect and intuition must be synergized in the quest for the nature of ultimate reality.

Addressing scientific issues, Radhakrishnan argues that “great scientific discoveries are due to the inventive genius of creative thinkers”, intuitive thinking being as relevant to science as it is to the arts. Consider, for example, Faraday's discoveries, Mendeleev's periodic table, Kekulé's postulation

of the cyclic structure for benzene, or the way in which Crick and Watson unravelled the double-helix structure of DNA.

Several hypotheses in Radhakrishnan's book are worthy of close attention from scientists. First, he says that great intuition arises from a bedrock of rationality. Next, when the big discovery is made, there is enough room for the readjustment and reinterpretation of partial and incomplete concepts and data that preceded the discovery. This readjustment is so simple, says Radhakrishnan, that when full scientific insight is obtained it escapes notice, allowing one to imagine that the process of discovery arose entirely from intellectual thinking. Finally, instinctive thinking is not easily communicable – so when the discovery is discussed, it appears to have arisen from rational thought. The lines between discovery and proof are now blurred, resulting in an erroneous simplification of the deeper movements of thought.

There is much to commend this approach to scientists today, given the increasing complexity inherent in contemporary scientific problems. The coming century will see an intensive study of emergent phenomena such as the prediction of crystal structures, protein folding, fractals and monsoon forecasting. The answers to these difficult questions may not be found in a single model of complexity, such as cellular automata. Eventually, we would even like to examine the differences between life and non-life in, say, chemical terms. Subjects such as physics and chemistry are already redefining their goals to study more complex biological phenomena, with modern chemical biology being a pertinent example of this trend.

As the natural sciences move towards the social sciences and less precise forms of knowledge, there is a real need for inspired intuition, not as a substitute for thought but as a challenge to intelligence. An intuitive and holistic grasp of the situation is required. What we need is not faster computers, but faster minds.

The final section of the book seamlessly synthesizes the role of intuition in the cognitive, aesthetic and ethical endeavours of humankind. Recognizing these efforts as varied facets of human expression, Radhakrishnan opines that only religion based on spiritual values can completely encapsulate the human spirit. At a time when religious fundamentalism threatens the stability of the world, there is an urgent need for intuitive and inquiring scientists to contemplate the eternity between the atom and the Absolute. As Radhakrishnan says: "Real heroes are religious in a true sense in that they have broken down the barriers between the individual and the universal."

## **Idealist View of Life**

*An Idealist View of Life* has a marked mystical foundation in the theory of knowledge. In this regard, it may be said to express the main Hindu tradition in philosophy. This is one reason for its importance. The other is the author's familiarity with Western philosophy and science. Though his general standpoint guides him, there is no turning away from crucial problems.

## **Radhakrishnan's Idealism**

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan recognizes that the term "idealism" needs definition. It is clear that he is not a subjective idealist of the mode of the early George Berkeley. Nor does he much concern himself with Hegelian rationalistic Idealism. Rather, his emphasis is on the relation of value to reality. The truly real is replete with value. The alignment is with the Upanishads in India and the outlook of the Platonists, especially that of Plotinus, the father of the Western tradition of mysticism.

The book reflects the meeting of the East and the West. The broad sweep of Radhakrishnan's thought brings together Hindu classic thinkers with the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, and with the Anglo-American idealists Francis Herbert Bradley and Josiah Royce. Less attention is paid to Western naturalism and realism. That is both the strength and the weakness of the book. It stands out as an excellent example of its perspective, and it has both scope and verve.

Radhakrishnan's general argument is that the ideal world, which alone is real, lies beyond the phenomenal one of appearance yet is tied in with it and dominates it. Spirit is working in matter that matter may serve spirit. In a sense, matter is an abstraction and not a concrete reality, such as spirit. That is why materialism can be absorbed and transcended. It is doubtful whether Western materialists would accept this thesis, but it goes quite logically with the author's outlook. For him, the center of the universe is the transcendent, the Absolute, Brahma, that which has *aseity*, being. However, despite this assurance—rather, because of it—he is sympathetic with other points of view because they have their partial truth.

### **Religion and Mysticism**

The first of the eight lectures concerns itself with the modern challenge to the religious outlook on the universe as a result of scientific and social thought. Here the author confronts psychology specialists Sigmund Freud, John B. Watson, and Émile Durkheim. The second lecture notes contemporary movements such as humanism, naturalism, and logical positivism. These are tied in with science. In all this, the author is frank and well informed. He is not trying to defend specific orthodoxies. Like the Buddhist, he has no tradition of particular doctrines in geology and biology. Science is to be accepted but has its limits.

It is in the third lecture that Radhakrishnan states the basic claims of the religious consciousness, especially at the mystical level. He introduces *intuition* as a way of knowledge alternative to that of sense perception or discursive conception. He puts forward the claim for an integral apprehension of ultimate reality. It is a knowledge by identity that transcends the distinction between subject and object. Here, of course, is where dispute arises. Those who do not have the mystical vision are likely to deny its significance.

In the fourth lecture, Radhakrishnan develops the idea that scientific certainty is not the only kind of certainty available to us. A query may, of course, be raised as to the scientific claim that is usually more modestly put as an affair of working hypotheses. However, the author is ready to admit that, in the mystical revelation, we must distinguish between the kernel of it and the interpretation given, which is historically conditioned. Thus Hindu, Muslim, and Christian mystics have different accounts of the meanings of their experiences.

### **PHILOSOPHY OF RADHAKRISHNAN IN GENERAL:**

Radhakrishnan is one of the greatest figures of the Indian Renaissance. He has a place of eminence amongst the most important thinkers of the contemporary world of philosophy and creative thought. Contemporary Indian Philosophy is greatly indebted to him for his contribution of immense scholarly works in the field of religious philosophy. He has contributed powerfully to the synthesis of the two hemispheres – East and the West. A man of very rare intellectual endowments, his fame rests securely on the contribution as the creative interpreter of the comprehensive religious and philosophical traditions of India and the West. His early education made him familiar with the knowledge of the East – particularly of India, and his own scholarly

adventure acquainted him with the wisdom of the West. But his fundamental convictions are deeply rooted in Indian traditions. His philosophy was grounded in Advaita Vedānta reinterpreting this tradition for a contemporary understanding. He defended Hinduism against 'uninformed Western criticism' contributing to the formation of contemporary Hindu identity. He has consistently defended Hinduism against all criticisms which tend to describe it as non historical and negative. He has been influential in shaping the understanding of Hinduism, in both India and the West, and earned a reputation as a bridge-builder between India and the West. But he has a knack of presenting all ideas into idioms and models of Western thought. He seems to be presenting old and traditional ideas in a refreshingly novel manner. Among Contemporary thinkers he has done a great deal to shape what may be described as a 'world philosophy,' by bringing Eastern and Western thought closer together.

C.E.M Joad, the famous interpreter of Radhakrishnan, has described him as the liaison officer between the East and the West. Joad in his Counter attacks from the East describes Radhakrishnan's metaphysical position thus, " the function, the unique function which Radhakrishnan fulfils today is that of a liaison officer. He seeks to build a bridge between the traditional wisdom of the east and the new knowledge and energy of the west." This statement does contain some elements of truth, and that is apparent from the fact that Radhakrishnan makes persistent efforts to bring about an eastwest synthesis.

It is generally accepted that Radhakrishnan is one of the greatest modern exponents of Hindu thought possessing the true hospitality of the Hindu mind and defending successfully not only the essentials of Hinduism but the spirit which lies behind all religions. His work is important not merely because he gives an attractive description of a "mysteriously profound way of thinking," but also because of his conscious attempt to construct a system of thought in which there is a place for the insights of other thinkers, both philosophers and scientists of the modern world.

There are some scholars who strongly maintain that the metaphysics of Radhakrishnan is a real fusion of the East and West, particularly because he attempts to answer responsibly the problem which has haunted philosophers and theologians of all time, namely the relation between the Absolute of philosophy and the God of religious experience. In his attempt to work out a solution to this problem, he is rightly described as not merely the distinguished exponent of a lofty spiritual philosophy, but as the initiator of a new synthesis. The basic philosophical position of Radhakrishnan is an outcome of synthesis between the Eastern and Western traditions. He synthesises Advaita Vedānta especially of Śaṅkara and Absolute Idealism of the West. The spirit of Radhakrishnan's philosophy consists fundamentally in the attitude of synthesis or the concept of organic unity. As Charles A. Moore observed, "His basic approach to philosophy is the recognition of and demand for organic unity of the universe and its many aspects of the many sides of the nature of man, of man and universe, of the finite and the infinite, the human and the Divine."

Thus Radhakrishnan provides an interpretation of the philosophy which does justice to intuition and reason, philosophy and religion and this world and the other world. So it is clear that he provides inevitably a synthesis of the old and the new and of the east and the west in order to construct a philosophy of religion based on Absolute Idealism of Indian origin. The philosophical thinking of Radhakrishnan is influenced by a number of factors of which Indian religious tradition, Advaita Vedānta philosophy and Hegelian Absolute Idealism are the most important. He does not advocate any philosophical system. As a neo- Vedāntin he reinterprets, reconstructs, purifies and

extends the philosophical doctrines of the Upanishads and the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara in the light of modern science and technology. Radhakrishnan goes through the philosophical doctrines of the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gitā, the basic texts of the orthodox and heterodox schools and the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Radhakrishnan himself says about the influences on him which lead him to develop philosophical views. He asserts, "I studied the classics of Hinduism, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gitā, and the commentaries on Brahmasutra by the chief Acharyas, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Nimbārka and others, the dialogues of Buddha as well as the scholastic works of Buddhism and Jainism. Among the western thinkers, the writings of Plato, Plotinus and Kant and those of Bradley and Bergson influence me a great deal. My relation with my great Indian contemporaries, Tagore and Gandhi were most friendly for nearly thirty years, and I realise the tremendous significance they had for me."<sup>3</sup> Thus Radhakrishnan has two ancestral lines in theology, one in India and the other in the West from which he develops his idea of religion. His philosophy contains a deep spiritual awareness. Radhakrishnan's system of philosophy is constructed around the spirit of the Vedas, although he differs from some of the ancient teachers. The three fundamental principles on which his philosophy was built are spirit, intuition and religion. Radhakrishnan has propounded spiritualism and dynamic idealism. Idea of spirit is the root concept of his philosophy. But he differs from Hegelianism and other Indian Idealism. He assumes the spirit not as substance but as life.

According to Radhakrishnan, "Spirit is life, not thing, energy, not immobility, something real in itself and by itself, and cannot be compared to any substance subjective or objective." For him humanity and reason should be explained in the light of spirit. Radhakrishnan considers self, God and Absolute as the different names of the Universal Spirit which represents his philosophy of idealism.

Radhakrishnan is a philosopher of comparative religion. The centre of his philosophical investigation is religion. He gives a modern interpretation of Ethics, Metaphysics, Politics, Aesthetics and Education on the basis of religion. He attempts to reconcile the teachings of different world religions. By religion or dharma Radhakrishnan did not mean any particular religion. Indeed he tried to glorify Hinduism which is clearly evident in his Hindu View of Life, but he seems to be more in favour of advocating a universal religion. According to Radhakrishnan religions may differ in their nomenclatures, rituals, ceremonies, however their essence is the same. He distinguishes between historical and universal religions.

Historical religions are many – Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, Jainism etc. He felt that they are the different dimensions of one universal religion, because the spirit of these historical religions is the same.

By Universal religion, Radhakrishnan does not mean a new religion over and above historical religions. He did not want to dispense with historical religions and create a new one. He is also aware of the fact that the historical religions cannot be removed overnight. He wanted that the historical religions should be understood through universal religion by grasping the essence of religions or the religion of the spirit.

Radhakrishnan speaks of the ultimate religion that is religion as conceived in the most general way. The universal character of the Bhagavad Gitā as expressed by Radhakrishnan can be applied to his view of religion also. According to Radhakrishnan, "The Bhagavad Gitā represents not any sect of Hinduism, but Hinduism as a whole, not merely Hinduism but religion as such in its universality

without limits of time and space, embracing within its synthesis the whole gamut of the human spirit.”<sup>5</sup> Since religion is such a universal phenomenon it becomes the subject of metaphysical enquiry in as much as metaphysics is concerned with the ultimate or universal reality. Radhakrishnan therefore points out that religion can be treated as a fit subject for metaphysical investigation.

Radhakrishnan, by analysing and interpreting different religious concepts like the nature of the Absolute, relation of God and Absolute, the theory of Karma, and rebirth, the nature of the self, and the means to its salvation, removed many doubts and confusions that trouble a philosophic mind. For example, in explaining the relation of the law of karma and the idea of the freedom of the human will, Radhakrishnan writes, “The cards in the game are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to past Karma, but we are free to make any call as we think fit and lead any suit, only we are limited by the rules of the game.”<sup>6</sup> Thus as we play we gain or lose.

Radhakrishnan’s conception of religion has a spiritual background. Spirit constitutes the centrality of his philosophy. His views on human being, world and God reflect this point. While discussing the nature of human being Radhakrishnan distinguishes between finite and infinite man and observes that the mind-body complex of human being is his finite nature. It is apparent and undergoes change and modifications. However, there is some permanent element in human.

Radhakrishnan calls it the spirit in man. He said that the spirit in man cannot be ruled out on the ground that it cannot be perceived with the naked eye. So also Radhakrishnan discusses the significance of spirit in the evolution of the world. He believes in different phases or levels of evolution of the world. They are matter, life, mind and spirit. Though Radhakrishnan considers spirit as the highest stage of evolution, he said that matter, life and mind are necessary for the realisation of the spirit. Radhakrishnan considers God as the spirit. It is the universal spirit existing in man and the world.

Thus we find that spirit occupies a significant place in Radhakrishnan’s conception of man, world and God. He extends this philosophy to his understanding of religion. He considers the different religions are the manifestations of the same spirit. On this ground he pleads for fellowship of religions. He wants different religions should prevail and must develop understanding, tolerance and brotherhood by realising the underlying spirit among them. Radhakrishnan repeatedly emphasised that we have to live in religion. Our religious temper and commitment must find expression in our day to day actions. Religion can become the most powerful means of improvement of an individual and human society if our faith in God is total, if our acts conform to our ideals, and if there is no difference between our belief and behaviour. In the words of Radhakrishnan, “There is nothing special in loving those who love us or who are themselves lovable. Jesus asks us to love our enemies in the hope of reawakening their humanness, their potential capacity for love. We are called upon to remove from enemy’s heart the fear of our own hateful intentions. How far do we carry out these instructions to be good even to those who hate us?”<sup>7</sup> Religion is the expression of human effort towards spiritual perfections. All religions are only varied historical expressions of one truth. The fundamental doctrine of Radhakrishnan’s philosophy is that there is an absolute spirit lying behind and involved in the whole world process. He says, “Spirit is the reality of the cosmic process.”<sup>8</sup> The acceptance of a spiritual reality is different from the physical that naturally leads to philosophical difficulties. A question arise here-how do we know the reality of the spirit? If our knowledge is confined to sense experience and thinking only, as many philosophers since the time of Hume maintain, then we have no ground to

believe in the spirit. This will be considered as a metaphysical assertion and hence non- sense. Radhakrishnan is aware of these criticisms. The whole range of his writing is an answer to these and in support of his claim that Ultimate Reality is spiritual. Radhakrishnan considers the different experiences of knowledge and accepts three ways of knowing namely sense experience, discursive reasoning and intuitive apprehension.

The first two are generally accepted by all, while the last namely intuition is accepted only by few. Radhakrishnan is aware of the fact that the basic concept of his philosophy on the reality of spirit cannot be justified without accepting intuition as a means of knowing. Radhakrishnan regarded intuition as a non- sensuous immediate apprehension which the Hindus call aparoksha. It arises from a close relation between mind and reality. It is the kind of knowledge acquired by being and not through senses or through symbols. In other words intuition is the most direct knowledge that man is capable. The main point which Radhakrishnan wants to emphasise is the directness and certainty of intuition. So what is intuited carries with it certainty. From this Radhakrishnan argues for the spirituality of reality and the spiritual basis of the universe.

## **RELIGION ACCORDING TO RADHAKRISHNAN**

The salient features of Radhakrishnan's philosophy comprise universal outlook, synthesis of the east and west in religion and philosophy, the spiritualism and humanism and openness to the influences of science, art and values. Naturally he combined the two traditions with perfect ease and is able to evolve a philosophy of synthesis. The philosophical thinking of Radhakrishnan is influenced by a number of factors of which Indian religious tradition, Advaita Vedānta philosophy, and Hegelian absolute idealism are the most important.

Radhakrishnan goes through the philosophical doctrines of the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gītā, the basic texts of the orthodox and the heterodox schools and the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. His philosophy contains a deep spiritual awareness. Religious philosophy of Radhakrishnan is a land mark in the history of religion since he has given a panorama of central core of religion, apart from giving an authoritarian as well as institutional interpretation of religion. Radhakrishnan was deeply religious in his thinking. In his many lectures and writings he explained what he meant by religion. Radhakrishnan conceives the meaning of religion with a new orientation. According to Radhakrishnan, "Religion is not a creed or a code but an insight in to reality."

Religion implies a discipline, which transforms man's nature and he develops an insight in to his own true nature or his essence. Religion also implies firm faith in the existence of God, the soul of man and absolute spiritual values.

Radhakrishnan stated that religion must contribute in the process of man's evolution in his divine stature. Religion has to develop the spirit of love, tolerance and universal brotherhood. Thus a religion, which breeds narrowness, dogmatism, selfishness and communalism, must be abandoned. Radhakrishnan stands for that religion which is ethically sound and quite relevant to human needs and social environment. Instead of isolation and resignation, true religion teaches courage and adventure. It also cultivates inner life, and the apprehension of the life beyond life. In his concept of religion, Radhakrishnan discussed all these things.

According to Radhakrishnan, "Religion is spiritual change, an inward transformation. It is a transition from darkness to light, from unregenerate to a regenerate condition. It is an awakening;

rebornness.....Religion is an experience which affects our entire being, ends our disquiet and anguish, the sense of aimlessness of our fragile and fugitive existence.”

Radhakrishnan's concept of religion is dynamic. It is an authentic religion which makes an individual free from fear and fanaticism and brings about a change in society at the conscious level for the attainment of wholeness. Radhakrishnan's religion of spirit serves as an inspiration in life. Religion is the awareness of our real nature in God. Religion is also defined by Radhakrishnan as strenuous endeavour to apprehend truth. Radhakrishnan admitted that a true religion is a perennial wisdom; it is eternal aspect behind all religions. It is 'Sanātana Dharma', or a timeless tradition of human race. According to Radhakrishnan religion is spiritual insight. Radhakrishnan holds that religion is, "in essence, experience or of living contact with ultimate reality."

It is an autonomous form of experience. Essentially, religion is concerned with the inner life of human being. True religion is an expression of the true nature of the self. Its root lies in the spirit of which is deeper than feeling, will or intellect. Our deepest soul experiences divine nature which is spontaneous, autonomous and unique. It is genius and exceptional. He says, "Religious experience is exceptional only in the sense that all genius is exceptional."<sup>16</sup> Religion therefore touches the inner essence of human being. It aims at the attainment of salvation of life and makes man able to transcend his narrow egoism to spiritual pride. Religion makes spiritual change, inward transformation. Religion is a power of conservation of the whole world by awakening spirituality in man. It makes man free from the delusion of caste, creed, wealth and power. Religion aims at peace and truth.

Radhakrishnan says, "Religion is a search for truth and peace, not power and plenty." The true meaning of religion is therefore found within and inside us. Man's religion is his own. It is not imposed by any external principles or authority or code. Radhakrishnan says, "A man's religion must be his own and not simply accepted or trust or imposed by authority. While trust and authority may put him on the way, it is his own independent search that will take him to the goal."<sup>18</sup> Of course trust or authority may guide him to lead a right path. So, religious experience is quite personal where the self makes communion with the divine being. It is so intensive and inward as its root lies in the very depth of being. More we dive in to the experience more we get an intense feeling of indubitable. It is "flight of the alone to the Alone."<sup>19</sup> For Radhakrishnan, religion is more than revelation. It attempts to manifest what lies deep in our being as also an effort to have a contact with that. The deepest layers of man's being are spiritual and religion being a spiritual attempt can trace out these layers. To have a notion of God is not enough for religion. It attempts to transform our material experience into spiritual one in which we are acquainted with the deepest layers. The deepest layers refer to ultimate reality. Radhakrishnan was a worldwide acknowledged idealistic philosopher who specially brought our certain influential development regarding the understanding and interpretation of religion. According to him it is not easy to find out an exact definition of religion. Basically he emphasises the universal aspect of religion. He speaks of the ultimate religion that is religion as conceived in the most general way.

According to Radhakrishnan, "Religion is an independent functioning of the human mind, something unique, possessing an autonomous character. It is something inward and personal, which unifies all values and organises all experiences. It is the reaction of the whole of man to the whole of reality. It may be called spiritual life, as distinct from a merely intellectual or moral or aesthetic activity or a combination of them." Religion is essentially a discipline of the soul. It effects the transformation, integration and purification of the entire human personality. It is a transforming

experience. Religion is not the result of intellectual analysis. It is the art of selfdiscovery. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that religion is not so much theological learning or dialectical skill as spiritual insight. It is the conviction that man is not mere intellect or senses or the mind but spirit, which while including all these far transcends them, and is different from them. Radhakrishnan holds that religion has the aim of fellow feeling in the entire mankind and this can be accomplished by the spiritual insight or the awareness that man is spirit and not intellect. Radhakrishnan rejects the false conceptions of religion such as the ideal of the satisfaction of pleasures in heaven. Religion unites time and eternity in one eternal bond of friendship and harmony. According to Radhakrishnan religion must be lived and experienced. In fact it is life experienced in its depth. Religion aims at spiritual fulfilment but it cannot be realised if man sticks to mere outer forms of religion without religious experience. Radhakrishnan repeatedly emphasised that we have to live in religion.

Our religious temper and commitment must find expression in our day –to – day actions. If a person only professes religion but cannot practice it then that person deceives himself and others. Again if our faith in God is complete, if our actions conform to our ideals and if there is no difference between our belief and behaviour then religion can become the most powerful means of improvement of an individual and human society. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that, "There is nothing special in loving those who love us or who are themselves lovable. Jesus asks us to love our enemies in the hope of reawakening their humanness, their potential capacity for love. We are called upon to remove from the enemy's heart the fear of our own hateful intentions. How far do we carry out these instructions to be good even to those who hate us?"<sup>21</sup> Radhakrishnan often uses the terms religion and spirituality as interchangeable. When he distinguishes the two he relates religion to dogma and creed and spirituality to the experience of the true or Real Being. To him, "Genuine religion is indistinguishable from and coeval with spirituality."

Radhakrishnan asserts that Hinduism emphasises 'spiritual experience' rather than doctrine or creed, for which Hinduism is as 'eternal religion' (Sanātana Dharma) as it encompasses all the other religions with an open mind. Religious experience is spiritual experience which is integral in nature. Religion cannot be identified with the phenomenal accounts of 'pure experience'. While phenomenologists attempt to restore the pre-reflective experience of unity that accompanies all cognition, Radhakrishnan is concerned with reinstating the uniqueness and autonomy of religious experience. In his analysis, wholeness and self-sufficiency emerge as hall marks of spiritual experience."

In the course of history of thought religion has been identified with feeling, emotion, and sentiment or with instinct, cult and ritual or with perception, belief and faith. According to Radhakrishnan, religion contains all those elements in some form or the other. Religion is a synthesis of all these. The conflicts of different religions are due to the emphasis on one aspect of religion in utter disregard to other aspects. These conflicts do not touch the essence of religion. The essence of all religions is one and the same. Religion is an insight into the nature of Reality. It is a direct experience of Reality. This insight reveals that the ultimate reality is somehow immanent in man. Religion is a living creative power. It is the self- manifestation of the ultimate reality in man. Religion is not a way out of life but way unto life.

Religion is the awareness of our real nature of the divine. It is also a way of response to the ultimate reality. Religion implies a faith in the ultimate spiritual values and a way of life to realise them. This faith involves an awareness of the beyond. It also involves a conviction that such

awareness is possible.

Radhakrishnan believes that the true meaning of religion lies in the development of the individuality of human being. It is a way of living which disciplines body, mind and thought. True religion therefore summons man to change his individualist selfish nature and to let the divine nature in him. Religion is therefore, not a rigid ethical code but a universal guideline which teaches man to fight against the evil and to strive for the truths of the spirit.

According to Radhakrishnan, true religion is the most efficient instrument of social regeneration. In almost all his speeches and writings, he has put forth the ideal of the Religion of the Spirit. The function of religion is to foster humanist ideals and world unity. It must harmonize the claims of the mind, heart and spirit. Religion is the response of the total nature of man. Religion is not a mere faith, it is conduct also. It helps us to transform our life and give us a new outlook.

Radhakrishnan believes that at the core of all religions there is a wide field of agreement. This field of agreement he calls the Religion of Spirit. Radhakrishnan conceives the meaning of religion neither as 'mere consciousness of value' as Kant says nor as a 'form of knowledge' as Hegel says. Like the ancient Indian thinkers he says, "There is in it a mystical element, an apprehension of the real and an enjoyment of it for its own sake which is absent in the moral consciousness."

For Radhakrishnan, religion is direct apprehension of the Supreme Reality.<sup>26</sup> It is the attainment of a state of illumination. The Reality is omnipresent and therefore man is able to comprehend it directly within his own inmost being. This truth is enunciated in the Upanishadic maxim, 'tat tvam asi,' (that thou art).

Radhakrishnan says that, God is true according to all religions. Religion is a way of life which has for its end a profound spiritual transformation. Religion is not a theory or a sentiment, but a vital experience. Ethics cannot be divorced from religion as the essence of religion is the vision of the good. All religions are of a value in so far as they are exercises and discipline of the spirit.

According to Radhakrishnan, any religion which asks us to hate other human beings cannot be regarded as true religion. Unless religion asks us to love one another, since God is love, it is not true religion. Religion is a means for fostering the integration of personality, social equality and also respect for all living faiths. A truly religious is devoid of any sense of egoism, any passions, hatred, ill will etc. Religion is direct encounter with the Supreme Reality and insight into the mastery of things, in to the meaning of existence. Religion reflects our common spiritual struggle and aspiration. Religion is not theology, but practice and discipline. The main purpose of religion is to restore the lost relationship between the individual and the eternal.

A particular religion, may, however be a defective one as it cannot generally get rid of prejudices and superstitions and dogmas. But an ideal religion is without defects and through Vedānta Radhakrishnan is seeking for such a religion. He is interested in a Universal Religion based on Vedāntic principles. His religion speaks of the city of God, a divine city where theological differences are absent. When man reaches this city through religion, he will find divine grace, and attain thereby salvation. He therefore, attempts at reconciliation of theological differences and claims of science and theology as well. Religion is a matter of personal experience; it is not a matter of mere dogmas or faiths; it is a kind of personal experience. Man must be transformed, in that he has to become a different human being altogether as a result of his religious conversion.

Without such spiritual conversion, man is not truly religious.

'Religion', Radhakrishnan says, "is not a thing which one can be bought or got from visiting temple or churches or other places of worship. It is a thing which one can practice only by waging incessant war on the baser instincts which have so much command over human nature."

For Radhakrishnan religion is not the mere search for individual salvation. It is not a mere belief, it is behaviour. It is a quest for values. Religion is the most potent instrument for individual salvation and social regeneration. It is a force and not a mere form. Through religion we can integrate ourselves with external nature, with fellow man and with one's own life. Radhakrishnan stands for a religion that is rational, scientific, humanistic and that which makes for world unity and fosters peace. For him religion is in essence a mystic experience- a firsthand encounter with God. It is a life transforming experience carrying a certitude all its own.

Religion as a transforming experience makes man realise his true nature. Man does not understand his true dimension as long as he lives at the superficial level of the senses. The function of religion is the evaluation of man into his divine stature, develop awareness and intensity of understanding and bring about a better, deeper and more enduring adjustment in life. Religion commands man to make the change in his own nature and let the divine in him manifest itself. According to Radhakrishnan the purpose of life is not the enjoyment of the world but the education of the soul. Like many modern thinkers Radhakrishnan's approach to religion has also a very strong social aspect.

According to him religion has a very vital role in moulding the society and conserves the order of the society. Radhakrishnan maintains that religion is an integral element of a society and it represents the whole aspect of human being. According to him there is no sharp distinction between religion and social life.

Religion has two sides, the individual and the social. Both the sides are interdependent and complementary to each other and without the one the other is ineffectual. Religion must lay emphasis on individual culture and transformation of the inner world of man. Unless the individual is pure and perfect the ideals of religion cannot be realised on earth. But religion is not merely individual perfection. Religion is not solitary life. Radhakrishnan says, it is sarvamukti or the emancipation of the entire mankind that the truly religious man tirelessly works. The religious man sees all existence in his own self. True religion is universally valid and it encourages 'fresh truth' and awakens 'social passion'. Religion encourages man to become more and more integrated. It aims at creating harmony among people of different religions and demonstrates how to live together striving to attain perfection.

According to Radhakrishnan the individual and social aspects of religion are interlinked and inseparable. The personal and social dimensions of religion derive from both the autonomous and heterogeneous nature of man. Religion has been one of the most important preoccupations of mankind throughout the course of human civilisation. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that most of the social inequalities and injustices pervading all over can be easily affected by harmonious relations based on spiritual consciousness and this sense of wholeness may be furnished by religious ideologies. Religion is a great socialising and civilising agency which intends to call for a fresh and new turn of mind and heart that guides us towards fellowship and co-operation.

Radhakrishnan holds religion as a social factor, a binding force upon the social relations with moral awareness. He believes in the authenticity of experience and its insight penetrates into the things. Radhakrishnan like Gandhi also believes that religion should be treated as an inward integration which each one has freedom to achieve for oneself, without interference from others. It is as well as a call to establish an equitable social order. Religion is in its essence, reintegration of human personality and redemption of human society. Radhakrishnan asserts that a religion which does not give importance to social reform and international justice has no appeal to the modern mind. Radhakrishnan believes that religion should have great touch with human behaviours and his works. There should have profound consistency between inner and outer life which modern man lacks.

Radhakrishnan writes, "The inadequacy of religion is evident from the disparity between outward allegiance and inward betrayal." Apart from its practical aspect religion is by itself is an abstraction. The true meaning of religion lies in man's utmost and intense faith in the Supreme. True religion is the aspiration of the soul. Radhakrishnan prescribes to observe different modes of religious rites like worship, prayer to increase our faith in the Supreme. Religion is not a study of God. It is an endeavour to regain the lost unity between the individual and the Absolute. It is a binding force which enriches our fellow feelings. It is generally observed that at the dawn of civilization religion, science, art, morality was found intermingled together.

According to Radhakrishnan, it is untrue to believe that there is an opposition between science and religion. Talking about the relevance of religion in our own age of science, Radhakrishnan said, "The controversy between science and religion is out of date, for the science which challenged religion is as dead as the religions which it challenged. The problem today relates not to the incredible dogmas of religion, but to the place of the spiritual in a universe which cannot be explained altogether by science. The kingdom of spirit is always within each of us."

He holds that the creed of religion is as real as the theories of sciences. Philosophy is to lean on religion heavily with a view to possessing a spiritual flavour. While science enriches philosophy with material data, religion provides it with spiritual data. Philosophy has to work on both of them. For the progress of man both civilization and culture are necessary. Science contributes to the advancement of civilization while religion contributes to the advancement of culture. While culture is connected with man's spiritual experience, civilization is disconnected with his material behaviour. Both are necessary for over all progress of man. Religion, for Radhakrishnan, was the supreme value of human life, which must lend its own colour and complexion to everything that concerns human life. The distinctive feature of Indian religious thought is that there is no dividing line between religious and secular.

Radhakrishnan exhibits an integral viewpoint in his systematic approach to religion. He has pointed out the contribution of each great religion to humanity and emphasised their fundamental unity. According to Radhakrishnan, religious truth depends upon the intuitive experience of the individual who reveals it to the world in human language as far as possible.

Radhakrishnan also stated that the religion, which springs from the radical insufficiency of human nature, is an instinct with us which surely we cannot shake off. In fact there is nothing else but religion which transfigures the whole personality of man, his thought, feeling and action. Religion is the ultimate attitude of thought, feeling and will to God or the ultimate reality. It is by religion that man is able to create harmony in him and produce harmony in the universe and establish

harmonious relationship with his fellowmen. Radhakrishnan assures that religion can give us the highest bliss; it can maintain our intimate contact with creativity. Religion has the capacity to meet challenges that come in course of time in the society. He emphasised very clearly that the growth of society is intimately related to the growth of religion. Religion gives security to value and meaning to life. Symbolism plays an important role in religion. We adore the Supreme in the form of images or symbols. Symbolism is the vision of infinite, in the finite.

According to Radhakrishnan, religion requires an observation of strict ethical discipline. It transforms our being and makes us capable to grasp the Reality by widening the narrow region of our being. Radhakrishnan holds that the Hindu concept of Dharma is accepted as the rule of life. The Hindu ethical and social duties make our life disciplined. They are the ways to achieve the goal of life.

Religion also requires an absolute purity of the mind. Inward purity is the complete mastery of the being over all other faculties. Purity of mind makes capable to realize divine being that within us. Meditation is the way of making contact with the Reality. It is the means of establishing direct relation with our inner being. It is the art of living in tune with the eternal. It increases our self-awareness. In true religion an inter-subjective relation between divine being and individual self is established. It manifests one's inward achievements. It is an aspiration of the self. In the words of Radhakrishnan, "True religion is not what we get from outside, from books and teachers. It is the aspiration of the human soul, that which unfolds within oneself, that which is built by one's life blood."

Radhakrishnan's interpretation of religion is unique in the field of philosophy. He has prescribed a religion which is both scientific and humanistic. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that we cannot rest religion on dogmatic supernaturalism. He affirms that the idea of God is an interpretation of experience. It follows here that religious experiences are for Radhakrishnan context relative.

However religious experiences have value for Radhakrishnan, in so far as they offer the possibility of heightening one's religious consciousness and bringing one to ever closer proximity to 'religious intuition'. In his conception of religion Radhakrishnan affirms religion as a life or experience. It is an insight into the nature of reality or experience of reality. The significance of Radhakrishnan's philosophy is that he has attempted to restate certain aspects of Vedānta and recapture the eternal meaning of religion for modern man. He has related the imperishable truths of religion to modern enquiry. Radhakrishnan has discovered the ultimate truth of philosophy and of religion in the history of Indian Philosophy. Radhakrishnan is of the opinion that religion can be equated with perennial philosophy under the circumstances that, religion must be purely spiritual, cleansed of all accidental accretions and it must be spiritual. Moreover Radhakrishnan seeks to show that religion has the qualifications to be treated as a fit subject for metaphysical investigation. He makes a sustained effort to vindicate religious experience as the plane where the realm of essence and existence meet. Radhakrishnan's constructive endeavour is directed towards delineating metaphysics of religious experience.

Radhakrishnan was a profoundly religious man. The most important contribution which Radhakrishnan has made is that of the religion of the spirit that must according to him be the future religion of the world. Radhakrishnan says that no religion is perfect, because religion is a movement or growth in which the new rests on the old. The different religions, Radhakrishnan felt, were like comrades in a joint enterprise for facing the common problems of peaceful co-existence,

international welfare and justice, social equality and political independence. He used this as the basis for the development of human culture. He also asserted that religion which has not given importance to social reforms and international justice has no appeal to the modern mind.

## **Hindu view of life**

Radhakrishnan starts off by confronting the classic question of what Hinduism actually is. This, he does not answer directly, for a very good reason: Hinduism isn't an internally recognized word, but a name given to the sub-continent of India by outsiders. Later, it was recognized by Hindus as being a practicable working name. This was because India, despite being diverse, had a common history, literature and civilization.

The backbone of Hindu culture and beliefs is the Vedas. Faith is the vision of the soul where the spiritual part of the world is apprehended, just as the material world is apprehended via the physical senses. The mind has two powers, reason and intuition. Reason correlates with the physical senses, intuition with faith. The Vedas are a collection of the intuitions of the soul, which became the spiritual intuitions which founded the cohesive Hinduism we now know. These intuitions have a perennial value because "the truths revealed in the Vedas are capable of being re-experienced on compliance with ascertained conditions".

Hindus believe that there are different paths to God, and each individual has their own path. This is one of the reasons why there are many different books to learn from, not just the Vedas, but the Puranas, Ramayana, Mahabharata, to name a few. The reason why it is thought that each person has their own path to God is that religious experience cannot be made objective. Instead, our path to God is crafted from how we are disposed to experience God, therefore we all have a different experience of what God is, and a different path to God.

We understand God by asking what God is not. Through negation, we get closer to the answer. Essentially, a Hindu Guru would take our idea of what we believe God to be and chip away until we have an experience of nothingness. This is because the exact nature of God alludes thought, language and symbolism. God is understood in palpable terms by being divided into personalities: Cognition (Brahman), Emotion (Visnu) and Will (Siva).

The questions of our individual experience of God and our experience of reality go hand in hand. "The seers of the Upanisads were impressed by the unreality of the world, its fleeting and transitory character, and sought for the infinite real [sat]" (p. 13). The character of the world which is illusory is known as Maya, Buddha taught that we can escape from it through the dharma. The absolute nature of reality is known as Brahman, the relation of that to us (our experience of it) is Bhagavan. Our Bhagavan causes us to experience not only the world differently, but also God, hence why some people experience God through Visnu, Rama, Buddha, and so forth. The Hindu attitude is that there is no right or wrong God, merely our experience of God.

The mystics, he says, are all one family. When one chooses to experience God removed from dogma, there is no difference between Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and so forth. "When the love of God is reached, divergences become impossible, for the soul has passed beyond the sphere of the manifold and is immersed in the one reality". As such, Hinduism welcomes Gods and figures from all religions.

He paints Hinduism's progression as being culturally democratic. They are well known to have kept

religious figures and ideologies from even the earliest known cultural traditions, and kept them on equal levels to their most modern gods. "To despise other people's Gods is to despise other people, for they and their Gods are adapted to each other" (p. 26). To the outsider, we can understand the people through their Gods, and the Gods by the people.

A great example of this is Krishna. He is so well known and loved that since Bhagavad Gita has become so culturally prominent, Krishna has too. Before the popularization of Bhagavad Gita, Krishna was a minor figure. Differences such as name become immaterial for the Hindu, since every name, at its best, connotes the same metaphysical and moral perfections.

Religion should be found in righteous living rather than correct belief. "What counts is not creed but conduct". By putting creed and doctrine before our personal faith, we lose ourselves to the religious group. "We start by claiming that Christianity is the only true religion and then affirm that Protestantism is the only true sect of Christianity, Episcopalianism the only true Protestant Christian religion...". Hinduism instead 'saps the roots instead of cutting the growths'.

Next we will discuss the concept of Maya. A majority of Hindus do not advocate fully the idea of Maya (the belief that the world is an illusion). However, it is held by Samkara who is often seen as holding the 'standard' type of Hindu thought. He had several reasons for advocating the doctrine of Maya including:

1. The manifold of experience is incomplete, and we are unable to unify it.
2. Time and space cannot be rounded into one whole.
3. That which is real must be exempt from change, and nothing empirical seems to be exempt from change.

The curtain of illusion may drop, but another drama will commence, continuing the illusion. This is why we must seek the eternal. "The state of perfection is a condition of absolute stillness". He warns us against merging waking state and dreams, and of merging illusions of reality with reality. "Moksa [release from belief in illusion] of an individual does not bring about the destruction of the world but the displacement of a false outlook by a true one".

He emphasized that the world was independent of Brahman, but not completely. Logically, we cannot rationalize the relationship of God and the world, so he says we should hold on to both. Agnosticism is the only logical conclusion.

Karma has been terribly misunderstood by westerners and by Hindus. Karma is an immutable natural law of the universe, and the universe is lawful to the core.

Karma is recognized to affect not only in the universe, but in minds and society too. It is "the embodiment of the mind and will of God... and justice is the karmic attribute of God". Karma is in fact a God-manifested law of justice which is immutable and intrinsic to nature.

Karma is the cause of the life and context in which we are born, and is conditioned by our right and wrong deeds in the world. We have a level of understanding of the karma an individual generates by their habits. What we mean by this is the kind and array of behavior to which they have propensity. Good karma is generated when people act highly in or above this range of habit. However, it is worth noting that bad and good do not level out, both will manifest in the next life.

Now on to what Dharma is. Dharma can roughly be translated as 'truth'. To have good dharma is to behave in the truest way. We all have an array of desires. "The Hindu code of practice links up the realm of desires with the perspective of the eternal. It binds together the kingdoms of earth and heaven".

Artha is that which deals with economic and political pursuits of man. Prosperity is the medium through which we express and move. Artha, Radhakrishnan notes, is good when, and only when, it is disciplined and ethical.

Moksa is 'spiritual realization'. It means 'release', and is our self-made spiritual emancipation from samsara (perpetual rebirth). There are three ways of attaining moksa-

1. Wisdom
2. Devotion
3. Servitude

Devotion is the most popular way as it is the most accessible way. It is also known as bhakti, and is explained in depth in Bhagavad Gita.



A wheel of Samsara, the process of continual reincarnation.

In a Hindu's life, there are four stages to move through. These stages are called Brahmacharya. The first stage is about training the body and mind. "The student is required to live for a fixed period in the house of his teacher".

The second stage is the prominent part of most Hindu's lives, and constitutes the level which most

Hindus are at. It is known as the householder stage. In this stage, Hindus get married. Marriage is considered highly sacred. The first reason is because sexual repression is believed to be unhealthy, and therefore a husband and wife should be sexually active.

Marriage is also important because it is a platform through which people can develop their personalities, and develop further spiritually. Marriage is successful when a partner becomes a lifetime companion. True love demands sacrifices, "byrestraint and endurance, we raise love to the likeness of the divine". Perfect relationships are created, not found.

The third stage comes about only when the second is perfected. "When one's bodily powers wane, it is time to depart to the forest and prepare oneself for the true life of the spirit. This is the stage when meditation is most important. Once the Hindu has been a benefactor to the world, they turn to their soul.

The final stage is that of the Samnyasin. At this stage, one seeks to attain complete spiritual freedom. This is done by intense practice, meditation and renunciation. The samnyasin does not attach to the world bodily or emotionally, their quest is a far more spiritual one.

Caste issues cause a lot of suffering and oppression in India. This is not the way it should have been. The caste system emerged as a way of creating a cohesive cultural synthesis, due largely to the fact that India had become highly multi cultured in a short space of time.

Multi culturalism in India, from an early point, encompassed "dark aboriginal tribes, the sturdy Dravidians, the yellow-skinned Mongols and the blithe, forceful Aryans... The Persians, Greeks and the Scythians...". Hindus wished for harmony between races. "those who tried to bring together different races in India are worshipped as the makers of Hindu society". When each race was welcomed into Hindu society, they were not seen as one nation, they believed that each race and community had a uniqueness, which was to be preserved.

He says that each caste has its own purpose and function, but that these can be categorized into four classes, called Varnas. These are-

1. These are granted freedom from labor, to develop spiritual insight, and to govern the state.
2. These are warriors. Whilst violence is never an ideal, it is sometimes thought of as a necessary evil in the world.
3. These people are responsible for wealth, they work with the movement of money. (Radhakrishnan says that "Hinduism has no sympathy with the view that 'to mix religion and business is to spoil two good things'. We ought not to banish spiritual values from life".
4. These are the unskilled workers.

These, respectively, are "men of thought, men of action, men of feeling, and others in whom none of these is highly developed". He wishes to reinforce, that there is no competition. No one caste is superior to another, they have equal value in the world.

He admits that there is in fact a lot of conflict between the castes. He puts this down to uneven wages and functioning of money in the world. He believes that artists and statesmen should receive less money than manual workers because their reward is in the love of their job, and therefore has a higher spiritual reward. He concludes that "A just organization of society will be

based of spiritual liberty, political equality and economic fraternity”.

### **J. Krishnamurti: 'Thought and Consciousness'**

All things were withdrawing into themselves. The trees were enclosing themselves in their own being; the birds were folding their wings to brood over their day's wanderings; the river had lost its glow, and the waters were no longer dancing but quiet and closed. The mountains were distant and unapproachable, and man had withdrawn into his house. Night had come, and there was the stillness of isolation. There was no communion; each thing had closed itself, set itself apart. The flower, the sound, the talk - everything was unexposed, invulnerable. There was laughter, but it was isolated and distant; the talk was muffled and from within. Only the stars were inviting, open and communicating; but they too were very far away.

Thought is always an outward response, it can never respond deeply. Thought is always the outer; thought is always an effect, and thinking is the reconciliation of effects. Thought is always superficial, though it may place itself at different levels. Thought can never penetrate the profound, the implicit. Thought cannot go beyond itself, and every attempt to do so is its own frustration. "What do you mean by thought?"

Thought is response to any challenge; thought is not action, doing. Thought is an outcome, the result of a result; it is the result of memory. Memory is thought, and thought is the verbalization of memory. Memory is experience. The thinking process is the conscious process, the hidden as well as the open. This whole thinking process is consciousness; the waking and the sleeping, the upper and the deeper levels are all part of memory, experience. Thought is not independent.

There is no independent thinking; "independent thinking" is a contradiction in terms. Thought, being a result, opposes or agrees, compares or adjusts, condemns or justifies, and therefore it can never be free. A result can never be free; it can twist about, manipulate, wander, go a certain distance, but it cannot be free from its own mooring. Thought is anchored to memory, and it can never be free to discover the truth of any problem.

"Do you mean to say that thought has no value at all?"

It has value in the reconciliation of effects, but it has no value in itself as a means to action. Action is revolution, not the reconciliation of effects. Action freed from thought, idea, belief, is never within a pattern. There can be activity within the pattern, and that activity is either violent, bloody, or the opposite; but it is not action. The opposite is not action, it is a modified continuation of activity. The opposite is still within the field of result, and in pursuing the opposite, thought is caught within the net of its own responses. Action is not the result of thought; action has no relation to thought. Thought, the result, can never create the new; the new is from moment to moment, and thought is always the old, the past, the conditioned. It has value but no freedom. All value is limitation, it binds. Thought is binding, for it is cherished.

"What relationship is there between consciousness and thought?"

Are they not the same? Is there any difference between thinking and being conscious? Thinking is a response; and is being conscious not also a response? When one is conscious of that chair, it is a response to a stimulus; and is not thought the response of memory to a challenge? It is this response that we call experience. Experiencing is challenge and response; and this experiencing,

together with the naming or recording of it - this total process, at different levels, is consciousness, is it not? Experience is the result, the outcome of experiencing. The result is given a term; the term itself is a conclusion, one of the many conclusions which constitute memory. This concluding process is consciousness. The conclusion, the result, is self-consciousness. The self is memory, the many conclusions; and thought is the response of memory. Thought is always a conclusion; thinking is concluding, and therefore it can never be free.

Thought is always the superficial, the conclusion. Consciousness is the recording of the superficial. The superficial separates itself as the outer and the inner, but this separation does not make thought any the less superficial. "But is there not something which is beyond thought, beyond time, something that is not created by the mind?"

Either you have been told about that state, have read about it, or there is the experiencing of it. The experiencing of it can never be an experience, a result; it cannot be thought about - and if it is, it is a remembrance and not experiencing. You can repeat what you have read or heard, but the word is not the thing; and the word, the very repetition, prevents the state of experiencing. That state of experiencing cannot be as long as there is thinking; thought, the result, the effect, can never know the state of experiencing.

"Then how is thought to come to an end?"

See the truth that thought, the outcome of the known, can never be in the state of experiencing. Experiencing is always the new; thinking is always of the old. See the truth of this, and truth brings freedom - freedom from thought, the result, Then there is that which is beyond consciousness, which is neither sleeping nor waking, which is nameless: it is

### **'Ending Thought'**

Questioner: I wonder what you really mean by ending thought. I talked to a friend about it and he said it is some kind of oriental nonsense. To him thought is the highest form of intelligence and action, the very salt of life, indispensable. It has created civilization, and all relationship is based on it. All of us accept this, from the greatest thinker to the humblest labourer. When we don't think we sleep, vegetate or daydream; we are vacant, dull and unproductive, whereas when we are awake we are thinking, doing, living, quarrelling: these are the only two states we know. You say, be beyond both - beyond thought and vacant inactivity. What do you mean by this?

Krishnamurti: Very simply put, thought is the response of memory, the past. The past is an infinity or a second ago. When thought acts it is this past which is acting as memory, as experience, as knowledge, as opportunity. All will is desire based on this past and directed towards pleasure or the avoidance of pain. When thought is functioning it is the past, therefore there is no new living at all; it is the past living in the present, modifying itself and the present. So there is nothing new in life that way, and when something new is to be found there must be the absence of the past, the mind must not be cluttered up with thought, fear, pleasure, and everything else. Only when the mind is uncluttered can the new come into being, and for this reason we say that thought must be still, operating only when it has to - objectively, efficiently. All continuity is thought; when there is continuity there is nothing new. Do you see how important this is? It's really a question of life itself. Either you live in the past, or you live totally differently: that is the whole point.

Questioner: I think I do see what you mean, but how in the world is one to end this thought? When I

listen to the blackbird there is thought telling me instantly it is the blackbird; when I walk down the street thought tells me I am walking down the street and tells me all I recognise and see; when I play with the notion of not thinking it is again thought that plays this game. All meaning and understanding and communication are thought. Even when I am not communicating with someone else I am doing so with myself. When I am awake, I think, when I am asleep I think. The whole structure of my being is thought. Its roots lie far deeper than I know. All I think and do and all I am is thought, thought creating pleasure and pain, appetites, longings, resolutions, conclusions, hopes, fears and questions. Thought commits murder and thought forgives. So how can one go beyond it? Isn't it thought again which seeks to go beyond it?

Krishnamurti: We both said, when thought is still, something new can be. We both saw that point clearly and to understand it clearly is the ending of thought.

Questioner: But that understanding is also thought.

Krishnamurti: Is it? You assume that it is thought, but is it, actually?

Questioner: It is a mental movement with meaning, a communication to oneself.

Krishnamurti: If it is a communication to oneself it is thought. But is understanding a mental movement with meaning?

Questioner: Yes it is.

Krishnamurti: The meaning of the word and the understanding of that meaning is thought. That is necessary in life. There thought must function efficiently. It is a technological matter. But you are not asking that. You are asking how thought, which is the very movement of life as you know it, can come to an end. Can it only end when you die? That is really your question, isn't it?

Questioner: Yes.

Krishnamurti: That is the right question. Die! Die to the past, to tradition. Questioner: But how?

Krishnamurti: The brain is the source of thought. The brain is matter and thought is matter. Can the brain - with all its reactions and its immediate responses to every challenge and demand - can that brain be very still? It is not a question of ending thought, but of whether the brain can be completely still. Can it act with full capacity when necessary and otherwise be still? This stillness is not physical death. See what happens when the brain is completely still. See what happens.

Questioner: In that space there was a blackbird, the green tree, the blue sky, the man hammering next door, the sound of the wind in the trees and my own heartbeat, the total quietness of the body. That is all.

Krishnamurti: If there was recognition of the blackbird singing, then the brain was active, was interpreting. It was not still. This really demands tremendous alertness and discipline, the watching that brings its own discipline, not imposed or brought about by your unconscious desire to achieve a result or a pleasurable new experience. Therefore during the day thought must operate effectively, sanely, and also watch itself.

Questioner: That is easy, but what about going beyond it?

Krishnamurti: Who is asking this question? Is it the desire to experience something new or is it the enquiry? If it is the enquiry, then you must enquire and investigate the whole business of thinking and be completely familiar with it, know all its tricks and subtleties. If you have done this you will know that the question of going beyond thought is an empty one. Going beyond thought is knowing what thought is.

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## **Freedom From the Known**

Man has throughout the ages been seeking something beyond himself, beyond material welfare - something we call truth or God or reality, a timeless state - something that cannot be disturbed by circumstances, by thought or by human corruption.

Man has always asked the question: what is it all about? Has life any meaning at all? He sees the enormous confusion of life, the brutalities, the revolt, the wars, the endless divisions of religion, ideology and nationality, and with a sense of deep abiding frustration he asks, what is one to do, what is this thing we call living, is there anything beyond it?

And not finding this nameless thing of a thousand names which he has always sought, he has cultivated faith - faith in a saviour or an ideal - and faith invariably breeds violence.

In this constant battle which we call living, we try to set a code of conduct according to the society in which we are brought up, whether it be a Communist society or a so-called free society; we accept a standard of behaviour as part of our tradition as Hindus or Muslims or Christians or whatever we happen to be.

We look to someone to tell us what is right or wrong behaviour, what is right or wrong thought, and in following this pattern our conduct and our thinking become mechanical, our responses automatic. We can observe this very easily in ourselves.

For centuries we have been spoon-fed by our teachers, by our authorities, by our books, our saints. We say, 'Tell me all about it - what lies beyond the hills and the mountains and the earth?' and we are satisfied with their descriptions, which means that we live on words and our life is shallow and empty. We are secondhand people. We have lived on what we have been told, either guided by our inclinations, our tendencies, or compelled to accept by circumstances and environment. We are the result of all kinds of influences and there is nothing new in us, nothing that we have discovered for ourselves; nothing original, pristine, clear.

Throughout theological history we have been assured by religious leaders that if we perform certain rituals, repeat certain prayers or mantras, conform to certain patterns, suppress our desires, control our thoughts, sublimate our passions, limit our appetites and refrain from sexual indulgence, we shall, after sufficient torture of the mind and body, find something beyond this little life. And that is what millions of so-called religious people have done through the ages, either in isolation, going off into the desert or into the mountains or a cave or wandering from village to village with a begging bowl, or, in a group, joining a monastery, forcing their minds to conform to an established pattern. But a tortured mind, a broken mind, a mind which wants to escape from all turmoil, which has denied the outer world and been made dull through discipline and conformity - such a mind, however long it seeks, will find only according to its own distortion.

So to discover whether there actually is or is not something beyond this anxious, guilty, fearful, competitive existence, it seems to me that one must have a completely different approach altogether. The traditional approach is from the periphery inwards, and through time, practice and renunciation, gradually to come upon that inner flower, that inner beauty and love - in fact to do everything to make oneself narrow, petty and shoddy; peel off little by little; take time; tomorrow will do, next life will do - and when at last one comes to the centre one finds there is nothing there, because one's mind has been made incapable, dull and insensitive.

Having observed this process, one asks oneself, is there not a different approach altogether - that is, is it not possible to explode from the centre?

The world accepts and follows the traditional approach. The primary cause of disorder in ourselves is the seeking of reality promised by another; we mechanically follow somebody who will assure us a comfortable spiritual life. It is a most extraordinary thing that although most of us are opposed to political tyranny and dictatorship, we inwardly accept the authority, the tyranny, of another to twist our minds and our way of life. So if we completely reject, not intellectually but actually, all so-called spiritual authority, all ceremonies, rituals and dogmas, it means that we stand alone and are

already in conflict with society; we cease to be respectable human beings. A respectable human being cannot possibly come near to that infinite, immeasurable, reality.

You have now started by denying something absolutely false - the traditional approach - but if you deny it as a reaction you will have created another pattern in which you will be trapped; if you tell yourself intellectually that this denial is a very good idea but do nothing about it, you cannot go any further. If you deny it however, because you understand the stupidity and immaturity of it, if you reject it with tremendous intelligence, because you are free and not frightened, you will create a great disturbance in yourself and around you but you will step out of the trap of respectability. Then you will find that you are no longer seeking. That is the first thing to learn - not to seek. When you seek you are really only window-shopping.

The question of whether or not there is a God or truth or reality, or whatever you like to call it, can never be answered by books, by priests, philosophers or saviours. Nobody and nothing can answer the question but you yourself and that is why you must know yourself. Immaturity lies only in total ignorance of self. To understand yourself is the beginning of wisdom.

And what is yourself, the individual you? I think there is a difference between the human being and the individual. The individual is a local entity, living in a particular country, belonging to a particular culture, particular society, particular religion. The human being is not a local entity. He is everywhere. If the individual merely acts in a particular corner of the vast field of life, then his action is totally unrelated to the whole. So one has to bear in mind that we are talking of the whole not the part, because in the greater the lesser is, but in the lesser the greater is not. The individual is the little conditioned, miserable, frustrated entity, satisfied with his little gods and his little traditions, whereas a human being is concerned with the total welfare, the total misery and total confusion of the world.

We human beings are what we have been for millions of years - -colossally greedy, envious, aggressive, jealous, anxious and despairing, with occasional flashes of joy and affection. We are a strange mixture of hate, fear and gentleness; we are both violence and peace. There has been outward progress from the bullock cart to the jet plane but psychologically the individual has not changed at all, and the structure of society throughout the world has been created by individuals. The outward social structure is the result of the inward psychological structure of our human relationships, for the individual is the result of the total experience, knowledge and conduct of man. Each one of us is the storehouse of all the past. The individual is the human who is all mankind. The whole history of man is written in ourselves.

Do observe what is actually taking place within yourself and outside yourself in the competitive culture in which you live with its desire for power, position, prestige, name, success and all the rest of it - observe the achievements of which you are so proud, this whole field you call living in which there is conflict in every form of relationship, breeding hatred, antagonism, brutality and endless wars.

This field, this life, is all we know, and being unable to understand the enormous battle of existence we are naturally afraid of it and find escape from it in all sorts of subtle ways. And we are frightened also of the unknown - frightened of death, frightened of what lies beyond tomorrow. So we are afraid of the known and afraid of the unknown. That is our daily life and in that there is no hope, and therefore every form of philosophy, every form of theological concept, is merely an

escape from the actual reality of what is.

All outward forms of change brought about by wars, revolutions, reformations, laws and ideologies have failed completely to change the basic nature of man and therefore of society. As human beings living in this monstrously ugly world, let us ask ourselves, can this society, based on competition, brutality and fear, come to an end? Not as an intellectual conception, not as a hope, but as an actual fact, so that the mind is made fresh, new and innocent and can bring about a different world altogether? It can only happen, I think, if each one of us recognises the central fact that we, as individuals, as human beings, in whatever part of the world we happen to live or whatever culture we happen to belong to, are totally responsible for the whole state of the world. We are each one of us responsible for every war because of the aggressiveness of our own lives, because of our nationalism, our selfishness, our gods, our prejudices, our ideals, all of which divide us. And only when we realize, not intellectually but actually, as actually as we would recognise that we are hungry or in pain, that you and I are responsible for all this existing chaos, for all the misery throughout the entire world because we have contributed to it in our daily lives and are part of this monstrous society with its wars, divisions, its ugliness, brutality and greed - only then will we act.

But what can a human being do - what can you and I do - to create a completely different society? We are asking ourselves a very serious question. Is there anything to be done at all? What can we do? Will somebody tell us? People have told us. The so-called spiritual leaders, who are supposed to understand these things better than we do, have told us by trying to twist and mould us into a new pattern, and that hasn't led us very far; sophisticated and learned men have told us and that has led us no further. We have been told that all paths lead to truth - you have your path as a Hindu and someone else has his path as a Christian and another as a Muslim, and they all meet at the same door - which is, when you look at it, so obviously absurd. Truth has no path, and that is the beauty of truth, it is living. A dead thing has a path to it because it is static, but when you see that truth is something living, moving, which has no resting place, which is in no temple, mosque or church, which no religion, no teacher, no philosopher, nobody can lead you to - then you will also see that this living thing is what you actually are - your anger, your brutality, your violence, your despair, the agony and sorrow you live in. In the understanding of all this is the truth, and you can understand it only if you know how to look at those things in your life. And you cannot look through an ideology, through a screen of words, through hopes and fears.

So you see that you cannot depend upon anybody. There is no guide, no teacher, no authority. There is only you - your relationship with others and with the world - there is nothing else. When you realize this, it either brings great despair, from which comes cynicism and bitterness, or, in facing the fact that you and nobody else is responsible for the world and for yourself, for what you think, what you feel, how you act, all self-pity goes. Normally we thrive on blaming others, which is a form of self-pity.

Can you and I, then, bring about in ourselves without any outside influence, without any persuasion, without any fear of punishment - can we bring about in the very essence of our being a total revolution, a psychological mutation, so that we are no longer brutal, violent, competitive, anxious, fearful, greedy, envious and all the rest of the manifestations of our nature which have built up the rotten society in which we live our daily lives?

It is important to understand from the very beginning that I am not formulating any philosophy or any theological structure of ideas or theological concepts. It seems to me that all ideologies are

utterly idiotic. What is important is not a philosophy of life but to observe what is actually taking place in our daily life, inwardly and outwardly. If you observe very closely what is taking place and examine it, you will see that it is based on an intellectual conception, and the intellect is not the whole field of existence; it is a fragment, and a fragment, however cleverly put together, however ancient and traditional, is still a small part of existence whereas we have to deal with the totality of life. And when we look at what is taking place in the world we begin to understand that there is no outer and inner process; there is only one unitary process, it is a whole, total movement, the inner movement expressing itself as the outer and the outer reacting again on the inner. To be able to look at this seems to me all that is needed, because if we know how to look, then the whole thing becomes very clear, and to look needs no philosophy, no teacher. Nobody need tell you how to look. You just look.

Can you then, seeing this whole picture, seeing it not verbally but actually, can you easily, spontaneously, transform yourself? That is the real issue. Is it possible to bring about a complete revolution in the psyche?

I wonder what your reaction is to such a question? You may say, 'I don't want to change', and most people don't, especially those who are fairly secure socially and economically or who hold dogmatic beliefs and are content to accept themselves and things as they are or in a slightly modified form. With those people we are not concerned. Or you may say more subtly, 'Well, it's too difficult, it's not for me', in which case you will have already blocked yourself, you will have ceased to enquire and it will be no use going any further. Or else you may say, 'I see the necessity for a fundamental inward change in myself but how am I to bring it about? Please show me the way, help me towards it.' If you say that, then what you are concerned with is not change itself; you are not really interested in a fundamental revolution: you are merely searching for a method, a system, to bring about change. If I were foolish enough to give you a system and if you were foolish enough to follow it, you would merely be copying, imitating, conforming, accepting, and when you do that you have set up in yourself the authority of another and hence there is conflict between you and that authority. You feel you must do such and such a thing because you have been told to do it and yet you are incapable of doing it. You have your own particular inclinations, tendencies and pressures which conflict with the system you think you ought to follow and therefore there is a contradiction. So you will lead a double life between the ideology of the system and the actuality of your daily existence. In trying to conform to the ideology, you suppress yourself - whereas what is actually true is not the ideology but what you are. If you try to study yourself according to another you will always remain a secondhand human being.

A man who says, 'I want to change, tell me how to', seems very earnest, very serious, but he is not. He wants an authority whom he hopes will bring about order in himself. But can authority ever bring about inward order? Order imposed from without must always breed disorder. You may see the truth of this intellectually but can you actually apply it so that your mind no longer projects any authority, the authority of a book, a teacher, a wife or husband, a parent, a friend or of society? Because we have always functioned within the pattern of a formula, the formula becomes the ideology and the authority; but the moment you really see that the question, 'How can I change?' sets up a new authority, you have finished with authority for ever.

Let us state it again clearly: I see that I must change completely from the roots of my being; I can no longer depend on any tradition because tradition has brought about this colossal laziness, acceptance and obedience; I cannot possibly look to another to help me to change, not to any

teacher, any God, any belief, any system, any outside pressure or influence. What then takes place?

First of all, can you reject all authority? If you can it means that you are no longer afraid. Then what happens? When you reject something false which you have been carrying about with you for generations, when you throw off a burden of any kind, what takes place? You have more energy, haven't you? You have more capacity, more drive, greater intensity and vitality. If you do not feel this, then you have not thrown off the burden, you have not discarded the dead weight of authority. But when you have thrown it off and have this energy in which there is no fear at all - no fear of making a mistake, no fear of doing right or wrong - then is not that energy itself the mutation? We need a tremendous amount of energy and we dissipate it through fear but when there is this energy which comes from throwing off every form of fear, that energy itself produces the radical inward revolution. You do not have to do a thing about it.

So you are left with yourself, and that is the actual state for a man to be who is very serious about all this; and as you are no longer looking to anybody or anything for help, you are already free to discover. And when there is freedom, there is energy; and when there is freedom it can never do anything wrong.

Freedom is entirely different from revolt. There is no such thing as doing right or wrong when there is freedom. You are free and from that centre you act. And hence there is no fear, and a mind that has no fear is capable of great love. And when there is love it can do what it will.

What we are now going to do, therefore, is to learn about ourselves, not according to me or to some analyst or philosopher - because if we learn about ourselves according to someone else, we learn about them, not ourselves - we are going to learn what we actually are.

Having realized that we can depend on no outside authority in bringing about a total revolution within the structure of our own psyche, there is the immensely greater difficulty of rejecting our own inward authority, the authority of our own particular little experiences and accumulated opinions, knowledge, ideas and ideals. You had an experience yesterday which taught you something and what it taught you becomes a new authority - and that authority of yesterday is as destructive as the authority of a thousand years. To understand ourselves needs no authority either of yesterday or of a thousand years because we are living things, always moving, flowing, never resting. When we look at ourselves with the dead authority of yesterday, we will fail to understand the living movement and the beauty and quality of that movement.

To be free of all authority, of your own and that of another, is to die to everything of yesterday, so that your mind is always fresh, always young, innocent, full of vigour and passion. It is only in that state that one learns and observes. And for this a great deal of awareness is required, actual awareness of what is going on inside yourself, without correcting it or telling it what it should or should not be, because the moment you correct it you have established another authority, a censor.

So now we are going to investigate ourselves together - not one person explaining while you read, agreeing or disagreeing with him as you follow the words on the page, but taking a journey together, a journey of discovery into the most secret corners of our minds. And to take such a journey we must travel light; we cannot be burdened with opinions, prejudices and conclusions - all that old furniture we have collected for the last two thousand years and more. Forget all you know

about yourself; forget all you have ever thought about yourself; we are going to start as if we knew nothing.

It rained last night heavily, and now the skies are beginning to clear; it is a new fresh day. Let us meet that fresh day as if it were the only day. Let us start on our journey together with all the remembrance of yesterday left behind - and begin to understand ourselves for the first time.

### **Freedom from the Self**

Freedom from the self, and therefore the search of reality, the discovery and the coming into being of reality, is the true function of man. Religions play with it in their rituals and rigmarole – you know, the whole business of it. But if one becomes aware of this whole process, then there is a possibility for the newly awakened intelligence to function. In that, there is not self-release, not self-fulfilment, but creativeness. It is this creativeness of reality, which is not of time, that sets one free from all the business of the collective and the individual. Then one is really in a position to help create the new.

### **It is only the free mind that is creative**

Why does the mind accumulate knowledge or acquire virtue? Why does the mind constantly strive to become something, to perfect itself? In the process of acquisition and accumulation, the mind is burdened. All accumulation in self-knowledge is a hindrance to the further discovery of the self. Now, is it possible to discover and not be acquisitive, so that the discovery does not leave an experience which will condition further discovery?

This is really the freedom from the self, so that there is no accumulative entity, and therefore there is creative being. Accumulation is not creativeness. A mind which is constantly acquiring can obviously never be creative. It is only the free mind that is creative. There can be no freedom if every experience is stored up, because that which is accumulated becomes the centre of the “me”, of the “I”.

### **The process of the self**

By the self, I mean the idea, the memory, the conclusion, the experience, the various forms of nameable and unnameable intentions, the conscious endeavour to be or not to be, competition, the accumulated memory of the unconscious, the racial, the group, the individual, the clan, the whole of it, whether projected outwardly in action or projected spiritually as virtue. The whole process of that is the self; and we know actually when we are faced with it that it is an evil thing. I am using the word *evil* intentionally, because the self is dividing; it is self-enclosing; its activities, however noble, are separative and isolating. We know all this. We also know those extraordinary moments when the self is not there, in which there is no sense of endeavour, of effort, and which happens when there is love.

### **Is it possible for the mind to be quite still, in a state of non-recognition or non-experiencing?**

All the various forms of discipline, belief and knowledge only strengthen the self. Can we find an element which will dissolve the self? Or is that a wrong question? That is what we want basically. We want to find something which will dissolve the “me”. We think there are various means, namely identification, belief, etc., but all of them are at the same level; one is not superior to the other because all of them are equally powerful in strengthening the self, the “me”. So can I see the “me” wherever it functions and see its destructive forces and energy? Whatever name I may give to it, it is an isolating force, it is a destructive force, and I want to find a way of dissolving it. You must

have asked this yourself. I see the "I" functioning all the time and bringing anxiety, fear, frustration, despair, misery, not only to myself but to all around me. Is it possible for that self to be dissolved, not partially but completely? Can we go to the root of it and destroy it? That is the only way of truly functioning, is it not? I do not want to be partially intelligent but intelligent in an integrated manner. Most of us are intelligent in layers: you probably in one way and I in some other way. People are intelligent in different ways but we are not integrally intelligent. To be integrally intelligent means to be without the self. Is it possible?

Is it possible for the self to be completely absent now? What are the necessary ingredients or requirements? What is the element that brings it about? Can I find it? When I put that question 'Can I find it?' I am convinced that it is possible and so I have already created an experience in which the self is going to be strengthened. Understanding of the self requires a great deal of intelligence, a great deal of watchfulness, alertness, watching ceaselessly so that it does not slip away. I, who am very earnest, want to dissolve the self. When I say that, I know it is possible to dissolve the self. The moment I say, 'I want to dissolve this,' in that there is still the experiencing of the self, and so the self is strengthened.

One can see that the state of creation is not at all the experience of the self. Creation is when the self is not there, because creation is not intellectual, is not of the mind, is not self-projected, is something beyond all experiencing. So is it possible for the mind to be quite still, in a state of non-recognition or non-experiencing, to be in a state in which creation can take place, which means when the self is not there, when the self is absent? Any movement of the mind, positive or negative, is an experience which actually strengthens the "me". Is it possible for the mind not to recognize? That can only take place when there is complete silence, but not the silence which is an experience of the self and which therefore strengthens the self.

Is there an entity apart from the self which looks at the self and dissolves the self? Is there a spiritual entity which supersedes the self and destroys it, which puts it aside? Most religious people think there is such an element. The materialist says, 'It is impossible for the self to be destroyed; it can only be conditioned and restrained – politically, economically and socially; we can hold it firmly within a certain pattern and we can break it; and therefore it can be made to lead a high life, a moral life, and not to interfere with anything but to follow the social pattern and to function merely as a machine.' That we know. There are other people, the so-called religious ones – they are not really religious, though we call them so – who say, 'Fundamentally there is such an element; if we can get in touch with it, it will dissolve the self.' Is there such an element to dissolve the self? Please see what we are doing. We are forcing the self into a corner. If you allow yourself to be forced into the corner, you will see what will happen. We should like there to be an element which is timeless, which is not of the self, which we hope will come and intercede and destroy the self, and which we call God. Now is there such a thing which the mind can conceive? There may be or there may not be; that is not the point.

**If you and I as individuals can see the whole working of the self, then we shall know what love is.** When the mind seeks a timeless spiritual state which will go into action in order to destroy the self, is that not another form of experience which is strengthening the "me"? When you believe, is that not what is actually taking place? When you believe that there is truth, God, the timeless state, immortality, is that not the process of strengthening the self? The self has projected that thing which you feel and believe will come and destroy the self. So, having projected this idea of continuance in a timeless state as a spiritual entity, you have an experience. Such an experience only

strengthens the self, and therefore what have you done? You have not really destroyed the self but only given it a different name, a different quality. The self is still there, because you have experienced it. Thus our action from the beginning to the end is the same action, only we think it is evolving, growing, becoming more and more beautiful. But it is the same action going on, the same "me" functioning at different levels with different labels, different names.

When you see the whole process, the cunning, extraordinary inventions, the intelligence of the self, how it covers itself up through identification, through virtue, through experience, through belief, through knowledge; when you see that the mind is moving in a circle, in a cage of its own making, what happens? When you are aware of it, fully cognizant of it, then are you not extraordinarily quiet? Not through compulsion, not through any reward, not through any fear, when you recognize that every movement of the mind is merely a form of strengthening the self, when you observe it, see it, when you are completely aware of it in action, when you come to that point, not ideologically or verbally, not through projected experiencing, but when you are actually in that state, then you will see that the mind, being utterly still, has no power of creating. Whatever the mind creates is in a circle, within the field of the self. When the mind is non-creating there is creation, which is not a recognizable process.

Reality, truth, is not to be recognized. For truth to come, belief, knowledge, experiencing, the pursuit of virtue, all this must go. The virtuous person who is conscious of pursuing virtue can never find reality. He may be a very decent person but that is entirely different from being a man of truth, a man who understands. To the man of truth, truth has come into being. A virtuous man is a righteous man, and a righteous man can never understand what is truth because virtue to him is the covering of the self, the strengthening of the self because he is pursuing virtue. When he says, 'I must be without greed,' the state of non-greed which he experiences only strengthens the self. That is why it is so important to be poor, not only in the things of the world but also in belief and in knowledge. A man with worldly riches or a man rich in knowledge and belief will never know anything but darkness, and will be the centre of all mischief and misery. But if you and I as individuals can see the whole working of the self, then we shall know what love is. I assure you that is the only reformation which can possibly change

the world. Love is not of the self. Self cannot recognize love. You say, 'I love,' but in the very saying of it, in the very experiencing of it, love is not. But when you know love, self is not. When there is love, self is not.

## **Self-knowing**

Intelligence is possible only when there is real freedom from the self, from the "me", that is, when the mind is no longer the centre of the demand for the "more", no longer caught up in the desire for greater, wider, more expansive experience. Intelligence is freedom from the pressure of time, because the "more" implies time, and as long as the mind is the centre of the demand for the "more", it is the result of time. So the cultivation of the "more" is not intelligence. The understanding of this whole process is self-knowledge. When one knows oneself as one is, without an accumulating centre, out of that self-knowing comes the intelligence which can meet life; and that intelligence is creative.

I and my mind are the same, there is no division between myself and my mind. The self that is envious or ambitious is exactly the same as the mind that says, 'I must not be envious, I must be noble,' only the mind has divided itself. Now, when I see that, what am I to do? If the mind is the

product of environment, of envy, greed and conditioning, then what is it to do? Surely any movement it makes to free itself is still part of that conditioning. Any movement on the part of the mind to free itself from conditioning is an action of the self which wants to be free in order to be more happy, more at peace, nearer the right hand of God. So I see the whole of this, the ways and trickeries of the mind. Therefore the mind is quiet, it is completely still, there is no movement; and it is in that silence, in that stillness, that there is freedom from the self, from the mind itself. Surely the self exists only in the movement of the mind to gain something or to avoid something.

If there is no movement of gaining or avoiding, the mind is completely quiet. Then only is there a possibility of being free from the totality of consciousness. *Krishnamurti*

### **The totality of the self**

I do not know if you have noticed the constant effort that one is consciously or unconsciously making to express oneself, to be something, either socially, morally, or economically. This entails a great deal of striving; our whole life is based on the everlasting struggle to arrive, to achieve, to become. The more we struggle, the more significant and exaggerated the self becomes, with all its limitations, fears, ambitions, frustrations. There must have been times when each one has asked themselves whether it is not possible to be totally without the self.

### **Can we live in this world without any identification at all?**

After all, we do have rare moments when the sense of the self is not. I am not talking of the transmutation of the self to a higher level, but of the simple cessation of the "me" with its anxieties, worries, fears – the absence of the self. One realises that such a thing is possible, and then one sets about deliberately, consciously, to eliminate the self. That is what organised religions try to do, to help each worshipper or believer to lose themselves in something greater, and thereby perhaps to experience some higher state. If you are not a so-called religious person, then you identify yourself with the State, with the country, and try to lose yourself in that identification, which gives you the feeling of greatness, of being something much larger than the petty little self. Or if we do not do that, we try to lose ourselves in social work of some kind, again with the same intention. We think that if we can forget ourselves, deny ourselves, put ourselves out of the way by dedicating our lives to something greater and more vital than ourselves, we shall perhaps experience bliss or happiness. And if we do none of these things, we hope to stop thinking about ourselves through the cultivation of virtue, through discipline, through control or through constant practice.

All this implies a ceaseless effort to be or to become something. Perhaps in listening to what is being said, we can together go into this whole process and discover for ourselves whether it is possible to wipe away the sense of the "me" without this fearful, restricting discipline, without this enormous effort to deny ourselves, this constant struggle to renounce our wants, our ambitions, in order to be something or to achieve some reality. I think in this lies the real issue. All effort implies motive. I make an effort to forget myself in something, in a ritual or ideology, because in thinking about myself I am unhappy. When I think about something else, I am more relaxed, my mind is quieter, I seem to feel better, I look at things differently. So I make an effort to forget myself. But behind my effort there is a motive, which is to escape from myself because I suffer; and that motive is essentially a part of the self. When I renounce this world and become a monk, or a very devout religious person, the motive is that I want to achieve something better; but that is still the process of the self. I may give up my name and just be a number in a religious order, but the motive is still there.

Is it possible to forget oneself without any motive? We can see very well that any motive has within it the seed of the self, with its anxiety, ambition, frustration, its fear of not being, and the immense urge to be secure. Can all that fall away easily, without any effort? Which means, really, can you and I, as individuals, live in this world without being identified with anything? I identify myself with my country, with my religion, with my family, with my name, because without identification I am nothing. Without a position, without power, without prestige of one kind or another, I feel lost; and so I identify myself with my name, with my family, with my religion, I join some organisation or become a monk – we all know the various types of identification that the mind clings to. But can we live in this world without any identification at all?

If we can think about this, if we can listen to what is being said, and at the same time be aware of our own intimations regarding the implications of identification, then I think we shall discover, if we are at all serious, that it is possible to live in this world without the nightmare of identification and the ceaseless struggle to achieve a result. Then I think knowledge has quite a different significance. At present we identify ourselves with our knowledge and use it as a means of self-expansion, just as we do with the nation, with a religion, or with some activity.

Identification with the knowledge we have gained is another way of furthering the self. Through knowledge the 'me' continues its struggle to be something, and thereby perpetuates misery, pain.

**“Self-knowledge means going very deeply into oneself without assuming anything.”**

If we can very humbly and simply see the implications of all this, be aware, without assuming anything, of how our minds operate and what our thinking is based on, then I think we shall realise the extraordinary contradiction that exists in this whole process of identification. After all, it is because I feel empty, lonely, miserable, that I identify myself with my country, and this identification gives me a sense of wellbeing, a feeling of power. Or for the same reason I identify myself with a hero or with a saint. But if I can go into this process of identification very deeply, I will see that the whole movement of my thinking and my activity, however noble, is essentially based on the continuance of myself in one form or another.

Now, if I once see that, if I realise it, feel it with my whole being, then religion has quite a different meaning. Then religion is no longer a process of identifying myself with God, but rather the coming into being of a state in which there is only that reality, and not the “me”. But this cannot be a mere verbal assertion, it is not just a phrase to be repeated.

That is why it is very important to have self-knowledge, which means going very deeply into oneself without assuming anything, so that the mind has no deceptions, no illusions, so that it does not trick itself into visions and false states.

Then perhaps it is possible for the enclosing process of the self to come to an end – but not through any form of compulsion or discipline, because the more you discipline the self, the stronger the self becomes. What is important is to go into all this very deeply and patiently, without taking anything for granted, so that one begins to understand the ways, the purposes, the motives and directions of the mind. Then the mind comes to a state in which there is no identification at all, and therefore no effort to be something; then there is the cessation of the self, and that is the real. Although we may swiftly, fleetingly experience this state, the difficulty for most of us is that the mind clings to the experience and wants more of it; and the very wanting of more is again the beginning of the self. That is why it is very important, for those of us who are really serious in these

matters, to be inwardly aware of the process of our own thinking, to silently observe our motives, our emotional reactions, and not merely say, 'I know myself very well' – for actually one does not. You may know your reactions and motives superficially, at the conscious level, but the self, the "me", is a very complex affair, and to go into the totality of the self needs persistent and continuous inquiry without a motive, without an end in view. Such inquiry is surely a form of meditation.

That immense reality cannot be found through any organisation, through any church, through any book, through any person or teacher. One has to find it for oneself – which means that one has to be completely alone, uninfluenced. But we are all the result of so many influences, so many pressures, known and unknown; and that is why it is very important to understand these many pressures, influences, and be dissociated from them all, so that the mind becomes extraordinarily simple, clear. Then perhaps it will be possible to experience that which cannot be put into words.

## **Choiceless**

The concept of choiceless observation or awareness is the crux of J.Krishnamurti's philosophy of life. Awareness is only one word that can explain what he has been saying for the last fifty years to large audiences both in the east and the west. A state called choiceless awareness where the notion of choice collapses and we give up taking sides. This state of mind is similar to a state of awareness that collapses into a choiceless state where there are no likes or dislikes from the observer's point of view. It is also a state where total attention is given without the observer, the observer is the self, the past, who is conditioned. Therefore, to observe choicelessly is not to divide the observer and the observed and since the observer is the past, it's the past that observes. The division between the observer and the observed is the source of conflict, the source of psychological conditioning. The conflict between desire and necessity is rooted in the state of mind where there is a constant battle between the demands of one's ego and the true self. J.Krishnamurti was the first person to have used the term choiceless awareness, he asserts:

Choiceless awareness is to be aware both externally and inwardly, without any choice. Just to be aware of the trees, the mountains, nature, just to be aware. Not choose, saying, –I like this!, –I don't like that!, or –I want this!, –I don't want that!. It is to observe without the observer. The observer is the past, which is conditioned, always looking from that conditioned point of view, therefore there is like and dislike and so on. To be choicelessly aware implies observing the whole environment around you, the mountains, the trees, also the ugly world and the towns; just to be aware, observe and in that observation there is no decision, no will, no choice.

A deeper understanding of this notion of choiceless awareness reveals that it is not about giving up anything or taking sides, but rather a state of mind where the ego, the conditioned mind or the shadow is transcended, not by the act of will but by inquiring and allowing them to flower. According to J.Krishnamurti, choiceless awareness means to be completely free of lower senses like self, ego, I, sense of self, anger, hatred etc. It is in fact developing of a completely pure mind. It is totally passive in nature, if there is made a choice there is a center, the ego, wanting to have a result, to avoid something, to fulfill something. The ego is always wishing, wanting, the best for itself. Ego is making the greatest choice, by making a choice, and there is contradiction, with what ego is experiencing, which is not pleasant. Choiceless observation is the only way, the direct and intelligent way of understanding the truth of 'what is'. It alone can transform the fact, the actuality by revealing its true nature. It is only through choiceless observation, that consciousness can be emptied of its content. He maintains that excepting choiceless awareness, there is no other way of regenerating the human mind and the world irreversibly and instantly.

Choiceless observation is the observation of 'what is', the fact or the actuality without the movement of thought which is knowledge or past. It is the observation devoid of the observer, the centre, the censor, the 'me' or the thinker which is thought. It is the awareness without the division as the observer and the observed. It is a holistic observation in which the observer is the observed.

As J.Krishnamurti says:

In it there is no reaction, resistance, justification and condemnation. It is a pure observation sans remembrance, recollection, recognition and naming. It is free from ideas, ideals and opinions. It is observation without prejudice likes and dislikes. It is without a motive and an end in view.

According to J.Krishnamurti, choiceless awareness is an understanding in which the previous experience is totally absent. It is experiencing 'what is' without the experiences. It is a 'negative' approach to the fact. It is an awareness in which the psychological past is totally negated. It is the denial of knowledge in understanding. It is a 'passive' awareness without effort. It is a 'silent' observation without the activity of thought. It is 'silence' with which thought does not interfere in any form. According to J.Krishnamurti, the negative and the passive approach is the most active and positive one. It alone leads to the absolute certainty which is truth. Skepticism is the basis of true spirituality. Choiceless awareness does not understand the fact from a particular point of view. It is not moulding according to a preconceived conclusion. It is not fitting 'what is' into the framework of a system. It does not involve intellectualization, interpretation, explanation or theorization. Nor does it warrant analysis or introspection. Choiceless awareness perceives the fact without translating it to knowledge. J.Krishnamurti avers:

This awareness is not evolutionary. It is not a 'progressive' or a gradual understanding of 'what is' by accumulating knowledge about it. It is not movement from the past to the future, but it is 'seeing' the fact without distorting and dividing it. It is 'remaining with' 'what is' without moving away from it. It is the complete attention of holding the totality of 'what is', like a vessel holding water. Total attention generates the holistic energy that regenerate 'what is'

According to J.Krishnamurti, it is an experimental approach of allowing 'what is' to reveal itself as it exactly and essentially is. It is an unpremeditated art of looking at 'what is' directly and wholly. It is a non-verbal and non-conceptual understanding. It is an a causal and a timeless insight into 'what is' Insight is the comprehension of the truth of 'what is', in a 'flash'. According to J.Krishnamurti, —the insight is not analysis, time, remembrance, all that. It is the immediate perception of something. 4 It is an absolute observation of allowing the 'what is' to 'flower' freely and fully. The spontaneous and total flowering of the 'what is' is the ending of its bondage. J.Krishnamurti says, —Truth is when there is the realization that the observer is the observed. Then, in that realization, which is truth, the conditioning disappears.

**AWARENESS:** According to J.Krishnamurti, the effortless action springs from choiceless awareness. Mind that is caught in problems, in fear, in despair, in the desire to fulfill itself, is always creating illusion and is therefore in a state of neurosis. That is the first thing to realize. So when the mind is highly sensitive and free of all choice and illusion, out of that choicelessness and sensitivity there is intelligence, and only then can the mind be completely and effortlessly quiet. That state of complete and effortless quietness is the beginning of meditation and in that state of mind there arise action which are completely effortless. So, first there is awareness, a choiceless

observation of all your thoughts and feelings, of everything that you do. Out of that there comes a state of attention which has no frontier, but in which the mind can concentrate, and from this state of attention there is quietness of the mind. And when the mind is completely quiet, without any illusion, without any kind of self-hypnosis, there is the coming into being of something which is not put together by the mind.

According to J.Krishnamurti, we know only the action of will which consists in the formulation of a goal and the struggle for achieving it, which is effort. Action of will involves choice which breeds resistance to the undesirable and the overcoming of this resistance is the effort involved in the endeavor to achieve the desired end in view. So action of will involves choice, resistance and effort. But why do we choose at all? Because we are confused, we don't know ourselves; we don't see 'what is,' because we want something else; and so, to choose is to deny, to ignore 'what is' To the discerning eye there is no choice, there is only one truth which does not admit of any choice. To have no choice is to be free from effort. Effort is not action, effort is mere activity. Choice implies confusion and conflict, the resistance of the self which is violence, the violation of the law of love, the state of no duality. In other words, the effort to be what one is not, what one should be, is to escape from what is, is to be unaware of oneself. As J.Krishnamurti points out:

Effortless is a distraction from 'what is.' Sirs, if I may suggest, think it over and you will see the moment I accept 'what is' there is no struggle. Any form of struggle or strife is an indication of distraction and distraction which is effort must exist as long as psychologically I wish to transform 'what is' into something it is not.

It is notable that J.Krishnamurti, is not referring to the changes that we want to bring about at the physical level; he is talking of change at the psychological level. For, psychologically, if the action is born of the desire to change 'what is,' that desire is either the projection of the mind or a reaction of the mind; and so the action will take place in the field of the mind, in the field of becoming; and there will be no categorical change. This interpretation is illustrated by the following extract from his talk at Ommen, 1937.

The mind finds that it does not pay to hate, for it has discovered that there is too much suffering involved in it, and so it makes an effort to discipline itself, to overcome hate by love, to subdue violence and fear by peace. All this indicates the fundamental desire merely to escape from suffering; that is, to guard itself in those virtues and qualities that will not give it pain, that will not cause disturbance.

Thus, we are reminded once again, that effort of will is effective in the field of becoming, but as far as the psychological revolution is concerned, effort is a distraction. Effort indicates overcoming of resistance, struggle and strife, but not action. Effort implies dissipation of energy, division in the consciousness and distraction in the flow of attention. Therefore, effort is involved in the activity of mind which is self-perpetuities, self-expansive, fragmentary and contradictory.

Total action, action free of distraction, free of division in consciousness cannot come through effort; it has to be effortless, spontaneous. In other words, silence of mind cannot be brought about by the action of will, since it implies effort resistance, conflict, duality, fragmentation of consciousness and self-perpetuation.

According to J.Krishnamurti, the action of will is based on idea, on a projection or a reaction of

mind. So there should be action without idea, without projecting oneself, without a blue print.

## **Gandhi: Truth**

The word satya (Truth) is derived from Sat which means 'being.' Nothing is or exists in reality except Truth. That is why Sat or Truth is perhaps the most important name of God, In fact it is more correct to say that Truth is God than to say God is truth. On deeper thinking, however it will be realized that Sat or Satya is the only correct and fully significant name for God.

And where there is Truth, there is also knowledge which is true. Where there is no Truth, there also is knowledge which is true. Where there is no Truth, there can be no true knowledge. That is why the word Chit or knowledge is associated with the name of God. And where there is true knowledge, there is always bliss (Ananda). There sorrow has no place. And even as Truth is eternal, so is the bliss derived from it. Hence we know God as Sat-Chit-Ananda, one who combines in Himself Truth, Knowledge and Bliss.

Devotion to this Truth is the sole justification for our existence. All our activities should be centered in Truth. Truth should be the very breath of our life. When once this stage in the pilgrim's progress is reached, all other rules of correct living will come without effort, and obedience to them will be instinctive. But without Truth it is impossible to observe any principles or rules in life.

But how is one to realize this Truth, which may be likened to the philosopher's stone or the cow of plenty? By single minded devotion (abhyasa) and indifference to all other interests in life (vairagya) replies the Bhagavad Gita.

In spite, however of such devotion, what may appear as Truth to one person will often appear as untruth to another person. But that need not worry the seeker. Where there is honest effort, it will be realized that what appear to be different truths are like the countless and apparently different leaves of the same tree.

Does not God himself appear to different individuals in different aspects? Yet we know that He is one. But Truth is the right designation of God. Hence there is nothing wrong in every man following Truth according to his lights. Indeed it is his duty to do so. Then if there is a mistake on the part of any one so following Truth it will be automatically set right.

In such selfless search for Truth nobody can lose his bearings for long. Directly he takes to the wrong path he stumbles, and is thus redirected to the right path. Therefore the pursuit of Truth is true bhakti (devotion). It is the path that leads to God.

## **Nonviolence**

With Gandhi, the notion of nonviolence attained a special status. He not only theorized on it, he adopted nonviolence as a philosophy and an ideal way of life. He made us understand that the philosophy of nonviolence is not a weapon of the weak; it is a weapon, which can be tried by all.

Nonviolence was not Gandhi's invention. He is however called the father of nonviolence because according to Mark Shepard, "He raised nonviolent action to a level never before achieved." Krishna Kripalani again asserts "Gandhi was the first in Human history to extend the principle of nonviolence from the individual to social and political plane."<sup>2</sup> While scholars were talking about an idea without a name or a movement, Gandhi is the person who came up with the name and brought

together different related ideas under one concept: Satyagraha.

## **Gandhi's View of Violence / Nonviolence**

Gandhi saw violence pejoratively and also identified two forms of violence; Passive and Physical, as we saw earlier. The practice of passive violence is a daily affair, consciously and unconsciously. It is again the fuel that ignites the fire of physical violence. Gandhi understands violence from its Sanskrit root, "*himsa*", meaning injury. In the midst of hyper violence, Gandhi teaches that the one who possesses nonviolence is blessed. Blessed is the man who can perceive the law of *ahimsa* (*nonviolence*) in the midst of the raging fire of *himsa* all around him. We bow in reverence to such a man by his example. The more adverse the circumstances around him, the more intense grows his longing for deliverance from the bondage of flesh which is a vehicle of *himsa*...<sup>3</sup> Gandhi objects to violence because it perpetuates hatred. When it appears to do 'good', the good is only temporary and cannot do any good in the long run. A true nonviolence activist accepts violence on himself without inflicting it on another. This is heroism, and will be discussed in another section. When Gandhi says that in the course of fighting for human rights, one should accept violence and self-suffering, he does not applaud cowardice. Cowardice for him is "the greatest violence, certainly, far greater than bloodshed and the like that generally go under the name of violence."<sup>4</sup> For Gandhi, perpetrators of violence (whom he referred to as criminals), are products of social disintegration. Gandhi feels that violence is not a natural tendency of humans. It is a learned experience. There is need for a perfect weapon to combat violence and this is nonviolence. Gandhi understood nonviolence from its Sanskrit root "*Ahimsa*". *Ahimsa* is just translated to mean nonviolence in English, but it implies more than just avoidance of physical violence. *Ahimsa* implies total nonviolence, no physical violence, and no passive violence. Gandhi translates *Ahimsa* as love. This is explained by Arun Gandhi in an interview thus; "He (Gandhi) said *ahimsa* means love. Because if you have love towards somebody, and you respect that person, then you are not going to do any harm to that person."<sup>5</sup> For Gandhi, nonviolence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than any weapon of mass destruction. It is superior to brute force. It is a living force of power and no one has been or will ever be able to measure its limits or its extent. Gandhi's nonviolence is the search for truth. Truth is the most fundamental aspect in Gandhi's Philosophy of nonviolence. His whole life has been "experiments of truth". It was in this course of his pursuit of truth that Gandhi discovered nonviolence, which he further explained in his Autobiography thus "Ahimsa is the basis of the search for truth. I am realizing that this search is vain, unless it is founded on *ahimsa* as the basis."<sup>6</sup> Truth and nonviolence are as old as the hills. For nonviolence to be strong and effective, it must begin with the mind, without which it will be nonviolence of the weak and cowardly. A coward is a person who lacks courage when facing a dangerous and unpleasant situation and tries to avoid it. A man cannot practice *ahimsa* and at the same time be a coward. True nonviolence is dissociated from fear. Gandhi feels that possession of arms is not only cowardice but also lack of fearlessness or courage. Gandhi stressed this when he says; "I can imagine a fully armed man to be at heart a coward. Possession of arms implies an element of fear, if not cowardice but true nonviolence is impossible without the possession of unadulterated fearlessness."<sup>7</sup> In the face of violence and injustice, Gandhi considers violent resistance preferable to cowardly submission. There is hope that a violent man may someday be nonviolent, but there is no room for a coward to develop fearlessness.

As the world's pioneer in nonviolent theory and practice, Gandhi unequivocally stated that nonviolence contained a universal applicability. In his letter to Daniel Oliver in Hammana Lebanon on the 11<sup>th</sup> of 1937 Gandhi used these words: " I have no message to give except this that there is no deliverance for any people on this earth or for all the people of this earth except through truth

and nonviolence in every walk of life without any exceptions."<sup>8</sup> In this passage, Gandhi promises "deliverance" through nonviolence for oppressed peoples without exception.

Speaking primarily with regards to nonviolence as a liberatory philosophy in this passage, Gandhi emphasizes the power of nonviolence to emancipate spiritually and physically. It is a science and of its own can lead one to pure democracy.

## **Satyagraha**

Satyagraha (pronounced sat-YAH-graha) is a compound of two Sanskrit nouns *satya*, meaning truth (from 'sat'- 'being' with a suffix 'ya'), and *agraha*, meaning, "firm grasping" (a noun made from the *agra*, which has its root '*grah*'- 'seize', 'grasp', with the verbal prefix 'a' - 'to' 'towards'). Thus Satyagraha literally means devotion to truth, remaining firm on the truth and resisting untruth actively but nonviolently. Since the only way for Gandhi getting to the truth is by nonviolence (love), it follows that Satyagraha implies an unwavering search for the truth using nonviolence. Satyagraha according to Michael Nagler literally means 'clinging to truth,' and that was exactly how Gandhi understood it: "clinging to the truth that we are all one under the skin, that there is no such thing as a 'win/lose' confrontation because all our important interests are really the same, that consciously or not every single person wants unity and peace with every other"<sup>9</sup> Put succinctly, Satyagraha means 'truth force', 'soul force' or as Martin Luther Jr would call it 'love in action.' Satyagraha has often been defined as the philosophy of nonviolent resistance most famously employed by Mahatma Gandhi, in forcing an end to the British domination. Gene Sharp did not hesitate to define Satyagraha simply as "Gandhian Nonviolence."

Today as Nagler would say, when we use the word Satyagraha we sometimes mean that general principle, the fact that love is stronger than hate (and we can learn to use it to overcome hate), and sometimes we mean more specifically active resistance by a repressed group; sometimes, even more specifically, we apply the term to a given movement like Salt Satyagraha etc. It is worthwhile looking at the way Gandhi uses Satyagraha.

## **Gandhi View of Satyagraha**

Satyagraha was not a preconceived plan for Gandhi. Event in his life culminating in his "Bramacharya vow", prepared him for it. He therefore underlined:

Events were so shaping themselves in Johannesburg as to make this self-purification on my part a preliminary as it were to Satyagraha. I can now see that all the principal events of my life, culminating in the vow of Bramacharya were secretly preparing me for it.

Satyagraha is a moral weapon and the stress is on soul force over physical force. It aims at winning the enemy through love and patient suffering. It aims at winning over an unjust law, not at crushing, punishing, or taking revenge against the authority, but to convert and heal it. Though it started as a struggle for political rights, Satyagraha became in the long run a struggle for individual salvation, which could be achieved through love and self-sacrifice. Satyagraha is meant to overcome all methods of violence. Gandhi explained in a letter to Lord Hunter that Satyagraha is a movement based entirely upon truth. It replaces every form of violence, direct and indirect, veiled and unveiled and whether in thought, word or deed.

Satyagraha is for the strong in spirit. A doubter or a timid person cannot do it. Satyagraha teaches the art of living well as well as dying. It is love and unshakeable firmness that comes from it. Its

training is meant for all, irrespective of age and sex. The most important training is mental not physical. It has some basic precepts treated below.

## **The Basic Precepts of Satyagraha**

There are three basic precepts essential to Satyagraha: Truth, Nonviolence and self-suffering. These are called the pillars of Satyagraha. Failure to grasp them is a handicap to the understanding of Gandhi's non-violence. These three fundamentals correspond to Sanskrit terms:

- *Sat/Satya* - Truth implying openness, honesty and fairness
- *Ahimsa/Nonviolence* - refusal to inflict injury upon others.
- *Tapasya* - willingness to self-sacrifice.

These fundamental concepts are elaborated below.

### **1. Satya/Truth:**

Satyagraha as stated before literally means truth force. Truth is relative. Man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth. Satyagraha implies working steadily towards a discovery of the absolute truth and converting the opponent into a trend in the working process. What a person sees as truth may just as clearly be untrue for another. Gandhi made his life a numerous experiments with truth. Inholding to the truth, he claims to be making a ceaseless effort to find it. Gandhi's conception of truth is deeply rooted in Hinduism. The emphasis of Satya-truth is paramount in the writings of the Indian philosophers. "*Satyannasti Parodharmati (Satyan Nasti Paro Dharma Ti)* - there is no religion or duty greater than truth", holds a prominent place in Hinduism. Reaching pure and absolute truth is attaining moksha. Gandhi holds that truth is God, and maintains that it is an integral part of Satyagraha. He explains it thus:

The world rests upon the bedrock of satya or truth; asatya meaning untruth also means "nonexistent" and satya or truth, means that which is of untruth does not so much exist. Its victory is out of the question. And truth being "that which is" can never be destroyed. This is the doctrine of Satyagraha in a nutshell.<sup>13</sup>

### **2. Ahimsa:**

In Gandhi's Satyagraha, truth is inseparable from Ahimsa. Ahimsa expresses as ancient Hindu, Jain and Buddhist ethical precept. The negative prefix 'a' plus himsa meaning injury make up the world normally translated 'nonviolence'. The term Ahimsa appears in Hindu teachings as early as the Chandoya Upanishad. The Jain Religion constitutes Ahimsa as the first vow. It is a cardinal virtue in Buddhism. Despite its being rooted in these Religions, the special contribution of Gandhi was:

To make the concept of Ahimsa meaningful in the social and political spheres by moulding tools for nonviolent action to use as a positive force in the search for social and political truths. Gandhi formed Ahimsa into the active social technique, which was to challenge political authorities and religious orthodoxy.<sup>14</sup>

It is worth noting that this 'active social technique which was to challenge political authorities', used by Gandhi is none other than Satyagraha. Truly enough, the Indian milieu was already infused with notions of Ahimsa. Nevertheless, Gandhi acknowledged that it was an essential part of his experiments with the truth whose technique of action he called Satyagraha.

At the root of Satya and Ahimsa is love. While making discourses on the Bhagavad-Gita, an author says:

Truth, peace, righteousness and nonviolence, *Satya, Shanti,*

*Dharma* and *Ahimsa*, do not exist separately. They are all essentially dependent on love. When love enters the thoughts it becomes truth. When it manifests itself in the form of action it becomes truth. When Love manifests itself in the form of action it becomes *Dharma* or righteousness. When your feelings become saturated with love you become peace itself. The very meaning of the word peace is love. When you fill your understanding with love it is *Ahimsa*. Practicing love is *Dharma*, thinking of love is *Satya*, feeling love is *Shanti*, and understanding love is *Ahimsa*. For all these values it is love which flows as the undercurrent.<sup>15</sup>

### **3. Tapasya (Self-Suffering):**

It remains a truism that the classical yogic laws of self-restraint and self-discipline are familiar elements in Indian culture. Self-suffering in Satyagraha is a test of love. It is detected first of all towards the much persuasion of one whom is undertaken. Gandhi distinguished self-suffering from cowardice. Gandhi's choice of self-suffering does not mean that he valued life low. It is rather a sign of voluntary help and it is noble and morally enriching. He himself says; It is not because I value life so I can countenance with joy Thousands voluntarily losing their lives for Satyagraha, but because I know that it results in the long run in the least loss of life, and what is more, it ennoble those who lose their lives and morally enriches the world for their sacrifice.<sup>16</sup>

Satyagraha is at its best when preached and practiced by those who would use arms but decided instead to invite suffering upon them.

It is not easy for a western mind or nonoriental philosopher to understand this issue of self-suffering. In fact, in Satyagraha, the element of self-suffering is perhaps the least acceptable to a western mind. Yet such sacrifice may well provide the ultimate means of realizing that characteristic so eminent in Christian religion and western moral philosophy: The dignity of the individual.

The three elements: Satya, Ahimsa, Tapasya must move together for the success of any Satyagraha campaign. It follows that Ahimsa - which implies love, leads in turn to social service. Truth leads to an ethical humanism. Self-suffering not for its own sake, but for the demonstration of sincerity flowing from refusal to injure the opponent while at the same time holding to the truth, implies sacrifice and preparation for sacrifice even to death.

### **Satyagraha in Action**

For Satyagraha to be valid, it has to be tested. When the principles are applied to specific political and social action, the tools of civil disobedience, noncooperation, nonviolent strike, and constructive action are cherished. South Africa and India were 'laboratories' where Gandhi tested his new technique. Satyagraha was a necessary weapon for Gandhi to work in South Africa and India. Louis Fischer attests that: "Gandhi could never have achieved what he did in South Africa and India but for a weapon peculiarly his own. It was unprecedented indeed; it was so unique he could not find a name for it until he finally hit upon Satyagraha."<sup>17</sup>

South Africa is the acclaimed birthplace of Satyagraha. Here Satyagraha was employed to fight for

the civil rights of Indians in South Africa. In India, Gandhi applied Satyagraha in his socio-political milieu and carried out several acts of civil disobedience culminating in the Salt March.

Another wonderful way of seeing Satyagraha in action is through the fasting of Mahatma Gandhi. Fasting was part and parcel of his philosophy of truth and nonviolence. Mahatma Gandhi was an activist - a moral and spiritual activist. And fasting was "one of his strategies of activism, in many ways his most powerful."<sup>18</sup>

### **Qualities of a Satyagrahi (Nonviolence Activist)**

Gandhi was quite aware that there was need to train people who could carry on with his Satyagraha campaigns. He trained them in his "Satyagraha Ashrams".

Here are some of the basic qualities of expected of a Satyagrahi.

- A Satyagraha should have a living faith in God for he is his only Rock.
- One must believe in truth and nonviolence as one's creed and therefore have faith in the inherent goodness of human nature.
- One must live a chaste life and be ready and willing for the sake of one's cause to give up his life and his possessions.
- One must be free from the use any intoxicant, in order that his reason may be undivided and his mind constant.
- One must carry out with a willing heart all the rules of discipline as maybe laid down from time to time.
- One should carry out the jail rules unless they are especially dense to hurt his self-respect.
- A satyagrahi must accept to suffer in order to correct a situation.

In a nutshell, Satyagraha is itself a movement intended to fight social and promote ethical values. It is a whole philosophy of nonviolence. It is undertaken only after all the other peaceful means have proven ineffective. At its heart is nonviolence. An attempt is made to convert, persuade or win over the opponent. It involves applying the forces of both reason and conscience simultaneously, while holding aloft the indisputable truth of his/her position. The Satyagrahi also engages in acts of voluntary suffering. Any violence inflicted by the opponent is accepted without retaliation. The opponent can only become morally bankrupt if violence continues to be inflicted indefinitely.

Several methods can be applied in a Satyagraha campaign. Stephen Murphy gives primacy to "noncooperation and fasting". Bertrand Russell has this to say about Gandhi's method:

The essence of this method which he (Gandhi) gradually brought to greater and greater perfection consisted in refusal to do things, which the authorities wished to have done, while abstaining from any positive action of an aggressive sort...The method always had in Gandhi's mind a religious aspect... As a rule, this method depended upon moral force for its success. <sup>19</sup>

Murphy and Russell do not accept Gandhi's doctrine totally. Michael Nagler insists that they ignore Constructive Programme, which Gandhi considered paramount. A better understanding of Gandhi's nonviolence will be seen in the next chapter.

## **Swaraj**

*Mahatma Gandhi introduced the concept of 'Swaraj' during the British regime. His ideology of 'Swaraj' was to empower people and give them the real meaning of self-rule. 'Swaraj' is a bigger term. In political terms it talks about the implementation of democracy in its true form right from the grass-root level where at every level there is a public representative, moreover, it is also about the overall development of the nation where every section of the society irrespective of religion, caste, race, sex or economic condition are treated equally* Gandhi's idea of 'Swaraj', in the colonial period was prominently to empower and liberate people and teach them to rule themselves and establish self-control, self-respect and capacities for self-realisation. By teaching people about liberation, Gandhi intended to reject and wholly uproot the British rule in India. But, through the course of time, post-independence, the meaning of 'Swaraj' modified to implement better governance in a democratic political structure and promote equality and overall development.

To implement this ideology for making India a true democracy at the grass-root level, the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments were passed. As a result, from gram panchayat to the union government there is always a public representative at every level of governance. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments passed by the Parliament in 1992 laid the foundation of local government system in India. The Indian political structure saw a major change after the amendments came into existence. The amendments not only described the local governing bodies as basic units of democracy but also put forth a provision that all seats must be filled by direct voting and one-third of total number of seats be reserved for women and one-third for SCs and STs, hence, providing equal opportunities to every section of society and promoting equality factor of Gandhian ideology as well.

## **Gandhi on 'Swadeshi and Gram Swaraj'**

One of the Mahatma's major concerns was to make villages self-sustaining and self-contained units. To fulfil this, Gandhi put forth the ideology of 'Swadeshi and Gram Swaraj'. One of the similar movements we have seen recently taken up the Patanjali Ayurveda – a company creating, promoting and selling indigenously manufactured products – Gandhi in his time promoted the idea saying, "It is your duty and mine to find out neighbors who can supply our wants and teach them to supply them where they do not know how to proceed, assuming that there are neighbors who are in want of healthy occupation. Then every village of India will almost be self-supporting and self-contained unit, exchanging only such necessary commodities with other villages as are not locally produced."

## **'Swaraj' at present**

Gandhi's definition of Swaraj also focused on regenerating reference points, systems, and structures that enable individuals and collective self-development. Researchers studying Gandhi's ideology and promoting his views define 'Swaraj' as not merely a political structure but an ideology which promotes overall development of a nation. Citizens make the nation and therefore development of each and every individual leads to the development of the nation. Looking at the economically weaker sections of the society today, it can be seen that there are loopholes in the system which restricts the development of poor people on various aspects like skill development, education, hygiene, healthcare, or other aspects.

The Gandhian philosophy has always been the guiding light for the governments to implement the democracy in India and world-wide in an effective manner.

Although there are certain loopholes in implementation, the Gandhian ideology, in recent years, has been given prominence and made the very basis of many government schemes and policies launched like Swachh Bharat Mission, Swachhta se Swachhagraha and more. India is taking baby steps towards creating a nation where people can enjoy Swaraj in its true essence.

## **GANDHI'S CRITIQUE OF MODERN CIVILISATION**

All of you, who have seen Gandhi, in pictures obviously, agree that in his dress and appearance he belonged to the Indian ascetic tradition. As a mass leader and iron hearted campaigner against the British imperialism, he consciously chose such an image. His philosophy too contained symbols and words which were, in look and meaning, essentially Eastern in general and Hindu in particular. He used these words and symbols as weapons not only against the British colonisers, but also against the modern civilisation they represented, and in a sense, against modernity itself.

Khadi, about which we will discuss more in the course of this chapter has been one such symbol and Ram Rajya, Sanatan Dharma, Satyagraha, Swaraj are some more in the long list. In a sense most of the words and symbols Gandhi invented and used in his long political and philosophical struggle against the British and the Western materialism were symbols of Indian tradition on the one hand and a critique of modern Western civilisation on the other. These words and symbols have more than one meaning. They also present multiple messages and the most important among them was a critique of modernity. These essentially Indian words and symbols were used by Gandhi as critiques of and counter to the three important concepts of nationalism, industrialism and western education, which form the very core of modernity in India. All these suggest that Gandhi declined to accept "modern civilisation" which he designates and describes as "Western civilisation" and most of the values it stood for. He actively countered them with words, symbols, concepts, traditions, values and in all, the very philosophy which is essentially Indian.

### **Aims and Objectives After studying this Unit, you will be able to understand:**

- Gandhi's ideas and perspectives on modern western and Indian civilisations.
- His perception of modern civilisation as a bane for India.
- His use of Indian symbols like Khadi to counter modern civilisation.
- His ideas of education that best suited India

## **GANDHI'S IDEA OF CIVILISATION**

Gandhi explains in detail his ideas and concepts of civilisation, positive and negative features of Western civilisation i.e., modern civilisation, and comparison and contrast between Indian and Western civilisations in many speeches and writings especially in Hind Swaraj which he wrote in Gujarati in 1909 on his return voyage from London to South Africa. It was serialised in two installments in the same year in the Gujarati edition of Indian Opinion, the weekly published by Gandhi in South Africa. It was issued as a booklet in Gujarati in 1910 and was banned by the British authorities on the charges of seditious content. Undaunted by this move of the imperial authorities, Gandhi later developed the ideas he expressed in Hind Swaraj further and enriched them by new contributions throughout his life.

When we try to assess Gandhi's view on the then existing civilisation, we must take a note of these in the context of the impact of his work on his total philosophy. His views emanated mainly from his reaction to events and his attempt to give a lead to many social reforms and political

movements. However, the existence of a uniformity underlying his thoughts will make our task of connecting, understanding and analysing them relatively easy. This uniformity in Gandhian thoughts arose from a moral approach and a desire to lead active and creative life not for the sake of himself but for the sake of his countrymen. Gandhi regarded violence un-Indian, something alien to Indian civilisation and he makes his opinions amply clear in Hind Swaraj.

In a sense, the aim of Hind Swaraj was to confront the anarchist and violence-prone Indian nationalism with an alternative to violence derived from Gandhi's earliest experiments with Satyagraha. Gandhi mentioned that Hind Swaraj was written in order to show that his countrymen were following a suicidal policy of violence, and that if they but revert to their own glorious civilisation, either the English would adopt the latter and become Indianised or find their occupation in India gone. Furthermore, in Hind Swaraj Gandhi depicted "the dichotomy between the spiritual, moral superiority of Indian society, and the violent, politically corrupt nature of European states" even more dramatically than any of his predecessors.

While condemning the 'brute force' of Western power, Gandhi distances himself from the militant nationalists for their support to violence which he considered a suicidal strategy as it would provoke 'an organised violence' by the ruling authority. Hind Swaraj was a detailed commentary on Western civilisation that thrived on material power. According to Gandhi, modern Western civilisation is characterised by the many negative features like greed, aggression, colonialism, imperialism, war technology, inequity, exploitation, poverty, extravagance and luxury, bodily comforts, unbridled individualism and vulgar materialism, immorality, valueless and commercial education, alienation and so on.

These are thoroughly criticised by Gandhi. Before explaining these features in detail and their impact on social, economic, political and moral aspects of modern human life, and Gandhi's overall critique of Western civilisation scattered throughout his extensive works, it is better to know what Gandhi meant by civilisation -both Western and Indian- by quoting himself elaborately. According to Gandhi, "Civilisation is that mode of conduct which points out to man the path of duty. Performance of duty and observance of morality are convertible terms.

To observe morality is to attain mastery over our mind and our passions. So doing, we know ourselves".

In the chapter titled "Civilisation" in Hind Swaraj, he provides an elaborate explanation about his ideas on modern (western) civilisation: First consider what state of things is described by the word "civilisation". Its true test lies in the fact that people living in it make bodily welfare the object of life... The people of Europe today live in better-build houses than they did a hundred years ago. This is considered an emblem of civilisation, and this is also a matter to promote bodily happiness. Formerly, they wore skins, and used spears as their weapons. Now, they wear long trousers, and, for embellishing their bodies, they wear a variety of clothing, and, instead of spears, they carry with them revolvers containing five or more chambers. If people of a certain country, who have hitherto not been in the habit of wearing much clothing, boots, etc., adopt European clothing, they are supposed to have become civilized out of savagery.

Formerly, in Europe, people ploughed their lands mainly by manual labour.

Now, one man can plough a vast tract by means of steam engines and can thus amass great

wealth. This is called a sign of civilisation. Formerly, only a few men wrote valuable books. Now, anybody writes and prints anything he likes and poisons people's minds. Formerly, men traveled in wagons. Now, they fly through the air, in trains at the rate of four hundred and more miles per day. This is considered the height of civilisation. It has been stated that, as men progress, they shall be able to travel in airship and reach any part, of the world in a few hours. Men will not need the use of their hands and feet. They will press a button, and they will have their clothing by their side. They will press another button, and they will have their newspaper.

A third, and a motor-car will be in waiting for them. They will have a variety of delicately dished up food. Everything will be done by machinery. Formerly, when people wanted to fight with one another, they measured between them their bodily strength; now it is possible to take away thousands of lives by one man working behind a gun from a hill. This is civilisation. Formerly, men worked in the open air only as much as they liked. Now thousands of workmen meet together and for the sake of maintenance work in factories or mines. Their condition is worse than that of beasts. They are obliged to work, at the risk of their lives, at most dangerous occupations, for the sake of millionaires. Formerly, men were made slaves under physical compulsion. Now they are enslaved by temptation of money and of the luxuries that money can buy. There are now diseases of which people never dreamt before, and an army of doctors is engaged in finding out their cures, and so hospitals have increased. This is a test of civilisation. Formerly, special messengers were required and much expense was incurred in order to send letters; today, anyone can abuse his fellow by means of a letter for one penny. True, at the same cost, one can send one's thanks also. Formerly, people had two or three meals consisting of home-made bread and vegetables; now, they require something to eat every two hours so that they have hardly leisure for anything else. This civilisation takes note neither of morality nor of religion... Civilisation seeks to increase bodily comforts, and it fails miserably even in doing so... This civilisation is irreligion, and it has taken such a hold on the people in Europe that those who are in it appear to be half mad.

This civilisation is such that one has only to be patient and it will be self-destroyed. According to the teaching of Mohammed this would be considered a Satanic Civilisation. Hinduism calls it a Black Age.

Gandhi reasoned why western writers were not critical of the civilisations they lived in: We rarely find people arguing against themselves. Those who are intoxicated by modern civilisation are not likely to write against it. Their care will be to find out facts and arguments in support of it, and this they do unconsciously, believing it to be true. A man whilst he is dreaming, believes in his dream. He is undeceived only when he is awakened from his sleep. A man laboring under the bane of civilisation is like a dreaming man. What we usually read are the works of defenders of modern civilisation, which undoubtedly claims among its votaries very brilliant and even some very good men. Their writings hypnotize us. And so, one by one, we are drawn into the vortex.

Get an idea of his opinion on Indian civilisation. In this regard, he wrote: I believe that the civilisation India has evolved is not to be beaten in the world. Nothing can equal the seeds sown by our ancestors. Rome went, Greece shared the same fate; the might of the Pharaohs was broken; Japan has become Westernized; of China nothing can be said; but India is still, somehow or other, sound at the foundation. The people of Europe learn their lessons from the writings of the men of Greece or Rome, which exist no longer in their former glory... In the midst of all this India remains immovable and that is her glory. It is a charge against India that her people are so uncivilized, ignorant and stolid that it is not possible to induce them to adopt any changes. It is a charge really

against our merit. What we have tested and found true on the anvil of experience, we dare not change. Many thrust their advice upon India, and she remains steady. This is her beauty: it is the sheet-anchor of our hope.

We have retained the same kind of cottages that we had in former times and our indigenous education remains the same as before. We have had no system of life-corroding competition. Each followed his own occupation or trade and charged a regulation wage. It was not that we did not know how to invent machinery, but our forefathers knew that, if we set our hearts after such things, we would become slaves and lose our moral fiber. They therefore, after due deliberation decided that we should only do what we could with our hands and feet. They saw that our real happiness and health consisted in a proper use of our hands and feet... They saw that kings and their swords were inferior to the sword of ethics, and they, therefore, held the sovereigns of the earth to be inferior to the Rishis and the Fakirs. A nation with a constitution like this is fitter to teach others than to learn from others.

While admiring the Indian civilisation, Gandhi was not unaware of the fact that India of his days was not exactly like he described it. He was quite aware of the darker side—child marriage, child widows, teenaged mothers and housewives, women practising polyandry, existence of the practice of Niyoga, where, girls dedicate themselves to prostitution in the name of religion, goats and sheep killed in the name of religion. He candidly regarded those defects as defects. He declared that nobody mistook evils of Indian civilisation for ancient civilisation. He recognised the attempts that have always been made in the past to remove those evils and believed that such attempts would be made to remove them in future too. He said: We may utilize the new spirit that is born in us for purging ourselves of these evils. But what I have described to you as emblems of modern civilisation are accepted as such by its votaries. The Indian civilisation, as described by me, has been so described by its votaries. In no part of the world, and under no civilisation, have all men attained perfection. The tendency of the Indian civilisation is to elevate the moral being, that of the Western civilisation is to propagate immorality. The latter is godless, the former is based on a belief in God. So understanding and so believing, it behoves every lover of India to cling to the Indian civilisation even as a child clings to the mother's breast.

Gandhi declared that "India is unique. Its strength is immeasurable." He also draws our attention to the historical fact that when other civilisations succumbed, the Indian civilisation has survived many a shock.

### **Ambedkar: Annihilation of caste**

B.R. Ambedkar's passion for the abolition of untouchability and the eradication of caste is as relevant today as it was 75 years ago.

THE Jat Pat Todak Mandal, a social reformist organisation of Lahore, had, in 1936, invited Dr B.R. Ambedkar to deliver the presidential address of its annual conference on the topic of the caste system in India. Ambedkar sent the manuscript of his speech titled *The Annihilation of Caste*. However, the organising committee found some of his views, particularly his critique of the Vedas and his inclination to leave the Hindu fold, unacceptable.

It, therefore, suggested to Ambedkar that he delete these views, to which he replied that he would not change a comma. The speech thus remained undelivered. Ambedkar subsequently published it in May 1936.

Among the numerous writings and speeches of Ambedkar that run into thousands of pages, *The Annihilation of Caste* is indeed his magnum opus. Judged by any criterion such as content, logic, argument, language, diction, exposition, urge and, above all, the force, it is a manifesto of social emancipation, and occupies a place similar to what *The Communist Manifesto* once did in the world communist movement.

Since the book is polemical in nature, Ambedkar did not elaborate much on the agonies, indignities, humiliation and overall sufferings of the Sudras, and particularly the untouchables. He only gave illustrations of how they were deprived of education and freedom of occupation and were subjected to stigmatised manual labour, all resulting in their virtual economic slavery, how they were segregated and deprived of basic rights such as drinking water even from public wells, and above all how they were made victims of social persecutions.

But, according to Ambedkar, worse and unparalleled, the Hindu Dharmashastras gave legitimacy to the doctrine of Chaturvanya and the caste system. The infamous Manusmriti dehumanised the Sudras and untouchables, ruled the Hindu psyche for centuries and created the greatest obstacle to any serious attempt at eradicating the caste system. This made Ambedkar publically burn the Manusmriti on the occasion of his historical Mahad Satyagraha in 1927 for establishing the right of untouchables to drink the water of the Chawdar tank in Mahad town in Maharashtra.

In *The Annihilation of Caste*, Ambedkar, probably for the first time, raised many profound questions with respect to caste. First, he rejected the defence of caste on the basis of division of labour and argued that it was not merely a division of labour but a division of labourers. The former was voluntary and depended upon one's choice and aptitude and, therefore, rewarded efficiency. The latter was involuntary, forced, killed initiative and resulted in job aversion and inefficiency. He argued that caste could not be defended on the basis of purity of blood, though pollution is a hallmark of the caste system.

He quoted from D.R. Bhandarkar's paper *Foreign Elements in the Hindu Population* that there is hardly any class or caste in India which has not a foreign strain in it, (and that) there is an admixture of alien blood not only among the warrior classes the Rajputs and the Marathas but also among the Brahmins who are under the happy delusion that they are free from all foreign elements.

Ambedkar thus argued that caste had no scientific basis. He painfully maintained that Hindu society was a collection of castes, fixed in watertight compartments with graded hierarchy that made an associated corporate life virtually impossible.

But most importantly, according to Ambedkar, caste destroyed the concept of ethics and morality. To quote him: The effect of caste on the ethics of the Hindus is simply deplorable. Caste has killed public spirit. Caste has destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has made public opinion impossible. A Hindu's public is his caste. His responsibility is to his caste. His loyalty is restricted only to his caste.

Virtue has become caste-ridden, and morality has become caste-bound.

Ambedkar ultimately suggested that inter-caste marriage is the only remedy to destroy caste. In *The Annihilation of Caste*, Ambedkar's critique of the Hindu social order was so strong that

Mahatma Gandhi, in Harijan, described Ambedkar as a challenge to Hinduism. Ambedkar replied to Gandhi in his usual uncompromising manner.

Ambedkar did not spare the socialists or the communists either. He vehemently attacked the communists for their doctrinaire approach to caste in treating it as the superstructure and argued that unless they dealt with caste as a basic structural problem, no worthwhile social change, let alone a socialist revolution, was possible.

From the beginning Ambedkar was convinced that political empowerment was key to the socio-economic development of the untouchables. Therefore, he vehemently demanded a separate electorate for untouchables in the Second Round Table Conference in 1932.

When the British conceded his demand, Gandhi started his historic fast unto death in the Yerawada jail. Pressure from all corners mounted on Ambedkar to forgo the demand for a separate electorate as the Mahatma's life was at stake. Reluctantly Ambedkar agreed to the formula of a Joint Electorate with reserved seats in legislatures for untouchables.

What is the situation today with respect to Ambedkar's mission of annihilation of caste and, in view of that, the relevance of his manifesto of social emancipation?

First, the state's reservation policy for the Scheduled Castes (S.Cs) and Scheduled Tribes (S.Ts) has made a positive impact on their socio-economic condition.

Though the gap between them and the rest of society persists, and they lag behind the others with respect to many indicators of development, the overall situation has improved. A small strata in all areas of national importance education, professions, governance, politics, art, literature and so on has emerged in these communities. This upward occupational mobility has been accompanied by some social prestige, which was unthinkable earlier. The spread of literacy and higher and professional education, the pace of urbanisation, the development of means of communication and transport, and so on have been instrumental in loosening somewhat the rigidity and hangover of the caste system, particularly in the urban areas.

Second, and contrary to this positive development, caste has come to be used blatantly and indiscriminately for political ends. This has sharpened caste and sub-caste identities and resulted in caste alliances of different types in different regions for the sole purpose of wielding political power.

Thus, while the dominant castes, either in numerical strength or in terms of economic clout, struggle to retain their monopoly over power, the marginal castes, operating on the periphery of the power structure, have aroused their caste consciousness for political mobilisation.

### **POTENT INSTRUMENT**

Third, since caste is considered a potent instrument for socio-economic and political empowerment, caste and sub-caste organisations have proliferated. There is growing demand by some castes, keeping their caste arrogance intact, to get included in the Other Backward Classes (OBC) category, and by some OBCs to be considered as S.Ts (for instance, Jats in Haryana and Rajasthan). This is indeed a trend in reverse. Fourth, the entire trade union movement ignored issues relating to caste owing to total apathy and lack of concern or because of the fear of a rift in

the rank and file over the contentious issue of reservation. As a result, there is a growing tendency on the part of the S.Cs and S.Ts in several organisations to form their own associations to fight for their demands.

Fifth, Ambedkar suggested inter-caste marriage as the remedy to destroy caste. Today, marriages are preferred not only within castes, but also within sub-castes. In Haryana and Rajasthan, for instance, the khap (caste council) gives orders to kill young lovers for marrying outside their caste. Such inhuman killings are glorified as honour killings.

Lastly, atrocities on the S.Cs and S.Ts continue unabated in different parts of the country. They are on two counts: first, owing to the practice of untouchability, resulting in the violation of human and civil rights of these groups, particularly in the rural areas; second, for economic and political reasons. Thus, according to the National Crime Records Bureau of the Union Home Ministry, between 2001 and 2005, the total number of crimes against the S.Cs alone were 1,56,274, of which 3,406 were of murder and 6,163 were of rape.

Various legislative measures such as the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, and the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, have proved to be virtually worthless because of the lack of political will to implement them.

Ambedkar thought the abolition of untouchability and the eradication of caste would make India an emotionally strong and unified country. His thought and passion are as relevant today as they were 75 years ago.

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## **Philosophy of Hinduism**

Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891-1956), or Babasaheb Ambedkar, was a scholar, social reformer, powerful advocate of the rights of Dalits and women, chairman of the Constituent Assembly of India, and the country's first law minister.

In 1976, the Government of Maharashtra set up the Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Source Material Publication Committee to compile Dr. Ambedkar's complete works. The Committee consisted of the state's then education minister and noted scholars and writers. In 1978, when Vasant Moon (Dalit activist, author and Officer on Special Duty) joined the Committee it decided to procure and publish Dr. Ambedkar's unpublished writings too.

The state's Education Department started to publish a 22-volume series titled *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches* in 1979, and it brought out this third volume (consisting of five parts) in 1987. The series was re-printed by the Dr. Ambedkar Foundation, an autonomous body under the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, in January 2014.

This volume is significant as it contains of Dr. Ambedkar's unpublished books and essays (parts I-IV). Part V contains the outlines of books that Dr. Ambedkar had planned; the chapters he was able to finish have been included in this volume.

## **Part I: Philosophy of Hinduism**

In this essay, Dr. Ambedkar investigates the 'Hindu scheme of divine governance', which, he says, is enshrined in the *Manu Smriti*. He examines the place of religion in 'savage' and 'civilised' societies; the latter, he says, can be further divided into antique and modern societies. According to Dr. Ambedkar, the concept of right or wrong in antique societies was based on 'social utility', while in modern societies, it was based on 'individual justice', that is, equality, liberty and fraternity.

Dr. Ambedkar says that central to the social organisation of Hinduism is a system "in which different castes are placed in a vertical series one above the other." Inequality, for him, is the soul of Hinduism, and the religion supports and sustains the rights of a class of 'supermen' – the Brahmins. The caste system, he adds, divides labourers, dissociates work from interest, disconnects intelligence from manual labour, prevents a person from cultivating interests, and prevents societal mobilisation. Thus, in Dr. Ambedkar's view, Hinduism fails the test of social utility and individual justice.

## **Part II: India and the Pre-Requisites of Communism**

In Dr. Ambedkar's papers, the Committee found three chapters from the unfinished book *India and Communism*, which are included in this part of the volume.

The first chapter – 'Hindu Social Order—Its Essential Principles' – discusses whether the Hindu social order is free. According to Dr. Ambedkar, a free social order is based on equality, liberty and fraternity, while Hindu society, because of the caste system, is inherently unequal and cannot accommodate these ideals. Among its tenets are 'graded inequality' (castes existing in an order of precedence), the fixity of occupations and the fixation of people within their class. He concludes that the Hindu social order is based on classes, not individuals.

The second chapter lists the Hindu social order's unique features. Among them is the worship of a class of 'supermen' (the Brahmins), the denial of the right to rebel due to restrictions on the 'oppressed castes', and that the order is divinely ordained and inviolate.

The incomplete third chapter discusses various historical descriptions of caste provided by foreign travellers like Megasthenes (350–290 BC) and Alberuni (973-1050 AD). Dr. Ambedkar says that while caste has changed over time, it is still highly organised with rigid groups that have involuntary membership, and individuals are completely subordinated to their castes.

## **Part III: Revolution and Counter-Revolution**

This part has 13 incomplete chapters from Dr. Ambedkar's proposed treatise titled *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Ancient India*, which, too, was unfinished. Dr. Ambedkar considers the rise of Buddhism as a revolution, and the 'counter revolution', pioneered by the Brahmins, as the cause for its decline.

In a chapter titled 'The Triumph of Brahmanism: Regicide or the birth of Counter-Revolution', Dr. Ambedkar says that Buddhism brought about a change in the status of Shudras and women – they had social mobility and freedom – as compared as to the Vedic Regime under which they had 'a very low position'. In Brahmanism's subsequent triumph over Buddhism, the former brought about 'a complete demolition' of the high status that the latter had accorded to Shudras and women. Dr. Ambedkar contends that graded inequality, whereby castes benefit differentially due to inequity, is the reason there has been no revolution against Brahmanism.

In 'The Woman and the Counter-Revolution', Dr. Ambedkar discusses the rights of women in the Manu and pre-Manu eras. For Manu, women should not have the right to property, divorce or education. In fact, Manu's scheme of enforced widowhood or Sati and early marriage for girls was a way to establish endogamy within caste groups.

### **Ambedkar, Buddhism and Neo Buddhism**

Ambedkar is the symbol of Dalit's freedom from the jaws of upper cast oriented system of India. He was the man who raised his voice against the discriminations being practiced with the so called lower cast and untouchable people in India and finally became successful, at large extent, in making them get rid of this system.

He was born in the 1891 in a family of Mahāra caste which was considered as untouchable during that time. Born as a part of Hindu society, he felt that there was no right or freedom to study, live with the common society, to participate in the social function to the lower caste people and especially untouchables were being treated very cruelly by the upper caste people. He, having got the higher education somehow, tried to improve the condition of suppressed class within the Hindu society and in this context; he had the conflict with the Hindu freedomfighter leaders like Gandhi Ji also on several occasions. But the status of Dalits could not be upgraded barring a few incidental successes.

Finally, he decided to renounce the Hindu religion in 1935 saying: *"Although I am born as a Hindu because I had no control over it. But I will not die as a Hindu because I do have control over it"*. He had been studying about other religions for a long time and, now after, he began to do so with more commitments so that he could choose the appropriate religion for himself and his followers. He became greatly impressed by studying Tipitaka (Popularly known as Tripitaka), the collection of Buddha's words and he decided to convert towards Buddhism. In a lecture "Why I like Buddhism" he says: *"I prefer Buddhism because it gives three principles in combination which no other religion does. All other religions are bothering themselves with 'God' and 'soul' and 'life after death'. Buddhism teaches 'Prajñā' (understanding as against superstition and supernaturalism). It teaches 'Karuṇā' (love). It teaches 'Samatā' (equality). This is what man wants for a good and happy life on earth. These three principles of Buddhism make their appeal to me. These three principles should, also make an appeal to the world. Neither God nor soul can save society"*.

He, with the half of the million followers of him, took refuge under Buddhism on October 14th, 1956 and revived Buddhism in modern India, which was extant from India since 12th Century AD. The kind of Buddhism he adopted and propagated is known as Neo Buddhism in the history. Neo Buddhism does not give any importance to the spiritual part of original Buddhism. It does not accept that Buddha gave any sermon related to other world or to transcendental realization. It applies all the doctrines of the Buddha in the social context.

### **D.D. Upadhyaya: Integral Humanism**

**Integral humanism** is a doctrine developed by Deendayal Upadhyaya and adopted by the Jana Sangh in 1965 as its official doctrine. It is also the official philosophy of the Bharatiya Janata Party. It aims to appeal to broad sections of Indian society by presenting an indigenous economic model that puts the human being at center stage.

According to Upadhyaya, the primary concern in India must be to develop an indigenous economic

model that puts the human being at center stage.

## Features

- It is **opposed to both western capitalist individualism and Marxist socialism**, though welcoming to western science.
- It seeks a middle ground between capitalism and socialism, evaluating both systems on their respective merits, while being critical of their excesses and alienness.

## Four objectives of humankind

Humankind, according to Upadhyaya, had four hierarchically organized attributes of body, mind, intellect and soul which corresponded to four universal objectives,

- kama (desire or satisfaction),
- artha (wealth),
- dharma (moral duties),
- moksha (total liberation or 'salvation').

While none could be ignored, **dharma is the 'basic', and moksha the 'ultimate' objective** of humankind and society.

## Why did he reject other ideologies ?

He claimed that the problem with both capitalist and socialist ideologies is that they only consider the needs of body and mind, and were hence based on the materialist objectives of desire and wealth.

## Rejection of individualism

(First what is individualism .....Individualism is a social theory favouring freedom of action for individuals over collective or state control.)

- Upadhyaya rejected social systems in which individualism 'reigned supreme'.
- He also rejected communism in which individualism was 'crushed' as part of a 'large heartless machine'.
- *Society, according to Upadhyaya, rather than arising from a social contract between individuals, was fully born at its inception itself as a natural living organism with a definitive 'national soul' or 'ethos' and its needs of the social organism paralleled those of the individual.*

## Source of Integral Humanism Advaita Vedanta

- Upadhyaya claimed that Integral Humanism followed the tradition of advaita developed by Adi Sankara.
- Non-dualism represented the unifying principle of every object in the universe, and of which humankind was a part.
- This, claimed Upadhyaya, was the essence and contribution of Indian culture.

(In case u don't know what Non Dualism or Advaita is ? Advaita means nondual or "not two." This oneness is a fundamental quality of everything. Everything is a part of and made of one nondual

consciousness. Often the question arises, “If it is all one thing, why don’t I experience it that way?” This is confusing oneness for the appearance of sameness. Things can appear different without being separate. Just look at your hand for a moment. Your fingers are all different from each other, but are they separate? They all arise from the same hand. Similarly, the objects, animals, plants and people in the world are all definitely different in their appearance and functioning. But they are all connected at their source—they come from the same source. This one Being that is behind all life has an infinite number of different expressions that we experience as different objects. )

## **Integral Humanism and Gandhian Philosophy**

Integral humanism is almost an exact paraphrase of Gandhi’s vision of a future India.

- Both seek a distinctive path for India,
- both reject the materialism of socialism and capitalism alike,
- both reject the individualism of modern society in favor of a holistic, varna-dharma based community,
- both insist upon an infusion of religious and moral values in politics,
- both seek a culturally authentic mode of modernization that preserves Hindu values.

Integral humanism contains visions organized around two themes: **morality in politics and swadeshi**, and small-scale industrialization in economies, all Gandhian in their general thematic but distinctly Hindu nationalist. These notions revolve around the basic themes of harmony, primacy of cultural-national values, and discipline.

## **Narayana Guru**

**Shree Narayana Guru** (1856–1928), also known as Shree Narayana Guru Swami, was a Hindu saint & social reformer of India. The Guru was born into an Ezhava family, in an era when people from backward communities like the Ezhavas faced social injustice in the caste-ridden Kerala society. Gurudevan, as he was known among his followers, led Reform movement in Kerala, revolted against caste system and worked on propagating new values of freedom in spirituality and social equality which transformed the Kerala society.

Shree Narayana Guru is revered for his Vedic knowledge, poetic proficiency, openness to the views of others, non-violent philosophy, and unrelenting resolve to set aright social wrongs. Narayana Guru was instrumental in setting the spiritual foundations for social reform in Kerala and was one of the most successful social reformers to revolt against caste system in India. He demonstrated a path to social emancipation without invoking the dualism of the oppressed and the oppressor. The Guru stressed the need for spiritual growth and social upliftment of the downtrodden by the establishment of temples and educational institutions. In the process, he brushed aside the superstitions that clouded the fundamental Hindu religious convention of *Chaturvarna*.

## **Freedom in Spirituality**

*Not to be confused with Spiritualism.*

**Spirituality** can refer to an ultimate or immaterial reality; an inner path enabling a person to discover the essence of their being; or the “deepest values and meanings by which people live.” Spiritual practices, including meditation, prayer and contemplation, are intended to develop an individual's inner life; such practices often lead to an experience of connectedness with a larger reality, yielding

a more comprehensive self; with other individuals or the human community; with nature or the cosmos; or with the divine realm. Spirituality is often experienced as a source of inspiration or orientation in life. It can encompass belief in immaterial realities or experiences of the immanent or transcendent nature of the world.

Traditionally, religions have regarded spirituality as an integral aspect of religious experience. Many do still equate spirituality *with* religion, but declining membership of organized religions and the growth of secularism in the western world has given rise to a broader view of spirituality.

Secular spirituality carries connotations of an individual having a spiritual outlook which is more personalized, less structured, more open to new ideas/influences, and more pluralistic than that of the doctrinal faiths of organized religions. At one end of the spectrum, even some atheists are spiritual. While atheism tends to lean towards skepticism regarding supernatural claims and the existence of an actual "spirit", some atheists define "spiritual" as nurturing thoughts, emotions, words and actions that are in harmony with a belief that the entire universe is, in some way, connected; even if only by the mysterious flow of cause and effect at every scale.

In contrast, those of a more 'New-Age' disposition see spirituality as the active connection to some force/power/energy/spirit, facilitating a sense of a deep self. For some, spirituality includes introspection, and the development of an individual's inner life through practices such as meditation, prayer and contemplation. Some modern religions also see spirituality in everything: see pantheism and neo-Pantheism. In a similar vein, Religious Naturalism has a spiritual attitude towards the awe, majesty and mystery it sees in the natural world.

## **Spiritual path**

Spirituality, in a wide variety of cultural and religious concepts, is itself often seen as incorporating a spiritual path, along which one advances to achieve a given objective, such as a higher state of awareness, outreach wisdom or communion with God or with creation. Plato's Allegory of the Cave, which appears in book VII of *The Republic*, is a description of such a journey, as are the writings of Teresa of Avila. The spiritual journey is a path that has a dimension primarily subjective and individual. For a spiritual path may be considered a path of short duration, directed at a specific target, or a lifetime. Every event of life is part of this journey, but in particular one can introduce some significant moments or milestones, such as the practice of various spiritual disciplines (including meditation, prayer, fasting), the comparison with a person believed with deep spiritual experience (called a teacher, assistant or spiritual preceptor, guru or otherwise, depending on the cultural context), the personal approach to sacred texts, etc. If the spiritual path is the same in whole or in part, with an initiatory path, there may be real evidence to overcome. Such tests usually before a social significance, are a "test" for the individual of his reaching a certain level. Spirituality is also described as a process in two phases: the first on inner growth, and the second on the manifestation of this result daily in the world.

## **Religion**

Whilst the terms *spirituality* and *religion* can both refer to the search for the Absolute or God, an increasing number of people have come to see the two as separate entities, religion being just one way in which humans can experience spirituality. Cultural historian and yogi William Irwin Thompson states, "Religion is not identical with spirituality; rather religion is the form spirituality takes in civilization."

Those who speak of spirituality outside of religion often define themselves as SBNR or "spiritual but not religious" and generally believe in the existence of many different "spiritual paths" - emphasizing the importance of finding one's own individual path to spirituality. According to one poll, some 24±4% of the United States population identifies itself as spiritual but not religious. One might say then, that a key difference is that religion is a type of formal external search, while spirituality is defined as a search within oneself.

The experience of 'spirituality'; the human emotions of awe, wonder and reverence, are also the province of the secular/scientific, in response to their highest values, *vague* or when observing or studying nature, or the universe.

## **NARAYANA GURU'S CONCEPTION OF ONE CASTE, ONE RELIGION AND ONE GOD**

There is a call for globalisation in the present era. It aims at a kind of unity, harmony, co-operation and worldwide able communication. Economical globalisation has a currency. In this background, it aims at international market, international economy, international interaction. But stillly we are not matured enough for contemplating spiritual globalisation and world Government.

Sri Narayana Guru has thought of spiritual globalisation and a kind of world Government long ago, that is during 19th century itself. Rishis and Yogis are all time thinkers, since they are great visionaries. They can visualise past, present and future. When the upanishad says 'Vasudaiva Kutumbakam' which refers to one family system on the entire existence. This refers to spiritual globalisation; spirit or consciousness is one but forms are many.

Another upanishad says : 'Neha Nanasti Kinchana', that means^ there is no multiplicity what so ever. Such a unitary existence was being visualised by the Rishis. Narayana Guru, following such as Rishi-tradition. has therefore envisaged the concept of one caste, one religion and one God in the entire universe. It is because the entire universe is created by God and He is present everywhere.

Guru quotes an upanishadic statement "Tatsristva Tadevanu Pravishat" which means^ God has not only created the universe but also he himself entered into it. If God has himself enters it\* and pervades whole of existence, where is Brahmin and paraiah (untouchables)? Where is Brahmin and Sudra? Where is varna and avarna? All these differentiations are but the creation of fools says Narayana Guru. Hence he has advocated one caste, one religion and one God. This means the fundamental unity of blood of the human species, the uniformity of the truths of all the religions and the common goal of all human kind.

Narayana Guru says : there is no difference between one man to another man and man to woman at all. All differences are created by lunatics and fanatics. There is a basic unity among the human beings both physically as well as scientifically. In a plant there are roots, trunks, branches, leaves, flowers and fruits etc. Apparently there seems to be difference but the sap in it is flowing all through the entire tree. It is only sap which makes the tree united and one; so also among the human beings colour may be different, name, height, etc. may be different but the Pure Consciousness is same and common to all. Philosophically there is one caste of human beings and no more. Even scientifically our body is made up of five mahabhutas (Earth, Water, Air, Fire and Akasha). There is another system brain, heart, so on and so forth, they are all common factors which all human beings are sharing. The blood is same in all ; we cannot find kerosene in some bodies instead of blood. Hence, even scientifically there is unity among the human beings and

therefore humanity as such belongs to only one caste.

Narayana Guru has admitted in his institution/ ashrama all people irrespective of caste, creed and sect, since, he was great committed humanist. All the students used to live together dine together and study together. They never thought of anycaste or creed. Like Plato, commune theory formed a universal group and brought out new social revolution under the leadership of the great Guru Narayan.

Sri Narayana Guru was not a religious fanatic, but believed that every religion seeks human happiness. Established in different countries at different times religions appeared to be different, but the goal of them is the same. All religions attempt to uplift souls. For ^uru, the non-violence of Buddhism, Brotherhood of Islam, and Universal love of Christianity are equally important and inter-related. According to guru^ Hinduism is the unity of a number of religious sects like Vaidika, Puranic, Sakta, Saiva, Samkhya, Yoga, Vaisesika and Vedanta etc.

Sectarian differences are common to all religions, he points out that, in the course of time the wise used to select different doctrines from the teaching of their predecessors and combined them. Thus, a new religion comes into existence and named after the man who started it. Then, by this argument Narayana Guru says that all these religions are one because their goal is the same, that is the welfare of the world. Narayana Guru says:

Religions are in essence one; as blind men dispute about the elephant« the ignorant with Varying arguments stray Behold and stray not, be at peace'

In fact, religion is the art of living through right action; we have to live our daily life in harmony within ourselves and with others and to lead a life of peace and happiness. It means, a way of life that which supports the entire universe and it is the supreme means of providing eternal bliss of man.

Yajñavalkya smṛiti says: " Ahimsa Satyamasteyam Soucha mindriyanigraha Danam da^odaya ksanti \*7 Sarvesha dharma sadhanah"

Means : Non-violence, truth, non control of mind and sense charity, compas//\*\* etc are the basic principles of Dharma or religion. The Guru from his theological interpretation of one God and one religion, further asserted that there is one caste. It has been recorded that his dictum was : "Ask not, speak not, think not of caste. "Narayana Guru argued vehemently for the establishment of niversal brotherhood, Men . immersed in ignorance tt&t thinking that there are different religions and castes. Just as, there is only one jati or universal cowhood in all cows, similarly in all men there is only one jati or universal humanity. A man can bom any where and can produce human beings^ so they all belong to one species. As cowhood is one jati or rkg universal in all cows, humanity is the one jati or universal in all human beings. When this truth is rightly grasped, race and caste differences based on untruth^ are destroyed and will develop a universal friendliness and one^ness. Sri Narayana Guru says that differences among men are due to language, dress etc.;but not due to race and caste. Therefore, intermarriage and inter- dining may be voluntarily done among men. In his own words: "whatever may be the difference in man's creeds, dress, language etc. because all of them belong to the same kind of creation, there is no harm at all in their dining together or having marital relations with one another.

Hindu religions and the chief theologians or interpreters of them have employed static laws on the basis of myths and superstitions and made the individual enslaved to them. They deceive themselves, their fellow men and ordinary people by their myth-making and keep society in closed morality. Narayana Guru gave a revolutionary interpretation and a new orientation to the vedantic tradition and integrated its teaching with the social needs and requirements. Guru developed a theoretical understanding of the ancient wisdom and derived the practical implication of them and thereby advocated practical and religious ideas that unite all mankind. He says : Acts that one performs for one's own sake should also aim the good of othermen.

A casual incident in a train on the way to Madras throws light on his attitude. A young Indian in European dress was sitting in the compartment. He asked the Guru seriously,

"What is your name?'Narayana'

'Of what caste are you?' 'What do you think? Guess!'

'I cannot make out from your appearance'

'If you do not know by sight, how can you through hearing'

On hearing a report of this from Guru at Madras a young firebrand blurted out that the so called sacred thread of the twice born should be burnt. The Guru commented 'If there are half a dozen youth of such enthusiasm, the curse of caste can be exercised. No special proof is needed to believe that all human beings belong to the same jati'. A dog, on seeing another, recognizes it as one of its own kin. Every animal has this instinct except man. Only he has doubts. He is inferior to beasts.

The Guru was totally against the system of segregating people on the basis of their hereditary profession. In fact, he was against the very idea of making a profession hereditary. Should the son of a thief become a thief? Making a profession hereditary is fundamentally the denial of a man's freedom of choice. If a priest's son likes and wants to become a priest, let him become one. It does not need to be branded as hereditary and restricted to a framework of caste. The problem comes when he does not want to become a priest. If his right to choose a profession is taken away and he is compelled to do something which he does not like, he will degenerate into a slavish imitator. The goal of all religions is same. Religion has the role of creating in the human soul the trend to ascend. Once the trend is set, they themselves will seek and find the ultimate truth. Religions are only the guides to help one seek rightly. To those who have attained the supreme, religion is not at all authority, they themselves are authority to religion. Did Lord Buddha preach the path to Nirvana after studying Buddhism? He sought and found the way to salvation and then preached. It subsequently became Buddhism. Did Buddhism do any good to Lord Buddha. That only means a realised soul is above religion and it is only from such a soul religion emerges. Hence all religions emerged out of such a realised soul and therefore Sri Narayana Guru says the principle underlying all religions, eternal values are of equal significance and all religions are representing one or the other such eternal truth. Depending upon time and circumstances one may become more important and other truth may become less important. Hence to bring peace and harmony on earthy Narayana Guru has prescribed the study of all religions with open mind and equal attention.

Narayana Guru a God-intoxicant saint advocates that 'God is all, God alone is The one who has realised the God can see the presence of God everywhere.' Some time Guru used to say one's own potential is one's own 'God, ^ours God is your- self. This is true if and only if we explore the divine within us the kingdom of God is definitely within us. The knowledge or Arivu according to Guru is

God itself Brahavidya means this God realisation or attainment of advaitic knowledge.

Attainment of 73 awareness or knowledge is the realisation of the knowledge^ fime dualism of the self gud the supreme; the Atman and the Brahman. When such a realisation downs upon one;self he will embrace all, see the unity of life, this is what Narayana Guru says the essence of existence. Thus^ such God is the protector, benefactor, supporter, leader and guide all in one. He is the creator, the creation and the instrument of creation. He is eternal omniscient ^omnipresent and omnipotent. He is reality and illusion. He is the creator and destroyer of illusion, illusion itself, exponent of reality and reality itself. He is all inall. Just like water can Giot separated from the v\_ r wave, God cannot be separated from life.

Narayana Guru has not separated God from life. For him life is God, God is life andman himself is God fife Guru M(s great humanist, he could identifier God with man. If he says God is somewhere who transcends, man and nature hiding inc) ?M&no one would have accepted his views. If there is a God, He must be one andmust be present every where. If there were more than one God there would havebeen fight among themselves, which is not God at all. Hence there must be one and only one God. If that one God is staying in one particular place He will not be considered as supreme, he will be limited being like us. Hence he must be existingevery where as ais essence. As Gita puts Sutremani Ganaa era a common thread which is immanent principle in many pearls.

Narayana Guru a saint-philosopher and prophet has maintained all through theconception of one caste, one religion and one God in order to bring harmony, peace and global understanding in the human kind. He was a great humanist, secular saint and socio-religious reformer.

### Social Reforms

Sri Narayana Guru was a prophet, sage and Hindu saint and also a social reformer of India. He was born in the family of Ezhavas, in a period when people from backward communities, like, the Ezhavas faced much social injustices in the caste-ridden Kerala society. Gurudevan, as he was fondly known to his followers, revolted against casteism and worked on propagating new values of freedom in spirituality and of social equality, thereby transforming the Kerala society and as such he is adored as a prophet. India as a whole may have produced its Gandhi, but Keralites are inclined to take more pride in their own great spiritual and social leader, the contemporary of Gandhi, the low-caste sage Sri Narayana Guru, with his tireless preaching of the doctrine of 'One Caste, One Religion, One God.' He preached for moral and religious universalism.

### Tiruvallur: Tirukkural

**Tirukkural**, (Tamil: "Sacred Couplets")also spelled **Tirukural** or **Thirukkural**, also called **Kural**, the most celebrated of the *Patiren- kirkkanakku* ("Eighteen Ethical Works") in Tamil literature and a work that has hadan immense influence on Tamil culture and life. It is usually attributed to the poet Tiruvalluvar, who is thought to have lived in India in the 6th century, thoughsome scholars assign an earlier date (1st century BC). In its practical concerns, aphoristic insights into daily life, and universal and timeless approach, the *Tirukkural* has been compared to the great books of the

world's major religions.

An all-inclusive ethical guide, the *Tirukkural* has as its foremost moral imperative the avoidance of killing and the avoidance of falsehood. It also commends to the reader a feeling of compassion for all individuals, regardless of caste or creed. Its 133 sections of 10 couplets each are divided into three books: *aram* (virtue), *porul* (government and society), and *kamam* (love). The first section opens with praise of God, rain, renunciation, and a life of virtue. It then presents a world-affirming vision, the wisdom of human sympathy that expands from one's family and friends to one's clan, village, and country. The *porul* section projects a vision of an ideal state and relates good citizenship to virtuous private life. The *kamam* section addresses both "secret love" and married love; the section on married love is written as a dialogue between husband and wife.

### **Jyotiba Phule: Critical understanding of Caste-system**

It is a well-known fact that at the time of India's national movement, there was another movement known as the movement of social engineering or social revolution, led by Mahatma Phule, who had pioneered the foundation of a social revolution in India. Although contemporary thinkers like Ram Mohan Roy, Justice

M.G. Ranade and G.G. Agarkar were quite active in social reforms at that time, Mahatma Phule was different from them as he was the first non-Brahmin social revolutionary in India.

Phule believed that radical ideology must be complemented by radical practices, which was in striking contrast to the upper caste elite thinkers and social reformers of his time. He criticized the literature of *Vedas* and *Puranas* and Hindu mythological stories woven around deities that facilitated special privileges to Brahmins in every sphere of life. Brahmins always had the upper hand and authoritative power of decision-making, particularly in religious affairs. The significance of his movement was that it not only aimed to eradicate caste-hierarchy from the society but also protested against gender inequity. He advocated the progress of backward caste communities while emphasizing the importance of imparting education to women in the family. In other words, he insisted on gender equality in the field of education, property, jobs, and of course, in the family. During the nineteenth century, contemporaries of Phule who belonged to the upper strata of society tried to enlighten the masses on critical and sensitive issues like the caste-based patriarchal practices of Sati, and child-marriage, while also building up a favourable public opinion towards widow re-marriage and women's education. Nevertheless, the approach of these thinkers was within the framework of caste hierarchy and based on the principles and practices of Vedic-Brahmanic Dharmashastras.

Mahatma Phule was against this approach and argued for the emancipation of women from these socio-religious shackles, and eradication of caste hierarchy. In this way, Phule's anti-caste outlook was more sensitive to gender equality than other social reformers of his time. He included women of all castes and communities in his notion of the 'oppressed', which shows his consideration for those women who were victims of Brahmanical culture and power in common with other low caste people and untouchables.

While Karl Marx was propagating the theory of Class Struggle in Europe, Mahatma Phule in India was not merely advocating but was practically involved in mobilizing the lower castes and women to organize against Brahmanical exploitations. To quote G.P. Deshpande, "Phule was the first to identify and theorize the bipolar (*dvaivarnik*) structure of Indian Society, marked by the

dichotomous relationship between the oppressors (the Brahmans) and the oppressed (*Stri-Shudra-Atishudras*).[1]

It is to be noted here that Mahatma Phule used the term 'Stri-Shudra-Atishudras', thereby connecting all categories of women with Shudra-Atishudras, which includes middle castes, untouchables, tribes (Adivasis) and all other castes that are at the receiving end of the Brahmanical order. He also made an attempt to unify all Non-Brahmin castes by clubbing them into one category—Non-Aryans.

Mahatma Phule says that according to the Dharmashastras all women, irrespective of their castes, are inferior creatures and hence invariably in the same group as Shudras and Dasas.

He realised that since women were the biological reproducers of caste-patriarchy, the regulation, and control of their sexuality was crucial to retain and preserve the 'pure' roots of caste and lineage. The notions of purity and impurity are extremely complex and vary greatly among different castes. For example, high castes are always associated with purity whereas lower castes are equated with impurity as mentioned in Dharmashastras, which also say that an impurity means '*varnasankara*' (mixing of caste). Therefore Phule, denounced the *chaturvarna* system, attacked the notions of purity and impurity in his writings, and examined the motives and objects of the cruel and inhuman laws framed by the Brahmins.

Brahmanical hegemonic culture represents a specific view of the world, based on caste-bound social order and patriarchal oppression. However, there are other dimensions to this, which are class and caste. In this regard, Phule was not definite about the role of endogamy in caste patriarchy and the control of women, but he was well aware of the fact that there was a power structure between men and women. According to him, in the Brahmanical social order 'Stri-Shudra-Atishudras' were not allowed to enter the field of knowledge and education since it was a monopoly of the Brahmins. This caused 'Stri-Shudra-Atishudras' to remain in slavery. Phule realized the significance of Knowledge as a key to their emancipation and as a tool for breaking the monopoly of Brahmins in the society. His pedagogy clearly mentions the magnitude of the relation between 'Knowledge' and 'Power'.

To recall Professor Deshpande's argument, Phule spoke of the relationship between Knowledge and Power much before Foucault did. To quote him, "In fact, Foucault's post-modernist analysis came at a time when Europe was literally seeing an 'End of History', whereas Phule's efforts were to change the world

/Society with the weapon of Knowledge." Therefore, Phule was right in his writings when he says that the Third Eye (*Tritiya Netra*) is Knowledge, as it can mentally and materially emancipate human beings. He describes three types of Knowledge:

- (1) Knowledge of self, which means to realize one's own consciousness and come out of the pseudo understanding of caste, class, race and gender.
- (2) The collective knowledge, which means a social cluster that introduces itself or an individual according to class, caste, race and gender, and makes aware of the dynamism of Knowledge.
- (3) Practical, technical and scientific knowledge, that helps human beings in materialistic progress as well as emancipation.

As far as the issue of gender is concerned, it can be observed that most of the social reformers at that time with elitist backgrounds, had an agenda for the improvement of women's social status, whereas Mahatma Phule believed in equal status for women and wanted equal and common human rights for women at par with men. His was the first attempt in modern Indian history to correlate the slavery of women with oppressed castes in Indian society. His critique of history is based on the references to patriarchal conditions on women, caste-based slavery, untouchables within and outside of the village boundaries, and peasants and artisans included in the caste hierarchy.

In the Brahmanical system, though poor farmers were exploited, he brought to notice that the peasant women were most exploited. He says in his *Akhandas* that in caste hierarchy, unlike Brahmin women, the peasant women engaged both in household and agricultural work, thus doing far more physical labour. To make a point here, Mahatma Phule could imagine the stratification of labour and exploitation of women in India much before Karl Marx could visualize the exploitation of labour merely for men. His conscious mind quantified the division of labour based on caste and gender, which is why he explains how in a peasant/artisan's family, immediately after marriage, women engaged themselves in domestic labour as well as artisan labour, based on caste patriarchy.

Phule also criticized the nature of exploitation by oppressed classes and castes of women in their own families. This was a genuine concern for women since these women were more vulnerable to getting exploited by men who were themselves victims of a caste-ridden society. In the words of Professor Gail Omvedt, "His depth of pro-feminist feeling was great enough that he was ready to attack one of his co-workers, Krishnarao Bhalekar. Bhalekar, it seems, had written a severe criticism of a book published by one Tarabai Shinde, comparing men and women (*Stri-Purusha Tulana*). Phule replied in 1885 with an attack that was ferocious and in some ways more bitter than his attack on Brahmins."

He also put forward an alternative framework of gender equality based on social, cultural and religious structures. While doing so, Mahatma Phule gives special attention to the fact that all religious scriptures were written by men, and none were written by women. According to him, this showed that women were more peace-abiding and creative. Therefore, Phule in his *Sarvajanik Satyadharma* rejects the concepts of god, soul, re-birth, and theories of karma and rituals based on caste, class and gender. He accepted instead the philosophies of secular and humanistic religions, inspired by Buddhism, Jainism, Lokayata and Sant Kabir.

### **M.N.Roy: Radical Humanism**

Humanism is a philosophical stance that emphasizes the value and agency of human beings, individually and collectively. The concept of humanism refers primarily to a system of thought, which focuses on the autonomy of the individual. Humanism is a doctrine according to which man is point of departure and point of reference of human action. Humanism was a product of Renaissance and reformation in Europe and found its fullest expression in the American and French Revolutions.

### **Ancient India And Humanism**

Human-centered philosophy that rejected the supernatural may also be found circa 1500 BCE in the Lokayata system of Indian philosophy. Nasadiya Sukta, a passage in the Rig Veda, contains one of the first recorded assertions of agnosticism. In the 6th century BCE, Gautama

Buddha expressed, in Pali literature a skeptical attitude toward the supernatural.

Since neither soul, nor aught belonging to soul, can really and truly exist, the view which holds that this I who am **world**, who am **soul**, shall hereafter live permanent, persisting, unchanging, yea abide eternally: is not this utterly and entirely a foolish doctrine.

**Humanism is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as:**

*an outlook or system of thought concerned with human rather than divine or supernatural matters. A belief or outlook emphasizing common human needs and seeking solely rational ways of solving human problems and concerned with mankind as responsible and progressive intellectual beings.*

Humanism expresses that human being has great potentiality and if developed fully, one can reach to the greatest height, provided one gets proper opportunities to develop. Gandhi ji, Russel and Tolstoy were great humanists of the twentieth century.

In humanist thought, man becomes free in his private life. He was not only unique but also different and could not be reduced to the other. Man acquired inherent natural right to decide the rules of moral living. Man claimed freedom in the public domain and asserted the right to choose his political regime.

Human beings are in complete charge of themselves, they will decide their own values and they are materialists. Everyone wants to be a freeman. Everyone occupies a unique position, in communion with oneself, everyone is alone, and responsible for his actions. The final decision in all matters now rests with the individual. Since man has the capacity to decide true and false as he is endowed with reason, he has a right to choose his political regime. Democracy is the only legitimate form of government as it is based on the idea of willing subjects. Thus, humanism has links with the materialism, individualism and democratism.

**M.N. Roy's Radical Humanism In India**

M.N. Roy gave a clear expression to the idea of humanism. Manavendranath Roy whose original name was Narendranath Bhattacharya was born on 21st March, 1887 at Arbalia in Bengal. He was a revolutionary and a member of Juganther Party and went to other countries to secure arms. He came in touch with Marxism in the USA. He joined the Socialist Party of Mexico and he made it the Communist Party of Mexico and he became the founder of the first Communist Party outside Soviet Union. He became a prominent member of Communist International.

In his later life, he was well-known as a radical humanist. Radical Humanism was also known as scientific humanism. It undertook a scientific approach for understanding man and his place in the world. So it was called scientific humanism. It is known as materialism or monistic naturalism whose characteristics are naturalism, determinism and monism.

Naturalism asserts the existence of nature and holds that everything that exists including man is a part of nature. Determinism implies that the universe is governed by certain objective laws, that the process is orderly and that events do not take place without a cause. Nothing is left to chance. So it leads to the following conclusion. The universe works on a deterministic manner. This is called monism. Man is made of superior matter. He has a rational mind. He is gifted with reason.

Man is a part of nature. He lives in society. But, society does not possess consciousness. It does

not know what is good and bad. It is not a biological being. Man has all these characteristics. So between man and society, man is important. He is the measure of everything. Social development means development of all people living in the society. In other words, society, State, government, etc. exist for the welfare of man. He is the end and the society is the means. It exists to guarantee his freedom and to protect his liberty. In short, he asserts the sovereignty of man. Roy regarded man as central. He wrote:

**freedom is the supreme value because the urge for freedom is the essence of human existence.**

Roy accepted humanism because humanists had always approached life from the assumption of the sovereignty of man. It is man's unique capacity of knowing, as distinct from the common biological activity of being aware, which endows him with powers, not to rule over others, but to create freedom for the benefit of humanity. All citizens are equal members of the society.

Humanism believes that society consists of individuals, good and bad; those who can co-operate and those who cannot, and those who can inflict injury and those who cannot. All of them can coexist in a framework of plurality. The State should protect them all and should be so organized that the individual becomes an end in itself. The State, science, technology, etc. are all means of an end, namely, to enable individuals to flourish; they are not ends in themselves; they cannot be allowed to dominate human life.

## **Conclusion**

Submerged Humanism is a system of views based on respect for the dignity of man, concern for his welfare, his all round development and creation of favorable conditions for social life. The humanism that we have seen in thoughts of contemporary Indian philosophers is different from the western humanism.

Western humanism is mostly intellectual, economic and political in nature. But the Indian humanism is primarily spiritual. The Indian humanism does not take man to be material being but as one with spirit, mind, life and body. It aims at the fulfillment of the aspirations which are physical, vital, mental and spiritual in nature.

## **Roy's Materialism or Physical Realism**

M .N. Roy was a strong supporter of materialist philosophy. According to Roy, strictly speaking, materialism is "the only philosophy possible", because it represents the knowledge of nature as it really exists—knowledge acquired through the contemplation, observation and investigation of nature itself.

Roy points out that materialism is not the "monstrosity" it is generally supposed to be. It is not the cult of "eat, drink and be merry", as it has been depicted by its ignorant or malicious adversaries. It simply maintains that "the origin of everything that really exists is matter, that there does not exist anything but matter, all other appearances being transformations of matter, and these transformations are governed necessarily by laws inherent in nature." (Roy 1951)

Thus, broadly speaking, Roy's philosophy is in the tradition of materialism. However, there are some important differences between Roy's materialism and traditional materialism. In fact, Roy's "materialism" is a restatement of traditional materialism in the light of contemporary scientific knowledge. According to Roy, the substratum of the universe is not matter as traditionally

conceived, but it is “physical as against mental or spiritual”. It is, in other words, “a measurable entity”. Therefore, says Roy, to prevent prejudice, materialism could be renamed “physical realism”.

## **Roy’s Materialism and Traditional Materialism**

Roy was of the view that materialism must be dissociated from certain notions, which have been rendered untenable by the discoveries of science. His revision and restatement of materialism embraces both the basic tenets of materialism: the concept of matter as well as the doctrine of physical determinism.

### **i. Change in the Concept of “Matter”**

According to Roy, the discoveries of quantum physics have “made the classical notion of matter untenable”. Nevertheless, Roy insists that though the substratum of the universe is “not matter as traditionally conceived” it is “physical as against mental or spiritual. It is a measurable entity”.

The so-called “crisis” of materialism, according to Roy, involved the *conception* of matter, and not its *existence*. The “crisis” simply exposed the inadequacy of the old atomist theory. The substance of the “crisis” was, “that it appeared to reduce matter from mass to energy and radiation”. However, there cannot be any doubt about the fact that “atomic physics deals with material realities which exist objectively, outside the mind of the physicist.” Thus, in Roy’s physical realism “matter” is not made up of hard and massy stone-like atoms as in traditional “mechanical materialism”. The whole concept of “matter” has been revised in the light of new physics. In fact, Roy was even ready to discard the term “matter” provided a more appropriate new term could be coined. In *Science and Philosophy*, Roy describes “matter” as the “sole-existence.” According to Roy, it is not very important what name is attached to the “substratum of existence” – matter, energy, action, vibratory motion or field. However, he insists that it is a *physical reality*. What Roy means by calling it *physical* is that it *exists objectively* and that it is *measurable*. As we have seen, Roy has even renamed his revised version of materialism as “physical realism”.

### **ii. Revision of Physical Determinism**

Roy disagrees with the view of some thinkers that Heisenberg’s Principle of Uncertainty requires the rejection of the doctrine of determinism. According to Roy, only a modification in the traditional conception of causality is required.

Causality, in Roy’s view, is not an *a priori* form of thought or an axiomatic law; it is physical relation inherent in the constitution of the universe.

Roy, in fact, tries to temper a rigidly mechanical view of determinism by interpreting it in terms of probability. He admits plurality of possibilities and the element of contingency in the world, and tries to show that *determinism and probability are not mutually exclusive*. However, Roy insists that statistical methods presuppose determinism. The universe is a law-governed system, and the existence of law presupposes causality. He is emphatic that the element of *uncertainty* in the sub-atomic world is not to be equated with *indeterminacy*. Rejection of the idea that there are invariant relations in nature, maintains Roy, will blast the very foundation of science.

Roy also tries to reconcile “freedom of will” with determinism. According to him, human beings possess free will and can *choose* out of various alternatives in front of them. Roy, however, is not unique among materialists in recognizing free will. Epicurus, among ancient Greek materialists, and Hobbes, among modern materialists, tried to accommodate free will in their philosophies.

According to Roy, the vast world of biological evolution lies between the world of human beings and the world of inanimate matter, and, therefore, the world of human beings has its own specific laws, though these laws can be referred back to the general laws of the world of dead matter. Nevertheless, human will, says Roy, cannot be directly related to the laws of physical universe. Thus, Roy is not, to use the terminology of William James, a “hard” determinist like Holbach, but a “soft” determinist like Hobbes.

### **iii. Objective Reality of Ideas and the Autonomy of the Mental World**

Though Roy traces the origin of mental activities to the physical background of the living world, yet he also grants them an objective existence of their own. Mind and matter, according to Roy, can be reduced to a *common denominator*; as such, they are *two objective realities*. In Roy’s view, once formed, *ideas exist by themselves, governed by their own laws*. Thus, Roy grants much more objectivity and autonomy to the mental world than has been traditionally granted by materialists. Roy’s materialism is not an “extreme” materialism like that of the eighteenth century French materialist, Julien de la Mettrie, who regarded man to be a self-moving machine. According to Roy, on the other hand, “Man is not a living machine, but a thinking animal”.

### **iv. Emphasis on Ethics**

Roy has given a very important place to ethics in his philosophy. According to Roy, “the greatest defect of classical materialism was that its cosmology did not seem to have any connection with ethics”. Roy strongly asserts that if it is not shown that materialist philosophy can accommodate ethics, then, human spirit, thirsting for freedom, will spurn materialism. In Roy’s view materialist ethics is not only possible but also the noblest form of morality. Roy links morality with human being’s innate rationality. *Human beings are moral*, according to Roy, *because they are rational*. In Roy’s ethics *freedom*, which he links with the struggle of existence is the *highest value*. Search for truth is a corollary to the quest for freedom.

However, Roy is not unique among materialists in emphasizing the importance of ethics in his philosophy. Contrary to popular impression, ancient materialist Epicurus and modern materialist Holbach, for example, accorded an important place to ethics in their philosophies. However, the details of Roy’s ethics are somewhat different from these philosophers.

## **C. Roy’s Materialism and Marxian Materialism**

Before he formulated and expounded his own philosophy of New Humanism, Roy was an orthodox Marxist. In fact, Roy’s revision of materialism was carried out in the context of Marxism. Thus, Roy’s revision of materialism in general is also applicable to Marxian materialism to the extent Marxian materialism resembles traditional materialism.

Roy’s Physical Realism is, however, different from Marxian materialism in three important ways:

### **i. Delinking of Dialectics and Materialism**

Roy considers the Hegelian heritage a weak spot of Marxism. The simplicity and scientific soundness of materialism are marred by making its validity conditional upon dialectic. According to Roy, *materialism pure, and simple, can stand on its own legs*, and, therefore, he tries to de-link dialectics from materialism. The validity of materialism, maintains Roy, is in no way conditional on dialectics, as there is no logical connection between the two.

## **ii. Rejection of Historical Materialism**

Roy rejects historical materialism and advocates a *humanist* interpretation of history in which he gives an important place to human will as a determining factor in history, and he recognizes the autonomy of the mental world. He argues that human will cannot be directly related to the laws of physical universe. Ideas, too, have an objective existence, and are governed by their own laws. The economic interpretation of history is deduced from a wrong interpretation of materialism.

## **iii. Emphasis on Ethics**

Roy's materialism is sharply different from Marxian materialism in so far it recognizes the importance of ethics and gives a prominent place to it. According to Roy, Marxian materialism wrongly disowns the humanist tradition and thereby divorces materialism from ethics. The contention that "from the scientific point of view this appeal to morality and justice does not help us an inch farther" was based, according to Roy, upon a false notion of science.

## **Maulana Azad: Humanism**

India is considered as an emerging power on the international platform but there are number of problems still prevalent in the Indian society which prevents its progress ahead to be great nation. Great nation means having great people and resources which are self sustained peacefully and attract the world for its character of humanity, culture, stability, maintenance of natural resource in environmental friendly manner. India will take many decades or century to reach to that tag of greatness. It is not true that India was not great but over a period of time since Asoka, all those characteristics of greatness taken away by the selfish and inhuman individuals and groups. Today India is struggling with many problems. The uncontrolled growth of its population which has already touched 1.21 billion alongwith some social and health problems are major challenges for its progress. With these problems remaining unresolved, it is unlikely that India will be able to provide its citizens a respectable life. Unplanned population growth with total negligence towards proper human resource development puts a huge pressure on the existing resources which leads to poverty, poor quality of life of people. One third of Indian population is still living below poverty line. According to the new World Bank's estimates on poverty based on 2005 data, India has 456 million people, 41.6% of its population, living below the new international poverty line of \$1.25 (PPP) per day. The World Bank further estimates that 33% of the global poor now reside in India.<sup>1</sup> It is further augmented by uneven distribution of wealth, with the top 10% of income groups earning 33% of the income.<sup>2</sup> This inequity and unequal development leads to people in urban area enjoying better comforts than rural areas. Illiteracy makes people weaker and susceptible to not only exploitation but also to more prone to die of diseases. Other problems like malnutrition among pregnant women, children, and adolescent girls make them at risk of diseases throughout their lives. More than fifty percent of our mothers are anemic. There are 20% of all pregnancies are among teenage group. Lack of adequate sanitation in more than 60% of the total household in the country also leads to significant economic losses for the country apart from frequent diseases outbreaks. Gender discrimination remains the most distressing social evils in India. Issues like female feticide, infanticide, exploitation, illiteracy, maternal mortality and dowry deaths are throbbing discrimination women of India are subjected to. Unemployment remains a problem since with increasing price of necessary resources of life, unemployed people are unable to fetch themselves and their families. Other major problems like child labour, discrimination towards lower caste, religious conflict and civil war, widespread corruption, terrorism, naxalism and weak political-legislative implementation and social system- all these lead to a society with wide socioeconomic disparities and poor growth. All these problems are affecting human society and

violating human rights. To protect the Indian society from these problems, humanism needs to be protected and promoted and realized in true sense. According to *American Humanist Association*, **Humanism** is defined as a progressive life stance that, without supernaturalism, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead meaningful, ethical lives capable of adding to the greater good of humanity.<sup>3</sup> **Humanism** is a rational philosophy informed by science, inspired by art, and motivated by compassion.

Affirming the dignity of each human being, it supports the maximization of individual liberty and opportunity consonant with social and planetary responsibility. It advocates the extension of participatory democracy and the expansion of the open society, standing for human rights and social justice. It recognizes human beings as a part of nature and holds that values—be they religious, ethical, social, or political—have their source in human experience and culture. With humanism, all social barriers like discrimination, violence against women, gender bias, religion wars, casteism etc can be eliminated. It calls upon a participatory political system with equal distribution of resources thereby reducing wealth gap, promoting rational thinking and promoting human rights. For this reason humanism needs to be inculcated in every character of people of India on urgent basis.

As a public health professional I personally feel that humanism in public health is equally important in India. Public health is defined "the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health through the organized efforts and informed choices of society, organizations, public and private, communities and individuals."<sup>4,5</sup> The role of humanism is becoming more important when there is disparity of health care among people. According to the Constitution of India, state is responsible for health of its people, however, more than 80% of its population health is catered by Private or corporate bodies. Due to the nature of private and corporate bodies to earn profit the welfare of the people is sidelined. Hence exploitation of poor in private health sector is common. Poor doctor patient relationship is rampant. There are incidences where doctors and healthcare staff refused to give treatment to HIV patients, handling trauma or delivery of poor. Weaker sections of the society like scheduled castes, scheduled tribe, residents of rural areas, illiterate and women should also be given due attention and facilities which is given to other patients. To tackle these problems of healthcare delivery in India, there is urgent need of humanism in health sector. Health care workers should not treat patients as diseased bodies but treat them with human touch and values. They should not discriminate patients with HIV, tuberculosis and leprosy in care. All the doctors and paramedical staff should be trained in humanist values to interact with the people. Hospital environment should be such that to provide services to the patients in a human friendly manner and planning the services for patient welfare. At the same time, patients should also be taught about their role and support in providing such kind of services. They should take their responsibility in following the treatment and instructions of the doctor, keep faith in the doctor, be aware and spread awareness among fellow community members. With both doctor and patient working together with human values, health care services can be improved in future. Without the health of its people no nation can be great.

We are aware of many problems striking the nation which make us weak and poor. Because the problems are multifactorial in nature, our efforts should be multilayered at home, society, and country and within country in various sectors. Humanism should be practiced in following levels:

### ***Importance of Humanism in Home***

Family needs to deal with following problems in emotional, logical and effective manner:

Low value of girl child and women, female infanticide and feticide, women equalrights and respect, etc.

### ***Importance of Humanism in Society***

Society needs to deals with following problems in participatory, consultative, supportive and rational manner:

Casteism, inequalities, poor attitude towards rape and molestation, Child labor, mentally and physically challenges people, elderly population,

### ***Importance of Humanism in the Country***

Country through its parliament and political structure needs to deals with following problems in scientific, rational, parliamentary, and authoritativemanner:

Defective policies and program, poor implementation of laws, corruption, black money, divisive politics, etc.

### ***Importance of humanism in Medicine and public health***

Health sector needs to deal with following problems in ethical, rational, scientific,and responsible manners:

Exploitation of patients, maltreatment, discrimination with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, poor, destitute, poor doctor-patients relationship, quackery, unscientific system of medicine, etc. According to Gautama Buddha, six things are to be remembered in order to unite any community in harmony which are promoting human values in community:

- 1: Friendly Behaviour both in public & in private.
- 2: Friendly Speech both in public & in private.
- 3: Friendly Thought both in public & in private
- 4: Sharing of Gains even down to any single lump of food
- 5: Moral Agreement: All respect the same ethical rules
- 6: Same Views: All share the same general views & opinions

No human being can remain happy and progress if he/she is not in harmony and peace. When humanism prevailed people are happy and progressed. When you care for human beings you start looking in all those factors which are responsible for human health and happiness such as environmental health protection and preservation of animals and birds. It can only happen when you have platonic anduniversal humanism.

# MCQs

1. Ambedkar's theory of relation is essentially:

- a) Spiritual
- b) Metaphysical
- c) Naturalistic
- d) Hermeneutical

Answer: (c)

2. Which among the following is true regarding K.C. Bhattacharya's two branches of Philosophy of object?

- a) Ethics and Logic
- b) Religion and Ethics
- c) Logic and Metaphysics
- d) Physics and Metaphysics

Answer: (c)

3. Given below are the four principles of Existence.

- 1. The Super – Cosmic theory
- 2. The Cosmic or the Terrestrial
- 3. The Supraterrestrial or the other worldly
- 4. The integral or the synthetic

Which one of the following philosopher has mentioned in his philosophy?

- a) Vivekanand
- b) K.C. Bhattacharya
- c) Iqbal
- d) Sri Aurobindo

Answer: (d)

4. Gandhian View of trusteeship was not designed to:

- a) evolve a new social order
- b) promote love and sacrifice among people
- c) give every opportunity to an individual to rise
- d) apply force to deprive the privileged class of their wealth

Answer: (d)

5. What are trinity principles espoused by Dr. Ambedkar?

- a) Non-violence, Truth and Peace
- b) Non-Cooperation, Non-stealing and Non-equalization
- c) Revolution, Historical Materialism and Dialectical materialism
- d) Liberty, Equality and Fraternity

Answer: (d)

6. Which of the following is a prophetic religion?

- a) Hinduism
- b) Islam
- c) Buddhism
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (B)

7. Who is the author of 'The Essential Unity of all Religions'?

- a) Radhakrishnan
- b) Tagore
- c) Bhagwandas
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (C)

8. Retributive theory of punishment holds the view that

- a) Criminals can be reformed
- b) Criminals are ought to be punished
- c) Criminals can be set free without any punishment
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (B)

9. Cardinal virtues according to Plato,

- a) Right speech, Right action, Right mindedness
- b) Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice
- c) Intellectual virtues and Moral virtues
- d) Truth, Non-violence, Celibacy, Non-Stealing

**Answer:** (B)

10. Eudaemonism means

- a) Well being
- b) Hedonism
- c) Utilitarianism
- d) Perfectionism

**Answer:** (A)

11. Which one of the statements in the following does not reflect the true Gandhian perspective of thought?

- a) Non-violence is an active moral struggle against evil.
- b) Hate the sin and not the sinner.
- c) Punishment must be retributive in nature.
- d) Violence is not always wrong.

**Answer:** (C)

12. 'Sarvadharmā Sambhava', according to Gandhi means

- a) All religions should be synthesised.
- b) All religions teach moral values.
- c) All religions are to be treated equally.
- d) There is the unity of all religions.

**Answer:** (C)

13. The function in terms of which all the constants of truth-functional system can be defined, is called

- a) Strawson's stroke function
- b) Russell's stroke function
- c) Sheffer's stroke function
- d) Whitehead's stroke function

**Answer:** (C)

14. Which one of the following is a fundamental law of thought?

- a) Law of Reasoning
- b) Law of Excluded Middle
- c) Law of Compatibility
- d) Law of Double Negation

**Answer:** (B)

15. Kant's Conception of the 'Kingdom of ends' approximates to the Gita's Conception of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Asceticism
- b) Solidarity of humanity
- c) Humanism
- d) Atheism

**Answer:** (B)

16. True knowledge according to J. Krishnamurti is

- a) Revealed by mystics
- b) Conditioned by experience
- c) Obtained by religious reflection
- d) Unconditional awareness

**Answer:** (D)

17. Who focussed the Upanisadic dictum "Arise, Awake and Stop not till the goal is reached" in modern times?

- a) Swami Dayanand
- b) Raja Rammohan Roy
- c) Swami Vivekananda
- d) Mahatma Gandhi

**Answer:** (C)

18. Which of the following are admitted by Tagore to be the essential aspects of human self?

- a) Physical and mental
- b) Vital and mental
- c) Physical and spiritual
- d) Mental and spiritual

**Answer:** (C)

19. According to K.C. Bhattacharyya philosophy is:

- a) The knowledge of the Absolute.
- b) Self-evident elaboration of the self.

- c) Self-evident elaboration of the self-evident.
- d) The study of the self-evident.

**Answer:** (C)

**20.** Consider the List-I and List-II and select the code correctly matched:

List – I

- 1. Subject as freedom
- 2. Gnostic being
- 3. Universal Religion
- 4. JivanDevata

1 2 3 4

List – II

- i. Sri.Aurobindo
- ii. Rabindranath Tagore
- iii. Vivekananda
- iv. K.C. Bhattacharyya

- a) i ii iii iv
- b) i iii ii iv
- c) iv i iii ii
- d) iv ii i iii

**Answer:** (C)

**21.** According to Kant, the ideas of 'reason' are

- a) Regulative and constitutive
- b) Affirmative and negative
- c) Negative and probable
- d) Constitutive and regulative

**Answers:** (D)

**22.** According to Kant, a person becomes aware of the freedom of his will because

- a) It is an apriori condition of the experience of obligation.
- b) He has empirical experience of it.
- c) It is an apriori condition of experience of senses.
- d) It can be demonstrated by science.

**Answers:** (A)

**23.** Match List – I with List – II and choose the correct answer from the code given below:

List – I

(Ideas)

- a. Swaraj is my birth right
- b. Awakening in the Land of Heaven
- c. Hind Swaraj
- d. Swaraj in Ideas

Codes:

a b c d

List– II

(Philosophers)

- i. Sri Rabindranath Tagore
- ii. Mahatma Gandhi
- iii. Dr. K.C. Bhattacharya
- iv. Lokmānya B.G. Tilak

- a) iv i ii iii
- b) ii i iv iii
- c) iii i ii iv
- d) i iii ii iv

**Answers:** (A)

24. According to B.R. Ambedkar the ideal religion should:

- i be consistent with science
  - ii rationalize rituals and superstitious
  - iii support liberty, equality and fraternity
  - iv not glorify poverty
  - v be based on Buddhist canons
  - vi have sacred morality as its core concept
- Choose from the codes given below:

- a) i, ii and iii
- b) iii, iv and vi
- c) iii, iv and v
- d) i, iii and iv

**Answer:** (D)

25. In the context of logical positivism evaluate (A) and (R) and select correct answer from given options:

Assertion (A): 'God exists' is a true proposition.

Reason (R): 'God exists' is not verifiable. Options:

- a) Both (A) and (R) are true and (R) provides a correct explanation of (A).
- b) Both (A) and (R) are false and (R) does not provide a correct explanation of (A).
- c) (A) is true and (R) is false and (R) does not provide correct explanation of (A).
- d) (A) is false and (R) is true and (R) does not provide a correct explanation of (A).

**Answer:** (D)

26. The path of Rāja-yoga in modern period was propounded by

- a) Swami Ram Tīrth
- b) Mahātmā Gandhi
- c) S. Rādhākrishnan
- d) Swami Vivekānand

**Answer:** (D)

27. The book My Experiments with Truth is written by

- a) Jiddu Krishnamurty
- b) Swami Yoganand
- c) Shri Raman Maharshi
- d) Mahātmā Gandhi

**Answer:** (D)

28. Which one of the following pairs is incorrectly matched?

- a) Dr. M. Iqbal – Integral Intuition
- b) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar - Removal of Casteism
- c) Sri. K.C. Bhattacharya – The Subject as Freedom
- d) Sri. R. Tagore - Jivana- Devatā

**Answer:** (A)

29. According to Sri. Aurobindo, the ascent from mind to supermind takes place through the following order of steps:

- a) Illumined mind, over mind, Intuition
- b) Illumined mind, higher mind, Intuition, over mind
- c) Higher mind, Illumined mind, Intuition, over mind
- d) Intuition, over mind, Illumined mind

**Answer: (C)**

30. 'The Life Divine' is the work of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Gandhi
- b) Vivekananda
- c) Aurobindo
- d) Rousseau

**Answer: c**

31. 'Nothing can be taught' is the position of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Gandhi
- b) Aurobindo
- c) Tagore
- d) none of these

**Answer: b**

32. 'To work from the near to the far' is the educational principle of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Gandhi
- b) Tagore
- c) Aurobindo
- d) none of these

**Answer: c**

33. According to Aurobindo, \_\_\_\_\_ education is not only spiritual but also rational, mental and physical.

- a) integral
- b) philosophical
- c) theological
- d) psychological

**Answer: a**

34. \_\_\_\_\_ states, "By education, I mean an all- round drawing out of the best in man – body, mind and spirit".

- a) Vivekananda
- b) Tagore
- c) Aurobindo
- d) Gandhi

**Answer: d**

35. \_\_\_\_\_ criticized colonial education.

- a) Tagore
- b) Aurobindo
- c) Gandhi
- d) None of these

**Answer: c**

36. Basic education is the proposal of\_\_.

- a) Gandhi
- b) Vivekananda
- c) Aurobindo
- d) Tagore

**Answer: a**

37. Which of the following statement is false according to Gandhi?

- a) is self- discipline Education is service
- b) Education is liberation
- c) Education is mere literacy
- d) Education

**Answer: c**

38. According to Gandhi, the aim of education is\_\_\_\_\_.

- i) Character building
- ii) Self- control
- iii) Kindness to all
- iv) Self-dependence

- a) (i) and ( ii)
- b) ( i), (ii), and (iii)
- c) only (iv)
- d) (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)

**Answer: d**

39. Find the odd one out.

- a) Frobel
- b) Gandhi
- c) Plato
- d) Rousseau

**Answer: b**

40. \_\_\_\_\_is the primary purpose of education according to Gandhi.

- a) Patriotism
- b) Employment
- c) Literacy
- d) Character building

**Answer: d**

41. According to \_\_\_\_\_, spiritual perfection is the basic aim of education.

- a) Aurobindo
- b) Gandhi
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

42. "Education is the manifestation of the perfection already in man" This is the view of\_.

- a) Frobel
- b) Paulo Freire
- c) Plato
- d) Vivekananda

**Answer: d**

43. Pick out the correct definition of education according to Swami Vivekananda.

- a) Education is the perfection of man
- b) Education is the manifestation of God
- c) Education is the manifestation of the perfection already in man
- d) Education is the manifestation of the perfection already in God

**Answer: c**

44. According to Vivekananda, education should aim at\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) life-building
- b) man-making
- c) character making
- d) all these

**Answer: d**

45. "There must be equal chance for all - or if greater for some and for some less - the weaker should be given more chance than the strong". Who said these words?

- a) Gandhi
- b) Aurobindo
- c) Vivekananda
- d) none of these

**Answer: c**

46. 'Education of the masses' is the concept of\_.

- a) Vivekananda
- b) Aurobindo
- c) Rousseau
- d) Gandhi

**Answer: a**

47. \_\_\_\_\_ is not an idealist educational philosopher.

- a) Plato
- b) St. Augustine
- c) John Dewey
- d) none of these

**Answer: c**

48. John Dewey is the proponent of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Realism
- b) Idealism
- c) Naturalism

d) Pragmatism

**Answer: d**

49. According to \_\_\_\_\_, curriculum should be scientifically approached, standardized, and discipline based.

a) realists

b) idealists

c) naturalists

d) none of these

**Answer: a**

50. \_\_\_\_\_ believe that learners should apply their knowledge to real situations through experimental inquiry.

a) Realists

b) Idealists

c) Naturalists

d) Pragmatists

**Answer: d**

51. 'Truth is that which works' is the view of \_\_\_\_\_.

a) Pragmatists

b) Idealists

c) Naturalists

d) Realists

**Answer: a**

52. More than the acquisition of knowledge, education should encourage \_\_\_\_\_.

a) intolerance

b) conflict

c) creativity

d) none of these

**Answer: c**

53. \_\_\_\_\_ is a naturalist thinker.

a) John Dewey

b) Aristotle

c) Frobel

d) Rousseau

**Answer: d**

54. "I hate books; they merely teach us to talk of what we do not know." Who said these words?

a) John Dewey

b) Rousseau

c) Frobel

d) Gandhi

**Answer: b**

55. \_\_\_\_\_ criticized the concept of formal education.

- a) Rousseau John
- b) Aristotle
- c) Frobel
- d) Dewey

**Answer: a**

56. Match the following:

- i) Gandhi - i) Negative education
- ii) Frobel -ii) Integral education
- iii) Rousseau - iii) Basic education
- iv) Aurobindo -iv) Spherical education

- a) i- ii ii- iv iii- iii iv - i
- b) i - iii ii - iv iii - i iv - ii
- c) i -iii ii -iv iii - ii iv- i
- d) i - iv ii - iii iii - i iv - ii

**Answer: b**

57. Educational philosophy is\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) speculative
- b) normative
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

58. The quantity of education has increased, but the quality has decreased. This leads to the necessity of\_\_\_.

- a) Peace
- b) Tolerance
- c) Literacy
- d) Value education

**Answer: d**

59. Value -oriented education aims atcultural\_\_\_.

- a) oppression
- b) conflict
- c) harmony
- d) intolerance

**Answer: c**

60. Value- oriented education shouldbe\_.

- a) Text book-oriented
- b) Exam-oriented
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: d**

61. \_\_\_\_\_ form the core theme ofvalue education.

- a) Caring for others
- b) Cooperation
- c) Humility
- d) All these

**Answer: d**

62. Value education aims at the\_\_development of the learners.

- a) total
- b) partial
- c) negative
- d) exam-oriented

**Answer: a**

63. Schooling that promotes care, respect and cooperation is specifically the aim of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) teaching
- b) learning
- c) value education
- d) technical education

**Answer: c**

64. Value education aims at removing the vice of\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) cooperation
- b) intolerance
- c) honesty
- d) humility

**Answer: b**

65. “\_\_\_\_\_education can take place at home, as well as in schools, colleges, universities, offender institutions and voluntary youth organizations.”

- a) Formal
- b) Technical
- c) Science
- d) Value

**Answer: d**

66. According to Rousseau, Education must conform to the\_\_processes of growth and mental development.

- a) natural
- b) divine
- c) spiritual
- d) social

**Answer: a**

67. \_\_\_\_\_is the aim of education for naturalists.

- a) Self-expression
- b) Autonomous development of individuality
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

68. One of the most influential books by Rousseau is\_\_.

- a) Emile
- b) A Manual of Ethics
- c) Ethics
- d) Practical Ethics

**Answer: a**

69. \_\_\_\_\_is a prominent philosopher of education in contemporary India.

- a) Aurobindo
- b) S. Radhakrishnan
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

70. \_\_\_\_\_is a function of education.

- a) Acquisition of information about the past and present
- b) Developing decision making capacity
- c) Developing problem solving capacity
- d) All these

**Answer: d**

71. Both\_\_\_\_\_education and valueeducation should be part of the higher education curriculum.

- a) negative
- b) career
- c) child
- d) all these

**Answer: b**

72. Education confined to mere imparting of knowledge is not\_\_\_\_\_education.

- a) true
- b) negative
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: a**

73. Education is a \_\_\_\_\_institution.

- a) formal
- b) informal
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

74. \_\_\_\_\_held the spiritualist view of education.

- a) Mahatma Gandhi
- b) Swami Vivekananda
- c) Both (a) and (b)

d) Neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

75. Pragmatists insist on the \_\_\_\_\_ aspect of education.

- a) theoretical
- b) practical
- c) philosophical
- d) none of these

**Answer: b**

76. Gandhian programme of education lay emphasis on \_\_\_\_ education.

- a) higher
- b) basic
- c) technical
- d) military

**Answer: b**

77. Educational institutions enable students to develop the sense of.

- a) well being
- b) intolerance
- c) hatred
- d) prejudice

**Answer: a**

78. According to the \_\_\_\_\_ view, education is the process of manifesting the innate perfection of the individual.

- a) Pragmatist
- b) Spiritualist
- c) Realist
- d) None of these

**Answer: b**

79. Education should enable the learners to develop \_\_ spirit.

- a) submissive
- b) religious
- c) partisan
- d) critical

**Answer: d**

80. Find out the mismatching pairs.

1. Vivekananda/spiritualism
2. Rousseau/pragmatism
3. Value education/ intolerance
4. John Dewey/ pragmatism

- a) Only 3
- b) 3 and 4
- c) 2 and 3

d) Only 4

**Answer: c**

81. Education is primarily a/an\_\_\_\_\_ institution

a) economic

b) formative

c) religious

d) all these

**Answer: b**

82. Etymological meaning of the term 'education' is to\_.

a) bring up

b) know

c) do

d) grow

**Answer: a**

83. The root word of 'education' is\_\_\_\_\_.

a) edusat

b) educare

c) edu

d) educate

**Answer: b**

84. The term 'education' is derived from a\_\_\_\_\_word.

a) English

b) French

c) Latin

d) German

**Answer: c**

85. Philosophy of education is concerned with the\_\_\_\_of education.

a) aims

b) nature

c) functions

d) all these

**Answer: d**

86. Which one of the following statements is/are true?

i) Education is a life-long process.

ii) Education is a systematic process.

iii) Education is a modification of behaviour.

iv) Education is instruction and direction.

a) i and ii

b) i,ii and iii

c) i and iv

d) All the four

**Answer: d**

87. Education is a continuous process through which a person acquires \_\_\_\_.

- a) a view of life
- b) knowledge
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: c**

88. Education is the harmonious development of \_\_\_\_ faculty.

- a) physical
- b) mental
- c) moral
- d) all of these

**Answer: d**

89. Educational philosophy is defined as the philosophical study of the \_\_\_\_ of education.

- a) purpose
- b) nature
- c) ideals
- d) all these

**Answer: d**

90. \_\_\_\_ is an interactive method in the pursuit of knowledge through dialogue.

- a) Teacher-centered method
- b) Experimental method
- c) Socratic method
- d) Introspective method

**Answer: c**

91. According to realists, curriculum should be \_.

- i) practical and useful
- ii) highly organized and systematic
- iii) teacher-centered

- a) i and ii
- b) only i
- c) i,ii and iii
- d) only iii

**Answer: c**

92. \_\_\_\_\_ is not a proponent of realism.

- a) Plato
- b) Russell
- c) Aristotle
- d) Locke

**Answer: a**

93. Education should proceed from simple to complex and from concrete to abstract. This is the method of teaching in\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) idealism
- b) realism
- c) essentialism
- d) none of these

**Answer: b**

94. Which one of the following statements is/are not applicable to the idealist view of education?

- i) The aim of education is self- realization.
- ii) Education is spiritual development.
- iii) The curriculum should not be based upon the ideals and values.
- iv) Plato's doctrines form the basis of the system.

- a) i, ii and iv
- b) i, ii and iii
- c) only iii
- d) ii and iv

**Answer: c**

95. Idealists argue that\_\_\_\_\_are the ultimate reality.

- a) values
- b) ideas
- c) feelings
- d) sensations

**Answer: b**

96. \_\_\_\_\_is not a proponent of idealist educational philosophy.

- a) Plato
- b) St. Augustine
- c) Aristotle
- d) Hegel

**Answer: c**

97. \_\_\_\_\_is not a proper method of teaching according to idealism.

- a) Dialectical method
- b) Intuitive method
- c) Experimental method
- d) Conceptual method

**Answer: c**

98. According to idealists, curriculum should be.

- a) pupil-centered
- b) teacher-centered
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) neither (a) nor (b)

**Answer: b**

99. \_\_\_\_\_ introduced the concept of kindergarten.

- a) Gandhi
- b) Frobel
- c) Plato
- d) Rousseau

**Answer: b**

100. "The purpose of man is primarily to develop his own spherical nature and then the nature of spherical being as such, to train and represent that nature". This is the view of \_\_\_\_.

- a) Rousseau
- b) Vivekananda
- c) Russell
- d) Frobel

**Answer: d**

101. "The spherical law is the basic law of all true and sufficient human education". This is the view of \_\_\_\_.

- a) Frobel
- b) Russell
- c) Pestalozzi
- d) Aurobindo

**Answer: a**

102. The model of Frobel's spherical education is known as \_\_\_\_.

- a) Montessori
- b) Banking method
- c) Keilhau
- d) none of these

**Answer: c**

103. Aurobindo's educational ideal is known as \_\_\_\_.

- a) Right education
- b) Integral education
- c) Spherical education
- d) Basic education

**Answer: b**

104. "The meaning of the word education is to reduce the inner, hidden latent dormant potential secret within any human being .... This is the view of \_\_\_\_.

- a) Plato
- b) Rousseau
- c) Aurobindo
- d) Frobel

**Answer: c**

105. In Aurobindo's philosophy, education in the integral sense includes the \_\_\_\_ aspects.

- a) physical and mental
- b) vital and mental

- c) physical and spiritual
- d) physical, vital, mental and spiritual

**Answer: d**

106. The ultimate aim of education is evolution of total humanity, which includes the evolution of the nation, which in its turn depends upon the evolution of the individual. This concept of education is known as\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Integral education
- b) Perfect education
- c) Spiritual education
- d) none of these

**Answer: a**

107. According to Aurobindo, the aim of education in child is\_\_.

- i) Perfection
- ii) Harmony
- iii) Evolution
- iv) Humanization

- a) i and ii
- b) iii and iv
- c) ii and iii
- d) All the four

**Answer: d**

108. \_developed the concept of Integral education.

- a) Gandhi
- b) Vivekananda
- c) Tagore
- d) Aurobindo

**Answer: d**

109. Which of the following statements is not applicable to Aurobindo's system of education?

- i) A teacher should be the philosopher and guide.
- ii) A teacher should be an integral yogi.
- iii) A teacher should be having an integrated personality.
- iv) Intellectual excellence is the most important thing in a teacher.

- a) i and iv
- b) i and iii
- c) only iv
- d) only ii

**Answer: c**

110. Who amongst the following thinkers gave prominent emphasis on the concept of 'Intellect and Intuition'?

- a) Dr. K.C. Bhattacharya
- b) Dr. S. Rādhākṛishnan

- c) Dr. M. Iqbal
- d) Dr. M.N. Roy

**Answer:** (B)

111. Which one of the statements in the following does not reflect the true Gandhian perspective of thought?

- a) Non-violence is an active moral struggle against evil.
- b) Hate the sin and not the sinner.
- c) Punishment must be retributive in nature.
- d) Violence is not always wrong.

**Answer:** (C)

112. Match List – I with List – II and select the correct code as given:

List – I	List – II
(Religion)	(Aspiring Process)
a. Buddhism	i. Gunasthanek
b. Islam	ii. Namasmarana
c. Sikhism	iii. Astāngmarga
d. Jainism	iv. Praying five times a day

Codes:  
a b c d

- a) ii i iv iii
- b) i iii ii iv
- c) iii iv ii i
- d) iv ii i iii

**Answer:** (C)

113. 'Sarvadharmā Sambhava', according to Gandhi means

- a) All religions should be synthesised.
- b) All religions teach moral values.
- c) All religions are to be treated equally.
- d) There is the unity of all religions.

**Answer:** (C)

114. Which one of the following is a fundamental law of thought?

- a) Law of Reasoning
- b) Law of Excluded Middle
- c) Law of Compatibility
- d) Law of Double Negation

**Answer:** (B)

115. True knowledge according to J. Krishnamurti is

- a) Revealed by mystics
- b) Conditioned by experience
- c) Obtained by religious reflection
- d) Unconditional awareness

**Answer:** (D)

116. Truth of reason is justified by
- a) Law of contradiction and principles of sufficient reason
  - b) Principles of sufficient reason alone
  - c) Law of contradiction alone
  - d) Laws of intuitive imagination

**Answer:** (C)

117. Which one of the following sets, in the context of ashrama dharma, is not matching?
- a) Gandhi – Brahmacharya and Grihastha
  - b) Śākara – Brahmacharya and Sanyas
  - c) Yājñavalkya – Grihastha and Sanyas
  - d) Vivekānanda – Brahmacharya and Grihastha

**Answer:** (D)

118. Who among the following propounded the concept of subject as freedom? \_

- a) K.C. Bhattacharya
- b) M.N. Roy
- c) A.K. Coomarswami
- d) S. Radhakrishnan

**Answer:** (A)

119. For Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Intellectual Knowledge is realised by

- a) Imagination and Sensation
- b) Analysis and Synthesis
- c) Synthesis and Abstraction
- d) Imagination and Abstraction

**Answer:** (B)

120. The idea of 'super mind' is connected with the philosophy of

- a) Dr. S. Radhakrishnan
- b) Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan
- c) Śri Aurobindo
- d) Dr. K.C. Bhattacharya

**Answer:** (C)

121. Who is the author of the book 'Commentaries on Living'?

- a) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
- b) Śri J. Krishnamurti
- c) M. N. Roy
- d) Śri K.C. Bhattāchārya

**Answer:** (B)

122. Who amongst the following is considered as pioneering in establishing the Ramkrishnan Math & Mission?

- a) Śri Ramkrishna Paramhansa
- b) Śri Ramana Maharshi
- c) Swami Vivekanand
- d) Śri Ranganāthānand Maharāj

**Answer: (C)**

123. Match List – I with List – II and select correct answer by using the given code:

List – I

(Books)

- a. Religion of Man
- b. Freedom from the Known
- c. Eastern Religion and Western Thought
- d. The Life Divine

List – II

(Authors)

- i. Śri Aurobindo
- ii. Śri R. Tagore
- iii. Śri J. Krishnamurti
- iv. S. Radhakrishnan

Codes:  
a b c d

a) i iii ii iv

b) ii i iv iii

c) iii iv i ii

d) ii iii iv i

**Answer: (D)**

124. Which pair correctly matches in following the cause of Neo-Buddhist thought in India in contemporary times?

- a) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan
- b) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Lokmanya Tilak, Śri M.G. Ranade
- c) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Śri D.D. Kosambi, Dr. Rahul Sa kityāyana
- d) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Śri J. Krishnamurti, Sri Dalai Lama

**Answer: (C)**

125. According to G. E. Moore whenever there is a conflict between a philosophical doctrine and common sense, it was more likely that

- a) Common sense has gone astray than that philosophical doctrine had done so.
- b) The argument has gone astray than that the common sense had done so.
- c) Both argument and common sense have gone astray.
- d) Neither the argument nor common sense had gone astray.

**Answer: (B)**

126. Match Set – I and Set – II and select the correct answer from the code:

List – I

(Thinkers)

- a. Śri Aurobindo
- b. R.N. Tagore
- c. K.C. Bhattacharya
- d. Vivekananda

List – II

(Doctrines/Sayings)

- i. Biological & spiritual aspects of man
- ii. Self-evident elaboration of the self-evident
- iii. Universal Religion
- iv. Psychic transformation

Codes:

a b c d

a) i ii iii iv

b) iv i ii iii

c) iv ii i iii

d) ii i iii iv

**Answer: (B)**

127. According to Shankar Brahman is away from which of the following three distinctions?

- a) Homogenous distinction, Heterogeneous distinction, internal distinction
- b) Waking experience, Dreaming experience, Dreamless experience
- c) Experimental contradiction, Logical contradiction, illogical contradiction
- d) None of above

**Answer:** (A)

128. Select the correct descending order of Tirthankaras in the context of their period:

- a) R. abhanātha, Anantanatha, Shantinātha, Nemināth, Mahāveera
- b) Anantanatha, Shantinātha, R. abhanātha, Mahāveera, Nemināth
- c) Padmaprabha, Ajitanatha, Mallinātha, R. abhanātha, Shantinātha
- d) R. abhanātha, Anantanatha, Sambhavanātha, Ajitanatha, Mahavira

**Answer:** (A)

129. Which of the following is a prophetic religion?

- a) Hinduism
- b) Islam
- c) Buddhism
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (B)

130. Who is the author of 'The Essential Unity of all Religions'?

- a) Radhakrishnan
- b) Tagore
- c) Bhagwandas
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (C)

131. In Russell's philosophy, logical atomism and theory of truth go together

- a) Correspondence
- b) Pragmatic
- c) Coherence
- d) Semantic

**Answer:** (A)

132. Who has said that "The Whole of the Western World is sitting on a Volcano which may burst tomorrow, go to pieces tomorrow."?

- a) K.C. Bhattacharyya
- b) Radhakrishnan
- c) Krishnamurti
- d) Vivekānand

**Answer:** (D)

133. Which modern Indian Philosopher propounds that rebirth is essential for individual/soul evolution?

- a) Gandhi
- b) K.C. Bhattacharyya

- c) Iqbal
- d) Sri Aurobindo

**Answer: (D)**

134. According to Rāmānuja, Iswara consists of

- a) Sajatiya Bheda
- b) Vijātiya Bheda
- c) Svagata Bheda
- d) None of the above

**Answer: (C)**

135. The theory of error accepted by Samkara is known as

- a) Akhyativada
- b) Anirvacaniyakhyativada
- c) Anyathakhyativada
- d) Satkhyativada

**Answer: (B)**

136. For Gandhi, the political and economic organization of the State should be based on

- a) Growing mechanization and physical satisfactions
- b) The moral and intellectual development of the individual
- c) Full state control and direction
- d) By representation of workers

**Answer: (B)**

137. Gandhi's solution of all social problems ultimately rests on

- a) Establishing the kingdom of God on earth
- b) Total and unprecedented humanistic outlook
- c) Total self-sacrificing
- d) Total love and feeling for all

**Answer: (A)**

138. Gandhi developed the ideology of 'Sarvodaya'

- a) Through the influencing writings of Henry David and Thoreau
- b) Through the influencing writings of Srimad Rajchandra
- c) Through the influencing writings of Ruskin
- d) Through the influencing writings of Leo Tolstoy

**Answer: (C)**

139. For Gandhi, the method of nonviolence has to be

- a) Non-involving at all with others
- b) Non-involving in conflicts with others
- c) Defying the enemy and still winning and converting him
- d) All of the above

**Answer: (C)**

140. Non-violence as a law of love is

- a) Loving those that are affectionate

- b) Loving those whom one likes
- c) Loving those who even hate one
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (C)

141. Point out from the following reason why Dr. B.R. Ambedkar opposes the caste system prevalent in India?

- a) .... as it creates discrimination, social injustice and inequality within the Indian Nation.
- b) .... as it is foreign innovation.
- c) .... as it is vedic heritage.
- d) .... as it is suggested by smritis.

**Answer:** (A)

142. The theory of evolution accepted by SriAurobindo is known as

- a) Emergent Evolution
- b) Mechanical Evolution
- c) Integral Evolution
- d) None of the above

**Answer:** (C)

143. To whom of the following statement can be rightfully attributed to 'He reads Shankara from a Hegelian point of view'?

- a) Swami Vivekananda
- b) Sri Aurobindo
- c) Dr. S. Radhakrishnan
- d) J. Krishnamurthy

**Answer:** (B)

144. True knowledge according to J.Krishnamurthy is as follows:

- a) Accepted by Religious Text
- b) Prescribed by masters
- c) Unconditional awareness
- d) Conditional reactions

**Answer:** (C)

145. Mahatma Gandhi criticized industrialisation in one of the following writings:

- a) Autobiography
- b) Hind Swaraj
- c) Key to health
- d) Harijan

**Answer:** (B)

146. According to which theory truth depends upon practical consequences?

- a) Correspondence theory
- b) Coherence theory
- c) Pragmatic theory
- d) Semantic theory

**Answer:** (C)

147. The University Grants Commission was constituted on the recommendation of:

- a) Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan Commission
- b) Mudaliar Commission
- c) Sargent Commission
- d) Kothari Commission

**Answer: (A)**

148. Which one of the following have a profound impact on the development of Gandhi's holistic thinking on humanity, nature and their ecological interrelations?

- a) Jain teachings
- b) Christian sermons
- c) Bhagavad Gita
- d) Ruskin and Tolstoy

**Answer: (C)**

149. Gandhi's overall social and environmental philosophy is based on human beings':

- a) need
- b) desire
- c) wealth
- d) welfare

**Answer: (A)**

150. Who was the first man to advocate the concept of Swaraj?

- a) Swami Dayanand Saraswati
- b) Swami Vivekananda
- c) HP Blavatsky
- d) Annie Besant

**Ans: A**

151. Gandhiji's deep concern for the disadvantaged, the poor and rural population created an ambience for an alternative:

- a) rural policy
- b) social thinking
- c) urban policy
- d) economic thinking

**Answer: (B)**

152. Gandhi's active non-violence is derived from:

- a) Moral restraint of not injuring another being
- b) Having liberties, desires and acquisitiveness
- c) Freedom of action
- d) Nature-blind technology and enslavement of human spirit and energies

**Answer: (A)**

153. The University Grants Commission (UGC) was formally inaugurated on 28 December 1953 by whom among the following?

- a) Sh. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad

- b) Dr. Rajendra Prasad
- c) Mrs. Indira Gandhi
- d) Dr. S. Radhakrishnan

**Answer: (A)**

**155.** Which system of education was propounded by Mahatma Gandhi?

- a) Teaching by activities
- b) Teaching through music
- c) Teaching through listening, meditation etc.
- d) All of these.

**Answer: d**

**156.** *The founder of Ramakrishna Mission, which is based on the principles of Practical Vedanta was:*

- a) Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa
- b) Swami Vivekananda
- c) Swami Yogananda
- d) Swami Brahmananda

**Answer: b**

**157.** Why did Gandhiji organise Satyagrah in 1917 in Kheda district of Gujarat?

- a) To support the plantation workers
- b) To protest against high revenue demand
- c) To support the mill workers to fulfil their demand
- d) To demand loans for the farmers

**Answer: b**

**158.** Why was Satyagrah organised in Champaran in 1916?

- a) To oppose the British laws
- b) To oppose the plantation system
- c) To oppose high land revenue
- d) To protest against the oppression of the mill workers

**Answer: b**

**159.** What kind of movement was launched by the tribal peasants of Gudam Hills in Andhra Pradesh?

- a) Satyagrah Movement
- b) Militant Guerrilla Movement
- c) Non-Violent Movement
- d) None of the above

**Answer: b**

**160.** Why did Gandhiji withdraw the Non-Cooperation Movement? [Delhi 2011]

- a) Gandhiji realised that people were losing interest in the movement.
- b) Gandhiji felt that the movement was turning violent in many places.
- c) Some Congress leaders wanted to participate in elections to Provincial Councils.
- d) Some Congress leaders wanted more radical mass agitations.

**Answer: b**

**161.** 'Hind Swaraj' was written by:

- a) Abul Kalam Azad
- b) Mahatma Gandhi
- c) Sardar Patel
- d) Subhas Chandra Bose

Answer: b

**162.** What does satyagraha mean? Choose one from the following options.

- a) 'Satyagraha' means use of physical force to inflict pain while fighting.
- b) 'Satyagraha' does not inflict pain, it is a non-violent method of fighting against oppression.
- c) 'Satyagraha' means passive resistance and is a weapon of the weak.
- d) 'Satyagraha' was a racist method of mass agitation.

Answer: b

**163.** Who was the writer of the book 'Hind Swaraj'?

- a) Rabindranath Tagore
- b) B.R. Ambedkar
- c) Mahatma Gandhi
- d) Jawahar Lai Nehru

Answer: c

**164.** " are the eyes of all human beings"

In the above Thirukkural, which one of the below are identified by Thiruvalluvar as the eyes of all human beings :

- a) Virtue and wealth
- b) Impartiality and self control
- c) Wealth and love
- d) Numbers and letters

Answer: d

**165.** "Dare to do a thing..... it is shameful to say"

As per the above Thirukkural, how should we enter an action?

- a) After accumulating enormous wealth
- b) After charity
- c) After a mature thought
- d) At an appropriate time

Answer: c

**166.** "Speak out your speech, when once 'tis past dispute That none can utter speech that shall your speech refute." What does Thiruvalluvar mean by "that shall your speech" ?

- a) A synonym of the word used by you.
- b) A substitute word.
- c) A translated word for the word used by you.
- d) That word of yours which cannot be won by others

Answer: d

**167.** " if they fail to control it, their words will lose weight and sorrow and grief will overwhelm them".

In the above Thirukkural, Thiruvalluvar emphasizes the importance to control one's tongue. According to him, this is applicable to :

- a) The wealthy
- b) The Poor
- c) The Good human beings
- d) Everyone

Answer: d

**168.** "Incomings may be scant; but yet, no failure there, if in expenditure you rightly learn to spare". What do you infer from the above ?

- a) Work hard to increase your income.
- b) Though income is limited, one can live without any misery, if the outflow is carefully managed
- c) Completely restrict the outflow regardless of your income.
- d) Increase both the income and the outflow.

Answer: b

**169.** "To use ..... is to make choice of unripe fruits to ripe fruits". In the above Thirukkural, according to Thiruvalluvar, which one, when spoken is equivalent to choosing unripe to ripe fruits ?

- a) Truth instead of falsity.
- b) Rebirth instead of the current birth.
- c) Bitter words instead of sweet words
- d) Talking about arrogance instead of humility.

Answer: c

**170.** (i) "What is called Truth of True word..... "  
(ii) "External cleanliness can be had by use of ....."

Considering both the above Thirukkural together, which one of the following would be the most important outcome?

- a) Falsehood
- b) Truthfulness
- c) External cleanliness
- d) Blameless good

Answer: b

**171.** "All men that live are one in circumstances of birth;..... "

According to the above Thirukkural, differences among the individuals in a society are due to:

- (i) Quality of their actions.
- (ii) Amount of wealth possessed by their kith and kin.

- a) (i) only
- b) (ii) only
- c) Both (i) and (ii)
- d) None of the above

Answer: a

**172.** What is the importance of Thirukkural as a secular literature?

- a) Being secular, its values are not just confined to any particular religion and it is applicable to the

- entire humanity.
- b) Its focus on human welfare.
  - c) Reading Thirukkural strengthened the secular vision of the founding fathers of our nation.
  - d) All the above
- Answer: d

**173.** Who was the best commentator on the Kural?

- a) Kambar
- b) Agastya
- c) Parimelalagar
- d) Kalanchapulavar

Answer: c

**174.** 'Feminist movements' are aimed at:

- a) Liberty
- b) Equality
- c) Participation
- d) Power

Answer: b

**175.** Which one of the following is not a cause of communalism? [CBSE 2011]

- a) Religion is taken as the basis of the nation
- b) When one religion is discriminated against other
- c) State has no official religion
- d) Demands of one religious group are formed in opposition to another

Answer: c

**176.** Which of the following divisions is unique to India? [CBSE 2011]

- a) Gender division
- b) Caste division
- c) Economic division
- d) Religious division

Answer: b

**177.** Which leaders worked for the elimination of caste system in India?

- a) Jotiba Phule, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Mahatma Gandhi and Periyar Ramaswami Naicker
- b) Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and Mahatma Gandhi
- c) Jotiba Phule, Periyar Ramaswami Naicker and Mahatma Gandhi
- d) Swami Vivekananda, Jotiba Phule and Raja Ram Mohan Roy

Answer: a

**178.** Name the philosopher who believed that freedom is the keynote of spiritual life?

- a) Gopalakrishna Gokhale
- b) Nehru
- c) Ambedkar
- d) Vivekananda

Answer: d

**179.** Who is the chief exponent of Twonation theory

- a) Vivekananda
- b ) Gokhale
- c) Gandhiji
- d) Mohammed Ali Jinnah

**Answer: d**

**180.** The doctrine of Hindutva was expounded by

- a) V.D.Savarkar
- b) Tilak
- c) Gandhiji
- d) Nehru

**Answer: a**

**181.** Tilak regarded that Swaraj was not only a right but a

- a) Justice
- b) Dharma
- c) power
- d) Status

**Answer: b**

**182.** Sree Narayana Guru was born in :

- a) Sivagiri
- b ) Aruvipuram
- c) Chempazanthi
- d) Kollam

**Answer: c**

**183.** Who regarded the villages as the centre of Indian economic organization?

- a) Gandhiji
- b) Vivekananda
- c) Raja Ram Mohan Roy
- d) Thilak

**Answer: a**

**184.** Gandhism is not merely a political creed it is

- a) A programme of action
- b) A message
- c) theory
- d) Working class movement

**Answer: b**

**185.** Who is regarded as the pragmatic social reformer?

- a) Nehru
- b) Thilak
- c) Sree Narayana Guru
- d) Mahathma Gandhi

**Answer: c**

**186.** Who condemned Gandhism as a reactionary social philosophy?

- a) Gopalakrishna Gokhale
- b) M.N.Roy
- c) Nehru
- d) Lohia

**Answer: b**

**187.** Independent India was founded by :

- a) Gopalakrishna Gokhale
- b) Thilak
- c) M.N. Roy
- d) Jayaprakas Narayanan

**Answer: c**

**188.** Doctrine of Total Revolution was expounded by

- a) Jayaprakas Narayanan
- b) M.N Roy
- c) Gandhiji
- d) Thilak

**Answer: a**

**189.** Radical Democratic party was organised by

- a) Lohia
- b) M.N.Roy
- c) Jayaprakash Narayanan
- d) Thilak

**Answer: b**

**190.** Who is the champion of the doctrine of 'social revolution through human Revolution'?

- a) M.N.Roy
- b) Lohia
- c) Jayaprakash Narayanan
- d) Nehru

**Answer: c**

**191.** The central teaching of Gandhi's thought is :

- a) truth
- b) love
- c) religion
- d) spirituality

**Answer: a**

**192.** Gandhi understood the facts of non- violence from the teachings of:

- a) Buddhism and Jainism
- b) Advaita
- c) Christianity

d) Islam

**Answer: a**

193 ranked the first among the influences which moulded Gandhi.

a) Upanishads

b) Quran

c) Bible

d) Gita.

**Answer: d**

194 is considered as the most important teaching of Gandhi.

a) Love of humanity

b) Love of God

c) Truth is God

d) God is love

**Answer: c**

195. Truth to Gandhi is not an epistemological presupposition but an :

a) psychological notion

b) ontological implication

c) epistemological notion

d) none of these

**Answer: c**

196. According to Gandhi nothing is exist inreality expect:

a) love

b) goodness

c) beauty

d) truth

**Answer: d**

197. The essential nature of God is described by Gandhi by the phrase:

a) Sarveswaran

b) Svarupan

c) Satchidananda

d) Iswara

**Answer: c**

198 Upanishad made a deep influence upon Ganhi

a) Mandukhya

b) Chandokhya

c) Isavasym

d) Brahadaranya

**Answer: b**

199. To Gandhi is the aim of life.

a) self-realization

b) freedom

- c) liberation
- d) independence

**Answer: a**

200. Tolstoy's " " made much impression upon Gandhi.

- a) Unto This Last
- b) Enlightens
- c) The Kingdom of God within You
- d) None of these

**Answer: c**

201. The identity of the subject and object consciousness adopting the form of external object is known as

- (a) Perception.
- (b) Inference,
- (c) Scriptures.
- (d) All of these.

202. The relation of subject and object in perception, according to Vedanta, is

- (a) Identical.
- (b) Different,
- (c) Contradictory
- (d) None of these.

203. The knowledge which results by the past impressions based upon the awareness of concomitance is known as

- (a) Perception.
- (b) Inference,
- (c) Scriptures.
- (d) All of these.

204. The most important pramana, according to Advaita Vedanta, is

- (a) Perception.
- (b) Inference,
- (c) Scriptures.
- (d) All of these.

205. While Nyaya admits as many as five stages in the process of inference, Samkara has admitted

- (a) Three.
- (b) Seven.
- (c) Two.
- (d) None of these.

206. The best theory of Pramanas in Indian philosophy has been presented by

- (a) Nyaya.
- (b) Samkhya.
- (c) Advaita Vedanta.
- (d) None of these.

207. The most, important source of knowledge, according to Indian philosophy is

- (a) Scriptures.
- (b) Inference,
- (c) Perception.
- (d) All of these.

208. The imposition of some external objects upon the self, according to Samkara, means

- (a) Atmakhyativada.
- (b) Anyathakhyativada.
- (c) Akhyativada.
- (d) Asatkhyativada.

209. The theory of error known as Atmakhyativada in Indian philosophy has been presented by

- (a) Advaita vedanta.
- (b) Samkhya.
- (c) Nyaya.
- (d) Mimamsa.

210. The theory of imposition of a mental concept upon the external world is known as

- (a) Atmakhyativada.
- (b) Akhathakhyativada.
- (c) Mmyativada.
- (d) Asatkhyativada.

211. The imposition of an object upon another due to illusion is known as

- (a) Atmakhyativada.
- (b) Anyathakhyativada.
- (c) Akhyativada.
- (d) Asatkhyativada.

212. The imagination of quality in a thing which has been the subject of imposition of the object having that quality leads to the error known as

- (a) Atmakhyativada.
- (b) Anyathakhyativada.
- (c) Akhyativada.
- (d) Asatkhyativada.

213. The imposition of some quality in a thing where it is not, is known as

- (a) Avidya.
- (b) Adhyasa.
- (c) Akhyati.
- (d) None of these.

214. The proper cause of adhyasa, according to Samkara, is

- (a) Avidya.
- (b) Maya.
- (c) Vyavahara.

(d)All of these.

215. The world, according to Samkara, is

- (a)Real.
- (b)Unreal.
- (c)Illusory.
- (d)None of these.

216. In Indian philosophy the theory of error has been mostly utilised in the field of

- (a)Metaphysics.
- (b)Epistemology.
- (c)Axiology.
- (d)All of these.

217. Samkara has utilised the Adhyasa to explain

- (a)Nature of Brahman.
- (b)Nature of self.
- (c)Nature of world.
- (d)Nature of liberation.

218. The proper nature of Adhyasa can be explained as

- (a)Knowledge.
- (b)Ignorance,
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

219. The right knowledge, according to Samkara, is known as

- (a)Vidya.
- (b)Avidya.
- (c)Adhyasa.
- (d)Maya.

220. The knowledge known as Pramana is gained by

- (a)Soul.
- (b)Jiva.
- (c)Sense organs.
- (d)None of these.

221. The knowledge which the Jiva attains without any help is known as

- (a)pratyaksha
- (b)Paroksha
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

222. The knowledge of a thing by means of Hetu, according to Jain's is known as

- (a)Pratyaksha.
- (b)Paroksha.
- (c)Both of them.

(d)None of these.

223. Knowledge according to Nyaya, can be properly described as

- (a)Prama
- (b)Aprarna
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

224. Uncontradicted knowledge arising out of the sense object contact is known as

- (a)Perception.
- (b)Inference,
- (c) Comparison.
- (d)Testimony.

225. The most important source of knowledge according to Nyaya philosophy is

- (a)Perception.
- (b)Inference,
- (c) Comparison.
- (d)Testimony.

226. Anuma knowledge according to Nyaya is

- (a)Perception.
- (b)Inference.
- (c) Comparison.
- (d)Testimony.

227. The proper means of anumana according to Nyaya is

- (a)Perception.
- (b)Hetu.
- (c) Sadhya.
- (d)Paksha.

228. Liberation, as becoming a part of God, according to Ramanuja is known as

- (a)Salokya.
- (b)Samipya.
- (c) Sanidhya.
- (d)Sayujya.

229. Liberation, as nearness to Ishwara according to Ramanuja is known as

- (a)Salokya.
- (b)Samipya.
- (c) Sanidhya.
- (d)Sayujya.

230. The important means for achievement or liberation, according to Samkara, is

- (a)Distinction of self and not-self.
- (b)Concentration on Om.
- (c) Religious practices.

(d) All of these.

231. The main theories concerning the intrinsic values are

- (a) Axiological subjectivists.
- (b) Objective theory.
- (c) Both of them.
- (d) None of these.

232. The extrinsic values mainly include

- (a) Wealth.
- (b) Things.
- (c) Property.
- (d) All of these.

233. Health can be classified as having the value of

- (a) Extrinsic.
- (b) Intrinsic.
- (c) Instrumental.
- (d) None of these.

234. Beauty can be classified as having the value of

- (a) Instrumental.
- (b) Ultimate.
- (c) Extrinsic.
- (d) None of these.

235. Value can be properly defined as

- (a) Something important.
- (b) Object of effort.
- (c) Aim of life.
- (d) All of these.

236. Value is accompanied with

- (a) Beliefs.
- (b) Convictions,
- (c) Sacrifices.
- (d) All of these.

237. Value has been closely linked with interest. This statement has been given by

- (a) J.B. Perry.
- (b) J.S. Mackenzie,
- (c) J.S. Mill.
- (d) W. M. Urban.

238. According to psychologists, value is primarily concerned with:

- (a) Needs.
- (b) Sentiments,
- (c) Drives.

(d)All of these.

239. According to ethicists, values are concerned with

- (a)Morals.
- (b)Reasons,
- (c)Purposes.
- (d)All of these.

240. Axiological judgement shows the characteristics of

- (a)Inevitable.
- (b)Obligatory.
- (c)Based upon judgment.
- (d)All of these.

241. The materialists define value as

- (a)Material.
- (b)Mental.
- (c)Spiritual.
- (d)None of these.

242. The spiritualists define value as

- (a)Material.
- (b)Mental.
- (c)Spiritual.
- (d)None of these.

243. Values have been classified as

- (a)Intrinsic.
- (b)Extrinsic,
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

244. Goodwill, according to Immanuel Kant, is

- (a)Extrinsic value.
- (b)Intrinsic value.
- (c)Instrumental value.
- (d)None of these.

245. The ultimate good includes

- (a)Extrinsic value.
- (b)Intrinsic value.
- (c)Instrumental value.
- (d)None of these.

246. The ultimate human values are of the nature of

- (a)Physical.
- (b)Intellectual,
- (c)Spiritual.

(d)None of these.

247. Values can be classified as

- (a)Permanent.
- (b)Temporary,
- (c)Both of them
- (d)None of these.

248. The theory of liberation has been rejected in Indian philosophy by the school known as

- (a)The Charvaka.
- (b)The Jaina.
- (c)The Buddhists,
- (d)The Vedanta.

249. Liberation, according to Charvaka, can be said to be

- (a)Possible.
- (b)Impossible,
- (c)Foolish.
- (d)None of these.

250. Liberation, according to Jain philosophy, is

- (a)Freedom of matter.
- (b)Freedom from life and death.
- (c)Freedom from Karma.
- (d)All of these.

251. Liberation, according to Jain philosophy can be classified as

- (a)Bhava moksha.
- (b)Dravya moksha.
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

252. The state of Jivan mukti is included in

- (a)Bhava moksha.
- (b)Dravya moksha.
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

253. Liberation, according to Jaina, can be achieved by

- (a)Penance.
- (b)Self-control,
- (c)Detachment.
- (d)All of these.

254. Liberation, according to Buddha, means

- (a)Extinction.
- (b)Freedom.
- (c)Detachment.

(d)None of these.

255. Liberation in Buddhist philosophy is known as

- (a)Nirvana.
- (b)Moksha.
- (c) Mukti.
- (d)None of these.

256. The most important means for achieving Nirvana, according to Buddha, is

- (a)Eight-fold path,
- (b)Penance,
- (c) Detachment.
- (d)Mortification.

257. Nirvana in Buddhist texts has been described as

- (a)State of peace.
- (b)Eternal health,
- (c) Perfect freedom,
- (d)All of these.

258. Nirvana cannot be described as

- (a)Eternalism.
- (b)Nihilism.
- (c)Both
- (d)None of these.

259. The famous preaching of Nirvana to King Milinda were given by

- (a)Gautam Buddha.
- (b)Nagarjuna.
- (c) Nagasena.
- (d)None of these

260. The important forms of Nirvana include

- (a)Sopadhi sesa.
- (b)Nirupadhi sesa
- (c)Both of them.
- (d)None of these.

261. The world as suffering has been postulated by

- (a)Buddhism.
- (b)Samkhya.
- (c) Jainas.
- (d)All of these.

262. The cause of suffering, according to Samkhya, philosophy is

- (a)Ignorance.
- (b)Attachment,
- (c)Fear.

(d)None of these.

263. Liberation, according to Samkhya, can be attained by:

- (a) Knowledge.
- (b) Penance,
- (c) Enjoyment.
- (d) None of these.

264. The self in Samkhya philosophy is known as

- (a) Jiva.
- (b) Purusa.
- (c) Atman.
- (d) None of these.

265. The chief characteristics of purusa in Samkhya philosophy is

- (a) Transcendent.
- (b) Ever liberated,
- (c) Non-attached.
- (d) All of these.

266. The liberation by living, according to Samkhya philosophy, can be termed as

- (a) Jivanmukti.
- (b) Videhamukti.
- (c) Both of them.
- (d) None of these.

267. Liberation after death, according to Samkhya philosophy, can be termed as

- (a) jivanmukti.
- (b) videhamukti.
- (c) Both of them.
- (d) None of these.

268. The final state of liberation, according to Samkhya philosophy, is

- (a) Jivanmukti.
- (b) Videhamukti.
- (c) Both of them.
- (d) None of these.

269. Liberation and bondage, according to Samkhya philosophy, are of the nature of

- (a) Ultimate reality,
- (b) Practical reality,
- (c) Like dream.
- (d) None of these.

270. The main objection against Samkhya concept of liberation is based upon

- (a) The Purusa as agent.
- (b) No happiness in liberation.
- (c) Fallacies of evolution.

(d)All of these.

271. The best theory of liberation in Indian philosophy has been advanced by

- (a)The Jainas.
- (b)The Buddhists.
- (c)The Samkhya.
- (d)Advaita Vedanta.

272. According to Advaita Vedanta, the nature of liberation can be explained as

- (a)Brahman.
- (b)Atman.
- (c)Transcendental reality.
- (d)All of these.

273. Advaita Vedanta theory of liberation is based upon

- (a)The Vedas.
- (b)The Upanishads.
- (c)Bhagwadgita.
- (d)Brahmasutra.

274. The liberation in Advaita Vedanta is known as:

- (a)Nirvana.
- (b)Apavargh.
- (c)Moksha.
- (d)None of these.

275. To contribute to India's national integration education should

- (a)Make children familiar with all aspects of national life.
- (b)Reach each and every child of the country.
- (c)Be free and compulsory.
- (d)Be of high quality.

276. Indian education can promote national consciousness by

- (a)Breaking down regional and linguistic barriers.
- (b)Establishing more and more all India institutions which will admit students from different parts of the country.
- (c)Understanding and re-evaluating of India's cultural heritage.
- (d)All of these.

277. Who was the founder of Shanti Niketan ?

- (a)Tagore
- (b)Vivekananda
- (c)Gandhi
- (d)Sri Aurobindo.

278. under whose leadership is founded the University at Pondicherry?

- (a)Tagore
- (b)Vivekananda

- (c) Gandhi
- (d) Sri Aurobindo.

279. On whose philosophy is based the current primary education in India?

- (a) Tagore
- (b) Vivekananda
- (c) Gandhi
- (d) Sri Aurobindo.

280. Material and spiritual knowledge is already present in man covered by a 'curtain of ignorance-who said this?

- (a) Tagore
- (b) Vivekananda
- (c) Gandhi
- (d) Plato.

281. Vivekananda included study of religion, philosophy, Upanishadas and Puranas" to achieve

- (a) Spiritual development of the child.
- (b) Development of intellect of the child.
- (c) Propagation of Indian culture.
- (d) Complete development of child's personality.

282. Which of the following was not suggested as a method of education by Vivekananda?

- (a) Lecture-cum-discussion
- (b) Yoga
- (c) Meditation
- (d) Guided readings.

283. Vivekananda's philosophy of life was derived from

- (a) Buddhist philosophy.
- (b) Vedanta philosophy.
- (c) Sankhya philosophy.
- (d) Plato's Idealism.

284. Which of the following types represents M.K. Gandhi's contribution to education?

- (a) Integral education
- (b) Basic Education
- (c) Education for man making
- (d) Education for international understanding.

285. Which of the following types represents Vivekananda's contribution to education?

- (a) Integral education
- (b) Basic education
- (c) Education for man making
- (d) Education for International understanding.

286. Which of the following types represents Aurobindo's contribution to education?

- (a) Integral Education
- (b) Basic education

- (c) Education for man making
- (d) Education for international understanding.

287. As an educationist, Gandhiji was

- (a) A naturalist
- (b) An Idealist
- (c) Naturalist, an Idealist and a Pragmatist all together
- (d) A Pragmatist.

288. The ultimate aim of education, according to Gandhiji, was to help the individuals to be

- (a) Gainfully employed in life.
- (b) Peaceful and happy in life.
- (c) Able to acquire as much as possible from the ocean of knowledge.
- (d) Able to grow into a divine human being by realizing Godliness.

289. What did Gandhiji's philosophy of education stress as aim of education?

- (a) Social aims
- (b) Individual aims
- (c) Cultural aims
- (d) A synthesis of individual and social aims.

290. Rabindra Nath Tagore was a Naturalist because he said about children that

- (a) They should be made to develop into complete human being.
- (b) They should be given full freedom to live in natural environment and learn by doing.
- (c) They should be acquainted with the ideals and values of national culture.
- (d) They should be educated for national integration.

291. Tagore was an Idealist because he emphasized

- (a) Religious education in a formal manner.
- (b) Moral and spiritual development of the child.
- (c) Vocational education.
- (d) Rigid control and discipline in schools.

292. In Democracy educational pattern is planned after the interests of the many because

- (a) Democracy is the government of the many, by the many and for the many.
- (b) There are always too many illiterates in a democracy.
- (c) The ultimate authority determining educational policy in democracy is imminent in man.
- (d) Democracy has tremendous faith in hermen and their powers.

293. Aims of education are determined by human being for the good of the

- (a) Individual.
- (b) Society.
- (c) The individual and the society both.
- (d) Neither the individual nor the society.

294. India's constitutional value of "equality of all" is founded on several assumptions. Which of the following is not among these?

- (a) Claim of human dignity

- (b) All men have intrinsic worth
- (c) All men are alike by nature
- (d) All men are created equal.

295. In India's constitutional values equality applied to education means
- (a) To equalize the external or material circumstances of obtaining education.
  - (b) To impart same kind of education to all.
  - (c) To impart education to all up to the same level.
  - (d) To have same kinds of institutions for all in the society.

**296.** Which of the following does not contribute to India's national integration?

- (a) National system of education
- (b) Teaching history compulsorily in the school
- (c) National language
- (d) National curriculum.

297. Which of the following is not a national objective to be achieved through education in India?

- (a) Increasing productivity
- (b) Achieving social and national integration
- (c) Increasing children's creative ability
- (d) Accelerating process of modernization.

298. Development of which of the following is not an aim of democratic education?

- (a) Vocational efficiency
- (b) Educational leadership
- (c) Scientific and technical education
- (d) Democratic citizenship.

299. The Vedas teach us that creation is

- (a) Without beginning.
- (b) Without an end.
- (c) Without beginning and without an end.
- (d) Has a definite beginning and also an end.

300. Who said, "Without caring for all that is believed, reason it all out and having found that it will do good to you and all believe it, live up to it and help others to live up to it"?

- (a) Swami Vivekananda
- (b) Buddha
- (c) Kapila
- (d) Vyas.

201. (a) 202. (a) 203. (b) 204. (c)  
 205. (a) 206. (a) 207. (d) 208. (a)  
 209. (a) 210. (b) 211. (c) 212. (d)  
 213. (b) 214. (d) 215. (b) 216. (d)  
 217. (c) 218. (b) 219. (a) 220. (b)  
 221. (a) 222. (b) 223. (a) 224. (a)

225. (b) 226. (b) 227. (b) 228. (d)  
229. (b) 230. (d) 231. (c) 232. (d)  
233. (b) 234. (b) 235. (d) 236. (d)  
237. (a) 238. (d) 239. (d) 240. (d)  
241. (a) 242. (c) 243. (c) 244. (b)  
245. (b) 246. (c) 247. (c) 248. (a)  
249. (d) 250. (d) 251. (c) 252. (a)  
253. (d) 254. (a) 255. (a) 256. (a)  
257. (d) 258. (c) 259. (c) 260. (c)  
261. (d) 262. (a) 263. (a) 264. (b)  
265. (d) 266. (c) 267. (b) 268. (b)  
269. (b) 270. (d) 271. (d) 272. (d)  
273. (d) 274. (c) 275. (a) 276. (d)  
277. (a) 278. (d) 279. (c) 280. (b)  
281. (a) 282. (d) 283. (b) 284. (b)  
285. (c) 286. (a) 287. (c) 288. (d)  
289. (d) 290. (b) 291. (b) 292. (b)  
293. (c) 294. (c) 295. (a) 296. (b)  
297. (c) 298. (c) 299. (c) 300. (b)

301. The Gujarati translation of the 'Unto this Last' is called:

- a. Harijan
- b. Sarvodya
- c. Navajeevan
- d. Swadesi

**Answer: c**

302. Gandhi said, "For me there can be no politics without "

- a. Service
- b. religion
- c. will
- d. none of these

**Answer: a**

303. Gandhi believed in the sovereignty of the people based on pure

- a. rational authority
- b. political wisdom.
- c. moral authority
- d. knowledge

**Answer: d**

304. Which of the following statements is not correct about Dr. Ambedkar?

- (a) Dr. Bhimrao got married at the age of 15 years with a nine-year-old girl "Ramabai".
- (b) The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was based on the ideas of Ambedkar, which he recommended to the Hilton Young Commission.
- (c) He was the first Law and Justice Minister of independent India
- (d) He adopted Buddhism in 1965

**Answer: d**

**Explanation:** All options are correct except option d. Dr. Ambedkar adopted Buddhism in 1956.

305. When was Dr. Ambedkar given Bharat Ratna?

- (a) 1985
- (b) 1980
- (c) 1990
- (d) 1973

**Answer: c**

**Explanation:** Bharat Ratna was given to Dr. Ambedkar by the government of Vishwanath Pratap Singh in 1990.

306. What is the name of Dr. Ambedkar's memorial site?

- (a) Samta Sthal
- (b) Chaitya Bhoomi
- (c) Veer Bhumi
- (d) Buddhist Bhumi

**Answer: b**

**Explanation:** The name of Dr. Ambedkar's memorial site is Chaitya Bhoomi, which is in Mumbai, Maharashtra.

307. Which of the following political parties has not been formed by Dr. Ambedkar?

- (a) Indian Republican Party
- (b) Independent Labor Party
- (c) Scheduled Cast Federation
- (d) Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti

**Answer: d**

**Explanation:** A party called Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti was formed by Kanshi Ram not by Dr. Ambedkar.

308. Dr. Ambedkar was the chairman of which committee constituted to form the Indian Constitution?

- (a) Preamble Committee
- (b) Drafting Committee
- (c) Flag Committee
- (d) Union Constitution Committee

**Answer: b**

**Explanation:** Dr. Ambedkar was elected as the chairman of the drafting committee setup to form the Indian Constitution. A 7-member draft committee was formed for the framing of the constitution on 29 August 1947.

309. Which of the following books has not been written by Dr. Ambedkar?

- (a) Thoughts on Pakistan
- (b) Annihilation of caste
- (c) The problem of Rs: Origin and solution
- (d) Gandhi, Nehru, and Tagore

**Answer: d**

**Explanation:** Dr. Ambedkar has written all books except Gandhi, Nehru, and Tagore. Worth to mention, the problem of money: the origin and solution and the Annihilation of caste are among his

famous books.

310. Which of the following Indians participated in all three round table conferences?

- (a) Dr. Ambedkar
- (b) Mahatma Gandhi
- (c) Jawaharlal Nehru
- (d) Madan Mohan Malaviya

**Answer: a**

**Explanation:** Dr. Ambedkar participated in all the three Round Table Conferences. Gandhiji participated only in the Second Round Table Conference from the Congress side.

311. Who was the first and only Satyagrahi to perform "Satyagraha for drinking water"?

- (a) Mahatma Gandhi
- (b) Vallabhbhai Patel
- (c) Dr. Ambedkar
- (d) None of the above

**Answer: c**

**Explanation:** Dr. Ambedkar was the first and only Satyagrahi to conduct "Satyagraha for drinking water". On 20 March 1927, he also organized a satyagraha in the city of 'Mahad' to get the untouchable community the right to take water from the city's Chavdar pond.

312. Which of the following statements is not correct about Poona Pact?

- (a) Poona Pact was held on 24 September 1934
- (b) Poona Pact took place between Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar.
- (c) In Poona Pact, right to separate electorate and two votes for Dalits was abolished
- (d) After Poona Pact, the number of seats reserved for Dalits was increased from 71 in the Provincial Legislatures to 147 and 18% of the total seats in the Central Legislature.

**Answer: a**

**Explanation:** Poona Pact took place on 24 September 1932 between Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar. At this time Gandhiji was on a fast unto death in protest against the Communal Award at Yerwada Jail in Pune. It is said that Baba Saheb Bhimrao Ambedkar had signed the Poona Pact crying out of remorse.

313. Who was the author of the book "The Problem of the Rupee: Its Origin and Its Solution"?

- (a) Mahatma Gandhi
- (b) M.N Roy
- (c) B.R. Ambedkar
- (d) Sarojini Naidu

**Answer: c**

**Explanation:** The author of the book "The Problem of the Rupee" was Dr. Ambedkar. This book is one of his most popular books. Even today it is counted among the best selling books in India.

314. Who among the following established the 'Bahishkrit Hitakarini Sabha'?

- (a) Mahatma Phule
- (b) Dr. Ambedkar
- (c) Govind Ranade
- (d) Govind Vallabh Pant

**Answer: b**

**Explanation:** The 'Bahishkrit Hitakarini Sabha' was founded by Dr. Ambedkar in 1924 as an attempt to promote and uplift the education of untouchables.

315. Which of the following magazine was not launched by Dr. Ambedkar?

- (a) Mooknayak
- (b) Bahishkrit Bharat
- (c) Prabuddh Bharat
- (d) Saraswati

**Answer: d**

**Explanation:** In order to protect the rights of Dalits, Dr. Ambedkar had brought out five journals namely; Bahishkrit Bharat, Mooknayak, Samata, Prabuddh Bharat, and Janata.

316. What are trinity principles espoused by Dr. Ambedkar?

- a. Non-violence, Truth and Peace
- b. Non-Cooperation, Non-stealing and Non-equalization
- c. Revolution, Historical Materialism and Dialectical materialism
- d. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity

**Answer: (d)**

317. Which of the following, according to Gandhiji, is an essential principle of Satyagraha?

- a. Infinite capacity for suffering
- b. Non violence
- c. Truth
- d. All the three

**Ans: D**

**Explanation:** 'Satyagraha' is the most important weapon of Gandhiji. It emerged as a weapon of conflict resolution. Gandhiji applied satyagraha in the non-violent struggle against exploitation, injustice and dictatorship.

318. Gandhiji's "The Story of My Experiments with Truth" was originally written in Gujarati. Who translated it into English?

- a. Maganlal Gandhi
- b. Mahadev Desai
- c. Pyarelalji
- d. Sushila Nayyar

**Ans: B**

319. Indian Philosophy is

- a. Subjective in Nature
- b. Objective in nature
- c. Both
- d. None

**Ans: a**

320. Indian philosophy is

- a. Materialistic
- b. Spiritualistic
- c. Both

d. None

**Ans: b**

# **UNIT – 6**

Recent Western Philosophy

## **Applied Philosophy**

Applied philosophy is marked out from philosophy in general by its focus on matters of practical concern. It is often identified with applied ethics, but although this forms a large part of the area of applied philosophy, the broader term includes discussion of philosophical problems, some metaphysical, some epistemological, in fields such as law, education or art, that are not strictly or uniquely ethical. Applied ethics also includes the area of professional ethics; it examines the ethical dilemmas and challenges met with by workers in health-care, business and other areas where specific ethical issues such as confidentiality and truth-telling may arise.

## **The Proper Preoccupations of Philosophy**

Philosophy is often regarded as the most abstract of studies, so the term 'applied philosophy' needs some explanation. It represents the claim that it is possible to build bridges between theory and practice and, in particular, that philosophy is not only an internal movement in philosophy but that it can and should play a role in public debate. This should not be seen, though, as a bid to claim expertise on the part of philosophers but rather as a reassertion of the traditional conception of the philosopher, not as an expert, but as an honest and open seeker after truth. This search involves accepting the possibility of rational argument about normative directions. It does not mean, though, maintaining a posture of uninvolved neutrality. As philosophy, indeed, it involves a prior commitment to the values of rationality, impartiality and equality of respect for individuals, and these provide the foundation for the moral values and range of rights that are fundamental to applied ethics. Applied philosophy, then, is part of a whole view of the human condition and takes a broad view of ethical decision-making. It can therefore accept as part of its task the identification and discussion of values capable of securing widespread acceptance in the contemporary world. For philosophy has traditionally been concerned, not only with abstract reflection but also with questions about how we should live and how we should conduct our social life and political affairs.

Today's applied philosophy, then, marks a return to what have always been proper preoccupations of philosophers. Some of these preoccupations are old and could be said to have a perennial interest - intimate relationships and family life, for example, or global issues of peace and war. Others are the product of new technologies, revolutions in communication, new weapons of indiscriminate destruction, and an unprecedented increase in the impact of humans on their environment and support systems. Applied philosophy and especially applied ethics yields scope and space for discussion of these issues of public policy. To all these debates, it can bring clarity, openness, critical analysis, and respect for careful evaluation of arguments. At the same time, it represents a shift from the view that philosophy can only analyse and clarify problems but is not able to take on the task of seeking answers to them.

Applied philosophy differs in style and approach from some mainstream philosophy in other ways, too. It gives greater attention to context and to the detailed texture of complex situations and it is also more holistic in approach - that is to say, it is much more ready to include the insights of psychology, sociology and other relevant areas of knowledge in its deliberations, and to allow the facts it finds there to influence its conclusions. Its method of reasoning could be compared to that of a designer who starts with a blueprint, but has to adapt it to the materials to hand and to the situations in which it is required.

The origins and background of applied philosophy can be traced back to the first of the early Greek philosophers, Thales (c.585 BCE), who could well qualify as the first applied philosopher.

Having been scorned for his speculative and impractical interests - he was so preoccupied with studying the stars that he fell down a well!

- he decided, very successfully, to go into business and use those observations to make a fortune, thus demonstrating that philosophical abstraction had its uses, and even a potential cash-value.

Later schools of philosophy in ancient times - Pythagoreans, Epicureans, Stoics - offered their followers principles for living and guidance on life-style. Socrates (469-399 BCE.), too, while he avoided preaching any dogma, did offer in his own approach to life and also to death an example of a way of living appropriate to the pursuit of philosophy.

Plato (c.430-347 BCE), the chronicler of Socrates' discussions, described his own blueprint for the good society in his dialogue the Republic, which covered not only political arrangements, but also the way social life should be organised. He set out there his ideals for education, for sexual relations and reproduction, for art, literature and censorship.

In the modern period, too, many philosophers have applied their philosophical insights to practical issues. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) treated such topics as marriage and the family in his *Summa Theologiae*. John Locke (1632-1704) wrote on toleration, and also on education; his political theory also provided the philosophical underpinning of the American Declaration of Independence. The principle of human dignity formulated by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is central to most modern conventions of human rights, and Kant also treated the subject of suicide, and the question of whether it is ever right to tell a lie from benevolent motives - questions which continue to be important for medical ethics. Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73) have a continued if not always acknowledged influence on public policy, while Karl Marx's (1818-83) political philosophy has played a dramatic role in the shaping of the modern world.

Applied philosophy, then, is not a new subject. Nevertheless, it suffered a period of neglect as the pendulum in philosophy swung from the speculative metaphysics of the nineteenth century to the materialistic scientism of the twentieth.

A number of factors contributed to the return to applied ethics, dating from approximately the mid-twentieth century. Perhaps the most important of these was the development of new kinds of medical technology, particularly those involving new methods of reproduction, and those affecting the end of life; another has been controversy about war and international relations. The publication of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975) prompted increased academic debate about the relationship between humans and the animal world, and at the same time, there was a dawning public awareness of environmental threats on a global scale. Finally, interest in business and corporate ethics has grown, in reaction to scandals of public and business life. For all these reasons, then, and many others, applied philosophy has today entered a new, more self-conscious and better-defined phase of development.

## **PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY**

The philosophy of technology brings logical, metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political philosophical questions to bear on the making and using of artifacts. The particular balance among these questions will differ within related regionalizations of philosophy, such as the philosophy of science or the philosophy of art. In the philosophy of technology, for instance, epistemology typically plays a lesser role than in the philosophy of science but a greater role than in the philosophy of art. Any philosophical assessment of technology is thus partially defined by its own in-

ner balance in relation to philosophy as a whole.

## Historical Emergence

Although limited discussions of techne and associated or derivative phenomena can be found in ancient, medieval, and early modern philosophy, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that technology, as something distinct from technics or technique, became a subject for theoretical examination. Among the earliest contributing texts, the mechanical engineer Franz Reuleaux's *Theoretische Kinematik* (1875) developed an extended conceptual analysis of different types of tools and machines. More generally, Ernst Kapp's *Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik* (1877), in the first book to use "philosophy of technology" in its title, outlined a theory of culture grounded in technics understood as the extension and differentiation of human anatomy and physiology. The hammer, for instance, functions as an extension of the fist, the camera as an extension of the eye, and the railroad as an extension of the circulatory system; and vice versa, the fist can be said to be like a hammer, the eye like a camera, and rail lines like blood vessels. Elaborations of this view of technology as organ projection are representative of a school of what Carl Mitcham (1994) calls engineering philosophy of technology, an approach that was further developed in the work of thinkers as diverse as the Russian Peter Englemeier, the German Friedrich Dessauer, the Frenchman Gilbert Simondon, and the Spaniard Juan David García Bacca (all of whom have been largely ignored in Anglo American philosophy).

The research engineer Dessauer, for instance, developed a neo-Kantian critique of the transcendental possibility of technological invention that sees technology as bringing noumenal power into the world. Dessauer was also instrumental in promoting philosophical discussion within the *Verein Deutscher Ingenieure* (VDI; Society of German Engineers). The psychologist Simondon explored relations among parts, artifacts, and technical systems and the evolutionary manifestation of what he called technicity. The engineer Englemeier and the philosopher García Bacca both saw technological change engendering world-historical transformations that were at once humanizing and transcending of the merely organically human. Additional contributions to this school can be found in theoretical discussions about cybernetics and artificial intelligence. Also illustrative of achievements in engineering-oriented philosophy of technology are the scientific philosopher Mario Bunge's (1985) systematic metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of technology and the engineer Billy Vaughn Koen's (2003) brief for engineering as the one right method for problem solving.

In its emergence, however, philosophy of technology was more commonly associated with what might be called a counterphilosophy that interprets technology not as extending but as encroaching on or narrowing the dimensions of human experience. Following Immanuel Kant's attempt "to deny [scientific] knowledge, in order to make room for faith," this humanities philosophy of technology has sought to limit technological thought and practice to make room for human culture in all its rich diversity. A case in point is the public intellectual Lewis Mumford's (1967) criticism of what he calls monotechnics, the technics of power, in contrast to poly- or biotechnics. The problem with monotechnics is that it promotes the pursuit of physical power and control at the expense of other aspects of human flourishing such as friendship and art. For Mumford the "myth of the machine" is to think that power is the source of all human benefit. In fact, it constitutes an unrealistic narrowing of human activity. Some version of this argument has been promoted especially by the continental European philosophical tradition in the works of José Ortega y Gasset (1939), Martin Heidegger (1954), and Jacques Ellul (1954). Indeed, even more broadly, the relation between technology and life—whether in the sense of *zoe* (organic existence) or *bios* (human flourishing)—has become one of the most crucial issues in both the metaphysics and ethics of

technology.

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the argument for delimitation had the unintended side effect of relegating technology to marginal status in professional philosophy. Only as technology became more than an engineering interest or a social problem has it begun to be a mainstream topic in philosophy. One of the challenges in the twenty-first century will be to pursue the professional development of philosophical reflection on technology in ways that bridge the oppositions inherent in its bimodal historical origins without compromising their basic if divergent concerns.

## **Ethical and Political Issues**

Because of their prominence in public affairs, the philosophy of technology properly highlights ethical and political issues. Indeed, contemporary work in practical or applied ethics—as in nuclear, environmental, biomedical, and computer ethics—emphasizes the moral challenges of technology, although in ways that sometimes reduce the field to an aggregate of different ethics for different technologies. Such subspeciation can deprive ethics of possible synergistic strengths. Access equity issues, for instance, occur in both biomedicine and computers, and the concepts and principles for dealing with one might well inform or enhance the other. Speaking generally, then, one can identify at least six competing and overlapping interpretations of technology as an ethical or political problem. Three of these arose initially before World War II, although they have continued to cast a shadow of concern, often in new and distinctive forms.

First, there is a problem of the just distribution of technological products and powers—that is, technology as a political issue. Since the Industrial Revolution the social-justice question has found numerous expressions in authoritarian and democratic regimes, in developing and developed countries. Authoritarian regimes have often justified themselves as acting to promote access to technological benefits against entrenched special scientific, technical, or corporate interests or against those whose commitment to equality undermines the invention and production of goods and services. Democratic regimes have placed more emphasis on promoting equality by means of due process and regulatory agencies. One aspect of due process that has been given special philosophical attention concerns the legal protocols to promote free and informed consent, extending the concept from human experimentation to engineering at large (Martin and Schinzing 2005).

With the engineered design of new products and processes social justice issues have often taken special form in association with some otherwise morally neutral concepts. The advent of electronic computer and Internet communications, for instance, has helped impart ethical significance to questions of privacy and the so-called "digital divide." Additionally, according to Ulrich Beck (1992), concerns for the fair distribution of goods and services were, during the late twentieth century, superseded by those dealing with the fair distribution of dangers and risks, thus giving social justice debates a special twist. One of the strongest criticisms of some of the resulting twists and turns has been Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette's (1991) careful dissecting of the antidemocratic assumptions of much risk-cost-benefit analysis.

Second is the problem of the alienation of workers from their labor in the industrial means of production, which has been presented especially by Marxists as an economic and by some non-Marxist social scientists as a psychological issue. Langdon Winner's (1977) analysis of the theory of autonomous technology or the idea that technology as resistant to human control is a more general statement of the issue. Critical theory work by Herbert Marcuse (1964) and Andrew Feen-

berg (1991, 1999) extended the classic Marxist discussion into situations reconfigured by consumerist culture and globalization. Opposing Marcuse's pessimism about transformation, Feenberg (especially 1995) has been more optimistic about alternative possibilities. Environmentalists, however, have further argued that technology in general alienates human beings from nature.

Don Ihde's (1990) phenomenology of the techno-lifeworld offers another take on this issue through an analysis of human—technology—world relations. Two fundamental types of such engagements are instrumental relations, in which the technology is integrated into the human sensorium as its extension (the blind man's cane), and hermeneutic relations, in which the technology becomes part of the world to be interpreted (a thermometer). Both engagements manifest an invariant structure that amplifies some aspect of the world (exact metric of temperature) while simultaneously reducing others (general sense of climate). The former tends to bring humans closer to the world, the latter to distance (or alienate) them from it.

Third is the problem of the destruction or transformation of culture by modern science and technology—either directly through new weapons and forms of military conflict or indirectly through the impact of new means of transportation, communication, and media. The destruction of World War I, the most violent in human history, was a manifestation of technology that only became worse during World War II with the development of nuclear weapons. The long cold war practice of nuclear deterrence and the early twenty-first-century challenges of terrorism present special problems for learning to manage the destructive potential in technology.

Between the two world wars concern for the more indirect technological transformation of culture took on special salience, as variously illustrated by the cultural lag theory of the American sociologist William Fielding Ogburn, the elegiac ruminations of the Catholic theologian Romano Guardini, or the active nihilistic enthusiasms of Ernst Jünger. In the latter half of the twentieth century the issue found small-scale manifestation in personal efforts to come to terms with new choices (e.g., in diet, drugs, and consumer lifestyle options) and large-scale manifestation in debates about the dynamics of sociotechnical change (e.g., the role of technology in economic development and technological determinism versus social constructionism). Questions can also arise about the transformed character of cultural life under the influence of information and image technologies, from television to the Internet and virtual reality machines.

Since World War II three more issues have emerged to ethical and political prominence. One is that of democratic participation. An anticipatory version of this issue emerged in interwar proposals for technocracy. For some theorists (such as Thorstein Veblen) rule by technical elites offered a better alternative than rule by economic or political elites. However, in the postwar revival of democratic theory, and with recognition that technology (like law) is a creation that also influences the creators, it was argued that the principle of "no taxation without representation" should be extended to "no innovation without representation" (Goldman 1992). Winner, for instance, describes "technologies as forms of life" and calls for the abandonment of "technological somnambulism" (1986, p. 10) in favor of public debate about the design of technological projects as diverse as highway bridges, tomato harvesters, and nuclear power plants. Efforts to determine how such democratic participation should be structured both within communities of technical expertise and in the negotiations between technical experts and the nontechnical public have been the subject of ongoing debates.

Fifth is the industrial pollution of the natural environment, which has contributed to attempts to develop an appropriate environmental or ecological ethics. What is the difference between artifice and nature—and the moral status of wilderness or the nonhuman environment? As nature is hu-

manly transformed, to what extent should contemporary technological action take into account the welfare of future generations, whether human or nonhuman? What is the relation between values that are divided between the anthropocentric and ecocentric, extrinsic or instrumental and intrinsic?

Another morally relevant concept, closely related to issues of both participation and environmentalism, is that of unintended consequences. To what extent are scientists and engineers responsible for the unexpected and perhaps even unforeseeable results of their technological actions? Two attempts to deal with the plethora of environmental issues, especially in relation to the challenge of unintended consequences, are those associated with sustainable development and the precautionary principle—with competing interpretations of both becoming major themes of moral and political deliberations.

Finally, there is the issue of responsibility: How are humans to respond ethically to the power placed in their hands by modern technology? Such a question has personal, professional, and policy dimensions. At the personal level, quantitatively and qualitatively enhanced choices, with expanding knowledge production relevant to such choices (scientific research and consumer reports), place existential pressures on individuals to increase conscious reflection. The principle of free and informed consent appears to require not only that medical professionals inform the subjects of human experimentation about the risks and benefits of their participation but also that medical patients of all sorts become reflective participants in their own treatment—and that consumers of any technological goods or services weigh multiple costs and benefits as if they were engineers designing their lives. Are such demands both reasonable and possible?

At the professional level, scientists and engineers, falling under similar existential pressures to expand the conscious exercise of responsibility, have formulated codes of conduct for technical practices related to both research and design. In engineering ethics, for instance, the primacy of protecting public safety, health, and welfare is now a well-established general principle. In what sense, however, are engineers qualified to make such judgments? Does technical expertise provide any basis for determining appropriate levels of public safety, health, or welfare?

Finally, at the level of public policy, responsibility takes two closely related forms. Policy for science and technology seeks out the best ways to fund or regulate developments in science and technology. Science and technology for policy searches for the best ways to bring scientific knowledge to bear on political decision making while making technological power most effectively available for political action. Responding to and exemplifying these dual drives scientific and technological research agencies such as the U.S. National Science Foundation, the Human Genome Project, and the National Nanotechnology Initiative have created specific programs to promote ethical reflection on the creation and use of new scientific knowledge and technological products, processes, and systems.

Again speaking broadly, it is possible to identify two fundamental attitudes toward this spectrum of ethical and political issues. One attempts to explain modern technology as rooted in human nature and culture (engineering philosophy of technology), the other interprets modern technical methods and effects as deformations of human action, however preferable in particular instances to those of nature (humanities philosophy of technology). The engineering approach in its expansive confidence calls in one way or another for more and better technology, the humanities approach in its restrictive questioning for some relinquishment or delimitation of technology. The tensions between such alternative attitudes repeatedly come to the fore in analysis of such key concepts as privacy, risk, participation, and the environment, and in assessments of new opportu-

nities in virtual reality construction, biotechnological design, and nanotechnological research and development.

There is also a tendency for the engineering school to make alliances with the Anglo American analytic tradition in philosophy, and for the humanities school to find a convenient partner in the European phenomenological tradition. The former, viewing technology as a complex amalgam of artifacts, knowledge, activities, and volitions, each with diverse structural features scattered across historical epochs and societal contexts, prefers to deal on a case-by-case basis with one technology after another. The latter strives for bolder generalizations about technology as a whole, at least across each historical or societal context. From the phenomenological perspective, too great an emphasis on individual technological rocks can obscure the extent to which such geological specimens are constituents of mountains extended in both space and time.

## **Metaphysical Issues**

The attempt to speak of technology rather than technologies rests on an attempt to identify some inner or essential feature of diverse technologies. This hypothetical essential feature may be termed technicity. One can then immediately note that, before the modern period, technicity was at a minimum scattered throughout and heavily embedded within a diversity of human engagements, and indeed that philosophy took a stand against any separating of technicity from its embedding context. Plato's argument in the *Gorgias* is precisely an argument against disembedding *techne* from social or cultural contexts and traditions, not to mention ideas of the good. For Aristotle, *techne* is an intellectual virtue, and thus properly subordinate to the flourishing of human nature. What is distinctive about modern philosophy, by contrast, is the attempt, beginning with Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and René Descartes to disembed technics from particular human activities, to study them in systematic ways, and thus to create technology.

John Stuart Mill in his *Logic* (1843) already assumes the success of this disembedding project when he explains the practical value of science. For Mill the rationality of any art is grounded in a corresponding science.

The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and, having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations or circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. (*logic*, book 6, ch. 12, section 2).

Remarkably, Mill's analysis does not recognize art (or traditional technics) as including any knowledge of means. Art is concerned solely with determining an end, to achieve which it deploys appropriate means as determined by science. It is the scientific study of means that constitutes what even during Mill's lifetime was coming to be called technology. Modern technicity may thus be defined as a systematic or scientific study of means that suspends examination of ends. Does such an approach have distinctive social and cultural implications, independent of any particular technologies and contexts?

Among the first philosophers to analyze such a disembedding of means from ends was Ortega. In the English translation of his *La rebelión de las masas* (1929), Ortega writes that "[t]hree principles have made possible [the] new world: liberal democracy, scientific experiment, and industrialism.

The two latter may be summed up in one word: technicism" (1939, p. 56). Ortega himself actually uses the word *técnica*, but the term technicism is significant, and this in fact constitutes one of its first English occurrences with this sense. (Before the 1930s, technicism simply meant excessive reliance on technical terminology. The previous decade Max Scheler used the cognate *Technizismus* to name the industrial ethos.)

As part of a further "Meditación de la técnica" (1939), Ortega outlined a historical movement from the chance inventions that characterize archaic societies, through the trial-and-error techniques of the artisan, to the scientific technologies of the engineer. According to Ortega, the difference between these three forms of making lies in the way they create the means to realize a human project—that is, in the kind of technicity involved. In the first epoch, technical discoveries are accidental; in the second, techniques emerge from intuitive skill. In both instances they are preserved and elaborated within the confines of myth and craft traditions. In the third, however, the engineer undertakes scientific studies of technics and, as a result, "prior to the possession of any [particular] technics, already possesses technics [itself]" (Obras, 5:369). It is this third type of technicity that constitutes modern technicism (and here Ortega himself uses the term *tecnicismo*).

But technicism, understood here as the science of how to generate all possible technical means, disembedded from any lived making and using, creates a unique challenge. Before the modern period human beings were commonly limited by circumstances, within which they inherited a way of life and the technical means to achieve it. Now, however, they are given in advance many possible ways to live and a plethora of technical means but little in the way of a substantive vision of human flourishing. "To be an engineer and only an engineer is to be everything possibly and nothing actually," all form and no content (Obras, 5:366). There is in the midst of modern technicism what Ortega describes as a hidden ethical challenge to imagination and choice. Insofar as people can be anything they want, why should they take the trouble to be any one thing at all? Will not some extranatural motivation (not to say fanaticism) not be needed to help Buridan's cyborgs select among (rejecting some) the equally liberal options that surround them?

According to Heidegger modern technology is a challenge not just to ethics but to ontology. For Heidegger (1954) scientific technics constitutes a new kind of truth: truth not as correspondence, not as coherence, and not as functional knowledge, but as disclosure or revelation. Technology discloses Being in a historically unique way: as *Bestand* or resource. A castle constructed with traditional technics on a cliff overlooking the Rhine makes more fully present than before the stone that invests the landscape with its particular contours, while it sets off the curve of the river against the backdrop of its walls and towers. It invites people to settle near and experience the particularities of this place. By contrast, a poured concrete, hydroelectric power station compels the river to become an energy resource and converts the landscape into, not a place of human habitation, but a machine for the generation of electricity. It encourages people to draw on its energy for multitasking business in production and travel. The distinctly modern technicity that manifests itself in the disclosure of nature as resource Heidegger names *Gestell* (enframing).

*Gestell* at first sight appears to be a human work, something human beings in the course of history have chosen to practice for their own benefit. It gives them power over nature. However, as it digitalizes nature physically (dimensioned vectors), geographically (longitude and latitude), chemically (molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles), and biologically (genetic mapping), it also transforms language (computer signal processing) and art (pixel imaging) so that impact outstrips original intentions. Hidden in the midst of *Gestell* is Being as event, that which lets this dominating transformation come to pass. *Gestell* is at once destiny and, precisely because it appears so clearly to be

the result of a human activity, an obscuring of the transhuman imparting of a destiny that is its ground.

In the same year that Heidegger's *Die Frage nach der Technik* appeared, Jacques Ellul published *La Technique*, later translated into English as *The Technological Society* (1954). For Ellul, too, what is happening is something transhuman, or at least transindividual, the emergence of a new social order in which people give themselves up to the systematic analysis of actions into constituent means that are then evaluated in terms of output/input metrics. The scientific analysis of techniques extends technoscientific methods into economics, politics, education, leisure, and elsewhere creating what he calls the technical milieu. After the milieus of nature and of society, technology is the third great epoch of human history. Ellul's characterology of this new reality—describing its rationality, artificiality, self-directedness, self-augmentation, indivisibility, universality, and autonomy—reveals the technical milieu as something more than simply human. Although more hospitable to human biological existence, it nevertheless also manifests certain inexorable laws of artifice (such as those of economics). Just as the natural milieu once provided a framework for human life, a differentiated but overriding order to which human beings adapted in a variety of ways, so now a much more homogeneous technical milieu presents itself, not simply as a realm of freedom that human beings have constructed, but as that which also constructs and constrains them even when they fail to recognize it.

### **From Metaphysics to Ethics**

Efforts to make phenomenological metaphysics fruitful for ethics can be found in the work of two German American philosophers, Hans Jonas and Albert Borgmann. Jonas's (1966) work begins with a fundamental inquiry into the phenomenon of life, arguing that in the organic world there emerges a new kind of being. For Jonas the key features of human inner life (introspection and subjectivity) are present in embryo in the most primitive organisms, and in metabolism there emerges the primordial form of freedom. In metabolism a detachment enters the world insofar as being becomes distinguished from physical identity. However, in the materialism of modern science this unique reality is easily overlooked. Adopting a teleological approach to ontology, Jonas argues that only from the perspective of the more fully realized freedom manifest in humans can the reality of the organic as a whole be recognized for what it is. On this ontological basis Jonas (1984) undertakes an extended philosophical scrutiny of the technological projects of nuclear weapons and biomedical health care. In the presence of technical powers to end or alter human life Jonas reformulates the Kantian categorical imperative as: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life" (p. 11). Such a reformulation of the fundamental deontological principle constitutes an attempt at the re-embedding of technology in moral philosophy.

More broadly and in sustained dialogue with a range of discussions about the place of technology in human affairs, Borgmann's (1984) work draws a fundamental distinction between two kinds of artifice and action. On the one side are technological devices that obscure their inner functions to deliver without engagement commodities for easy and effortless consumption. This constitutes what Borgmann calls the device paradigm, an ideal type at which the products and processes of modern technology aim. On the other are focal things and practices whose workings are more transparent and that demand of their users some reordering of interests if they are to be used. The model for the first is the central heating system that only needs its thermostat set, for the second the wood-fired hearth.

In a series of studies arguing the nondeterminist importance of material culture to ethics and politics, Borgmann (1992, 1999) calls on citizens in the high-tech world to reconsider their ways of life to develop a deeper sense for the possibilities of human flourishing in the midst of liberal options for self-determined self- fulfillment. For Borgmann the ideal is not a forced return to the past but a voluntary recovery of the commanding presence of things in the technological present. As he concludes in a volume devoted to the critical assessment of his thought:

Science makes reality ever more transparent, and technology makes it more and more controllable. But at the end of our inquiries and manipulations there is always something that reflects rather than yields to our searchlight and presents itself as given to us rather than constructed by us. It is intelligible not because we have seen through it or designed it but because it speaks to us [in the form of] an unforethinkable and uncontrollable reality. (Higgs, Lights, and Strong 2000, pp. 368–369)

It is such a reality to which human flourishing is ultimately in thrall even in the midst of its highest exercises of insight and mastery.

## **Epistemological Issues**

Epistemology has often been treated as a stepchild in the philosophy of technology family of philosophical interests. Technological forms of knowledge are commonly thought to be derivative of scientific knowledge, so that any attempt to bring the theory of knowledge to bear in the examination of technology has regularly been part of a discussion of the relation between technology and science. At the same time this common privileging of science has been philosophically criticized, although the criticism has taken different forms in the European phenomenological and in the Anglo American analytic philosophical traditions.

From a phenomenological perspective the argument has been that technology is not so much applied science as science is theoretical technology. In his historico- philosophical studies of the scientific and technological revolutions of the seventeenth century and after, for instance, Jonas (1974) argues that from its origins modern science was animated by a technological interest that gives it an inherently applicable or technological character. Related studies of the dependency of science on technological instrumentation, from Galileo's telescopes to particle accelerators and PCR (polymerase chain reaction) machines suggest that science might even be described as applied technology. This approach to the epistemology of technology has parallels with the pragmatic tradition of conceiving scientific knowledge in fundamentally instrumentist terms. The Venezuelan phenomenologist Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla (2004) likewise offers a more Husserlian-based but complementary effort to describe the unique epistemological features of what he calls meta-technical instruments.

From the analytic perspective there has been more of an effort to identify distinctive types of knowledge operative in technology. Summarizing the results from such an approach, Mitcham (1994) draws attention to at least four types of distinctly technological knowledge: sensorimotor skills, technical maxims (including rules of thumb and recipes), descriptive laws or technological rules (which take an "if A then B" form), and technological theories (either grounded in scientific theory or bringing scientific method to bear on human-technology interactions). German philosophers of technology such as Hans Lenk, Gunter Ropohl, and Bernhard Irrgang, all associated with the VDI promotion of philosophical reflection on technology, are pursuing efforts to develop epistemological analyses of the engineering sciences. And Joseph C. Pitt (2000) makes a determined

effort to identify the distinctive forms of technological and engineering knowledge, drawing especially on the careful analyses of aeronautical engineering history by Walter G. Vincenti (1990) to argue that engineering design possesses its own cognitive features.

Important issues for any theory of technological knowledge remain the characterization of whatever basic epistemic criteria might be analogous to those operative in science such as truth, simplicity, coherence, and explanation. There may be distinctive technological forms of such criteria. But two major candidates for uniquely technological criteria are effectiveness and efficiency. Certainly, many propositions of engineering knowledge are assessed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency more than truth or explanation. A further epistemological challenge is to explicate the distinctive character of models and modeling in the technological and engineering contexts. The relevance of such epistemological analyses nevertheless remains of problematic relevance to ethics and politics.

### **Empirical, Anthropological, and Policy Turns**

Concern for the adequacy of metaphysical definitions of technology—and perhaps exhaustion with endless ethical and political difficulties (with hopes that new approaches might prove more fruitful)—has given rise to what has been called an empirical turn in the philosophy of technology. As advocated by the Dutch philosophers Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, this program argues that "philosophical reflection should be based on empirically adequate descriptions reflecting the richness and complexity of modern technology" (2000, p. xix) and promotes a greater analysis of what technologists and engineers actually do over any extended exegesis of texts, whether those of other philosophers of technology or even engineers and technicians. As such, a natural alliance has developed with social constructivist approaches to science, technology, and society studies in the pursuit of richer metaphysical or ontological understandings of artifacts, epistemological analyses of technical practice, and even ethical decision making among professional engineers. From the perspective of Jozef Keulartz et al. (2002), this also provides a solid opportunity for advancing a pragmatist ethics for technological culture.

Two topics of prominence in the empirical turn from the interpretation of texts to the interpretation of technical artifacts have been those of design and function. Design is often identified as the essence of engineering, and there have been numerous technical studies of design methodology. At the same time engineering design must be distinguished from aesthetic design as well as design by means of evolutionary processes in nature. Even within the realm of engineering design, studies such as those by Vincenti (1990), Louis Bucciarelli (1994), and Richard Buchanan and Victor Margolin (1995) have very different implications for assessing proposals for consumer, green, sustainable, or participatory design. With regard to technical functions, analyses have focused on the relation between functions in organisms, social institutions, and artifacts; on the relation between functional and physical descriptions of artifacts; and on the extent to which functions are determined by design or use.

A different sense for new beginnings has emerged in relation to prospects in the development of the new fields of bioengineering and biotechnology—especially when applied to humans. The leader in this case is the medical scientist and philosopher Leon Kass, the chair of the Bush administration's President's Council on Bioethics. In his turn Kass has tried to go outside the boundaries of standard bioethics in at least four ways: to promote thinking that enrolls more than professional bioethicists, that does more than piecemeal or specialized analyses, that references human nature as a norm, and that builds toward policy results. As in *Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and*

the Pursuit of Happiness (2003), Kass et al. at the council seek to raise broad issues about what it means to be human in the presence of possibilities for the reengineering not just of the external world but of the inner world of human birth, growth, and experience. He has been especially concerned about the possibilities for the deformation of humanity not from above by totalitarian governmental use of technology but from below by positive consumer endorsement of behaviors that would from a traditional perspective be assessed as temptations.

Beyond the policy-oriented work of Kass and colleagues, policy questions have become increasingly central not just as aspects of ethical responsibility but as issues in their own right. What precisely is technological policy, as opposed to technological politics? Does policy decision making take different forms in relation to science and to engineering? How are policies to be formulated and assessed?

The extent to which these turns in the philosophy of technology will define its future are questions that the professional community must examine. Any such examination will also need to include a self-criticism that considers the special responsibilities of a regionalization in philosophy that, more than the philosophy of science or of art, has as part of its heritage public responsibilities and a large measure of ethical concerns.

### **(The Nature of) Technology?**

The question, What is technology? or What is the nature of technology?, is both a central question that philosophers of technology aim to answer and a question the answer to which determines the subject matter of philosophy of technology. One can think of philosophy of technology as the philosophical examination of technology, in the same way as the philosophy of science is the philosophical examination of science and the philosophy of biology the philosophical study of a particular subdomain of science. However, in this respect the philosophy of technology is in a similar situation as the philosophy of science finds itself in.

Central questions in the philosophy of science have long been what science is, what characterizes science and what distinguishes science from non-science (the demarcation problem). These questions have recently somewhat moved out of focus, however, due to the lack of acceptable answers. Philosophers of science have not been able to satisfactorily explicate the nature of science or to specify any clear-cut criterion by which science could be demarcated from non-science or pseudo-science. As philosopher of science Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008: 168) wrote: "fact is that at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there is no consensus among philosophers or historians or scientists about the nature of science."

The nature of technology, however, is even less clear than the nature of science. As philosopher of science Marx Wartofsky put it, "'Technology' is unfortunately too vague a term to define a domain; or else, so broad in its scope that what it does define includes too much. For example, one may talk about technology as including all artifacts, that is, all things made by human beings. Since we "make" language, literature, art, social organizations, beliefs, laws and theories as well as tools and machines, and their products, such an approach covers too much" (Wartofsky, 1979: 176). More clarity on this issue can be achieved by looking at the history of the term (for example, Nye, 2006: Chapter 1; Misa, 2009; Mitcham & Schatzberg, 2009) as well as at recent suggestions to define it. Jacob Bigelow, an early author on technology, conceived of it as a specific domain of knowledge: technology was "an account [...] of the principles, processes, and nomenclatures of the more conspicuous arts" (Bigelow, 1829, quoted in Misa, 2009: 9; Mitcham & Schatzberg, 2009: 37). In a

similar manner, Günter Ropohl (1990: 112; 2009: 31) defined “technology” as the ‘science of technics’ (“Wissenschaft von der Technik”, where “Technik” denotes the domain of crafts and other areas of manufacturing, making, etc.). The important aspect of Bigelow’s and Ropohl’s definitions is that “technology” does not denote a domain of human activity (such as making or designing) or a domain of objects (technological innovations, such as solar panels), but a domain of knowledge. In this respect, their usage of the term is continuous with the meaning of the Greek “techne” (Section 1.a).

A review of a number of definitions of “technology” (Li-Hua, 2009) shows that there is not much overlap between the various definitions that can be found in the literature. Many definitions conceive of technology in Bigelow’s and Ropohl’s sense as a particular body of knowledge (thus making the philosophy of technology a branch of epistemology), but do not agree on what kind of knowledge it is supposed to be. On some definitions it is seen as firm-specific knowledge about design and production processes, while others conceive of it as knowledge about natural phenomena and laws of nature that can be used to satisfy human needs and solve human problems (a view which closely resembles Francis Bacon’s).

Philosopher of science Mario Bunge presented a view of the nature of technology along the latter lines (Bunge, 1966). According to Bunge, technology should be understood as constituting a particular subdomain of the sciences, namely “applied science”, as he called it. Note that Bunge’s thesis is not that technology is applied science in the sense of the application of scientific theories, models, etc. for practical purposes. Although a view of technology as being “just the totality of means for applying science” (Scharff, 2009: 160) remains present among the general public, most engineers and philosophers of technology agree that technology cannot be conceived of as the application of science in this sense. Bunge’s view is that technology is the subdomain of science characterized by a particular aim, namely application. According to Bunge, natural science and applied science stand side by side as two distinct modes of doing science: while natural science is scientific investigation aimed at the production of reliable knowledge about the world, technology is scientific investigation aimed at application. Both are full-blown domains of science, in which investigations are carried out and knowledge is produced (knowledge about the world and how it can be applied to concrete problems, respectively). The difference between the two domains lies in the nature of the knowledge that is produced and the aims that are in focus. Bunge’s statement that “technology is applied science” should thus be read as “technology is science for the purpose of application” and not as “technology is the application of science.”

Other definitions reflect still different conceptions of technology. In the definition accepted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), technology not only includes specific knowledge, but also machinery, production systems and skilled human labor force. Li-Hua (2009) follows the UNCTAD definition by proposing a four-element definition of “technology” as encompassing technique (that is, a specific technique for making a particular product), specific knowledge (required for making that product; he calls this technology in the strict sense), the organization of production and the end product itself. Friedrich Rapp, in contrast, defined “technology” even more broadly as a domain of human activity: “in simplest terms, technology is the reshaping of the physical world for human purposes” (Rapp, 1989: xxiii).

Thus, attempts to define “technology” in such a way that this definition would express the nature of technology, or only some of the principal characteristics of technology, have not led to any generally accepted view of what technology is. In this context, historian of science and technology

Thomas J. Misa observed that historians of technology have so far resisted defining “technology” in the same way as “no scholarly historian of art would feel the least temptation to define “art”, as if that complex expression of human creativity could be pinned down by a few well-chosen words” (Misa, 2009: 8). The suggestion clearly is that technology is far too complex and too diverse a domain to define or to be able to talk about the nature of technology. Nordmann (2008: 14) went even further by arguing that not only can the term “technology” not be defined, but also it should not be defined. According to Nordmann, we should accept that technology is too diverse a domain to be caught in a compact definition. Accordingly, instead of conceiving of “technology” as the name of a particular fixed collection of phenomena that can be investigated, Nordmann held that “technology” is best understood as what Grunwald & Julliard (2005) called a “reflective concept”. According to the latter authors, “technology” should simply be taken to mean whatever we mean when we use the term. While this clearly cannot be an adequate definition of the term, it still can serve as a basis for reflections on technology in that it gives us at least some sense of what it is that we are reflection on. Using “technology” in this extremely loose manner allows us to connect reflections on very different issues and phenomena as being about – in the broadest sense – the same thing. In this way, “technology” can serve as the core concept of the field of philosophy of technology.

Philosophy of technology faces the challenge of clarifying the nature of a particular domain of phenomena without being able to determine the boundaries of that domain. Perhaps the best way out of this situation is to approach the question on a case-by-case basis, where the various cases are connected by the fact that they all involve technology in the broadest possible sense of the term. Rather than asking what technology is, and how the nature of technology is to be characterized, it might be better to examine the natures of particular instances of technology and in so doing achieve more clarity about a number of local phenomena. In the end, the results from various case studies might to some extent converge – or they might not.

## **Dominance**

**Theory of Technology Dominance** Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s) TTD has two dependent factors:

1. Reliance - The extent to which and individual applies the intelligent decision aid and integrates the recommendations of that aid into his or her judgment.
2. Dominance - The state of decision making where the intelligent decision aid, as opposed to its user, takes primary control of a decision making process.

## **Main independent construct(s)/factor(s)**

TTD has four independent factors:

1. Task Experience - The level of experience a decision maker has regarding the completion of a task as well as the extent to which the decision maker has developed strategies for completing that particular task.
2. Task Complexity - The extent to which the cognitive abilities of the decision maker are challenged with completing a certain task. (In psychology this is often termed Task Difficulty.)
3. Decision Aid Familiarity - The extent to which the decision maker is comfortable with the intelligent decision aid based on prior experience and/or significant training with the aid (or similar aids).

4. Cognitive Fit – The extent to which the cognitive processes used with the decision aid to complete a task match the cognitive processes normally applied by the decision maker using the aid.

### **Concise description of theory**

The Theory of Technology Dominance (TTD) posits that a decision maker may become reliant on an intelligent decision aid under two conditions:

1. The decision maker is low in task experience.
2. The decision maker is high in all factors (task experience, task complexity, decision aid familiarity, and cognitive fit).

According to TDD, reliance on an intelligent decision aid can create a long-term, de-skilling effect in the user as well as hinder that user's growth of knowledge and advancement in his or her domain. Furthermore, TDD states that a negative relationship exists between the user's expertise level and the risk of poor decision making when the expertise of the user and intelligent decision aid are mismatched. When the expertise of the user and the aid are matched, however, a positive relationship exists between reliance on the aid and improved decisions making.

Conceptually, TTD can be divided into three sections which are built on a total of eight testable propositions. The three sections are:

- Section 1: Addresses the factors that determine the likelihood that a decision maker will rely on an intelligent decision aid.
- Section 2: Addresses the conditions under which a decision maker is vulnerable to being dominated by the intelligent decision aid.
- Section 3: Addresses the long-term impact of intelligent decision aid use on de-skilling domain experts and impeding epistemological evolution.

The eight testable propositions are (Arnold & Sutton, 1998):

### **Section 1 - Factors influencing reliance**

- Proposition 1: "When users have a low to moderate level of experience, there is a negative relationship between task experience and reliance on a decision aid."
- Proposition 2: "There is a positive relationship between task complexity and reliance on a decision aid."
- Proposition 3: "When task experience and perceived task complexity are high, there is a positive relationship between decision aid familiarity and reliance on the decision aid."
- Proposition 4: "When task experience and perceived task complexity are high, there is a positive relationship between cognitive fit and reliance on the decision aid."


### **Section 2 – Conditions favorable for dominance**

- Proposition 5: "When the expertise of the user and intelligent decision aid are mismatched, there is a negative relationship between the user's expertise level and the risk of poor decision making."
- Proposition 6: "When the expertise level of the user and intelligent decision aid are matched, there is a positive relationship between reliance on the aid and improved decisions making."

### Sction 3 – Long-term effects

- Proposition 7: "There is a positive relationship between continued use of an intelligent decision aid and the de-skilling of auditors' abilities for the domain in which the aid is used."
- Proposition 8: "There is negative relationship between the broad- based, long-term use of an intelligent decision aid in a given problem domain and the growth in knowledge and advancement of the domain."

### Diagram/schematic of theory



Recreated from Arnold and Sutton (1998)

### Power and Social inequalities

Power and inequality determine the socioeconomic conditions of different classes.

## Key Points

- Social stratification is a concept involving the classification of persons into groups based on shared socioeconomic conditions.
- Conflict theories, such as Marxism, focus on the inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies.
- Social stratification has been shown to cause many social problems, including homicide, infant mortality, obesity, teenage pregnancies, emotional depression, teen suicide, and a high prison population.
- In modern Western societies, stratification is broadly organized into three main layers: upper class, middle class, and lower class.
- Conflict theories, such as Marxism, point to the inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies.
- In Marxist theory, the capitalist mode of production consists of two main economic parts: the substructure and the Superstructure. Marx
- Social stratification has been shown to cause many social problems.

## Key Terms

- **Marxist Theory:** An economic and sociopolitical worldview and method of socioeconomic inquiry centered upon a materialist interpretation of history, a dialectical view of social change, and an analysis–critique of the development of capitalism.
- **Conflict Theories:** Perspectives in social science that emphasize the social, political, or material inequality of a social group, critique the broad socio-political system, or otherwise detract from structural functionalism and ideological conservatism.
- **Weberian:** Of or relating to Max Weber (1864–1920), influential German sociologist and political economist.

## Power and Inequality

In social science and politics, power is the ability to influence the behavior of people. The term *authority* is often used for power perceived as legitimate by the social structure. Power can be seen as evil or unjust, but the exercise of power is accepted as endemic to (or regularly found in) humans as social beings. French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) saw power as “a complex strategic situation in a given society social setting”. Power may be held through authority, social class (material wealth), personal charisma, expertise or knowledge, persuasion, force (such as law or violence), and a myriad of other dynamics.

Because power operates both relationally and reciprocally, sociologists speak of the balance of power between people in a relationship. All parties to all relationships have some power; the sociological examination of power concerns itself with discovering and describing the relative strengths – equal or unequal, stable or subject to periodic change. Given that power is not innate and can be granted to others, to acquire power you must possess or control a form of power currency (such as wealth, social status, authority, etc.).

## **Social inequality and stratification**

Social inequality refers to relational processes in society that have the effect of limiting or harming a group's social status, social class, and social circle. Areas of social inequality include access to voting rights, freedom of speech and assembly, the extent of property rights and access to education, health care, quality housing, traveling, transportation, vacationing and other social goods and services.

The reasons for social inequality can vary, but are often broad and far reaching. Social inequality can emerge through a society's understanding of appropriate gender roles, or through the prevalence of social stereotyping. They can also be established through discriminatory legislation. Social inequalities exist between ethnic or religious groups, classes and countries, making the concept a global phenomenon.

In sociology, social stratification is a concept involving the classification of persons into groups based on shared socioeconomic conditions; it is a relational set of inequalities with economic, social, political and ideological dimensions. Theories of social stratification are based on four basic principles:

- 1) Social stratification is a trait of society, not simply a reflection of individual differences.
- 2) Social stratification carries over from generation to generation.
- 3) Social stratification is universal but variable.
- 4) Social stratification involves not just inequality but beliefs as well.

## **Classifications of stratification**

In modern Western societies, stratification is broadly organized into three main layers: upper class, middle class, and lower class.

The upper class in modern societies is the social class composed of the wealthiest members of society, who also wield the greatest political power. The upper class is generally contained within the wealthiest 1–2 percent of the population, with wealth passed from generation to generation.

In Weberian socioeconomic terms, the middle class is the broad group of people in contemporary society who fall socioeconomically between the working class and upper class. The common measures of what constitutes middle class vary significantly between cultures.

The working class describes the group of people employed in lower tier jobs, often including those in unemployment or otherwise possessing below-average incomes. Working classes are mainly found in industrialized economies and in urban areas of non-industrialized economies.

## **Social Stratification and Marxism**

Conflict theories, such as Marxism, focus on the inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies. Many sociological theorists have criticized the extent to which the working classes are unlikely to advance socioeconomically; the wealthy tend to hold political power which they use to exploit the proletariat inter-generationally.

In Marxist theory, the capitalist mode of production consists of two main economic parts: the substructure and the superstructure. Marx saw classes as defined by people's relationship to the

means of productions in two basic ways: either they own productive property or they labor for others. The base comprehends the forces and relations of production: employer-employee work conditions, the technical division of labor, and property relations—into which people enter to produce the necessities and amenities of life. These relations determine society's other relationships and ideas, which are described as its superstructure. The superstructure of a society includes its culture, institutions, political power structures, roles, rituals, and state.

Social stratification has been shown to cause many social problems. A comprehensive study of major world economies revealed that homicide, infant mortality, obesity, teenage pregnancies, emotional depression, teen suicide, and prison population all correlate with higher social inequality.

### **There are three common characteristics of stratified systems:**

1. Rankings apply to social categories of people who share a common characteristic without necessarily interacting or identifying with each other. The process of being ranked can be changed by the person being ranked, and it can differ based on race, gender, and social class.
2. People's life experiences and opportunities depend on their social category. This characteristic can be changed by the amount of work a person can put into their interests. The use of resources can influence others.
3. The ranks of different social categories change slowly over time. This has occurred frequently in the United States ever since the American revolution—the U.S. Constitution has been altered several times to specify rights for everyone.

### **Democratization of technology**

**Democratization of technology** refers to the process by which access to technology rapidly continues to become more accessible to more people. New technologies and improved user experiences have empowered those outside of the technical industry to access and use technological products and services. At an increasing scale, consumers have greater access to use and purchase technologically sophisticated products, as well as to participate meaningfully in the development of these products. Industry innovation and user demand have been associated with more affordable, user-friendly products. This is an ongoing process, beginning with the development of mass production and increasing dramatically as digitization became commonplace.

Thomas Friedman argued that the era of globalization has been characterized by the democratization of technology, democratization of finance, and democratization of information. Technology has been critical in the latter two processes, facilitating the rapid expansion of access to specialized knowledge and tools, as well as changing the way that people view and demand such access.

### **History**

Scholars and social critics often cite the invention of the printing press as a major invention that changed the course of history. The force of the printing press rested not in its impact on the printing industry or inventors, but on its ability to transmit information to a broader public by way of mass production. This event is so widely recognized because of its social impact – as a democratizing force. The printing press is often seen as the historical counterpart to the Internet. After the development of the Internet in 1969, its use remained limited to communications between scientists and within government, although use of email and boards gained popularity among those

with access. It did not become a popular means of communication until the 1990s. In 1993 the US federal government opened the Internet to commerce and the creation of HTML formed the basis for universal accessibility.

## **Major innovations**

The Internet has played a critical role in modern life as a typical feature of most Western households, and has been key in the democratization of knowledge. It not only constitutes arguably the most critical innovation in this trend thus far; it has also allowed users to gain knowledge of and access to other technologies. Users can learn of new developments more quickly, and purchase high-tech products otherwise only actively marketed to recognized experts. Some have argued that cloud computing is having a major effect by allowing users greater access through mobility and pay-as-you-use capacity.

Social media has also empowered and emboldened users to become contributors and critics of technological developments.

The open-source model allows users to participate directly in development of software, rather than indirect participation, through contributing opinions. By being shaped by the user, development is directly responsive to user demand and can be obtained for free or at a low cost. In a comparable trend, arduino and littleBits have made electronics more accessible to users of all backgrounds and ages. The development of 3D printers has the potential to increasingly democratize production.

## **Cultural impact**

This trend is linked to the spread of knowledge of and ability to perform high-tech tasks, challenging previous conceptions of expertise.

Widespread access to technology, including lower costs, was critical to the transition to the new economy. Similarly, democratization of technology was also fuelled by this economic transition, which produced demands for technological innovation and optimism in technology-driven progress.

Since the 1980s, a spreading constructivist conception of technology has emphasized that the social and technical domains are critically intertwined. Scholars have argued that technology is non-neutral, defined contextually and locally by a certain relationship with society.

Andrew Feenberg, a central thinker in the philosophy of technology, argued that democratizing technology means expanding technological design to include alternative interests and values. When successful in doing so, this can be a tool for increasing inclusiveness. This also suggests an important participatory role for consumers if technology is to be truly democratic. Feenberg asserts that this must be achieved by consumer intervention in a liberated design process.

Improved access to specialized knowledge and tools has been associated with an increase in the "do it yourself" (DIY) trend. This has also been associated with consumerization, whereby personal or privately owned devices and software are also used for business purposes. Some have argued that this is linked to reduced dependence on traditional information technology departments.

Astra Taylor, the author of the book *The People's Platform: Taking Back Power and Culture in the Digital Age*, argues, "The promotion of Internet-enabled amateurism is a lazy substitute for real equality of opportunity."

### **Industry impact**

In some ways, democratization of technology has strengthened this industry. Markets have broadened and diversified. Consumer feedback and input is available at a very low or no cost.

However, related industries are experiencing decreased demand for qualified professionals as consumers are able to fill more of their demands themselves. Users of a range of types and status have access to increasingly similar technology. Because of the decreased costs and expertise necessary to use products and software, professionals (e.g. in the audio industry) may experience loss of work.

In some cases, technology is accessible but sufficiently complex that most users without specialized training are able to operate it without necessarily understanding how it works. Additionally, the process of consumerization has led to an influx in the number of devices in businesses and accessing private networks that IT departments cannot control or access. While this can lead to lowered operating costs and increased innovation, it is also associated with security concerns that most businesses are unable to address at the pace of the spread of technology.

### **Political impact**

At a demonstration at BMVIT, banners read, "Democracy needs anonymity – stop data retention" (left) and "Liberty dies with security" (right).

Some scholars have argued that technological change will bring about a third wave of democracy. The Internet has been recognized for its role in promoting increased citizen advocacy and government transparency. Jesse Chen, a leading thinker in democratic engagement technologies, distinguishes the democratizing effects of technology from democracy itself. Chen has argued that, while the Internet may have democratizing effects, the Internet alone cannot deliver democracy at all levels of society unless technologies are purposely designed for the nuances of democracy, specifically the engagement of large groups of people in between elections in and beyond government.

The spread of the Internet and other forms of technology has led to increased global connectivity. Many scholars believe that it has been associated in the developing world not only with increased Western influence, but also with the spread of democracy through increased communication, efficiency, and access to information. Scholars have drawn associations between the level of technological connectedness and democracy in many nations.

Technology can enhance democracy in the developed world as well. In addition to increased communication and transparency, some electorates have implemented online voting to accommodate an increased number of citizens.

### **Public evaluation of science and technology**

Although there was much technological progress in the Roman empire and during the Middle Ages, philosophical reflection on technology did not grow at a corresponding rate. Comprehensive works

such as Vitruvius' *De architectura* (first century BC) and Agricola's *De re metallica* (1556) paid much attention to practical aspects of technology but little to philosophy.

In the realm of scholastic philosophy, there was an emergent appreciation for the mechanical arts. They were generally considered to be born of—and limited to—the mimicry of nature. This view was challenged when alchemy was introduced in the Latin West around the mid-twelfth century. Some alchemical writers such as Roger Bacon were willing to argue that human art, even if learned by imitating natural processes, could successfully reproduce natural products or even surpass them (Newman 2004). The result was a philosophy of technology in which human art was raised to a level of appreciation not found in other writings until the Renaissance. However, the last three decades of the thirteenth century witnessed an increasingly hostile attitude by religious authorities toward alchemy that culminated eventually in the denunciation *Contra alchymistas*, written by the inquisitor Nicholas Eymeric in 1396 (Newman 2004).

The Renaissance led to a greater appreciation of human beings and their creative efforts, including technology. As a result, philosophical reflection on technology and its impact on society increased. Francis Bacon is generally regarded as the first modern author to put forward such reflection. His view, expressed in his fantasy *New Atlantis* (1627), was overwhelmingly positive. This positive attitude lasted well into the nineteenth century, incorporating the first half-century of the industrial revolution.

For example, Karl Marx did not condemn the steam engine or the spinning mill for the vices of the bourgeois mode of production; he believed that ongoing technological innovation were necessary steps toward the more blissful stages of socialism and communism of the future.

A turning point in the appreciation of technology as a socio-cultural phenomenon is marked by Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872), written under the influence of the Industrial Revolution, and Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859). Butler's book gave an account of a fictional country where all machines are banned and the possession of a machine or the attempt to build one is a capital crime. The people of this country had become convinced by an argument that ongoing technical improvements are likely to lead to a 'race' of machines that will replace mankind as the dominant species on earth.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century a critical attitude predominated in philosophical reflection on technology. The representatives of this attitude were, overwhelmingly, schooled in the humanities or the social sciences and had virtually no first-hand knowledge of engineering practice. Whereas Bacon wrote extensively on the method of science and conducted physical experiments himself, Butler, being a clergyman, lacked such first-hand knowledge. Ernst Kapp, who was the first to use the term 'philosophy of technology' in his book *Eine Philosophie der Technik* (1877 [2018]), was a philologist and historian. Most of the authors who wrote critically about technology and its socio-cultural role during the twentieth century were philosophers of a general outlook, such as Martin Heidegger (1954 [1977]), Hans Jonas (1979 [1984]), Arnold Gehlen (1957 [1980]), Günther Anders (1956), and Andrew Feenberg (1999). Others had a background in one of the other humanities or in social science, such as literary criticism and social research in the case of Lewis Mumford (1934), law in the case of Jacques Ellul (1954 [1964]), political science in the case of Langdon Winner (1977, 1980, 1983) and literary studies in the case of Albert Borgmann (1984). The form of philosophy of technology constituted by the writings of these and others has been called by Carl Mitcham (1994) "humanities philosophy of technology", because it takes its point of departure from the social sciences and the humanities

rather than from the practice of technology, and it approaches technology accepting “the primacy of the humanities over technologies” (1994: 39), since technology originates from the goals and values of humans.

Humanities philosophers of technology tend to take the phenomenon of technology itself largely for granted; they treat it as a ‘black box’, a given, a unitary, monolithic, inescapable phenomenon. Their interest is not so much to analyze and understand this phenomenon itself but to grasp its relations to morality (Jonas, Gehlen), politics (Winner), the structure of society (Mumford), human culture (Ellul), the human condition (Hannah Arendt), or metaphysics (Heidegger). In this, these philosophers are almost all openly critical of technology: all things considered, they tend to have a negative judgment of the way technology has affected human society and culture, or at least they single out for consideration the negative effects of technology on human society and culture. This does not necessarily mean that technology itself is pointed out as the principal cause of these negative developments. In the case of Heidegger, in particular, the paramount position of technology in modern society is rather a symptom of something more fundamental, namely a wrongheaded attitude towards Being which has been on the rise for almost 25 centuries. It is therefore questionable whether Heidegger should be considered as a philosopher of technology, although within the traditional view he is considered to be among the most important ones. Much the same could be said about Arendt, in particular her discussion of technology in *The Human Condition* (1958), although her position in the canon of humanities philosophy of technology is not as prominent.

To be sure, the work of these founding figures of humanities philosophy of technology has been taken further by a second and third generation of scholars— in particular the work of Heidegger remains an important source of inspiration— but who in doing so have adopted a more neutral rather than overall negative view of technology and its meaning for human life and culture. Notable examples are Ihde (1979, 1993) and Verbeek (2000 [2005]).

In its development, humanities philosophy of technology continues to be influenced not so much by developments in philosophy (e.g., philosophy of science, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind) but by developments in the social sciences and humanities. Although, for example, Ihde and those who take their point of departure with him, position their work as phenomenologist or postphenomenologist, there does not seem to be much interest in either the past or the present of this diffuse notion in philosophy, and in particular not much interest in the far from easy question to what extent Heidegger can be considered a phenomenologist. Of particular significance has been the emergence of ‘Science and Technology Studies’ (STS) in the 1980s, which studies from a broad social- scientific perspective how social, political, and cultural values affect scientific research and technological innovation, and how these in turn affect society, politics, and culture. For a detailed treatment Mitcham’s 1994 book provides an excellent overview. Olsen, Selinger and Riis (2008) offer a collection of more recent contributions; Scharff and Dusek (2003 [2014]) and Kaplan (2004 [2009]) present comprehensive anthologies of texts from this tradition.

## **A Basic Ambiguity in the Meaning of Technology**

Mitcham contrasts ‘humanities philosophy of technology’ to ‘engineering philosophy of technology’, where the latter refers to philosophical views developed by engineers or technologists as “attempts ... to elaborate a technological philosophy” (1994: 17). Mitcham discusses only a handful of people as engineering philosophers of technology, however: Ernst Kapp, Peter Engelmeier, Friedrich Dessauer, and much more briefly Jacques Lafitte, Gilbert Simondon, Hendrik van Riessen, Juan David García Bacca, R. Buckminster Fuller and Mario Bunge. The label raises serious questions, however: several of them hardly classify as ‘engineers or technologists’ and it is also not very

clear how the notion of 'a technological philosophy' should be understood. As philosophers these authors seem all to be rather isolated figures, whose work shows little overlap and who seem to be sharing mainly the absence of a 'working relation' with established philosophical disciplines. It is not so clear what sort of questions and concerns underlie the notion of 'engineering philosophy of technology'. A larger role for systematic philosophy could bring it quite close to some examples of humanities philosophy of technology, for instance the work of Jacques Ellul, where the analyses would be rather similar and the remaining differences would be ones of attitude or appreciation.

In the next section we discuss in more detail a form of philosophy of technology that we consider to occupy, currently, the position of alternative to the humanities philosophy of technology. It emerged in the 1960s and gained momentum in the past fifteen to twenty years. This form of the philosophy of technology, which may be called 'analytic', is not primarily concerned with the relations between technology and society but with technology itself. It expressly does not look upon technology as a 'black box' but as a phenomenon that should be studied in detail. It regards technology perhaps not in its entirety as a practice but as something grounded in a practice, basically the practice of engineering. It analyses this practice, its goals, its concepts and its methods, and it relates its findings to various themes from philosophy.

In focusing on technology as a practice sustained by engineers, similar to the way philosophy of science focuses on the practice of science as sustained by scientists, analytic philosophy of technology could be thought to amount to the philosophy of engineering. Indeed many of the issues related to design, could be singled out as forming the subject matter of the philosophy of engineering. The very title of *Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences* (Meijers 2009), an extensive up-to-date overview, which contains contributions to all of the topics treated in the next section, expresses the view that technology and engineering do not coincide. Which is not to say, however, that the book offers a clear conception of what makes technology different from engineering, or more than engineering. In fact, the existence of humanities philosophy of technology and analytic philosophy of technology next to each other reflects a basic ambiguity in the notion of technology that the philosophical work that has been going on has not succeeded in clarifying.

Technology can be said to have two 'cores' or 'dimensions', which can be referred to as instrumentality and productivity. Instrumentality covers the totality of human endeavours to control their lives and their environments by interfering with the world in an instrumental way, by using things in a purposeful and clever way. Productivity covers the totality of human endeavours to bring new things into existence that can do certain things in a controlled and clever way. For the study of instrumentality, however, it is in principle irrelevant whether or not the things that are made use of in controlling our lives and environments have been made by us first; if we somehow could rely on natural objects to always be available to serve our purposes, the analysis of instrumentality and its consequences for how we live our lives would not necessarily be affected. Likewise, for the analysis of what is involved in the making of artifacts, and how the notion of artifact and of something new being brought into existence are to be understood, it is to a large extent irrelevant how human life, culture and society are changed as a result of the artifacts that are in fact produced. Clearly, humanities philosophy of technology has until now been more attracted by the instrumentality core whereas analytic philosophy of technology has mainly gone for the productivity core. But technology as one of the basic phenomena of modern society, if not the most basic one, clearly is constituted by the processes centering on and involving both cores. It has proved difficult, however, to come to an overarching approach in which the interaction between these two dimensions of technology are adequately dealt with—no doubt partly due to the great differences in philosophical orientation and methodology associated with the two traditions and their separate foci. To improve

this situation is arguably the most urgent challenge that the field of philosophy of technology as a whole is facing, since the continuation of the two orientations leading their separate lives threatens its unity and coherence as a discipline in the first place. Notwithstanding its centrality and urgency, the ambiguity noted here seems hardly to be confronted directly in the literature. It is addressed by Lawson (2008, 2017) and by Franssen and Koller (2016).

After presenting the major issues of philosophical relevance in technology and engineering that are studied by analytic philosophers of technology in the next section, we discuss the problems and challenges that technology poses for the society in which it is practiced in the third and final section.

## **Analytic Philosophy of Technology**

**Introduction:** Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Science as Philosophies of Practices

It may come as a surprise to those new to the topic that the fields of philosophy of science and philosophy of technology show such great differences, given that few practices in our society are as closely related as science and technology. Experimental science is nowadays crucially dependent on technology for the realization of its research set-ups and for gathering and analyzing data. The phenomena that modern science seeks to study could never be discovered without producing them through technology.

Theoretical research within technology has come to be often indistinguishable from theoretical research in science, making engineering science largely continuous with 'ordinary' or 'pure' science. This is a relatively recent development, which started around the middle of the nineteenth century, and is responsible for great differences between modern technology and traditional, craft-like techniques. The educational training that aspiring scientists and engineers receive starts off being largely identical and only gradually diverges into a science or an engineering curriculum. Ever since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, characterized by its two major innovations, the experimental method and the mathematical articulation of scientific theories, philosophical reflection on science has focused on the method by which scientific knowledge is generated, on the reasons for thinking scientific theories to be true, or approximately true, and on the nature of evidence and the reasons for accepting one theory and rejecting another. Hardly ever have philosophers of science posed questions that did not have the community of scientists, their concerns, their aims, their intuitions, their arguments and choices, as a major target. In contrast it is only recently that the philosophy of technology has discovered the community of engineers.

It might be claimed that it is up to the philosophy of technology, and not the philosophy of science, to target first of all the impact of technology—and with it science—on society and culture, because science affects society only through technology. This, however, will not do. Right from the start of the scientific revolution, science affected human culture and thought fundamentally and directly, not with a detour through technology, and the same is true for later developments such as relativity, atomic physics and quantum mechanics, the theory of evolution, genetics, biochemistry, and the increasingly dominating scientific world view overall. Philosophers of science overwhelmingly give the impression that they leave questions addressing the normative, social and cultural aspects of science gladly to other philosophical disciplines, or to historical studies. There are exceptions, however, and things may be changing; Philip Kitcher, to name but one prominent philosopher of science, has since 2000 written books on the relation of science to politics, ethics and religion (Kitcher 2001, 2011).

There is a major difference between the historical development of modern technology as compared to modern science which may at least partly explain this situation, which is that science emerged in the seventeenth century from philosophy itself. The answers that Galileo, Huygens, Newton, and others gave, by which they initiated the alliance of empiricism and mathematical description that is so characteristic of modern science, were answers to questions that had belonged to the core business of philosophy since antiquity. Science, therefore, kept the attention of philosophers. Philosophy of science is a transformation of epistemology in the light of the emergence of science. The foundational issues— the reality of atoms, the status of causality and probability, questions of space and time, the nature of the quantum world—that were so lively discussed during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century are an illustration of this close relationship between scientists and philosophers. No such intimacy has ever existed between those same philosophers and technologists; their worlds still barely touch. To be sure, a case can be made that, compared to the continuity existing between natural philosophy and science, a similar continuity exists between central questions in philosophy having to do with human action and practical rationality and the way technology approaches and systematizes the solution of practical problems. To investigate this connection may indeed be considered a major theme for philosophy of technology. This continuity appears only by hindsight, however, and dimly, as the historical development is at most a slow convening of various strands of philosophical thinking on action and rationality, not a development into variety from a single origin. Significantly it is only the academic outsider Ellul who has, in his idiosyncratic way, recognized in technology the emergent single dominant way of answering all questions concerning human action, comparable to science as the single dominant way of answering all questions concerning human knowledge (Ellul 1954 [1964]). But Ellul was not so much interested in investigating this relationship as in emphasizing and denouncing the social and cultural consequences as he saw them. It is all the more important to point out that humanities philosophy of technology cannot be differentiated from analytic philosophy of technology by claiming that only the former is interested in the social environment of technology. There are studies which are rooted in analytic philosophy of science but address specifically the relation of technology to society and culture, and equally the relevance of social relations to practices of technology, without taking an evaluative stand with respect to technology; an example is B. Preston 2012.

## **The Relationship Between Technology and Science**

The close relationship between the practices of science and technology may easily keep the important differences between the two from view. The predominant position of science in the philosophical field of vision made it difficult for philosophers to recognize that technology merits special attention for involving issues that do not emerge in science. This view resulting from this lack of recognition is often presented, perhaps somewhat dramatically, as coming down to a claim that technology is 'merely' applied science.

A questioning of the relation between science and technology was the central issue in one of the earliest discussions among analytic philosophers of technology. In 1966, in a special issue of the journal *Technology and Culture*, Henryk Skolimowski argued that technology is something quite different from science (Skolimowski 1966). As he phrased it, science concerns itself with what is, whereas technology concerns itself with what is to be. A few years later, in his well-known book *The Sciences of the Artificial* (1969), Herbert Simon emphasized this important distinction in almost the same words, stating that the scientist is concerned with how things are but the engineer with how things ought to be. Although it is difficult to imagine that earlier philosophers were

blind to this difference in orientation, their inclination, in particular in the tradition of logical empiricism, to view knowledge as a system of statements may have led to a conviction that in technology no knowledge claims play a role that cannot also be found in science. The study of technology, therefore, was not expected to pose new challenges nor hold surprises regarding the interests of analytic philosophy.

In contrast, Mario Bunge (1966) defended the view that technology is applied science, but in a subtle way that does justice to the differences between science and technology. Bunge acknowledges that technology is about action, but an action heavily underpinned by theory—that is what distinguishes technology from the arts and crafts and puts it on a par with science. According to Bunge, theories in technology come in two types: substantive theories, which provide knowledge about the object of action, and operative theories, which are concerned with action itself. The substantive theories of technology are indeed largely applications of scientific theories. The operative theories, in contrast, are not preceded by scientific theories but are born in applied research itself. Still, as Bunge claims, operative theories show a dependence on science in that in such theories the method of science is employed. This includes such features as modeling and idealization, the use of theoretical concepts and abstractions, and the modification of theories by the absorption of empirical data through prediction and retrodiction.

In response to this discussion, Ian Jarvie (1966) proposed as important questions for a philosophy of technology what the epistemological status of technological statements is and how technological statements are to be demarcated from scientific statements. This suggests a thorough investigation of the various forms of knowledge occurring in either practice, in particular, since scientific knowledge has already been so extensively studied, of the forms of knowledge that are characteristic of technology and are lacking, or of much less prominence, in science. A distinction between 'knowing that'—traditional propositional knowledge—and 'knowing how'—non-articulated and even impossible-to-articulate knowledge—had been introduced by Gilbert Ryle (1949) in a different context. The notion of 'knowing how' was taken up by Michael Polanyi under the name of tacit knowledge and made a central characteristic of technology (Polanyi 1958). However, emphasizing too much the role of unarticulated knowledge, of 'rules of thumb' as they are often called, easily underplays the importance of rational methods in technology. An emphasis on tacit knowledge may also be ill-fit for distinguishing the practices of science and technology because the role of tacit knowledge in science may well be more important than current philosophy of science acknowledges, for example in concluding causal relationships on the basis of empirical evidence. This was also an important theme in the writings of Thomas Kuhn on theory change in science (Kuhn 1962).

## **The Centrality of Design to Technology**

To claim, with Skolimowski and Simon, that technology is about what is to be or what ought to be rather than what is may serve to distinguish it from science but will hardly make it understandable why so much philosophical reflection on technology has taken the form of socio-cultural critique. Technology is an ongoing attempt to bring the world closer to the way one wishes it to be. Whereas science aims to understand the world as it is, technology aims to change the world. These are abstractions, of course. For one, whose wishes concerning what the world should be like are realized in technology? Unlike scientists, who are often personally motivated in their attempts at describing and understanding the world, engineers are seen, not in the least by engineers themselves, as undertaking their attempts to change the world as a service to the public. The ideas on what is to be or what ought to be are seen as originating outside of technology itself; engineers then take it upon

themselves to realize these ideas. This view is a major source for the widely spread picture of technology as being instrumental, as delivering instruments ordered from 'elsewhere', as means to ends specified outside of engineering, a picture that has served further to support the claim that technology is neutral with respect to values. This view involves a considerable distortion of reality, however. Many engineers are intrinsically motivated to change the world; in delivering ideas for improvement they are, so to speak, their own best customers. The same is true for most industrial companies, particularly in a market economy, where the prospect of great profits is another powerful motivator. As a result, much technological development is 'technology-driven'.

To understand where technology 'comes from', what drives the innovation process, is of importance not only to those who are curious to understand the phenomenon of technology itself but also to those who are concerned about its role in society. Technology or engineering as a practice is concerned with the creation of artifacts and, of increasing importance, artifact-based services. The design process, the structured process leading toward that goal, forms the core of the practice of technology. In the engineering literature, the design process is commonly represented as consisting of a series of translational steps; At the start are the customer's needs or wishes. In the first step these are translated into a list of functional requirements, which then define the design task an engineer, or a team of engineers, has to accomplish. The functional requirements specify as precisely as possible what the device to be designed must be able to do. This step is required because customers usually focus on just one or two features and are unable to articulate the requirements that are necessary to support the functionality they desire. In the second step, the functional requirements are translated into design specifications, which the exact physical parameters of crucial components by which the functional requirements are going to be met. The design parameters chosen to satisfy these requirements are combined and made more precise such that a blueprint of the device results. The blueprint contains all the details that must be known such that the final step to the process of manufacturing the device can take place. It is tempting to consider the blueprint as the end result of a design process, instead of a finished copy being this result. However, actual copies of a device are crucial for the purpose of prototyping and testing. Prototyping and testing presuppose that the sequence of steps making up the design process can and will often contain iterations, leading to revisions of the design parameters and/or the functional requirements. Even though, certainly for mass-produced items, the manufacture of a product for delivery to its customers or to the market comes after the closure of the design phase, the manufacturing process is often reflected in the functional requirements of a device, for example in putting restrictions on the number of different components of which the device consists. The complexity of a device will affect how difficult it will be to maintain or repair it, and ease of maintenance or low repair costs are often functional requirements. An important modern development is that the complete life cycle of an artifact is now considered to be the designing engineer's concern, up till the final stages of the recycling and disposal of its components and materials, and the functional requirements of any device should reflect this. From this point of view, neither a blueprint nor a prototype can be considered the end product of engineering design.

The biggest idealization that this scheme of the design process contains is arguably located at the start. Only in a minority of cases does a design task originate in a customer need or wish for a particular artifact. First of all, as already suggested, many design tasks are defined by engineers themselves, for instance, by noticing something to be improved in existing products. But more often than not design starts with a problem pointed out by some societal agent, which engineers are then invited to solve. Many such problems, however, are ill-defined or wicked problems, meaning that it is not at all clear what the problem is exactly and what a solution to the problem would consist in. The 'problem' is a situation that people—not necessarily the people 'in' the situation—find

unsatisfactory, but typically without being able to specify a situation that they find more satisfactory in other terms than as one in which the problem has been solved. In particular it is not obvious that a solution to the problem would consist in some artifact, or some artifactual system or process, being made available or installed. Engineering departments all over the world advertise that engineering is problem solving, and engineers easily seem confident that they are best qualified to solve a problem when they are asked to, whatever the nature of the problem. This has led to the phenomenon of a technological fix, the solution of a problem by a technical solution, that is, the delivery of an artifact or artifactual process, where it is questionable, to say the least, whether this solves the problem or whether it was the best way of handling the problem.

A candidate example of a technological fix for the problem of global warming would be the currently much debated option of injecting sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere to offset the warming effect of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane. Such schemes of geoengineering would allow us to avoid facing the—in all likelihood painful—choices that will lead to a reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, but will at the same time allow the depletion of the Earth's reservoir of fossil fuels to continue. See for a discussion of technological fixing, e.g., Volti 2009: 26–32. Given this situation, and its hazards, the notion of a problem and a taxonomy of problems deserve to receive more philosophical attention than they have hitherto received.

These wicked problems are often broadly social problems, which would best be met by some form of 'social action', which would result in people changing their behavior or acting differently in such a way that the problem would be mitigated or even disappear completely. In defense of the engineering view, it could perhaps be said that the repertoire of 'proven' forms of social action is meager. The temptation of technical fixes could be overcome—at least that is how an engineer might see it—by the inclusion of the social sciences in the systematic development and application of knowledge to the solution of human problems. This however, is a controversial view. Social engineering is to many a specter to be kept at as large a distance as possible instead of an ideal to be pursued. Karl Popper referred to acceptable forms of implementing social change as 'piecemeal social engineering' and contrasted it to the revolutionary but completely unfounded schemes advocated by, e.g., Marxism. In the entry on Karl Popper, however, his choice of words is called 'rather unfortunate'. The notion of social engineering, and its cogency, deserves more attention than it is currently receiving.

An important input for the design process is scientific knowledge: knowledge about the behavior of components and the materials they are composed of in specific circumstances. This is the point where science is applied. However, much of this knowledge is not directly available from the sciences, since it often concerns extremely detailed behavior in very specific circumstances. This scientific knowledge is therefore often generated within technology, by the engineering sciences. But apart from this very specific scientific knowledge, engineering design involves various other sorts of knowledge. In his book *What Engineers Know and How They Know It* (Vincenti 1990), the aeronautical engineer Walter Vincenti gave a six-fold categorization of engineering design knowledge (leaving aside production and operation as the other two basic constituents of engineering practice). Vincenti distinguishes

1. Fundamental design concepts, including primarily the operational principle and the normal configuration of a particular device;
2. Criteria and specifications;
3. Theoretical tools;

4. Quantitative data;
5. Practical considerations;
6. Design instrumentalities.

The fourth category concerns the quantitative knowledge just referred to, and the third the theoretical tools used to acquire it. These two categories can be assumed to match Bunge's notion of substantive technological theories. The status of the remaining four categories is much less clear, however, partly because they are less familiar, or not at all, from the well-explored context of science. Of these categories, Vincenti claims that they represent prescriptive forms of knowledge rather than descriptive ones. Here, the activity of design introduces an element of normativity, which is absent from scientific knowledge. Take such a basic notion as 'operational principle', which refers to the way in which the function of a device is realized, or, in short, how it works. This is still a purely descriptive notion. Subsequently, however, it plays a role in arguments that seek to prescribe a course of action to someone who has a goal that could be realized by the operation of such a device. At this stage, the issue changes from a descriptive to a prescriptive or normative one. An extensive discussion of the various kinds of knowledge relevant to technology is offered by Houkes (2009).

Although the notion of an operational principle—a term that seems to originate with Polanyi (1958)—is central to engineering design, no single clear-cut definition of it seems to exist. The issue of disentangling descriptive from prescriptive aspects in an analysis of the technical action and its constituents is therefore a task that has hardly begun. This task requires a clear view on the extent and scope of technology. If one follows Joseph Pitt in his book *Thinking About Technology* (1999) and defines technology broadly as 'humanity at work', then to distinguish between technological action and action in general becomes difficult, and the study of technological action must absorb all descriptive and normative theories of action, including the theory of practical rationality, and much of theoretical economics in its wake. There have indeed been attempts at such an encompassing account of human action, for example Tadeusz Kotarbinski's *Praxiology* (1965), but a perspective of such generality makes it difficult to arrive at results of sufficient depth. It would be a challenge for philosophy to specify the differences among action forms and the reasoning grounding them in, to single out three prominent fields of study, technology, organization and management, and economics.

A more restricted attempt at such an approach is Ilkka Niiniluoto's (1993). According to Niiniluoto, the theoretical framework of technology as the practice that is concerned with what the world should be like rather than is, the framework that forms the counterpoint to the descriptive framework of science, is design science. The content of design science, the counterpoint to the theories and explanations that form the content of descriptive science, would then be formed by technical norms, statements of the form 'If one wants to achieve X, one should do Y'. The notion of a technical norm derives from Georg Henrik von Wright's *Norm and Action* (1963). Technical norms need to be distinguished from anankastic statements expressing natural necessity, of the form 'If X is to be achieved, Y needs to be done'; the latter have a truth value but the former have not. Von Wright himself, however, wrote that he did not understand the mutual relations between these statements. Ideas on what design science is and can and should be are evidently related to the broad problem area of practical rationality—see this entries on practical reason and instrumental rationality—and also to means-ends reasoning, discussed.

## Methodological Issues: Design as Decision Making

Design is an activity that is subject to rational scrutiny but in which creativity is considered to play an important role as well. Since design is a form of action, a structured series of decisions to proceed in one way rather than another, the form of rationality that is relevant to it is practical rationality, the rationality incorporating the criteria on how to act, given particular circumstances. This suggests a clear division of labor between the part to be played by rational scrutiny and the part to be played by creativity. Theories of rational action generally conceive their problem situation as one involving a choice among various course of action open to the agent. Rationality then concerns the question how to decide among given options, whereas creativity concerns the generation of these options. This distinction is similar to the distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery in science. The suggestion that is associated with this distinction, however, that rational scrutiny only applies in the context of justification, is difficult to uphold for technological design. If the initial creative phase of option generation is conducted sloppily, the result of the design task can hardly be satisfactory. Unlike the case of science, where the practical consequences of entertaining a particular theory are not taken into consideration, the context of discovery in technology is governed by severe constraints of time and money, and an analysis of the problem how best to proceed certainly seems in order. There has been little philosophical work done in this direction; an overview of the issues is given in Kroes, Franssen, and Bucciarelli (2009).

The ideas of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality (see, e.g., Simon 1982) are relevant here, since decisions on when to stop generating options and when to stop gathering information about these options and the consequences when they are adopted are crucial in decision making if informational overload and calculative intractability are to be avoided. However, it has proved difficult to further develop Simon's ideas on bounded rationality since their conception in the 1950s. Another notion that is relevant here is means-ends reasoning. In order to be of any help here, theories of means-ends reasoning should then concern not just the evaluation of given means with respect to their ability to achieve given ends, but also the generation or construction of means for given ends. A comprehensive theory of means-ends reasoning, however, is not yet available; for a proposal on how to develop means-ends reasoning in the context of technical artifacts. In the practice of technology, alternative proposals for the realization of particular functions are usually taken from 'catalogs' of existing and proven realizations. These catalogs are extended by ongoing research in technology rather than under the urge of particular design tasks.

When engineering design is conceived as a process of decision making, governed by considerations of practical rationality, the next step is to specify these considerations. Almost all theories of practical rationality conceive of it as a reasoning process where a match between beliefs and desires or goals is sought. The desires or goals are represented by their value or utility for the decision maker, and the decision maker's problem is to choose an action that realizes a situation that, ideally, has maximal value or utility among all the situations that could be realized. If there is uncertainty concerning the situations that will be realized by a particular action, then the problem is conceived as aiming for maximal expected value or utility. Now the instrumental perspective on technology implies that the value that is at issue in the design process viewed as a process of rational decision making is not the value of the artifacts that are created. Those values are the domain of the users of the technology so created. They are supposed to be represented in the functional requirements defining the design task. Instead the value to be maximized is the extent to which a particular design meets the functional requirements defining the design task. It is in this sense that engineers share an overall perspective on engineering design as an exercise in optimization. But although optimization is a value-orientated notion, it is not itself perceived as a value

driving engineering design.

The functional requirements that define most design problems do not prescribe explicitly what should be optimized; usually they set levels to be attained minimally. It is then up to the engineer to choose how far to go beyond meeting the requirements in this minimal sense. Efficiency, in energy consumption and use of materials first of all, is then often a prime value. Under the pressure of society, other values have come to be incorporated, in particular safety and, more recently, sustainability. Sometimes it is claimed that what engineers aim to maximize is just one factor, namely market success. Market success, however, can only be assessed after the fact. The engineer's maximization effort will instead be directed at what are considered the predictors of market success. Meeting the functional requirements and being relatively efficient and safe are plausible candidates as such predictors, but additional methods, informed by market research, may introduce additional factors or may lead to a hierarchy among the factors.

Choosing the design option that maximally meets all the functional requirements (which may but need not originate with the prospective user) and all other considerations and criteria that are taken to be relevant, then becomes the practical decision-making problem to be solved in a particular engineering-design task. This creates several methodological problems. Most important of these is that the engineer is facing a multi-criteria decision problem. The various requirements come with their own operationalizations in terms of design parameters and measurement procedures for assessing their performance. This results in a number of rank orders or quantitative scales which represent the various options out of which a choice is to be made. The task is to come up with a final score in which all these results are 'adequately' represented, such that the option that scores best can be considered the optimal solution to the design problem. Engineers describe this situation as one where trade-offs have to be made: in judging the merit of one option relative to other options, a relative bad performance on one criterion can be balanced by a relatively good performance on another criterion. An important problem is whether a rational method for doing this can be formulated. It has been argued by Franssen (2005) that this problem is structurally similar to the well-known problem of social choice, for which Kenneth Arrow proved his notorious impossibility theorem in 1950, implying that no general rational solution method exists for this problem. This poses serious problems for the claim of engineers that their designs are optimal solutions, since Arrow's theorem implies that in most multi-criteria problems the notion of 'optimal' cannot be rigorously defined.

This result seems to except a crucial aspect of engineering activity from philosophical scrutiny, and it could be used to defend the opinion that engineering is at least partly an art, not a science. Instead of surrendering to the result, however, which has a significance that extends much beyond engineering and even beyond decision making in general, we should perhaps conclude instead that there is still a lot of work to be done on what might be termed, provisionally, 'approximative' forms of reasoning. One form of reasoning to be included here is Herbert Simon's bounded rationality, plus the related notion of 'satisficing'. Since their introduction in the 1950s (Simon 1957) these two terms have found wide usage, but we are still lacking a general theory of bounded rationality. It may be in the nature of forms of approximative reasoning such as bounded rationality that a general theory cannot be had, but even a systematic treatment from which such an insight could emerge seems to be lacking.

Another problem for the decision-making view of engineering design is that in modern technology almost all design is done by teams. Such teams are composed of experts from many different disciplines. Each discipline has its own theories, its own models of interdependencies, its own as-

assessment criteria, and so forth, and the professionals belonging to these disciplines must be considered as inhabitants of different object worlds, as Louis Bucciarelli (1994) phrases it. The different team members are, therefore, likely to disagree on the relative rankings and evaluations of the various design options under discussion. Agreement on one option as the overall best one can here be even less arrived at by an algorithmic method exemplifying engineering rationality. Instead, models of social interaction, such as bargaining and strategic thinking, are relevant here. An example of such an approach to an (abstract) design problem is presented by Franssen and Bucciarelli (2004).

To look in this way at technological design as a decision-making process is to view it normatively from the point of view of practical or instrumental rationality. At the same time it is descriptive in that it is a description of how engineering methodology generally presents the issue how to solve design problems. From that somewhat higher perspective there is room for all kinds of normative questions that are not addressed here, such as whether the functional requirements defining a design problem can be seen as an adequate representation of the values of the prospective users of an artifact or a technology, or by which methods values such as safety and sustainability can best be elicited and represented in the design process.

### **Metaphysical Issues: The Status and Characteristics of Artifacts**

Understanding the process of designing artifacts is the theme in philosophy of technology that most directly touches on the interests of engineering practice. This is hardly true for another issue of central concern to analytic philosophy of technology, which is the status and the character of artifacts. This is perhaps not unlike the situation in the philosophy of science, where working scientists seem also to be much less interested in investigating the status and character of models and theories than philosophers are.

Artifacts are man-made objects: they have an author. The artifacts that are of relevance to technology are, in particular, made to serve a purpose. This excludes, within the set of all man-made objects, on the one hand byproducts and waste products and on the other hand works of art. Byproducts and waste products result from an intentional act to make something but just not precisely, although the author at work may be well aware of their creation. Works of art result from an intention directed at their creation (although in exceptional cases of conceptual art, this directedness may involve many intermediate steps) but it is contested whether artists include in their intentions concerning their work an intention that the work serves some purpose. A further discussion of this aspect belongs to the philosophy of art. An interesting general account has been presented by Diptert (1993).

Technical artifacts, then, are made to serve some purpose, generally to be used for something or to act as a component in a larger artifact, which in its turn is either something to be used or again a component. Whether end product or component, an artifact is 'for something', and what it is for is called the artifact's function. Several researchers have emphasized that an adequate description of artifacts must refer both to their status as tangible physical objects and to the intentions of the people engaged with them. Kroes and Meijers (2006) have dubbed this view "the dual nature of technical artifacts"; its most mature formulation is Kroes 2012. They suggest that the two aspects are 'tied up', so to speak, in the notion of artifact function. This gives rise to several problems. One, which will be passed over quickly because little philosophical work seems to have been done concerning it, is that structure and function mutually constrain each other, but the constraining is only partial. It is unclear whether a general account of this relation is possible and what problems need

to be solved to arrive there. There may be interesting connections with the issue of multiple realizability in the philosophy of mind and with accounts of reduction in science; an example where this is explored is Mahner and Bunge 2001.

It is equally problematic whether a unified account of the notion of function as such is possible, but this issue has received considerably more philosophical attention. The notion of function is of paramount importance for characterizing artifacts, but the notion is used much more widely. The notion of an artifact's function seems to refer necessarily to human intentions. Function is also a key concept in biology, however, where no intentionality plays a role, and it is a key concept in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, where it is crucial in grounding intentionality in non-intentional, structural and physical properties. Up till now there is no accepted general account of function that covers both the intentionality-based notion of artifact function and the non-intentional notion of biological function—not to speak of other areas where the concept plays a role, such as the social sciences. The most comprehensive theory, that has the ambition to account for the biological notion, cognitive notion and the intentional notion, is Ruth Millikan's 1984. The collection of essays edited by Ariew, Cummins and Perlman (2002) presents a recent introduction to the general topic of defining the notion of function in general, although the emphasis is, as is generally the case in the literature on function, on biological functions.

Against the view that, at least in the case of artifacts, the notion of function refers necessarily to intentionality, it could be argued that in discussing the functions of the components of a larger device, and the interrelations between these functions, the intentional 'side' of these functions is of secondary importance only. This, however, would be to ignore the possibility of the malfunctioning of such components. This notion seems to be definable only in terms of a mismatch between actual behavior and intended behavior. The notion of malfunction also sharpens an ambiguity in the general reference to intentions when characterizing technical artifacts. These artifacts usually engage many people, and the intentions of these people may not all pull in the same direction. A major distinction can be drawn between the intentions of the actual user of an artifact for a particular purpose and the intentions of the artifact's designer. Since an artifact may be used for a purpose different from the one for which its designer intended it to be used, and since people may also use natural objects for some purpose or other, one is invited to allow that artifacts can have multiple functions, or to enforce a hierarchy among all relevant intentions in determining the function of an artifact, or to introduce a classification of functions in terms of the sorts of determining intentions. In the latter case, which is a sort of middle way between the two other options, one commonly distinguishes between the proper function of an artifact as the one intended by its designer and the accidental function of the artifact as the one given to it by some user on private considerations. Accidental use can become so common, however, that the original function drops out of memory.

Closely related to this issue to what extent use and design determine the function of an artifact is the problem of characterizing artifact kinds. It may seem that we use functions to classify artifacts: an object is a knife because it has the function of cutting, or more precisely, of enabling us to cut. On closer inspection, however, the link between function and kind-membership seems much less straightforward. The basic kinds in technology are, for example, 'knife', 'aircraft' and 'piston'. The members of these kinds have been designed in order to be used to cut something with, to transport something through the air and to generate mechanical movement through thermodynamic expansion. However, one cannot create a particular kind of artifact just by designing something with the intention that it be used for some particular purpose: a member of the kind so created must actually be useful for that purpose. Despite innumerable design attempts and claims,

the perpetual motion machine is not a kind of artifact. A kind like 'knife' is defined, therefore, not only by the intentions of the designers of its members that they each be useful for cutting but also by a shared operational principle known to these designers, and on which they based their design. This is, in a different setting, also defended by Thomasson, who in her characterization of what she in general calls an artifactual kind says that such a kind is defined by the designer's intention to make something of that kind, by a substantive idea that the designer has of how this can be achieved, and by his or her largely successful achievement of it (Thomasson 2003, 2007). Qua sorts of kinds in which artifacts can be grouped, a distinction must therefore be made between a kind like 'knife' and a corresponding but different kind 'cutter'. A 'knife' indicates a particular way a 'cutter' can be made. One can also cut, however, with a thread or line, a welding torch, a water jet, and undoubtedly by other sorts of means that have not yet been thought of. A 'cutter' would then refer to a truly functional kind. As such, it is subject to the conflict between use and design: one could mean by 'cutter' anything that can be used for cutting or anything that has been designed to be used for cutting, by the application of whatever operational principle, presently known or unknown.

This distinction between artifact kinds and functional kinds is relevant for the status of such kinds in comparison to other notions of kinds. Philosophy of science has emphasized that the concept of natural kind, such as exemplified by 'water' or 'atom', lies at the basis of science. On the other hand it is generally taken for granted that there are no regularities that all knives or airplanes or pistons answer to. This, however, is loosely based on considerations of multiple realizability that fully apply only to functional kinds, not to artifact kinds. Artifact kinds share an operational principle that gives them some commonality in physical features, and this commonality becomes stronger once a particular artifact kind is subdivided into narrower kinds. Since these kinds are specified in terms of physical and geometrical parameters, they are much closer to the natural kinds of science, in that they support law-like regularities. A recent collection of essays that discuss the metaphysics of artifacts and artifact kinds is Franssen, Kroes, Reydon and Vermaas 2014.

## **Ethics of Technology**

It was not until the twentieth century that the development of the ethics of technology as a systematic and more or less independent subdiscipline of philosophy started. This late development may seem surprising given the large impact that technology has had on society, especially since the industrial revolution.

A plausible reason for this late development of ethics of technology is the instrumental perspective on technology. This perspective implies, basically, a positive ethical assessment of technology: technology increases the possibilities and capabilities of humans, which seems in general desirable. Of course, since antiquity, it has been recognized that the new capabilities may be put to bad use or lead to human hubris. Often, however, these undesirable consequences are attributed to the users of technology, rather than the technology itself, or its developers. This vision is known as the instrumental vision of technology resulting in the so-called neutrality thesis. The neutrality thesis holds that technology is a neutral instrument that can be put to good or bad use by its users. During the twentieth century, this neutrality thesis met with severe critique, most prominently by Heidegger and Ellul, but also by philosophers from the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer and Adorno (1947 [2002]), Marcuse (1964), and Habermas (1968 [1970]).

The scope and the agenda for ethics of technology to a large extent depend on how technology is conceptualized. The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed a richer variety of conceptualizations of technology that move beyond the conceptualization of technology as a neutral tool,

as a world view or as a historical necessity. This includes conceptualizations of technology as a political phenomenon (Winner, Feenberg, Sclove), as a social activity (Latour, Callon, Bijker and others in the area of science and technology studies), as a cultural phenomenon (Ihde, Borgmann), as a professional activity (engineering ethics, e.g., Davis), and as a cognitive activity (Bunge, Vincenti). Despite this diversity, the development in the second half of the twentieth century is characterized by two general trends. One is a move away from technological determinism and the assumption that technology is a given self-contained phenomenon which develops autonomously to an emphasis on technological development being the result of choices (although not necessarily the intended result). The other is a move away from ethical reflection on technology as such to ethical reflection of specific technologies and to specific phases in the development of technology. Both trends together have resulted in an enormous increase in the number and scope of ethical questions that are asked about technology. The developments also imply that ethics of technology is to be adequately empirically informed, not only about the exact consequences of specific technologies but also about the actions of engineers and the process of technological development. This has also opened the way to the involvement of other disciplines in ethical reflections on technology, such as Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Technology Assessment (TA).

## **Approaches in the Ethics of Technology**

Not only is the ethics of technology characterized by a diversity of approaches, it might even be doubted whether something like a subdiscipline of ethics of technology, in the sense of a community of scholars working on a common set of problems, exists. The scholars studying ethical issues in technology have diverse backgrounds (e.g., philosophy, STS, TA, law, political science) and they do not always consider themselves (primarily) ethicists of technology. To give the reader an overview of the field, three basic approaches or strands that might be distinguished in the ethics of technology will be discussed.

### **1. Cultural and political approaches**

Both cultural and political approaches build on the traditional philosophy and ethics of technology of the first half of the twentieth century. Whereas cultural approaches conceive of technology as a cultural phenomenon that influences our perception of the world, political approaches conceive of technology as a political phenomenon, i.e., as a phenomenon that is ruled by and embodies institutional power relations between people.

Cultural approaches are often phenomenological in nature or at least position themselves in relation to phenomenology as post-phenomenology. Examples of philosophers in this tradition are Don Ihde, Albert Borgmann, Peter-Paul Verbeek and Evan Selinger (e.g., Borgmann 1984; Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2000 [2005], 2011). The approaches are usually influenced by developments in STS, especially the idea that technologies contain a script that influences not only people's perception of the world but also human behavior, and the idea of the absence of a fundamental distinction between humans and non-humans, including technological artifacts (Akrich 1992; Latour 1992, 1993; Ihde & Selinger 2003). The combination of both ideas has led some to claim that technology has (moral) agency.

Political approaches to technology mostly go back to Marx, who assumed that the material structure of production in society, in which technology is obviously a major factor, determined the economic and social structure of that society. Similarly, Langdon Winner has argued that technologies can embody specific forms of power and authority (Winner 1980). According to him, some tech-

nologies are inherently normative in the sense that they require or are strongly compatible with certain social and political relations. Railroads, for example, seem to require a certain authoritative management structure. In other cases, technologies may be political due to the particular way they have been designed. Some political approaches to technology are inspired by (American) pragmatism and, to a lesser extent, discourse ethics. A number of philosophers, for example, have pleaded for a democratization of technological development and the inclusion of ordinary people in the shaping of technology (Winner 1983; Sclove 1995; Feenberg 1999).

Although political approaches have obviously ethical ramifications, many philosophers who have adopted such approaches do not engage in explicit ethical reflection on technology. An interesting recent exception, and an attempt to consolidate a number of recent developments and to articulate them into a more general account of what an ethics of technology should look like, is the volume *Pragmatist Ethics for a Technological Culture* (Keulartz et al. 2002). In this volume, the authors plead for a revival of the pragmatist tradition in moral philosophy because it is better fit to deal with a number of moral issues in technology. Instead of focusing on how to reach and justify normative judgments about technology, a pragmatist ethics focuses on how to recognize and trace moral problems in the first place. Moreover, the process of dealing with these problems is considered more important than the outcome.

## **I. Engineering ethics**

Engineering ethics is a relatively new field of education and research. It started off in the 1980s in the United States, merely as an educational effort. Engineering ethics is concerned with “the actions and decisions made by persons, individually or collectively, who belong to the profession of engineering” (Baum 1980: 1). According to this approach, engineering is a profession, in the same way as medicine is a profession.

Although there is no agreement on how a profession exactly should be defined, the following characteristics are often mentioned:

- A profession relies on specialized knowledge and skills that require a long period of study;
- The occupational group has a monopoly on the carrying out of the occupation;
- The assessment of whether the professional work is carried out in a competent way is done by, and it is accepted that this can only be done by, professional peers;
- A profession provides society with products, services or values that are useful or worthwhile for society, and is characterized by an ideal of serving society;
- The daily practice of professional work is regulated by ethical standards, which are derived from or relate to the society-serving ideal of the profession.

Typical ethical issues that are discussed in engineering ethics are professional obligations of engineers as exemplified in, for example, codes of ethics of engineers, the role of engineers versus managers, competence, honesty, whistle-blowing, concern for safety and conflicts of interest (Da-

vis 1998, 2005; Martin & Schinzinger 2005; Harris, Pritchard, & Rabins 2008).

Recently, a number of authors have pleaded for broadening the traditional scope of engineering ethics (e.g., Herkert 2001; van de Poel & Royakkers 2011). This call for a broader approach derives from two concerns. One concern is that the traditional micro-ethical approach in engineering ethics tends to take the context in which engineers have to work for given, while major ethical issues pertain to how this context is 'organized'. Another concern is that the traditional micro-ethical focus tends to neglect issues relating to the impact of technology on society or issues relating to decisions about technology. Broadening the scope of engineering ethics would then, among others, imply more attention for such issues as sustainability and social justice.

## **II. Ethics of specific technologies**

The last decades have witnessed an increase in ethical inquiries into specific technologies. This may now be the largest of the three strands discussed, especially given the rapid growth in technology-specific ethical inquiries in the last two decades. One of the most visible new fields is probably computer ethics (e.g., Moor 1985; Floridi 2010; Johnson 2009; Weckert 2007; van den Hoven & Weckert 2008), with more recently a focus on robotics, artificial intelligence, machine ethics, and the ethics of algorithms (Lin, Abney, & Jenkins 2017; Nucci & Santoni de Sio 2016; Mittelstadt et al. 2016; Bostrom & Yudkowsky 2014; Wallach & Allen 2009). But biotechnology has spurred dedicated ethical investigations as well (e.g., Sherlock & Morrey 2002; P. Thompson 2007). More traditional fields like architecture and urban planning have also attracted specific ethical attention (Fox 2000). More recently, nanotechnology and so-called converging technologies have led to the establishment of what is called nanoethics (Allhoff et al. 2007). Other examples are the ethics of nuclear deterrence (Finnis et al. 1988), nuclear energy (Taebi & Roeser 2015) and geoengineering (C. Preston 2016).

Obviously the establishment of such new fields of ethical reflection is a response to social and technological developments. Still, the question can be asked whether the social demand is best met by establishing new fields of applied ethics. This issue is in fact regularly discussed as new fields emerge. Several authors have for example argued that there is no need for nanoethics because nanotechnology does not raise any really new ethical issues (e.g., McGinn 2010). The alleged absence of newness here is supported by the claim that the ethical issues raised by nanotechnology are a variation on, and sometimes an intensification of, existing ethical issues, but hardly really new, and by the claim that these issues can be dealt with the existing theories and concepts from moral philosophy. For an earlier, similar discussion concerning the supposed new character of ethical issues in computer engineering.

The new fields of ethical reflection are often characterized as applied ethics, that is, as applications of theories, normative standards, concepts and methods developed in moral philosophy. For each of these elements, however, application is usually not straightforward but requires a further specification or revision. This is the case because general moral standards, concepts and methods are often not specific enough to be applicable in any direct sense to specific moral problems. 'Application' therefore often leads to new insights which might well result in the reformulation or at least refinement of existing normative standards, concepts and methods. In some cases, ethical issues in a specific field might require new standards, concepts or methods. Beauchamp and Childress for example have proposed a number of general ethical principles for biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress 2001). These principles are more specific than general normative standards, but still so general and abstract that they apply to different issues in biomedical ethics. In

computer ethics, existing moral concepts relating to for example privacy and ownership has been redefined and adapted to deal with issues which are typical for the computer age (Johnson 2003). New fields of ethical application might also require new methods for, for example, discerning ethical issues that take into account relevant empirical facts about these fields, like the fact that technological research and development usually takes place in networks of people rather than by individuals (Zwart et al. 2006). Another more

general issue that applies to many new technologies is how to deal with the uncertainties about (potential) social and ethical impacts that typically surround new emerging technologies. Brey's (2012) proposal for an anticipatory ethics may be seen as a reply to this challenge. The issue of anticipation is also one of the central concerns in the more recent interdisciplinary field of responsible innovation (e.g., Owen et al. 2013).

Although different fields of ethical reflection on specific technologies might well raise their own philosophical and ethical issues, it can be questioned whether this justifies the development of separate subfields or even subdisciplines. One obvious argument might be that in order to say something ethically meaningful about new technologies, one needs specialized and detailed knowledge of a specific technology. Moreover such subfields allow interaction with relevant non-philosophical experts in for example law, psychology, economy, science and technology studies (STS) or technology assessment (TA). On the other side, it could also be argued that a lot can be learned from interaction and discussion between ethicists specializing in different technologies, and a fruitful interaction with the two other strands discussed above (cultural and political approaches and engineering ethics). Currently, such interaction in many cases seems absent, although there are of course exceptions.

## **2. Some Recurrent Themes in the Ethics of Technology**

We now turn to the description of some themes in the ethics of technology. We focus on a number of general themes that provide an illustration of general issues in the ethics of technology and the way these are treated.

### **III. Neutrality versus moral agency**

One important general theme in the ethics of technology is the question whether technology is value-laden. Some authors have maintained that technology is value-neutral, in the sense that technology is just a neutral means to an end, and accordingly can be put to good or bad use (e.g., Pitt 2000). This view might have some plausibility in as far as technology is considered to be just a bare physical structure. Most philosophers of technology, however, agree that technological development is a goal-oriented process and that technological artifacts by definition have certain functions, so that they can be used for certain goals but not, or far more difficulty or less effectively, for other goals. This conceptual connection between technological artifacts, functions and goals makes it hard to maintain that technology is value-neutral. Even if this point is granted, the value-ladenness of technology can be construed in a host of different ways. Some authors have maintained that technology can have moral agency. This claim suggests that technologies can autonomously and freely 'act' in a moral sense and can be held morally responsible for their actions.

The debate whether technologies can have moral agency started off in computer ethics (Bechtel 1985; Snapper 1985; Dennett 1997; Floridi & Sanders 2004) but has since broadened. Typically, the authors who claim that technologies (can) have moral agency often redefine the notion of

agency or its connection to human will and freedom (e.g., Latour 1993; Floridi & Sanders 2004, Verbeek 2011). A disadvantage of this strategy is that it tends to blur the morally relevant distinctions between people and technological artifacts. More generally, the claim that technologies have moral agency sometimes seems to have become shorthand for claiming that technology is morally relevant. This, however, overlooks the fact technologies can be value-laden in other ways than by having moral agency (see, e.g., Johnson 2006; Radder 2009; Illies & Meijers 2009; Peterson & Spahn 2011). One might, for example, claim that technology enables (or even invites) and constrains (or even inhibits) certain human actions and the attainment of certain human goals and therefore is to some extent value-laden, without claiming moral agency for technological artifacts. A good overview of the debate can be found in Kroes and Verbeek 2014.

The debate about moral agency and technology is now particularly salient with respect to the design of intelligent artificial agents. James Moor (2006) has distinguished between four ways in which artificial agents may be or become moral agents:

1. Ethical impact agents are robots and computer systems that ethically impact their environment; this is probably true of all artificial agents.
2. Implicit ethical agents are artificial agents that have been programmed to act according to certain values.
3. Explicit ethical agents are machines that can represent ethical categories and that can 'reason' (in machine language) about these.
4. Full ethical agents in addition also possess some characteristics we often consider crucial for human agency, like consciousness, free will and intentionality.

It might perhaps never be possible to technologically design full ethical agents, and if it were to become possible it might be questionable whether it is morally desirable to do so (Bostrom & Yudkowsky 2014). As Wallach and Allen (2009) have pointed out, the main problem might not be to design artificial agents that can function autonomously and that can adapt themselves in interaction with the environment, but rather to build enough, and the right kind of, ethical sensitivity into such machines.

#### **IV. Responsibility**

Responsibility has always been a central theme in the ethics of technology. The traditional philosophy and ethics of technology, however, tended to discuss responsibility in rather general terms and were rather pessimistic about the possibility of engineers to assume responsibility for the technologies they developed. Ellul, for example, has characterized engineers as the high priests of technology, who cherish technology but cannot steer it. Hans Jonas (1979 [1984]) has argued that technology requires an ethics in which responsibility is the central imperative because for the first time in history we are able to destroy the earth and humanity.

In engineering ethics, the responsibility of engineers is often discussed in relation to code of ethics that articulate specific responsibilities of engineers. Such codes of ethics stress three types of responsibilities of engineers: (1) conducting the profession with integrity and honesty and in a competent way, (2) responsibilities towards employers and clients and (3) responsibility towards the public and society. With respect to the latter, most US codes of ethics maintain that engineers 'should hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public'.

As has been pointed out by several authors (Nissenbaum 1996; Johnson & Powers 2005; Swierstra & Jelsma 2006), it may be hard to pinpoint individual responsibility in engineering. The reason is that the conditions for the proper attribution of individual responsibility that have been discussed in the philosophical literature (like freedom to act, knowledge, and causality) are often not met by individual engineers. For example, engineers may feel compelled to act in a certain way due to hierarchical or market constraints, and negative consequences may be very hard or impossible to predict beforehand. The causality condition is often difficult to meet as well due to the long chain from research and development of a technology till its use and the many people involved in this chain. Davis (2012) nevertheless maintains that despite such difficulties individual engineers can and do take responsibility.

One issue that is at stake in this debate is the notion of responsibility. Davis (2012), and also for example Ladd (1991), argue for a notion of responsibility that focuses less on blame and stresses the forward-looking or virtuous character of assuming responsibility. But many others focus on backward-looking notions of responsibility that stress accountability, blameworthiness or liability. Zandvoort (2000), for example has pleaded for a notion of responsibility in engineering that is more like the legal notion of strict liability, in which the knowledge condition for responsibility is seriously weakened. Doorn (2012) compares three perspectives on responsibility ascription in engineering—a merit-based, a right-based and a consequentialist perspective—and argues that the consequentialist perspective, which applies a forward-looking notion of responsibility, is most powerful in influencing engineering practice.

The difficulty of attributing individual responsibility may lead to the Problem of Many Hands (PMH). The term was first coined by Dennis Thompson (1980) in an article about the responsibility of public officials. The term is used to describe problems with the ascription of individual responsibility in collective settings. Doorn (2010) has proposed a procedural approach, based on Rawls' reflective equilibrium model, to deal with the PMH; other ways of dealing with the PMH include the design of institutions that help to avoid it or an emphasis on virtuous behavior in organizations (van de Poel, Royackers, & Zwart 2015).

## **V. Design**

In the last decades, increasingly attention is paid not only to ethical issues that arise during the use of a technology, but also during the design phase. An important consideration behind this development is the thought that during the design phase technologies, and their social consequences, are still malleable whereas during the use phase technologies are more or less given and negative social consequences may be harder to avoid or positive effects harder to achieve.

In computer ethics, an approach known as Value Sensitive Design (VSD) has been developed to explicitly address the ethical nature of design. VSD aims at integrating values of ethical importance in engineering design in a systematic way (Friedman & Kahn 2003). The approach combines conceptual, empirical and technical investigations. There is also a range of other approaches aimed at including values in design. 'Design for X' approaches in engineering aim at including instrumental values (like maintainability, reliability and costs) but they also include design for sustainability, inclusive design, and affective design (Holt & Barnes 2010). Inclusive design aims at making designs accessible to the whole population including, for example, handicapped people and the elderly (Erlandson 2008). Affective design aims at designs that evoke positive emotions with the users and so contributes to human well-being. Van de Hoven, Vermaas, and van de Poel 2015 gives a good overview of the state-of-the art of value sensitive design for various values and

application domains.

If one tries to integrate values into design one may run into the problem of a conflict of values. The safest car is, due to its weight, not likely to be the most sustainability. Here safety and sustainability conflict in the design of cars. Traditional methods in which engineers deal with such conflicts and make trade-off between different requirements for design include cost-benefit analysis and multiple criteria analysis. Such methods are, however, beset with methodological problems like those discussed (Franssen 2005; Hansson 2007). Van de Poel (2009) discusses various alternatives for dealing with value conflicts in design including the setting of thresholds (satisficing), reasoning about values, innovation and diversity.

## VI. Technological risks

The risks of technology are one of the traditional ethical concerns in the ethics of technology. Risks raise not only ethical issues but other philosophical issues, such as epistemological and decision-theoretical issues as well (Roeser et al. 2012).

Risk is usually defined as the product of the probability of an undesirable event and the effect of that event, although there are also other definitions around (Hansson 2004b). In general it seems desirable to keep technological risks as small as possible. The larger the risk, the larger either the likeliness or the impact of an undesirable event is. Risk reduction therefore is an important goal in technological development and engineering codes of ethics often attribute a responsibility to engineers in reducing risks and designing safe products. Still, risk reduction is not always feasible or desirable. It is sometimes not feasible, because there are no absolutely safe products and technologies. But even if risk reduction is feasible it may not be acceptable from a moral point of view. Reducing risk often comes at a cost. Safer products may be more difficult to use, more expensive or less sustainable. So sooner or later, one is confronted with the question: what is safe enough? What makes a risk (un)acceptable?

The process of dealing with risks is often divided into three stages: risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk management. Of these, the second is most obviously ethically relevant. However, risk assessment already involves value judgments, for example about which risks should be assessed in the first place (Shrader-Frechette 1991). An important, and morally relevant, issue is also the degree of evidence that is needed to establish a risk. In establishing a risk on the basis of a body of empirical data one might make two kinds of mistakes. One can establish a risk when there is actually none (type I error) or one can mistakenly conclude that there is no risk while there actually is a risk (type II error). Science traditionally aims at avoiding type I errors. Several authors have argued that in the specific context of risk assessment it is often more important to avoid type II errors (Cranor 1990; Shrader-Frechette 1991). The reason for this is that risk assessment not just aims at establishing scientific truth but has a practical aim, i.e., to provide the knowledge on basis of which decisions can be made about whether it is desirable to reduce or avoid certain technological risks in order to protect users or the public.

Risk evaluation is carried out in a number of ways (see, e.g., Shrader-Frechette 1985). One possible approach is to judge the acceptability of risks by comparing them to other risks or to certain standards. One could, for example, compare technological risks with naturally occurring risks. This approach, however, runs the danger of committing a naturalistic fallacy: naturally occurring risks may (sometimes) be unavoidable but that does not necessarily make them morally acceptable. More generally, it is often dubious to judge the acceptability of the risk of technology A by

comparing it to the risk of technology B if A and B are not alternatives in a decision.

A second approach to risk evaluation is risk-cost benefit analysis, which is based on weighing the risks against the benefits of an activity. Different decision criteria can be applied if a (risk) cost benefit analysis is carried out (Kneese, Ben-David, and Schulze 1983). According to Hansson (2003: 306), usually the following criterion is applied: ... a risk is acceptable if and only if the total benefits that the exposure gives rise to outweigh the total risks, measured as the probability-weighted disutility of outcomes.

A third approach is to base risk acceptance on the consent of people who suffer the risks after they have been informed about these risks (informed consent). A problem of this approach is that technological risks usually affect a large number of people at once. Informed consent may therefore lead to a "society of stalemates" (Hansson 2003: 300).

Several authors have proposed alternatives to the traditional approaches of risk evaluation on the basis of philosophical and ethical arguments. Shrader-Frechette(1991) has proposed a number of reforms in risk assessment and evaluation procedures on the basis of a philosophical critique of current practices. Roeser (2012) argues for a role of emotions in judging the acceptability of risks. Hansson has proposed the following alternative principle for risk evaluation:

Exposure of a person to a risk is acceptable if and only if this exposure is part of an equitable social system of risk-taking that works to her advantage. (Hansson 2003: 305)

Hansson's proposal introduces a number of moral considerations in risk evaluation that are traditionally not addressed or only marginally addressed. These are the consideration whether individuals profit from a risky activity and the consideration whether the distribution of risks and benefits is fair.

Some authors have criticized the focus on risks in the ethics of technology. One strand of criticism argues that we often lack the knowledge to reliably assess the risks of a new technology before it has come into use. We often do not know the probability that something might go wrong, and sometimes we even do not know, or at least not fully, what might go wrong and what possible negative consequences may be. To deal with this, some authors have proposed to conceive of the introduction of new technology in society as a social experiment and have urged to think about the conditions under which such experiments are morally acceptable (Martin & Schinzingler 2005; van de Poel 2016). Another strand of criticism states that the focus on risks has led to a reduction of the impacts of technology that are considered (Swierstra & te Molder 2012). Only impacts related to safety and health, which can be calculated as risks, are considered, whereas 'soft' impacts, for example of a social or psychological nature, are neglected, thereby impoverishing the moral evaluation of new technologies.

## **Computer and Information Ethics**

This section surveys the field of computer and information ethics. The first section will define the field and will consider its aims and scope, its history, and major approaches and orientations. In the section thereafter, major topics in computer ethics will be surveyed, including privacy, security, free expression and content control, equity issues, intellectual property, and issues of moral responsibility. The final section will focus on the approaches of values in design and valuesensitive design, which aim to analyze embedded values in computer software and systems, and to devise methodologies for incorporating values into the design process.

Approaches in Computer and Information ethics Computer ethics is a field of applied ethics that addresses ethical issues in the use, design and management of information technology and in the formulation of ethical policies for its regulation in society. Computer ethics, which has also been called cyberethics, took off as a field in the 1980s, together with the rise of the personal computer. Early work in the field had already started in the 1940s, soon after the invention of the computer. MIT Professor Norbert Wiener was a precursor of the field, already identifying many issues of computer ethics in his book *The Human Use of Human Beings* [Wiener, 1950]. The term “computer ethics” was first introduced in the mid-1970s by Walter Maner, who also promoted the idea of teaching computer ethics in computer science curricula [Maner, 1980]. The watershed year of 1985 saw the appearance of seminal publications by Jim Moor [1985] and Deborah Johnson [1985] that helped define the field. Since then, it has become a recognized field of applied ethics, with its own journals and conference series. In recent years, the field is sometimes also related to a more general field of information ethics, which includes computer ethics, media ethics, library ethics, and bioinformation ethics.

Why would there be a need for computer ethics, while there is no need for a separate field of ethics for many other technologies, like automobiles and appliances? Jim Moor [1985] has argued that the computer has had an impact like no other recent technology. The computer seems to impact every sector of society, and seems to require us to rethink many of our policies, laws and behaviors. According to Moor, this great impact is due to the fact that computers have logical malleability, meaning that their structure allows them to perform any activity that can be specified as a logical relation between inputs and outputs. Many activities can be specified in this way, and the computer therefore turns out to be an extremely powerful and versatile machine that can perform an incredible amount of functions, from word processor to communication device to gaming platform to financial manager.

The versatility of computers is an important reason for the occurrence of a computer revolution, or information revolution, which is now transforming many human activities and social institutions. Many important things that humans do, including many that raise moral questions like stealing from someone, defaming someone, or invading someone’s privacy now also exist in electronic form. In addition, the computer also makes substantially new types of activities possible that are morally controversial, such as the creation of virtual child pornography for which no real children were abused. Because many of the actions made possible by computers are different and new, we often lack policies and laws to guide them. They generate what Moor has called policy vacuums, being the lack of clear policies or rules of conduct. The task of computer ethics, then, is to propose and develop new ethical policies, ranging from explicit laws to informal guidelines, to guide new types of actions that involve computers. Computer ethics has taken off since its birth in the mid-80s, and has established itself as a mature field with its own scientific journals, conferences and organizations.

The field initially attracted most of its interests from computer scientists and philosophers, with many computer science curricula nowadays requiring a course or module on computer ethics. However, given the wide implications for human action sketched by Moor, computer ethics is also of interest to other fields that focus on human behavior and social institutions, such as law, communication studies, education, political science and management. Moreover, computer ethics is also an important topic of debate in the public arena, and computer ethicists regularly contribute to public discussions regarding the use and regulating of computer technology. Computer ethics is sometimes defined as a branch of professional ethics similar to other branches like engineering ethics and journalism ethics. On this view, the aim of computer ethics is to define and ana-

lyze the moral and professional responsibilities of computer professionals. Computer professionals are individuals employed in the information technology branch, for example as hardware or software engineer, web designer, network or database administrator, computer science instructor or computer-repair technician.

Computer ethics, on this view, should focus on the various moral issues that computer professionals encounter in their work, for instance in the design, development and maintenance of computer hardware and software. Within this approach to computer ethics, most attention goes to the discussion of ethical dilemmas that various sorts of computer professionals may face in their work and possible ways of approaching them. Such dilemmas may include, for example, the question how one should act as a web designer when one's employer asks one to install spyware into a site built for a client, or the question to what extent software engineers should be held accountable for harm incurred by software malfunction. Next to the discussion of specific ethical dilemmas, there is also general discussion of the responsibilities of computer professionals towards various other parties, such as clients, employers, colleagues, and the general public, and of the nature and importance of ethical codes in the profession.

A recent topic of interest has been the development of methods for value-sensitive design, which is the design of software and systems in such a way that they conform to a desired set of (moral) values [Friedman, Kahn and Borning, 2006]. While the professional ethics view of computer ethics is important, many in the field employ a broader conception that places the focus on general ethical issues in the use and regulation of information technology. This approach may be called the philosophical ethics approach to computer ethics. This conception holds, following Moor [1985], that computer ethics studies moral issues that are of broad societal importance, and develops ethical policies to address them. Such policies may regulate the conduct of organizations, groups and individuals and the workings of institutions.

The philosophical approach focuses on larger social issues like information privacy and security, computer crime, issues of access and equity, and the regulation of commerce and speech on the Internet. It asks what ethical principles should guide our thinking about these issues, and what specific policies (laws, social and corporate policies, social norms) should regulate conduct with respect to them. Within this approach, some researchers focus on the development of ethical guidelines for users of computer technology. Others place more emphasis on policy issues, and try to formulate ethical policies for organizations, government agencies or lawmakers. Still others focus on computer technologies themselves, and try to identify and evaluate morally relevant features in their design. Some also focus on theoretical and metaethical issues.

## **Topics in Computer and Information Ethics**

Introductions to computer ethics show considerable agreement on what the central issues for computer ethics are. They include ethical issues of privacy, security, computer crime, intellectual property, free expression, and equity and access, and issues of responsibility and professional ethics.

### **Privacy**

Privacy is a topic that has received much attention in computer ethics from early on. Information technology is often used to record, store and transmit personal information, and it may happen that this information is accessed or used by third parties without the consent of the corresponding persons, thus violating their privacy. Privacy is the right of persons to control access to their per-

sonal affairs, such as their body, thoughts, private places, private conduct, and personal information about themselves. The most attention in computer ethics has gone to information privacy, which is the right to control the disclosure of personal data. Information technology can easily be used to violate this right.

Privacy issues come into play on the Internet, where cookies, spyware, browser tracking and access to the records of internet providers may be used to study the Internet behavior of individuals or to get access to their PCs. They also come into play in the construction of databases with personal information by corporations and government organizations, and the merging of such databases to create complex records about persons or to find matches across databases. Other topics of major concern include the privacy implications of video surveillance and biometric technologies, and the ethics of medical privacy and privacy in the workplace. It has also been studied whether people have a legitimate expectation to privacy in public areas, whether they can be freely recorded, screened and tracked whenever they appear in public and how the notion of "public" itself has changed in light of information technology.

### **Security and crime**

Security has become a major issue in computer ethics, because of rampant computer crime and fraud, the spread of computer viruses, malware and spam, and national security concerns about the status of computer networks as breeding grounds for terrorist activity and as vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks. Computer security is the protection of computer systems against the unauthorized disclosure, manipulation, or deletion of information and against denial of service attacks. Breaches of computer security may cause harms and rights violations, including economic losses, personal injury and death, which may occur in so-called safety-critical systems, and violations of privacy and intellectual property rights.

Much attention goes to the moral and social evaluation of computer crime and other forms of disruptive behavior, including hacking (non-malicious break-ins into systems and networks), cracking (malicious break-ins), cybervandalism (disrupting the operations of computer networks or corrupting data), software piracy (the illegal reproduction or dissemination of proprietary software), and computer fraud (the deception for personal gain in online business transactions by assuming a false online identity or by altering or misrepresenting data). Another recently important security-related issue is how state interests in monitoring and controlling information infrastructures to better protect against terrorist attacks should be balanced against the right to privacy and other civil rights [Nissenbaum, 2005].

### **Free expression and content control**

The Internet has become a very important medium for the expression of information and ideas. This has raised questions about whether there should be content control or censorship of Internet information, for example by governments or service providers. Censorship could thwart the right to free expression, which is held to be a basic right in many nations. Free expression includes both freedom of speech (the freedom to express oneself through publication and dissemination) and freedom of access to information.

Several types of speech have been proposed as candidates for censorship. These include pornography and other obscene forms of speech, hate speech such as websites of fascist and racist organizations, speech that can cause harm or undermine the state, such as information as to how to

build bombs, speech that violates privacy or confidentiality, and libelous and defamatory speech. Studies in computer ethics focus on the permissibility of these types of speech, and on the ethical aspects of different censorship methods, such as legal prohibitions and software filters.

**Equity and access** The information revolution has been claimed to exacerbate inequalities in society, such as racial, class and gender inequalities, and to create a new, digital divide, in which those that have the skills and opportunities to use information technology effectively reap the benefits while others are left behind. In computer ethics, it is studied how both the design of information technologies and their embedding in society could increase inequalities, and how ethical policies may be developed that result in a fairer and more just distribution of their benefits and disadvantages. This research includes ethical analyses of the accessibility of computer systems and services for various social groups, studies of social biases in software and systems design, normative studies of education in the use of computers, and ethical studies of the digital gap between industrialized and developing countries.

**Intellectual property** Intellectual property is the name for information, ideas, works of art and other creations of the mind for which the creator has an established proprietary right of use. Intellectual property laws exist to protect creative works by ensuring that only the creators benefit from marketing them or making them available, be they individuals or corporations. Intellectual property rights for software and digital information have generated much controversy. There are those who want to ensure strict control of creators over their digital products, whereas others emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong public domain in cyberspace, and argue for unrestricted access to electronic information and for the permissibility of copying proprietary software. In computer ethics, the ethical and philosophical aspects of these disputes are analyzed, and policy proposals are made for the regulation of digital intellectual property in its different forms. Patentability of software is also a topic of major concern, which is problematic due to the non-tangible nature of software as well as the difficulty in specifying what counts as the identity of a piece of software (cf. Turner and Eden, forthcoming b).

## **Moral Responsibility**

Society strongly relies on computers. It relies on them for correct information, for collaboration and social interaction, for aid in decision-making, and for the monitoring and execution of tasks. When computer systems malfunction or make mistakes, harm can be done, in terms of loss of time, money, property, opportunities, or even life and limb. Who is responsible for such harms? Computer professionals, end-users, employers, policy makers and others could all be held responsible for particular harms.

It has even been argued that intelligent computer systems can bear moral responsibility themselves [Dodig-Crnkovic and Persson, 2008]. In computer ethics, it is studied how the moral responsibility of different actors can be defined, and what kinds of decisions should be delegated to computers to begin with. It is studied how a proper assignment of responsibility can minimize harm and allows for attributions of accountability and liability.

## **Foundational Issues in Computer Ethics**

Foundational, metaethical and methodological issues have received considerable attention in computer ethics. Many of these issues have been discussed in the context of the so-called foundationalist debate in computer ethics [Floridi and Sanders, 2002; Himma, 2007a]. This is an on-

going metatheoretical debate on the nature and justification of computer ethics and its relation to metaethical theories. Three questions central to the foundationalist debate are: "Is computer ethics a legitimate field of applied ethics?", "Does computer ethics raise any ethical issues that are new or unique?" and "Does computer ethics require substantially new ethical theories, concepts or methodologies different from those used elsewhere in applied ethics?"

The first question, whether computer ethics is a legitimate field of applied ethics, has often been discussed in the context of the other two questions, with discussants arguing that the legitimacy of computer ethics depends on the existence of unique ethical issues or questions in relation to computer technology. The debate on whether such issues exist has been called the uniqueness debate [Tavani, 2002].

In defense of uniqueness, Maner [1996] has argued that unique features of computer systems, like logical malleability, superhuman complexity and the ability to make exact copies, raise unique ethical issues to which no non-computer analogues exist. Others remain unconvinced that any computer ethics issue is genuinely unique. Johnson [2003] has proposed that issues in computer ethics are new species of traditional moral issues. They are familiar in that they involve traditional ethical concepts and principles like privacy, responsibility, harm and ownership, but the application of these concepts and principles is not straightforward because of special properties of computer technology, which require a rethinking and retooling of ethical notions and new ways of applying them. Floridi and Sanders [2002; Floridi, 2003] do not propose the existence of unique ethical issues but rather argue for the need of new ethical theory. They argue that computer ethics needs a metaethical and macrotheoretical foundation, which they argue be different from the standard macroethical theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism. Instead, they propose a macroethical theory they call Information Ethics, which assigns intrinsic value to information. The theory covers not just digital or analogue information, but in fact analyzes all of reality as having an informational ontology, being built out of informational objects.

Since informational objects are postulated to have intrinsic value, moral consideration should be given to them, including the informational objects produced by computers. In contrast to these various authors, Himma [2007a] has argued that computer technology does not need to raise new ethical issues or require new ethical theories to be a legitimate field of applied ethics. He argues that issues in computer ethics may not be unique and may be approached with traditional ethical theories, and that it nevertheless is a legitimate field because computer technology has given rise to an identifiable cluster of moral issues in much the same way like medical ethics and other fields of applied ethics.

Largely separately from the foundationalist debate, several authors have discussed the issue of proper methodology in computer ethics, discussing standard methods of applied ethics and their limitations for computer ethics [Van den Hoven, 2008; Brey, 2000]. An important recent development that has methodological and perhaps also metaethical ramifications is the increased focus on cultural issues. In intercultural information ethics [Ess and Hongladarom, 2007; Brey, 2007], ethicists attempt to compare and come to grips with the vastly different moral attitudes and behaviors that exist towards information and information technology in different cultures. In line with this development, Gorniak-Kocykowska [1995] and others have argued that the global character of cyberspace requires a global ethics which transcends cultural differences in value systems.

## Other Topics

There are many other social and ethical issues that are studied in computer ethics next to these central ones. Some of these include the implications of IT for community, identity, the quality of work, and the quality of life, the relation between information technology and democracy, the ethics of Internet governance and electronic commerce, and the ethics of trust online. Many new ethical issues come up together with the development of new technologies or applications. Recently, much attention has been devoted to ethical aspects of social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace and Youtube, to ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence, and to robotics and artificial agents. The constant addition of new products and services in information technology and the emergence of new uses and correlated social and cultural consequences ensures that the field keeps meeting new challenges.

## Values and Computer Systems Design

Although most ethical commentary in the philosophical approach is directed at the use of computers by individuals and organizations, attention has also started to be paid to systems and software themselves. It has come to be recognized that the systems themselves are not morally neutral but contain values and biases in their design that must also be analyzed. Approaches of this sort have been called values in design approaches [Nissenbaum, 1998; Flanagan, Howe and Nissenbaum, 2007]. Values in design approaches hold that computer software and systems can be morally evaluated partially or wholly independently of actual uses of them. They can be said to embody values in the sense that they have a tendency to promote or sustain particular values when used. This may sound like technological determinism, but proponents usually do not subscribe to the strong determinist thesis that embodied values necessitate certain effects in whatever way the system is used.

Yet, they do hold a weak determinism according to which systems may embody values that systematically engender certain effects across a wide range of uses, at least including typical or "normal" ways of using the system. For a system to embody a value, then, means that there is a tendency for that value to be promoted or realized when the system is used. This observation has led proponents to argue that more attention should be paid to ethical aspects in the design of computer systems rather than just their use.

Friedman and Nissenbaum [1996] have studied how values may enter into computer systems, with a focus on justice and bias. They argue that bias can enter into computer systems in three ways. Preexisting bias emerges from the practices and attitudes of designers and the social institutions in which they function. Technical bias arises from technical constraints. Emergent bias arises after the design of the system, when a context of use emerges that is different from the one anticipated. These three origins of bias may be generalized to apply to other values as well. Brey [2000] has proposed a particular values in design approach termed disclosive computer ethics. He claims that a significant part of the effort of computer ethics should be directed at deciphering and subsequently evaluating embedded moral values in computer software and systems.

The focus should be on widely held public and moral values, such as privacy, autonomy, justice, and democracy. Research, Brey argues, should take place at three levels: the disclosure level, at which morally charged features of computer systems are detected and disclosed, the theoretical level, at which relevant moral theory is developed, and the application level, at which ethical theory is used in the evaluation of the disclosed morally charged features. He claims that such research should be interdisciplinary, involving ethicists, computer scientists and social scientists.

The approach of value-sensitive design [Friedman, Kahn and Borning, 2006; Friedman & Kahn, 2003] is not so much concerned with the identification and evaluation of values in computer systems, but rather with the development of methods for incorporating values into the design process. It is an approach to software engineering and systems development that builds on values in design approaches and studies how accepted moral values can be operationalized and incorporated into software and systems. Its proposed methodology integrates conceptual investigations into values, empirical investigations into the practices, beliefs and intentions of users and designers, and technical investigations into the way in which technological properties and mechanisms support or hinder the realization of values. It also seeks procedures to incorporate and balance the values of different stakeholders in the design process.

## **Biotechnology**

The term “techno science” is increasingly being used to refer to such contemporary disciplines as information and communication technology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and to biotechnology. The popularity of the term is illustrated by the fact that even a group of social scientists reporting on the changing attitudes of European public towards biotechnology invokes the term to mark the departure of this particular field from the norms and values once held to be essential to the ethos of science. The evident commercialization and industrialization of biotechnology, with the pursuit of private knowledge, patents and profits, hardly meets Merton's criteria of universalism, communism, disinterestedness and skepticism, or the public's expectations about the values, accountability and social responsibility of science. Biotechnology has become a techno science, a commercial enterprise accountable to financial markets and to shareholders. It is interesting to note that the public, according to these social scientists, have not yet fully accommodated to the new commercial realities of “techno science” and still entertain expectations about science that modern biotechnology is unlikely going to meet.

In the seventeenth century the philosophers Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650) advocated a new way of doing science that would have the power to conquer nature for human benefit. (The old science had seemed to be more concerned with contemplating nature than controlling it.) In the contemporary world biotechnology is providing the technology for controlling and changing living nature, including human nature. However, because biotechnological power over the living world offers not only the promise for doing good but also an opportunity for doing evil, this has provoked an ethical debate over the modern scientific project for the mastery of nature through technology.

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### **Biotechnology in History**

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The history of biotechnology can be divided into three periods: ancient, modern, and contemporary. Ancient biotechnology began more than 10,000 years ago with the emergence of agriculture in ancient Mesopotamia. Modern biotechnology began in the nineteenth century with the develop-

ment of industrial microbiology. Contemporary biotechnology began in the 1970s with new techniques for genetic engineering. In each period one can see the power humans have acquired to manipulate nature. But one also can see the natural limits of this power, which is constrained by the natural potentialities available in wild plants and animals and the natural complexities of behavioral traits in the living world.

Ancient biotechnology began when human beings started to domesticate plants and animals for human use. Throughout most of the history of the human species, spanning approximately six million years, human beings fed themselves by gathering wild plants and hunting wild animals. Then some people in a few parts of the world began to produce food by cultivating domesticated plants and herding domesticated animals. As a consequence those farmers and herders bred for and selected genetic modifications in domesticated organisms that were more suitable to human desires. Even in the early twenty-first century all of human civilization depends on this project in agricultural biotechnology.

The human power of domestication is limited, however, by the natural potentiality of wild plants and animals. Most plant and animal species in the wild are not suitable for domestication. For example, most wild plants are not good as a source of food because they are woody or do not produce fruit, leaves, or roots that are edible. Most wild animals are not susceptible to successful domestication because they cannot be bred and herded in a manner that makes them useful for human beings. Although advances in biological knowledge have increased human biotechnological power over living nature, that power will always be limited by the potentialities found in nature.

Modern biotechnology arose in the nineteenth century as growing knowledge in the biological sciences was applied to the technological manipulation of the living world for human purposes. For example, the chemist Louis Pasteur's (1822–1895) microbiological explanation of fermentation as resulting from the activity of microscopic organisms allowed improvements in the brewing of beer and other industries that depend on using fermentation by yeast to produce food and beverages. Pasteur also showed that infectious diseases are caused by disease-producing microorganisms and perfected techniques for vaccination that would create immunity to some of those diseases. Later, in the twentieth century, the discovery of the ways in which some fungi produce antibiotics such as penicillin revolutionized the medical treatment of bacterial infections. In the early 2000s there are hundreds of pharmaceutical agents derived from fungal fermentation.

However, even modern biotechnology shows the technical limits set by nature. Bacteria vulnerable to fungal toxins can evolve to become resistant to those toxins. Indeed, bacteria have been so successful in evolving tolerance to antibiotics that there is a growing fear in the medical profession that the age of antibiotic protection against infectious diseases is reaching its end. The power of this aspect of biotechnology for controlling living nature is great but limited.

The contemporary biotechnology that began in the last half of the twentieth century arose from a deeper knowledge of genetics and molecular biology and has provided humans with greater power over the living world. Even so, contemporary biotechnology is limited in its technical means by the physical and chemical limits of nature.

Contemporary biotechnology began in 1973 when Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen developed the technology for recombinant DNA, which allows scientists to alter DNA molecules and thus artificially create new forms of life. They did this by combining a number of discoveries. Bacteria protect themselves against certain viruses through the use of restriction enzymes that cut up viral DNA at specific sequences of nucleotide bases; this allows a scientist with the right restriction

enzyme to cut out a specific genetic sequence. Bacteria contain plasmids, which are small loops of DNA that can pass from one bacterium to another. This allows bacteria to develop antibiotic resistance quickly if the genes for resistance are passed by plasmids. Boyer and Cohen showed how one could use a restriction enzyme to cut out a specific genetic sequence and then glue that sequence into a bacterial plasmid. That plasmid, with its new combination of genetic sequences, could be introduced into a bacterial cell. As the bacterial cell divided, it would produce copies of the recombinant plasmid, which then could be extracted from the bacteria.

An illustration of the value of this recombinant DNA technique is provided by the production of human insulin. People with diabetes do not have enough of the protein insulin to regulate blood-sugar levels. After the 1920s diabetic patients were treated with injections of insulin extracted from pigs and cattle. This is an example of modern biotechnology. Although pig and cow insulin is very similar to human insulin, there are enough differences that some people with diabetes have had allergic reactions. Contemporary biotechnology provided a solution to the problem by using recombinant DNA techniques. The human gene for insulin was identified and then could be inserted into a bacterial cell through a plasmid so that the bacterium would produce human insulin that could be harvested for use by human patients. In 1982 human insulin produced in genetically modified bacteria became the first drug of contemporary biotechnology to be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Contemporary biotechnology has developed hundreds of products with agricultural, environmental, and medical benefits. Agricultural biotechnology uses reliable techniques for genetic manipulation to produce new kinds of plants and animals to provide food that is cheaper and more nutritious. Environmental biotechnology is used to design genetically modified organisms that can clean up environmental pollution by consuming toxic materials. Medical biotechnology is used to devise new drugs and vaccines and therapeutic techniques that relieve or prevent suffering, cure disease, and enhance physical and mental well-being.

## **Ethical Issues**

Despite its many benefits, biotechnology has provoked ethical controversy in six areas of moral concern: safety, liberty, justice, environmental nature, humannature, and religious beliefs.

**SAFETY.** Safety is a moral concern for opponents of biotechnology who worry that its power disrupts the complex balance in living nature in ways that are likely to be harmful. Individuals such as Jeremy Rifkin (1977) and groups such as Greenpeace have warned that genetically modified crops and foods could endanger human health as well as the health of the environment. Critics of medical biotechnology fear that biotechnology medicine alters the human body and mind in radical ways that could produce harmful consequences—perhaps far into the future—in ways that are hard to foresee.

Proponents of biotechnology such as James Watson (2003) and Michael Fumento (2003) argue that its techniques are so precise and controlled that it tends to be far safer than older forms of technology. Breeders of plants and animals have genetically modified organisms for thousands of years without understanding exactly what they were doing. But biotechnology in the early 2000s provides a better understanding of and greater power over genetic mechanisms so that it is possible to minimize the risks. In fact, there is no clear evidence that any human being among the hundreds of millions who have been exposed has become sick from eating genetically modified foods. Similarly, the risks to human health from medical biotechnology can be reduced by means of careful testing and new techniques for designing drugs and therapies that are designed specifically for

individual patients with unique genetic traits. Nevertheless, the history of unforeseen harm from all technologies justifies a cautious approach.

**LIBERTY.** Liberty is a moral concern for those who fear that biotechnology will give some people tyrannical power over others. The history of eugenics, in which governments used coercion to eliminate those judged to be biologically "unfit," illustrates the danger of encroachments on liberty. Libertarian proponents of biotechnology such as Fumento and Virginia Postrel (1998) insist that there should be no threat to liberty as long as biotechnology is chosen freely by individuals in a free market economy. But conservatives such as Leon Kass (2002) worry that people could be coerced informally by social pressure, employers, and insurance companies so that they will feel compelled to adopt biotechnology products and procedures. Moreover, Kass and others suggest that biotech can give parents the power to control the nature and behavior of their children in ways that threaten the liberty of the children.

**JUSTICE.** Justice is a moral concern for people who anticipate that biotechnology will be so expensive that only the richest individuals will benefit from it so that the rich will have an unjust advantage over the poor. Even proponents of biotechnology such as Lee Silver (1998) worry that reproductive biotechnology eventually could divide humanity into two separate species based on the wealth or poverty of their ancestors: the "genrich" who would be genetically designed to be superior and the "genpoor" who would be left behind as biologically inferior beings. Of course in some ways this problem is not unique to biotechnology because rich people always have unfair advantages over the poor, but the libertarian defenders of biotechnology foresee that in a free-market society prices for biotechnology products and services eventually will decline as a result of competition, and this will lessen the advantages of the rich over the poor. Similarly, critics of biotechnology argue that the rich nations of the world will benefit more from this new technology than will the poor nations, yet libertarians predict that international free trade will spread the advantages of biotechnology around the world.

**ENVIRONMENTAL NATURE.** Environmental nature is a moral concern for environmentalists such as Rifkin and Bill McKibben (2003). Those environmentalists predict that biotechnology will promote the replacement of the natural environment with a purely artificial world and that this will deprive human beings of healthy contact with wild nature. They also fear that introducing genetically modified organisms into the environment will produce monstrous forms of life that will threaten human beings and the natural world.

Proponents of biotechnology respond by noting that beginning with agriculture, human beings have been creating genetically modified organisms that transform the environment for thousands of years. All organisms modify their environments, sometimes with global effects. For example, the oxygen in the earth's atmosphere has been produced over billions of years by photosynthetic organisms. Biologists such as F. John Odling-Smee (2003) have called this "niche construction." So human beings are not unique in their capacity for changing their environments. Although this sometimes has produced disasters such as the extinction of plants and animals and the emergence of new disease-causing agents, people have learned to adjust to these dangers, and contemporary biotechnology provides more precise knowledge and techniques to recognize and avoid such dangers. Moreover, environmental biotechnology is developing new organisms, such as bacteria genetically engineered to metabolize toxic wastes, to restore dangerous natural environments to a condition that is safe for human beings.

## HUMAN NATURE.

Human nature is a moral concern for anyone who fears that biotechnology could change or even abolish human nature. Both environmentalists such as Rifkin and McKibben and conservatives such as Kass and Francis Fukuyama (2002) worry that the biotechnological transformation of human nature will produce a "posthuman" world with no place for human dignity rooted in human nature. On the other side of this debate Nick Bolstrom (2003) and others in the World Transhumanist Association welcome the prospect of using biotechnology to move toward a "transhuman" condition. More moderate proponents of biotechnology dismiss both positions for being based on exaggerated views of the power of biotechnology.

In a report by the President's Council on Bioethics (2003) Kass and other members of the council contend that biotechnology expresses a willful lack of humility in pursuing a scientific mastery of nature that carries out the modern scientific project first described by Francis Bacon. When a physician uses medical therapy to restore the health of a patient, the physician cultivates the body's natural capacity for healing to serve the natural goal of health. Such medical treatment is guided in both its means and its ends by nature. But when biotechnologists use genetic engineering or psychotropic drugs to extend human bodily or mental powers beyond their normal range, they act not as nature's servant but as nature's master because they are forcing nature to serve their own willful desires.

As an example Kass and other members of the council point to the use of psychotropic drugs such as Prozac that alter the biochemistry of the brain to elevate mood. Using such drugs to cure severely depressed patients can be justified as therapy directed toward restoring normal mental health, but their use to change human personality radically—perhaps by inducing feelings of contentment that never yield to sadness—would violate the normal range of human mental experience set by nature. The ultimate aim of such a psychopharmacological science would be a drug-dependent fantasy of happiness that would be dehumanizing. Furthermore, scientists such as David Healy (2004) have warned that any drug powerful enough to change human personality is likely to have severely harmful side effects.

The President's Council (2003) warns against the excessive pride inherent in Bacon's project for mastering nature, which assumes that nature is mere material for humans to shape to their desires. Rather, it urges people to adopt an attitude of humility and respect and treat the natural world as a "gift." To respect the "giftedness" of the natural world is to recognize that the world is given to humans as something not fully under their control and that even human powers for changing the world belong to human nature as the unchanging ground of all change (Kass 2003).

Proponents of biotechnology could respond by defending Bacon's project as combining respect for nature with power over nature. At the beginning of the *Novum Organon* Bacon observed that "nature to be commanded must be obeyed" because "all that man can do is to put together or put asunder natural bodies," and then "the rest is done by nature working within" (Bacon 1955, p. 462). Kass has used the same words in explaining how the power of biotechnology is limited by the potentialities inherent in nature (Kass 1985).

Throughout the history of biotechnology—from the ancient Mesopotamian breeders of plants and animals, to Pasteur's use of microorganisms for fermentation and vaccination, to Boyer and Cohen's techniques for gene splicing—people have employed nature's properties for the satisfaction of human desires. Boyer and Cohen did not create restriction enzymes and bacterial plasmids but discovered them as parts of living nature. They then used those natural processes to bring about

outcomes, such as the production of human insulin for persons with diabetes, that would benefit human beings. Biotechnology has the ability to change nature only insofar as it conforms to the laws of nature. To command nature people must obey it.

Baconian biotechnology is thus naturally limited in its technical means because it is constrained by the potentialities of nature. It is also naturally limited in its moral ends because it is directed toward the goals set by natural human desires. Kass and the President's Council (2003) acknowledge this by showing how biotechnology is employed to satisfy natural desires such as the desire of parents for happy children and the desire of all human beings for life and health. As they indicate, it is not enough to respect the "giftedness" of nature because some of the "gifts" of nature, such as diabetes and cancer, are undesirable. People accept some of nature's gifts and reject others on the basis of the desires inherent in human nature.

**RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.** To appreciate life as a gift that should elicit a feeling of humility rather than mastery is a religious emotion. Some of the moral concerns about biotechnology express the religious attitude that life is sacred and therefore the biotechnological manipulation of life shows a lack of reverence for the divinely ordained cosmic order. The biblical story of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1–9) suggests that the human lust for technical power over the world provokes divine punishment.

In 1977 the environmentalist Jeremy Rifkin wrote a book attacking biotechnology with the title *Who Should Play God?: The Artificial Creation of Life and What It Means for the Future of the Human Race*. The title conveys the direction of his argument. The "creation of life" is proper only for God. For human beings to create life "artificially" is a blasphemous transgression of God's law that will bring punishment upon the human race. Rifkin often uses the imagery of the Frankenstein story. Like Doctor Frankenstein, biotech scientists are trying to take God's place in creating life, and the result can only be the creation of monsters. When people such as Rifkin use the phrase "playing God," they evoke a religious sense that nature is a sacred expression of God's will and therefore should not be changed by human intervention. Rifkin has said that "the resacralization of nature stands before us as the great mission of the coming age" (Rifkin 1983, p. 252).

In contrast to Rifkin, Bacon thought that regarding nature as sacred was a pagan idea contrary to biblical religion. In pagan antiquity the natural world was the sacred image of God, but the Bible teaches that God is the transcendent Creator of nature; therefore, God's mysterious will is beyond nature. Although nature declares God's power and wisdom, it does not declare the will and true worship of God. Bacon believed that true religion as based on faith in biblical revelation must be separated from true philosophy based on the rational study of nature's laws (Bacon 1955).

Some biblical theologians, such as Philip Hefner (2003) and Ted Peters (2003), have restated this Baconian claim that the biblical conception of God as the supernatural creator of nature separates the sacred and the natural and thus denies pagan pantheism. They argue that because human beings have been created in God's image and God is the Creator, human beings must share somehow in God's creativity. The Bible declares that when God made humanity in his image, this was to include "dominion" or "mastery" over all the earth, including all the animals (Genesis 1:26–28). Hefner reads the Bible as teaching that human beings are "created cocreators." As "created," humans are creatures and cannot create in the same way as God, who can create *ex nihilo*, "from nothing." However, as "cocreators" people can contribute to changes in creation. Of course, Hefner warns, people must do this as cautious and respectful stewards of God's creation, but it is not appropriate to worship nature as sacred and thus inviolable.

The theological idea of human beings as cocreators was affirmed by Pope John Paul II in his 1981 encyclical *Laborem Exercens* and criticized as a "remarkably bad idea" by the Protestant theologian Stanley Hauerwas (Houck and Williams 1983). In his 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus* the Pope stressed the importance of human technological knowledge in improving the conditions of life (Novak 1993).

That God transcends nature, that nature is thus not sacred, that human beings as created in God's image share in God's creative activity, that human beings have the power and the duty to master nature by artful manipulation, and that they have the moral duty to do this as an activity of charity for the improvement of human life—all the precepts Bacon drew from the Bible to support his view of the new science—have been accepted by some biblical believers. But many of those believers worry that modern science promotes an atheistic materialism that denies the dignity of human beings and of the natural world generally as God's Creation. In particular they worry about whether biotechnology expresses an unduly willful attitude toward the world as merely raw material for human manipulation and survival.

## **Environmental ethics Introduction**

Environmental ethics is a sub-discipline of philosophy that deals with the ethical problems surrounding environmental protection. It aims to provide ethical justification and moral motivation for the cause of global environmental protection.

## **Body**

- Environmental ethics focuses on questions concerning how we ought to inhabit the world; what constitutes a good life or a good society; and who, where, or what merits moral standing. The field emerged most significantly in the 1960s from an increasing awareness of the global environmental condition.
- It is concerned with the issue of responsible personal conduct with respect to natural landscapes, resources, species, and non-human organisms. It is a cluster of beliefs, values and norms regarding how humans should interact with the environment.

## **Issues involved in environmental ethics**

- a) **Consumption of natural resources:** Since humans are part of nature, sustainable use of resources can be achieved through cooperation with nature.
- b) **Destruction of forests:** Big industries and multinational companies form the major section which exploits forests unsustainably. However, the brunt of the destruction is faced by the poor and tribals who are the inhabitants of the forests. It leads to the loss of biodiversity, habitats and extinction of plants and animals.
- c) **Environmental pollution:** Consequences of environmental pollution do not respect national boundaries. Moreover, the poor and weaker sections of society are disproportionately affected by negative effects of climate change.
- d) **Anthropocentrism:** It refers to an ethical framework that grants "moral standing" solely to human beings. Thus, an anthropocentric ethic claims that only human beings are morally considerable in their own right, meaning that all the direct moral obligations we possess, including

those we have with regard to the environment, are owed to our fellow human beings.

- e) **Equity:** People living in the economically-advanced sections/ parts use greater amount of resources and energy per individual and also waste more resources. This is at the cost of poor people who are resource-deprived.
- f) **Animal rights:** The plants and animals that share the Earth with us too have a right to live and share the Earth's resources and living space. Animal

welfare is relevant to environmental ethics because animals exist within the natural environment and thus form part of environmentalists' concerns.

### **Measures to maintain environmental ethics**

- The **"land ethic"** of Aldo Leopold: It demands that we stop treating the land as a mere object or resource. Land is not merely soil, instead, it is a fountain of energy, flowing through a circuit of soils, plants and animals.
- In order to preserve the relations within the land, Leopold claims that we must move towards a "land ethic", thereby granting moral standing to the land community itself, not just its individual members.
- Deep ecology: There are eight principles or statements that are basic to deep ecology:
  - The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
  - Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
  - Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
  - The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
  - Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
  - Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
  - The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living.
  - Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

**The conservation ethics and traditional value systems:** Since olden days, people have always valued mountains, rivers, forests, trees and several animals. Thus, much of nature was venerated and protected. Traditions held plants and animals as an important aspect of nature and were considered the basis of life-support systems and integral to bring about a harmonious life.

**Virtue ethics:** Virtue ethics is a way of thinking about how to behave well, which focuses on the character of moral agents and the nature of the good life. Virtue ethics is based on a positive view of human nature, one that takes into account that humans are strongly predisposed to recognize excellence in others (including non-human) whom they can take as role models and gain fulfillment from a life lived virtuously.

## Conclusion

To cope with the issues of environmental ethics, human beings must reach some value consensus and cooperate with each other at the personal, national, regional, multinational and global levels. Global environmental protection depends on global governance. An environmental ethic is, therefore, typically a global ethic with a global perspective.

## Nature as means or end

From the Latin *natura* (Gr. φύσις), a term with many related meanings in philosophy and with extensive applications in theology. Among philosophers it is commonly taken to mean the essence of a thing as this is the source of its properties or operations; more strictly, however, it is a primary and per se principle of motion and rest that is found in natural things as opposed to artifacts. It is sometimes used in the more restricted sense of human nature, for which meaning see man. Theologians use the term in opposition to grace or to supernature, particularly when discussing human nature, and in opposition to person, particularly in Trinitarian theology and Christology.

Since nature is the proper subject of the philosophy of nature, the major emphasis in this article is on nature as studied in natural philosophy. Topics treated include the primary meanings of the concept, its development among the Greeks, modifications in it occasioned by the rise of modern science, an Aristotelian analysis of its meaning in natural philosophy, and various secondary meanings.

**Primary Meanings.** On Nature (Περὶ φύσεως) is the title under which the writings of the pre-Socratics have been handed down to posterity. Some doubt exists as to what precisely was the first meaning, but it is generally admitted that at least an early and important use of the term φύσις was to designate the primordial stuff or underlying substratum persisting through all change. It is likely that the early Ionian philosophers imagined the world as developing in an orderly fashion from within, somewhat as a living being, and hence the primary substance would have been viewed, though indistinctly, as a source of activity. Thus φύσις was an intrinsic principle that accounted for the ceaseless change or becoming of things. Moreover, the very process of becoming, it seems, was itself called φύσις, a term that is etymologically related to φύω, to grow (cf. Lat. *natura* and *nascor*). Finally, at some later date the term was applied to the changing things themselves taken in their totality. This is possibly the most common sense of nature in modern usage and was probably the meaning of φύσις intended in the title Περὶ φύσεως.

**Greek Development.** The attempt of the Ionians of the 6th century b.c. to explain all becoming in terms of one material principle (e.g., water or air or fire) reached its logical conclusion in Parmenides with the very denial of nature as process. For Parmenides all being must be one and exclude all nonbeing; as such it is perfectly immutable, and only as such is it knowable; all change is but sensory illusion. After Parmenides, there was an attempt to reconcile being, stable object of intellect, with the becoming of sensory experience. Fundamental reality remained immutable; it was, however, multiple: the four elements of Empedocles; the "seeds," infinite in number, of Anaxagoras; the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. These particles, in motion, combined and separated, and

as such were principles of change and of a multiplicity of changing compounds. The atomists, with their homogeneous particles differing only in size and shape, interpreted all change in terms of movement in space ("void") and all sensible qualities, such as color, in terms of quantitative differences. They have been considered as forerunners to modern science. So too have the Pythagoreans, who, from the 6th century b.c., had been seeking to explain the world in the light of numbers.

The claim to find the ultimate explanation of reality in the random motions of corporeal elements, i.e., in nature and chance, was strongly opposed by Plato. If nature means the primary source of becoming, what is truly nature, for him, could only be what is really first, and that is intelligence and art. Thus, with Plato, nature in the commonly accepted sense gave way to divine soul, and chance to divine direction (Laws 888E–899D). Finality, introduced as conscious design, was lodged in a principle (soul) distinct from the purely corporeal. Likewise, the intelligibility of sensible bodies was to be sought beyond them, in the changeless, purely intelligible Ideas, of which they are imperfect imitations. The order of the sensible world could be seen, too, in terms of the a priori principles of pure number. As for the changing imitations considered in themselves, of these there could be no science, but only a likely account.

Nature was reinstated as a true principle and a real source of explanation within the material universe by Aristotle, who thus restored the philosophy of nature to the rank of a science (*scientia*). Aristotle continued the naturalist tradition of the pre-Socratics, his science being qualitative rather than mathematical, empirical rather than rationalist. It was far from being a mere return, however. After Plato there was form to be reckoned with. In Aristotle the natural world becomes intelligible in itself only because nature is identified with form in matter—with form now seen as the actuality of matter—even more properly than with matter itself. This form becomes the origin of activity, and matter, considered in itself, is reduced to a principle of mere passivity and receptivity. The realization of form in matter is the goal of natural activity, and although there are various combinations and separations of elements, it is always for the sake of a form; hence, the teleological view, as opposed to the mechanistic, remains dominant. But purpose is now found in the unconscious workings of form as well as in the conscious activities of rational soul. Although Aristotle conceived the natural universe as impregnated with and illuminated by form, for the ultimate explanation he too reached beyond nature. It is the desire to imitate the fully actual reality of Pure Form that, in the final analysis, explains all the ceaseless processes of nature.

**Later Modifications.** Both the Platonist and the Aristotelian view of nature extended into the Middle Ages. The early period was largely Neoplatonist, but in the 13th century the commentaries of St. Albert the Great and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas brought the Aristotelian doctrine of nature into the foreground.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the rapid development of the new empirico-mathematical science was accompanied by an emphatic rejection of teleology: the conception of natures tending to ends. At first, change was Platonistically explained by an inherent, creative principle (*natura naturans*) animating and directing the world of nature (*natura naturata*)—terms that go back to the Latin translation of Averroës. Before long, however, under the influence of F. Bacon, J. Kepler, G. Galilei, R. Descartes, I. Newton, and others, the account became thoroughly mechanistic. With the rejection of the geocentric astronomy and the adoption of the universal law of gravitation, the qualitatively differentiated world of Aristotle gave place to a totally homogeneous universe. Purely qualitative differences, such as color, were considered to be functions of quantitative structure, and were soon dismissed as mere appearances to a sentient mind. Matter as potency was replaced by matter as mass and extension. All change was reduced to the motion of smallest parts in space;

all causality, to prior events, i.e., to prior motions, identical causes being followed by identical effects. The spontaneous activity of bodies gave way to the idea of force (impact, attraction) and the impulse toward ends was displaced by inertia, the disposition to remain always the same. Nature thus became, for the scientist and the philosopher of nature alike, a mechanical system of inert, homogeneous mass-bodies, situated in space and time, moved by external forces, and utterly devoid of all but quantitative properties.

In the 20th century, the adequacy of purely mechanistic principles of explanation has been seriously questioned for the biological and psychological sciences. Further, the scientific theories of evolution along with the physicist's conception of matter as energy have made more generally acceptable a view that was already to some degree in evidence in the philosophies of G. W. Leibniz and G. W. F. Hegel, viz, the idea of nature as internally active and engaged in process. This conception, to which in some instances has been added the idea of aim, has found philosophical expression in the works of such thinkers as H. Bergson, S. Alexander, and A.N. Whitehead.

**Aristotelian Analysis.** A fuller presentation of the Aristotelian concept of nature, which has been generally adopted by scholastic thinkers, entails considering his definition of nature, nature as passive, nature as active, end as nature, and related concepts.

**Definition of Nature.** Aristotle (Phys. 192b 8–32) reached his definition of nature by way of a comparison of the things that exist by nature (viz, animals and their parts, plants and simple bodies) with those that exist by other causes, in particular by art. The former are seen to have within them a tendency to move, i.e., to change. The artifact as such has no such tendency. It has an inclination to change only accidentally insofar as it is made of a natural substance. Nature, then, concluded Aristotle, is the principle or cause of being moved and being at rest in that in which it is primarily, by reason of itself and not accidentally.

"Being moved" implies passivity. Strictly speaking, the principle that constitutes a thing as a mover is a nature only when the mover by its activity is itself moved. Also, motion here includes any kind of corporeal change, accidental or substantial; it excludes, however, spiritual operations, such as intellection. "Rest" implies the attainment of the end to which the movement was directed. The phrase "by reason of itself and not accidentally" excludes such cases as the doctor who cures himself. The art of medicine is, in this case, intrinsic but accidental to the one who is being cured, considered as such.

**Nature as Passive.** Nature, thus defined, was identified by Aristotle first (Phys. 193a 10–30) with matter taken as the substratum of change, i.e., as the passive, potential principle of being moved. In opposition to the pre-Socratics, Aristotle conceived of the ultimate material principle (primary matter) as being of itself bereft of all form, purely passive, pure potentiality. The matter, however, from which becoming proceeds, taken in its concrete existence, is always determined matter. The substantial form currently possessed, determining the matter in a particular way, always limits and defines matter's immediate potentialities. This is true both for the potency of primary matter for new substantial forms and more obviously for the accidental receptivities characteristic of any given being. Furthermore, since the form already possessed by the matter can be the source of certain activities as well, the matter on which a natural agent operates, just as it is never pure potency, need not be entirely passive. Its activity, in fact, may run contrary to the aim of the agent.

**Nature as Active.** It is especially with form, however, that Aristotle is concerned to identify nature (Phys. 193a 30–b 19). The ancients, not distinguishing the two principles of matter and form, had

conceived of their primordial stuff as already determined and capable of activity. Once substantial form is disassociated from matter and recognized as principle of essential determination, source of activity, and end of generation, it becomes obvious that form more than matter deserves to be called nature. Nature, then, as active principle of movement, is substantial form. (Note that, although one says "Nature acts," strictly speaking it is the composite substance that acts in virtue of its nature.)

Form is the source of two different types of activity in nature. First and more obviously, form is the intrinsic source of the vital activities of the living body. As such, it is known as soul. And as such it is a nature, since, by these activities, the living being is itself moved. The soul, in fact, is the primary source of activity whereby one part of the heterogeneous composite moves another part. Moreover, all the vital activities are either movements themselves (e.g., growth) or essentially connected with movements (e.g., sensation) or they pre-suppose movements (e.g., intellection). The soul, however, is also the principle of generation, an activity that is essentially directed to another substance. But even as such, it is a nature, insofar as the movement takes place within the same species, if not within the same individual.

Second, form is the intrinsic source of the spontaneous activities characteristic of a given body, e.g., a chemical element. Inanimate bodies, not having differentiated parts, do not move themselves. Their activities, on the contrary, are directed to other bodies that in turn may affect them. The forms, in this case, satisfy the requirement of interiority in the definition of nature insofar as they are parts within a system of interrelated active and passive potencies.

In Aristotle's cosmology, however, there are certain movements of bodies that do arise from an intrinsic source (Phys. 254b 33–255b 31), as in his example of a body falling to the ground—a movement that does not appear to require an external agent. In this case, however, nature functions as a principle of activity without constituting the thing as a mover. The body, in fact, does not move itself, part moving part, as does the living thing. For Aristotle, rather, the movement arises spontaneously from the impulse of the form toward what is appropriate to it, which, in this instance, is a suitable environment.

### **End as Nature.**

Whether a movement is natural or not cannot always be determined by sole reference to the active and passive principles. The determining factor is ultimately the end of becoming, and this too is nature.

Nature, in one sense, has been identified with the receptive and determinable principle. There are, however, in the world of nature, potencies that are not natural: the capacity of a natural body to take on an artificial form, or the capacity to be altered by some violent action. The natural potency differs from these in that it is a positive inclination to an act that perfects or fulfills the being so inclined, or else contributes to the good of the species or even to the good of the universe as a whole. The passive principle in nature, moreover, is normally related to a natural agent, through the activity of which it is brought to act. The activity of natural agents is accounted for by the tendency of the form in nature to actualize and bring to completion what is potential either within the same individual or beyond. The natural agent, then, actively tends to that good or perfection to which the potential principle is passively inclined. Furthermore, the natural agent, fixed in its species by its form, is also determined by this same principle with respect to specific goals, which it attains for the most part. Thus the acts to which it naturally directs matter by its activity are determinate acts.

It is in this sense that a nature is said to act for an end. (Obviously, the end as a good is more easily recognized in the activity of living beings than it is in the workings of the inanimate world.) Consequently, it is the act or form, considered as the end to which a natural being tends either actively or passively, that determines whether a process is or is not in accordance with nature. And in those cases where the good of the whole is in opposition to the good of the individual (as in the case of corruption), it is the former that takes precedence as a determining principle.

The form considered as end, furthermore, is itself properly called nature. It is a principle of becoming, and one that, in the essential order of things, is prior even to the passive and active principles as such. It is also intrinsic, insofar as natural movements are for the sake of the form (*finis cui*) from which they spring. In fact, the natural form seeks its own preservation and development within the individual; it tends by generation to its own continuance, as a specific form, in other individuals; and ultimately, by realizing its specific ends, it contributes to the order and preservation of the universe, i.e., to the good of the whole of which it is a part.

Related Concepts. Art, violence, and chance are all active principles that presuppose nature but operate outside the order of natural finality.

**Secondary Meanings.** From nature meaning the form or essence that is the end of generation, the word has been extended to signify any essence whatsoever without reference at all to becoming. This sense, as applicable to any being, material or immaterial, is frequently conveyed by the terms definition and quiddity. A meaning somewhat closer to the original is that of essence as the source of any activity, whether of physical movement or of spiritual operation (*De ente* 1). This sense, too, is sometimes conveyed by the term substance.

### **Aldo-Leopold; land-ethics**

When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in Troy, he hanged all on one rope a dozen slave-girls of his household whom he suspected of misbehavior during his absence. This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls were property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and wrong. Concepts of right and wrong were not lacking from Odysseus'. Greece: witness the fidelity of his wife through the long years before at last his black galleys clove the wine-dark seas for home. The ethical structure of that day covered wives, but had not yet been extended to human chattels. During the three thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages - in those judged by expediency only.

### **The Ethical Sequence**

This extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as in philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses. Politics and economics are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mechanisms with an ethical content. The complexity of co-operative mechanisms has increased with population density, and with the efficiency of tools. It was simpler, for example, to define the anti-social uses of sticks and stones in the days of the mastodons than of bullets and billboards in the age of motors. The first ethics dealt with the relation between individuals; the Mosaic Decalogue is

an example. Later accretions dealt with the relation between the individual and society. The Golden Rule tries to integrate the individual to society; democracy to integrate social organization to the individual. There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus' slave-girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations.

The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity. It is the third step in a sequence. The first two have already been taken. Individual thinkers since the days of Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the despoliation of land is not only inexpedient but wrong. Society, however, has not yet affirmed their belief. I regard the present conservation movement as the embryo of such an affirmation. An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting ecological situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions, that the path of social expediency is not discernible to the average individual. Animal instincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting such situations. Ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making.

### **The Community Concept**

All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for). The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.

This sounds simple: do we not already sing our love for and obligation to the land of the free and the home of the brave? Yes, but just what and whom do we love? Certainly not the soil, which we are sending helter-skelter downriver. Certainly not the waters, which we assume have no function except to turn turbines, float barges, and carry off sewage. Certainly not the plants, of which we exterminate whole communities without batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which we have already extirpated many of the largest and most beautiful species. A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, - management, and use of these 'resources,' but it does affirm their right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural state.

In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such. In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror role is eventually self-defeating. Why? Because it is implicit in such a role that the conqueror knows, ex cathedra, just what makes the community clock tick; and just what and who is valuable, and what and who is worthless, in community life. It always turns out that he knows neither, and this is why his conquests eventually defeat themselves.

In the biotic community, a parallel situation exists. Abraham knew exactly what the land was for: it was to drip milk and honey into Abraham's mouth. At the present moment, the assurance with which we regard this assumption is inverse to the degree of our education: The ordinary citizen today assumes that science knows what makes the community clock tick; the scientist is equally sure that he does not. He knows that the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings may never be fully understood: That man is, in fact, only a member of a biotic team is shown by an ecological interpretation of history. Many historical events, hitherto explained solely in terms of hu-

man enterprise, were actually biotic interactions between people and land. The characteristics of the land determined the facts quite as potently as the characteristics of the men who lived on it.

Consider, for example, the settlement of the Mississippi valley. In the years following the Revolution, three groups were contending for its control: the native Indian, the French and English traders, and the American settlers. Historians wonder what would have happened if the English at Detroit had thrown a little more weight into the Indian side of those tipsy scales which decided the outcome of the colonial migration into the cane-lands of Kentucky. It is time now to ponder the fact that the cane-lands, when subjected to the particular mixture of forces represented by the cow, plow, fire, and axe of the pioneer, became bluegrass.

What if the plant succession inherent in this dark and bloody ground had, under the impact of these forces, given us some worthless sedge, shrub, or weed? Would Boone and Kenton have held out? Would there have been any overflow into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri? Any Louisiana Purchase? Any transcontinental union of new states? Any Civil War?

Kentucky was one sentence in the drama of history. We are commonly told what the human actors in this drama tried to do, but we are seldom told that their success, or the lack of it, hung in large degree on the reaction of particular soils to the impact of the particular forces exerted by their occupancy. In the case of Kentucky, we do not even know where the bluegrass came from whether it is a native species, or a stowaway from Europe.

Contrast the cane-lands with what hindsight tells us about the Southwest, where the pioneers were equally brave, resourceful, and persevering. The impact of occupancy here brought no bluegrass, or other plant fitted to withstand the bumps and buffetings of hard use. This region, when grazed by livestock, reverted through a series of more and more worthless grasses, shrubs, and weeds to a condition of unstable equilibrium. Each recession of plant types bred erosion; each increment to erosion bred a further recession of plants. The result today is a progressive and mutual deterioration, not only of plants and soils, but of the animal community subsisting thereon. The early settlers did not expect this: on the cienegas of New Mexico some even cut ditches to hasten it. So subtle has been its progress that few residents of the region are aware of it. It is quite invisible to the tourist who finds this wrecked landscape colorful and charming (as indeed it is, but it bears scant resemblance to what it was in 1848).

This same landscape was 'developed' once before, but with quite different results. The Pueblo Indians settled the Southwest in pre-Colombian times, but they happened not to be equipped with range live stock. Their civilization expired, but not because their land expired. In India, regions devoid of any sod-forming grass have been settled, apparently without wrecking the land, by the simple expedient of carrying the grass to the cow, rather than vice versa. (Was this the result of some deep wisdom, or was it just good luck? I do not know.) In

short, the plant succession stared the course of history; the pioneer simply demonstrated, for good or ill, what successions inhered in the land. Is history taught in this spirit? It will be, once the concept of land as a community really penetrates our intellectual life.

## **The Ecological Conscience**

Conservation is a state of harmony between men and land. Despite nearly a century of propaganda, conservation still proceeds at a snail's pace; progress still consists largely of letterhead pieties and convention oratory. On the back forty we still slip two steps backward for each forward stride.

The usual answer to this dilemma is 'more conservation education.' No one will debate this, but is it certain that only the volume of education needs stepping up? Is something lacking in the content as well? It is difficult to give a fair summary of its content in brief form, but, as I understand it, the content is substantially this: obey the law, vote right, join some organizations, and practice what conservation is profitable on your own land; the government will do the rest. Is not this formula too easy to accomplish anything worth while? It defines no right-or-wrong, assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice, implies no change in the current philosophy of values. In respect of land use, it urges only enlightened self-interest. Just how far will such education take us? An example will perhaps yield a partial answer.

By 1930 it had become clear to all except the ecologically blind that southwestern Wisconsin's topsoil was slipping seaward. In 1933 the farmers were told that if they would adopt certain remedial practices for five years, the public would donate CCC labor to install them, plus the necessary machinery and materials. The offer was widely accepted, but the practices were widely forgotten when the five-year contract period was up. The farmers continued only those practices that yielded an immediate and visible economic gain, for themselves.

This led to the idea that maybe farmers would learn more quickly if they themselves wrote the rules. Accordingly the Wisconsin Legislature in 1937 passed the Soil Conservation District Law. This said to farmers, in effect: We, the public, will furnish you free technical service and loan you specialized machinery, if you will unite your own rules for land-use. Each county may write its own rules, and these will have the force of law. Nearly all the counties promptly organized to accept the proffered help, but after a decade of operation, no county has yet written a single rule. There has been visible progress in such practices as strip-cropping, pasture renovation, and soil liming, but none in fencing woodlots against grazing, and none in excluding plow and cow from steep slopes. The farmers, in short, have selected those remedial practices which were profitable anyhow, and ignored those which were profitable to the community, but not clearly profitable to themselves.

When one asks why no rules have been written, one is told that the community is not yet ready to support them; education must precede rules. But the education actually in progress makes no mention of obligations to land over and above those dictated by self-interest. The net result is that we have more education but less soil, fewer healthy woods, and as many floods as in 1937.

The puzzling aspect of such situations is that the existence of obligations over and above self-interest is taken for granted in such total community enterprises as the betterment of roads, schools, churches, and baseball teams. Their existence is not taken for granted, nor as yet seriously discussed, in bettering the behavior of the water that falls on the land, or in the preserving of the beauty or diversity of the farm landscape. Land use ethics are still governed wholly by economic self-interest, just as social ethics were a century ago.

To sum up: we asked the farmer to do what he conveniently could to save his soil, and he has done just that, and only that. The farmer who clears the woods off a 75 percent slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society. If he puts lime on his fields and plants his crops on contour, he is still entitled to all the privileges and emoluments of his Soil Conservation District. The District is a beautiful piece of social machinery, but it is coughing along on two cylinders because we have been too timid, and too anxious for quick success, to tell the farmer the true magnitude of his obligations. Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to land.

No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis loyalties, affections, and convictions. The proof that conservation has not yet touched these foundations of conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have not yet heard of it. In our attempt to make conservation easy, we have made it trivial.

### **Substitutes for a Land Ethic**

When the logic of history hungers for bread and we hand out a stone, we are at pains to explain how much the stone resembles bread. I now describe some of the stones which serve in lieu of a land ethic. One basic weakness in a conservation system based wholly on economic motives is that most members of the land community, have no economic value. Wildflowers and songbirds are examples. Of the 22,000 higher plants and animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtful whether more than 5 per cent can be sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise put to economic use. Yet members of the biotic community; and if (as I believe) its stability depends on its integrity, they are entitled to continuance. When one of these non-economic categories is threatened; and if we happen to love it, we invent subterfuges to give it economic importance. At the beginning of the century songbirds were supposed to be disappearing. Ornithologists jumped to the rescue with some distinctly shaky evidence to the effect that insects would eat us up if birds failed to control them. The evidence had to be economic in order to be valid. It is painful to read these circumlocutions today. We have no land ethic yet, but we have at least drawn nearer the point of admitting that birds should continue as a matter of biotic right, regardless of the presence or absence of economic advantage to us.

A parallel situation exists in respect of predatory mammals, raptorial birds, and fish-eating birds. Time was when biologists somewhat overworked the evidence that these creatures preserve the health of game by killing weaklings, or that they control rodents for the farmer, or that they prey only on 'worthless' species. Here again, the evidence had to be economic in order to be valid. It is only in recent years that we hear the more honest argument that predators are members of the community, and that no special interest has the right to exterminate them for the sake of a benefit, real or fancied, to itself. Unfortunately this enlightened view is still in the talk stage. In the field the extermination of predators goes merrily on: witness the impending erasure of the timber wolf by fiat of Congress, the Conservation Bureaus, and many state legislatures.

Some species of trees have been 'read out of the party' by economics-minded foresters because they grow too slowly, or have too low a sale value to pay as - timber crops: white cedar, tamarack, cypress, beech, and hemlock are examples. In Europe, where forestry is ecologically - more advanced, the non-commercial tree species are recognized as members of the native forest community, to be preserved as such, within reason. Moreover some (like beech) have been found to have a valuable function in building up soil fertility. The interdependence of the forest and its constituent tree species, ground flora, and fauna is taken for granted.

Lack of economic value is sometimes a character not only of species or groups, but of entire biotic communities: marshes, bogs, dunes, and 'deserts' are examples. Our formula in such cases is to relegate their conservation to government as refuges, monuments, or parks. The difficulty is that these communities are usually interspersed with more valuable private lands; the government cannot possibly own or control such scattered parcels. The net effect is that we have relegated some of them to ultimate extinction over large areas. If the private owner were ecologically minded, he would be proud to be the custodian of a reasonable proportion of such areas, which add diversity and beauty to his farm and to his community. In some instances, the assumed lack of profit

in these 'waste' areas has proved to be wrong, but only after most of them had been done away with. The present scramble to reflood muskrat marshes is a case in point.

There is a clear tendency in American conservation to relegate to government all necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform. Government ownership, operation, -subsidy, or regulation is now widely prevalent in forestry, range management, soil and watershed management, park and wilderness conservation, fisheries management, and migratory bird management, with more to come. Most of this growth in governmental conservation is proper and logical, some of it is inevitable. That I imply no disapproval of it is implicit in the fact that I have spent most of my life working for it. Nevertheless the question arises: What is the ultimate magnitude of the enterprise? Will the tax base carry its eventual ramifications? At what point will governmental conservation, like the mastodon, become handicapped by its own dimensions? The answer, if there is any, seems to be in a land ethic, or some other force which assigns more obligation to the private landowner.

Industrial landowners and users, especially lumbermen and stockmen, are inclined to wail long and loudly about the extension of government ownership and regulation to land, but (with notable exceptions) they show little disposition to develop the only visible alternative: the voluntary practice of conservation on their own lands. When the private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act for the good of the community, he today assents only without stretched palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but when it costs only fore-thought, open-mindedness, or time, the issue is at least debatable. The overwhelming growth of land-use subsidies in recent years must be ascribed, in large part, to the government's own agencies for conservation education: the land bureaus, the agricultural colleges, and the extension services. As far as I can detect, no ethical obligation toward land is taught in these institutions.

To sum up: a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the biotic cluck will function without the uneconomic parts. It tends to relegate to government many functions eventually too large, too complex, or too widely dispersed to be performed by government. An ethical obligation on the part of the private owner is the only visible remedy for these situations.

## **The Land Pyramid**

An ethic to supplement and guide the economic relation to land presupposes the existence of some mental image of land as a biotic mechanism. We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in. The image commonly employed in conservation education is 'the balance of nature.' For reasons too lengthy to detail here, this figure of speech \* fails to describe accurately what little we know about the land mechanism.- A much truer image is the one employed in ecology: the biotic pyramid. I shall first sketch the pyramid as a symbol of develop some of its implications in terms of land-use.

Plants absorb energy from the sun. This energy flows through a circuit called the biota, which may be represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil. A plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the insects, and so on up through various animal groups to the apex layer, which consists of the larger carnivores. The species of a layer are alike not in where they came from, or in what they look like, but rather in what they eat. Each successive layer depends on those below it for food and often for other services,

and each in turn furnishes food and services to those above. Proceeding upward, each successive layer decreases in numerical abundance. Thus, for every carnivore there are hundreds of his prey, thousands of their prey, millions of insects, uncountable plants. The pyramidal form of the system reflects this numerical progression from apex to base. Man shares an intermediate layer with the bears, raccoons, and squirrels which eat both meat and vegetables.

The lines of dependency for food and other services are called food chains. Thus soil-oak-deer-Indian is a chain that has now been largely converted to soil-corn-cow-farmer. Each species, including ourselves, is a link in many chains. The deer eats a hundred plants other than oak, and the cow a hundred plants other than corn. Both; then, are links in a hundred chains. The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the cooperation and competition of its diverse parts.

In the beginning; the pyramid of life was low and squat; the food chains short and simple. Evolution has added layer after layer, link after link. Man is one of thousands of accretions to the height and complexity of the pyramid. Science has given us many doubts, .but it has given us at least one certainty: the trend ; of evolution .is to elaborate and diversify the biota. Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. The circuit is not closed; some energy is dissipated in decay, some is added by absorption from the air, some is stored in soils, peats and longlived forests; but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly augmented revolving fund of life. There is always a net loss by downhill wash, but this is normally small and offset by the decay of rocks. It is deposited in the ocean and, in the course of geological time, raised to form new lands and new pyramids.

The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on the complex structure of the plant and animal community, much as the upward flow of sap in a tree depends on its complex cellular organization. Without this complexity, normal circulation would presumably not occur. Structure means the characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic kinds and functions, of the component species. This interdependence between the .complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as -an, energy unit is one of its basic attributes.

When a change occurs in one part: of the circuit, may other parts must adjust themselves to it. Change does not . necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of energy; evolution is a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which has been to elaborate the flow, mechanism, and to lengthen. the circuit. Evolutionary changes; however, are usually slow and local. Man's invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope.

One change is in the composition of floras and faunas. The larger predators are lopped off the apex of the pyramid; food chains, for the first time in history, become shorter rather than longer. Domesticated species from other lands are substituted for wild ones, and wild ones are moved to new habitats. In this world-wide pooling of faunas and floras, some species get out of bounds as pests and diseases, others are, extinguished. Such effects are seldom intended or foreseen; they represent unperfected and often untraceable readjustments in the structure. Agricultural science is largely a race between the emergence of new pests and the emergence of new techniques for their control.

Another change touches the flow of energy through plants and `animals and its return to the soil. Fertility is the ability of soil to receive, store, and release energy. Agriculture, by overdrafts on the

soil, or by too radical a substitution of domestic for native species in the superstructure; may derange the channels of flow or deplete storage. Soils depleted of their storage, or of the organic matter which anchors it, wash away faster than they form. This is erosion. Waters, like soil; are part of the energy circuit. Industry, by polluting waters or obstructing them with dams, may exclude the plants and -animals necessary to keep energy incirculation.

Transportation brings about another basic change: the plants or animals grown in one region are now consumed and returned to-the soil in another. Transportation taps the energy stored in rocks, and in the air, and uses it elsewhere; thus we fertilize the garden with nitrogen gleaned by the guano birds from the fishes of seas on the other side of the Equator. Thus the formerly localized and self- contained circuits are pooled on a world-wide scale.

The process of altering the pyramid for human occupation releases stored energy, and this often gives rise, during the pioneering period; to a deceptive exuberance of plant and animal life, both wild and tame. These releases of biotic capital tend to becloud or postpone the penalties of violence.

This thumbnail sketch of land as an energy circuit conveys three basic ideas:

- (1) (1) That land is not merely soil.
- (2) That the native plants and animals kept the energy circuit open; others may or may not.
- (3) That man-made changes are of -a different order than evolutionary changes, and have effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen.

These ideas, 'collectively; raise two- basic issues: Can the land adjust itself to the new order? Can the desired alterations be accomplished with less violence?

Biotas seem to differ in their capacity . to sustain violent conversion. Western Europe, for example, carries- a far different pyramid than Caesar found there. Some large animals are lost; swampy forests have become meadows or plowland; many new plants and animals are introduced, some of which escape as pests; the remaining natives are greatly changed in distribution and abundance. Yet the soil is still there and, with the help of imported nutrients, still fertile; the waters flow normally; the new structure seems to function and to persist. There is no visible stoppage or derangement of the circuit.

Western Europe, then, has a resistant biota. Its inner processes are tough, elastic, resistant to strain. No matter how violent the alterations, the pyramid, so far, has developed some new *modus vivendi* which preserves its habitability for man, and for most of the other natives. Japan seems to present another instance of radical conversion without disorganization. Most other civilized regions, and some as yet barely touched by civilization, display various stages of disorganization, varying from initial symptoms to advanced wastage: In Asia Minor and North Africa diagnosis is confused by climatic changes, which may have been either the cause or the effect of advanced wastage. In the United States the degree of disorganization varies locally; it is worst in the Southwest, the Ozarks, and parts of the South, and least in New England and the Northwest. Better land-uses may still arrest it in the less :advanced regions. In parts of Mexico, South America, South Africa, and Australia a violent and accelerating wastage is in progress, but I cannot assess the prospects.

This almost world-wide display of disorganization in the land seems to be similar to disease in an

animal, except that it never culminates in complete disorganization or death. The land \_ recovers, but at some reduced level of complexity, and with a reduced carrying capacity for people, plants, and animals: Many biotas currently regarded as lands of opportunity' are in fact already subsisting on exploitative agriculture, i.e. they have already exceeded their sustained carrying capacity. Most of South America is overpopulated in this sense.

In arid regions we attempt to offset the process of wastage by reclamation, but it is only too evident that the prospective longevity of reclamation projects is often short. In our own West, the best of them may not last a century.

The combined evidence of history and ecology seems to support one general deduction: the less violent the man-made changes, the greater the probability of successful readjustment in the pyramid. Violence, in turn, varies with human population density; a dense population requires a more violent conversion. In this respect, North America has a better chance for permanence than Europe, if she can contrive to limit her density.

This deduction runs counter to our current philosophy, which assumes that because a small increase in density enriched human life, that an indefinite increase will enrich it indefinitely. Ecology knows of no density relationship that holds for indefinitely wide limits. All gains from density are subject to a law of diminishing returns.

Whatever may be the equation for men and land, it is improbable that we as yet know all its terms. Recent discoveries in mineral and vitamin nutrition reveal unsuspected dependencies in the up-circuit: incredibly minute quantities of certain substances determine the value of soils to plants, of plants to animals. What of the down-circuit? What of the vanishing species, the preservation of which we now regard as an esthetic luxury? They helped build the soil; in what unsuspected ways may they be essential to its maintenance? Professor Weaver proposes that we use prairie flowers to reflocculate the wasting soils of the dust bowl; who knows for what purpose cranes and condors, otters and grizzlies may some day be used?

## **Land Health and the A-B Cleavage**

A land, ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the -health of 'the land. Health is the capacity of . the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity.

Conservationists are notorious for their dissensions. Superficially these seem to add up to mere confusion, but a more careful scrutiny reveals a single plane of cleavage common to many specialized fields. In each field one group (A) regards the land as soil, and its function as commodity-production; another group (B) regards the land as a biota, and its. function as something broader. How much broader is admittedly in a state of doubt and confusion.

In my own field, forestry, group A is quite content to grow trees like cabbages, with cellulose as the sic forest commodity. It feels no inhibition against violence; its ideology is agronomic. Group B, on the other hand, sees forestry as fundamentally different from agronomy because it, employs natural species, and manages a natural environment rather than creating an artificial one. Group B prefers natural reproduction on principle. It worries on biotic as well as economic grounds about the loss of species like chestnut, and the threatened lugs of the white pines. It worries about a whole

series of secondary forest Functions: wildlife, recreation, watersheds, wilderness areas. To my mind, Group B feels the stirrings of an ecological conscience.

In the wildlife field, a parallel cleavage exists. For Group A the basic commodities are sport and meat; the yardsticks of production are ciphers of take in pheasants and trout. Artificial propagation is acceptable as a permanent as well as a temporary recourse if its unit costs permit. Group B, on the other hand, worries about a whole series of biotic side-issues. What is the cast in predators of producing a game crop? Should we have further recourse to exotics? How can management restore the shrinking species, like prairie grouse, already hopeless as shootable game? How can management restore the threatened ratites, like trumpeter-swan and whooping crane? Can management principles be extended to wildflowers? Here again it is dear to me that we have the same A-B cleavage as in forestry.

In the larger field of agriculture I am less competent to speak, but there seem to be somewhat parallel cleavages. Scientific agriculture was actively developing before ecology was born, hence a slower penetration of ecological concepts might be expected. Moreover the farmer, by the very nature of his techniques, must modify the biota more radically than the forester or the wildlife manager. Nevertheless, there are many discontents in agriculture which seem to add up to a new vision of biotic farming.'

Perhaps the most important of these is the new evidence that poundage or tonnage is no measure of the food-value of farm crops; the products of fertile soil may be qualitatively as well as quantitatively superior. We can bolster poundage from depleted soils by pouring on imported fertility, but we are not necessarily bolstering food-value. The possible ultimate ramifications of this idea are so immense that I must leave their exposition to abler pens.

The discontent that labels itself 'organic farming,' while bearing some of the earmarks of a cult, is nevertheless biotic in its direction, particularly in its insistence on the importance of soil flora and fauna.

The ecological fundamentals of agriculture are just as poorly known to the public as in other fields of land-use. For example, few educated people realize that the marvelous advances in technique made during recent decades are improvements in the pump, rather than the well. Acre for acre, they have barely sufficed to offset the sinking level of fertility.

In all of these cleavages, we see repeated the same basic paradoxes: man the conqueror versus man the biotic citizen; science the sharpener of his sword versus science the searchlight on his universe; land the slave and servant versus land the collective organism. Robinson's injunction to Tristram may well be applied, at this juncture, to Homo Sapiens as a species in geological time

Whether you will or not You are a King, Tristram, for you are one Of the time- tested few that leave the world, When they are gone, not the same place it was. Mark what you leave.

## **The Outlook**

It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense.

Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our education is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land. Your true modern is

separated from the land by many middlemen, and by innumerable physical gadgets. He has no vital relation to it; to him it is the space between cities on which crops grow. Turn him loose for a day on the land, and if the spot does not happen to be a golf links or a 'scenic' area, he is bored stiff. If crops could be raised by hydroponics instead of farming, it would suit him very well. Synthetic substitutes for wood, leather, wool, and other natural land products suit him better than the originals. In short, land is something he has 'outgrown.'

Almost equally serious as an obstacle to a land ethic is the attitude of the farmer for whom the land is still an adversary, or a taskmaster that keeps him in slavery. Theoretically, the mechanization of farming ought to cut the farmer's chains, but whether it really does is debatable.

One of the requisites for an ecological comprehension of land is an understanding of ecology, and this is by no means co-extensive with 'education'; in fact, much higher education seems deliberately to avoid ecological concepts. An understanding of ecology does not necessarily originate in courses bearing ecological labels; it is quite as likely to be labeled geography, botany, agronomy, history, or economics. This is as it should be, but whatever the label, ecological training is scarce.

The case for a land ethic would appear hopeless but for the minority which is in obvious revolt against these 'modern' trends.

The 'key-log' which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.

It of course goes without saying that economic feasibility limits the tether of what can or cannot be done for land. It always has and it always will. The fallacy the economic determinists have tied around our collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is the belief that economics determines all land use. This is simply not true. An innumerable host of actions and attitudes, comprising perhaps the bulk of all land relations, is determined by the land-users' tastes and predilections, rather than by his purse. The bulk of all land relations hinges on investments of time, forethought, skill, and faith rather than on investments of cash. As a land-user thinketh, so is he.

I have purposely presented the land ethic as a product of social evolution because nothing so important as an ethic is ever 'written.' Only the most superficial student of history supposes that Moses 'wrote' the Decalogue; it evolved in the minds of a thinking community, and Moses wrote a tentative summary of it for a 'seminar.' We say tentative because evolution never stops.

The evolution of a land ethic is an intellectual as well as emotional process. Conservation is paved with good intentions which prove to be futile, or even dangerous, because they are devoid of critical understanding either of the land, or of economic land-use. We think it is a truism that as the ethical frontier advances from the individual to the community, its intellectual content increases.

The mechanism of operation is the same for any ethic: social approbation for right actions: social disapproval for wrong actions.

By and large, our present problem is one of attitudes and implements. We are remodeling the AI with a steam-shovel, and we are proud of our yardage. We shall hardly relinquish the shovel, which after--all has many good points, but we are in need of gentler and more objective criteria for

its successful use.

## Deep Ecology

“Deep ecology” was born in Scandinavia, the result of discussions between Næss and his colleagues Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils Faarlund; for a historical survey and commentary on the development of deep ecology). All three shared a passion for the great mountains. On a visit to the Himalayas, they became impressed with aspects of “Sherpa culture” particularly when they found that their Sherpa guides regarded certain mountains as sacred and accordingly would not venture onto them. Subsequently, Næss formulated a position which extended the reverence the three Norwegians and the Sherpas felt for mountains to other natural things in general.

The “shallow ecology movement”, as Næss (1973) calls it, is the “fight against pollution and resource depletion”, the central objective of which is “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.” The “deep ecology movement”, in contrast, endorses “biospheric egalitarianism”, the view that all living things are alike in having value in their own right, independent of their usefulness to others. The deep ecologist respects this intrinsic value, taking care, for example, when walking on the mountainside not to cause unnecessary damage to the plants.

Inspired by Spinoza’s metaphysics, another key feature of Næss’s deep ecology is the rejection of atomistic individualism. The idea that a human being is such an individual possessing a separate essence, Næss argues, radically separates the human self from the rest of the world. To make such a separation not only leads to selfishness towards other people, but also induces human selfishness towards nature. As a counter to egoism at both the individual and species level, Næss proposes the adoption of an alternative relational “total-field image” of the world. According to this relationalism, organisms (human or otherwise) are best understood as “knots” in the biospherical net. The identity of a living thing is essentially constituted by its relations to other things in the world, especially its ecological relations to other living things. If people conceptualise themselves and the world in relational terms, the deep ecologists argue, then people will take better care of nature and the world in general.

As developed by Næss and others, the position also came to focus on the possibility of the identification of the human ego with nature. The idea is, briefly, that by identifying with nature we can enlarge the boundaries of the self beyond my skin. My larger—ecological—Self (the capital “S” emphasizes that we are something larger than our body and consciousness), deserves respect as well. To respect and to care for my Self is also to respect and to care for the natural environment, which is actually part of me and with which I should identify. “Self-realization”, in other words, is the reconnection of the shriveled human individual with the wider natural environment. Næss maintains that the deep satisfaction that we receive from identification with nature and close partnership with other forms of life in nature contributes significantly to our life quality. (One clear historical antecedent to this kind of nature spiritualism is the romanticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as expressed in his last work, the *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*)

When Næss’s view crossed the Atlantic, it was sometimes merged with ideas emerging from Leopold’s land ethic; But Næss—wary of the apparent totalitarian political implications of Leopold’s position that individual interests and well-being should be subordinated to the holistic good of the earth’s biotic community—has always taken care to distance himself from advocating any sort of “land ethic”. Some critics have argued that Næss’s deep ecology is no more than an extended social-democratic version of utilitarianism, which counts human interests in the same calculation

alongside the interests of all natural things (e.g., trees, wolves, bears, rivers, forests and mountains) in the natural environment. However, Næss failed to explain in any detail how to make sense of the idea that oysters or barnacles, termites or bacteria could have interests of any morally relevant sort at all. Without an account of this, Næss's early "biospheric egalitarianism"—that all living things whatsoever had a similar right to live and flourish—was an indeterminate principle in practical terms. It also remains unclear in what sense rivers, mountains and forests can be regarded as possessors of any kind of interests. This is an issue on which Næss always remained elusive.

Biospheric egalitarianism was modified in the 1980s to the weaker claim that the flourishing of both human and non-human life have value in themselves. At the same time, Næss declared that his own favoured ecological philosophy— "Ecosophy T", as he called it after his Tvergastein mountain cabin—was only one of several possible foundations for an environmental ethic. Deep ecology ceased to be a specific doctrine, but instead became a "platform", of eight simple points, on which Næss hoped all deep green thinkers could agree. The platform was conceived as establishing a middle ground, between underlying philosophical orientations, whether Christian, Buddhist, Daoist, process philosophy, or whatever, and the practical principles for action in specific situations, principles generated from the underlying philosophies. Thus the deep ecological movement became explicitly pluralist.

While Næss's Ecosophy T sees human Self-realization as a solution to the environmental crises resulting from human selfishness and exploitation of nature, some of the followers of the deep ecology platform in the United States and Australia further argue that the expansion of the human self to include non-human nature is supported by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which is said to have dissolved the boundaries between the observer and the observed. These "relationalist" developments of deep ecology are, however, criticized by some feminist theorists. The idea of nature as part of oneself, one might argue, could justify the continued exploitation of nature instead. For one is presumably more entitled to treat oneself in whatever ways one likes than to treat another independent agent in whatever ways one likes. According to some feminist critics, the deep ecological theory of the "expanded self" is in effect a disguised form of human colonialism, unable to give nature its due as a genuine "other" independent of human interest and purposes.

Meanwhile, some third-world critics accused deep ecology of being elitist in its attempts to preserve wilderness experiences for only a select group of economically and socio-politically well-off people. The Indian writer Ramachandra Guha (1989, 1999) for instance, depicts the activities of many western-based conservation groups as a new form of cultural imperialism, aimed at securing converts to conservationism (cf. Bookchin 1987 and Brennan 1998a). "Green missionaries", as Guha calls them, represent a movement aimed at further dispossessing the world's poor and indigenous people. "Putting deep ecology in its place," he writes, "is to recognize that the trends it derides as "shallow" ecology might in fact be varieties of environmentalism that are more apposite, more representative and more popular in the countries of the South." Although Næss himself repudiates suggestions that deep ecology is committed to any imperialism. Guha's criticism raises important questions about the application of deep ecological principles in different social, economic and cultural contexts. Finally, in other critiques, deep ecology is portrayed as having an inconsistent utopian vision.

## **Peter Singer; Animal Rights**

Moral philosopher and Princeton professor Peter Singer described what he called a "momentous

revolution in thinking” regarding animal welfare during a talk in the Ames Courtroom at the Harvard Law School on Friday.

During the event, entitled “Ethics and Animals: Where are We Now,” Singer described the economically-driven processes of factory farming and mass-fishing and the laws that the European Union and United Kingdom have implemented in the past decade to strictly regulate the treatment of animals during those practices.

But, Singer cautioned, while the world has come a long way, outlooks surrounding the ethics and the treatment of animals have not been pushed as far as he thinks they could.

“Animals have interests,” Singer said. “When these are similar to ours, or their pain is on a similar level, why give them less consideration?”

Singer cited the Bible, in which God grants the humans dominion over the animals, as the first documentation of humanity’s obligation to animals. He said that he thinks “dominion” has come to be interpreted as the right “to do as we will,” rather than as responsible stewardship.

“The question is not ‘Can they reason?’ nor ‘Can they talk?’ but ‘Can they suffer?’” said Singer, quoting the logic used by nineteenth-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham, Bentham’s ideology has also been applied to discussions about slaves, infants, and those with cognitive disabilities.

The case for animal consciousness and the need to acknowledge their interests, Singer said, is evidenced by the similarities between animals and humans— anatomically, physiologically, and behaviorally. He also pointed to the shared evolutionary history between the two.

“We are animals,” Singer said, citing Darwin’s theory of evolution.

Singer, a professor of bioethics at Princeton and the University of Melbourne, is the author of the controversial book *Animal Liberation*, which asserts that animals’ interests should be given equal weight to those of humans. The book drew criticism upon its release in 1975.

Friday’s talk was part of a series sponsored by the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at the Law School. Singer also spoke later in the day in the Science Center about effective altruism—a utilitarian stance on how best to affect change in the world.

“If God were a utilitarian, Singer would be his patron saint,” Law School professor and Petrie-Flom Center co-director Glenn Cohen said in his introduction.

## **Medical-Ethics: Surrogacy**

“Surrogacy is often thought to be a ‘treatment’ option for the infertile or an alternative to adoption, and so to be celebrated in fulfilling people’s desires to be parents. However, surrogacy also brings a wealth of more complex ethical issues around gender, labour, payment, exploitation and inequality.”

## **Payment**

Take the issue of payment: surrogacy involves literal labour (physical and often emotional effort in both gestating and birthing). However, many see it as distinct from labour (working in a factory or teaching a class). This raises an ethical question around whether surrogacy is different from other kinds of paid work and, if it isn’t, shouldn’t we remunerate surrogates?

Some philosophers argue that surrogacy is unique when compared to other work. For instance, they claim that women are intimately connected to their reproductive capacities and bodies (so pregnancy and birth are special and should not be bought), or that being pregnant requires an unusual time commitment (unlike other kinds of work, the woman works for 24 hours a day, seven days a week, for nine months).

Others argue that there is equivalence to traditional work. Various occupations demand control over the body (ballerinas and astronauts are heavily controlled in what they can eat and how much they exercise, just as surrogates are) and longevity of work (writing a book can take longer than gestating and delivering a baby). All this work should be paid, so the argument goes.

## **Gender**

Ethics also come into play when thinking about the gendered nature of surrogacy and intended parenting. Biologically, the surrogate has to be someone with the capacity to gestate and give birth – usually a woman. As gendered labour, surrogacy triggers important feminist concerns, such as about bodily autonomy, vulnerability, inequality and rights.

For example, whether women who are surrogates maintain autonomy over their body when they are carrying a foetus for another individual or couple, or when decisions are being made about what happens to that foetus when there is disagreement. I think about the complexity of these sorts of questions and defend the importance of protecting and promoting women's autonomy in my broader work on feminist conceptions of autonomy.

Intended parenthood raises feminist concerns too, such as on gendered roles and expectations. This includes whether women in particular feel that being mothers is critical to being 'proper' women (and hence why they might pursue surrogacy if they cannot carry their own children). Likewise, women might feel breastfeeding is what 'real' mothers (and women) do (and why intended mothers – ie, women who are not pregnant – might want to induce lactation).

Interestingly, at SUK's annual conference in September, it was noted that lactation can be induced in men using a similar process as for non-pregnant women. (It has been used for a transgender woman who wanted to breastfeed recently too). For feminists worried about unequal gender roles in parenting in general, this could be further ammunition for dispelling myths about women as 'natural' carers because of their biological capacities.

## **Exploitation**

A final ethical issue to mention is exploitation. The UK, Ukraine, US, Australia and India have different regulations about surrogacy. Some countries see the surrogate, while others the intended mother, as the legitimate mother. Some favour altruistic forms of surrogacy, while others allow commercial forms. Some countries give parental rights to intended parents before or at the birth of the child, while others only after six weeks.

There are good reasons to worry about a country-specific approach to surrogacy, as outlined in the recent. In particular, the country-specific approach opens up the potential to exploit legal loopholes, intended parents, and, ultimately those doing the majority of the labour – surrogates.

Despite the inevitable difficulties of securing global agreement, concerns about exploitation – of all parties, but especially the most vulnerable – provides a significant reason to push for a global

approach to surrogacy arrangements.

These are just three ethical puzzles of surrogacy. All of the themes, and more beyond, require careful consideration since what we think about each is not just philosophically intriguing but is likely to have implications for how we believe our practice, laws and policy should be shaped. As the UK is currently reviewing its legislation on surrogacy, giving attentive thought to these issues is a particularly timely demand on all of us.

## **Social, ethical, medical & legal aspects of surrogacy:**

### **An Indian Scenario**

On examining the thousands of years old records of Indian Vedic literature and based on the discoveries of today's science dealing with molecules, genes and DNA it appears that the motherhood is an instinct driven physiological phenomena. Instinct of motherhood is the most powerful desire that exists in all the living creatures that include all animals and humans. According to ancient Indian philosophy the biological purpose of life is to propagate once own traits (genes) and all living creatures are here on a transition phase to pass their own traits (genes) to the next generation. Propagation is the ultimate purpose of any species, therefore, birth of an offspring is always dependent on the factors that lead to high chances of survival of the offspring. For example, birds migrate thousands of kilometers to find out suitable place where environment can support the high chances of survival of their offsprings. In the Canadian Inuit Community which is 300 miles north of Arctic Circle, the seasonality was reported till 1970. But due to modernization and decline of traditional life-style the seasonality in this community has not been reported in the later years.

Infertility is generally known as a social stigma in India. It is hypothesized that the agony and trauma of infertility is best felt and described by the infertile couples themselves. Though, infertility does not claim the life of an individual but it inflicts devastating influence on life of an individual for not fulfilling the biological role of parenthood for no fault of his or her own. It is also known that in general, Indian society has got a very stable family structure, strong desire for children and particularly for son to carry forth the lineage or Vansh. With the enormous advances in the field of medicine, the infertility can now be treated using the new medical technologies collectively called as Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), etc. The birth of the world's first child, Louise Brown on July 25, 1978, through the technique of in vitro fertilization was a path-breaking step in control of infertility; and is considered as one of the most important medical advances of the last century. In October 1978, Dr Subhash Mukherjee, Kolkata (India) announced the birth of country's first test tube baby. Dr Mukherjee and his team used the cryopreserved embryo.

There are different types of infertility and in some cases it would be physically or medically impossible/ undesirable to carry a baby to term and hence, to fulfill the desire of such infertile couple to have a child, the surrogacy comes as an important option.

## **Surrogacy**

In Latin "Surrogatus" means a substitute i.e. a person appointed to act in the place of another. As per the Black's Law Dictionary surrogacy means the process of carrying and delivering a child for another person. The New Encyclopedia Britannica defines surrogacy as a practice in which a woman bears a child for a couple unable to produce children in the usual way. According to Warnock Report (1984) HF&E, surrogacy is the practice whereby one woman carries a child for another with

the intension that the child should be handed over after birth.

There are two types of surrogacy practices prevailing in India: (i) Traditional/Natural/Partial surrogacy; and (ii) Gestational surrogacy.

Like in other countries, in India also, the following two types of surrogacy arrangements are being practiced:

**Altruistic surrogacy:** Where the surrogate mother receives no financial rewards for her pregnancy or the relinquishment of the child to the genetic parents except necessary medical expenses.

**Commercial surrogacy:** Where the surrogate mother is paid over and above the necessary medical expenses.

Surrogacy is the union of science, society, services and person that make it a reality. Surrogacy leads to a win-win situation for both the infertile couple and the surrogate mother. The infertile couple is able to fulfill their most important desire and the surrogate mother receives the suitable reward.

To give a womb for rent means to nurture the fertilized egg of another couple in your womb and give birth to the child with a specific intention, the intention here being either money, or service, or because of altruistic reasons.

Bhadaraka has described the following misconceptions regarding a surrogate mother:

- (i) She is not the genetic mother of the child whom she nurtures and gives birth to.
- (ii) She is not the wife of the father of the child to whom she gives birth.
- (iii) This is a scientific idea, a scientific process. There is no need for any physical contact.
- (iv) She is not an asocial woman.
- (v) This is not an illegal practice.
- (vi) She is not forced into this. She herself decides whether she wants to become a surrogate mother or not.
- (vii) She has no claim or rights over the child that is born.
- (viii) "This is my child", "this child is my inheritance" - she cannot articulate such thoughts, because of social, scientific and legal restrictions.
- (ix) She is not a woman who sells children.
- (x) She is not responsible for the child (once the child is born).
- (xi) Surrogacy is a mutually beneficial concept of providing services.

It is necessary to mention here that the couple's insistence does not agree with what science believes. It does not matter as to which religion the surrogate belongs, as the child is genetically of the couple. Religion is interpreted according to the conditions, education, time and the circumstances.

Surrogacy is a social act of highest level of service which is scientific and brims with goodwill. A person's opinion based on a lack of information should not harm others. Like medicine is prescribed for treatment of a disorder, in the same way surrogacy is also a method of treatment.

Bhadaraka reported that the majority of the Indian society considered surrogate mother as an

amalgam of religion, culture and science with following noble services: (i) She shows a strong inclination to society by doing something novel, (ii) She abolishes the stigma of infertility from the society, (iii) She fulfils her duty by doing something worthwhile for the society, and (iv) She is an example of a model woman in society.

As per the proposed draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill the surrogacy and related terms are defined in the following ways: (i) Surrogacy means an arrangement in which a woman agrees to a pregnancy, achieved through assisted reproductive technology, in which neither of the gametes belong to her or her husband, with the intention to carry it to term and hand over the child to the person or persons for whom she is acting as a surrogate; (ii) Surrogate mother means a woman who agrees to have an embryo generated from the sperm of a man who is not her husband and the oocyte of another woman, implanted in her to carry the pregnancy to full term and deliver the child to its biological parents; and (iii) Surrogacy agreement means a contract between the persons availing of assisted reproductive technology and the surrogate mother.

### **Issues related with surrogacy**

Surrogacy, by ART, should be considered only for those infertile women for whom it would be physically or medically impossible/ undesirable to carry a baby to the term. Surrogate mother should sign an agreement with the commissioning couple which shall have legal bindings on both the parties. Before signing the agreement, the written consent of her spouse shall be required. A woman seeking or agreeing to act as a surrogate shall be medically tested for diseases such as sexually transmitted diseases or otherwise, as may be necessary, and all other communicable diseases which may endanger the health of the child or children, and must declare in writing that she has not received a blood transfusion or a blood product in the last six months. The commissioning parent(s) shall ensure that the surrogate and the child or children she delivers are appropriately insured until the time the child is handed over to the commissioning parent(s) or any other person as per the agreement and till the surrogate is free of all health complications arising out of surrogacy. Surrogate mother must register as a patient in her own name in the hospital after signing the appropriate agreement. While registering, the surrogate mother must mention that she is a surrogate mother and should provide all the necessary information about the commissioning parents. Surrogate mother should not use or register in the name of the commissioning couple for whom she is acting as surrogate as this would pose legal issues, particularly in the untoward event of maternal death.

The birth certificate shall be in the name of the commissioning parents. The ART clinic should also provide a certificate to the commissioning parents giving the name and address of the surrogate mother. All the expenses of surrogate mother during the period of pregnancy and postnatal care relating to pregnancy should be borne by the commissioning couple. The surrogate mother would also be entitled a monetary compensation from the commissioning couple for agreeing to act as a surrogate. The exact value of the compensation should be decided by discussion between the commissioning couple. and the prospective surrogate mother or an appropriate formula may be developed by the Government to calculate the minimum compensation to be paid to the surrogate mother. A surrogate mother should never donate her own oocyte to the commissioning couple. Surrogate mother as well as the donor shall relinquish all parental rights related with the offsprings in writing.

## Background of proposed draft ART (Regulation) Bill

After the birth of the first scientifically well documented test tube baby in 1986 in India, there was mushrooming of IVF clinics in the country. The services offered by some of these IVF clinics were questionable. The reason for this was a lack of ART guidelines as well as legislation on ART in the country, no accreditation, supervisory and regulatory body and no control of Government. Therefore, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) developed draft National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision & Regulation of ART Clinics in India in 2002. The draft document was then subjected to extensive public debate throughout the country (in seven cities; New Delhi, Jodhpur, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad & Kolkata) where more than four thousand people participated. To obtain the opinion of the people on the various issues where the consensus of all the members of the Committee could not be established, a prescribed proforma was designed and given to the participants (85% general public, 13% Indian doctors and 2% international doctors).

Based on the opinion of this survey (Table), comments and suggestions received from the various stakeholders including National Commission for Women and National Human Right Commission, the National Guidelines were finalized and after the approval of the Drafting Committee the revised document was submitted to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India. The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare examined these guidelines and after slight modifications published the National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision & Regulation of ART Clinics in India as National Guidelines of Government of India in 2005.

Table Opinion of the people on various issues obtained during the public debates

Sl. no.	Issues	Opinion of the people (%)					
		Doctor			General public		
		Yes	No	No opinion	Yes	No	No opinion
1	Whether surrogacy should be allowed in the Country?	96	2	2	92	3	5
2	Whether commercial surrogacy should be allowed in the Country?	80	15	5	72	24	4
3	Whether relatives/friends should be allowed to act as a surrogate mother?	45	52	3	14	83	3
4	Whether the identity of the donor should be known to the infertile couple?	37	58	5	7	89	4
5	Whether relatives/friends should be allowed for gamete donation?	44	54	2	8	91	1
6	Whether you are satisfied or agreed with the points mentioned under the heading "How may sperm and oocytes donors be sourced?"	54	42	4	81	15	4

On obtaining the feedback from different States of the country it was noticed that these National

Guidelines were not being followed properly in the country. Therefore, the Indian Council of Medical Research developed draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill in 2008 with the help of a Drafting Committee of ICMR. The draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill-2008 was again subjected to extensive public debate not only throughout the country but globally by placing the draft Bill on the websites of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India and of the ICMR. Based on the comments received from various stakeholders including the comments from other countries and as per the recommendations of the Drafting Committee, the draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill was revised and finalized. The finalized version of draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill- 2010 was sent to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, and has now been revised by the Ministry of Law & Justice as Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill - 2013. The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill- 2014 has now become a part of the Cabinet Note.

## **Conclusion**

The draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill proposes to establish National Board, State Boards and National Registry of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) in India for accreditation and supervision of ART clinics and ART Banks, ensuring that services provided by these are ethical and that the medical, social and legal rights of all those concerned including surrogate mother are protected with maximum benefit to all the stakeholders within a recognized framework of ethics and good medical practices.

## **The doctor-patient relationship Introduction**

The doctor-patient relationship plays an essential role in ordering the health care system and medical ethics, and since it is a form of communication, it necessitates ethical, philosophical, psychological, and sociological considerations. The present paper aims to evaluate the essence of the doctor-patient relationship in order to re-examine its conceptual framework. In the first part, the philosophical, psychological and sociological significance of this relationship is explored, and in the final section, the theoretical implications will be discussed. It seems that despite the imbalance in the relationship between doctors and patients resulting from the greater significance of the physicians' ethics, organization of this relationship is not possible without enhancing patient ethics.

Simultaneous consideration of sociological, psychological and philosophical dimensions of the doctor-patient relationship can contribute to developing theoretical foundations and multidisciplinary bases for establishing practical ethical codes. The result will eventually be a more effective interaction between the two.

## **A) The Philosophical Essence of the Doctor-Patient Relationship**

In investigating the philosophical essence of the doctor-patient relationship, three points should be taken into consideration. First, ethical demands in doctor-patient interactions must have distinct definitions and terms; second, the phenomenological ethical debates on this issue need to be explored; and third, modern topics in the philosophy of the relationship should be considered, and relationships with the others should be analyzed from different perspectives.

## **Ethical Demands**

Various organizations and professions differ in their attitudes towards ethical demands, recommendations, norms, values and judgments. The three components of inclusion, priority and severity

are presented below as the criteria for judgment in ethical issues.

**1. Inclusion:** The main questions to answer in regard to this component are: "What are the ethical limits?" and "Should all of our actions be judged ethically or only some of them are included in the scope of ethical judgment?" In other words, is it enough to avoid doing the wrong thing, or is doing right among our moral duties too? It seems that the doctors' moral duties include doing the right thing as well. This important matter is embedded within the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.

**2. Priority:** The component of priority relies on the answers to the following questions: "If what morality is demanding is in conflict with our personal interests (for example it concerns our self, family, friends and so on), which side should we take? Should we always take the ethical side and forget about our personal interests? Or personal interests could have priority over moral obligations?" Nigel and Stalker explain that autonomy and our personal integrity have priority over what morality is demanding from us, or as Kagan and Singer say, demandingness of morality can even affect autonomy and our personal integrity. It seems that on the one hand the altruism of a practitioner as a professional should be based on the priority of patients' interests, and on the other hand it should safeguard the practitioner's own autonomy.

**3. Severity:** The main questions here are: Can ethics press extreme and costly demands from us? Or are the obligations of morality lighter and easier in the way that most people could overcome?" Apparently if ethics are founded on costly demands, we will be more likely to fail to fulfill our ethical duties.

Based on the above-mentioned considerations and classifications, three macro-positions emerge in the ethical relationship, including: maximal ethics, ordinary ethics, and minimal ethics.

**Maximal Ethics:** Maximal ethics include all the three components discussed above. In this type of ethics, ethical inclusion does not have any limits and covers all human actions. Extremist moralities consider ethical inclusion to be an absolute matter that covers all life styles and signify that no human action should be outside of this infinite circle.

**Ordinary Ethics:** This is the sort of ethics that most people believe in, and because of its affinity to the contemporary human life, it is also referred to as "common ethics". Here what ethics demands from us are boundaries. In other words, moderate ethics often state that after performing our obligations and moral duties, in a relatively wide range of personal interests we can start selecting. Thus, our actions are not always subject to moral judgment.

**Minimal Ethics :** This type of ethics is contradicted with maximal ethics. According to minimalists, the only forbidden action is intentional harassment. Followers of minimal ethics believe in a wide range of choices and selection areas; they recognize only a limited range of constraints and are in favor of acting upon personal interests.

It is a growing concern in medical ethics that the doctor-patient relationship is not approached in a sufficiently broad way and that this overly narrow medical perspective leaves doctors, nurses and other health care professionals badly equipped to deal with ethical dilemmas. Phenomenology could broaden this perspective and serve as a strong basis to understand moral sensitivity. Two notions in phenomenology have a central role in understanding the concept of the doctor-patient relationship: intentionality and first-person point of view.

## **Intentionality and first-person point of view**

One of the basic concepts of phenomenology is attainment of phenomenal intentionality, which occurs when a person recognizes earlier assumptions and adopts a perspective. Some thinkers like Franz Brentano believe that intentionality and the phenomenological approach can be applied to the first-person point of view. For instance the first sighting of a beautiful landscape elevates us in a way that may not happen in later encounters. The reason is that later encounters are accompanied by presuppositions of the observer, who will be more used to the landscape. It seems that the phenomenological approach can be applied to the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors must reexamine and restrict assumptions toward patients, and at the same time value intentionality in order not to fall into habits.

## **Moral Sensitivity**

Moral sensitivity may be enhanced in two ways. First, through reinforcing the phenomenological approach by renewing the first sight experience, that is, in each re-identification (of the patient for instance), priorities should be observed. Second, since any situation could come to a fork and ethical conflicts may rise, the adverse impacts should be considered and every situation must be regarded from an ethical perspective. Although at commencement moral sensitivity appears to overlap with maximal ethics, it is of particular importance especially in heterogeneous communications such as the doctor-patient relationship. It may be added that enhancing moral sensitivity even seems to be the target of the phenomenology of ethics in the doctor-patient relationship.

## **Communication with Others**

The term "communication" can be defined through the philosophical approaches of great thinkers such as Levinas, Marcel and Buber who set their philosophical arguments in the relationship between "me" and "the other". Levinas insists on the maximum responsibility of any other; Marcel assists on turning the me-that relationship to the me-you relationship and replacing absence with presence; Buber finds God in "Thou".

## **B) The Psychological Essence of The Doctor-Patient Relationship**

In terms of psychology, the doctor-patient relationship is imbalanced as the doctor has superiority over the patient. Such imbalanced relationships may give rise to various patterns of communication behavior. Psychologists have distinguished the following four communication behavior patterns based on components such as honesty, perspicuity, respect and inhibition:

### **1) Submissiveness**

Submissive persons are shy, and although they speak honestly, they are usually taciturn and cannot express themselves perspicuously. They are also afraid of being judged or offending others, so they are incapable of making eye contact while speaking. Their voices are weak and unsteady, and they speak hesitantly. Submissive people avoid conflict rather than try to resolve it. They speak indirectly and in general terms because they cannot express themselves openly and may quickly feel depressed and vulnerable. People with this behavioral pattern admittedly let others abuse them and treat them disrespectfully. These patterns work both for doctors and patients. Patients who evade their responsibilities and encourage physicians to patriarchy in the process of therapy, or doctors who are not able to say "no" to patients easily consent to inappropriate and ineffective treatments.

## 2) Dominance

Domineering people feel insecure and believe that they do not possess good qualities. Accordingly, they try to deceive others and take advantage. Domineering persons do not have the perspicuity and honesty necessary for earning their wishes. They express themselves in general terms and sometimes their voices shake. These people use others to achieve their goals and make light of this inhibition and deception, so they take away another person's autonomy and freedom. This behavioral pattern is often seen in doctors and sometimes among patients as well. Doctors who prefer patient satisfaction to authority thus create a false autonomy for the patients and will eventually be dominated by them, and patients with this behavioral pattern impair the healing process by inhibition and deception.

## 3) Aggressiveness

The target of aggressive and domineering people is very similar and that is exploitation and domination of others. Their difference is that a domineering person achieves this aim by secrecy and cheating, while an aggressive person follows it frankly and openly. Unlike the domineering type, aggressive people are honest and straightforward; they are horrible listeners, always accuse others, get angry soon, get confused by criticism, and are usually grim in appearance. They have loud voices and look hostile, and in conflicts, they tend to destroy their opponents. This pattern is seen among both physicians and patients. Impatient physicians that do not listen, shout all the time and sometimes make irreparable mistakes during the healing process, or patients with lower anger thresholds who create tension in medical environments belong in the category of aggressive people.

## 4) Assertiveness

Assertiveness is the most creative behavioral pattern of communication. Assertive people respect themselves and others, and observe the authority of all sides. They are both honest and frank, and do not accuse themselves or others. Their approach to matters is problem-oriented, that is, when dealing with a problem, instead of accusing themselves and others, they think of a solution. They listen effectively and speak appropriately and understandably. During conflict they emphasize conversation. Their arguments are clear, specified, objective, fair and respectful, and eventually they are the most successful communicators. Issues such as breaking bad news, wasted treatments and medical mistakes are easy and solvable with this type of behavioral pattern. While submissiveness, dominance and aggression lead to lose-lose situations in long term, assertiveness, is a helpful behavioral pattern and finally results in win-win solutions.

**Based on the above-mentioned notions, the following practical hints should be outlined:**

- 1. Psychic Distance:** An important topic in aesthetics and artistic criticism that is also related to ethics is psychic distance. In aesthetics, this refers to the distance that should exist between a work of art and the viewer, so that aesthetic entente is created and art is not confused with reality. Omitting the psychic distance and forming deep sympathy and psychological identification with the work of art obstructs artistic judgment and aesthetic approach. In medical ethics, the concept seems to be important while encountering patients. Reduction of psychic distance and excessive sympathy with patients prevent an effective doctor-patient relationship as a fundamental element of treatment.
- 2. Body Language:** Nonverbal communication skills are referred to as body language. This type of

communication is very important in the doctor-patient relationship due to factors such as the limited visiting time, and linguistic and discourse differences.

**3. Truth-Telling versus Pain Relief:** One of the oldest ethical challenges is the pain and suffering that can be caused by telling the truth. On the other hand, we can bring comfort and relief to patients by lying to them. Physicians can employ various methods at their discretion, but it seems that health care systems are more inclined toward telling the truth, and doctors must try to maintain a balance between the two.

**4. Emotional Quotient (EQ):** Unlike intelligence quotient that does not improve after the second decade of life, emotional quotient can continue to improve till the end. Emotional quotient refers to the ability to control emotions, sentiments and unwanted desires. People with high intelligence quotient dealing with people with lower intelligence quotient are susceptible to reckless, impulsive behavior and may gradually lose their EQ. In order to improve the doctor-patient relationship, health providers must be instructed in techniques to promote their emotional quotient.

### **C) The Sociological Essence of the Doctor-Patient Relationship**

Unlike the psychological approach, the sociological approach to the doctor-patient relationship examines the essence of this (individualistic) relationship in a social context. In other words, the sociological approach regards the doctor-patient relationship beyond a merely mutual connection and therefore external elements are considered particularly important.

In order to investigate this relationship from the sociological perspective, communicative actions serve as a valid basis. They have been included among the most important sociological criteria in the last few decades as a set of social actions oriented towards reaching entente. The target of communication action theory is to subvert a single prophetic and patriarchal individualism in human interactions. Jürgen Habermas has developed this notion in his famous book *The Theory of Communicative Action*, and his ideas are quite often presented in ethical manuscripts and medical ethics books. In this book Habermas distinguishes and characterizes his theory by drawing a distinction between instrumental action and communicative action.

#### **Instrumental Action**

Jürgen Habermas states, "We call an action oriented to success instrumental when we consider it in the light of following the rules of rational choice and assess the efficiency of influencing the decisions of a rational opponent. By contrast, I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts aiming at reaching an understanding. In communicative action the participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, negotiating the definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action".

Reducing an individual to only one of the functions of his or her integrity is called instrumentalism. The function of a ticket seller in a bus station is just like that of a machine and therefore his human dimension could easily be overlooked. In the doctor-patient relationship both sides (especially the doctor) are susceptible to perceive others as mere instruments. The power that is practiced over patients by "medical gazing" makes them abject by reducing them to bodies that are examined

simply to locate illness. Three fundamental concepts in sociology and philosophy have been proposed to deal with instrumentalism:

### **1) Teleological view of others by emphasizing the task:**

In his works on the Golden Rule, Kant argues that instrumental action is inconsistent with socialization and human dignity, and proposes to regard others as an acme, not an instrument. The universal version of this rule is that you should like for others whatever you like for yourself and vice versa. One concrete technique for applying this rule is that human beings constantly put themselves in other people's positions and see the world from their perspectives.

### **2) The distinction between mysterious looks and issue makers:**

Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel emphasize the difference between the I-Thou and I-It relationship. In the former, a human is a mystery that unfolds and in the latter, an issue that resolves.

### **3) Maximum responsibility toward others:**

Emmanuel Levinas states, "We are responsible for each other, and me more so...". This approach considers responsibility toward others as an unconditional matter, but does not require others to be equally responsible in return.

## **Communicative Action**

Communicative action is allegedly an action focused on entente. Whoever wants to be successful in reaching entente should be prepared to bring up claims. Habermas states that the communication between a speaker and a listener is constituted by the existence of three universally valid claims: the claims for truth, rightness and truthfulness. The terms of these claims in the doctor-patient relationship accurately reveal the sociological essence of this relationship. Doctors should speak understandably and beware of ambiguity and opacity in their speech. On the other hand, they should make true statements and propositions, scientific and other. They should be honest and have faith in what they say, and ultimately they can use their discretion to determine the content of their relationship with patients.

## **Analysis**

To clarify the concept of relationship and connectedness, we used a hybrid concept analysis including: identifying essential attributes, critiquing the existing definitions, examining boundaries and identifying antecedents. On the basis of the comparative concept analysis, the doctor-patient relationship is an interdisciplinary notion and a mono-disciplinary approach will reduce this relationship to communicative skills.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

The doctor-patient relationship has greater impact on the health system than it may seem at first. In this paper, three novel dimensions of the doctor-patient relationship were deeply explored. The philosophical approach emphasizes the importance of promoting moral sensitivity. Communicating with others entails considerations rooted in the human soul that provoke great philosophical concerns. The psychological approach emphasizes learning about behavioral patterns, enhancing the intelligence quotient, and creating a balance between truth-telling and pain relief. Finally, the sociological approach demonstrates that the doctor-patient relationship is part of a macro social relationship in a community and discovers various aspects beyond the two-person relation-

ship.

## **Abortion**

An overview of the moral and legal aspects of abortion and evaluates the most important arguments. The central moral aspect concerns whether there is any morally relevant point during the biological process of the development of the fetus from its beginning as a unicellular zygote to birth itself that may justify not having an abortion after that point. Leading candidates for the morally relevant point are: the onset of movement, consciousness, the ability to feel pain, and viability. The central legal aspect of the abortion conflict is whether fetuses have a basic legal right to live, or, at least, a claim to live. The most important argument with regard to this conflict is the potentiality argument, which turns on whether the fetus is potentially a human person and thus should be protected. The question of personhood depends on both empirical findings and moral claims.

## **Preliminary Distinctions**

One of the most important issues in biomedical ethics is the controversy surrounding abortion. This controversy has a long history and is still heavily discussed among researchers and the public—both in terms of morality and in terms of legality. The following basic questions may characterize the subject in more detail: Is abortion morally justifiable? Does the fetus (embryo, conceptus, and zygote) have any moral and/or legal rights? Is the fetus a human person and, thus, should be protected? What are the criteria for being a person? Is there any morally relevant break along the biological process of development from the unicellular zygote to birth? This list of questions is not meant to be exhaustive, but it describes the issues of the following analysis.

### **1) Three Views on Abortion**

There are three main views: first, the extreme conservative view (held by the Catholic Church); second, the extreme liberal view (held by Singer); and third, moderate views which lie between both extremes. Some opponents (anti-abortionists, pro-life activists) holding the extreme view, argue that human personhood begins from the unicellular zygote and thus – according to the religious stance – one should not have an abortion by virtue of the *imago dei* of the human being (for example, Schwarz 1990). To have an abortion would be, by definition, homicide. The extreme liberal view is held by proponents (abortionists). They claim that human personhood begins immediately after birth or a bit later (Singer). Thus, they consider the relevant date is at birth or a short time later (say, one month). The proponents of the moderate views argue that there is a morally relevant break in the biological process of development – from the unicellular zygote to birth – which determines the justifiability and non-justifiability of having an abortion. According to them, there is a gradual process from being a fetus to being an infant where the fetus is not a human being but a human offspring with a different moral status.

The advantage of the extreme conservative view is the fact that it defines human personhood from the beginning of life (the unicellular zygote); there is no slippery slope. However, it seems implausible to say that the zygote is a human person. The advantage of the extreme liberal view is that its main claim is supported by a common philosophical usage of the notion “personhood” and thus seems more sound than the extreme conservative view because the offspring is far more developed; as the unicellular zygote. This view also faces severe problems; for example, it is not at all clear where the morally relevant difference is between the fetus five minutes before birth and a just born offspring. Some moderate views have commonsense plausibility especially when it is argued that there are significant differences between the developmental stages. The fact that they also claim for a break in the biological process, which is morally relevant, seems to be a relapse into

old and unjustified habits. As Gillespie stresses in his article "Abortion and Human Rights" (1984, 94-102) there is no morally relevant break in the biological process of development. But, in fact, there are differences, which make a comparative basis possible without having to solve the problem of drawing a line. How should one decide?

## **2) The Standard Argument**

The standard argument is the following practical syllogism:

1. The killing of human beings is prohibited.
2. A fetus is a human being.
3. The killing of fetuses is prohibited.

Hence, abortion is not allowed since homicide is prohibited. It seems obvious to question the result of the practical syllogism since one is able to argue against both premises. First, there are possible situations where the first premise could be questioned by noting, for example that killing in self-defense is not prohibited. Second, the second premise could also be questioned since it is not at all clear whether fetuses are human beings in the sense of being persons, although they are of course human beings in the sense of being members of the species of homo sapiens. Consecutively, one would deny that fetuses are persons but admit that a young two year old child may be a person. Although, in the end, it may be difficult to claim that every human being is a person. For example, people with severe mental handicaps or disorder seem not to have personhood. That is, if personhood is defined with regard to specific criteria like the capacity to reason, or to have consciousness, self-consciousness, or rationality, some people might be excluded. But, in fact, this does not mean that people with severe mental handicaps who lack personhood can be killed. Even when rights are tied to the notion of personhood, it is clearly prohibited to kill disabled people. Norbert Hoerster, a well-known German philosopher, claims that fetuses with severe handicaps can be – like all other fetuses – aborted, as born human beings with severe handicaps they have to be protected and respected like all other human beings, too (1995, 159).

## **3) The Modified Standard Argument**

However, it seems appropriate to modify the standard argument and to use a more sophisticated version. Replace the notion "human being" with "human life form." The new practical syllogism is:

4. The killing of human life forms is prohibited.
5. A fetus is a human life form.
6. The killing of fetuses is prohibited.

The objection against the first premise of the standard argument still holds for the new more sophisticated version. But, the second modified premise is much stronger than the previous one because one has to determine what a human life form really is. Is a fetus a human life form? But, even if the fetus is a human life form, it does not necessarily follow that it should be protected by that fact, simpliciter. The fetus may be a human life form but it hardly seems to be a person (in the ordinary sense of the notion) and thus has no corresponding basic right to live. However, as already stated, this kind of talk seems to go astray because the criteria for personhood may be suitable for just-borns but not appropriate for fetuses, embryos, or unicellular zygotes, like some biological (human being), psychological (self-consciousness), rational (ability to reasoning), social (sympathy/love), or legal (being a human life form with rights) criteria may indi-

cate (for example, Jane English 1984). Jane English persuasively argues in "Abortion and the Concept of a Person" that even if the fetus is a person, abortion may be justifiable in many cases, and if the fetus is no person, the killing of fetuses may be wrong in many cases.

## Personhood

What does it mean to claim that a human life form is a person? This is an important issue since the ascription of rights is at stake. I previously stated that it is unsound to say that a fetus is a person or has personhood since it lacks, at least, rationality and self-consciousness. It follows that not every human being is also a person according to the legal sense, and, thus, also lacks moral rights (extreme case). The fetus is by virtue of his genetic code a human life form but this does not mean that this would be sufficient to grant it legal and moral rights. Nothing follows from being a human life form by virtue of one's genes, especially not that one is able to derive legal or moral rights from this very fact (for example, speciesism). Is a human person exclusively defined by her membership of the species *Homo sapiens sapiens* and thus should be protected? To accept this line of argumentation would entail the commitment of the existence of normative empirical features. It seems premature to derive the prohibition to kill a life form from the bare fact of its genetic feature – including the human life form – unless one argues that human beings do have the basic interest of protecting their offspring. Is a human life form a moral entity? This seems to be a good approach. The argument runs as follows: It seems plausible to claim that human beings create values and, if they have the basic interest of protecting their offspring, human beings may establish a certain morality by which they can argue, for example, for the prohibition of abortions. The moral judgment can be enforced through legal norms.

To be more precise about the assumption of the existence or non-existence of normative, empirical features: Critics of the view to tie the right to live and the biological category of being a human being claim that the protagonists effect the is-ought fallacy. Why is it unsound to take the bare fact of being a member of the biological species *Homo sapiens* as a solid basis for granting the right to live? The linkage seems only justified when there are sound factual reasons. If there are none, the whole line of reasoning would "hang in the air" so that one could also easily argue for the right to live for cats and dogs. Only factual relevant features may be important for the linkage. What could these relevant features look like?

Jane English presents in her article "Abortion and the Concept of a Person" several features of personhood which characterize the human person. Her notion of personhood can be grouped into five sectors (English 1984, pp. 152): (i) the biological sector (being a human being, having extremities, eating and sleeping); the psychological sector (perception, emotions, wishes and interests, ability to communicate, ability to make use of tools, self-consciousness); (iii) the rational sector (reasoning, ability to make generalizations, to make plans, learning from experience); (iv) the social sector (to belong to different groups, other people, sympathy and love); and (v) the legal sector (to be a legal addressee, ability to make contracts, to be a citizen). According to English, it is not necessary for a human life form to comply with all five sectors and different aspects to count as a person. A fetus lies right in the penumbra where the concept of personhood is hard to apply. There is no core of necessary and sufficient features that could be ascribed to a human life form in order to be sure that these features constitute a person (English 1984, 153).

Mary Anne Warren claims that a human life form should qualify as a person when, at least, some of the following aspects (especially i-iii) are at stake: (i) consciousness and the ability to feel pain; (ii) reasoning; (iii) a self-motivated activity; (iv) ability to communicate; and (v) the existence of a

self-concept (for example, individual, racial) and self-consciousness (Warren 1984, 110-113). Warren argues that the fetus is no person since it lacks the criteria of personhood and, thus, an abortion is justified.

The aim is not to give an airtight definition of the concept of personhood. The main question is whether a fetus could qualify as a person. The following can be stated: The fetus is a human offspring but is not a legal, social, and rational person in the ordinary sense of the notions. Some aspects of the psychological sector for example, the ability to feel and perceive can be ascribed to the fetus but not to the embryo, conceptus, or the (unicellular) zygote. It seems implausible to say that a fetus (or embryo, conceptus, zygote) is a person, unless one additionally claims that the genetic code of the fetus is a sufficient condition. However, this does not mean, in the end, that one could always justify an abortion. It only shows that the fetus could hardly be seen as a human person.

It is hard to keep the legal and moral aspects of the conflict of abortion apart. There are overlaps which are due to the nature of things since legal considerations are based on the ethical realm. This can also be seen according to the notion person. What a person is is not a legal question but a question which is to be decided within a specific ethics. If one characterizes the notion of a person along some criteria, then the question of which criteria are suitable or not will be discussed with regard to a specific moral approach (for example, Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics). The relevant criteria, in turn, may come from different areas like the psychological, rational, or social sphere. If the criteria are settled, this influences the legal sector because the ascription of legal rights – especially the right to live in the abortion debate – is tied to persons and respectively to the concept of personhood.

## **Moral Aspects of the Abortion Conflict**

The main question with regard to the moral sphere concerns identification of the right developmental point of the fetus (or the embryo, conceptus, zygote) to decide which break may morally justify an abortion or not (proponents of the moderate view and the extreme liberal view claim that there is such a break). The main arguments in the debate will be evaluated in the following. Before we analyze the arguments, it is necessary to say something about moral rights.

### **a) Moral Rights**

Some authors claim that the talk of moral rights and moral obligations is an old never-ending tale. There are no “moral rights” or “moral obligations” per se; at least, in the sense that there are also moral rights and moral obligations apart from legal rights and legal obligations. There is no higher ethical authority which may enforce a specific moral demand. Rights and obligations rest on law. According to ethics, one should better say “moral agreements” (for example, Gauthier). The proponents claim that moral agreements do have a similar status to legal rights and legal obligations but stress that no person has an enforceable demand to have her moral rights prevail over others. The suitability is the essential aspect of the metaphysics of rights and obligations. Only the formal constraint establishes rights and obligations within a given society (for example, Hobbes); the informal constraint within a given society – though it may be stronger – is not able to do so. Without a court of first instance there are no rights and obligations. Only by using the legal system is one able to establish specific moral rights and specific moral obligations. Those authors claim that there are no absolute moral rights and moral obligations which are universally valid; moral agree-

ments are always subjective and relative. Hence, there are also no (absolute) moral rights which the fetus (embryo, conceptus, or zygote) may call for. The only solution may be that the survival of the fetus rests on the will of the human beings in a given moral society. According to their view, it is only plausible to argue that an abortion is morally reprehensible if the people in a given society do have a common interest not to abort and make a moral agreement which is enforced by law.

### **b) At Birth**

Proponents of the liberal view contend that the morally significant break in the biological development of the fetus is at birth. This means that it is morally permitted to have an abortion before birth and morally prohibited to kill the offspring after birth. The objection against this view is simple because there seems to be no morally relevant difference between a short time (say five minutes) before birth and after it. Factually, the only biological difference is the physical separation of the fetus from the mother. However it seems unsound to interpret this as the morally significant difference; the bare evidence with regard to the visibility of the offspring and the physical separation (that is, the offspring is no longer dependent on the woman's body) seems insufficient.

### **c) Viability**

Proponents of the moderate view often claim that the viability criterion is a hot candidate for a morally significant break because the dependence of the nonviable fetus on the pregnant woman gives her the right to make a decision about having an abortion. The aspect of dependence is insufficient in order to determine the viability as a possible break. Take the following counter-example: A son and his aged mother who is nonviable without the intensive care of her son; the son has no right to let his mother die by virtue of her given dependence. However, one may object that there is a difference between "needing someone to care for you" and "needing to live off a particular person's body." Furthermore, one may stress that the nonviable and the viable fetus both are potential human adults. But as below the argument of potentiality is flawed since it is unclear how actual rights could be derived from the bare potentiality of having such rights at a later time. Hence, both types of fetuses cannot make claim for a right. There is also another objection that cannot be rebutted: the viability of the fetus regarding the particular level of medical technology. On the one hand, there is a temporal relativity according to medical technology. The understanding of what constitutes the viability of the fetus has developed over time according to the technical level of embryology in the last centuries and decades. Today, artificial viability allows physicians to rescue many premature infants who would have previously died. On the other hand, there exists a local relativity according to the availability of medical supplies in and within countries which determines whether the life of a premature infant will be saved. The medical supply may vary greatly. Consequently, it seems inappropriate to claim that viability as such should be regarded as a significant break by being a general moral justification against abortions.

### **d) First Movement**

The first movement of the fetus is sometimes regarded as a significant break because proponents stress its deeper meaning which usually rests on religious or non-religious considerations. Formerly the Catholic Church maintained that the first movement of the fetus shows that it is the breathing of life into the human body (animation) which separates the human fetus from animals. This line of thinking is out-of-date and the Catholic Church no longer uses it. Another point is that the first movement of the fetus that women experience is irrelevant since the real first movement of the fetus is much earlier. Ultrasonic testing shows that the real first movement of the fetus is somewhere between the 6th and 9th week. But even if one considers the real first movement prob-

lems may arise. The physical ability to move is morally irrelevant. One counter-example: What about an adult human being who is quadriplegic and is unable to move? It seems out of the question to kill such people and to justify the killing by claiming that people who are disabled and simply lack the ability to move are, therewith, at other people's disposal.

### **e) Consciousness and the Ability to Feel Pain**

In general, proponents of moderate views believe that consciousness and the ability to feel pain will develop after about six months. However the first brain activities are discernable after the seventh week so that it is possible to conclude that the fetus may feel pain after this date. In this respect, the ability to suffer is decisive for acknowledging a morally significant break. One may object to this claim, that the proponents of this view redefine the empirical feature of "the ability to suffer" as a normative feature (is-ought fallacy). It is logically unsound to conclude from the bare fact that the fetus feels pain that it is morally reprehensible or morally prohibited per se to abort the fetus.

### **f) Unicellular Zygote**

Proponents of the extreme conservative view claim that the morally significant break in the biological development of the fetus is given with the unicellular human zygote. They argue that the unicellular zygote is a human person, and thus, it is prohibited to have an abortion because one kills a human being (for example, Schwarz).

The extreme conservative proponents argue that biological development from the fetus to a human being is an incremental process which leaves no room for a morally significant break (liberals deny this line of thinking). If there is no morally significant break, then the fetus has the same high status of a newborn, or the newborn has the same low status of the fetus.

To many opponents of the "extreme" conservative position, it seems questionable to claim that a unicellular zygote is a person. At best, one may maintain that the zygote will potentially develop into a human being. Except the potentiality argument is flawed since it is impossible to derive current rights from the potential ability of having rights at a later time. Opponents (for example, Gert) also object to any attempt to base conclusions on religious considerations that they believe cannot stand up to rational criticism. For these reasons, they argue that the conservative view should be rejected.

### **g) Thomson and the Argument of The Sickly Violinist**

Judith Jarvis Thomson presents an interesting case in her landmark article "A Defense of Abortion" (1971) in order to show that, even if the fetus has a right to live, one is still able to justify an abortion for reasons of a woman's right to live/integrity/privacy. Thomson's famous example is that of the sickly violinist: You awake one morning to find that you have been kidnapped by a society of music lovers in order to help a violinist who is unable to live on his own by virtue of his ill-health. He has been attached to your kidneys because you alone have the only blood type to keep him alive. You are faced with a moral dilemma because the violinist has a right to live by being a member of the human race; there seems to be no possibility to unplug him without violating this right and thus killing him. However, if you leave him attached to you, you are unable to move for months, although you did not give him the right to use your body in such a way (Thomson 1984, 174-175).

First, Thomson claims that the right to live does not include the right to be given the means necessary for survival. If the right to live entails the right to those means, one is not justified in preventing the violinist from the on-going use of one's kidneys. The right to the on-going use of the kidneys necessarily implies that the violinist's right to his means for survival always trumps the right to another person's body. Thomson refuses this and claims that "the fact that for continued life that violinist needs the continued use of your kidneys does not establish that he has a right to be given the continued use of your kidneys" (Thomson 1984, 179). She argues that everybody has a right of how his own body is used. That is, the violinist has no right to use another person's body without her permission. Therefore, one is morally justified in not giving the violinist the use of one's own kidneys.

Second, Thomson contends that the right to live does not include the right not to be killed. If the violinist has the right not to be killed, then another person is not justified in removing the plug from her kidneys although the violinist has no right to their use. According to Thomson, the violinist has no right to another person's body and hence one cannot be unjust in unplugging him: "You surely are not being unjust to him, for you gave him no right to use your kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right" (Thomson 1984, 180). If one is not unjust in unplugging oneself from him, and he has no right to the use of another person's body, then it cannot be wrong, although the result of the action is that the violinist will be killed.

### **Legal Aspects of the Abortion Conflict**

What is the legal status of the fetus (embryo, conceptus, and zygote)? Before the question is answered, one should pay some attention to the issue of the genesis of a legal system. Which ontological status do legal rights have? Where do they come from? Usually we accept the idea that legal rights do not "fall from the blue sky" but are made by human beings. Other conceptions which had been provided in the history of human kind are:

1. rights rest on God's will;
2. rights rest on the strongest person; or
3. rights rest on a specific human feature like a person's wisdom or age.

However, let us take the following description for granted: There is a legal community in which the members are legal entities with (legal) claims and legal addressees with (legal) obligations. If someone refuses the addressee's legal obligation within such a system, the legal entity has the right to call the legal instance in order to let his right be enforced. The main question is whether the fetus (or the embryo, conceptus, zygote) is a legal person with a basic right to live or not and, furthermore, whether there will be a conflict of legal norms, that is a conflict between the fetus' right to live and the right of self-determination of the pregnant woman (principle of autonomy). Is the fetus a legal entity or not?

#### **a) The Account of Quasi-Rights**

It was previously stated that the fetus as such is no person and that it seems unsound to claim that fetuses are persons in the ordinary sense of the notion. If rights are tied to the notion of personhood, then it seems appropriate to say that fetuses do not have any legal rights. One can object that animals of higher consciousness have some "rights" or quasi-rights because it is prohibited to kill them without good reason (killing great apes and dolphins for fun is prohibited in most coun-

tries). Their “right” not to be killed is based on the people’s will and their basic interest not to kill higher developed animals for fun. But, it would be wrong to assume that those animals are legal entities with “full” rights, or that they have only “half” rights. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that animals have “quasi-rights.” There is a parallel between the so-called right of the fetus and the quasi-rights of some animals: both are not persons in the normal sense of the notion but it would cause us great discomfort to offer them no protection and to deliver them to the vagaries of the people. According to this line of argument, it seems sound to claim that fetuses also have quasi-rights. It does not follow that the quasi-rights of the fetuses and the quasi-rights of the animals are identical; people would normally stress that the quasi-rights of fetuses are of more importance than that of animals.

However, there are some basic rights of the pregnant woman, for example, the right of self-determination, the right of privacy, the right of physical integrity, and the right to live. On the other hand, there is the existential quasi-right of the fetus, that is, the quasi-right to live. If the presumption is right that legal rights are tied to the notion of personhood and that there is a difference between rights and quasi-rights, then it seems right that the fetus has no legal right but “just” a quasi-right to live. If this is the case, what about the relation between the existential quasi-right of the fetus and the basic legal rights of the pregnant woman? The answer seems obvious: quasi-rights cannot trump full legal rights. The fetus has a different legal status that is based on a different moral status (see above). On this view there is no legal conflict of rights.

## **b) The Argument of Potentiality**

Another important point in the debate about the ascription of legal rights to the fetus is the topic of potential rights. Joel Feinberg discusses this point in his famous article “Potentiality, Development, and Rights” (1984, 145-151) and claims that the thesis that actual rights can be derived from the potential ability of having such rights is logically flawed because one is only able to derive potential rights from a potential ability of having rights. Feinberg maintains that there may be cases where it is illegal or wrong to have an abortion even when the fetus does not have any rights or is not yet a moral person. To illustrate his main argument – that rights do not rest on the potential ability of having them – Feinberg considers Stanley Benn’s argument which I slightly modified:

If person X is President of the USA and thus is Commander in Chief of the army, then person X had the potential ability to become the President of the USA and Commander in Chief of the army in the years before his rule.

But, it does not follow that:

The person X has the authority to command the army as potential President of the USA.

Thus, it seems incorrect to derive actual rights from the bare potential ability to have legal rights at a later time. It should be added that Benn – despite his criticism on the argument of potential rights – also claims that there are valid considerations which do not refer to the talk of rights and may provide plausible reasons against infanticide and late abortions even when fetuses and newborns are lawless beings with no personhood.

## **A Pragmatic Account**

There is always a chance that women get pregnant when they have sex with their (heterosexual) partners. There is not a 100% certainty of not getting pregnant under “normal circumstances”; there is always a very small chance even by using contraception to get pregnant. However, what

does the sphere of decisions look like? A pregnancy is either deliberate or not. If the woman gets deliberately pregnant, then both partners (respectively the pregnant woman) may decide to have a baby or to have an abortion. In the case of having an abortion there may be good reasons for having an abortion with regard to serious health problems, for example, a (seriously) disabled fetus or the endangerment of the woman's life. Less good reasons seem to be: vacation, career prospects, or financial and social grievances. If the pregnancy is not deliberate, it is either self-caused in the sense that the partners knew about the consequences of sexual intercourse and the contraception malfunctioned or it is not self-caused in the sense of being forced to have sex (rape). In both cases the fetus may be aborted or not. The interesting question concerns the reasons given for the justification of having an abortion.

There are at least two different kinds of reasons or justifications: The first group will be called "first order reasons"; the second "second order reasons." First order reasons are reasons of justifications which may plausibly justify an abortion, for example, (i) rape, (ii) endangerment of the woman's life, and (iii) a serious mentally or physically disabled fetus. Second order reasons are reasons of justifications which are, in comparison to first order reasons, less suitable in providing a strong justification for abortion, for example, (i) a journey, (ii) career prospects, (iii) by virtue of financial or social grievances.

## **a) First Order Reasons**

### **i. Rape**

It would be cruel and callous to force the pregnant woman who had been raped to give birth to a child. Judith Jarvis Thomson maintains in her article "A Defense of Abortion" that the right to live does not include the right to make use of a foreign body even if this means having the fetus aborted (Thomson 1984, pp. 174 and pp. 177). Both the fetus and the raped woman are "innocent," but this does not change "the fact" that the fetus has any rights. It seems obvious in this case that the raped woman has a right to abort. Forcing her not to abort is to remind her of the rape day-by-day which would be a serious mental strain and should not be enforced by law or morally condemned.

However, this assumption would be premature from John Noonan's viewpoint according to his article "An Almost Absolute Value in History" (Noonan 1970, 51- 59). He claims that the fetus as human [is] a neighbor; his life [has] parity with one's own [...] [which] could be put in humanistic as well as theological terms: do not injure your fellow man without reasons. In these terms, once the humanity of the fetus is perceived, abortion is never right except in self-defense. When life must be taken to save life, reason alone cannot say that a mother must prefer a child's life to her own. With this exception, now of great rarity, abortion violates the rational humanist tenet of the equality of human lives.

Hence, the woman has no right to abort the fetus even if she had been raped and got pregnant against her will. This is the consequence of Noonan's claim since he only permits having an abortion in self-defense while Thomson argues that women, in general, have a right to abort the fetus when the fetus is conceived as an intruder (for example, due to rape). But, it remains unclear what Noonan means by "self-defense." At the end of his article he states that "self-sacrifice carried to the point of death seemed in extreme situations not without meaning. In the less extreme cases, preference for one's own interests to the life of another seemed to express cruelty or selfishness irreconcilable with the demands of love"

(Noonan 1970). On this view, even in the standard case of self-defense – for example, either the

woman's life or the life of the fetus – the pregnant woman's death would not be inappropriate and in less extreme cases the raped woman would express cruelty or selfishness when she aborts the fetus – a judgment not all people would agree with.

## **ii. Endangerment of the Woman's Life**

Furthermore, there is no good reason to proceed with a pregnancy when the woman's life is in serious danger. Potential life should not be more valued than actual life. Of course, it is desirable to do everything possible to rescue both but it should be clear that the woman's life "counts more" in this situation. To force her at the risk of her life means to force her to give up her right of self-defense and her right to live. There seems to be no good reason to suspend her basic right of self-defense.

## **iii. Serious Mentally or Physically Disabled Fetuses**

It is hard to say when exactly a fetus is seriously mentally or physically disabled because this hot issue raises the vital question of whether the future life of the disabled fetus is regarded as worth living (problem of relativity). Hence, there are simple cases and, of course, borderline cases which lie in the penumbra and are hard to evaluate. Among the simple cases take the following example: Imagine a human torso lacking arms and legs that will never develop mental abilities like self-consciousness, the ability to communicate, or the ability to reason. It seems quite obvious to some people that such a life is not worth living. But what about the high number of borderline cases? Either parents are not entitled to have a healthy and strong offspring, nor are the offspring entitled to become healthy and strong. Society should not force people to give birth to seriously disabled fetuses or morally worse to force mothers who are willing to give birth to a disabled fetus to have an abortion (for example, Nazi Germany). It seems clear that a rather small handicap of the fetus is not a good reason to abort it.

Often radical groups of disabled persons claim that, if other people hold the view that it is all right to abort fetuses with (serious) genetic handicaps, the same people therewith deny the basic right to live of disabled adults with serious handicaps. This objection is unreasonable since fetuses in contrast to adult human beings have no basic interest in continuing to live their lives. Disabled fetuses maybe aborted like other fetuses, disabled (adult) human persons have to be respected like other people.

## **b) Second Order Reasons**

### **i. A Journey to Europe**

With regard to the reasons of justification according to the second group, there is a specific view which is based on the argument that it is the decision of the woman to have an abortion or not.

There is a related view that rests on the assumption of the pregnant woman who claims that the fetus is a part of her body like a limb so that she has the right to do what ever she wants to do with the fetus. The argument is wrong. The fetus is certainly not a simple part of the pregnant woman but, rather, a dependent organism that relies on the woman.

The following example, the journey to Europe from North America, is based on the feminist argument but it is somewhat different in stressing another point in the line of argumentation: A young woman is pregnant in the seventh month and decides to make a journey to Europe for a sight-

seeing four. Her pregnancy is an obstacle to this and she decides to have an abortion. She justifies her decision by claiming that it will be possible for her to get pregnant whenever she wants but she is only able to make the journey now by virtue of her present career prospects. What can be said of her decision? Most authors may feel a deep discomfort not to morally condemn the action of the woman or not to reproach her for her decision for different reasons. But, there seems only two possible answers which may count as a valid basis for morally blaming the woman for her decision: First, if the young woman lives in a moral community where all members hold the view that it is immoral to have an abortion with regard to the reason given, then her action may be morally reprehensible. Furthermore, if the (moral) agreement is enforced by law, the woman also violated the particular law for which she has to take charge of. Second, one could also blame her for not showing compassion for her potential child. People may think that she is a callous person since she prefers to make the journey to Europe instead of giving birth to her almost born child (seventh month). If the appeal to her mercy fails, one will certainly be touched by her "strange" and "inappropriate" action. However, the community would likely put some informal pressure on the pregnant woman to influence her decision not to have an abortion. But some people may still contend that this social pressure will not change anything about the fact that the fetus has no basic right to live while claiming that the woman's decision is elusive.

## **ii. Financial and Social Reasons**

A woman got pregnant (not deliberately) and wants to have an abortion by virtue of her bad financial and social background because she fears that she will be unable to offer the child an appropriate life perspective. In this case, the community should do everything possible to assist the woman if she wants to give birth to her child. Or, some may argue, that society should offer to take care of her child in special homes with other children or to look for other families who are willing to house another child. According to this line of thinking, people may claim that the financial or social background should not be decisive for having an abortion if there is a true chance for help.

## **c) First Order Reasons vs. Second Order Reasons**

There is a difference between the first order reasons and the second order reasons. We already saw that the first order reasons are able to justify an abortion while the second order reasons are less able to do so. That is because people think that the second order reasons are weaker than the reasons of the first group. It seems that the human ability to show compassion for the fetus is responsible for our willingness to limit the woman's basic right of autonomy where her reasons are too elusive. However, one may state that there are no strong compulsive reasons which could morally condemn the whole practice of abortion. Some people may not unconvincingly argue that moral agreements and legal rights are due to human beings so that reasons for or against abortion are always subjective and relative. According to this view, one is only able to contend the "trueness" or "wrongness" of a particular action in a limited way. Of course, there are other people who argue for the opposite (for example, Kantians, Catholic Church). One reason why people have strong feelings about the conflict of abortion is that human beings do have strong intuitive feelings, for example, to feel compassion for fetuses as helpless and most vulnerable human entities. But moral intuitionism falls short by being a valid and objective basis for moral rights.

In the end, it is a question of a particular moral approach whether one regards an abortion as morally justifiable or not. But not every approach is justified. There is no anything goes.

## **Public Policy and Abortion**

One of the most difficult issues is how to make a sound policy that meets the needs of most people in a given society without focusing on the extreme conservative view, or the extreme liberal view, or the many moderate views on the conflict of abortion. The point is simple, one cannot wait until the philosophical debate is settled, for maybe there is no one solution available. But, in fact, people in a society must know what the policy is; that is, they have to know when and under what circumstances abortion is permitted or altogether prohibited. What are the reasons for a given policy? Do they rest on religious beliefs or do they depend on cultural claims? Whose religious beliefs and whose cultural claims? Those beliefs and claims of most people or of the dominant group in a given society? What about the problem of minority rights? Should they be respected or be refused? These are hard questions; no one is able to yet give a definite response.

But, of course, the problem of abortion has to be “solved,” at least, with regard to practical matters. This means that a good policy does not rest on extreme views but tries to cover as many points of views, although being aware of the fact that one is not able to please every person in society. This would be an impossible task. It seems that one should adopt a moderate view rather than the proposed extreme views. This is not because the moderate view is “correct” but because one needs a broad consensus for a sound policy. The hardliners in the public debate on the conflict of abortion, be they proponents or opponents, may not be aware of the fact that neither view is sustainable for most people.

A sound way for governments with regard to a reasonable policy could be the acceptance of a more or less neutral stance that may function as a proper guide for law. But, in fact, the decisive claim of a “neutral stance” is, in turn, questionable. All ethical theories try to present a proper account of a so-called neutral stance but there is hardly any theory that could claim to be sustainable with regard to other approaches. However, the key seems to be, again, to accept a middle way to cover most points of views. In the end, a formation of a policy seeks a sound compromise people could live with. But this is not the end of the story. One should always try to find better ways to cope with hard ethical problems. The conflict of abortion is of that kind and there is no evidence to assume otherwise.

## **Clinical Ethics Consultation and Abortion**

The vital issue of how one chooses whether or not to have an abortion is of utmost importance since people, in particular women, want to have a proper “guideline” that can support them in their process of ethical decision-making. According to pregnant women, the most crucial point seems not to be whether abortion is morally legitimate or not but, rather, how one should deliberate in the particular case. In fact, observations regularly show that women will nearly have the same number of abortions in contexts in which it is legal or not.

Gert is right in claiming that “the law can allow behavior that some people regard as morally unacceptable, such as early abortion, and it can prohibit behavior that some people regard as morally acceptable, such as late abortion. No one thinks that what the law decides about abortion settles the moral issue” (Gert 2004, 138). But what follows from that? What aspects should one consider and how should one decide in a particular case?

It would be best to consult a neutral person who has special knowledge and experiences in medicine and medical ethics (for example, clinical ethics consultation). Most people are usually not faced with hard conflicts of abortion in their daily lives and get simply swamped by it; they are un-

able to determine and evaluate all moral aspects of the given case and to foresee the relevant consequences of the possible actions (for example, especially with regard to very young women who get pregnant by mistake). They need professional help without being dominated by the person in order to clarify their own (ethical) stance.

However, the conflict of abortion as such may not be solvable, in the end, but the experienced professional is able to provide persons with feasible solutions for the particular case.

## **Euthanasia**

Euthanasia, also called 'Mercy Killing' and 'Physician Assisted Suicide'; is a term in medical ethics for the practice of interfering or intervening in a natural process towards death. In other words it is accelerating the natural course of death in terminally ill patients, when all treatments become ineffective or much too painful for the patient to bear. In short Euthanasia is ending a human life with the intention of relieving the person from an unbearable pain. Haris (2001) precisely defines Euthanasia as 'a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending a life to relieve intractable suffering'.

The issue of Euthanasia has always remained controversial and still has failed to carry legal and constitutional support in most parts of the world. Suicide in any form and by any means is either punished or at least disapproved in human history. There is no permissibility of such a killing/suicide in Islam so Euthanasia can never be the part of Muslim law in Islamic world. Therefore the origin and development of this concept can be historically located in the non Muslim countries especially of the west.

Back in 400 BC when the father of medicine Hippocrates formulated the oath still taken by the fresh medical graduates dictates 'I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel', speaks against physician assisted suicide. Even in the 19th century, the US legislation proclaimed that if a suicide is committed on the advice of another person, the adviser would be guilty of a murder. In the early 20th century, the Supreme Court reevaluated its judgments concerning 'living will' and focusing how best to ensure the dignity and the independence for the 'end of life' with considerable changes in the health laws. In 1920 the book "Permitting the Destruction of Life not Worthy of Life" was published, in which the author Hoche advocated the death assistance be given under very controlled conditions. In 1935 Euthanasia society was formed in England to support mercy killing. 1939's Nazi's Euthanasia became very popular when Hitler ordered mercy killing of the sick and disabled. From 1995 to 2008, Euthanasia has been legalized in countries like parts of Australia, Netherland, Belgium and few states of the United States of America. [2]

There are several forms or kinds of Euthanasia; each form has its own ethical issues.

**Active Euthanasia:** is the one which causes immediate death of the patient, by the direct and deliberate action of the physician. For example when a lethal injection is given to the patient or an overdose of a pain killer when the physician knows the after effects of such a dose.

**Passive Euthanasia** involves an indirect action by the physician for the death of the patient. This may include withdrawing or withholding the required treatment. For example switching off the life supporting machine like ventilator or not doing the required surgical procedures that can keep the person alive though for a short time.

**Voluntary Euthanasia:-** takes place with the will of the patient, usually on his request to the physi-

cian.

Non-Voluntary Euthanasia occurs when the patient is unconscious or in comma for a long time, or unable to make decision for example a very young child, or a mentally retarded person. Therefore someone else related to the patient makes the decision of ending the patient's life.

Involuntary Euthanasia:- is oftentimes equated to murder because in this case the patient does not opt for death but he is killed as the doctor thinks it to be in his benefit.

Indirect Euthanasia: – does not involve the intentional killing by the physician, but the side effects of the treatment, usually given to reduce the pain accelerate the death of the patient.

Assisted Suicide:- includes cases when the patient seeks help from his physician to die. This can include making the lethal drugs available for the patients.

The most common argument given by the proponents of Euthanasia is its effective way of relieving excruciating pain. To this one argument there can be two counter arguments. Firstly the advancements made today in the field of medicine, especially in pain management weakens the justification for Euthanasia. Secondly research shows that terminally ill patients choose suicide not because of the physical pain but because of depression. A study of terminally ill patients published in The American Journal of Psychiatry in 1986 concluded:

'The striking feature of [our] results is that all of the patients who had either desired premature death or contemplated suicide were judged to be suffering from clinical depressive illness; that is, none of those patients who did not have clinical depression had thoughts of suicide or wished that death would come early'.

Researchers believe that a person diagnosed with terminal illness should be given time and support to pass through the five stages of the process – denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance, and killing them before they come to terms with the situation is nothing less than a murder.

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Boston Globe survey of 1991 shows that patients with incurable illnesses who see suicide as an option are mostly those who are neither tired of pain or of restricted life style, nor the fear of machine dependency but rather the feeling of being a burden on their family. Sometimes it's the family who advocate Euthanasia for the terminally ill patient, considering his life unworthy, and therefore a burden; which in turn throws the patient in the abbeys of depression. One should be afraid of the day when legalization of the right to die will become duty to die, pressurizing the already tormented patients to select Euthanasia as an only option. [3]

If we look at Euthanasia from another angle it is not a right to die but gives someone a right to kill. A right given to doctors and the relatives of a person to intentionally end his life. There is a need to differentiate between suicide and killing. Suicide is an individual act, whereas Euthanasia is not a private act. It involves the will of the person or the relatives and action of the physician, and known by everyone around. It is therefore more close to public killing than suicide. Such a power to kill can be abused for the most vulnerable people in the population.

There should be a public realization that if all forms of treatments fail or become ineffective or continuation of any medical or surgical procedure would increase the pain rather than alleviating it, the suffering soul should be given support in all possible ways and all efforts should be directed toward minimizing his agony and making whatever little time he has, comfortable.

As followers of Islam such an option as Euthanasia can never cross our minds for ourselves or for our dear ones. I have a personal experience of accompanying a close kin of mine to the dialysis sessions, where patients were not only dependent on machines for their lives but were not even allowed to drink water during the warmest summers, but never did I once heard a patient or any of his relative praying for a quick demise. They would seek Allah's blessings during the hardest of times and a kind of hope would get them going. I saw doctors trying to look for options to improve the quality of life of such patients but any thought of eliminating the patient's pain through killing them was out of question and option.

As Muslims it is our firm belief that every life is sacred and Allah never creates and sustains anyone without purpose. In the holy Quran He says 'And if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he has saved the life of whole people'. (Quran 5:32). Allah further commands 'take not the life which Allah made sacred otherwise in the course of justice'.

If we equate voluntary Euthanasia with suicide, then again none of us has a right to take his own life. How can we have this right when we have not created ourselves, in fact how can we destroy something of which we are not the owners. Our bodies and souls belong to the Almighty and have been entrusted to us to be taken care of in the best ways possible. Suicide is a crime which is not only punishable in this world but also unforgivable sin in the hereafter. Prophet Mohammad warned the people against suicide by saying "Whoever kills himself with an iron instrument will be carrying it forever in hell. Whoever takes poison and kills himself will forever keep sipping that poison in hell. Whoever jumps off a mountain and kills himself will forever keep falling down in the depths of hell". [4]

Our religion Islam not only emphasize on seeking all possible medical help during illness but further consoles the patients in pain by giving him the happy tidings for reward if he endures the pain with patience. In one of the hadith it is mentioned that when a true believer is afflicted with pain, even a prick of a thorn and he bears it with patience, then his sins will be forgiven and his wrongdoings will be discarded as the tree sheds off its leaves. Such words by the Holy Prophet can be a huge support for a sufferer of a terminal illness or of incurable and painful disease. Euthanasia cannot therefore be a part of the dictionary of a true believer.

The weak value system of the west has come up with the idea of deserting the old, weak and the sick by leaving them in the old houses and hospitals. These so called facilities also sometimes cost them huge amounts, which make them claim that people who become unproductive for the society and a burden on the productive fellows should die for the good of the people around and for their own ease. But the east has still kept its value system strong. Our religious and social values dictate us to take care with respect and dignity of the old, weak, sick and the helpless. Allah has specially stressed upon respecting and serving the parents specially when they become old. "and that you be kind to your parents. Whether one or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of contempt but address them in terms of honor. And lower to them the wing of humility out of compassion, and say: my Lord, bestow on them your mercy even as they cherished me in childhood" (Qur'an 17:25- 25). As far as the issue of heavy cost is concerned to keep a terminally ill patient alive, Islam makes it a responsibility of the state and the society as a

whole to cover the health care needed.

Euthanasia might be categorized into several kinds but Islam emphasizes the intentions involved in the act. If for example physician intends to alleviate the pain of the patients but the dose somehow kill him, the doctor cannot be accused of murder, or cannot be said to have practiced Euthanasia. The doctor is expected to help the patient in the process of life and not in process of death.

Important enough is to consider the relative nature of the terms like pain, suffering and agony. It really depends on the patience and tolerance level of each individual, which of course varies. What is suffering for one person might not be the same for the other, similarly excruciating pain for one can be bearable for someone else.

Conclusion: – Humans might be the wisest form of God's creation but still not wise enough to be given a right to decide for their own death or for the death of another of their own kind. All lives are precious and sacred and only such value system can be the basis of a human society, where the sanctity of life is maintained. Euthanasia in any of its forms, involves the intention of killing or finishing a still living human weakens the fabric of the society and gives an altogether a different lens to the members to see death as the only solution for all pains and torments, which blurs the vision to see other possibilities to fight the situation. Euthanasia should therefore be discouraged in all its forms and in all parts of the world.

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tormented patients to select Euthanasia as an only option.

If we look at Euthanasia from another angle it is not a right to die but gives someone a right to kill. A right given to doctors and the relatives of a person to intentionally end his life. There is a need to differentiate between suicide and killing. Suicide is an individual act, whereas Euthanasia is not a private act. It involves the will of the person or the relatives and action of the physician, and known by everyone around. It is therefore more close to public killing than suicide. Such a power to kill can be abused for the most vulnerable people in the population.

There should be a public realization that if all forms of treatments fail or become ineffective or continuation of any medical or surgical procedure would increase the pain rather than alleviating it, the suffering soul should be given support in all possible ways and all efforts should be directed toward minimizing his agony and making whatever little time he has, comfortable.

As followers of Islam such an option as Euthanasia can never cross our minds for ourselves or for our dear ones. I have a personal experience of accompanying a close kin of mine to the dialysis sessions, where patients were not only dependent on machines for their lives but were not even allowed to drink water during the warmest summers, but never did I once heard a patient or any of his relative praying for a quick demise. They would seek Allah's blessings during the hardest of times and a kind of hope would get them going. I saw doctors trying to look for options to improve the quality of life of such patients but any thought of eliminating the patient's pain through killing them was out of question and option.

As Muslims it is our firm belief that every life is sacred and Allah never creates and sustains anyone without purpose. In the holy Quran He says 'And if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he has saved the life of whole people'. (Quran 5:32). Allah further commands 'take not the life which Allah made sacred otherwise in the course of justice'.

If we equate voluntary Euthanasia with suicide, then again none of us has a right to take his own life. How can we have this right when we have not created ourselves, in fact how can we destroy something of which we are not the owners. Our bodies and souls belong to the Almighty and have been entrusted to us to be taken care of in the best ways possible. Suicide is a crime which is not only punishable in this world but also unforgivable sin in the hereafter. Prophet Mohammad warned the people against suicide by saying "Whoever kills himself with an iron instrument will be carrying it forever in hell. Whoever takes poison and kills himself will forever keep sipping that poison in hell. Whoever jumps off a mountain and kills himself will forever keep falling down in the depths of hell'.

Our religion Islam not only emphasize on seeking all possible medical help during illness but further consoles the patients in pain by giving him the happy tidings for reward if he endures the pain with patience. In one of the hadith it is mentioned that when a true believer is afflicted with pain, even a prick of a thorn and he bears it with patience, then his sins will be forgiven and his wrongdoings will be discarded as the tree sheds off its leaves. Such words by the Holy Prophet can be a huge support for a sufferer of a terminal illness or of incurable and painful disease. Euthanasia cannot therefore be a part of the dictionary of a true believer.

The weak value system of the west has come up with the idea of deserting the old, weak and the sick by leaving them in the old houses and hospitals. These so called facilities also sometimes cost them huge amounts, which make them claim that people who become unproductive for the society and a burden on the productive fellows should die for the good of the people around and

for their own ease. But the east has still kept its value system strong. Our religious and social values dictate us to take care with respect and dignity of the old, weak, sick and the helpless. Allah has specially stressed upon respecting and serving the parents specially when they become old. "and that you be kind to your parents. Whether one or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of contempt but address them in terms of honor. And lower to them the wing of humility out of compassion, and say: my Lord, bestow on them your mercy even as they cherished me in childhood" (Qur'an 17:25- 25). As far as the issue of heavy cost is concerned to keep a terminally ill patient alive, Islam makes it a responsibility of the state and the society as a whole to cover the health care needed.

Euthanasia might be categorized into several kinds but Islam emphasizes the intentions involved in the act. If for example physician intends to alleviate the pain of the patients but the dose somehow kill him, the doctor cannot be accused of murder, or cannot be said to have practiced Euthanasia. The doctor is expected to help the patient in the process of life and not in process of death.

Important enough is to consider the relative nature of the terms like pain, suffering and agony. It really depends on the patience and tolerance level of each individual, which of course varies. What is suffering for one person might not be the same for the other, similarly excruciating pain for one can be bearable for someone else.

**Conclusion:** – Humans might be the wisest form of God's creation but still not wise enough to be given a right to decide for their own death or for the death of another of their own kind. All lives are precious and sacred and only such value system can be the basis of a human society, where the sanctity of life is maintained. Euthanasia in any of its forms, involves the intention of killing or finishing a still living human weakens the fabric of the society and gives an altogether a different lens to the members to see death as the only solution for all pains and torments, which blurs the vision to see other possibilities to fight the situation. Euthanasia should therefore be discouraged in all its forms and in all parts of the world.

## **Female-infanticide What is infanticide?**

Infanticide is the unlawful killing of very young children. It is found in both indigenous and sophisticated cultures around the world.

## **Female infanticide**

Female infanticide is the deliberate killing of girl babies.

It is also described as gender-selective killing or "gendercide". (Similar words like 'gynocide' and 'femicide' are used to describe the killing of females of any age.)

Female infanticide is more common than male infanticide, and in some countries, particularly India and China, is likely to have serious consequences on the balance of the sexes in the population.

The reasons behind it are almost always cultural, rather than directly religious. The causes:

## **Anti-female bias**

Societies that practise female infanticide always show many other signs of bias against females.

Women are perceived as subservient because of their role as carers and homemakers, whilst men predominantly ensure the family's social and economic stability.

## Family economics

Girl babies are often killed for financial reasons.

- **Earning power:** Men are usually the main income-earners, either because they are more employable or earn higher wages for the same work, or because they are able to do more agricultural work in subsistence economies. Since male babies have a greater income potential, they are less likely to be killed.
- **Potential pensions:** In many societies, parents depend on their children to look after them in old age. But in many of these cultures a girl leaves her parental family and joins her husband's family when she marries. The result is that parents with sons gain extra resources for their old age, when their sons marry, while parents with daughters lose their 'potential pensions' when they marry and move away. This gives parents a strong reason to prefer male children. Some parents (particularly poor ones) who can't afford to support a large family, will kill female babies. Girls are considered a drain on family resources during their childhood without bringing economic benefits later on.
- **Dowry:** Some girl babies are killed so that the family doesn't have to pay a dowry when they get married. In Indian society it is tradition for the parents of the bride to give a dowry to the groom and his family. The dowry consists of large amounts of money and valuable goods. For families with several daughters this can be a serious financial burden.

## Government policy

Governmental policies have also increased female infanticide as an unpredicted side-effect. For example, when the Chinese Government introduced a One Child per Family Policy there was a surge in female infanticide. Families needed to have a son because of their higher earning potential, so a girl baby was an economic disaster for them, and there was a strong motive to ensure that girl babies did not survive.

## Caste

Some female infants are killed because they are regarded as being lower in the **caste** hierarchy than males.

## Where does female infanticide occur?

Female infanticide is a significant problem in parts of Asia - infanticide does occur in the West, but usually as isolated family tragedies with no underlying pattern or gender bias.

## India

Female infanticide and **female foeticide** (the selective abortion of girls in the womb) are significant issues in India.

Female infanticide has been a problem for centuries, partly as a result of the patriarchal nature of Indian society.

## **Tackling the issue**

Modern India has tried several ways to tackle the issue. One initiative in the state of Tamil Nadu was taken to attack the underlying economic problems.

Where parents had one or two daughters but no son, and either of the parents was willing to be sterilised, the government offered the parents money to help look after the children. This money was to be paid annually throughout the daughter's education, followed by a lump sum on her twentieth birthday, either for use as a dowry or to fund further education.

## **China**

Female infanticide has existed in China for a long time, and although the One Child per Family policy has added to the problem, it didn't cause it.

The One Child Policy was introduced by the Chinese Government in 1979 with the intention of keeping the population within sustainable limits even in the face of natural disasters and poor harvests, and improving the quality of life for the Chinese population as a whole.

Under the policy, parents who have more than one child may have their wages reduced and be denied some social services.

Despite the egalitarian nature of Chinese society, many parents believe that having a son is a vital element of providing for their old age. Therefore in extreme cases, a baby is killed if it is not of the preferred sex, because of the pressure not to have more than one child.

## **Tackling the issue**

The Chinese Government have acknowledged the problem and introduced laws to deal with it:

- Marriage law prohibits female infanticide.
- Women's Protection Law prohibits infanticide and bans discrimination against women who choose to keep female babies.
- Maternal Health Care Law forbids the use of technological advances, such as ultra-sound machines, to establish the sex of foetuses, so as not to pre-determine the fate of female infants or encourage selective abortion.

## **Origins of infanticide**

Infanticide occurs in most cases as a way of restricting poverty and population. Throughout history infanticide has been regarded as a productive and efficient way to control starvation and poor standards of living caused by over population.

## **Confucianism**

The male bias in China is deeply rooted in Chinese traditions which leads parents to want their first child to be a boy.

Confucianism regards male children as more desirable since they provide security for the elderly, work and are important for the performance of ancestral rites.

## **Hinduism**

Hindu authorities condemn infanticide.

Son-preference in Hindu cultures is largely based on the fact that men are better providers, and that sons are required for the proper performance of funeral rites.

Some writers argue that Hindu culture has long had a patriarchal bias against women.

## **Sikhism**

Sikh authorities condemn infanticide.

The Sikh religion is one of the most gender-neutral, and explicitly proclaims the equality of men and women. This makes it more surprising that censuses in India show there are far more male children than female children in the Sikh community.

In practice there does appear to be a strong preference for boys in the Sikh heartland. The community appears to give greater respect to the parents of boys, and boys themselves.

In response the Sikh religious organisation Akal Takht has re-emphasised that women are equal to men. It has banned neo-natal sex identification, selective abortion and the killing of female babies.

## **Islam**

Islam has always condemned infanticide.

Female infanticide was common in pre-Islamic Arabia. However, by the time of Muhammad, and the revelation of the Qur'an female infanticide was strictly forbidden, and regarded as seriously as adult murder.

### **The Qur'an on female infanticide:**

When the infant girl, is buried alive, is questioned, for what crime she was killed.

#### **Surah 81 v 8 - 9**

You shall not kill your children for fear of want. We will provide for them and for you. To kill them is a grievous sin.

#### **Surah 17 v 31**

## **Christianity**

Christianity has always condemned infanticide.

## **Judaism**

Judaism has always condemned infanticide. **Professional Ethics: Corporate Governance The ends and means of corporate governance** There is significant debate about the ends and means of corporate governance, i.e., about who firms should be managed for, and who should (ultimately) man-

agethem. Much of this debate is carried on with the large publicly-traded corporation in view.

### **Ends: shareholder primacy or stakeholder balance?**

There are two main views about the proper ends of corporate governance. According to one view, firms should be managed in the best interests of shareholders. It is typically assumed that managing firms in shareholders' best interests requires maximizing their wealth. This view is often called "shareholder primacy" (Stout 2002) or—in order to contrast it more directly with its main rival (to be discussed below) "shareholder theory". (Confusingly, the label 'shareholder primacy' is sometimes used—e.g., by Bainbridge [2008]—to refer to the view that shareholders should have ultimate control over the firm.) Shareholder primacy is the dominant view about the ends of corporate governance among financial professionals and in business schools.

A few writers argue for shareholder primacy on deontological grounds. On this argument, shareholders own the firm, and hire managers to run it for them on the condition that the firm is managed in their interests. Shareholder primacy is thus based on a promise that managers make to shareholders (Friedman 1970; Hasnas 1998). In response, some argue that shareholders do not own the firm. They own stock, a type of corporate security (Bainbridge 2008; Stout 2002); the firm itself may be unowned (Strudler 2017). Others argue that managers do not make, explicitly or implicitly, any promises to shareholders to manage the firm in a certain way (Boatright 1994). More writers argue for shareholder primacy on consequentialist grounds. On this argument, managing firms in the interests of shareholders is more efficient than managing them in any other way (Hansmann & Kraakman 2001; Jensen 2002). In support of this, some argue that, if managers are not given a single objective that is clear and measurable—viz., maximizing shareholder value—then they will have an enhanced opportunity for self-dealing (Stout 2002). Consequentialist arguments for shareholder primacy run into problems that afflict many versions of consequentialism: in requiring all firms to be managed in a certain way, it does not allow sufficient scope for personal choice (Hussain 2012). Most think that people should be able to pursue projects, including economic projects, that matter to them, even if those projects do not maximize welfare.

The second main view about the proper ends of corporate governance is given by stakeholder theory. This theory was first put forward by Freeman in the 1980s (Freeman 1984; Freeman & Reed 1983), and then refined by Freeman and various collaborators over the next 30 years (see, e.g., Freeman et al. 2010; Jones, Wicks, & Freeman 2002). According to stakeholder theory—or at least, early formulations of the theory—instead of managing the firm in the best interests of shareholders only, managers should seek to "balance" the interests of all stakeholders, where a stakeholder is anyone who has a "stake", or interest (including a financial interest), in the firm.

To its critics, stakeholder theory has seemed both insufficiently articulated and weakly defended. With respect to articulation, one question that has been pressed is: Who are the stakeholders (Orts & Strudler 2002, 2009)? The groups most commonly identified are shareholders, employees, the community, suppliers, and customers. But other groups have stakes in the firm, including creditors, the government, and competitors. It makes a great deal of difference where the line is drawn, but stakeholder theorists have not provided a clear rationale for drawing a line in one place rather than another. Another question is: What does it mean to "balance" the interests of all stakeholders—other than not always giving precedence to shareholders' interests (Orts & Strudler 2009)? With respect to defense, critics have wondered what the rationale for managing firms in the interests of all stakeholders is. In one place, Freeman (1984) offers an instrumental argument for his view, claiming that balancing stakeholders' interests is better for the firm strategically than maxim-

izing shareholder wealth. (This is precisely what defenders of shareholder primacy say about that view.) In another, he gives an argument that appeals to Rawls's justice as fairness.

In recent years, questions have been raised about whether stakeholder theory is appropriately seen as a genuine competitor to shareholder primacy, or is even appropriately called a "theory". In one article, Freeman and collaborators say that stakeholder theory is simply "the body of research ... in which the idea of 'stakeholders' plays a crucial role" (Jones et al. 2002). In another, Freeman describes stakeholder theory as "a genre of stories about how we could live"

(1994: 413). It may be, as Norman (2013) says, that stakeholder is now best regarded as "mind-set", i.e., a way of looking at the firm that emphasizes its embeddedness in a network of relationships.

It is important to realize that a resolution of the debate between shareholder and stakeholder theorists (however we conceive of the latter) will not resolve all or even most of the ethical questions in business. This is because this is a debate about the ends of corporate governance; it cannot answer all of the questions about the moral constraints that must be observed in pursuit of those ends (Goodpaster 1991; Norman 2013). Neither shareholder primacy nor stakeholder theory is plausibly interpreted as the view that corporate managers should do whatever is possible to maximize shareholder wealth and balance all stakeholders' interests, respectively. Rather, these views should be interpreted as views that managers should do whatever is morally permissible to achieve these ends. A large part of business ethics is trying to determine what morality permits in this domain.

### **Means: control by shareholders or others too?**

Answers to questions about the means of corporate governance often mirror answers to question about the ends of corporate governance. Often the best way to ensure that a firm is managed in the interests of a certain party P is to give P control over it. Conversely, justifications for why the firm should be managed in the interests of P sometimes appeal P's rights to control it.

Thus Friedman (1970) thinks that shareholders' ownership of the firm gives them a right to control the firm (which they can use to ensure that the firm is run in their interests). We might see control rights for shareholders as following analytically from the concept of ownership. To own a thing is to have a bundle of rights with respect to that thing. One of the standard "incidents" of ownership is control.

As noted, in recent years the idea that the firm is something that can be owned has been challenged (Bainbridge 2008; Strudler 2017). But contractarian arguments for shareholder control of firms have been constructed which do not rely on the assumption of firm ownership. All that is assumed in these arguments is that some people own capital, and others own labor. Capital can "hire" labor (and other inputs of production), on terms that it draws up, or labor can "hire" capital, on terms that it draws up, with society setting limits on what the terms may be. It just so happens that, in most cases, capital hires labor. These points are emphasized especially by those who regard the firm as a "nexus of contracts" among various parties.

Many writers find this result troubling. Even if the governance structure in most firms is in some sense agreed to, they say that it is unjust in other ways. Anderson (2015) characterizes standard corporate governance regimes as oppressive and unaccountable private dictatorships. To address this injustice, these writers call for various forms of worker participation in managerial decision-

making, including the ability by workers to reject arbitrary directives by managers (Hsieh 2005), worker co-determination of firms' policies and practices, and exclusive control of productive enterprises by workers.

Arguments for these governance structures take various forms. One type of argument appeals to the value of protecting workers' interests (Brenkert 1992a; Hsieh 2005). A second type of argument appeals to the value of autonomy, or a right to freely determine one's actions, including one's actions at work (McCall 2001). A third type of argument for worker participation in managerial decision-making is the "parallel case" argument. According to it, if states should be governed democratically, then so should firms, because firms are like states in the relevant respects (Dahl 1985; Walzer 1983). A fourth argument for worker participation in firm decision-making sees it as valuable or even necessary training for participation in political processes in the broader society (Cohen 1989).

Space considerations prevent a detailed examination of these arguments. But criticisms generally fall into two categories. The first insists on the normative priority of agreements, of the sort described above. There are few legal restrictions on the types of governance structures that firms can have. And some firms are in fact controlled by workers (Dow 2003; Hansmann 1996). To insist that other firms should be governed this way is to say, according to this argument, that people should not be allowed to arrange their economic lives as they see fit. Another criticism of worker participation appeals to efficiency. Allowing workers to participate in managerial decision-making may decrease the pace of decision-making, since it requires giving many workers a chance to make their voices heard (Hansmann 1996). It may also raise the cost of capital for firms, as investors may demand more favorable terms if they are not given control of the enterprise in return (McMahon 1994). Both sources of inefficiency may put the firm at a significant disadvantage in a competitive market. And it may not be just a matter of competitive disadvantage. If it were, the problem could be solved by making all firms worker-controlled. The problem may be one of diminished productivity more generally.

### **Corporate social responsibility**

Corporate social responsibility is based on the premise that a business can only thrive if it operates within a thriving society. In that way, the business depends on the community it operates within, and as such, has an ethical and moral responsibility towards that community. A business is perceived as legitimate when its activities are congruent with the goals and values of the society in which the business operates.

Consumers and other companies are likely to shun firms that develop unethical reputations. And arguably, companies that don't pay attention to their social and ethical responsibilities are more likely to stumble into legal troubles, such as mass corruption or accounting fraud scandals – threatening the sustainability of the business itself.

By promoting respect for the company in the marketplace, CSR can result in higher sales, enhance employee loyalty and attract better personnel to the firm. It is also a way to connect to the personal well-being of customers. In this way, the CSR can contribute towards higher profits for the company.

Therefore, by ensuring brand loyalty and consumer patronage, CSR can ensure that the business remains sustainable in the long-term and it stays profitable.

## **Ethical Responsibility**

Responsibility is an ethical concept that refers to the fact that individuals and groups have morally based obligations and duties to others and to larger ethical and moral codes, standards and traditions.

## **Ethical Principles of Responsibility and Accountability**

Responsibility in a business context refers to “a sphere of duty or obligation assigned to a person by the nature of that person’s position, function or work.”

The roles taken on by decision-makers imply a responsibility to perform certain functions associated with those roles. To be more specific, responsibility refers to more than just the primary function of a role; it refers to the multiple facets of that function, which includes both processes and outcomes, and the consequences of the acts performed as part of that set of obligations. A responsible actor may be seen as one whose job involves a predetermined set of obligations that need to be met in order for the job to be accomplished.

According to Aristotle, moral responsibility was viewed as originating with the moral agent as decision-maker, and grew out of an ability to reason, an awareness of action and consequences, and a willingness to act free from external compulsion.

Accountability is the readiness or preparedness to give an explanation or justification to stakeholders for one’s judgments, intentions and actions.

“It is a readiness to have one’s actions judged by others and, where appropriate, accept responsibility for errors, misjudgments and negligence and recognition for competence, conscientiousness, excellence and wisdom.” While responsibility is defined as a bundle of obligations associated with a role, accountability could be defined as “blaming or crediting someone for an action”—normally associated with a recognized responsibility. The accountable actor is “held to external oversight, regulation, and mechanisms of punishment aimed to externally motivate responsive adjustment in order to maintain adherence with appropriate moral standards of action.”

In the professional context, accountability is about answering to clients, colleagues and other relevant professionals. The demand to give an account of one’s judgments, acts and omissions arises from the nature of the professional-client and the professional-professional relationships. For communication professionals, accountability has more specific implications. Recent years have seen more practical and concrete interpretation of the concept of accountability by communication specialists. It is associated with responsiveness to the views of all stakeholders, which includes a willingness to explain, defend, and justify actions.

While tracing the lines of responsibility and accountability can be difficult, in the end, if one is responsible in any way for an action, then one must accept some degree of accountability. On the other hand, if responsibility and accountability are not equitably shared and if the process by which they are assigned is not transparent, then problems will arise. In the corporate world, not every actor is blame-worthy, especially if the actor’s autonomy is limited by structure, process, or circumstance. However, lack of autonomy is not an excuse for avoiding accountability entirely.

## **Media Ethics: ethical issues in Privacy Introduction**

The use of social media is growing at a rapid pace and the twenty-first century could be described

as the “boom” period for social networking. According to reports provided by Smart Insights, as at February 2019 there were over 3.484 billion social media users. The Smart Insight report indicates that the number of social media users is growing by 9% annually and this trend is estimated to continue. Presently the number of social media users represents 45% of the global population. The heaviest users of social media are “digital natives”; the group of persons who were born or who have grown up in the digital era and are intimate with the various technologies and systems, and the “Millennial Generation”; those who became adults at the turn of the twenty-first century. These groups of users utilize social media platforms for just about anything ranging from marketing, news acquisition, teaching, health care, civic engagement, and politicking to social engagement.

The unethical use of social media has resulted in the breach of individual privacy and impacts both physical and information security. Reports in 2019, reveal that persons between the ages 8 and 11 years spend an average 13.5 hours weekly online and 18% of this age group are actively engaged on social media. Those between ages 12 and 15 spend on average 20.5 hours online and 69% of this group are active social media users. While children and teenagers represent the largest Internet user groups, for the most part they do not know how to protect their personal information on the Web and are the most vulnerable to cyber-crimes related to breaches of information privacy.

In today’s IT-configured society data is one of, if not the most, valuable asset for most businesses/organizations. Organizations and governments collect information via several means including invisible data gathering, marketing platforms and search engines such as Google. Information can be attained from several sources, which can be fused using technology to develop complete profiles of individuals. The information on social media is very accessible and can be of great value to individuals and organizations for reasons such as marketing, etc.; hence, data is retained by most companies for future use.

## **Privacy**

Privacy or the right to enjoy freedom from unauthorized intrusion is the negative right of all human beings. Privacy is defined as the right to be left alone, to be free from secret surveillance, or unwanted disclosure of personal data or information by government, corporation, or individual (dictionary.com). In this chapter we will define privacy loosely, as the right to control access to personal information. Supporters of privacy posit that it is a necessity for human dignity and individuality and a key element in the quest for happiness. According to Baase [5] in the book titled “A Gift of Fire: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues for Computing and the Internet,” privacy is the ability to control information about one’s self as well as the freedom from surveillance from being followed, tracked, watched, and being eavesdropped on. In this regard, ignoring privacy rights often leads to encroachment on natural rights.

Privacy, or even the thought that one has this right, leads to peace of mind and can provide an environment of solitude. This solitude can allow people to breathe freely in a space that is free from interference and intrusion. According to Richards and Solove, Legal scholar William Prosser argued that privacy cases can be classified into four related “torts,” namely:

1. Intrusion—this can be viewed as encroachment (physical or otherwise) on one’s liberties/solitude in a highly offensive way.
2. Privacy facts—making public, private information about someone that is of no “legitimate con-

cern" to anyone.

3. False light—making public false and “highly offensive” information about others.
4. Appropriation—stealing someone’s identity (name, likeness) to gain advantage without the permission of the individual.

Technology, the digital age, the Internet and social media have redefined privacy however as surveillance is no longer limited to a certain pre-defined space and location. An understanding of the problems and dangers of privacy in the digital space is therefore the first step to privacy control. While there can be clear distinctions between informational privacy and physical privacy, as pointed out earlier, intrusion can be both physical and otherwise.

This chapter will focus on informational privacy which is the ability to control access to personal information. We examine privacy issues in the social media context focusing primarily on personal information and the ability to control external influences. We suggest that breach of informational privacy can impact: solitude (the right to be left alone), intimacy (the right not to be monitored), and anonymity (the right to have no public personal identity and by extension physical privacy impacted). The right to control access to facts or personal information in our view is a natural, inalienable right and everyone should have control over whose their personal information and how it is disseminated.

In May 2019 the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) clearly outlined that it is unlawful to process personal data without the consent of the individual (subject). It is a legal requirement under the GDPR that privacy notices be given to individuals that outline how their personal data will be processed and the conditions that must be met that make the consent valid. These are:

- 1) “Freely given—an individual must be given a genuine choice when providing consent and it should generally be unbundled from other terms and conditions (e.g., access to a service should not be conditional upon consent being given).”
- 2) “Specific and informed—this means that data subjects should be provided with information as to the identity of the controller(s), the specific purposes, types of processing, as well as being informed of their right to withdraw consent at any time.”
- 3) “Explicit and unambiguous—the data subject must clearly express their consent (e.g., by actively ticking a box which confirms they are giving consent—pre-ticked boxes are insufficient).”
- 4) “Under 13s—children under the age of 13 cannot provide consent and it is therefore necessary to obtain consent from their parents.”

Arguments can be made that privacy is a cultural, universal necessity for harmonious relationships among human beings and creates the boundaries for engagement and disengagement. Privacy can also be viewed as instrumental good because it is a requirement for the development of certain kinds of human relationships, intimacy and trust. However, achieving privacy is much more difficult in light of constant surveillance and the inability to determine the levels of interaction with various publics. Some critics argue that privacy provides protection against anti-social behaviors such as trickery, disinformation and fraud, and is thought to be a universal right. However, privacy can also be viewed as relative as privacy rules may differ based on several factors such as “climate, religion, technological advancement and political arrangements”. The need for privacy is an objective reality though it can be viewed as “culturally rational” where the need for personal privacy is viewed as relative based on culture. One example is the push by the government, businesses and Singaporeans to make Singapore a smart nation. According to GovTech 2018 reports

there is a push by the government in Singapore to harness the data “new gold” to develop systems that can make life easier for its people. The report points out that Singapore is using sensors robots Smart Water Assessment Network (SWAN) to monitor water quality in its reservoirs, seeking to build smart health system and to build a smart transportation system to name a few. In this example privacy can be describe as “culturally rational” and the rules in general could differ based on technological advancement and political arrangements.

In today’s networked society it is naïve and ill-conceived to think that privacy is over-rated and there is no need to be concerned about privacy if you have done nothing wrong. The effects of information flow can be complex and may not be simply about protection for people who have something to hide. Inaccurate information flow can have adverse long-term implications for individuals and companies. Consider a scenario where someone’s computer or tablet is stolen. The perpetrator uses identification information stored on the device to access their social media page which could lead to access to their contacts, friends and friends of their “friends” then participate in illegal activities and engage in anti- social activities such as hacking, spreading viruses, fraud and identity theft. The victim is now in danger of being accused of criminal intentions, or worse. These kinds of situations are possible because of technology and networked systems. Users of social media need to be aware of the risks that are associated with participation.

## **Social media**

The concept of social networking pre-dates the Internet and mass communication as people are said to be social creatures who when working in groups can achieve results in a value greater than the sum of its parts. The explosive growth in the use of social media over the past decade has made it one of the most popular Internet services in the world, providing new avenues to “see and be seen”. The use of social media has changed the communication landscape resulting in changes in ethical norms and behavior. The unprecedented level of growth in usage has resulted in the reduction in the use of other media and changes in areas including civic and political engagement, privacy and safety. Alexa, a company that keeps track of traffic on the Web, indicates that as of August, 2019 YouTube, Facebook and Twitter are among the top four (4) most visited sites with only Google, being the most popular search engine, surpassing these social media sites.

Social media sites can be described as online services that allow users to create profiles which are “public, semi-public” or both. Users may create individual profiles and/or become a part of a group of people with whom they may be acquainted offline. They also provide avenues to create virtual friendships. Through these virtual friendships, people may access details about their contacts ranging from personal background information and interests to location. Social networking sites provide various tools to facilitate communication. These include chat rooms, blogs, private messages, public comments, ways of uploading content external to the site and sharing videos and photographs. Social media is therefore drastically changing the way people communicate and form relationships.

Today social media has proven to be one of the most, if not the most effective medium for the dissemination of information to various audiences. The power of this medium is phenomenal and ranges from its ability to overturn governments (e.g., Moldova), to mobilize protests, assist with getting support for humanitarian aid, organize political campaigns, organize groups to delay the passing of legislation (as in the case with the copyright bill in Canada) to making social media billionaires and millionaires. The enabling nature and the structure of the media that social networking offers provide a wide range of opportunities that were nonexistent before technology. Face-

book and YouTube marketers and trainers provide two examples. Today people can interact with and learn from people millions of miles away. The global reach of this medium has removed all former pre-defined boundaries including geographical, social and any other that existed previously. Technological advancements such as Web 2.0 and Web 4.0 which provide the framework for collaboration, have given new meaning to life from various perspectives: political, institutional and social.

## **Privacy and social media**

Social media and the information/digital era have “redefined” privacy. In today’s Information Technology–configured societies, where there is continuous monitoring, privacy has taken on a new meaning. Technologies such as closed-circuit cameras (CCTV) are prevalent in public spaces or in some private spaces including our work and home. Personal computers and devices such as our smart phones enabled with Global Positioning System (GPS), Geo locations and Geo maps connected to these devices make privacy as we know it, a thing of the past. Recent reports indicate that some of the largest companies such as Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook as well as various government agencies are collecting information without consent and storing it in databases for future use. It is almost impossible to say privacy exists in this digital world (@nowthisnews).

The open nature of the social networking sites and the avenues they provide for sharing information in a “public or semi-public” space create privacy concerns by their very construct. Information that is inappropriate for some audiences are many times inadvertently made visible to groups other than those intended and can sometimes result in future negative outcomes. One such example is a well-known case recorded in an article entitled “The Web Means the End of Forgetting” that involved a young woman who was denied her college license because of backlash from photographs posted on social media in her private engagement.

Technology has reduced the gap between professional and personal spaces and often results in information exposure to the wrong audience. The reduction in the separation of professional and personal spaces can affect image management especially in a professional setting resulting in the erosion of traditional professional image and impression management. Determining the secondary use of personal information and those who have access to this information should be the prerogative of the individual or group to whom the information belongs. However, engaging in social media activities has removed this control.

Privacy on social networking sites (SNSs) is heavily dependent on the users of these networks because sharing information is the primary way of participating in social communities. Privacy in SNSs is “multifaceted.” Users of these platforms are responsible for protecting their information from third-party data collection and managing their personal profiles. However, participants are usually more willing to give personal and more private information in SNSs than anywhere else on the Internet. This can be attributed to the feeling of community, comfort and family that these media provide for the most part. Privacy controls are not the priority of social networking site designers and only a small number of the young adolescent users change the default privacy settings of their accounts. This opens the door for breaches especially among the most vulnerable user groups, namely young children, teenagers and the elderly. The nature of social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter and other social media platforms cause users to re-evaluate and often change their personal privacy standards in order to participate in these social networked communities.

While there are tremendous benefits that can be derived from the effective use of social media there are some unavoidable risks that are involved in its use. Much attention should therefore be given to what is shared in these forums. Social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are said to be the most effective media to communicate to Generation Y's (Gen Y's), as teens and young adults are the largest user groups on these platforms. However, according to Bolton et al. Gen Y's use of social media, if left unabated and unmonitored will have long-term implications for privacy and engagement in civic activities as this continuous use is resulting in changes in behavior and social norms as well as increased levels of cyber-crime.

Today social networks are becoming the platform of choice for hackers and other perpetrators of antisocial behavior. These media offer large volumes of data/information ranging from an individual's date of birth, place of residence, place of work/business, to information about family and other personal activities.

In many cases users unintentionally disclose information that can be both dangerous and inappropriate. Information regarding activities on social media can have far reaching negative implications for one's future. A few examples of situations which can, and have been affected are employment, visa acquisition, and college acceptance. Indiscriminate participation has also resulted in situations such as identity theft and bank fraud just to list a few. Protecting privacy in today's networked society can be a great challenge. The digital revolution has indeed distorted our views of privacy, however, there should be clear distinctions between what should be seen by the general public and what should be limited to a selected group. One school of thought is that the only way to have privacy today is not to share information in these networked communities. However, achieving privacy and control over information flows and disclosure in networked communities is an ongoing process in an environment where contexts change quickly and are sometimes blurred. This requires intentional construction of systems that are designed to mitigate privacy issues.

## **Ethics and social media**

Ethics can be loosely defined as "the right thing to do" or it can be described as the moral philosophy of an individual or group and usually reflects what the individual or group views as good or bad. It is how they classify particular situations by categorizing them as right or wrong. Ethics can also be used to refer to any classification or philosophy of moral values or principles that guides the actions of an individual or group. Ethical values are intended to be guiding principles that if followed, could yield harmonious results and relationships. They seek to give answers to questions such as "How should I be living? How do I achieve the things that are deemed important such as knowledge and happiness or the acquisition of attractive things?" If one chooses happiness, the next question that needs to be answered is "Whose happiness should it be; my own happiness or the happiness of others?" In the domain of social media, some of the ethical questions that must be contemplated and ultimately answered are:

- Can this post be regarded as oversharing?
- Has the information in this post been distorted in anyway?
- What impact will this post have on others?

As previously mentioned, users within the ages 8–15 represent one of the largest social media user groups. These young persons within the 8–15 age range are still learning how to interact with the people around them and are deciding on the moral values that they will embrace. These moral

values will help to dictate how they will interact with the world around them. The ethical values that guide our interactions are usually formulated from some moral principle taught to us by someone or a group of individuals including parents, guardians, religious groups, and teachers just to name a few. Many of the Gen Y's/"Digital Babies" are "newbies" yet are required to determine for themselves the level of responsibility they will display when using the varying social media platforms. This includes considering the impact a post will have on their lives and/or the lives of other persons. They must also understand that when they join a social media network, they are joining a community in which certain behavior must be exhibited. Such responsibility requires a much greater level of maturity than can be expected from them at that age.

It is not uncommon for individuals to post even the smallest details of their lives from the moment they wake up to when they go to bed. They will openly share their location, what they eat at every meal or details about activities typically considered private and personal. They will also share likes and dislikes, thoughts and emotional states and for the most part this has become an accepted norm. Often times however, these shares do not only contain information about the person sharing but information about others as well. Many times, these details are shared on several social media platforms as individuals attempt to ensure that all persons within their social circle are kept updated on their activities. With this openness of sharing risks and challenges arise that are often not considered but can have serious impacts. The speed and scale with which social media creates information and makes it available—almost instantaneously—on a global scale, added to the fact that once something is posted there is really no way of truly removing it, should prompt individuals to think of the possible impact a post can have. Unfortunately, more often than not, posts are made without any thought of the far-reaching impact they can have on the lives of the person posting or others that may be implicated by the post.

### **Why do people share?**

According to Berger and Milkman there are five (5) main reasons why users are compelled to share content online, whether it is every detail or what they deem as highlights of their lives. These are:

- cause related
- personal connection to content
- to feel more involved in the world
- to define who they are
- to inform and entertain

People generally share because they believe that what they are sharing is important. It is hoped that the shared content will be deemed important to others which will ultimately result in more shares, likes and followers.

Figure below sums up the findings of Berger and Milkman which shows that the main reason people feel the need to share content on the varying social media platform is that the content relates to what is deemed as worthy cause. 84% of respondents highlighted this as the primary motivation for sharing. Seventy-eight percent said that they share because they feel a personal connection to the content while 69 and 68%, respectively said the content either made them feel more involved with the world or helped them to define who they were. Forty-nine percent share because of the entertainment or information value of the content. A more in depth look at each reason for sharing

follows.



### Figure

Why people share source: Global Social Media Research.

### Content related to a cause

Social media has provided a platform for people to share their thoughts and express concerns with others for what they regard as a worthy cause. Cause related posts are dependent on the interest of the individual. Some persons might share posts related to causes and issues happening in society. In one example, the parents of a baby with an aggressive form of leukemia, who having been told that their child had only 3 months to live unless a suitable donor for a blood stem cell transplant could be found, made an appeal on social media. The appeal was quickly shared and a suitable donor was soon found. While that was for a good cause, many view social media merely as platforms for freedom of speech because anyone can post any content one creates. People think the expression of their thoughts on social media regarding any topic is permissible. The problem with this is that the content may not be accepted by law or it could violate the rights of someone thus giving rise to ethical questions.

### Content with a personal connection

When social media users feel a personal connection to their content, they are more inclined to share the content within their social circles. This is true of information regarding family and personal activities. Content created by users also invokes a deep feeling of connection as it allows the users to tell their stories and it is natural to want the world or at least friends to know of the achievement. This natural need to share content is not new as humans have been doing this in some form or the other, starting with oral history to the media of the day; social media. Sharing the self-created content gives the user the opportunity of satisfying some fundamental needs of humans to be heard, to matter, to be understood and emancipated. The problem with this however is that in an effort to gratify the fundamental needs, borders are crossed because the content may not be sharable (can this content be shared within the share network?), it may not be share-worthy (who is the audience that would appreciate this content?) or it may be out of context (does the content fit the situation?).

## **Content that makes them feel more involved in the world**

One of the driving factors that pushes users to share content is the need to feel more in tune with the world around them. This desire is many times fueled by jealousy. Many social media users are jealous when their friends' content gets more attention than their own and so there is a lot of pressure to maintain one's persona in social circles, even when the information is unrealistic, as long as it gets as much attention as possible. Everything has to be perfect. In the case of a photo, for example, there is lighting, camera angle and background to consider. This need for perfection puts a tremendous amount of pressure on individuals to ensure that posted content is "liked" by friends. They often give very little thought to the amount of their friend's work that may have gone on behind the scenes to achieve that perfect social post.

Social media platforms have provided everyone with a forum to express views, but, as a whole, conversations are more polarized, tribal and hostile. With Facebook for instance, there has been a huge uptick in fake news, altered images, dangerous health claims and cures, and the proliferation of anti-science information. This is very distressing and disturbing because people are too willing to share and to believe without doing their due diligence and fact-checking first.

## **Content that defines who they are**

Establishing one's individuality in society can be challenging for some persons because not everyone wants to fit in. Some individuals will do all they can to stand out and be noticed. Social media provides the avenue for exposure and many individuals will seek to leverage the media to stand out of the crowd and not just be a fish in the school. Today many young people are currently being brought up in a culture that defines people by their presence on social media where in previous generations, persons were taught to define themselves by their career choices. These lessons would start from childhood by asking children what they wanted to be when they grew up and then rewarding them based on the answers they give. In today's digital era, however, social media postings and the number of "likes" or "dislikes" they attract, signal what is appealing to others. Therefore, posts that are similar to those that receive a large number of likes but which are largely unrealistic are usually made for self-gratification.

## **Content that informs and entertains**

The acquisition of knowledge and skills is a vital part of human survival and social media has made this process much easier. It is not uncommon to hear persons realizing that they need a particular knowledge set that they do not possess say "I need to learn to do this. I'll just YouTube it." Learning and adapting to change in as short as possible time is vital in today's society and social media coupled with the Internet put it all at the finger tips. Entertainment has the ability to bring people together and is a good way for people to bond. It provides a diversion from the demands of life and fills leisure time with amusement. Social media is an outlet for fun, pleasurable and enjoyable activities that are so vital to human survival. It is now common place to see persons watching a video, viewing images and reading text that is amusing on any of the available social media platforms. Quite often these videos, images and texts can be both informative and entertaining, but there can be problems however as at times they can cross ethical lines that can lead to conflict.

## **Ethical challenges with social media use**

The use of modern-day technology has brought several benefits. Social media is no different and chief amongst its benefit is the ability to stay connected easily and quickly as well as build rela-

tionships with people with similar interests. As with all technology, there are several challenges that can make the use of social media off putting and unpleasant. Some of these challenges appear to be minor but they can have far reaching effects into the lives of the users of social media and it is therefore advised that care be taken to minimize the challenges associated with the use of social media.

A major challenge with the use of social media is oversharing because when persons share on social media, they tend to share as much as is possible which is often times too much. When persons are out and about doing exciting things, it is natural to want to share this with the world as many users will post a few times a day when they head to lunch, visit a museum, go out to dinner or other places of interest. While this all seems relatively harmless, by using location-based services which pinpoint users with surprising accuracy and in real time, users place themselves in danger of laying out a pattern of movement that can be easily traced. While this seems more like a security or privacy issue it stems from an ethical dilemma—"Am I sharing too much?" Oversharing can also lead to damage of user's reputation especially if the intent is to leverage the platform for business. Photos of drunken behavior, drug use, partying or other inappropriate content can change how you are viewed by others.

Another ethical challenge users of social media often encounter is that they have no way of authenticating content before sharing, which becomes problematic when the content paints people or establishments negatively. Often times content is shared with them by friends, family and colleagues. The unauthenticated content is then reshared without any thought but sometimes this content may have been maliciously altered so the user unknowingly participates in maligning others. Even if the content is not altered the fact that the content paints someone or something in a bad light should send off warning bells as to whether or not it is right to share the content which is the underlying principle of ethical behavior.

### **Conflicting views**

Some of the challenges experienced by social media posts are a result of a lack of understanding and sometimes a lack of respect for the varying ethical and moral standpoints of the people involved. We have established that it is typical for persons to post to social media sites without any thought as to how it can affect other persons, but many times these posts are a cause of conflict because of a difference of opinion that may exist and the effect the post may have. Each individual will have his or her own ethical values and if they differ then this can result in conflict. When an executive of a British company made an Instagram post with some racial connotations before boarding a plane to South Africa it started a frenzy that resulted in the executive's immediate dismissal. Although the executive said it was a joke and there was no prejudice intended, this difference in views as to the implications of the post, resulted in an out of work executive and a company scrambling to maintain its public image.

### **Impact on personal development**

In this age of sharing, many young persons spend a vast amount of time on social media checking the activities of their "friends" as well as posting on their own activities so their "friends" are aware of what they are up to. Apart from interfering with their academic progress, time spent on these posts can have long term repercussions. An example is provided by a student of a prominent university who posted pictures of herself having a good time at parties while in school. She was denied employment because of some of her social media posts. While the ethical challenge here is the question of the employee's right to privacy and whether the individual's social media profile

should affect their ability to fulfill their responsibilities as an employee, the impact on the individual's long term personal growth is clear.

## **Conclusion**

In today's information age, one's digital footprint can make or break someone; it can be the deciding factor on whether or not one achieves one's life-long ambitions. Unethical behavior and interactions on social media can have far reaching implications both professionally and socially. Posting on the Internet means the "end of forgetting," therefore, responsible use of this medium is critical. The unethical use of social media has implications for privacy and can result in security breaches both physically and virtually. The use of social media can also result in the loss of privacy as many users are required to provide information that they would not divulge otherwise. Social media use can reveal information that can result in privacy breaches if not managed properly by users. Therefore, educating users of the risks and dangers of the exposure of sensitive information in this space, and encouraging vigilance in the protection of individual privacy on these platforms is paramount. This could result in the reduction of unethical and irresponsible use of these media and facilitate a more secure social environment. The use of social media should be governed by moral and ethical principles that can be applied universally and result in harmonious relationships regardless of race, culture, religious persuasion and social status.

Analysis of the literature and the findings of this research suggest achieving acceptable levels of privacy is very difficult in a networked system and will require much effort on the part of individuals. The largest user groups of social media are unaware of the processes that are required to reduce the level of vulnerability of their personal data. Therefore, educating users of the risk of participating in social media is the social responsibility of these social network platforms. Adapting universally ethical behaviors can mitigate the rise in the number of privacy breaches in the social networking space. This recommendation coincides with philosopher Immanuel Kant's assertion that, the Biblical principle which states "Do unto others as you have them do unto you" can be applied universally and should guide human interactions. This principle, if adhered to by users of social media and owners of these platforms could raise the awareness of unsuspecting users, reduce unethical interactions and undesirable incidents that could negatively affect privacy, and by extension security in this domain.

## **Cyberspace**

**Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures (ITI) including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. The term originates in science fiction, where it also includes various kinds of virtual reality (which is the experience of "being" in the alternate reality, or the simulated "being" in such a reality").

Cyberspace raises unique issues, especially regarding intellectual property and copyright infringement, and may call for new models of commerce. Furthermore, cyberspace has also become a unique area for developing human relationships and communities. While some argue that this universal ground for communication helps bring the world together, others point out that people will continue to associate narrowly with those of similar interests and economic and social status. Nevertheless, largely through the Internet, cyberspace has become a common ground for the rapid communication of ideas and values.

While cyberspace itself is a neutral space that allows for the rapid communication of ideas, the use

of this space will determine its value and benefit for humankind. While the free use of this space is indeed valuable, especially as this cyberspace binds all humankind together in inseparable, interdependent relationships, the free use of this space also calls for its responsible use in order to ensure its value for humanity's overall pursuit of freedom and happiness. Thus, cyberspace mandates the responsible use of technology and reveals the need for a value-based perspective of the use of such technology.

## **Origins of the term**

The word "cyberspace" (from cybernetics and space) was coined by sciencefiction author William Gibson in his 1982 story, "Burning Chrome," and popularized by his 1984 novel *Neuromancer*. The portion of *Neuromancer* cited in this respect is usually the following:

**Cyberspace.** A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding (69).

Gibson later commented on the origin of the term in the 2000 documentary *No Maps for These Territories*:

**Note:** The term "cyberspace" was coined by science fiction writer William Gibson

All I knew about the word "cyberspace" when I coined it, was that it seemed like an effective buzzword. It seemed evocative and essentially meaningless. It was suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning, even for me, as I saw it emerge on the page.

## **Metaphorical**

The term Cyberspace started to become a de facto synonym for the Internet, and later the World Wide Web, during the 1990s. Author Bruce Sterling, who popularized this meaning, credits John Perry Barlow as the first to use it to refer to "the present-day nexus of computer and telecommunications networks."

## **Cyberspace as an internet metaphor**

While cyberspace should not be confused with the real internet, the term is often used to refer to objects and identities that exist largely within the communication network itself, so that a web site, for example, might be metaphorically said to "exist in cyberspace." According to this interpretation, events taking place on the Internet are not, therefore, happening in the countries where the participants or the servers are physically located, but "in cyberspace."

The "space" in cyberspace has more in common with the abstract, mathematical meanings of the term than physical space. It does not have the duality of positive and negative volume (while in physical space for example a room has the negative volume of usable space delineated by positive volume of walls, Internet users cannot enter the screen and explore the unknown part of the Net as an extension of the space they are in), but spatial meaning can be attributed to the relationship between different pages (of books as well as web servers), considering the unturned pages to be somewhere "out there." The concept of cyberspace therefore refers not to the content being pre-

sented to the surfer, but rather to the possibility of surfing among different sites, with feedback loops between the user and the rest of the system creating the potential to always encounter something unknown or unexpected.

Videogames differ from text-based communication in that on-screen images are meant to be figures that actually occupy a space and the animation shows the movement of those figures. Images are supposed to form the positive volume that delineates the empty space. A game adopts the cyberspace metaphor by engaging more players in the game, and then figuratively representing them on the screen as avatars. Games do not have to stop at the avatar-player level, but current implementations aiming for more immersive playing space (such as in Laser tag) take the form of augmented reality rather than cyberspace, fully immersive virtual realities remaining impractical.

Although the more radical consequences of the global communication network predicted by some cyberspace proponents (that is, the diminishing of state influence envisioned by John Perry Barlow) failed to materialize and the word lost some of its novelty appeal, the term continues to be used.

Some virtual communities explicitly refer to the concept of cyberspace, for example, Linden Lab calling their customers "Residents" of Second Life, while all such communities can be positioned "in cyberspace" for explanatory and comparative purposes (as Sterling did in *The Hacker Crackdown* and many journalists afterwards), integrating the metaphor into a wider cyber-culture.

The metaphor has been useful in helping a new generation of thought leaders to reason through new military strategies around the world, led largely by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The use of cyberspace as a metaphor has had its limits, however, especially in areas where the metaphor becomes confused with physical infrastructure.

### **Alternate realities in philosophy and art**

**Predating computers**  
Before cyberspace became a technological possibility, many philosophers suggested the possibility of a reality, or suggested that the reality in which we live in now is a reflection of some reality perhaps more pure than what we are aware of. In *The Republic*, Plato sets out his allegory of the cave, widely cited as one of the first conceptual realities. He suggests that we are already in a form of virtual reality which we are deceived into thinking is true. True reality for Plato is accessible only through mental training and is the reality of the forms. These ideas are central to Platonism and neoplatonism. Depending on how one views cyberspace in relation to physical reality, either people are living in a cyberspace-like reality in relation to a higher realm of ideas or cyberspace contains the abstract ideas that take form in the current, tangible reality.

Another forerunner of the modern idea of cyberspace is Descartes' hypothetical that people might be deceived by an evil demon which feeds them a false reality, and so the only thing one can be certain of is that one thinks; in other words, one is a thinking thing. This argument is the direct predecessor of the modern ideas of brain in a vat and many popular conceptions of cyberspace take Descartes' ideas as their starting point.

Visual arts have a tradition, stretching back to antiquity, of artifacts meant to fool the eye and be mistaken for reality. This questioning of reality occasionally led some philosophers and especially theologians to distrust art as deceiving people into entering a world which was not real. The artistic challenge was resurrected with increasing ambition as art became more and more realistic with the invention of photography, film and finally, immersive computer simulations.

## **Influenced by computersPhilosophy**

American counterculture exponents like William S. Burroughs (whose literary influence on Gibson and cyberpunk in general is widely acknowledged) were among the first to extol the potential of computers and computer networks for individual empowerment.

Some contemporary philosophers and scientists (such as David Deutsch in *The Fabric of Reality*) use virtual reality in various thought experiments. Philip Zhai connects cyberspace to the platonic tradition:

Let us imagine a nation in which everyone is hooked up to a network of VR infrastructure. They have been so hooked up since they left their mother's wombs. Immersed in cyberspace and maintaining their life by teleoperation, they have never imagined that life could be any different from that. The first person that thinks of the possibility of an alternative world like ours would be ridiculed by the majority of these citizens, just like the few enlightened ones in Plato's allegory of the cave.

## **Cyberspace and virtual reality**

Although cyberspace and virtual reality are often used interchangeably, these two concepts have a different orientation. While virtual reality refers to the simulated experience of reality, cyberspace refers to the plane of reality, or environment, within which this experience is made possible. Thus, experiences in cyberspace can entail aspects of virtual reality when a user is fully immersed in this alternate reality.

The difference between the two can be further described using an analogy of physical (space itself is not physical though) space and concepts of reality. On one hand, human beings presuppose a frame of reference called "space." Whether the space people live in is an empty container like a repository (Newtonian concept) or people exist in space according to the relationship between things (Leibnizian concept) is debatable; likewise, human beings relate to reality through perception (Kantian concept of space as a form of intuition) or through a nexus of meanings (concept of "lived space" in Phenomenology). Either way, human beings presuppose a plane of experience called "space." Within this space, humans physically experience reality through their five senses.

By extension, this sense of reality can be applied to imagined objects. Cyberspace is a frame of reference within which people can have quasi-real experiences with such objects; virtual reality refers to the simulated experiences with these objects.

Human experience of reality is also extended to non-physical events or phenomena such as death and associated emotional feelings about it. Fear, anxiety, joy, and other emotional feelings are real without association with the physical senses. At the same time, virtual reality may suggest a false reality that can be virtually experienced. Thus, the whole question of reality poses a series of questions beyond current epistemological models in modern philosophy, which presuppose the primacy of sense perception.

## **Pornographic Ethics**

"I can't define pornography," one judge once famously said, "but I know it when I see it." (Justice

Stewart in *Jacobellis v. Ohio* 378 US 184 (1964).) Can we do better?

The word “pornography” comes from the Greek for writing about prostitutes. However, the etymology of the term is not much of a guide to its current usage, since many of the things commonly called “pornography” nowadays are neither literally written nor literally about prostitutes.

Here is a first, simple definition. Pornography is any material (either pictures or words) that is *sexually explicit*. This definition of pornography may pick out different types of material in different contexts, since what is viewed as sexually explicit can vary from culture to culture and over time. “Sexually explicit” functions as a kind of indexical term, picking out different features depending on what has certain effects or breaks certain taboos in different contexts and cultures. Displays of women’s uncovered ankles count as sexually explicit in some cultures, but not in most western cultures nowadays (although they once did: the display of a female ankle in Victorian times was regarded as most risqué). There may be borderline cases too: do displays of bared breasts still count as sexually explicit in various contemporary western cultures? However, some material seems clearly to count as sexually explicit in many contexts today: in particular, audio, written or visual representations of sexual acts (e.g., sexual intercourse, oral sex) and exposed body parts (e.g., the vagina, anus and penis—especially the erect penis).

Within the general class of sexually explicit material, there is great variety in content. For example, some sexually explicit material depicts women, and sometimes men, in postures of sexual display (e.g., Playboy centrefolds). Some depicts non-violent sexual acts (both homosexual and heterosexual) between adults who are portrayed as equal and consenting participants. Other sexually explicit representations depict acts of violent coercion: people being whipped, beaten, bound, tortured, mutilated, raped and even killed. Some sexually explicit material may be degrading, without necessarily being overtly violent. This material depicts people (most often women) in positions of servility and subordination in their sexual relations with others, or engaged in sexual acts that many people would regard as humiliating. Some sexually explicit material involves or depicts children. Some portrays bestiality and necrophilia; and so on.

On the first definition of pornography as sexually explicit material, all such material would count as pornography, insofar as it is sexually explicit. But this simple definition is not quite right. Anatomy textbooks for medical students are sexually explicit—they depict exposed genitalia, for example—but are rarely, if ever, viewed as pornography. Sexual explicitness may be a necessary condition for material to count as pornographic, but it does not seem to be sufficient. So something needs to be added to the simple definition. What else might be required?

Here is a second definition. Pornography is sexually explicit material (verbal or pictorial) that is *primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers*. This definition is better: it deals with the problem of anatomy textbooks and the like. Indeed, this definition is one that is frequently employed (or presupposed) in discussions of pornography and censorship. Of course, it is important to distinguish here between sexually explicit material that is *wholly* or *primarily* designed to produce sexual arousal (i.e., whose only or overriding aim is to produce sexual arousal) and material whose aim is to do this in order to make some other artistic or political point. The film, *Last Tango in Paris* arguably aims to arouse audiences, but this is not its primary aim. It does so in order to make a broader political point.

It is sometimes assumed that pornography, in this second sense, is published and consumed by a small and marginalized minority. But, while exact estimates of the size and profitability of the international trade in pornography vary somewhat, it is generally agreed that the pornography indus-

try is a massive international enterprise, with a multi-billion dollar annual turnover. In 2003, the pornography industry (taken to include adult videos, magazines, Cable/Pay per view, Internet and CD-Rom) is estimated to have grossed US\$34 billion world-wide; and in excess of \$8 billion in the U.S. alone, greater than the combined revenue of ABC, CBS, and NBC (\$6.2. billion). Pornography is much more widely consumed than is sometimes supposed, and is a large and extremely profitable international industry.

However the term “pornography” is often used with an additional *normative* force that the first and second definitions leave out. When many people describe something (e.g., a book such as *Tropic of Capricorn* or a film such as *Baise Moi*) as “pornographic”, they seem to be doing more than simply dispassionately describing its sexually explicit content or the intentions of its producers—indeed, in these debates, the intentions of producers are sometimes treated as irrelevant to the work's status as pornography. They seem to be saying, in addition, that it is *bad*—and perhaps also that its badness is not redeemed by other artistic, literary, or political merit the work may possess. (Consider, for example, how people use the term “visual pornography” to condemn certain sorts of art or television, often when the material is not even sexually explicit).

This suggests a third definition: pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers *that is bad* in a certain way. This definition of pornography makes it analytically true that pornography is bad: by definition, material that is not bad in the relevant way is not pornography. It might be that *all and only* sexually explicit material is bad in a certain way (e.g., obscene): in which case, “pornography” will refer to all and only the class of sexually explicit materials. But it might be that only *some* sexually explicit material

is objectionable (e.g., degrading to women), in which case only the bad *subset* of sexually explicit material will count as pornography. And, of course, it is possible that *no* sexually explicit material is bad in the relevant way (e.g., harmful to women), in which case we would have an error theory about pornography: there would be no pornography, so defined, merely harmless, sexually explicit “erotica”.

A number of approaches define pornography as sexually explicit material that is bad—although they disagree as to the relevant source of its badness, and consequently about what material is pornographic. A particularly dominant approach has been to define pornography in terms of *obscenity*. (For critical discussions of this approach see Schauer 1982, Feinberg 1987, MacKinnon 1987.) The obscenity might be taken to be intrinsic to the content of the material itself (for example, that it depicts deviant sexual acts that are immoral in themselves) or it may lie in contingent effects that the material has (for example, that it tends to offend “reasonable” people, or to deprave and corrupt viewers, or to erode traditional family and religious values). If all sexually explicit material is obscene by whichever of these standards is chosen, then all sexually explicit material will be pornography on this definition. This is the definition of pornography that moral conservatives typically favour.

But the badness of pornography need not reside in obscenity. Pornography might be defined, not as sexually explicit material that is obscene, but as that sexually explicit material that *harms women*. Thus many contemporary feminist definitions define “pornography” as sexually explicit material that depicts women's subordination in such a way as to *endorse* that subordination. (See Longino 1980, MacKinnon 1987.) This definition of pornography leaves it open in principle that there might be sexually explicit material that is not pornography: sexually explicit material that does not subordinate women will count as harmless “erotica”.

Of course, women may not be the only people harmed by the production or consumption of certain sorts of sexually explicit material. The consumption of sexually explicit material has often been thought to be harmful to its (mostly male) consumers: for example, by corrupting their morals or by making them less likely to have loving, long-term sexual relationships. Many people strongly object to “child pornography”: that subset of sexually explicit material that involves depictions of actual children engaged in sexual activity. This class of sexually explicit material is widely regarded as objectionable because it involves the actual sexual exploitation of children, together with a permanent record of that abuse which may further harm their interests.

I have discussed how, on this third approach to defining “pornography” as sexually explicit material that is bad or harmful in a certain way, there are three possibilities: “pornography” might name *all*, *some* or even *no* sexually explicit material, depending on what (if any) class of sexually explicit material is in fact bad in the relevant way. But it is worth noting that there is an interesting fourth possibility. It is possible that some *non*-sexually explicit material might *also* turn out to be bad in the relevant way. It might be that some non-sexually explicit material is obscene in the relevant sense (e.g., Andres Serrano's famously controversial artwork entitled “Piss Christ”, which displays a plastic crucifix in urine with cow's blood). Or it might turn out that non-sexually explicit advertising that depicts women in positions of sexual servility in such a way as to endorse that subordination is *also* bad in the relevant way. (As many philosophers might be inclined to put the point, the sexually explicit materials that subordinate women via their depiction of women as subordinate may turn out not to form a natural kind.) In this case, there are two options. “Pornography” might be taken to name only the *sexually explicit subset* of material that is bad in the relevant sense (e.g., that depicts women as men's sexual subordinates in such a way as to endorse their subordination); or “pornography” might be taken to refer to *all* the material that is bad in that way, whether that material is sexually explicit or not. The former option would clearly stick more closely to the everyday conception of pornography as involving the sexually explicit. But it might be that this ordinary conception, on reflection, turns out not to capture what is of moral and political interest and importance. There may thus be a theoretical reason to conceive of pornography more broadly than simply sexually explicit material that is bad in a certain way, or perhaps simply to invent a new term that captures the theoretically interesting kind. Some feminists seem inclined to this broader approach, suggesting that material that explicitly depicts women in postures of sexual submission, servility or display in such a way as to endorse it counts as pornography. This may include some non-sexually explicit material that would not ordinarily be thought of as pornography: for example, photographs in artwork, advertising or fashion spreads that depict women bound, chained or bruised in such a way as to glamorise these things.

The term “pornography” is used in all of these different ways in everyday discourse and debate, as well as in philosophical discussions: sometimes it is used to mean merely material which is sexually explicit; sometimes it is used to mean material which is sexually explicit *and* objectionable in some particular way; and so on. It seems to me that we do not need to choose between these different definitions, for all of them capture something of the term's everyday use. What matters crucially is that we know which definition is being used in a particular case. For the fact that “pornography” has different senses can have two very unfortunate consequences if these differences are not clearly noted and kept in mind: it can make it seem that there is disagreement when there is not; and it can obscure the real nature of the disagreement when there is.

Here is one topical example of how this might happen. Some feminists object to pornography on the grounds that it harms women. Other feminists claim that pornography may not always be harmful to women, and may even sometimes be beneficial. It seems that there is genuine disa-

greement here. But is there? Not necessarily. For the two sides might mean different things by “pornography”. Suppose that feminists who object to pornography are defining “pornography” as sexually explicit material that subordinates women. So pornography, for them, is that subset of sexually explicit material that in fact harms women. This definition makes it an analytic truth that pornography, wherever it exists, is bad from a feminist point of view. Feminists who defend pornography, however, may be using “pornography” to mean simply sexually explicit material (regardless of whether it is harmful to women). There may thus be no genuine disagreement here. For both sides might *agree* that sexually explicit material that harms women is objectionable. They might also *agree* that there is nothing objectionable about sexually explicit material that does not harm women (or anyone else). If protagonists in the debate are using “pornography” in different senses in this way, they may simply be talking past each other.

Two really substantive issues at stake in the feminist debate over pornography are 1) whether *any* sexually explicit material is in fact harmful to women; and, if so, what should be done about it?; and 2) whether *all* sexually explicit material is in fact harmful to women; and, if so, what should be done about it? (We can thus phrase two of the important issues, if we like, without mentioning “pornography” at all.) If we define “pornography” simply as sexually explicit material (regardless of whether it is harmful to women), then the first substantive issue must be posed in this way: “is there *any* pornography that is harmful to women; and, if so, what should be done about it?” However, if “pornography” is defined as that sexually explicit material that subordinates women then, while we can ask this question, we must pose it differently: we must ask “which pieces of sexually explicit material, if any, are pornographic; and what should be done about any pornography that exists?” A second substantive issue at stake in the debate is whether *all* sexually explicit material, either in principle or under current social conditions, is or would be harmful to women. Again, it should be noted that this question can be asked using either conception of “pornography”, but it must be posed differently. If we define “pornography” simply as sexually explicit material (regardless of whether it is harmful), the question must be posed like this: “is all pornography as a matter of fact harmful?” On the other hand, if we define “pornography” as sexually explicit material that harms women, we must ask: “is all sexually explicit material as a matter of fact pornographic?” These are just terminological variants of the same substantive question: but when different terminology is used by different participants in the debate, the exact questions at issue, which are actually very simple to state, can be obscured.

## **The shape of the traditional pornography debate**

### **1) Conservative arguments for censorship**

Until comparatively recently, the main opposition to pornography came from moral and religious conservatives, who argue that pornography should be banned because its sexually explicit content is obscene and morally corrupting. By “pornography”, conservatives usually mean simply sexually explicit material (either pictures or words), since conservatives typically view all such material as obscene.

According to conservatives, the sexually explicit content of pornography is an affront to decent family and religious values and deeply offensive to a significant portion of citizens who hold these values. The consumption of pornography is bad for society. It undermines and destabilizes the moral fabric of a decent and stable society, by encouraging sexual promiscuity, deviant sexual practices and other attitudes and behaviour that threaten traditional family and religious institutions, and which conservatives regard as intrinsically morally wrong. Furthermore, pornography is bad for those who consume it, corrupting their character and preventing them from leading a good

and worthwhile life in accordance with family and religious values.

According to conservatives, the state is justified in using its coercive power to uphold and enforce a community's moral convictions and to prevent citizens from engaging in activities that offend prevailing community standards of morality and decency. (See e.g., Devlin 1968, Sandel 1984.) This position is sometimes called 'legal moralism'. Governments also have a responsibility to prevent citizens from harming themselves. This is true, even where the citizen is not a child (who may not yet be competent to make responsible judgements for themselves about what is in their own best interests), but a mature adult who is voluntarily engaged in an activity which they judge to be desirable and which causes no harm to others. The view that the state is entitled to interfere with the freedom of mentally competent adults against their will for their own good is often called 'legal paternalism'.

Conservatives therefore think that it is entirely legitimate for the state to prohibit consenting adults from publishing and viewing pornography, even in private, in order to protect the moral health of would-be consumers and of society as a whole.

## **2) The traditional liberal defence of a right to pornography**

Traditional liberal defenders of pornography famously disagree, rejecting both the principle of legal moralism and the principle of legal paternalism, at least where consenting adults are concerned. This is not to say that liberal defenders of pornography necessarily approve of it. Indeed, they frequently personally find pornography—especially violent and degrading pornography—mindless and offensive. Many concede that pornography—by which they usually mean sexually explicit material whose primary function is to produce sexual arousal in viewers—is “low value” speech: speech that contributes little, if anything, of intellectual, artistic, literary or political merit to the moral and social environment. But this does not mean that it should not be protected—quite the opposite. A vital principle is at stake for liberals in the debate over pornography and censorship. The principle is that mentally competent adults must not be prevented from expressing their own convictions, or from indulging their own private tastes, simply on the grounds that, in the opinion of others, those convictions or tastes are mistaken, offensive or unworthy. Moral majorities must not be allowed to use the law to suppress dissenting minority opinions or to force their own moral convictions on others. The underlying liberal sentiment here is nicely captured in the famous adage (often attributed to the French philosopher, Voltaire): “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”

For liberals, there is a very strong presumption in favour of individual freedom, and against state regulation that interferes with that freedom. The *only* grounds that liberals typically regard as providing a legitimate reason for state restrictions on individual freedom is in order to prevent *harm* to others. Hence, in debates over censorship and other forms of state regulation that restrict the liberty of individuals against their will, the burden of proof is always firmly on those who argue for censorship to demonstrate that the speech or conduct in question causes significant harm to others. It must either be shown to directly cause actual *physical violence* to others (e.g., murder, rape, assault, battery), on a narrower understanding of “harm”; or to deliberately or negligently violate sufficiently important *interests* or *rights* of others, on a broader, interest-based conception of “harm”.

Liberals have traditionally defended a right to pornography on three main grounds. (By the “right to pornography” here, and in what follows, I mean the negative right of consenting adults not to be

prevented from making, publishing, exhibiting, distributing and consuming pornography in private). Firstly, on the grounds of *freedom of speech or expression*, which protects the freedom of individuals (in this case, pornographers) to express their opinions and to communicate those opinions to others, however mistaken, disagreeable or offensive others may find them. Liberals have tended to conceive of freedom, including freedom of expression, as *negative* freedom-as non-interference by others-rather than as positive freedom, which involves having the positive goods and facilities required to exercise the freedom. Freedom is thus something that individuals have just so long as there are no coercive external obstacles-notably, physical or legal restrictions-in their way.

Few liberals nowadays think that the (negative) right to freedom of speech is an absolute right: a freedom that can never legitimately be restricted by the state. If the speech causes sufficiently great harm to others then the state may have a legitimate interest in regulating or preventing it. There is no simple general formula or algorithm for determining when the harm caused to others is "sufficiently great" to justify legal restrictions in the case of speech and more generally. This will depend on the outcome of a complex process of carefully weighing and balancing the strength and nature of the harm and the competing interests at stake, and an analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative policies, that needs to be undertaken on a case by case basis.

However, when it comes to legislation that interferes with free speech, the liberal presumption against legislation is especially high. For liberals take freedom of expression to be an especially important right that takes precedence over most other rights and interests (including equality) should they ever conflict. Levels of harm that would normally be sufficient to justify regulating the conduct which causes them may be not be sufficiently great to justify restrictions in cases where the harm is caused by speech or expression. Hence, for liberals, justifying censorship of pornography requires that there is extremely reliable evidence to show that the publication or voluntary private consumption of pornography by consenting adults causes *especially* great and serious harm to others. The harm caused by expression must be very certain and very great before it is legitimate for a state to prohibit it. We would be justified in banning a certain type of pornography (e.g., bondage pictures) only when we are very sure that, on average, tokens of that type (i.e., most particular bondage pictures) cause very great harm.

Secondly, liberals have defended a right to pornography on the grounds of a right to *privacy* (or "moral independence", as one prominent liberal defender of pornography calls it), which protects a sphere of private activity within which individuals can explore and indulge their own personal tastes and convictions, free from the threat of coercive pressure or interference by the state and other individuals. The spectre of state intrusion into the private lives of individuals underpins much of the liberal discomfort about censorship of pornography.

Like the right to freedom of speech, the liberal commitment to privacy is not absolute. It can be overridden if the private activities of individuals are such as to cause significant harm to others. Thus, if there is reliable evidence to suggest that the voluntary private consumption of pornography causes sufficiently great harm to others then- providing this harm is sufficiently great and that state prohibitions are the only effective way of preventing it-the state would have a legitimate interest in prohibiting it.

But-and this is the third prong of the traditional liberal defence-pornography is comparatively *harmless*. Neither the expression of pornographic opinions, nor the indulging of a private taste for pornography, causes significant harm to others, in the relevant sense of 'harm' (i.e., crimes of physical violence or other significant wrongful rights-violations). Hence, the publication and voluntary private consumption of pornography is none of the state's business.

## The 'harm principle': when is the state justified in restricting individual liberty?

These three central ingredients in the liberal defence of pornography find their classic expression in a famous and influential passage from John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1859). In this passage, Mill sets out the principle that underpins the prevailing liberal view about when it is justified for the state to coercively interfere with the liberty of its citizens. It is a principle that continues to provide the dominant liberal framework for the debate over pornography and censorship. Mill writes:

The only principle for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. (Mill 1975: 15)

Mill's central claim is that society is justified in interfering with the freedom of mentally competent adults to say and do what they wish *only* when their conduct will cause harm to others. This has come to be known as the 'liberty principle' or 'harm principle'; and it forms the cornerstone of the traditional liberal defence of individual liberty. It protects the freedom of all mentally competent individuals to live and shape their own lives in accordance with their own preferences and beliefs, so long as they do not harm others in the process.

Mill goes on to stress that the harm principle is meant to apply "only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties" (Mill 1975:15). So the principle permits paternalistic intervention in the case of those who are not competent to make an informed decision about what is in their best interests for themselves, and so who "must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury": for example, young children or those adults whose decision-making abilities are temporarily or permanently impaired.

It is generally thought to follow that child pornography, which is taken to involve the *actual* sexual abuse or exploitation of children (with or without their apparent consent), can legitimately be banned in order to protect the interests of children, who are not yet competent to fully understand the nature of the choice they are making or to grasp the impact of their decisions on their present and future interests. (This is not entirely uncontroversial, however: for it might be denied that children are harmed by participating in pornography. The North American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), for example, denies that having sex with adults is harmful for children.) For the same reason, liberals think that children can quite rightly be prevented by parents or by the state from purchasing or viewing pornography, if this is thought likely to harm them. That child pornography should be banned is common ground between liberals and conservatives. However, pornography that involves the *simulated* abuse of children (for example, consenting adult actors dressed up as schoolgirls) cannot legitimately be prohibited under the harm principle, unless there is good evidence to suggest that consumption of this material causes significant harm to people other than those who consume it: by, for example, causing those who consume it to abuse children.

We are now in a better position both to see what it would take for liberals to think that censorship

of pornography is justified and why liberals have been so unsympathetic to the sort of argument against pornography that conservatives make. Conservatives wish to prevent mentally competent adults from publishing and consuming pornography on the grounds that the choice to consume pornography is deeply morally misguided. But, as Mill insists, this is “not a sufficient warrant” for coercive interference with individual liberty. Neither the state nor moral majorities are entitled to restrict the private choices and activities of individuals against their will simply because, in the opinion of state officials or the social majority, that way of life is unworthy or unrewarding. Mill thinks that this sort of legal moralism will lead inevitably to a terrible “tyranny of the majority”, crushing individual diversity and blocking human progress and flourishing.

However, following Mill, liberals are generally happy to allow that considerations of the individual or common good may entitle the state to use other, so-called *non-coercive* means to persuade citizens to make wise or better choices. Thus public education campaigns designed to inform citizens of the dangers of smoking or excessive alcohol consumption, or to persuade them to make “wise” choices (for example, to eat more fruit and vegetables) may be justified. While others cannot force an individual to do something (or to forbear from doing it) when they are not harming others, it is entirely legitimate to seek to advise, instruct or persuade them. So, if there are reasons to think that pornography is not good for the individual who consumes it (say, because it makes them less likely to be able to have successful loving or long-term relationships), public education campaigns to warn consumers of these dangers may be justified. Indeed this-education and debate-is precisely the solution that liberals typically recommend to counter any harm that pornography may cause. (See e.g., Feinberg 1985, Donnerstein et al. 1987, Dworkin 1985) This solution respects the freedom of rational agents to exercise their own rational capacities in deciding what to think and how to live.

However, liberals insist that if attempts at persuasion should fail, and where an individual's conduct poses no significant threat to the physical security or interests of others, the state may not use coercive legal mechanisms to enforce these “wise” choices. “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (Mill 1975: 18). For Mill, the individual person is in the best position to judge what is in his or her own best interests; and, even if individuals may sometimes make bad choices, it is better in general that they be left free to make these mistakes. For no one's opinion about the good life is infallible; and, in any case, a life lived ‘from the inside’, in accordance with values that the individual endorses, is more likely to be a fulfilling one than a life where the individual is forced against their will to live as others as believe best.

In an influential liberal defence of pornography, Ronald Dworkin expresses this commitment in terms of a right to “moral independence”. People, he says, “have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social goods and opportunities, including disadvantages in the liberties permitted to them by the criminal law, just on the ground that their officials or fellow-citizens think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead their own lives are ignoble or wrong.” (Dworkin 1985: 353.) The fact, if it is one, that the majority of people in a society prefer that pornography be banned because they regard it as immoral or offensive is not a legitimate reason for interfering with (pornographers') freedom of speech or for preventing consenting adults from consuming it in private. For allowing such illegitimate “external” preferences of a majority to dictate government policy would violate the right to moral independence of the producers and consumers of pornography. It would give moral majorities the power to dictate how members of minority or non-mainstream groups can live on the basis of the majority's opinions about what sort of people are most worthy and what sorts of lives are worth living, and this violates the basic right of all indi-

viduals to be treated with equal concern and respect.

### **Pornography and Offense: Justifying restrictions on the public display of pornography**

However, Dworkin thinks, considerations of offence may provide some justification for preventing or restricting the public display of pornography so as to avoid its causing offense to *non-consenting* adults who might otherwise involuntarily or unwittingly be exposed to it. Joel Feinberg, another well-known liberal defender of pornography, agrees. But Feinberg thinks that such restrictions must be justified by a separate principle to the harm principle, for he thinks that certain sorts of unpleasant psychological states are not in themselves harms. Feinberg calls this additional principle the *offense principle*. The offense principle says that "It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end (i.e., there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to the other values)."

Like Dworkin, Feinberg thinks that the voluntary private consumption of pornography does not cause harm to others. Hence, wholesale criminal prohibitions on the publication and private voluntary consumption of pornography cannot be justified. But the public display of pornography may nonetheless constitute an "offensive nuisance" to non-consenting adults who are involuntarily exposed to it (just as neighbours who play bad music loudly into the wee hours of the morning may be an "offensive nuisance"). Since the harm-or rather, pseudo-harm-of pornography is the offense it may cause unwitting viewers involuntarily exposed to it, the solution is to restrict its exhibition to domains where such involuntary exposure will not occur, such as inside well sign-posted adult bookshops and cinemas where those who will be offended will know not to venture. Although this may prevent pornographers from distributing their opinions as widely as they might like, and may also cause some minor inconvenience to consumers (who may have to go further out of their way to find and view pornography, or suffer the embarrassment of having to sneak into known adult bookstores), these costs may be relatively small compared with the level of offense that involuntary exposure is likely to cause. Such restrictions on the public display of pornography would not amount to censorship, for pornographers are still free to publish and distribute their opinions. Nor would they violate consumers' right to privacy, for pornography would be freely available for willing consumers to view in private. The Williams Committee Report into Obscenity and Film Censorship in England made a similar recommendation, pointing to general considerations of public decency that prevent "offensive" public displays of conduct (e.g., nudity or sexual intercourse) that is appropriately seen or done only in private. Susan Wendell also agrees that the public display of certain sorts of pornography-visual, audio and written material that depicts and condones the unjustified physical coercion of women or other human beings- should be prohibited, although her particular concern is to remove the anxiety that involuntary exposure to such coercive material is likely to cause women and the harm it is likely to do to their self-esteem (Wendell 1983).

Liberal defenders of the right to pornography may thus allow that restrictions on its public display may be justified. But only if pornography can reliably be shown to cause significant harm to people other than those who voluntarily consume it will there be a legitimate case for prohibiting its voluntary *private* consumption. When an individual's private activities cause harm to others then they become no longer merely a private matter, but of legitimate public interest; and the state may be justified in regulating them. Thus, Dworkin says, were excessive consumption of pornography shown to cause *absenteeism* from work, then the public and the state might have some legitimate interest in preventing it. But, Dworkin thinks, there is as yet no reliable evidence that firmly

establishes that the voluntary private production or consumption of pornography by consenting adults causes this or any other sufficiently significant harm to others, in the relevant sense of 'harm'. Hence, pornography satisfies only harmless personal preferences for sexual gratification; and is therefore none of the state's business.

### **The dangers of censorship**

Liberals also have technical concerns about how censorship laws might work in practice. Many liberal (and feminist) objections to censorship of pornography point to the practical costs and dangers of censorship, arguing that even if pornography does cause some harm to others, the risks involved in censoring it are too great. They point to the difficulties involved in formulating a legal definition of 'pornography' that will be sufficiently precise to minimize the danger that censorship laws targeting pornography will be used (intentionally or unintentionally) to censor other unpopular material, including valuable literary, artistic and political works. Censoring pornography may thus place us on a dangerous "slippery slope" to further censorship of other material; and may have a general "chilling effect" on expression, making people reluctant to say or publish things that might be construed as pornography and for which they could be prosecuted.

These are serious dangers; and they need to be carefully taken into account in weighing the costs and benefits of censorship as a solution to any harm that pornography might cause. But it is worth noting that they are inherent in many existing forms of legislation, and are not always taken to be insoluble or to constitute a decisive reason against censorship in themselves.

### **Recent liberal dissent**

Although traditional defenders of a right to pornography have been liberals, it is important to note that not all contemporary liberals defend such a right. Indeed, the question of whether there might be good liberal grounds for prohibiting or otherwise regulating the voluntary private consumption of (some) pornography has become the subject of increasing and lively debate. Inspired by more recent feminist arguments against pornography, some scholars argue that the liberal commitment to protecting individual autonomy, equality, freedom of expression and other important liberal values may in fact support a policy that prohibits certain kinds of pornography, rather than the permissive stance that liberals have traditionally favoured. (See e.g., Dyzenhaus 1992, Easton 1994: 42–51, Langton 1990, Okin 1987, West 2003.) These theorists do not normally reject the harm principle, broadly understood: They generally agree that the crucial question in determining whether censorship of pornography is justified is whether there is reliable evidence to show that the publication or viewing of pornography by consenting adults causes sufficiently great harm to significant interests of others. Rather, they are open to the legitimacy of censorship because they think that the production and consumption of certain sorts of sexually explicit material—in particular, violent pornography and non-violent but degrading pornography—may in fact cause sufficiently significant harm to others, particularly women.

These theorists often follow social science researchers in drawing more fine-grained distinctions within the general category of pornography (i.e., the sexually explicit material whose primary function is to produce sexual arousal in those who view or read them). They often distinguish between

1) violent pornography; 2) non-violent but degrading pornography; and 3) non-violent and non-degrading pornography, since there is some evidence to suggest that some of these materials (e.g., in categories 1 and 2) may be harmful in ways that other material (e.g., category 3) is

not. I will summarize some of this important evidence shortly.

One important dimension of the disagreement between those liberals who defend a right to pornography and those who think that liberals should be open to the legitimacy of censorship is *empirical*: they disagree about the crucial empirical issue of whether there is reliable evidence to show that the production and consumption of pornography by consenting adults in fact causes harm to others, particularly women. But frequently they also disagree about some important *conceptual* matters as well. In particular, they may disagree (albeit sometimes implicitly) about how three central elements of the harm principle should be understood: (i) exactly what counts as “harm” to others, in the relevant sense; (ii) when can we say that something is a “cause”, or a sufficiently “direct cause”, of a harm; and (iii) how much harm to others is “sufficiently great” to justify coercive sanctions against the speech or conduct that produces it. In other words, they disagree about how the harm principle should be interpreted and applied.

Many argue that more traditional liberal conceptions of the interests or rights that individuals have, and so of what activities can cause harm to them, is too narrow. It ignores the way in which threats to individuals' interests can come not just from the state, but also from other social practices and circumstances (e.g., substantive socio-economic disadvantage) that can prevent the meaningful exercise of freedom just as effectively. The state may thus have a legitimate role to play in promoting the social conditions that enable individuals to exercise their rights in meaningful ways, and in regulating such activities of non-governmental agents or groups as may serve significantly to infringe them.

## **Pornographic Ethics**

A 2008 study on university campuses found that a whopping 87 percent of “emerging” adult men (aged 18-26), and 31 percent of emerging adult women report using porn at some level. Twenty percent of young men report using pornography daily or every other day, and almost half use it at least weekly. But the shock factor of pornography consumption statistics do not stop there: The sky is blue and men view porn—we’ve lost the shock value in our passive acceptance. Perhaps the more telling pornography statistic is that slightly over two thirds of young men, and nearly half of young women believe that porn consumption is morally acceptable.

This statistic of acceptance is particularly interesting because it is pulled from our generation, which often defines right and wrong in terms of consequences. Consequence-based morality maintains that if something doesn’t hurt yourself or others, it’s not wrong. The principle of “Thou shalt not hurt” thus becomes the backbone of discursive moral reasoning, as observed by the National Study of Youth and Religion. Removing an external moral standard from moral reasoning makes it difficult to condemn sex trafficking, exploitation, and violence, much less explicit sexual content and nudity. But even in terms of a “Thou shalt not hurt” moral code, passively accepting pornography overlooks the very real consequences of porn consumption.

Healthy sexuality combines emotional, social, intellectual, and physical elements, but pornography separates the mechanized components of intercourse from real sexuality itself. It leads to decreased sensitivity toward women and increased aggression. It also leads to a decreased ability to build healthy relationships or experience sexual satisfaction; users are increasingly unable to properly link emotional involvement with sex. Indeed, porn fosters incredibly unhealthy views about sexuality and human beings. Most porn portrays women as sex-obsessed, mindless objects, promiscuous and subordinate. As feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon might propose, the preva-

lence of pornography begs the question: Are women human? Though that question seems extreme, ask yourself if a good society can intentionally engage in a medium that portrays half of its members in such a derogatory manner.

There is much discussion on how the government should regulate the big business of pornography, seesawing between freewheeling libertarianism and heavy-handed censorship.

Indeed, we are increasingly desensitized to discussion about porn use and regulation, even as research proves the effects of pornography are life altering, and stories of sex exploitation, psychological problems, and abuse dominate inspections into the porn industry. Many Americans embrace fair-trade coffee, concerned about the industries that produce their goods, but few consumers express concern about porn industry operations, and its employees and victims.

Even by the often-cited moral standards of individual choice and "Thou shalt not hurt," the porn discussion demands our moral attention. Recent work by neurologists illustrates the very real addictive properties of pornography. Porn addictions restrict real individual choice. University of Texas-San Antonio's Dr. Donald L. Hilton, Jr.'s research on porn addiction explains that pleasure chemicals in the brain are gradually overused when a person views pornography; the brain then limits dopamine production, causing the viewer to become starved for dopamine.

Despite the personal and social costs of pornography, health services are absurdly silent on the issue of such an exploitative and harmful industry. Harvard's University Health Services and Office of Sexual Prevention and Response dance around the issue without offering services or information to students about porn consumption and addiction. OSAPR refused the requests of True Love Revolution officers to assist with the White Ribbon Against Pornography Week without citing any reasons. OSAPR should make a concerted effort to reach out to students who are struggling with porn and educate students on the harmful effects of pornography. University offices shy away from addressing the porn issue as a tangible part of students' personal lives; they instead turn it into a vague, elusive matter.

Perhaps the University avoids the porn issue in order to avoid moral or social controversy, but fear of stirring up debate does few favors for students who struggle with porn consumption. University of Chicago professor Jean Bethke Elshtain argues in *The Social Costs of Pornography* that we should not dismiss the "moral" in our avoidance of the "moralistic." Elshtain maintains that in order to be responsible citizens, we must ask ourselves, "What sort of community is this?"

Is it reasonably decent and kind? Is it a fit place for human habitation, especially for the young? What happens to the most vulnerable among us? How do we ill-dignify the human body, and how do we forestall such affronts?" Such questions demand long-winded, nuanced answers, yet it is worth seeking these answers. They are pertinent to those who are involved in the porn industry, and they are pertinent to our own lives. We should all be asking ourselves whether pornography is compatible with a respectful and good society.

## **Representation**

Representation is simply the act of imitation or the act of identification, people identify themselves by means of their mimetic ability, when they see themselves in others and perceive a state of mutual equality. Representation of reality may refer to simile, similarity and symbolization of the world when we take it as a transformation of myth. The idea of representation at its simple level involves our understanding for the action of representation and how we define that act. This essay details

media representation of reality as outlined by key theorists and their theories in the classical age and it further explains representation as a substitute and also as ideology.

Classical age refers to the antique period before the birth of Jesus Christ (Auerbach, E, 1974). Key philosophers during this period included people such as Plato who is the ancient Greek philosopher; Aristotle who is also a Greek philosopher and he was Plato's student; Saint Thomas Aquinas who is a theologian from Italy; Galileo Galilei an Italian physician, astronomy and philosopher and last but not least Francis Bacon who is an English philosopher and leader of scientific revolution. I will critically do an in-depth analysis/discuss representation as outlined by this philosophers and I will also distinguish representation as a substitute and ideology.

First of all let's consider Plato who takes 'representation' with several meanings and connotations in the dialogue and alters the term according to the context in which he uses it. Plato can perhaps be identified as the culprit behind the idea that representation are lacking in truth or 'real' quality. Plato view representation as imitation or '*mimesis*'. (Annas, 1982)

For Plato, more than two thousand years ago, an image was the representation of something and was not, could not, be an original. It was always an imitation and always lacking in value when compared to the original since it was not an original it had to be a simulacrum, a false claim to being. (Annas, 1982)

Plato simulacrum calls into question, the entire relationship between the real objects and its copy, and also prioritises the two entities in terms of value. Plato discuss 'representation' as likening oneself to another in speech and bodily behaviour and as addressing the lower part of man's soul; he also refers to the epistemology and metaphysics of the concept. (Spring, 1985)

In contradicting this, Aristotle who is known to be Plato's student 'representation' does not refers to the imitation of idea and appearance, like that of Plato. Aristotle view representation as a sign and argues that each area of knowledge is imitated in the sense that as a human being we all learn through imitation (Annas,1982)

According to Angelo (1985) Aristotle is the first to deal with 'representation' as a theory of art. He dwell on the concept of representation as an aesthetic theory of art and considers imitation in terms of the form it is embodied. Aristotle states that all human action are mimetic and that men learn through imitation e.g. in the social learning theory of Albert Bandura it is said that we learn by imitating from an early age. In particular to him 'representation' is a distinguishing quality of an art.

For Plato, the artist was nothing but an imitator. This imitator while pretending to represent the real, did nothing more than give representation to an opinion about the real. Plato's student Aristotle, perhaps more diplomatically than Plato, described the image of painted figure not as the likeness of a character but rather as a sign of the character. Aristotle view representation of reality as referent to someone or something but does not try to pose as that someone or something (Summers, 1996:6).

However, he carefully makes a distinction between difference kinds of knowledge e.g. he claims that art and philosophy deal with different kinds of truth; philosophy deals with concrete and absolute truth, whereas art deals with aesthetic and universal truth. Aristotle take's representation as an active aesthetic process. (Crane, R, S & Keats, W, R et al, 1996)

Plato and Aristotle attributed different meanings to the term representation. Plato considers rep-

representation as in ethical and political context whereas Aristotle uses representation as an aesthetic phenomenon and as an activity of the artist as I have explained in the above paragraph; they both agree that poetry is mimetic but they have different ideas about poetry and representation. (Summers, 1996)

Plato and Aristotle argue that artist (Demiurge) and poet imitate nature, thus, a work of art is a reflection of nature. However, they have different views on the functions of imitation in art and literature. Plato believes in the existence of the ideal world, where exists a real form of every object found in nature. A work of art which reflects nature and is twice far from the reality it represents. Aristotle, on the other hand, does not deal with the ideal world, instead he analyses nature. He argues that a work of art does not imitate nature as it is, but as it should be. In this sense, an artist does not violate the truth but reflects the reality.

Plato's main concern is with the public recitation of dramatic and epic poetry and in Plato there is emulation between philosophy and poetry. The poet influences the character of the young in every way and has corruptive impact upon the education of the young mind. In addition, poets don't have a true knowledge of the things. Plato suggests that the emotional appeal is a threat to reason, that mimetic art is remote from reality, that the poet is not serious and knows nothing about poetry and cannot give satisfactory information about his art.

It is obvious that he resists the concept of imitation in the case of poetic composition. Tragedy, in particular, and poetry, in general, is concerned with pleasure rather than instruction and since it is not possible to imitate a wise and quiet person in the play, since such a person does not fit the content of tragedy, 'representation' is ethically distracting. Therefore, the function of various

discussions of representational art in the Republic is ethical; wherever he mentions art he discusses it in relation to education and ethics (Annas, 1982).

Although Aristotle agrees with Plato that poetry has the power to stimulate emotions, he does not pay much attention to the ethical and epistemological aspects of 'representation'. Yet he dwells on the pleasure that men take in learning and argues that tragedy discharges the feelings and spectators leave the play in a state of calm, free of passions.

Plato worries about the moral effect of poetry, while Aristotle strikes to psychology and returns repeatedly to shuddering terror and pity that the tragedy is creating in the spectator, who therefore repeats or imitates what has already taken place on stage. And that, in its turn, spectator repeats or imitates what has already taken place. (Phillip, 1996)

Plato argues that there is a duality between art (representation and narrative art) and ethics. This manner of representation (impersonation), according to Plato, leads to the loss-of-self or transformation of identity and becomes a matter of moral destruction. Aristotle also takes the same activity of impersonation, but in a different way. (Gerathy, 1996:275)

After few years a medieval catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas acknowledged the vertical nature that symbolic representation had now taken on; a lower verse which indicates points to represent the higher God. Although denying that the higher and the lower are equivalents, Aquinas admitted that the higher can be addressed through the lower. Aquinas view representation as a divine instrument.

According to Aquinas representation have, in the midst of the mysteries of the faith, become almost supernatural mediums between mankind and God. In fact Aquinas encouraged this practice; since we cannot directly be exposed to divine truth, the faith must be translated into something which is represented to be consumed by us through our lower or human sense.

## **Representation and differences-Marginalization**

Media represent one of the most dynamically changing systems in society. The evolution of media has been determined by the progress in the area of information and communication technologies, their spread and mass usage, whereas it includes numerous and diverse political, economic, cultural, ethical, and social implications. The editor of the publication, Rachna Sharma, stated following in the Introduction: "Today, while observing 'movements' on social issues at an increased frequency, with increased participation of the public, the claimed media interventions and the changing role of governments in this triangular relationship, one is compelled to locate the issue of marginalised sections in society."

The present is, above all, the time of social media characterised by a high degree of civic activism and individual freedom in the creation and presentation of the content: on the other hand, the power and economic strength of international media conglomerates has been growing on a regional and global scale. It is often discussed the undeniable contribution of the media to building a democratic society, a healthy public environment and their ability to help to radical social transformations, however we may also see that media provide a diametrically different space for the presentations of certain groups. If they highlight specific social participants, others are out of focus of the mainstream media. This bipolarity in displaying marginalised groups in society is one of the paradoxes of the postmodern society and a significant feature of the contemporary mainstream mass media.

Relevant responding to numerous questions related to the establishment and clarification of relations between media, the state and marginalized groups has become the subject of an academic debate, the results of which have the potential to reach the broader social awareness and media practice. In March 2016, the National seminar on the topic Media, the State and the Marginalized: Tackling Challenges took place at the Department of Journalism, Kalindi College, University of Delhi in India. The reviewed publication consists of selected papers presented at the seminar, edited by Rachna Sharma, Assistant Professor in the Department of Journalism of Lady Shri Ram College for Women at Delhi University, India. The publication includes 21 chapters summarised in five major thematic areas, as follows: Part I: Media and Political Communication, Part II: Representation of the Marginalised and Media Ethics, Part III: New Media, Social Media and Digital Activism, Part IV: Alternative and Community Media: The Media of the Marginalised? and Part V: Critical Theory, Media Criticism and Media Reforms. A part of the proceedings is a brief dictionary, in which the reader can find definitions of key terms related to the solved issues and an index of concepts and names that will help them in orientation in the content. It consists of 331 pages.

As indicated by the structure of the publication, its ambition is to provide a variety of views on the dynamically changing relation between media, the state and marginalized groups in an effort to comprehensively understand current social-political and social-cultural processes, which the contributors managed to accomplish. Individual authors address selected areas in a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. This is mainly due to the composition of the authors' team, which includes leading Indian experts from different areas, such as media studies, cultural studies, journalism, sociology, Public Relations, as well as long-standing experts from media practice. It is an in-

terdisciplinary approach to exploring how media are in the digital age, who marginalised groups are in current social-political-economic structures and how they are reported by mainstream media that can be considered as a significant contribution of the publication to the wider debate on the subject. Despite the fact that the issue is dealt with by the authors from the domestic, Indian perspective, its overlap lies in a qualitative and quantitative solution. This approach expands the possibilities of publication's use. It can serve not only to academics and researchers, but also to the students of media studies, journalism, political science, and sociology. However, also workers in the media, especially in the news-service and others who are interested in the issue of marginalized groups in Indian society and its various stances can find a lot of inspirational information. Thus, notions presented in individual contributions may serve as the basis for the theoretical and empirical comparative research of the allocated groups in other countries, as well. We should particularly appreciate the fact that the findings published in the book *Media, the State and Marginalisation: Tackling Challenges* may serve as the foundation for institutional debate aimed at addressing the problematic position of the marginalized groups in the Indian society heading towards formulating reforms. Thus, I consider the reviewed publication as an extraordinarily impressive contribution to the discussion on tackling the position of marginalized groups in modern society, with a significant overlap to the theory and the endeavour to practically apply the findings not only in media practice, but also in formulating measures at society-wide level.

## **Martin Slivka**

'The Master of nine crafts', Professor Karol Plicka, was Martin Slivka's role model and inspiration. A few of his films and scholarly analyses published in several books were devoted to Plicka and his extraordinary artistic accomplishments. He was not only Slivka's inspiration but also the object of his profound research inquiries. Slivka's own creative path unfolded from his Master's work he admired so much. This creative path was extraordinarily rich and diverse – he was an excellent documentary filmmaker, screenwriter, playwright, director, as well as a prominent ethnologist, a scientist and, ultimately, a lecturer who inspired and provoked his students by creating a space for free search of connections through his lectures.

He considered education, creativity and ethics to be the basic values any artist should have possessed. He is one of the key personalities of our culture that need to be re-discovered, reflected on by returning to their messages, confronted with the world. Martin Slivka was the co-founder of modern Slovak documentary film; he made more than 140 remarkable film documents. His independent debut, *Water and Work* (1963), highlighted the fact that a gifted filmmaker possessing a precious artistic opinion has just entered the area. The motion picture, which focuses on technical landmarks such as mills, uses artworks of prominent Slovak artists, e.g. music of Ilya Zeljenka and images of Jozef Grussmann, yet without any explicit spoken comments.

In addition to many other Slivka's films worthy of our attention, the documentary from Bulgaria *Man Is Leaving* (1968) is truly exceptional. "He reconsidered the traditionally descriptive ethnographic film works, (...) talking about the place of death in human life, about things that are common in all cultures," *The History of Slovak Cinematography* (2016) claims. The same publication also states that "During the period of 1963 – 1969, the authors of various generations, e.g. Karol Skřípský (1908), Vlado Kubenko (1924), Martin Slivka (1929), Dušan Hanák (1938) and Dušan Trančík (1946) created their masterpieces, their opuses". However, it was no coincidence; the political situation of the 1960s in our country but also anywhere else in the world seemed to universally inspire the best creators of different generations active in different areas of artistic life. Martin

Slivka used similar artistic approaches to creating films about art and film portraits of prominent Slovak artists.

Moreover, he remained faithful to ethnographic film, exploring folk culture in its essence (but through a modern film language), customs and folk theatre that he also reflected on in his academic publications. The publication *The Slovak Folk Theatre* (2002) is the result of his researching and seeking. His precise work preparations necessarily involved searching for co-creators who, in his opinion, would provide their future collective work with the best possible quality. That is why Milan Rúfus, one of the most outstanding personalities of Slovak literature, wrote comments on some of his films. Moreover, world-famous music artists such as Krzysztof Penderecki and Ilya Zeljenka were willing to link their music with Slivka's films. Martin Slivka's filmmaking skills were connected to his ethnological erudition, based on multidisciplinary approaches to the presented themes, as his unique studies on this topic clearly reflected.

He was a rebellious, stubborn debater; his former students, and there are many, are grateful not only for his professional supervision but also for the intellectual search they were lucky to experience while standing beside him. "It is difficult, if I may use his own words, to 'establish Martin Slivka in any structure'. He is a patriarchal tradition of the East and a Renaissance legacy of the West, all in one.

His whole being completely smells of humanity," writes one of his most successful students, the film director Mário Homolka.

While appreciating his work, it is impossible to omit the 13-part television series *The Children of the Wind* (1990) about the lives of Gypsies in many European countries. His son Ľubomír worked with him and despite many difficulties they experienced in many countries while making the series, they created a unique piece of art that is still unmatched in this area of creative expression and, as I daresay, it will remain unmatched for a long time. The film's value will definitely increase, since it offers a set of thorough, yet subtle expressions of the quickly vanishing Romani traditions. Martin Slivka is the winner of many prizes and awards, one of the most discussed Slovak filmmakers. Above all, he will be remembered as an inventive, wise and loving man, as a true renaissance person who knew how to understand human weaknesses and always tried to overcome these weaknesses through considerable doses of irony that was so typical for all his works.

## **Milan Stano**

Painter, graphic designer, cartoonist. Publisher, editor, writer and connoisseur of everything connected with travelling around the world. His inspirations are tangible not only in images and writings he has created but also in endless considerations, comparisons and evaluations reflecting on his works. He is original, capable in each of the mentioned creative fields, unrepeatable. He is tough and hardworking. Most of his paintings are landscapes, images of rural environments and urban visions. Following his paintings, he travels across the country with his rack, sketchbook, colours and brushes. "In his paintings, a calm landscape emerges, radiating harmony, balance; through urban motives and folk architecture, he creates poetic compositions," wrote a critic. The humorous images of Slovak folklore and folk traditions also define the cartoons he has been publishing since 1966: "I love Slovak humour; the soul of the nation, the unbound joy of life, the sense of justice and the mockery of stupidity are all enchanted within it," wrote Milan Stano. That is why he also became the publisher, editor and later editor-in-chief of the independent satirical monthly magazine *Kocúrko*, published by Štúdio humoru a satiry since 1990. That is where he started to

publish books as well. His cartoons are kind, ironic and provocative at the same time, always able to reflect the problems Slovakia has to face – after all, the reader should become acquainted with various cultural or historical contexts –; however, they also point out the more general questions of being, joy and ‘borderless’ stupidity. They represent timelessness and a peculiar dialogue with the universe. His heroes are mostly sketched with a closed line, and that is the hallmark of his work: “I understand the caricature as a system of fine arts philosophy through which I can contribute to creating a certain atmosphere. For example, a humorous drawing allows me to create a sense of good mood, optimism, while a cartoon satire helps me create an atmosphere of criticism. The caricature is a good companion,” wrote the author.

## **Legal Ethics: law and morality**

Ethics is a branch of philosophy that aims to answer the basic question, “What should I do?” It’s a process of reflection in which people’s decisions are shaped by their values, principles, and purpose rather than unthinking habits, social conventions, or self-interest.

Our values, principles, and purpose are what give us a sense of what’s good, right, and meaningful in our lives. They serve as a reference point for all the possible courses of action we could choose. On this definition, an ethical decision is one made based on reflection about the things we think are important and that is consistent with those beliefs.

While each person is able to reflect and discover their own sense of what’s good, right, and meaningful, the course of human history has seen different groups unify around different sets of values, purposes and principles. Christians, consequentialists, Buddhists, Stoics and the rest all provide different answers to that question, “What should I do?” Each of these answers is a ‘morality’.

## **Morality**

Many people find morality extremely useful. Not everyone has the time and training to reflect on the kind of life they want to live, considering all the different combinations of values, principles, and purposes. It’s helpful for them to have a coherent, consistent account that has been refined through history and can be applied in their day to day lives.

Many people also inherit their morality from their family, community or culture – it’s rare for somebody to ‘shop around’ for the morality that most closely fits their personal beliefs. Usually the process is unconscious. There’s a challenge here: if we inherit a ready-made answer to the question of how we should live, it’s possible to apply it to our lives without ever assessing whether the answer is satisfactory or not.

We might live our whole lives under a moral system which, if we’d had the chance to think about, we would have rejected in part or in full.

## **Law**

The law is different. It’s not a morality in the strict sense of the word because, at least in democratic nations, it tries to create a private space where individuals can live according to their own ethical beliefs or morality. Instead, the law tries to create a basic, enforceable standard of behaviour necessary in order for a community to succeed and in which all people are treated equally.

Because of this, the law is narrower in focus than ethics or morality. There are some matters the law will be agnostic on but which ethics and morality have a lot to say. For example, the law will be

useless to you if you're trying to decide whether to tell your competitor their new client has a reputation for not paying their invoices, but our ideas about what's good and right will still guide our judgement here.

There is a temptation to see the law and ethics as the same – so long as we're fulfilling our legal obligations we can consider ourselves 'ethical'. This is mistaken on two fronts. First, the law outlines a basic standard of behaviour necessary for our social institutions to keep functioning. For example, it protects basic consumer rights. However, in certain situations the right thing to do in solving a dispute with a customer might require us to go beyond our legal obligations.

Secondly, there may be times when obeying the law would require us to act against our ethics or morality. A doctor might be obligated to perform a procedure they believe is unethical or a public servant might believe it's their duty to leak classified information to the press. Some philosophers have argued that a person's conscience is more binding on them than any law, which suggests to the letter of the law won't be an adequate substitute for ethical reflection.

## **Law and Morality**

Law and morality are too vague to understand. It must be added here that the notions of law and justice can't be captured and presented before us within a few sentences. These notions are too vast that even words are not sufficient to define them.

In general view morality is the quality of being in accord with standards of right or wrong conduct. Morality, speaks of a system of behavior in regards to standards of right or wrong. The word carries the concepts of: (1) moral standards, with regard to behavior; (2) moral responsibility, referring to our conscience; and (3) a moral identity, or one who is capable of right or wrong action. Morality has become a complicated issue in the multi-cultural world we live in today. Timeless wisdom explains that there cannot be a complete law unless there lays the effect and inclusion of morality. My Project explores what is Moore's concept of morality and how he explains its affects on our behavior, our conscience, our society, and our ultimate destiny.

Law and morality are too vague to understand. It must be added here that the notions of law and justice can't be captured and presented before us within a few sentences. These notions are too vast that even words are not sufficient to define them. Many jurists from the ancient Greek period to the modern and even the post-modern era have attempted numerously to define these concepts, but have failed. One of the reasons may be that the roots of these concepts lie somewhere within the human psyche, which is extremely random and versatile. Well it is required to describe the tenets of the two main schools of law.

## **Theory of Relationship between Law and Morality**

Ever since the revival of the scientific study of jurisprudence the connection of law and morality has much discussed, but the question is not yet, and perhaps never will be settled. Every variety of opinion has been entertained, from the extreme doctrine held by Austin that for the purpose of the jurist, law is absolutely independent of morality, almost to the opposite positions, held by every Oriental cadī, that morality and law are one. The question is an important one, and upon the answer which is given to it depends upon the answer which is consequences. The problem is an intensely practical one.

The popular conception of the connection between law and morality is that in some way the law

exists to promote morality, to preserve those conditions which make the moral life possible, and than to enable men to lead sober and industrious lives. The average man regards law as justice systematized, and justice itself as a somewhat chaotic mass of moral principles. On this view, the positive law is conceived of as a code of rules, corresponding to the code of moral laws, deriving its authority from the obligatory character of those moral laws, and being just or unjust according as it agrees with, or differs from them. This, like all other popular conceptions, is inadequate for scientific purposes, and the jurist, so far at least as he is also a scientist, is compelled to abandon it. For it is contradicted by the fact's. positive laws do not rest upon moral laws and common notions of justice furnish no court of appeal from the decrees of the State. The average man confounds law and morality, and identifies the rules of law with the principles of abstract justice.

### **No Distinction in Ancient Times**

In the earlier stages of the society there was no distinction between law and morals. In Hindu law, the prime source of which are the Vedas and the Smritis, we do not find such distinction in the beginning. However, later on, Mimamsa laid down certain principles to distinguish obligatory from recommendatory injunctions. In the West also the position was similar. The Greeks in the name of the doctrine of 'natural right' formulated a theoretical moral foundation of law. The roman jurist in the name of 'natural law' recognized certain moral principles as the basis of law. In the Middle Ages, the Church became dominant in Europe. The 'natural law' was given a theological basis and Christian morals were considered as the basis of law.

### **Moral as a part of law**

There are some who assert that even if law and morals are distinguishable it remains true that morality is in some way an integral part of law or of legal development, that morality is "secreted in the interstices" of the legal system, and to that extent is inseparable from it.

Thus it has been said that law in action is not a mere system of rules, but involves the use of certain principles, such as that of the equitable and the good (aequum et bonum). By the skilled application of these principles to legal rules the judicial process distills a moral content out of the legal order, though it is admitted that this does not permit the rules themselves to be rejected on the general ground of their immorality.

Another approach would go much further and confer upon the legal process an inherent power to reject immoral rules as essentially non-legal; this seems to resemble the classical natural law mode of thought, but it is urged, the difference is that according to the present doctrine it is a matter of the internal structure of the legal system, which treats immoral rules as inadmissible rather than as being annulled by an external law of nature.

If value judgments such as moral factors, form an inevitable feature of the climate of legal development, as is generally admitted, it is difficult to see the justification for this exclusive attitude.

Value judgment which enter into law will require consideration of what would be a just rule or decision, even though not objective in the sense of being based on absolute truth, may, nevertheless, be relatively true, in the sense of corresponding to the existing moral standards of the community.

Whether it is convenient or not to define law without reference to subjective factors, when we come to observe the phenomena with which law is concerned and to analyze the meaning and use

of legal rules in relation to such phenomena, it will be found impossible to disregard the role of value judgments in legal activity, and we cannot exercise this functional role by stigmatizing such judgments as merely subjective or unscientific.

### **The Problem about the Nature of Law J.Raz (1982)**

The theory of knowledge attempts to clarify the nature of knowledge, the philosophy of logic examines the definition of logic, moral philosophy reflects on the nature and boundaries of morality and so on.

One finds philosophers who took the enquiry concerning the nature of law to be an attempt to define the meaning of the word "law". Traditionally those who adopted the linguistic approach concentrated on the word "law". However, it encountered the overwhelming problem that that word is used in a multiplicity of non-legal contexts. We have laws of nature and scientific laws, laws of God and thought, of logic and of language, etc. Clearly the explanation of "law" has to account for its use in all these contexts and equally clearly any explanation which is so wide and general can be of very little use to legal philosophers.

Only one assumption can the explanation of "law" hope to provide the answer to the legal philosopher's inquiry into the nature of law. That assumption is that the use of "law" in all its contexts but one is analogical or metaphorical or in some other way parasitical on its core meaning as displayed in its use in one type of context and that that core meaning is the one the legal philosopher has at the centre of his enquiry. Unfortunately, the assumption is mistaken. Its implausibility is best seen by examining the most thorough and systemic attempt to provide an analysis of "law" based on this assumption, that proposed by John Austin in *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*.

### **The Lawyers' Perspective**

Many legal philosophers start from an unstated basic intuition:

"The law has to do with those considerations which it is appropriate for the courts to rely upon in justifying their decisions."

Most theorists tend to be by education and profession lawyers and their audience often consists primarily of law students. Quite naturally and imperceptibly they adopted the lawyers' perspective on the law. Lawyers' activities are dominated by litigation in court, actual or potential. They not only conduct litigation in the courts. They draft documents, conclude legal transactions, advise clients, etc., always with an eye to the likely outcome of possible litigation in which the validity of the document or transaction or the legality of the client's action may be called into question. From the lawyer's point of view the law does indeed consist of nothing but considerations appropriate for courts to rely upon.

Hans Kelsen says he follows a combination of the linguistic approach and the institutional approach: "Any attempt to define a concept in question. In defining the concept of law we must begin by examining the following questions:

Do the social phenomena generally called law present a common characteristic distinguishing them from other social phenomena of a similar kind?

The clue to the methodological approach Kelsen was in fact pursuing is in his insistence that legal theory must be a pure theory. Kelsen regarded it as doubly pure. It is pure of all moral argument and it is pure of all sociological facts. Kelsen indicates his belief that the analysis of legal concepts and the determination of the content of any legal system depends in no way at all on the effects the law has on the society or the economy, nor does it involve examination of people's motivation in obeying the law or in breaking it.

For Kelsen, it is self-evident that legal theory is free of all moral considerations. The task of legal theory is clearly to study law. If law is such that it cannot be studied scientifically then surely the conclusion that if the law does involve moral considerations and therefore cannot be studied scientifically, then legal theory will study only those aspects of the law which can be studied scientifically.

Since Kelsen has no good reason to insist that legal theory should be free from moral consideration, he has no good reason to delimit the law in the way he does.

### **The international Approach**

It is the lawyer's perspective which delivers the verdict. Yet there is something inherently implausible in adopting the lawyer's perspective as one fundamental methodological stance. There is no doubting the importance of the legal profession and of the judicial system in society. It is however, unreasonable to study such institutions exclusively from the lawyer's perspective.

Institutional approach seems much superior to its rivals. The institutional approach strives to present an analysis of a central political institution should be accepted as the analysis of law. From the institutional point of view, the basic intuition is the starting point for further critical reflection. It is entirely plausible to regard the notion of law as bound up with that of a judicial system but what are the essential characteristics of a court and why are they important to the political organization of society? Three features characterize courts of law:

1. They deal with disputes with the aim of resolving them.
2. They issue authoritative rulings which decides these disputes.
3. In their activities they are bound to be guided, at least partly, by positivist authoritative consideration.

At the highest level of philosophical abstraction the doctrine of the nature of law can and should be concerned with explaining law within the wider context of social and political institutions. It shows how the inclination to identify the theory of law with a theory of adjudication and legal considerations with all those appropriate for courts is based on a short sighted doctrine overlooking the connection of law with the distinction between executive and deliberative conclusion. Clearly, a theory of adjudication is a moral theory. It concerns all the considerations affecting reasoning in the courts, both legal and non-legal.

When the doctrine of the nature of law is identified with a theory of adjudication it becomes itself a moral theory. The doctrine of the nature of law yields a test for identifying law the use of which requires no resort to moral or any other evaluative argument. But it does not follow that one can defend the doctrine of the nature of law itself without using evaluative arguments. Its justification is tied to an evaluative judgment about the relative importance of various features of social organiza-

tions and these reflect our moral and intellectual interest and concerns.

## **Law and Morality**

In the modern world, morality and law are almost universally held to be unrelated fields and, where the term "legal ethics" is used, it is taken to refer to the professional honesty of lawyers or judges, but has nothing to do with the possible "rightness" or "wrongness" of particular laws themselves.

This is a consequence of the loss of the sense of any "truth" about man, and of the banishment of the idea of the natural law. It undermines any sense of true human rights, leaves the individual defenseless against unjust laws, and opens the way to different forms of totalitarianism. This should be easy enough to see for a person open to the truth; but many people's minds have set into superficial ways of thinking, and they will not react unless they have been led on, step by step, to deeper reflection and awareness.

## **Relationship between Law and Morality or Ethics**

Law is an enactment made by the state. It is backed by physical coercion. Its breach is punishable by the courts. It represents the will of the state and realizes its purpose.

Laws reflect the political, social and economic relationships in the society. It determines rights and duties of the citizens towards one another and towards the state.

It is through law that the government fulfils its promises to the people. It reflects the sociological need of society.

Law and morality are intimately related to each other. Laws are generally based on the moral principles of society. Both regulate the conduct of the individual in society.

They influence each other to a great extent. Laws, to be effective, must represent the moral ideas of the people. But good laws sometimes serve to rouse the moral conscience of the people and create and maintain such conditions as may encourage the growth of morality.

Laws regarding prohibition and spread of primary education are examples of this nature. Morality cannot, as a matter of fact, be divorced from politics. The ultimate end of a state is the promotion of general welfare and moral perfection of man.

It is the duty of the state to formulate such laws as will elevate the moral standard of the people. The laws of a state thus conform to the prevailing standard of morality. Earlier writers on Political Science never made any distinction between law and morality.

Plato's Republic is as good a treatise on politics as on ethics. In ancient India, the term Dharma connoted both law and morality. Law, it is pointed out, is not merely the command of the sovereign, it represents the idea of right or wrong Based on the prevalent morality of the people.

Moreover, obedience to law depends upon the active support of the moral sentiments of the people. Laws which are not supported by the moral conscience of the people are liable to become dead letters.

For example laws regarding Prohibition in India have not succeeded on account of the fact that full moral conscience of the people has not been aroused in favor of such laws.

As Green put it, "In attempting to enforce an unpopular law, a government may be doing more harm than good by creating and spreading the habit of disobedience to law. The total cost of such an attempt may well be greater than the social gain."

Although law and morality are interdependent yet they differ from each other in their content, definiteness and sanction.

### **Some points of distinction between law and morality may be brought out as follows:**

Law:

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the law as:

'the body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.'

That this should be regarded as the definition of law for the English language is evidence of the influence legal positivism has upon the philosophy of law in our culture. The central themes of positivism are the contentions: firstly, that the existence of law rests upon identifiable social facts and, secondly, that it is necessary to maintain a conceptual distinction between law and morality. In this essay I will examine the positivist assertion that law is identifiable independently of morality, with a particular focus on the theory of H.L.A Hart.

1. Law regulates and controls the external human conduct. It is not concerned with inner motives. A person may be having an evil intention in his or her mind but law does not care for it. Law will move into action only when this evil intention is translated into action and some harm is actually done to another person.
2. Law is universal in a particular society. All the individuals are equally subjected to it. It does not change from man to man.
3. Political laws are precise and definite as there is a regular organ in every state for the formulation of laws.
4. Law is framed and enforced by a determinate political authority. It enjoys the sanction of the state. Disobedience of law is generally followed by physical punishment. The fear of punishment acts as a deterrent to the breach of political law.
5. Law falls within the purview of a subject known as Jurisprudence.

### **Morality:**

1. Morality regulates and controls both the inner motives and the external actions. It is concerned with the whole life of man. The province of law is thus limited as compared with that of morality because law is simply concerned with external actions and does not take into its fold the inner motives. Morality condemns a person if he or she has some evil intentions but laws are not applicable

unless these intentions are manifested externally.

2. Morality is variable. It changes from man to man and from age to age. Every man has his own moral principles.
3. Moral laws lack precision and definiteness as there is no authority to make and enforce them.
4. Morality is neither framed nor enforced by any political authority. It does not enjoy the support of the state. Breach of moral principles is not accompanied by any physical punishment. The only check against the breach of morality is social condemnation or individual conscience. 'Moral actions are a matter of choice of inner conscience of the individual, laws are a matter of compulsion'.
5. Morality is studied under a separate branch of knowledge known as Ethics.  
We may conclude the discussion in the words of Gilchrist, "The individual moral life manifests itself in manifold ways. The state is the supreme condition of the individual moral life, for without the state no moral life is possible.  
The state, therefore, regulates other organizations in the common interest. The state, however, has a direct function in relation to morality."

### **Points to Remember**

Laws may be defined as external rules of human conduct backed by the sovereign political authority. Law and morality are intimately related to each other.

### **Laws are generally based on the moral principles of a particular society. Some points of distinction may be brought out as follows:**

- (a) Laws regulate external human conduct whereas morality mainly regulates internal conduct.
- (b) Laws are universal; morality is variable.
- (c) Laws are definite and precise while morality is variable.
- (d) Laws are upheld by the coercive power of the state; morality simply enjoys the support of public opinion or individual conscience.
- (e) Laws are studied under Jurisprudence but morality is studied under Ethics.

### **Law and freedom**

Both law and morality imply human freedom. Clearly, without freedom one cannot speak of morality. But the same holds for law, for if it were automatically and not freely obeyed, men would be mere robots. Law is not a simple indication of what happens, such as the law of physics; it is an admonition to free persons about what they are required to do if they wish to live freely and responsibly in society; and it normally carries with it a sanction or punishment to be imposed on whoever is shown to have acted against given norms of conduct. Just law, properly understood, appeals to freedom.

Nevertheless one of the most generalized liberal ideas is that law is by nature the enemy of freedom. Servais Pinckaers holds that Catholic moralists have gone through many centuries under the influence of this mentality which has led, by reaction, to the anti-law approach of much of contemporary moral theology. In this view, law and freedom were seen as "two opposed poles, law having the effect of limitation and imposing itself on freedom with the force of obligation. Freedom and law faced each other as two proprietors in dispute over the field of human actions. The moralists

commonly said, "Law governs this act, freedom governs that one..." The moralists were traditionally the representatives of the moral law, and their mission was to show to conscience how to apply it in a particular situation, in a "case of conscience". Today we witness a strong tendency to invert the roles; the moralists now regard themselves as defenders of freedom and of personal conscience" [as against the law].

## **Law and justice**

Law cannot attempt to regulate the purely interior sphere of personal conduct; morality can. Human or civil law is connected with external actions, precisely insofar and because they impinge on the rights or lawful actions of others. Hence the necessary connection of law with justice. For the regulation of interpersonal relations must work from the basic principle of justice: "to each his due". Hence arises the fundamental question of what is due to each one, and from this the further question of human rights.

To each his due. Something is due to each. This is the sense of equality before the law. "The possibility of giving his or her due not only to a relative, friend, citizen or fellow believer, but also to every human being simply because he is a person, simply because justice requires it, is the honor of law and of jurists. If there is an expression of the unity of the human race and of equality between all human beings, this expression is rightly given by the law, which can exclude no one from its horizon under pain of altering its specific identity".

Even for those who see law and freedom in mutual opposition, the whole concept of law is essentially connected with that of justice. The ancient principle *lex iniusta non est lex* (an unjust law is not a law), is at the basis of so many modern protests in the name of freedom. "This law is discriminatory, therefore it is not just". But justice is a moral concept; so these protests bear out the intrinsic connection between law and morality, "There is another crucial link between the virtues and law, for knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of justice".

'The law must respond to "living situations"...' Very good, but not in the sense that it must take the situation as its norm. Justice must remain the norm, and sometimes the law must regain ground for justice.

## **Influence of Morals on Law**

Law and Morals act and react upon and mould each other. In the name of 'justice', 'equity', 'good faith', and 'conscience' morals have in-filtered into the fabrics of law. In judicial law making, in the interpretation of legal precepts, in exercising judicial discretion (as in awarding punishment) moral considerations play a very important role. Morals work as a restraint upon the power of the legislature because the legislature cannot venture to make a law which is completely against the morals of the society. Secondly, all human conduct and social relations cannot be regulated and governed by law alone. A considerable number of them are regulated by morals. A number of action and relations in the life of the community go on very smoothly without any intervention by law. Their observance is secured by morals. So far as the legal rules are concerned, it is not the legal sanction alone that ensure their obedience but morals also help in it. Thus, morals perfect the law. 'In marriage, so long as love persists, there is little need of law to rule the relations of the husband and wife – but the solicitor comes in through the door, as love flies out of the window.'

## Growing Importance of Morals

Now, sociological approach has got its impact upon the modern age. This approach is more concerned with the ends that law has to pursue. Thus, recognized values, or, in other words, morals (of course the morals of the modern age) have become a very important subject of study for good law making. On international law also morals are exercising a great influence. The brutalities and inhuman acts in World Wars made the people to turn back to morals and efforts are being made to establish standards and values which the nations must follow. Perhaps there is no other so forceful ground to justify the Nuremberg Trials as morals. If the law is to remain closer to the life of the people and effective, it must not ignore morals.

## Legal Obligation and Authority

Whatever else they do, all legal systems recognize, create, vary and enforce obligations. This is no accident: obligations are central to the social role of law and explaining them is necessary to an understanding of law's authority and, therefore, its nature. Not only are there obligations *in* the law, there are also obligations *to* the law. Historically, most philosophers agreed that these include a moral obligation to *obey*, or what is usually called "political obligation." Voluntarists maintained that this requires something like a voluntary subjection to law's rule, for example, through consent. Non-voluntarists denied this, insisting that the value of a just and effective legal system is itself sufficient to validate law's claims. Both lines of argument have recently come under intense scrutiny, and some philosophers now deny that law is entitled to all the authority it claims for itself, even when the legal system is legitimate and reasonably just. On this view there are legal obligations that some of law's subjects have no moral obligation to perform.

## Obligations In the Law

Every legal system contains obligation-imposing laws, but there is no decisive linguistic marker determining which these are. The term "obligation" need not be used, nor its near-synonym, "duty." One rarely finds the imperative mood. The Canadian Criminal Code imposes an obligation not to advocate genocide thus: "Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years." The English Sale of Goods Act says that, "Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied under the contract are of merchantable quality." That these laws create obligations follows from the way "offence" and "implied condition" function in their respective areas of law, not from the language in which they are expressed.

On the face of it, some laws have other functions. A requirement that "a will must be signed" generally imposes no duty—not a duty to make a will, and not even a duty to have it signed if you do—it sets conditions in the absence of which the document simply does not count as a valid will. Nonetheless, some philosophers, including Jeremy Bentham and Hans Kelsen, argue that the content of every legal system can and should be represented solely in terms of duty-imposing and duty-excepting laws. Bentham asks, "What is it that every article of law has in common with the rest? It commands and by doing so creates *duties* or, what is another word for the same thing, *obligations*". They think that analyzing laws this way reveals what legislators or subjects most need to know: under what conditions the coercive power of law will ultimately be met. Others argue that even if such a reduction were possible, it would be unwieldy, uninformative and unmotivated, concealing as it does the different social functions that laws fulfil (Hart 1994: 26–49) and the different kinds of reasons for action that they create (Raz 1990). Others still, despairing of any principled way of knowing what a law is, have abandoned the problem entirely and tried to develop a theory

of law that bypasses it. At a minimum, it does seem clear that whether or not all laws impose obligations, they can only be fully *understood* through their relations to those that do. Thus, a legal right is an interest that warrants holding others under an obligation to protect it, a legal power is the ability to create or modify obligations, and so forth.

What then are legal obligations? They are legal requirements with which law's subjects are *bound* to conform. An obligatory act or omission is something the law renders non-optional. Since people plainly *can* violate their legal obligations, "non-optional" does not mean that they are physically compelled to perform, nor even that law leaves them without any eligible alternative. On the contrary, people often calculate whether or not to perform their legal duties. Could it be then that obligations are simply weighty reasons to perform, even if sometimes neglected or outweighed? This cannot be a sufficient condition: high courts have important reasons not to reverse themselves too frequently, but no legal obligation to refrain. Nor is it necessary: one has an obligation, but only a trivial reason, not to tread on someone's lawn without his consent.

If their content does not account for the stringency of obligations, what does? An historically important, though now largely defunct, theory explained it in terms of penalty. Following Hobbes and Bentham, the English jurist John Austin says that to have a legal obligation is to be subject to a sovereign command to do or forbear, where a command requires an expression of will together with an attached risk, however small, of suffering an evil for non-compliance. "When I am talking *directly* of the chance of incurring the evil, or (changing the expression) of the liability or obnoxiousness to the evil, I employ the term *duty*, or the term *obligation*..." (Austin 1832, 18). Others conceived an indirect connection between duty and sanction. Hans Kelsen holds that what is normally counted as the content of a legal duty is in reality only part of a triggering condition for the mandatory norm which commands or authorizes officials to impose a sanction: "[A] norm: 'You shall not murder' is superfluous, if a norm is valid: 'He who murders ought to be punished'" (Kelsen 1967, 55). And thus, "Legal obligation is not, or not immediately, the behavior that ought to be. Only the coercive act, functioning as a sanction, ought to be" (Kelsen 1967, 119).

None of these versions of the sanction theory survived H.L.A. Hart's criticisms (Hart 1994, 27–42; cf. Hacker 1973). First, they misleadingly represent a range of disparate legal consequences—including compensation and even invalidation—as if they all function as penalties. Second, they render unintelligible many familiar references to duties in the absence of sanctions, for example, the duty of the highest courts to apply the law. Third, they offer an inadequate explanation of non-optionalness. "You have an obligation not to murder" cannot merely mean "If you murder you will be punished," for the law is not indifferent between people, on the one hand, murdering and being jailed, and on the other hand not murdering at all. "The right to disobey the law is not obtainable by the payment of a penalty or a licence fee". Such dicta are commonplace and reflect familiar judicial attitudes. Most important, the normal function of sanctions in the law is to reinforce duties, not to constitute them. It is true that *one* reason people are interested in knowing their legal duties is to avoid sanctions, but this is not the only reason nor is it, contrary to what Oliver Wendell Holmes supposed, a theoretically primary one. Subjects also want to be *guided* by their duties—whether in order to fulfil them or deliberately to infringe them—and officials invoke them as *reasons for*, and not merely consequences of, their decisions.

Sensitivity to such matters led Hart to defend a *rule-based* theory. He says that while sanctions might mark circumstances in which people are *obliged* to conform, they have an *obligation* only when subject to a practiced social rule requiring an act or omission. The fact that subjects use it as a rule marks it as normative. Three further features distinguish obligation-imposing rules: they

must be reinforced by serious or insistent pressure to conform; they must be believed important to social life or to some valued aspect of it; and their requirements may conflict with the interests and goals of the subject (Hart 1994, 85–88). This account of the *nature* of obligations is not an account of their *validity*. Hart does not say that a legal duty is binding whenever there is a willingness to deploy serious pressure in its support, etc. He holds that a duty is legally valid if it is part of the legal system (i.e., if it is certified as such by the tests for law in that system), and a legal duty is morally valid only if there are sound moral reasons to comply with it. But, at least in his early work, he offers the practice theory as an explanation of duties generally—legal duties are the creatures of legal rules, moral duties of moral rules and so on.

The constitutive role of social pressure is sometimes considered an Austinian blemish on Hart's theory, but there are in any case more serious problems with it as a general account of obligations. People readily speak of obligations when they are well aware that there are no relevant social practices, as might a lone vegetarian in a meat eating society. And Hart's practice conditions may be satisfied in cases where there is no obligation but only generally applicable reasons, as when victims are regularly urged to yield their wallets to a mugger. At best, Hart's theory will apply only to a special class of obligations in which the existence of a conventional practice is an essential part of the reasons for conformity, though even here, the theory is open to doubt.

A third account is *reason-based*. On this view, what constitutes obligations is neither the social resources with which they are enforced, nor the practices in which they may be expressed, but the kind of reasons for action that they offer. Legal obligations are content-independent reasons that are both categorical and pre-emptive in force. The mark of their content-independence is that their force does not depend on the nature or merits of the action they require: in most cases, law can impose an obligation to do *X* or to refrain from doing *X*. That they are pre-emptive means that they require the subject to set aside his own view of the merits and comply nonetheless. That they are categorical means that they do not condition their claims on the subject's own goals or interests.

This view is foreshadowed in both Hobbes and Locke, but its most influential contemporary version is due to Joseph Raz. He argues that obligations are categorical reasons for action that are also protected by *exclusionary* reasons not to act on some of the competing reasons to the contrary. Obligations exclude *some* contrary reasons—typically at least reasons of convenience and ordinary preference—but they do not normally exclude all: an exclusionary reason is not necessarily a conclusive reason. The stringency of an obligation is thus a consequence not of its weight or practice features, but of the fact that it supports the required action by special normative means, insulating it from the general competition of reasons. Or at any rate this is what obligations do when they have the force the claim, i.e., when they are binding. The theory does not assume that all legal obligations actually are binding from the moral point of view, but it does suppose that the legal system puts them forth as if they were—a consequence that some have doubted. (Hart 1982, 263–67; Himma 2001, 284–97) And while this account is invulnerable to the objections to sanction-based and practice-based theories, it does need to make good the general idea of an 'exclusionary reason', and some philosophers have expressed doubts on that score also (Perry 1989, Regan 1987): is it ever reasonable to exclude *entirely* from consideration an otherwise valid reason? The account has, nonetheless, been adopted by legal philosophers with otherwise starkly contrasting views of the nature of law.

## Authority, Obligation, and Legitimacy

A competitive market is not a legal system, even though people adjust their behaviour in response to relative prices and the whole constitutes a form of social order. Neither was the system of mutual nuclear deterrence, though it guided behaviour and generated norms that regulated the Cold War. Many philosophers and social scientists agree that a social order is a legal system only if it has effective *authority*. An effective (or *de facto*) authority may not be justified, but it does stand in a special relation to justified (*de jure*) authority. Justified authority is what effective authorities claim, or what they are generally recognized to have.

What is legal authority, and how is it related to obligations? It is a kind of practical authority, i.e. authority over action. On one influential view, "To claim authority is to claim the right to be obeyed" (Wolff 1970, 5). There are, of course, authorities that make no such claim. Theoretical authorities, i.e., experts, are not characterized by claims to obedience—they need not even claim a right to be believed. And there are weaker forms of practical authority. To give someone authority to use your car is merely to permit him. But political authority, of which legal authority is one species, is normally seen as a right to rule, with a correlative duty to obey. On this account law claims the right to obedience wherever it sets out obligations. And to obey is not merely to comply with the law; it is to be *guided by* it. Max Weber says it is "as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake" (Weber 1963, 946). Or, as Robert Paul Wolff somewhat more perspicuously puts it: "Obedience is not a matter of doing what someone tells you to do. It is a matter of doing what he tells you to do *because he tells you to do it*" (Wolff 1970, 9). This is not to say that one obeys only in treating the authority's say-so as an indefeasible reason for action; but one must treat as a binding content-independent reason. The question whether there is an obligation of obedience to law is a matter of whether we should act from the legal point of view and obey the law as it claims to be obeyed.

It is an interesting feature of this account that it supposes that one can tell what the authority requires independent of whether the requirement is justified on its merits. Richard Friedman argues: "[I]f there is no way of telling whether an utterance is authoritative, except by evaluating its contents to see whether it deserves to be accepted in its own right, then the distinction between an authoritative utterance and advice or rational persuasion will have collapsed" (Friedman 1973, 132). An idea of this sort is developed by Raz into one of the leading arguments for the "sources thesis", the idea that an adequate test for the existence and content of law must be based only on social facts, and not on moral arguments. Authority's subjects "can benefit by its decisions only if they can establish their existence and content in ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the authority is there to settle" (Raz 1994, 219). If law aims to settle disputes about moral issues, then law must be identifiable without resolving these same disputes. The law is therefore exhausted by its *sources* (such as legislative enactments, judicial decisions, and customs, together with local conventions of interpretation). This kind of argument has been generalized (see Shapiro 1998), but also subjected to criticism. It is uncertain what sort of constraint is posed by the idea that it should not involve "the very same issues"—perhaps if morality is a necessary condition only there could be moral tests for authority that leave the relevant dependent reasons untouched (Coleman 2001, 126–7). And while law does indeed serve as a scheme for guiding and appraising behaviour, it may also have other functions, such as educating its subjects about right and wrong, and this may be ill-served the attitude that the rules are to be obeyed in part because they are the rules (Waluchow 1994).

The obligation-correlative view of authority is not universally accepted. Some argue that legal authority involves no claim right, but only a set of liberties: to decide certain questions for a society

and to enforce their decisions. The liberty conception must answer two questions. First, is it not a feature of a right to decide that it requires subjects to refrain from acting on competing decisions? If the law says that abortion is permissible and the Church says that it is not, what does the denial of the Church's right to decide amount to if not that public policy should be structured by the former decision and not the latter, even if the latter is correct? Second, does the right to enforce include a duty of subjects to pay the penalty when required? If it does, then this is only a truncated version of the obligation-correlative theory—one that holds that punitive and remedial obligations, but not primary obligations, are binding. If not, it is starkly at variance with the actual views of legal officials, who do not think that subjects are at liberty to evade penalties if they can.

This reaches a methodological issue in the philosophy of law. Some consider that the character of law's authority is a matter for descriptive analysis fixed by semantic and logical constraints of official language and traditions of argument. Others maintain that such analysis is impossible or indeterminate, and that we are therefore driven to normative arguments about what legal authority should be. Crudely put, they think that we should understand law to claim only the sort of authority it would be justifiable for law to have. Such is the motivation for Friedrich Hayek's suggestion that 'The ideal type of law ... provides merely additional information to be taken into account in the decision of the actor' (Hayek 1960, 150). Hayek favours the free market, and concludes that the nature of legal authority should be understood analogically. The most radical position of this sort is Ronald Dworkin's. He prefers what he calls a "more relaxed" understanding of legal authority (Dworkin 1986: 429). Others have argued that the pre-emptive notion of authority is unsatisfactory because it is too rigid (e.g., Perry 1989). Dworkin's objection runs much deeper. His position is not that law communicates only a weaker form of guidance; it is that law is not to be understood as trying to communicate anything at all. A subject considering his legal duties is not listening to the law; he is engaged in "a conversation with oneself," and is "trying to discover his own intention in maintaining and participating in that practice" (Dworkin 1986, 58). On this view there is no fact of the matter about what law claims that is independent of what each does well to regard it as claiming.

However we resolve the methodological question, there are two parallel normative questions:

- The problem of obligation: What if anything justifies the duty to obey the law, and how far does that obedience properly extend?
- The problem of legitimacy: What if anything justifies the coercive power of law, and how far may that power properly extend?

What is the relationship between these? Some maintain that obligation comes first: "[T]hough obligation is not a sufficient condition for coercion, it is close to a necessary one. A state may have good grounds in some special circumstances for coercing those who have no duty to obey. But no general policy of upholding the law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a source of genuine obligations" (Dworkin 1986, 191). The idea is that merely having justice on one's side is an inadequate ground for coercing others; one also needs a special title flowing from the moral status of the law. (Contrast, for example, Locke's view that everyone has an "executive power of the law of nature," at least outside political society (§ 13).)

Others contend that this gets the relationship backwards. First, it is doubtful whether one could have an obligation to obey an illegitimate regime. As Rawls says, "[A]cquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations". If so, at least some conditions of legitimacy precede an obligation of obedience. Second, there are substantive reasons for think-

ing we would not have obligations to obey if the law were not *already* justified in upholding its requirements “with steel.” A legal system that could not justifiably coerce could not assure the law-abiding that the recalcitrant will not take them for suckers. Without being able to solve this assurance problem it would be unjust to impose obligations on them, and unjust to demand their obedience. Underlying this suggestion is that idea that familiar idea that effectiveness is a necessary—but certainly not sufficient—condition for justified authority.

### 3. Obligations to the Law

It may affirm our confidence in the obligation-correlative view to know that from earliest times philosophical reflection on political authority has focussed on the obligation to obey. The passive obligation of obedience is certainly not all we owe the law (Parekh 1993, 243; Green 2003, 543–47) but many have taken it to be law's minimum demand. This gives rise to a puzzle. As Wolff puts it: “If the individual retains his autonomy by reserving to himself in each instance the final decision whether to co-operate, he thereby denies the authority of the state; if, on the other hand, he submits to the state and accepts its claim to authority then ... he loses his autonomy”. Wolff resolves the dilemma in favour of autonomy, and on that basis defends anarchism.

Some of Wolff's worries flow from the “surrender of judgement” itself—how can it ever be rational to act against reason as one sees it? Others flow from the fact that it is a surrender *to the law*. On the first point, it is relevant to notice that promises and contracts also involve surrender of judgement and a kind of deference to others, yet a rational anarchist needs such voluntary commitments to substitute for authoritative ordering. A principled objection to every surrender of judgement is thus self-defeating. Moreover, there seem to be cases in which by surrendering judgement on some matters one can secure more time and resources for reflection and decision on things that are more important, or with respect to which one has greater capacity for self-direction. A partial surrender of judgment may therefore enhance the agent's autonomy overall.

This suggests that Wolff's concern is better understood as scepticism about whether it is justifiable to surrender one's judgment wholesale to the law. Some philosophers have queried the intelligibility of this doubt; they say that it is of the *nature* of law that there is an obligation to obey it, at least in its central case. Some go so far as to conclude that it is therefore absurd to ask for any *ground* of the duty to obey the law: law is that which is to be obeyed (McPherson 1967, 64). We need a way into this circle, and the best entrance is in specifying the nature of law in a way compatible with various theories of its nature. Three features are especially important (drawing on Hart 1994, 193–200; Raz 1990, 149–54; and Lyons 1984, 66–68.) First, law is *institutionalized*: nothing is law that is not connected with the activities of institutions such as legislatures, courts, administrators, police, etc. Second, legal systems have a *wide scope*. Law not limited to the affairs of small face-to-face groups such as families or clans, nor does it only attend to a restricted domain of life such as baseball. Law governs open-ended domains of large, loosely structured groups of strangers and it regulates their most urgent interests: life, liberty, property, kinship, etc. But although law necessarily deals with moral matters, it does not necessarily do so well, and this is its third central feature: law is *morally fallible*. This is acknowledged by both positivists and natural lawyers, whose slogan “an unjust law is not a law” was never intended to assert the infallibility of law.

The question of political obligation, then, turns on whether there are moral reasons to obey the mandatory requirements of a wide-ranging, morally fallible, institutionalized authority. This obliga-

tion purports to be comprehensive in that it covers all legal obligations and everyone whose compliance the law requires. It is not assumed to bind come what may, though it is to be one genuine obligation among others. Some philosophers also consider that it should bind people particularly to their own states, i.e., the states of which they are residents or citizens, and that an argument that could not show that one had more stringent duties to obey one's own country than a similarly just foreign one would be in that measure deficient (Simmons 1979, 31–35; Green 1988, 227–28). Finally, it is common ground the obligation exists only when a threshold condition of justice is met.

## **Legal Validity**

Legal validity governs the enforceability of law, and the standard of legal validity enhances or restricts the ability of the political ruler to enforce his will through legal coercion. Western law adopts three competing standards of legal validity. Each standard emphasizes a different dimension of law (Berman 1988, p. 779), and each has its own school of jurisprudence.

Legal positivism emphasizes law's political dimension. Legal positivism recognizes political rulers as the only source of valid law and adopts the will of the political ruler as its validity standard. Leading legal positivists include Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and H.L.A. Hart.

Natural law theory emphasizes law's moral dimension. Natural law theory recognizes universal moral principles as the primary source of valid law. These moral principles provide a standard of legal validity that imposes moral limits on the ruler's coercive powers. Leading natural law theorists include Aristotle, Cicero, Justinian, and Thomas Aquinas.

The historicist school emphasizes law's historical dimension. The historicist school recognizes legal custom as the primary source of valid law. Legal custom provides a standard of legal validity that imposes customary limits on the political ruler's coercive powers. Leading historicists include Sir Edward Coke, John Selden, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone.

Legal positivism recognizes positive law as the only real law and rejects law's moral and historical dimensions as sources of valid laws. Natural law theory and the historicist school, on the other hand, often integrate law's three dimensions. They recognize each dimension as a potential source of valid law but emphasize a particular dimension through their validity standard. Blackstone's unique jurisprudence adopts two validity standards, one from law's historical dimension, and one from law's moral dimension.

Standards of legal validity are historically cyclical. A society typically adopts a standard of legal validity based on moral principles, custom, or both. This validity standard restricts the ruler's ability to enforce his will through legal coercion. Then, intellectual challenges to moral principles and legal custom minimize their esteem. A new validity standard is adopted based on the will of the political ruler. Abuses of coercive powers by political rulers eventually stimulate renewed restrictions on those powers. The society adopts a revived standard of legal validity based on moral principles, custom, or both. The revived validity standard will typically endure until the memory of abuse fades, when the cycle begins again.

This cycle began with Hesiod in 700 B. C. E. and continued into the 21st Century. In common law jurisprudence, judicial acceptance of Hart's legal positivism eroded Blackstone's validity standards based on moral principles and custom. In civil law jurisprudence, Soviet and Nazi abuses of positivist legal systems revived validity standards based on moral principles.

## The Sophists

The first standard of legal validity in the Western legal tradition appears in Hesiod's religious poem *Works and Days*, circa 700 B. C. E. Hesiod presents an archetypal jurisprudence that integrates law's three dimensions. Dikê, the goddess of human justice, personifies law's moral dimension. Dikê's father Zeus personifies law's political dimension. Dikê's mother Thetis, the Titan embodiment of custom and social order, personifies law's historical dimension.

Justice "sets the laws straight with righteousness" and distinguishes men from beasts. Divinely decreed moral principles establish the validity standard for human law and customs, and conforming laws and customs establish the *nomoi* (law). Just men obey the *nomoi*, and obedience brings peace and prosperity. Disobedience brings punishment to the individual and his city through famine, plague, infertility, and military disaster.

The Sophists, wandering teachers of the fifth century B. C. E., challenged Greek conventions in religion, morality, and political conduct. They rejected Hesiod's moral dimension by rejecting the existence of divine lawgivers and universal moral principles. They rejected Hesiod's historical dimension by denying any normative authority to custom. Might was right, and law functioned only in the political dimension as the will of the strongest.

The Sophist Protagoras of Abdera (b. circa 481 B. C. E.), rejected law's moral dimension. As an agnostic, Protagoras rejected the divine lawgiver. As a moral relativist, Protagoras rejected the existence of universal moral principles. Unlike later Sophists, however, Protagoras accepted the validity of custom in law's historical dimension.

Protagoras based his moral relativism on the argument that a shared factual knowledge of the world is impossible. The foundation of Protagoras' relativism is the "man-measure" of the *Aletheia* (Truth). "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not."

Sense perception forms the basis of all knowledge, Protagoras believed, and every sense impression that a person receives is securely true. The data of sense perception, however, are private, subjective states. The wind is truly warm to the man who perceives it as warm, but the same wind is truly cold to the man who perceives it as cold. Perceived objects therefore have contradictory properties and there are no public facts.

Protagoras maintained that all knowledge claims are thus equally true. Furthermore, their truth endures regardless of conflicting claims. Protagoras therefore claimed "it is equally possible to affirm and deny anything of anything."

Protagoras extended his doctrine that all *knowledge* claims are equally true to claim that all *virtue* claims are equally true. Virtue claims are relative to the claimant because virtue is only another form of knowledge. (Plato, *Protagoras*, 323a-328d). There are no universal moral principles, and law's moral dimension does not exist.

Although Protagoras rejected law's moral dimension, he embraced law's historical dimension. Although all knowledge and virtue claims are equally *true*, Protagoras argued they are not all equally *sound*. Only the ignorant equated truth with soundness. One set of thoughts can therefore be "better than another, but not in any way truer." The same is true of laws. All laws are equally true, but not all laws are equally sound.

Protagoras accepted a duty to obey the law. Since no moral or legal code is truer than any other, no individual should assert his moral or legal judgments over those advanced by the state. Society is required to preserve humanity. The perpetuation of society, in turn, requires respect for law and custom. Men should obey the state's laws and customs so long as they function soundly.

The Sophist Callicles (b. *circa* 484 B. C. E.), rejected law's historical dimension and denied any duty to obey the law. Using "nature" to mean the antithesis of mind, Callicles argued that nature's normative authority (*phusis*) supersedes the normative authority of man's laws and customs (*nomoi*). Man's laws and customs violate "nature's own law" and "natural justice." Nature's law, not man's, should govern our actions.

Callicles said that what men call "right" merely expresses what men believe to be to their advantage. Legal conventions in democracies wrongfully elevate the weak over the strong. The majority of weaker folk frame the laws for their advantage to prevent the stronger from gaining advantage over them. The true nature of right is established by nature, not men, and nature's law establishes right in the strong.

Natural justice provides that the better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior. Might, therefore, makes right. All animals and races of man recognize right as the sovereignty and advantage of the stronger over the weaker.

The Sophist Thrasymachus (b. *circa* 459 B. C. E.) argued for disobeying laws and customs. Defining justice as obedience to the laws, Thrasymachus argues that justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger. Obedience furthers the advantage of others and reduces the obedient to a form of slavery. Only disobedience to law profits a man and leads to his advantage. Injustice is therefore "a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice."

Solon's constitution created an archetypal positivist legal system in Athens in 594 B. C. E. Solon reposed political and judicial authority in the heliastic courts. The courts enforced undefined laws with no standard of legal validity other than the unrestrained will of the jurors. Pericles' introduction of payments for jurors in 451 B. C. E. enthroned Athens' poorest and least educated class as *dikasts* in the heliastic courts. The Athenian courts became infamous for injustice and gullibility. Xenophon writes that Athenian courts often acted on emotion to put innocent men to death and acquit wrongdoers. Eighty *dikasts* who found Socrates innocent voted for his death.

Athenian ostracism (*ostrakismos*) permitted the conviction, exile, and execution of any Athenian without charges, hearing, or defense. Originally intended for removing tyrants, Plutarch records that ostracism quickly became a way of pacifying jealousy of the eminent. Ostracism breathed out malice in exile and death. Everyone was liable to it whose reputation, birth, or eloquence rose above the common level.

Athens ostracized its greatest heroes from envy of their honors. Athens ostracized Aristides, the hero of the Battle of Marathon, in 483 B. C. E. Athens ostracized Themistocles, savior of Athens at the Battle of Salamis, in 471 B. C. E. Both men were exiled for ten years without charges or a hearing.

Lack of procedural safeguards encouraged frivolous public prosecutions (*graphai*) and impeachments (*eisangeliai*), giving free reign to Athens' gullible and imprudent *dikasts*. Frivolous political prosecutions destroyed Athens' leadership, spawning bloody regime changes and military disasters. The frivolous prosecution of Pericles in 443 B. C. E. precipitated the Peloponnesian War with

Sparta. The frivolous prosecution of Alcibiades in 415 B. C. E. caused Athens' ablest general to switch sides and lead Sparta against Athens.

The greatest ignominy involves the Arginusae generals in 404 B. C. E. Six Athenian naval commanders won a great naval victory against Sparta at Arginusae. A violent storm prevented their recovering the dead and shipwrecked. The generals were nevertheless impeached and executed for failing to do so. Deprived of her best generals, Athens lost the war the next year in a devastating naval defeat at Aegospotami.

Political prosecutions wreaked political havoc as well. Five regime changes rocked Athens between 411 B. C. E. and 403 B. C. E. These regimes included the reign of terror by the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B. C. E.

Athenian positivism criminalized thought and expression in frivolous prosecutions against philosophers. Anaxagoras *circa* 430 B. C. E., Protagoras *circa* 415 B. C. E., and Socrates in 399 B. C. E. were all convicted on manufactured charges of impiety (*asebeia*). Impiety was undefined by Athenian law. Every juror defined it anew in every case as he pleased.

Athens often regretted its decisions. Socrates' lead accuser Anytus was stoned for his role in Socrates' death. Athens honored Socrates with a bronze statue by Lysippus. Athens thus gained "the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next."

## 2. Plato

Plato described Socrates as the bravest, wisest, and most upright man of his time. Plato planned a career in politics but "withdrew in disgust" after observing how Athenian courts "corrupted the written laws and customs." (Plato, *Letter VII*, 325a-c). Plato reacted to Socrates' death by repudiating the Sophists, reviving law's moral and historical dimensions, and formulating a natural law standard of legal validity based on principles of universal justice.

Plato begins his revival of law's historical dimension by emphasizing the autonomy of law, which he considered the most important aspect of government. Autonomous laws wield supremacy over political rulers. Political rulers are subject to the same laws as other citizens, and they may not alter the laws to suit their will.

Plato wrote that the preservation or ruin of a community depends on the autonomy of laws more than anything else. Respecting law's autonomy preserves the entire community. Disregarding it brings destruction. Autonomy is so important that "the man who is most perfect in obedience to established law" should receive the highest post in government. The second most obedient man should receive the second highest post, and so on for all the posts.

Plato begins his revival of law's moral dimension by persuasively refuting Protagoras' moral relativism in the *Theaetetus*. Protagoras claimed that all sense perceptions are equally true. Since knowledge is perception, all knowledge claims are equally true. Since moral claims are a species of knowledge claims, all moral claims are equally true. Therefore, no one set of moral principles has authority to guide the laws.

Plato offers eleven objections to Protagoras' arguments in the *Theaetetus*. Three are recounted here. First, Plato denies that knowledge is perception. If knowledge were perception, we would understand anyone speaking to us in a foreign tongue. This is clearly not the case. Second, remem-

bered knowledge refutes Protagoras' claim that knowledge is perception. Remembered knowledge involves no perception, but it is knowledge nonetheless.

Third, moral relativism is self-refuting. Assume, as Protagoras claims, that "all beliefs are true." Assume also that another man exists who believes that "not all beliefs are true." If Protagoras is correct, then the second man's belief must be true. Protagoras' belief that "all beliefs are true" is thus refuted.

Plato continues his revival of law's moral and historical dimensions in the *Crito*. The *Crito* considers whether a duty exists to obey the law. Socrates' friend Crito argues for Socrates to escape and avoid his unjust execution.

Socrates replies that the soul is more precious than the body. Good actions benefit our souls, but wrong actions mutilate them. The important thing is not living, but living well. This means living honorably. Socrates utilizes three principles in determining whether to escape. First, circumstances never justify wrong action. Second, one should not injure others, even when they injure you. Third, one "ought to honor one's agreements, provided they are right."

Plato defines law's moral dimension through these principles. Justinian's *Corpus Juris Civilis* defines its moral dimension by these same principles in the sixth century. (Justinian, *Digest*, 1.1.10). Blackstone's *Commentaries* does the same in the eighteenth century.

Plato next refutes Thrasymachus' claim in the *Republic* that disobeying the law "is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing" than obeying the law. In the *Crito's* "Speech of the Laws," the Laws present two arguments for obedience. The first is the "argument from agreement." Socrates has undertaken to live his life in obedience to Athens' laws. Athens did not force Socrates to live in its precincts. Socrates was free to leave at any time. By choosing to stay in Athens with full knowledge of how the laws functioned, Socrates promised obedience to the laws.

The Laws' orders are "in the form of proposals, not savage commands." Socrates can either obey the Laws or persuade (the personification of) the Law that they are at fault. If Socrates escapes without persuading the personification of the Laws that they were at fault, he would dishonor his agreement to obey the laws. Dishonoring a just agreement violates the ethic of "living well" and damages the soul.

The Laws' second argument is the "argument from injury." Disobedience destroys both the Laws and the city, which cannot exist if legal judgments are ignored. Socrates concludes that "both in war and in the law courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and your country command, or else persuade them in accordance with universal justice" that they are at fault.

The Laws' second argument implies a natural law standard of validity based on principles of universal justice. The Laws insist they operate as "proposals, not savage commands." Socrates' duty to obey the Laws is contingent on the Laws' compliance with principles of universal justice. By implication, there is no duty to obey the Laws if they violate principles of universal justice.

### 3. Aristotle

Aristotle designs his legal philosophy to avoid the catastrophes described in his *Athenian Constitution*. Aristotle accepts the necessity of law's political dimension because laws cannot enforce themselves. Nevertheless, the Athenian legal history proves the political dimension is not

sufficient to preserve a society or achieve its happiness.

Human nature demands more than political power from law. Law must accomplish justice and foster virtue. Justice is required to prevent revolution, and virtue is required for human happiness. Man separated from justice is “the worst of animals,” and man without virtue “is the most unholy and the most savage of animals.”

Aristotle writes in the *Politics* that securing justice is the state’s most important function. Justice is more essential to the state than providing the necessities of life. Governments must be founded on justice to endure. Governments that rule unjustly and give unequal treatment to similarly placed subjects provoke revolutions. Justice maintained, however, forms a bond between the members of society that preserves the state. (Aristotle, *Politics* 1328b, 1332b, 1253a).

Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* defines justice as lawfulness concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community. Aristotle distinguishes between *legal justice* (*to nomikon dikaion*) and *natural justice* (*physikon dikaion*). *Legal justice* involves positive laws and custom enacted by man, such as conventional measures for grain and wine. These “are just not by nature but by human enactment” and “are not everywhere the same.” Aristotle secures *legal justice* by granting autonomy to law and by utilizing custom to encourage obedience.

*Natural justice*, on the other hand, involves principles of natural law that originate in nature. Such principles do not arise in the minds of men “by people’s thinking this or that.” Natural law principles apply with equal force everywhere, just as fire burns both in Greece and in Persia. Aristotle secures natural justice by adopting natural law precepts as the standard of legal validity. Positive laws that violate natural law precepts are nullified.

Aristotle secures *legal justice* by restricting the will of the political ruler through autonomous laws. The *Politics* teaches that unrestrained power produces tyranny, even in democracies. Aristotle considers whether societies function best under the “rule of men” or the “rule of law.” He concludes that laws, when good, should be supreme. Political rulers should merely complement the law by acting as its guardians and ministers. They should only regulate those matters on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars.

Aristotle gives four reasons for emphasizing law’s autonomy over the will of the political ruler. First, law frees the state from the desires and passions that afflict political rulers. “The law is reason unaffected by desire. Desire ... is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men.” (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1287a). Second, tyranny results when political rulers exercise autonomy over law, even in democracies. Third, the orderly rotation of political offices requires autonomous laws. Equality, liberty, justice, and expediency mandate that every mature citizen participates in governing the state. Fourth, the orderly rotation of political offices preserves the state by assuring evenhanded administration by magistrates.

Aristotle utilizes law’s historical dimension to secure *legal justice* through custom. Aristotle uses the term *nomos* for law, and *nomos* includes custom and convention as components of the social norm. Aristotle writes in the *Politics* that legal custom is itself a form of justice. Custom and convention maintain social stability by encouraging obedience to the law. The law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time. Aristotle urges caution in changing the law because changes enfeeble the power of the law. If the advantage of a change is small, it is wiser to leave errors in the law. The citizens usually lose more by the habit of disobe-

dience than they gain by changing the law.

Aristotle utilizes law's moral dimension to secure *natural justice* in two ways. The first is by nullifying positive laws that subvert natural law precepts. Aristotle formulates a natural law standard of legal validity. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* describes natural law as an unwritten law, based on nature, and common to all people. "There is in nature a common principle of the just and unjust that all people in some way divine."

Natural law provides immutable and universal standards of justice. Natural law constitutes a separate body of binding law that exceeds positive law in authority. Human actions should complete nature rather than subvert it, and natural law nullifies positive laws that subvert natural law precepts.

Like Plato, Aristotle argues that the universal standards of natural law justify disobeying positive laws. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provides two examples invalidating positive law for violating natural law precepts. The first is the case of Sophocles' *Antigone*, where Antigone disobeys Creon's order and provides funeral rites to her brother Polyneices. The second is Aristotle's guide to jury nullification of written law by appealing to higher principles of natural law.

Aristotle never explains why natural law wields supremacy over positive law. The supremacy of natural law is consistent, however, with Aristotle's view in the *Physics* that the ultimate causes of nature are divine.

The second way that Aristotle secures *natural justice* is by fostering virtue. Aristotle believed that human happiness depended on virtue more than liberty. The government is thus responsible for producing a virtuous state, and this is best accomplished through law. Although virtue encompasses more than mere conformity to law, virtue will only develop and flourish in a state that supports the legal enforcement of virtue. The state must provide moral education through its laws to make its citizens just and good. Failing to do so undermines the state's political system and harms its citizens.

#### **4. Cicero**

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B. C. E.) was a politician, philosopher, orator, and attorney. Cicero's *De Legibus* (*The Laws*), *De Officiis* (*On Duties*), and *De Re Publica* (*The Republic*) greatly influence the natural law tradition. Cicero esteemed Plato and Aristotle. Although not a Stoic, Cicero adopted Stoicism's divine Nature as the source of natural law precepts that dictate legal validity. The histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius persuaded Cicero that natural law imposes justice on human events.

Cicero's signature contribution to jurisprudence is his explication of Nature as divine lawgiver. Law and justice originate in Nature as a divinely ordained set of universal moral principles. Cicero describes Nature as the omnipotent ruler of the universe, the omnipresent observer of every individual's intentions and actions, and the common master of all people. Belief in divine Nature stabilizes society, encourages obedience to law, and leads to individual virtue.

Law's moral dimension dominates Cicero's jurisprudence. Cicero defines natural law as perfect reason in commanding and prohibiting. These principles are the sole source of justice and provide the sole standard of legal validity. "True law is right reason in agreement with Nature."

The precepts of natural law are eternal and immutable. They apply universally at all places, at all

times, and to all people. Natural law summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. Nature serves as the enforcing judge of natural law precepts, and Nature's punishment for violating natural law precepts is inescapable. (Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 3.33).

Natural law provides the *naturae norma*, the standard of legal validity for positive law and custom. The *naturae norma* provides the only means for separating good provisions from bad. Justice entails that laws and customs comply with the *naturae norma* and preserve the peace, happiness, and safety of the state and its citizens. Positive laws and customs that fail to do so are not regarded as laws at all.

Regarding Cicero's political dimension of law, the magistrate's limited role is to govern and to issue orders that are just and advantageous in keeping with the laws. Although the magistrate has some control of the people, the laws are fully in control of the magistrate. An official is the speaking law, and the law is a nonspeaking official.

Political rulers cannot alter, repeal, or abolish natural law precepts. Furthermore, political rulers have no role in interpreting or explaining natural law precepts. Every man can discern the precepts of natural law for himself through reason.

Political rulers must issue just commands as measured by natural law precepts. Individuals are protected against unjust coercion. Although rulers may use sanctions to enforce legitimate commands, every affected subject has the right to appeal to the people before enforcement of any sanction. Furthermore, no ruler can issue commands concerning single individuals. Any significant sanction against an individual, such as execution or loss of citizenship, is reserved to the highest assembly of the people. As a further protection, all laws must be officially recorded by the censors.

Like Aristotle, Cicero requires that magistrates be subject to the power of others. Successive terms are forbidden, and ten years must pass before the magistrate becomes eligible for the same office. Every magistrate leaving office must submit an account of his official acts to the censors. Misconduct is subject to prosecution. No magistrate may give or receive any gifts while seeking or holding office, or after the conclusion of his term.

Regarding Cicero's historical dimension of law, Cicero agrees with Aristotle that custom maintains social stability by encouraging obedience to law. Custom can even achieve immortality for the commonwealth. The commonwealth will be eternal if citizens conduct their lives in accordance with ancestral laws and customs.

## **5. Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis**

The *Corpus Juris Civilis* (Body of Civil Law) codified Roman law pursuant to the decree of Justinian I. Completed in A.D. 529, the four works of the *Corpus* became the sole legal authorities in the empire. The *Institutes* was a law school text. The *Codex* contained statutes dating from A.D. 438. The *Digest* contained commentaries by leading jurists, and the *New Laws* were supplemented as new laws became necessary.

The *Corpus* is the direct ancestor of modern Western civil law systems. Its influence on canon law is seen in the medieval maxim *Ecclesia vivit lege romana* (the Church lives on Roman law). Common law jurisprudence never accepted the *Corpus* as binding authority. Nevertheless, its twelfth century revival profoundly influenced the formation of common law jurisprudence through the works of the father of the common law, Henry de Bracton.

The *Corpus* divides law into public law involving state interests and private law governing individu-

als. Private law is a mixture of natural law, the law of nations, and municipal law. The *Corpus* establishes a clear hierarchy among law's three dimensions. The moral dimension occupies the highest position and provides the standard of legal validity. The historical dimension of legal custom occupies the second position, and the political dimension of Roman municipal law occupies the lowest position.

The *Corpus'* moral dimension resides in two bodies of law, natural law and the law of nations. Like Cicero, the *Corpus* originates natural law in a divine lawgiver. "The laws of nature, which are observed by all nations alike, are established by divine providence." The precepts of natural law are universal, eternal, and immutable.

Natural law governs all land, air, and sea creatures, including man. "The law of nature is that which she has taught all animals; a law not peculiar to the human race, but shared by all living creatures." The *Corpus* extends natural law to "all living creatures" to repudiate the Sophist arguments that law is merely a human convention with no basis in nature, justice does not exist, and there is no duty to obey law. The *Corpus'* rebuttal focuses on the highly socialized behavior of such animal species as ants, bees, and birds. Although animals cannot legislate or form social conventions, they nevertheless follow norms of behavior. These norms affirm the existence of natural law.

The *Institutes* and the *Digest* state three precepts of natural law: "*Honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.*" Live honorably, injure no one, and give every man his due. . These precepts track the *Crito's* admonishments to live well, harm no one, and honor agreements so long as they are honorable. Blackstone's *Commentaries* adopts these exact precepts.

The law of nations is the portion of natural law that governs relations between human beings. (Justinian, *Digest*, 1.4). Its rules are "prescribed by natural reason for all men" and "observed by all peoples alike." The law of nations is the source of duties to God, one's parents, and one's country. It recognizes human rights to life, liberty, and self-defense, and its recognition of property rights enables contracts and commerce between peoples.

The precepts of natural law provide the standard for legal validity. This standard voids any right or duty violating natural law precepts. The *Institutes* provides illustrative examples: Contracts created for immoral purposes, such as carrying out a homicide or a sacrilege, are not enforceable. (Justinian, *Institutes*, 3.19.24). Immorality invalidates wrongful profits. Anyone profiting from wrongful dominion over another's property must disgorge those profits. (Justinian, *Digest*, 5.3.52).

Immorality invalidates agency relationships. Agents are not obliged to carry out immoral instructions from their principals. If they do, they are not entitled to indemnity from their principals for any liability the agents incur. (Justinian, *Institutes*, 3.26.7). Immorality even invalidates bequests and legacies if the bequest is contingent upon immoral conduct. (Justinian, *Institutes*, 2.20.36).

The *Corpus'* historical dimension provides custom as a source of enforceable law. The *Corpus* defines legal custom as the tacit consent of a people established by long-continued habit. Since custom evidences the consent of the people, it is a higher source of law than positive or statutory law. Statutory provisions, if customarily ignored, are treated like repealed legislation. (Justinian, *Digest*, 1.1.3).

Legal custom establishes the autonomy of law over political rulers. Custom binds judges. A judge's first duty is "to not judge contrary to statutes, the imperial laws, and custom." Legal custom even controls statutory interpretation. "Custom is the best interpreter of statutes."

The *Corpus*' political dimension resides in its six categories of Roman municipal law, the "statutes, plebiscites, senatusconsults, enactments of the Emperors, edicts of the magistrates, and answers of those learned in the law." In contrast to natural law and the law of nations, Roman municipal law was unique to Rome. Its provisions were also "subject to frequent change, either by the tacit consent of the people, or by the subsequent enactment of another statute."

## **Philosophical Counseling: Managing everyday problems The Basic Premise**

Our ways of thinking influence our ways of feeling, desiring, choosing, acting, creating, relating, and being in the world. But most of the time we don't even notice our patterns of thinking. They run on auto-pilot, fueled by old habits and operating assumptions. If we could slow down and reflect on our ways of thinking, we might better understand our orientation on the world, and have a chance to ask questions about it, find out how it serves us, and how it trips us up at times. If we could examine our ways of thinking, we might cultivate greater clarity, coherence, breadth and depth in our worldview. This worldview can have a big impact on our future actions, reactions, and general experience of life. If we can learn how to apply a worldview that we've developed carefully and reflectively to our actions in a deliberate way, we can live with a much greater sense of empowerment and authenticity.

A regular practice of self-examination and deliberate action – the cornerstone of a philosophical life, and the very thing we pursue together in philosophical counseling – has the power to increase our sense of understanding, meaning, purpose, freedom, and fulfillment in our lives. It also has the power to transform many of the emotional culprits that cause us suffering – fear, dread, angst, anger, sadness, excessive attachment, jealousy, resentment, and guilt.

Philosophical counseling is, thus, a process that is educative, empowering, and therapeutic.

## **What do we do in Philosophical Counseling?**

In philosophical counseling, we embark on an inquiry into your life. Philosophical counseling is a collaborative and conversational activity between a trained philosopher and a client in which the client's life-problems are worked through by identifying, examining, and revising as necessary the operating beliefs, values, and habits of action that inform those problems.

- (1) The process of identifying the client's implicit "truths" and values, and making them explicit, improves self-awareness and puts the client in a position to clarify and critically examine the fundamental principles that have been guiding their lives.
- (2) The process of critically examining the client's core truths and values helps them to analyze the reasons and evidence that support their beliefs, discover the strengths and weaknesses as well as the benefits and challenges of their ways of thinking, and compare them with alternative perspectives. It also helps them to become aware of inconsistencies between beliefs, and conflicts between beliefs and habits of action (what they say and do). These revelations help the client to become aware of instances in which they might be working at cross-purposes with themselves.
- (3) The revision stage is one of creative re-building, in which the client's core truths and values shift, expand, and sharpen, with the consideration of various perspectives from philosophical wisdom traditions. It is also a stage of application, in which the client experiments with putting new ideas into practice, and works to direct their actions, relationships, and ways of com-

municating with intentional choice.

In counseling, the three stages tend to move in a circular manner, rather than a linear one. As new insights emerge, it can be valuable to circle back to earlier stages with new ideas for deeper examination.

The ultimate goal of philosophical counseling is to help the client to conduct an inquiry into their own life, to develop their own coherent, empowered, and fulfilling philosophy of life, and to live it! Minimally, what a client can expect to get out of philosophical counseling is greater self-knowledge and understanding of their own problems. Maximally, they can become empowered to solve those problems, relieve suffering, and create greater fulfillment in their lives. **The Role of the Philosophical Counselor.**

A philosophical counselor approaches their client as a fully functioning individual with the courage to deal with the perplexities and struggles central to the human condition.

A philosophical counselor does not diagnose or treat emotional or behavioral disorders, and if problems arise of a medical nature, the philosophical counselor will help the client to seek an appropriate health care professional.

A philosophical counselor works collaboratively with their client to solve life-problems by activating and cultivating the powers the client already possesses -- like critical thinking, imagination, empathy, desire, self-discipline, and creativity. A philosophical counselor acts as a navigation partner on the client's own journey to gain awareness, find direction, create solutions, and develop a fulfilling life.

The philosophical counselor does not tell the client what to think or what to do, but instead asks questions, uses tools of critical examination, offers fresh perspectives, draws connections, and gives encouragement. Most importantly, a philosophical counselor listens carefully to their client, works to understand the client's problems and their operating worldview, and works with the client to develop a coherent philosophy of life that will serve their own well-being.

### **An old role**

It may seem that philosophical counseling is a new invention. Actually, it is as old as philosophy itself. The Ancient Greeks – Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans – saw philosophy as not only an educational activity, but as a kind of therapy for the soul that eased suffering, developed personal integrity, encouraged self-mastery, created justice, and cultivated the good life. Even in the era of academic philosophy, this ancient vision of philosophy has survived in the philosophical traditions of ethics, political philosophy, existentialism, pragmatism, feminism, and hermeneutics (among others). Modern day philosophical counselors revive the ancient art of philosophy, and put it to work in a one-on-one setting.

### **What kinds of problems are philosophical problems?**

We might wonder whether or not we've got any philosophical problems. Most of the time we characterize our problems in terms of a particular relationship we're struggling with, a big life change, or a feeling of sadness, loss, confusion, loneliness, frustration, powerlessness, burn-out, or worry. But, quite often these very problems are signs of broader philosophical problems that deserve attention.

Common philosophical problems include questions or difficulties with:

- Core beliefs and truths
- Critical thinking and questioning assumptions
- Creative thinking and trying out alternative perspectives
- Clear reasoning and consistency
- Ethics and values
- Meaning, purpose, and fulfillment
- Happiness
- Identity, self-discovery, self-improvement
- Change, loss, death
- Moderating emotional life
- Existential Angst
- Alienation
- Self-discipline
- Decision Making
- Power and Justice
- Communication and relationships
- Conflict resolution
- Freedom, responsibility, and self-determination
- Authenticity

It's important to recognize that not all life-problems are medical in nature. Not every instance of struggle, suffering, or unhappiness is a sign of a mental illness. There are times when it is appropriate to seek a health care professional with training in psychology for treatment of an emotional or behavioral disorder. There are instances in which a problem in one's brain-chemistry exists and it is appropriate to get the help of a psychiatrist who can prescribe medication. But when problems are not medical in nature, one needs a different kind of counsel.

Sometimes non-medical problems are narrow in scope, requiring legal, financial, business, or academic counsel. And sometimes the problems are more general, at their root having to do with questions like:

- What's true?
- What's right?
- What's good?
- What should I care about most?
- What are my responsibilities?
- What does it all mean?
- What should I do?
- Who am I, and who do I want to be?
- How do I fit into the bigger world?
- Why am I here?
- How can I best relate with others?

- How can I best deal with change?
- How should I live?
- How can I take better control of my life?
- How can I be happy?
- and how can I come to know the answers to any of these questions and cope with uncertainty about them?

These are classic questions of philosophy.

Most everyday problems dealing with ethics, values, meaning, purpose, truth, certainty, justice, power, freedom, and happiness are not medical in nature and cannot be resolved with medical intervention. They are best approached through philosophical dialogue.

### **Differences between philosophical dialogue and psychotherapy**

Philosophical dialogue is a unique kind of dialogue. In it, we take our time to slowly and thoroughly clarify the meaning of our terms, examine lines of reasoning with critical thinking tools, compare our ways of thinking with other perspectives and worldviews, and consider the relationship between our ways of thinking and our ways of feeling, choosing, communicating, and acting.

Unlike psychotherapy, philosophical dialogue is not diagnostic. A philosopher does not treat their interlocutor as a patient, nor assume that there is a disorder or illness present (beyond the challenges with the human condition that we all face). A philosopher does not presume causal explanations for their interlocutor's behaviors, feelings, or thoughts: He or she does not view their interlocutor as one who is "determined" to feel, act, or think in a certain way because of internal or external conditions.

Whereas many psychotherapists tend to approach problems by focusing on their interlocutor's emotional life, eliciting affect, tracing a personal history of trauma, and identifying childhood origins of current difficulties (a retrospective approach focused heavily on emotion); philosophical counselors approach ways of feeling as a starting point for understanding and examining our ways of thinking, our world views, judgments, and values, which influence the way we experience the world and the choices we make. Philosophical counselors work to elicit reasons and evidence for the ways one thinks, ask questions about what is true, good, and fair, open up different perspectives for discussion, and help their clients to consider their future trajectory and range of possibilities (a prospective approach connecting thinking, feeling, and choosing).

Philosophical counselors also consider the ways in which one's personal history takes place within a wider context of social-political structures. There are times when one's distress has much to do with the power relations in which one exists or the state of injustice in the world, and the remedy is not so much about turning inward and learning to adapt to that injustice, but learning how to engage politically, and resist in active, creative, and fruitful ways that bring a sense of meaning, purpose, and agency to our lives.

There are a number of psychotherapeutic methods that are not in tension with, but have a strong kinship with philosophical approaches, as their strategies' theoretical roots can be traced back to Socratic, Stoic, Buddhist, and Existential philosophies, among others.

In summary, philosophical counseling takes a holistic approach to the thinking- feeling-choosing-doing of the individual in a social-political world, and considers the individual's powers of examination, creative exploration, and reflective choice to be vehicles of movement and change.

### **A philosopher's training**

Philosophers have a kind of training that makes them well suited for the kind of dialogue-work described above. It is probably well known that philosophers have a knack for asking questions, clarifying ideas, challenging popular opinions, drawing connections, offering fresh perspectives, and getting involved in painstakingly careful inquiries into big questions. There are some other skills philosophers have that are particularly useful in a one-on-one counseling relationship.

- Philosophers have a trained ability to understand others' worldviews, to learn them inside and out, to explain them, compare them, evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, to analyze their benefits and challenges, and to think through their concrete implications in practice.
- Philosophers have a trained ability to listen carefully for an argument in what another person says, and to identify assumptions, implicit truth claims, and implicit values. They can trace carefully another's line of reasoning, and ask the questions needed to examine it.
- Philosophers carry around with them a toolbox of well-used critical thinking tools that allow them to recognize and remedy faulty reasoning, fallacies, and contradictions.
- Philosophers have experience with uncertainty and exploring uncharted territories of thinking without a map. They are accustomed to working without a formula, and dealing creatively with open-ended questions.
- Philosophers know how to inspire learning, activate and awaken the inner philosopher in others (Socrates' gadfly effect), and empower people to think for themselves and choose reflectively.
- Philosophers know how to learn from others, take what they say seriously, interpret their meaning, and engage in an ongoing practice of self-critique and revision of their own understanding, providing a helpful model to others who are on their own philosophical journey for the first time.
- Philosophers know how to recognize relativism, nihilism, solipsism, and other "tail-spin" positions.
- Philosophers have been trained in, and can discuss, a broad array of wisdom traditions (ancient and modern, eastern and western). They are also experts in a few of their favorite theories, about which they have usually taught, debated publicly with other experts, and published in a deep and thorough manner.

So, here's the punchline. A philosopher can make an excellent co-traveler on your journey into the big questions of life. A philosopher can offer a unique inquiry- experience that opens up distinct dimensions of thought, and that complements and moves beyond other forms of "talk-therapy."

# MCQs

1. Ethics is a-----science.
  - a. Positive
  - b. Negative
  - c. Normative
  - d. Theoretical
  
2. is the domain of ethics that includes professional ethics and practical ethics.
  - a. Positive ethics
  - b. Applied ethics
  - c. Normative ethics
  - d. Metaethics
  
3. Analysis about the nature and status of ethical theories is the subject matter of:
  - a. Positive ethics
  - b. Applied ethics
  - c. Normative ethics
  - d. Metaethics
  
4. is the philosophical examination, from a moral standpoint, of particular issues in private and public life which are matters of moral judgment.
  - a. Positive ethics
  - b. Applied ethics
  - c. Normative ethics
  - d. Metaethics
  
5. is the method of resolving moral problems by the application of theoretical rules.
  - a. Casuistry
  - b. Analysis
  - c. Research
  - d. Heuristic
  
6. The method for jurisprudence and Applied ethics is:
  - a. Analysis
  - b. Research
  - c. Heuristic
  - d. Casuistry
  
7. In ethics Casuistry means:
  - a. Case-based analysis
  - b. Case-based reasoning
  - c. Case-based investigation
  - d. Case-based explanation

8. The word casuistry derives from the Latin noun:
- Case
  - Casue
  - Cassu
  - Casus
9. Identify the ethical position which accepted casuistry as a useful method.
- Absolutism
  - Prescriptivism
  - Utilitarianism
  - None of these.
10. Who among the following criticized utilizing casuistry as a method for applied ethics?
- Pope Francis
  - G. E. Moore
  - C. J. S. Mill
  - Bentham
- Answers 1-10: 1-c, 2-b, 3-d, 4-b, 5-a, 6-d, 7-b, 8-d, 9-c, 10-a,
11. \_\_\_\_\_ is a branch of applied ethics that studies the philosophical, social and legal issues arising in medicine and the life sciences.
- Medical ethics
  - Bio-ethics
  - Legal ethics
  - Practical ethics
12. \_\_\_\_\_ used the term Bio-ethics to describe the relationship between the biosphere and growing human population.
- Fritz Jahr
  - Peter Singer
  - Van R. Potter
  - Sargent Shriver
13. The notion Corporate Social Responsibility is related to:
- Medical ethics
  - Business ethics
  - Media ethics
  - Bio ethics
14. Business ethics is also called:
- Organizational ethics
  - Capital ethics
  - Industrial ethics
  - Corporate ethics
15. \_\_\_\_\_ is the ethical theory proposed maximum happiness for maximum number.
- Ethical absolutism
  - Utilitarianism

- c. Egoism
- d. Ethical Naturalism

16. The name Peter Singer is related to:

- a. Practical ethics
- b. Normative ethics
- c. Metaethics
- d. Deontology

17. Case of Roe V Wade is related to the issue of:

- a. Euthanasia
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. Abortion

18. IVF means:

- a. Intensive Fertilization
- b. In vitro Fertilization
- c. Intro fertilization
- d. In vitro Fetus

19. Identify the first IVF baby.

- a. Robert Edwards
- b. Dolly
- c. Louise Brown
- d. Roe V Wade.

20. Louis Brown was born in:

- a. 1978
- b. 1973
- c. 1975
- d. 1977

Answers 11-20 11-b, 12-c, 13-b, 14-d, 15d, 16-a, 17-d, 18-b, 19-c, 20-a,

21. Who put forward strongest argument against abortion?

- a. Liberalists
- b. Feminists
- c. Consequentialists
- d. Conservatives

22. -----is not a divide line between fertilized egg and child according to liberalists.

- a. Birth
- b. Viability
- c. Quickening
- d. Brain development

23. is the most visible possible divide line between fertilized egg and child for those who support abortion.

- a. Viability
  - b. Birth
  - c. Quickening
  - d. Consciousness
24. Which one is treated as the divided line in Roe Wade case?
- a. Viability
  - b. Birth
  - c. Quickening
  - d. Consciousness
25. -----is the time when the mother first feels the fetus move.
- a. Birth
  - b. Viability
  - c. Consciousness
  - d. Quickening
26. 'Silent scream' is related to:
- a. Euthanasia
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Abortion
  - d. Cloning.
27. 'Fetus is an innocent human being'. Who favored this position?
- a. Liberals
  - b. Conservatives
  - c. Feminists
  - d. Postmodernists
28. Who wrote on liberty?
- a. Kant
  - b. J. S. Mill
  - c. John Rawls
  - d. Bentham
29. According liberalist -----is the real morally significant divide line between fertilized egg and child.
- a. Viability
  - b. Birth
  - c. Quickening
  - d. Consciousness
30. Crimes without Victims is written by:
- a. Edwin Schur
  - b. J. S. Mill
  - c. Peter Singer
  - d. Immanuel Kant
- Answers 21-30 21-d, 22-d, 23-b, 24-a, 25-d, 26-c, 27-b, 28-b, 29-d, 30-a,

31. Opponents of abortion maintain that the victim of abortion is:
  - a. Woman
  - b. Society
  - c. Fetus
  - d. Child
  
32. 'Woman has the right to choose what happens to her own body'. Who favored this statement?
  - a. Liberalists
  - b. Conservatives
  - c. Feminists
  - d. Postmodernists
  
33. Judith Jarvis Thomson is a:
  - a. Liberalist
  - b. Feminist
  - c. Conservative
  - d. Postmodernist
  
34. 'Pro-life' movement is related to the issue of:
  - a. Euthanasia
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Abortion
  - d. Cloning
  
35. The problem of embryo wastage is related to:
  - a. Euthanasia
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. IVF
  - d. Cloning
  
36. Euthanasia means:
  - a. Gentle and easy death
  - b. Painless death
  - c. Unexpected death
  - d. Death
  
37. Euthanasia is popularly known as:
  - a. Silent killing
  - b. Deliberate killing
  - c. Killing on willingness
  - d. Mercy killing
  
38. Euthanasia carried out under the request of the person killed is known as:
  - a. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Voluntary euthanasia
  - c. Involuntary euthanasia
  - d. none of the above

39. Which form of euthanasia is legalized by most of the countries?
- Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - Voluntary euthanasia
  - Involuntary euthanasia
  - none of the above
40. Since 2018 ----- euthanasia is legalized in India.
- Active euthanasia
  - Involuntary euthanasia
  - Passive euthanasia
  - Nonvoluntary euthanasia
- Answers 31-40 31-c, 32-c, 33-b, 34-c, 35-c, 36-a, 37-d, 38-b, 39- b, 40c,

41. India legalized passive euthanasia in:
- March 2018
  - March 2019
  - April 2016
  - April 2015

42. Identify the Greek terms which are the roots of the term Euthanasia.
- Eu and Thaths
  - Eu and Thanatos
  - Eu and Thanasia
  - Eu and Thesia.

43. Aruna Shanbaug case is related to:
- Abortion
  - Surrogacy
  - Pro-life
  - Euthanasia

44. Who filed a petition in the supreme court of India as the plea to discontinue Aruna Shanbaug's life supporting system and allow passive euthanasia to her?
- Judith Jarvis Thomson
  - Pinki Virani
  - Edwin Schur
  - Peter Singer

45. Identify the nation which legalized active euthanasia.
- India
  - Netherlands
  - China
  - France

46. In India ----- is still illegal.
- Active euthanasia
  - Passive euthanasia
  - Involuntary euthanasia
  - Nonvoluntary euthanasia

47. The book -"Bitter Chocolate: Child Sexual Abuse in India", is written by:
- Judith Jarvis Thomson
  - Peter Singer
  - Edwin Schur
  - Pinki Virani
48. The book 'Aruna's Story' is written by:
- Judith Jarvis Thomson
  - Peter Singer
  - Edwin Schur
  - Pinki Virani
49. Which form of Euthanasia is called as Surgeon assisted suicide?
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
50. The term assisted suicide is related with:
- Passive Euthanasia
  - Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
- Answers 41-50 41-a, 42-b, 43-d, 44-b, 45-b, 46-a, 47-d, 48-d, 49-a, 50-b,
51. Euthanasia as -----when the person killed is capable of consenting to his or her death, but do not do so.
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
52. Euthanasia performed against the will of the patient is called:
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
53. Name the euthanasia conducted when the explicit consent of the individual concerned is unavailable.
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
54. Identify the form of Euthanasia which is performed when the person is persistently vegetative state, or the case of infants.

- a. Voluntary Euthanasia
- b. Involuntary Euthanasia
- c. Non-voluntary Euthanasia
- d. Passive Euthanasia

55. The notion of 'status of embryo' related to:

- a. Surrogacy
- b. Euthanasia
- c. Murder
- d. Abortion

56. 'Doing away with useless mouths'. This view related to

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
- b. Nazi euthanasia
- c. Fascists euthanasia
- d. Nonvoluntary euthanasia

57. 'Maintaining a pure Aryan Volk', is the justification given by:

- a. Nazism
- b. Fundamentalism
- c. Terrorism
- d. Fascism

58. Nazi euthanasia is neither voluntary nor non-voluntary but --.

- a. involuntary
- b. passive
- c. active
- d. assisted

59. According to the way in which euthanasia is conducted it can be divided in to :

- a. three
- b. four
- c. two
- d. five.

60. Euthanasia is done by the withdrawal of life supporting systems is called:

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
- b. Passive euthanasia
- c. Active euthanasia
- d. nonvoluntary euthanasia.

Answers 51-60 51-b, 52-b, 53-c, 54-c, 55-d, 56-b, 57-a, 58-a, 59-c, 60-b,

61. According to the way in which euthanasia is conducted it can be divided as :

- a. Voluntary and non-voluntary
- b. Non-voluntary and involuntary
- c. Active and passive
- d. Voluntary and involuntary

62. Division of active and passive euthanasia is based on:
- the uses of medicine
  - the consent of the patient
  - the process of doing euthanasia
  - the autonomy of the patient
63. The euthanasia is done by giving lethal injection is called:
- Passive euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - voluntary euthanasia
  - nonvoluntary euthanasia.
64. The notion 'letting die' is related to:
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.
65. type of euthanasia is widely accepted.
- Passive
  - active
  - in-voluntary
  - non-voluntary
66. Voluntary euthanasia is also called as:
- Suicide
  - Assisted murder
  - Surgeon assisted suicide
  - Surgeon assisted murder
67. Euthanasia is done by the withdrawal of the ventilator is called:
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.
68. Which among the given is treated as the widely accepted form of euthanasia?
- Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - Voluntary euthanasia
  - In-voluntary euthanasia
  - Active euthanasia
69. The term bioethics is derived from the Greek.....
- Bios and Ethos
  - Bio and Ethos
  - Bio and Etho
  - Bios and Etho
70. The article 'Bioethical imperative' is written by

- a. Peter Singer
- b. Van R. Potter
- c. Fritz Jahr
- d. Sargent Shriver

Answers 61-70 61-c, 62-c, 63-b, 64-d, 65-a, 66-c, 67-d, 68-b, 69-a, 70-c,

71. The principle of Autonomy is related to :
- a. Business ethics
  - b. Medical ethics
  - c. Media ethics
  - d. Legal ethics
72. Which among the following is not treated as the principle of Medical ethics?
- a. Autonomy
  - b. Justice
  - c. Beneficence
  - d. Objectivity
73. The notion of Informed consent is related to the principle of:
- a. Autonomy
  - b. Justice
  - c. Beneficence
  - d. Non-maleficence.
74. The concept 'Informed consent' is related to:
- a. Business ethics
  - b. Medical ethics
  - c. Media ethics
  - d. Legal ethics
- 75 is the basic principle of the view of Fair distribution of scarce medical resources.
- a. Autonomy
  - b. Justice
  - c. Beneficence
  - d. Non-maleficence
- 76 is the basic principle of the view that a medical procedure does not make harm to the patient involved and others in the society.
- a. Autonomy
  - b. Justice
  - c. Beneficence
  - d. Non-maleficence
- 77 occurs when the patient dies because the medical professionals don't do something necessary to keep the patient alive.
- a. Voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - c. active euthanasia
  - d. passive euthanasia.

78. occurs when the patient dies because of medical professionals stop doing something that is keeping the patient alive.

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
- b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
- c. active euthanasia
- d. passive euthanasia.

79. When death is brought about by an act is called:

- a. Passive euthanasia
- b. active euthanasia
- c. voluntary euthanasia
- d. nonvoluntary euthanasia.

80. When a patient is killed by giving an overdose of medicine is called:

- a. Passive euthanasia
- b. active euthanasia
- c. voluntary euthanasia
- d. nonvoluntary euthanasia.

Answers 71-80 71-b, 72-d, 73-a, 74-b, 75-b, 76-d, 77-d, 78d, 79-b, 80-b,

81. When euthanasia is brought about by an omission is called:

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
- b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
- c. active euthanasia
- d. passive euthanasia.

82. When euthanasia is brought about by commission of an action is called:

- a. Passive euthanasia
- b. active euthanasia
- c. voluntary euthanasia
- d. nonvoluntary euthanasia.

83. Passive euthanasia is when death is brought about by an \_\_\_\_.

- a. Commission
- b. Omission
- c. Action
- d. Intervention

84. Euthanasia popularly classified in to ----- according to the notion of informed consent.

- a. Five
- b. four
- c. Three
- d. D. Two

85. Classification of euthanasia as Voluntary, Non-voluntary and Involuntary are according to the notion of:

- a. Informed consent

- b. Procedure
  - c. Truth telling
  - d. Justice
86. The notion 'Pulling the plug' is related to:
- a. Voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - c. active euthanasia
  - d. passive euthanasia.
87. Euthanasia brought by not carrying out surgery that will extend life for short time is called:
- a. Voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - c. active euthanasia
  - d. passive euthanasia.
88. Among the following which form of euthanasia is very similar to act of murder:
- a. Voluntary Euthanasia
  - b. Involuntary Euthanasia
  - c. Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - d. Passive Euthanasia
89. The notion 'living will' is related to:
- a. Cloning
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Abortion
  - d. Euthanasia
90. Slippery slope argument is related to:
- a. Abortion
  - b. Euthanasia
  - c. Surrogacy
  - d. IVF

Answers 81-90 81-d, 82-b, 83-b, 84-c, 85-a, 86-d, 87-d, 88-b, 89-d, 90-b,

91. The question of personhood is related to:
- a. Abortion
  - b. Cloning
  - c. Surrogacy
  - d. None of these
92. Which among the following is accelerated the discussions upon abortion issues.
- a. Aruna Shanbaug case
  - b. Terri Schiavo case
  - c. Roe V. Wade case
  - d. Vincent Lambert case
93. The practice of giving birth to a baby for another women who is unable to have babies herself is called:

- a. In vitro fertilization
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Cloning
  - d. Genetic mutation
94. A woman who is given birth to a baby for another woman who is unable to have babies herself is called as:
- a. Surrogicer
  - b. Surrogose
  - c. Surrogate
  - d. Surrogate
95. Surrogacy is considered one among the -----.
- a. issue of abortion
  - b. problem of euthanasia
  - c. issue of media
  - d. assisted reproductive technologies
96. The notion of 'Baby selling' is related to:
- a. In vitro fertilization
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Cloning
  - d. Genetic mutation
97. The issue of 'commodification of babies' is discussed in:
- a. In vitro fertilization
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Cloning
  - d. Genetic mutation
98. Problem of parent hood is closely connected with:
- a. Euthanasia
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Cloning
  - d. Genetic mutation
99. Question regarding 'motherhood' is coming in the ethical discussion on:
- a. Euthanasia
  - b. Cloning
  - c. IVF
  - d. Surrogacy
100. ----- is treated as one of the fundamental ethical issue related to surrogacy.
- a. Question about the motherhood
  - b. Embryo wastage
  - c. Question about personhood
  - d. Sanctity of life

Answers 91-100 91-a, 92-c, 93-b, 94-c, 95-d, 96-b, 97-b, 98-b, 99-d, 100-a,

101. Traditional surrogacy is also called as:
- Gestational surrogacy
  - Artificial surrogacy
  - Biological surrogacy
  - Mutational surrogacy
102. Who is the biological mother of the child in a traditional surrogacy?
- Surrogate
  - Lady who brought the child
  - Mother who paid for the baby
  - Not determined
103. The surrogacy in which the surrogate's eggs are combined with donor's sperm and give birth to child is called:
- Gestational surrogacy
  - Artificial surrogacy
  - Mutational surrogacy
  - Biological surrogacy.
104. In a Traditional surrogacy -----gives eggs for fertilization.
- Donor
  - Surrogate
  - intended mother
  - Lady other than surrogate and intended mother
105. In \_\_\_\_\_ surrogacy both eggs and sperm are donated.
- Gestational surrogacy
  - Traditional surrogacy
  - Biological surrogacy
  - Mutational surrogacy.
106. In \_\_\_\_\_ the surrogate has no biological link to the baby.
- Traditional surrogacy
  - Biological surrogacy
  - Gestational surrogacy
  - Mutational surrogacy.
107. In gestational surrogacy-----is the method to create an embryo.
- Cloning
  - IVF
  - IUI
  - ISCI
108. \_\_\_\_\_ is a woman whose uterus was used for the nurturing and development of an embryo onto a baby.
- Social mother
  - Biological mother

- c. Gestational mother
- d. Mother by blood

109. A woman who rears the baby after birth is called:

- a. Gestational mother
- b. Biological mother
- c. Genetic mother
- d. Social mother

110. A woman whose contribution to the child was the ovum is called: a.

- a. Gestational mother
- b. Biological mother
- c. Genetic mother
- d. Social mother

Answers 101-110 101-b, 102-a, 103- d, 104-b, 105-a, 106-c, 107-b, 108- c, 109-d, 110-c,

111 is the male genetic contributor to the creation of an infant.

- a. Biological father
- b. Intended father
- c. Social father
- d. Sep father

112. Commercial surrogacy is banned in India in -----.

- a. 2019
- b. 2015
- c. 2018
- d. 2017

113. Surrogacy regulation bill was passed by Lok Sabha in --.

- a. July 15, 2019
- b. June 15, 2019
- c. August 18, 2018
- d. August 18, 2017

114. Which place in India was called as 'Babyfactory' ?

- a. Selam
- b. Delhi
- c. Jaipur
- d. Anand

115. ----- is called the surrogacy capital of India.

- a. Selam
- b. Delhi
- c. Jaipur
- d. Anand

116. Anand is called as:

- a. City of God

- b. City of Milk
- c. Surrogacy capital of India
- d. IVF capital of India

117. In India -----surrogacy is permissible.

- a. Altruistic surrogacy
- b. Commercial surrogacy
- c. Artificial surrogacy
- d. Paid surrogacy

118. ART means:

- a. Actual Reproductive Technology
- b. Artificial Reproductive Technology
- c. Artificial Response Technology
- d. None of these

119. Issues of surrogacy is commonly called :

- a. Issue of Three mothers
- b. Issues related to Two mothers
- c. Issues related to five mothers
- d. Issues related to mothers

120. Ethical issues of surrogacy is generally stated as issues of :

- a. Three mothers and three fathers
- b. Three fathers and two mothers
- c. Two mothers and Two fathers
- d. Three mothers and two fathers

Answers 111-120 111-a, 112-a, 113-a, 114-d, 115-d, 116-c, 117-a, 118-b, 119-a, 120-d,

121. Name the euthanasia which is done by the consent of the appropriate person on behalf of the patient who is unable to give consent.

- a. Voluntary Euthanasia
- b. Involuntary Euthanasia
- c. Non-voluntary Euthanasia
- d. Passive Euthanasia

122. Kantian ethical position is called:

- a. Deontology,
- b. Utilitarianism
- c. Consequentialism
- d. Ethical relativism

123. Who makes strong condemnation to casuistry?

- a. Moore
- b. F.H. Bradley
- c. Mackenzie
- d. Bentham

124. Universal happiness is related with
- Evolutionary theory
  - Emotivism
  - Utilitarianism
  - Cognitivism
125. The parents who brought baby form asurrogate is called:
- Genetic Parents
  - Intended parents
  - Traditional parents
  - Gestational parents.
126. The issue of commodification of babies isrelated to:
- Altruistic surrogacy
  - Commercial surrogacy
  - Independent surrogacy
  - Traditional surrogacy
- 127 argued that surrogacy is an assault to a woman’s dignity and right toautonomy over her body.
- conservatives
  - Sociologists
  - feminists
  - liberalists
128. The view of ‘baby producers’ is concernedwith:
- Abortion
  - Cloning
  - IVF
  - Surrogacy
129. Critics of surrogacy argued that, in surrogacy the baby becomes a mere -----  
-within an economic transaction of a good and a service.
- entity
  - commodity
  - object
  - instrument
130. Rights of the child become pressing issuein --.
- Surrogacy
  - Abortion
  - Cloning
  - IVF

Answers 121-130 121-c,122-a, 123b, 124-c, 125-b, 126-b, 127-c, 128-d, 129-b, 130-a,

131. Surrogacy which includes a monetarycompensation to the surrogate is called:
- Altruistic surrogacy
  - Commercial surrogacy
  - Gestational surrogacy

d. Traditional surrogacy.

132. refers to those surrogacy agreements where the surrogate does not receive monetary compensation.

- a. Altruistic surrogacy
- b. Commercial surrogacy
- c. Gestational surrogacy
- d. Traditional surrogacy.

133. 'Informed consent' is considered as one of the fundamental principles of

- a. Legal ethics,
- b. Medical ethics
- c. Business ethics
- d. Media ethics

134. In India Commercial surrogacy is-----.

- a. legal
- b. legal and constitutional right
- c. Illegal
- d. legal and advisable

135. In altruistic surrogacy the surrogate is most probably.....

- a. close relative
- b. unknown woman
- c. woman from other nation
- d. professional surrogate

136. ----- is the study of appropriate business policies and practices.

- a. Corporate ethics
- b. Business ethics
- c. Business policy
- d. Corporate analog

137. In the case of Roe v Wade, The United States Supreme Court held that women have a constitutional right to an abortion in the first ----- of pregnancy

- a. Four months
- b. three months
- c. six months
- d. two months

138. Who wrote the book 'A Theory of Justice'?

- a. Keats
- b. P.B. Shelly
- c. Rudyard Kipling
- d. John Rawls

139. 'Abortion is not wrong – at least not when the pregnancy result from rape'. Who proposed this view?

- a. J. S. Mill
- b. Arthur
- c. Eysenck
- d. d Judith Jarvis Thomson

140. Birth is the most visible possible dividing line between fertilized egg and child- This statement is recommended by:

- a. liberalists
- b. conservatives
- c. feminists
- d. pro-life activist

Answers 131-140 131-b, 132-a, 133-b, 134-c, 135-a, 136-b, 137-c, 138-d, 139-d, 140-a,

141. Peter Singer identified-----as the criteria for antiabortion stand point instead of the criteria of Homo sapiens.

- a. eccentric value
- b. pragmatic value
- c. instrumental value
- d. intrinsic value

142. Which among the following is considered as the standard way of distinguishing between active and passive euthanasia?

- a. Act versus passion
- b. Act versus omission
- c. act versus commission
- d. Omission versus Withdrawal

143. Active euthanasia occurs when the medical professionals do something that causes the patient to die.

- a. deliberately.
- b. passively
- c. without intentionally
- d. none of these

144. Which among the following is treated as fourth estate?

- a. Judiciary
- b. Mediac.
- c. Legislature
- d. Government

145. Which among the following is not a core principle of media ethics?

- a. Truth and accuracy
- b. Independence
- c. Impartiality
- d. Subjectivity

146. 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number' is the motto of:

- a. Utilitarianism

- b. Intuitionism
- c. Emotivism
- d. Deontology

147. Right to Information Act is passed in India on:

- a. 2000
- b. 2003
- c. 2001
- d. 2005

148. ----- treated as a one of the core principle of journalism.

- a. viability
- b. publicity
- c. truth
- d. sensation

149. RTI means:

- a. Right to Intelligence
- b. Right to Independence
- c. Right to Information
- d. Right to Interact

150. IPR means:

- a. Intellectual Property Right
- b. Indian Property right
- c. Intellectual Privacy Right
- d. International Privacy Right.

Answers 141-150 141-d, 142-b, 143-a, 144-b, 145-d, 146-a, 147-d, 148-c, 149-c, 150-a,

151. The practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and claim off as one's own is called:

- a. Intellectual theft
- b. Cyber theft
- c. Plagiarism
- d. Hacking

152. In media culture ----- builds trust and confidence.

- a. sensational reporting
- b. subjective reporting
- c. impartial reporting
- d. partial reporting

153 is a reasonable extension of the ethical principles in the actual circumstances of the moral life.

- a. Character
- b. Free will
- c. Behaviour
- d. Casuistry

154. G. E. Moore calls ----- is the goal of ethical investigation'

- a. casuistry
- b. practice
- c. c right action
- d. Right decision

155 deals the specific ethical principles and standards of media.

- a. Practical ethics
- b. Applied ethics
- c. Journalist ethics
- d. Media ethics

156 is considered as a principle of media ethics.

- a. Bias
- b. Subjectivity
- c. Accountability
- d. Popularity

157 is considered as a one of the fundamental principles of Journalism

- a. Truth and Accuracy
- b. Subjectivity
- c. Love and Care
- d. Freewill

158 treated as a principle of Journalism.

- a. Subjectivity
- b. Fairness and Impartiality
- c. Obligation to power
- d. None of these

159 is the sign of professionalism and responsible journalism.

- a. Humanity
- b. Truth and Accuracy
- c. Independence
- d. Accountability

160. A must possess independent voice regarding political, social and corporatesituations.

- a. Doctor
- b. Journalist
- c. Lawyer
- d. Business man

Answers 151-160 151-c, 152-c, 153-d, 154-a, 155-d, 156-c, 157-a, 158-b, 159-d, 160-b,

161. The notion 'Paid news' is related to:

- a. Journalism
- b. Theatre
- c. Film

d. Culture

162. Pulitzer prize is related to:

- a. Business
- b. Journalism
- c. Medicine
- d. Law

163. Who is called as the father of Journalism?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. M. N. Roy
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Aguste Comte

164. Who is called as Father of Indian Press?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. M. N. Roy
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Aguste Comte

165. Who started Bengal Gazette?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. M. N. Roy
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Tagore

166. Bengal Gazette was started on:

- a. 1782
- b. 1783
- c. 1780
- d. 1781

167. PCI means:

- a. Press Committee of India
- b. Press Council of India
- c. Press Council International
- d. Press Committee International

168. PCI was established on:

- a. 1973
- b. 1978
- c. 1977
- d. 1975

169. ----- is the statutory body of Indian media regulations.

- a. Press Council of India
- b. Press Committee of India
- c. Press club of India

d. None of these

170. In India news channels are governed by:

- a. PCI
- b. CBFC
- c. BSA
- d. NBSA

Answers 161-170 161-b, 162-b, 163-c, 164-a, 165-a, 166-c, 167-b, 168-b, 168-a, 170-d,

171. Who is known as Father of Modern Journalism?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. Walter Lippmann
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Aguste Comte

172. Who among the following won two Pulitzer prize?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. Lippmann
- c. Pranoy Roy
- d. Aguste Comte

173. Who is known as "Most influential Journalist of Twentieth century"?

- a. Lippmann
- b. Joseph Pulitzer
- c. James Augustus Hicky
- d. Aguste Comte

174. \_\_\_\_\_ is the aim of business.

- a. Service
- b. Profit making
- c. Employ satisfaction
- d. Resource allocation

175. \_\_\_\_\_ level of business ethics defines ethical behaviour and assesses the effect of business on society.

- a. The Company level
- b. The individual level
- c. The Industry level
- d. The Society level.

176. The notion 'Oxymoron' is related to:

- a. Business ethics
- b. Media ethics
- c. Medical ethics
- d. Legal ethics.

177. In Business ethics Micro level deals with the \_\_\_\_.

- a. Organization

- b. Individual in the organisation
- c. Institutions
- d. The market and Government

178. In Business ethics Meso level deals with the --.

- a. Organization
- b. Individual in the organisation
- c. Institutions
- d. The market and Government

179. In Business ethics Macro level deals with the --.

- a. Organization
- b. Individual in the organisation
- c. Institutions
- d. Employer

180. The notion of whistleblowing is related to:

- a. Business ethics
- b. Media ethics
- c. Medical ethics
- d. Legal ethics

Answers 171-180 181-c, 182-d, 183-a, 184-c, 185-a, 186-b, 187-b, 188-a, 189-d, 190-a,

181. ----- refers to the act of organisation members, disclosing information on illegal and unethical practices within the organisation.

- a. Oxymoron
- b. Reporting
- c. Whistleblowing
- d. Quickening

182. CSR means:

- a. Company Social Responsibility
- b. Corporate Social Response
- c. Corporate Social Representation
- d. Corporate Social Responsibility.

183. The concept CSR has implication in to the field of:

- a. Business
- b. Media
- c. Law
- d. Medicine

184 is a self-regulating business model that helps a company be socially accountable.

- a. Profit making
- b. Accounting
- c. Corporate Social Responsibility
- d. Quality production

185. By practicing CSR is also called:

- a. Corporate Citizenship
- b. Social Citizenship
- c. Corporate Service
- d. Social Service

186 is the positive involvement of a company in a society and environment.

- a. Offering employment
- b. Corporate Social Responsibility
- c. Whistleblowing
- d. None of these

187 activities help both employees and employer feel more connected with the society.

- a. Whistleblowing
- b. CSR
- c. Profit making
- d. Marketing

188. CSR programs raise -----in the work place.

- a. Morale
- b. Happiness
- c. Responsibility
- d. Leisure

189. Corporate Social Responsibility is equally important to:

- a. Community
- b. Company
- c. Community and Country
- d. Community and society

190. An activity of a business firm which promotes philanthropic concerns is identified as part of their:

- a. Corporate Social Responsibility
- b. Marketing plan
- c. Profit enhancing plan
- d. Employee welfare plan.

Answers 181-190 181-c, 182-d, 183-a, 184-c, 185-a, 186-b, 187-b, 188-a, 189-d, 190-a,

191 is asexual reproductive method.

- a. IVF
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. None of these

192. Genetic surrogacy is also called:

- a. Partial surrogacy
- b. Total surrogacy
- c. Social surrogacy

d. Intended surrogacy

193. 'Journalists should do no harm'. This assertion highlights the principle of:

- a. Accountability
- b. Impartiality
- c. Justice
- d. Humanism

194. Gestational Surrogacy is also called:

- a. Partial surrogacy
- b. Total surrogacy
- c. Social surrogacy
- d. Intended surrogacy

195. ----- argued that no morally significant dividing line between fertilized egg and child.

- a. Feminists
- b. Liberalists
- c. Conservatives
- d. Philanthropists

196. 'Digital divide' is related to:

- a. Cyber ethics
- b. Business ethics
- c. Medical ethics
- d. Professional ethics

197. The issue of Multiple parenting have strong significance in:

- a. Cloning
- b. IVF
- c. Surrogacy
- d. Abortion

198. ----- is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments.

- a. Normative ethics
- b. Meta ethics
- c. Applied ethics
- d. Virtue ethics

199. Right of the author or creator is known as:

- a. Intellectual property right
- b. Creator right
- c. Author right
- d. Copyright

200. The Hippocratic Oath is an oath historically taken by:

- a. Physicians
- b. Lawyers
- c. Corporates
- d. Teachers

Answers 191-200 191-c, 192-a, 193-d, 194-b, 195-c, 196-a, 197-c, 198-b, 199-d, 200-a

201. Which among the following dichotomies is used in a discourse on ethics?

- 1. Empirical – Normative
- 2. Descriptive – Prescriptive
- 3. Fact – Value
- 4. Profit - Loss

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1 and 3
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 1, 2 and 3
- d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

202. How does the individual come to be able to make moral decisions?

- 1. By understanding his **motives**
- 2. By understanding the **consequences** of his actions
- 3. By being deterred and frightened of the **penalties** incurred on him for his action
- 4. By understanding the **means** adopted to execute action

- a. 1, 2 and 3
- b. 1, 3 and 4
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1, 2 and 4

Correct Answer: D

203. Which of the following statements are true about Engineering Ethics?

- 1) Engineering Ethics is an area of practical or applied ethics
- 2) The aim of Engineering Ethics is to illuminate the ethical dimensions of engineering practice
- 3) Engineering Ethics is constituted of an eclectic contribution of all schools of ethics
- 4) Professional Engineering Societies are a major source of codes for engineering ethics. Which of the following is correct?

- a. Only 2
- b. 1 and 3
- c. 1, 3 and 4
- d. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: D

204. Which of the following assumption about moral behavior is reasonably justified?

- 1) Most people will behave morally if the socialization process has successfully inculcated the right values
- 2) Some people will behave more morally than others even if they have been under the same socialization process
- 3) Social situations provide the best stimulus to moral action or inaction; i.e social pressure determines moral action/inaction.

4) Socialisation has no role in developing moral values

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 1,2 and 3
- c. 1,2,3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: B

205. Which among the following are principle concerns with 'professional ethics'

- 1) To study ethical dilemmas in professions by application of moral theory
  - 2) The study of unique moral obligations created by special *social roles*
  - 3) The practice and consultancy of ethics by a trained professional ethicist
  - 4) The ethical challenges of a professional lifestyle
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: A

206. Which of the following are true

- 1) Ethical dilemmas arise when it is thought that serious good and bad are bound together in the same activity
  - 2) Ethics uses the instrument of coercion to oblige its subjects
  - 3) Ethical behavior is dependent on the conditions and circumstances under which an action/event takes place
  - 4) Codes of Conduct form a part of ethical training
- a. 1 and 3
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 1,2 and 3
  - d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

207. Which of the following statements is most appropriate to describe *deontological* ethics?

- a. The central idea is that the right or wrong consideration is what makes the act right or wrong, other things being equal
- b. The central idea is that an adherence to the codes prescribed under the duty one is employed in makes for the right action
- c. The central idea is that right and wrong are relative to time and circumstance
- d. The central idea is that right and wrong are determined by humans according to their subjective conscience

Correct Answer: A

208. Consider the following statements behavior and the type of activity corresponding to them as impediments to responsible action for an engineer

Type of Behavior

- 1. When group comes to agreement at the expense of critical thinking
- 2. When we see things at the microscopic level, we can't see them at the general and ordinary level
- 3. We tend to interpret situations from very limited perspectives

4. An engineer genuinely does not realize that a design poses a safety problem

Type of Activity

- a. Microscopic Vision
- b. Egocentrism
- c. Groupthink
- d. Ignorance

Which of the following are correct? 1) 1 - A; 2 - B; 3 - C; 4 - D

2) 1 - C; 2 - A; 3 - B; 4 - D

3) 1 - B; 2 - C; 3 - D; 4 - A

4) 1 - A; 2 - C; 3 - B; 4 - D

Correct Answer: B

209. Which of the following statements are true about 'Morale'

- 1) It is a form of 'attitude'
  - 2) It is reflected in positive feelings about the work group
  - 3) It instills confidence that difficult goals can be achieved easily
  - 4) It is the knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong action
- a. 1,2 and 3
  - b. 1,2,3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 3
  - d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: A

210. Which of the following is the most appropriate definition of "practice" vis a vis professional ethics?

- a. "practice" is a cooperative arrangement to pursue the goods that are internal to a structured communal life
- b. "practice" is an endeavor to achieve excellence by incessant repetition
- c. "practice" is the application of knowledge into real time problems
- d. "practice" is symbolic of the humble admission that humans can never know and learn enough

Correct Answer: A

211. Which of the following are true with regard to safety and treatment of employees

- 1) It is a means of promoting worker efficiency and social order by protecting lives and promoting the well-being of workers
  - 2) The idea of safety and treatment of employees was conceived during the Industrial Revolution in Europe
  - 3) By ensuring safety of workers the political society of a nation is stabilized
  - 4) All workers have a right to expect fairness from their employer and to be treated with respect and dignity
- a. 1,2,3 and 4
  - b. 1,3 and 4
  - c. and 4
  - d. 1 and 4

Correct Answer: A

212. What among the following is a sub - specie of "normative ethics"

- 1) War Ethics

- 2) Applied ethics
- 3) Virtue ethics
- 4) Meta ethics

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 2 only
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 2 and 3
- d. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: A

213. Which of the following are prominent examples of 'ethical issues' that fall under the domain of 'applied ethics'?

- 1) Euthanasia
- 2) Protection of human and animal subjects in research
- 3) Affirmative action
- 4) Acceptable risk in workplace

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

214. Consider the following options with regard to the 'Anthropogenic World View' vis a vis Environmental Ethics

- 1) Humanity perceives itself to be the center and ultimate goal of the Universe
- 2) Humanity perceives environment as a superior actor whose laws and codes are not well understood
- 3) Nature is viewed as a storehouse of resources
- 4) Many large, hierarchical business houses still base their business model on this world view

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 3
- d. 1 and 4

Correct Answer: B

215. Which of the following principles is the essential principle of utilitarian school of ethics?

- a. Greatest Health Principle
- b. Greatest Happiness Principle
- c. Greatest Wealth Principle
- d. Greatest Respect Principle.

Correct Answer: B

216. Which among the following is a true about ethics of research and experimentation?

1. Research that causes harm to humans is morally wrong
2. Research that involves humans is justified only when some good can come from it
3. A person's right to liberty is violated if he is a subject to research by coercion
4. Informed Consent plays a role in Research Ethics

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2 and 3
- d. 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

217. What among the following elements takes the most direct and immediate set back in a case of conflict of interest by a public official?

- a. The reputation of the officer
- b. The trust that the public holds in the office
- c. The legitimacy of the office
- d. The constitution of India

Correct Answer: B

218. "It is commonly said that before blowing the whistle, a person has an obligation to see that all existing avenues for change within the organization must have been explored". Consider the following statements as justifications for the above proposition.

- 1) The agent will be forced neither to breach confidentiality nor be disloyal
- 2) The agent (potential whistleblower) can seek remuneration from the organization for fidelity
- 3) The organization will not suffer embarrassment or more tangible harm
- 4) The organization can correct its mistakes internally by devising mechanisms to hear the issues raised by employees

Which of the following are correct set of justifications under ethics?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 1 and 4
- d. Only 1

Correct Answer: A

219. Which of the following actions can be termed as breach of 'Professional Ethics'?

- 1) A physician who refers patients to a specialist in return for monetary favours
- 2) A scientist who exaggerates the importance of his discoveries to encourage investors in his biotech company
- 3) A lawyer who lies to the Judge
- 4) The reporter who spreads fake news

- a. Only 1
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1, 2 and 4

Correct Answer: C

220. Which of the following are the functions of a code of ethics?

- 1) It can express a shared commitment on the part of a professional society's members to strive to satisfy certain ethical standards and principles.
  - 2) It can help foster an environment in which ethical behavior is the norm
  - 3) It can serve as a guide or reminder in specific situations
  - 4) A code can be a valuable academic and educational legacy for an organization.
- Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1 and 3
- b. 1,2 and 3
- c. 1,2,3 and 4
- d. 1 and 2

Correct Answer: C

221. Which of the following is an appropriate general principle with regard for 'Engineering Ethics'?

- a. The Engineer shall regard his duty to the **public welfare** as **paramount** to all other obligations.
- b. The Engineer shall regard his duty to the **objectives** of the company as **paramount** to all other obligations
- c. The Engineer shall regard his duty to the **profession of engineering** as **paramount** to other obligations
- d. The Engineer shall regard his **duty** to his excellence as **paramount** to other obligations

Correct Answer: A

222. Which of the following statements is the most correct description of the relationship between humans and technology?

- a. Technology "impacts" upon human actions and human beings
- b. Human beings "act on, make, use" technology
- c. Technology provides apparatus for human action
- d. Technology hijacks human autonomy

Correct Answer: C

223. What are the elements necessary for an Institution to formulate a state of the art 'code of ethics'?

- 1. a body of public interest/relevance
  - 2. expert scholarship
  - 3. enormous funding
  - 4. professional support
- a. 2 and 4
  - b. 2,3 and 4
  - c. 1, 2 and 4
  - d. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

224. Which of the following elements (as a fundamental criterion) must always be in the mind of Engineer while performing his duties vis a vis Ethics?

- 1. Public Safety
  - 2. Economy
  - 3. Health
  - 4. Welfare
- a. 1,2 and 3
  - b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 1 and 4
  - d. 1, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: D

225. What among the following are the shortcomings of a code of ethics formulated by a 'profes-

sional engineering society'?

- 1) These codes are not formulated with sincere scholarship or expertise and are often a hostage to economic interests
- 2) Most practicing engineers do not belong to any professional engineering society, so the codes cannot properly reach out to them
- 3) Such codes, at best represent the highest ethical common denominator among those to whom it applies therefore it may include provisions which may be ethically questionable
- 4) These codes are not exhaustive – and there are matters of ethical importance that may go unnoticed

Which of the following sets of answers are correct?

- a. 1 and 2
- b. 1, 2 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: C

226. As an engineer you are stuck in an ethical dilemma about the execution of a certain task that you find morally contestable. You refer to a well-known 'code of ethics' and other regulations but none of them specifically prohibit that certain course of action (which is in contestation). Under what category does the ethical dilemma fall, when the 'code of ethics' are not able to solve it?

- a. Professional Ethics
- b. Personal Ethics
- c. Societal Ethics
- d. Business Ethics

Correct Answer: B

227. Which of the following statements best explains the reason for engineering ethics being a branch of applied ethics?

1. The aim of engineering ethics is to shed light on ethical concerns related to engineering practice
  2. It is applied in the sense that ethical considerations are directed to practice rather than theory
  3. The first task of engineering ethics is to identify the basic concern that arise prior to practice
  4. To think on the questions of engineering ethics one necessarily needs a technical engineering knowledge.
- a. 1 and 4
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1 and 2
  - d. 2 and 4

Correct Answer: C

228. Consider the following statements about 'whistle blowing'

- 1) A whistle blower makes accusations against an Organization which call attention to alleged instances of negligence, abuse or practices that damage the public interest or harm others.
- 2) The accusation mostly single out individuals or groups within the organization as responsible for the harm being perpetrated
- 3) Whistle blowing instances can only occur in for profit organizations
- 4) If the accusations are not made *public* but only confided to a relative or acquaintance this

would not be termed whistle blowing

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1,2 and 4
- b. 1,2 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 4
- d. Only 1

Correct Answer: A

229. What values do a 'code of ethics' command in a court of law?

- 1) Code of ethics do not by themselves have the force of law
- 2) court of laws are bound by code of ethics
- 3) the code of ethics can provide upon its own power and legality
- 4) court of law can use the code of ethics in a non- authoritative manner to reason a judgment, by the aid of its principles

Which one is correct?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 2 and 3
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 4

Correct Answer: D

230. **X** is a director at a PSU in India, he sits on the interview panel that is scheduled to interview **B** who is his nephew, who has qualified the written examination for a job at that PSU – which of the following ethical issues apply to X?

- a. Nepotism
- b. Conflict of Interest
- c. Corruption
- d. Embezzlement

Correct Answer: B

231. Which of the following descriptions best describes the principle concerning professional ethics?

- a. Professional duties must be judged by ethical standards independent of time, place and circumstance
- b. Judging professional duties always involves reciprocal adjustment between ends and means
- c. Professional duties must by nature be strictly deontological, i.e – the ends must not come at the cost of the means
- d. Professional duties must be judged only by what they achieve in line with the ends prescribed by the ideals of business

Correct Answer: B

232. What are the possible ethical dilemmas that a whistle blower can be face?

- 1) Public Interests versus Private interests
  - 2) Citizenship versus Employment
  - 3) Private Benefit versus Employer's Benefit
  - 4) Short term view versus the long term view
- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 3 and 4

c. 1,2 and 3

d. 1 and 4

Correct Answer: C

233. The principle of deontological ethics has been most succinctly laid down by Immanuel Kant in his categorical imperative – which states “ Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law”- under what category of the following methods does this lie?

a. Bottom Up model

b. Top Down model

c. Internal ethics model

d. External ethics model

Correct Answer: B

234. Which of the following is the opposite of normative ethics?

a. Micro Ethics

b. Beta Ethics

c. Meta Ethics

d. Virtue Ethics

Correct Answer: C

235. When a multinational company goes for operations abroad there is an ambiguity as to the standard of ethical codes that must be adhered to within the company, commonly this problem is known as the problem of ethical relativism.

Which of the following statements are true about ethical relativism?

1) Cultural difference strictly entail ethical differences

2) Cultural differences should not be equated with irresolvable moral differences

3) What appear to be cultural differences may also be differences in perspective

4) All human beings around the world agree to the same moral standards. Which of the following sets are correct?

a. 2 and 3

b. 1, 3 and 4

c. 2, 3 and 4

d. Only 4

Correct Answer: A

236. Which of the following statements are true?

1) The more strict and disciplined the process of socialization - the better quality of morality is formed in an individual

2) The higher the level of moral reasoning in individuals - the more moral the behavior to be expected

3) The increase in perception of individual's responsibility and involvement in the situation increases the probability of moral behavior

4) The more rigorous the monitoring of behavior by a supervisory agency - the more voluntarily the individual acts morally.

a. 1,2 and 4

b. 1,2,3 and 4

c. 2 and 3

d. 2,3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

237. Which of the following are reasonable criteria for judging whether proposed research involving human subjects is ethically sound?

- 1) Risk to subject are minimized
  - 2) Risks are reasonable related to anticipated benefits
  - 3) Prior informed consent will be obtained from subjects
  - 4) Subjects privacy and confidentiality will be maintained
- Which of the following is correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. C. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. D. 1 and 3

Correct Answer: C

238. What is a more appropriate method to be employed whilst formulating a 'code of ethics' for engineering practices

1. To draw broad and general principles at the start and judge each case by that principle
  2. To begin with particular cases
  3. To look for relevant paradigm cases for appropriate and inappropriate points that can serve as a reference point for more complicated cases
  4. To borrow codes from other professional ethics like medicine and law
- Which of the following set is correct?
- a. 1,2,3 and 4
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 3
  - d. 3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

239. Consider the following ethical dilemmas and correspond them to the type of ethics Dilemma

- 1) Privacy Versus Social Utility
  - 2) Profit Versus Welfare
  - 3) Private Gain Versus Public Trust
  - 4) Sustainability Versus Development
- Type of Ethics
- A) Environmental Ethics
  - B) Business Ethics
  - C) Technology Ethics
  - Administrative Ethics

Which is the correct combination?

- a. 1 - A; 2 -B; 3 -C; 4 -D
- b. 1 -D; 2 -C; 3 -B; 4 -A
- c. 1 -D; 2 -B; 3 -C; 4 -A
- d. 1 -D 2 -A; 3 -B; 4 -C

Correct Answer: C

240. Which of the following are included as major normative ethical theories?

- 1) Contractualism
- 2) Consequentialism

- 3) Deontology
- 4) Virtue Theory

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1,2 and 4
- b. 1,2 and 3
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

241. You are appointed as the Production Manager of an oil corporation, since the industry that you work for has a lot of potential for hazard to the environment and other species, you have a mandate to think about these issues carefully and come up with a draft policy to deal with such issues. In such a scenario you contemplate on the nature of the relationship between man and other species around him, and try to judge how and why is man responsible towards sustaining other

species. What of the following types of ethics are you engaging in this process?

- a. Meta Ethics
- b. Virtue Ethics
- c. Environmental Ethics
- d. Deontological Ethics

Correct Answer: A

242. Which of the following options are included in the ethics of fair treatment of workers at workplace?

- 1) Physical safety of employees at the workplace
  - 2) Recreation facilities at the workplace
  - 3) Rights of workers to fairness and dignity
  - 4) Right of workers to have a share in company's profit
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 1 and 3
  - c. 2 and 4
  - d. 1, 3, and 4

Correct Answer: B

243. Which among the following statements fits into a description of *meta ethics*?

- a. X works for his 'personal benefit'
- b. X contemplates on the idea of 'personal benefit'
- c. X forms community where each individual works for his 'personal benefit'
- d. X extends the doctrine of 'personal benefit' to all living organisms on the planet.

Correct Answer: B

244. Consider the following options with regard to the 'Bio centric World View'

- 1) It is a world view that views the planet as a living system of interdependent species
- 2) It works under the "do not harm" principle
- 3) The environment is viewed as fragile, limited in resources and vulnerable to organizational actions
- 4) Every act of pollution or resource depletion is *not* viewed as an isolated event but as a contributing factor to a collective impact of increasingly accelerating global proportions

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1,2 and 4
- b. 2 and 4
- c. 2,3 and 4
- d. 1,2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: D

245. Which of the following is a description of the **collective action problem**?

- a. When all members of a group pursue a collective interest, *individuality* is crushed.
- b. When each member of a group pursues individual goals/self-interest the collective outcome is bad for the *group*
- c. When each member of a group pursues individual goals/self – interest the collective outcome is worse for *each* member
- d. When each member of a group pursues collective goal – the *collective goal* is never achieved.

Correct Answer: C

246. Which of the following descriptions best fit the ideal of *cooperation*

- 1. People cooperate when and as long as their *self - interest aligns* with the interests of the group
- 2. People cooperate when they *sacrifice their self – interests completely* for the well - being of others in the group
- 3. People cooperate when they *forgo the pursuit of their own independent interests* and follow rules or roles assigned to them by society
- 4. In cooperation the collective following of rules and roles assigned by a group promotes everyone's interests better than would have been done by everyone pursuing their own interests independently.

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 2 and 4
- c. 3 and 4
- d. Only 4

Correct Answer: C

247. Which of the following descriptions is correct about the ethical theory of consequentialism?

- a. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of an ideal type - the way world *ought* to be
- b. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of outcomes or states – the way world *might* be
- c. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of *motives* of the person acting
- d. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of the *means* that a person acts through

Correct Answer: B

248. Which of the following are the principles that need to be adopted in Economics to deal with the Environment responsibly

- 1) Marketing of safe products and services
  - 2) Curtailing the use of energy by developing economies
  - 3) Reduction and Disposal of manufactured products
  - 4) Environmental Directors and Managers for enterprises and corporations
- a. 1, 3 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 3

- c. 2 and 4
  - d. 1 and 3
- Correct Answer: A

249. Which of the following is a correct combination?

- a. 1 – A; 2 – B; 3 – C; 4 – D
  - b. 1 – C; 2 – D; 3 – A; 4 – B
  - c. 1 – A and 2 – B
  - d. 3 – C and 4 – D
- Correct Answer: A

250. Which among the following are most likely to be virtues of utilitarianism?

- 1) Moderation
- 2) Passion
- 3) Equality
- 4) Civil Rights

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 1 and 3
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

253. “the view that there is no general moral principles and that the moral disputes therefore cannot be resolved” – is a description of which of the following schools of ethics?

- a. Ethical nihilism
- b. Ethical skepticism
- c. Ethical relativism
- d. Ethical transcendence

Correct Answer: C

254. Which of the following is an example of a trade mark?

- a. “Pepsi”
- b. “Ye Dil maange More”
- c. A lyrical advertising composition
- d. All of the above

Correct Answer: D

255. There is a concept termed ‘*basic set of minimum moral standards*’ – that scholars believe are to be found in all cultures and societies in some form or the other; what among the following are its examples?

- 1) Torture and murder are wrong
- 2) One ought to respect another human being
- 3) Some principles of fairness are necessary for a working society
- 4) one ought to protect the innocent

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 1,2 and 3
- c. 1,2,3 and 4
- d. 1 and 3

Correct Answer: C

256. Which of the following statements are correct when speaking about **business ethics**?

- 1) Open and free competition without deception and fraud
- 2) Managers have fiduciary duties towards owners and shareholders
- 3) Corporations ought not to be disturbed or interfered by outside agencies like government, civil society etc
- 4) Law and common morality should guide the actions of corporation in a market place Which of the following is correct?
  - a. 1, 3 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 4
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

257. Which among the following falls under the definition of conservation?

1. Conservation deals with how to manage natural resources
2. Conservation deals with the consequences of wasteful use of property
3. Conservation deals with logistics of production goods
4. Conservation deals with genetically modified crops Which of the following are correct?
  - a. 1 and 4
  - b. 1 and 2
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1, 2 and 4

Correct Answer: B

258. What is the process of converting biological materials into useful fuels and chemicals called?

- a. Centrifugation
- b. Biomass Conversion
- c. Biological Fermentation
- d. Organic Cultivation

Correct Answer: B

259. 'Role morality' is often described as the moral obligations that arise out of the role that an individual assumes within an organization, consider the following statements

- 1) The moral obligations of an individual *ought* to be *defined* by and *limited* to the role that individual assumes in an organization
- 2) Role morality has an *important* but *limited* contribution to make in business ethics
- 3) Role responsibilities are not enough to describe the scope and extent of *managerial* responsibilities
- 4) Role morality is the paramount safeguard that ensures business ethics Which of the following is correct with regards to role morality in business ethics
  - a. 1 and 4
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

260 "A\_ is any individual or group who benefits from or is harmed by, or whose rights are affected

(violated, restricted or ignored) by an organization's action." What is the most appropriate insertion in the blank

- a. Victim
- b. Stakeholder
- c. Culprit
- d. Shareholder

Correct Answer: B

261. Which of the following is a form/type of *conflict of interest*?

- 1. Using government Property for extraofficial purposes
- 2. Post-Employment Benefits
- 3. Receiving Gifts from clients
- 4. Holding an office of profit

- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 3
  - c. 1 and 2
  - d. 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

262. Why are stakeholders important to acompany?

- 1) Because a company could not exist orachieve profits without them
- 2) Because stakeholders are individualsor groups of individuals – human beings with rights and interest.

Which of the following are correct?

- a. Only 1
- b. Only 2
- c. Both 1 and 2
- d. Neither 1 and 2

Correct Answer: C

263. What among the following virtues must be constituent elements of moral excellence of an individual discharging managerial duties at a business organization?

- 1) Community
- 2) Nobility
- 3) Holism
- 4) Judgment

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2 and 4
- d. 1, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

264. Which among the following is an appropriate understanding of what corporate responsibility means?

- a. Companies should be held accountablefor social effects of their actions
- b. Companies should be held accountablefor political effects of their actions
- c. Companies should be held accountablefor economic effects of their actions

d. All of the above

Correct Answer: D

265. Which of the following is correct combination?

8) 1 -A; 2 -B; 3 -C; 4 -D

9) 1 -A; 2 -C; 3 -B; 4 -D

10) 1 - D; 2 -C; 3 -A; 4 -B

11) 1 -C; 2 -A; 3 -B; 4 -D

Correct Answer: B

266. The ethical issues concerned with computer technology are often termed 'unique', what does it mean?

a. since computers are a relatively new phenomenon in history and therefore the ethical problems they pose are unique in nature, which can't be resolved by simple application of existing theories and disciplines of ethics

b. Only unique people can handle the sophisticated functioning of computers and therefore only they need to learn about its ethics

c. Both a and b

d. Neither a and b Correct Answer: A

267. Which of the following is the most appropriate dilemma within computer/technology ethics?

a. Means versus Ends

b. Risk versus benefit

c. Privacy versus social utility

d. Public Versus Private

Correct Answer: C

268. What are the possible ethical issues that can arise in 'Design'?

1. Sustainability of the design

2. Aesthetic of the design

3. Affordability of the design

4. Utility of the design

Which of the following is correct?

a. 1, 2, 3 and 4

b. 1, 3 and 4

c. 1 and 4

d. 1 and 3 Correct Answer: B

270. Which among the following are types of consequentialist/utilitarian ethics?

1. Act consequentialism

2. Rule consequentialism

3. Abstract consequentialism

4. Impact consequentialism

Which of the following are correct?

a. 1, 2 and 4

b. 1 and 2

c. 1, 2 and 3

d. 2 and 4

Correct Answer: B

271. Which of the following parties can be considered a stakeholder in a business organization?

- 1) Employees
- 2) Suppliers
- 3) Communities
- 4) Shareholders

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 1 and 2
  - d. 1, 2 and 3
- Correct Answer: B

272. Consider the following statement, and mark the correct one which is borrowed from NSPE code of ethics, about IPR

- a. "Engineers shall not reveal facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as authorized and required by law or this Code"
- b. "Engineers shall be free to reveal facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as prohibited by law or this Code"
- c. "Engineers shall not obtain facts, data or information in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as authorized and required by law or this Code"
- d. "Engineers shall not gain monetary benefits from facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as authorized and required by law or this Code"

Correct Answer: A

273. Which of the following are reasons for the rapid extinction of species?

1. Pollution
  2. Habitat destruction
  3. Deforestation
  4. Over-exploitation
- Which of the following is correct?
- a. 1 and 4
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 3 and 4

Correct Answer: C

274. Which among the following are the entities that check and control conflict of interest in a Govt Department?

- 1) Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)
  - 2) Judiciary
  - 3) Commissions of Inquiry
  - 4) Ministry of Finance
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1, 2 and 3
  - b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1 and 3

Correct Answer: A

275. Which of the following are fundamental canon of NSPE?

1. Hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public
2. Perform services only in areas of their competence
3. Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner
4. Never defect from the corporation which has employed them for a considerable amount of time

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: B

276. Which among the following issues falls under the category of *micro ethics*?

- 5) Health and Safety
- 6) Product Liability
- 7) Bribes and Gifts
- 8) Sustainable Development

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1 and 3
- c. 2 and 4
- d. 1, 2 and 3

Correct Answer: B

277. Identify the school of Ethics under which whistle blowing can be justified by the following proposition - "when the balance of good over evil is better for all affected parties than if the whistle was not blown."

- a. Deontological
- b. Ethical Realism
- c. Utilitarianism
- d. Ethical Relativism

Correct Answer: C

278. Which of the following statements are true about 'Values'?

- 9) People are always aware of all their values
- 10) Values are the links between needs and actions
- 11) Moral values are the most fundamental form of values
- 12) Values are the basis for emotions

- a. 1, 2 and 3
- b. 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2 and 4
- d. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

279. Which the following is true about environmental ethics?

- 1) Environmental ethics is a branch of applied ethics

- 2) Environmental ethics is most concerned with the moral grounds with the preservation and restoration of the environment
- 3) It has evolved more as a series of debates concerning meta ethics rather than a straight forward application of normative ethics
- 4) The principle question asked is – how can the value of nature be best described such that it is directly morally considerable in and of itself

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 2 and 3
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2 and 4

Correct Answer: B

280. Which of the following is a correct combination?

Type of Ethics Example

- |                        |   |
|------------------------|---|
| 1) Business Ethics     | A) Drafting a policy on Corporate Social Responsibility                     |
| 2) Meta Ethics         | B) Writing a thesis on the nature of perception in moral judgments          |
| 3) Professional Ethics | C) Drafting a white paper on the ethical conduct of Managers in Banks       |
| 4) Applied Ethics      | D) Conceiving a formula to deal with ethical implications of road accidents |

- a. 1 –A; 2 –B; 3 –C; 4 –D
- b. 1 –B; 2 – C; 3 –A; 4 –D
- c. 1 –A and 3 –C
- d. 2 –C; 3 –B and 4 –D

Correct Answer: A

281. Which among the following are principles to conserve environment as formulated by CERES

- 1) Protection of the Biosphere
- 2) Reduction and Disposal of Waste
- 3) Environmental Restoration
- 4) Informing the Public

Which among the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 1 and 3
- c. 2 and 4
- d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: A

282. What among the following are reasonable excuses for an amoral or immoral act?

- 1) Undue Emotional Pressure
- 2) Ignorance of facts and consequences
- 3) Not enough time to make a decision
- 4) Lack of moral training and insight

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1, 2 and 3
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: C

283. Which of the following forms a part of Bioethics?

1. Biomedical Technology
2. Genetic Engineering
3. Informed Consent
4. Genetic Screening

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1,3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: A

284. ' is the genetic diversity of all forms of life on Earth, measured in terms of both number of species and genetic variability among the species.

- a. Biodiversity
- b. Biocount
- c. Biolongivity
- d. Biosurplus

Correct Answer: A

285. What among the following question must a moral agent keep in mind while determining corporate social responsibility?

- 1) Is this activity necessary in order to conduct business?
- 2) Is it necessary to redress harms caused by the company?
- 3) Is the activity within the scope of the firm's expertise?
- 4) Can such an activity be carried out without interfering with the social fabric, or community, or national security?

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2,3 and 4
- d. 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

286. Which among the following are Professional Obligations as listed under NSPE?

- 1) Engineers shall be guided in all their relations by the highest standards of honesty and integrity
- 2) Engineers shall at all times strive to serve the public interest
- 3) Engineers shall not disclose, without consent, confidential information concerning the business affair or technical processes of any present or former client or employer, or public body on which they serve.
- 4) Engineers shall not be influenced in their professional duties by conflicting interest

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1,3 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 3

Correct Answer: B

287. What are the academic 'distinctions' observed during the study of environmental ethics?

1. Health related concern – Non health related concern
2. Intrinsic value – Instrumental value
3. Descriptive – Prescriptive
4. Rights – Duties

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 3
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 1 and 3
- d. 1, 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

288. Which among the following categories form a part of fairness towards the workers?

- 1) Hiring practices
- 2) Compensation
- 3) Privacy
- 4) Sexual Harassment

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 4

Correct Answer: B

289. Which among the following form a type of intellectual property?

- 1) Trade Secrets
- 2) Digital Signatures
- 3) Trademarks
- 4) Copyrights

Which of the following are correct?

- a) 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b) 1, 3 and 4
- c) 3 and 4
- d) 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

290. Which among the following acts fall under the category of hazard to employee's safety and health?

- 1) Exposure to asbestos
- 2) Second hand smoke
- 3) Music at the workplace
- 4) Obsolete industrial equipment

- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 1, 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1, 2 and 4

Correct Answer: D

291. Which of the following statements are true?

- a. Morality can be thought of as a especially broad and pervasive form of cooperation
- b. Morality can be thought of as an insignificant and obsolete left over of the pre modern societies
- c. Morality can be thought of as the champion of all things good in the world
- d. Morality can be thought of a hard science like physics and chemistry.

Correct Answer: A

292. Which of the following is true about sexual harassment at workplace as an ethical issue?

1. Harassment is a form of discrimination
  2. Harassment is an ethical issue because it unfairly focuses job advancement or retention on a factor other than the ability to do a job
  3. Workplaces in India must under law prepare guidelines to deal with cases of sexual harassment
  4. Sexual Harassment is a political issue
- Which of the following is correct?
- a. 1, 2 and 3
  - b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 1 and 4
  - d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: A

293. Which among the following are correct descriptions for "business ethics"

- 1) Business ethics is both normative and descriptive
  - 2) Business ethics describes and evaluates individual and corporate behavior and practices that managers and corporations ought and ought not to engage in
  - 3) Business ethics evaluates role of government, law and public policy in affecting business
  - 4) Business ethics is a meta ethical exercise
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 2, 3 and 4

Correct Answer: B

294. Which among the following are likely to be norms of the scientific research community

- 1) Communalism
  - 2) Organized skepticism
  - 3) Originality
  - 4) Universal application
- Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 3 and 4
- c. 2, and 3
- d. 1, 2 and 3

Correct Answer: A

295. To which type of engineers can code of ethics conceived by professional engineering

societies be of any use?

- a. Engineers who are licensed professionals
- b. Engineers who belong to professional engineering societies
- c. Engineers who are working in a Public Sector Enterprise
- d. All those people who engage in engineering practice

Correct Answer: D

296. X has been appointed by the Cyber Security Department of New Delhi to break into the website of a terrorist organization to extract information – what among the following is a suitable description of X's profile?

- a. Hactivist
- b. Ethical Hacker
- c. Troll
- d. Black hat Hacker

Correct Answer B

297. Which of the following is true about 'professional ethics'?

- 1) It borrows its codes and rules from common and universal morality
- 2) It formulates codes for unique roles played by individuals
- 3) They deal with 'special obligations' as per the duties undertaken by professionals
- 4) Different professions can have a radically different set of professional ethics

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 4
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: B

298. X is a director of a Nationalized Bank in India; the bank has opened up few posts for recruitment in one of their branches through lateral entry. X recommends the name of his nephew to the selection board, the selection board members all feel under pressure and influence of X because of his status in the company. What of the following ethical issues pertain to X's behavior in the matter.

- a. Conflict of Interest
- b. Nepotism
- c. Embezzlement
- d. Conflict of Competence

Correct Answer: B

299. Which of the following statements is true in respect to 'business ethics'?

- a. The common view of business as being amoral and therefore the need for a separate discourse of "ethics" in which to hold business morally accountable
- b. That business by nature is accountable to the institutions of government only and that by nature covers all forms of accountability, including ethical accountability.
- c. That business must be seen only as a profit oriented enterprise and business ethics is an oxymoron
- d. That the only way to make up for the ethical lapse in businesses is by imposing higher taxes on them

Correct Answer: A

300. Which of the following is a correct combination

Type of Ethic Application

- 1) Micro Ethics A) Applies to microchips and software technologies
  - 2) Meta Ethics B) Deals with abstract philosophical questions pertaining Ethics
  - 3) Macro Ethics C) Applies to society as a whole
  - 4) Normative Ethics D) Applies to religious order
- a. 1 - A; 2 - B; 3 - C; 4 - D
  - b. 2 - B; 3 - C
  - c. 2 - B only
  - d. 2 - B; 3 - C and 4 - D

Correct Answer: B

301. How is technology in need of ethics?

- 1) Technology can allow human beings to do what they earlier could not do, eg – explode a nuclear bomb
- 2) Technology can create new possibilities for collective and institutional arrangements, eg – Bitcoin can slowly replace fiat currency.

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1 only
- b. 1 and 2 both
- c. 2 only
- d. Neither of the above

Correct Answer: B

302. According to Ronald Dworkin, what is indispensable in order to interpret and apply laws?

- a. legal authority
- b. introduction of moral judgments
- c. a body of judges who are capable of keeping personal value judgments out of reach of laws
- d. a robust system of courts E.) Both (c) and (d)

Answer: B

303. Ronald Dworkin's 'Original Problem', based on *Riggs v. Palmer*, 115 NY 506, is used to illustrate the principle that Law is not merely a system of Rules but there are also 'principles, policies and other sort of standards' that govern the legal system. What was the case scenario in *Riggs v. Palmer*?

- a. the judge trying the case was himself a witness
- b. a man sued his father who struck him in self defense when the former attempted to kill him
- c. a defamation suit was filed by a man who knew the aspersions against him were true
- d. a man sought to sell the property of the person he killed
- e. none of the above

Answer: D

304. Legal Positivism directly clashes with which theory?

- a. Normative Jurisprudence
- b. natural law theory
- c. Legal Realism

- d. Constructivist theory
- e. None of the above; they are all compatible

Answer:B

305. Who among the following scholars is not a proponent of Legal Positivism?

- a. Ronald Dworkin
- b. John Austin
- c. Joseph Raz
- d. H. L. A. Hart
- e. None of the above

Answer:A

306. What is the fundamental problem in finding an analogy of Austin's political sovereign in India's Constitution?

- a. Austin's sovereign cannot be identified
- b. Austin's political sovereign in turn, does not himself habitually obey some other person or persons
- c. Austin's concept is radically flawed
- d. 'We, the people' as a political sovereign is too diffuse a body to locate sovereignty with certainty.
- e. both (b) and (d)

Answer:E

307. Since Hart asserts that there is 'no necessary connection between law and morality', what then, is the difference between Hart's Inclusive Legal Positivism and Exclusive Legal Positivism?

- a. Inclusive Legal Positivism does not completely discount the possibility of interface between law and morality
- b. There's no difference as such between the two
- c. The former rejects conventional morality while the latter rejects critical morality
- d. The former rejects critical morality while the latter rejects conventional morality
- e. Both c and d are true

Answer:A

308. The functional approach to understanding Law is best explained as:

- a. A key to morality of law
- b. an evolution of the society by social and economic circumstances
- c. Divine infallibility of the law-maker
- d. a code of conduct that man has devised
- e. None of the above

Answer:D

309. The Natural Law School, as propounded by Salmon, claims that positive law derives its standard from

- a. Consensus
- b. An objective norm that has to be followed in the interest of order in society
- c. Superior moral standards
- d. Command of the sovereign

e. None of the above  
Answer: D

## **UNIT – 7**

**Social and Political Philosophy:  
Indian**

## **Mahabharata**

The great epic Mahabharata represents the attempt of Vedic Brahmanism to adjust itself to the new circumstances reflected in the process of the Sanskritization (integration of Vedic beliefs, practices, and institutions) of the various non-Vedic communities. Many diverse trends of religious and philosophical thought have thus been synthesized in this work.

### **“Mokshadharma” Proto-Samkhyan texts**

In its philosophical views, the epic contains an early version of Samkhya (a belief in real matter and the plurality of individual souls), which is prior to the classical Samkhya of Ishvarakrishna, a 3rd-century-CE philosopher. The chapter on “Mokshadharma” in Book 12 of the Mahabharata is full of such proto-Samkhya texts. Mention is made of four main philosophical schools: Samkhya-Yoga, taught by Kapila (a sage living before the 6th century BCE); Pancharatra, taught by Vishnu; the Vedas; and Pashupata (“Lord of Creatures”), taught by Shiva. Belonging to the Pancharatra school, the epic basically attempts to accommodate certain presystematic Samkhya ideas into the Bhagavata faith. Samkhya and Yoga are sometimes put together and sometimes distinguished. Several different schemata of the 25 principles (tattvas) of the Samkhya are recorded. One common arrangement is that of eight productive forms of prakriti (the unmanifest, intellect, egoism, and five fine elements: sound, smell, form or colour, taste, and touch) and 16 modifications (five organs of perception, five organs of action, mind, and five gross elements: ether, earth, fire, water, and air), and purusha (person). An un-Samkhyan element is the 26<sup>th</sup> principle: Ishvara, or the supreme lord. One notable result is the identification of the four living forms (vyuhas) of the Pancharatra school with four Samkhya principles: Vasudeva with spirit, Samkarshana with individual soul, Pradyumna with mind, and Aniruddha with ego-sense.

### **Non-Samkhyan texts**

Beside the Samkhya-Yoga, which is in the foreground of the epic’s philosophical portions, there are Vedanta texts emphasizing the unity of spirits and theistic texts emphasizing not only a personal deity but also the doctrine of the avatar (avatara), or incarnation. The Vasudeva-Krishna cult characterizes the theistic part of the epic.

### **Early theories of kingship and state**

In the Shanti Parvan (“Book of Consolation,” 12th book) of the Mahabharata, there is also a notable account of the origin of kingship and of rajadharma, or the dharma (law) of the king as king. Bhishma, who is discoursing, refers with approval to two different theories of the origin of kingship, both of which speak of a prior period in which there were no kings. According to one account, this age was a time characterized by insecurity for the weak and unlimited power for the strong; the other regards it as an age of peace and tranquillity. The latter account contains a theory of the fall of humankind from this ideal state, which led to a need for institutionalized power, or kingship; the former account leads directly from the insecurity of the pre-kingship era to the installation of king by the divine ruler for the protection and the security of humankind. Kingship is thus recognized as having a historical origin. The primary function of the king is that of protection, and dandaniti, or the art of punishment, is subordinated to rajadharma, or dharma of the king. Though it recognizes a quasi-divinity of the king, the Mahabharata makes the dharma, the moral law, superior to the king.

### **Concepts of Danda, Dandaneethi, Dharma and Raja Dharma**

It is, in fact, difficult to understand the ancient Indian political thought without a prior knowledge

about certain concepts like Danda, Dandaneethi, Dharma and Raja Dharma. These concepts are drawn from Sanskrit languages.

### **The following is a brief explanation of each concept:**

#### **Danda:**

The term Danda is derived from the words Dam and Dand, which refer to tame, subdue, to conquer or to restrain and the like. This term also means a stick.

Danda, in fact, is one of the elements of a state. The main reason for institution of Danda is to bring about discipline in the lives of human beings who by nature are evil and corrupt. According to Manu, it is only the king who can protect the entire mankind and for this protection, the king uses Danda as a means or as an instrument.

In the ancient Indian political system, it was the responsibility of the king to maintain Dharma by means of Danda. It was widely believed that it is only through fear of punishment that the mankind can be made more disciplined. It is this punishment that keeps a check on their actions consciously or subconsciously.

However, this punishment should be inflicted only when necessary after much consideration. Otherwise, the concept of Danda is lost. Further, ancient Indian thinkers were of the opinion that Danda should not be used as per the whims and fancies of the rulers, but only when there is presence of any anti-social elements in the society.

They further stated that Danda is a code given to the humanity by God to follow a righteous life. This code should bind Danda against his subjects for their wrongdoings. Even the people can collectively take an action against the king if he commits any wrong.

#### **Dandaneethi:**

This ancient Indian concept deals with the totality of social, political and economic relationships and indicates how they have to be properly organized and integrated with one another. It indicates the rules that one needs to adhere to while punishing others.

Ancient political thinkers suggested that for the sanctity of the concept, Danda should be used carefully. Excessive use would distress the people and light usage of the same will lose its importance. Through Dandaneethi, it becomes easier to bring about proper progress and balanced system of social and economic needs.

Sometimes transliterated as: Dandaniti, DaNDaniti, Dandaniti Daṇḍaniti literally means 'that which helps to lead people by the power of punishment'.

Any civilized society needs a government and someone to head it and run it properly. In the ancient and medieval days, the king (called 'rājā') was the pivot of the governmental system.

The science and art of governance was given several appellations. Out of all these appellations, the words 'rājadharmā' and 'daṇḍaniti' were most common.

The Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya (300 B. C.) deals with the two subjects as one unit. These subjects are:

1. Vārtā - Economics

## 2. Daṇḍaniti - Statecraft

### **Dharma:**

This is a Sanskrit term, which means law and can be understood in various ways. Broadly speaking, the term has two connotations. Firstly, it means religious convictions and secondly, a set of duties or a code of conduct. It is stated that one who adopts Dharma would derive money, happiness and success. It also refers to a code of moral principles relating to the daily lives and following these rules ensures peace, prosperity and happiness.

Dharma is one of the values of an individual. As per the ancient Indian thought, it is dharma that sustains the universe and both the king as well as the people must adhere to it. Only the sages had the power to interpret this dharma or the Sacred Law.

### **Rajadharma:**

The concept of Rajadharma was introduced by one of the greatest epics of India, the Mahabharata. It refers to the laws or rules set for the rulers in the context of ensuring proper administration of the entire kingdom. Manu also mentioned about the concept of Rajadharma and prescribed certain rules called Dharma Sutras while discussing the rights and duties of a king with reference to his administration.

The duties that are laid down by the Rajadharma were described to be ideal for the highest good and a kingly conduct. The Manusmriti dealt with the concept of Rajadharma in a detailed manner than any other scriptures. It specified the duties of a king vis-a-vis the state, and not in his personal capacity. In ancient India, the entire discipline of political science was called Rajadharma. This concept was considered important in social practice. Failure to carry the rules diligently was considered dangerous to the existence of society itself. According to the Mahabharata, as per the rules, the king must be ready to dispose even the smallest of matters.

The king should be like a mother to his subjects and should be willing to make any sacrifices in their interest. He should possess all the qualities of a mother, father, preceptor, protector and also the attributes of Gods like fire, wealth and death towards his subjects. It was stated in the Mahabharata that a king who does not protect his subjects, is a thief and that he would attain hell after his death.

As regards the appointment of officials to cater to the administration, the Mahabharata stated that a king must appoint four Brahmins, three Kshatriyas, 21 Vyshyas, three Shudras and one Sutha. Thus, by this appointment, it is clear that even the so-called outcastes were also represented in the administrative body. The Mahabharata further stated that a king should be far-sighted like a vulture, patient like a crane, vigilant like a dog, and penetrate into the territories of the enemies like a snake without any anxiety. He should also be able to align with not only clever and powerful men but also a coward. The epic also advised king in matters related to war, diplomacy and in dealing with various kinds of people. With the above description, the following is a brief description of two of the most celebrated ancient Indian political thinkers, namely, Kautilya and Manu.

### **Mahabharata: foundations**

The **Mahabharata** is an ancient Indian epic where the main story revolves around two branches of a family - the **Pandavas** and **Kauravas** - who, in the Kurukshetra **War, battle** for the throne of Hastinapura. Interwoven into this narrative are several smaller stories about people dead or living, and philosophical discourses. **Krishna**-Dwaipayana Vyasa, himself a character in the epic, composed it; as, according to tradition, he dictated the verses and **Ganesha** wrote them down. At

100,000 verses, it is the longest epic poem ever written, generally thought to have been composed in the 4th century BCE or earlier. The events in the epic play out in the Indian subcontinent and surrounding areas. It was first narrated by a student of Vyasa at a snake-sacrifice of the great-grandson of one of the major characters of the story. Including within it the **Bhagavad Gita**, the Mahabharata is one of the most important texts of ancient Indian, indeed world, literature.

### **The prelude**

Shantanu, the king of Hastinapur, was married to **Ganga** (personification of the **Ganges**) with whom he had a son called Devavrat. Several years later, when Devavrat had grown up to be an accomplished prince, Shantanu fell in love with Satyawati. Her father refused to let her marry the king unless the king promised that Satyawati's son and descendants would inherit the throne. Unwilling to deny Devavrat his rights, Shantanu declined to do so but the prince, on coming to know of the matter, rode over to Satyawati's house, vowed to renounce the throne and to remain celibate throughout his life. The prince then took Satyawati home to the **palace** so that the king, his father, could marry her. On account of the terrible vow that he'd taken that day, Devavrat came to be known as Bheeshm. Shantanu was so pleased with his son that he granted to Devavrat the boon of choosing the time of his own **death**.

In time, Shantanu and Satyawati had two sons. Soon thereafter, Shantanu died. Satyawati's sons still being minors, the affairs of the kingdom were managed by Bheeshm and Satyawati. By the time these sons reached adulthood, the elder one had died in a skirmish with some gandharvas (heavenly beings) so the younger son, Vichitravirya, was enthroned. Bheeshm then abducted the three princesses of a neighbouring kingdom and brought them over to Hastinapur to be wedded to Vichitravirya. The eldest of these princesses declared that she was in love with someone else, so she was let go; the two other princesses were married to Vichitravirya who died soon afterwards, childless.

Dhritarashtra was the strongest of all princes in the country, Pandu was skilled in warfare & archery, & Vidur knew all the branches of learning, politics, & statesmanship.

### **Dhritarashtra, Pandu & Vidur**

So that the family line did not die out, Satyawati summoned her son Vyasa to impregnate the two queens. Vyasa had been born to Satyawati of a great sage named Parashar before her marriage to Shantanu. According to the laws of the day, a child born to an unwed mother was taken to be a step-child of the mother's husband; by that token, Vyasa could be considered Shantanu's son and could be used to perpetuate the Kuru clan that ruled Hastinapur. Thus, by the Niyog custom, the two queens each had a son of Vyasa: to the elder queen was born a blind son called Dhritarashtra, and to the younger was born an otherwise healthy but extremely pale son called Pandu. To a maid of these queens was born a son of Vyasa called Vidur. Bheeshm brought up these three boys with great care. Dhritarashtra grew up to be the strongest of all princes in the country, Pandu was extremely skilled in warfare and archery, and Vidur knew all the branches of learning, politics, and statesmanship. With the boys grown, it was now time to fill up the empty throne of Hastinapur. Dhritarashtra, the eldest, was bypassed because the laws barred a disabled person from being king. Pandu, instead, was crowned. Bheeshm negotiated Dhritarashtra's marriage with Gandhari, and Pandu's with Kunti and Madri. Pandu expanded the kingdom by conquering the surrounding areas, and brought in considerable war booty. With things running smoothly in the country, and with its coffers full, Pandu asked his elder brother to look after the state affairs, and retired

to the forests with his two wives for some time off.


## Kauravas & Pandavas

A few years later, Kunti returned to Hastinapur. With her were five little boys, and the bodies of Pandu and Madri. The five boys were the sons of Pandu, born to his two wives through the Niyog custom from gods: the eldest was born of Dharma, the second of Vayu, the third of **Indra**, and the youngest - twins - of the **Ashvins**. In the meanwhile, Dhritarashtra and Gandhari too had had children of their own: 100 sons and one daughter. The Kuru elders performed the last rites for Pandu and Madri, and Kunti and the children were welcomed into the palace.



## Pandavas

All of the 105 princes were subsequently entrusted to the care of a teacher: Kripa at first and, additionally, Drona later. Drona's school at Hastinapur attracted several other boys; Karna, of the Suta clan was one such boy. It was here that hostilities quickly developed between the sons of Dhritarashtra (collectively called the Kauravas, patronymic of their ancestor Kuru) and the sons of Pandu (collectively called the Pandavas, patronymic of their father). Duryodhana, the eldest Kaurava, tried - and failed - to poison Bheem, the second Pandava. Karna, because of his rivalry in archery with the third Pandava, **Arjuna**, allied himself with Duryodhan. In time, the princes learnt all they could from their teachers, and the Kuru elders decided to hold a public skills exhibition of the princes. It was during this exhibition that the citizens became plainly aware of the hostilities between the two branches of the royal family: Duryodhan and Bheem had a mace fight that had to be stopped before things turned ugly, Karna - uninvited as he was not a Kuru prince - challenged Arjuna, was insulted on account of his non-royal birth, and was crowned king of a vassal state on the spot by Duryodhan. It was also around this time that questions began to be raised about Dhritarashtra occupying the throne, since he was supposed to be holding it only in trust for Pandu, the crowned king. To keep peace in the realm, Dhritarashtra declared the eldest Pandava, Yudhishtir, as the crown prince and heir apparent.



The Kuru Family Tree

## The first exile

Yudhishtir's being the crown prince and his rising popularity with the citizens was extremely distasteful to Duryodhan, who saw himself as the rightful heir since his father was the de facto king. He plotted to get rid of the Pandavas. This he did by getting his father to send the Pandavas and Kunti off to a nearby town on the pretext of a fair that was held there. The palace in which the Pandavas were to stay in that town was built by an agent of Duryodhan; the palace was made entirely of inflammable materials since the plan was to burn down the palace - together with the Pandavas and Kunti - once they'd settled in. The Pandavas, however, were alerted to this fact by their other uncle, Vidur, and had a counter plan ready; they dug an escape tunnel underneath their chambers. One night, the Pandavas gave out a huge feast which all of the townsfolk came to. At that feast, a forest woman and her five sons found themselves so well-fed and well-drunk that they could no longer walk straight; they passed out on the floor of the hall. That very night, the Pandavas themselves set fire to the palace and escaped through the tunnel. When the flames had died down, the townsfolk discovered the bones of the forest woman and her boys, and mistook them for Kunti and the Pandavas. Duryodhan thought his plan had succeeded and that the world was free of the Pandavas.

## Arjuna & Draupadi

Meanwhile, the Pandavas and Kunti went into hiding, moving from one place to another and passing themselves off as a poor brahmin family. They would seek shelter with some villager for a few weeks, the princes would go out daily to beg for food, return in the evenings and hand over the day's earnings to Kunti who would divide the food into two: one half was for the strongman Bheem and the other half was shared by the others. During these wanderings, Bheem killed two demons, married a demoness, and had a demon child called Ghatotkach. They then heard about a swayamvar (a ceremony to choose a suitor) being organised for the princess of Panchal, and

went at Panchal to see the festivities. According to their practice, they left their mother home and set out for alms: they reached the swayamvar hall where the king was giving away things most lavishly to almsseekers. The brothers sat themselves down in the hall to watch the fun: the princess Draupadi, born of fire, was famed for her beauty and every prince from every country for miles around had come to the swayamvar, hoping to win her hand. The conditions of the swayamvar were difficult: a long pole on the ground had a circular contraption spinning at its top. On this moving disc was attached a fish. At the bottom of the pole was a shallow urn of water. A person had to look down into this water-mirror, use the bow and five arrows that were provided, and pierce the fish spinning on top. Five attempts were allowed. It was evident that only an extremely skilled archer, such as the now-presumed-dead Arjuna, could pass the test.



### **Arjuna at the Draupadi Swayamvar**

One by one, the kings and princes tried to shoot the fish, and failed. Some could not even lift the bow; some could not string it. The Kauravas and Karna were also present. Karna picked up the bow and strung it in a moment, but was prevented from taking aim when Draupadi declared she would not marry anyone from the Suta clan. After every one of the royals had failed, Arjuna, the third Pandava, stepped up to the pole, picked up the bow, strung it, affixed all of the five arrows to

it, looked down into the water, aimed, shot, and pierced the fish's eye with all of the five arrows in a single attempt. Arjuna had won Draupadi's hand. The Pandava brothers, still in the guise of poor brahmins, took Draupadi back to the hut they were staying at and shouted for Kunti, "Ma, Ma, come and see what we've brought back today." Kunti, saying, "Whatever it is, share it among yourselves", came out of the hut, saw that it wasn't alms but the most beautiful woman she had ever set her eyes on, and stood stock still as the import of her words sank in on everybody present.

Meanwhile, Draupadi's twin Dhrishtadyumna, unhappy that his royal sister should be married off to a poor commoner, had secretly followed the Pandavas back to their hut. Also following them secretly was a dark prince and his fair brother - Krishna and Balaram of the Yadava clan - who had suspected that the unknown archer could be none other than Arjuna, who had been presumed dead at the palace-burning incident several months ago. These princes were related to the Pandavas - their father was Kunti's brother - but they had never met before. By design or happenstance, Vyasa also arrived at the scene at this point and the Pandava hut was alive for a while with happy cries of meetings and reunions. To keep Kunti's words, it was decided that Draupadi would be the common wife of all of the five Pandavas. Her brother, Dhrishtadyumna, and her father, the king Drupad, were reluctant with this unusual arrangement but were talked around to it by Vyasa and Yudhishtir.



## Places in the Mahabharata

### Indraprastha & the dice game

After the wedding ceremonies at Panchal were over, the Hastinapur palace invited the Pandavas and their bride back. Dhritarashtra made a great show of happiness on discovering that the Pandavas were alive after all, and he partitioned the kingdom, giving them a huge tract of barren land to settle in and rule over. The Pandavas transformed this land into a paradise. Yudhishtir was

crowned there, and he performed a sacrifice that involved all of the kings of the land to accept - either voluntarily or by force - his suzerainty. The **new kingdom**, Indraprastha, prospered. Meanwhile, the Pandavas had entered into an agreement among themselves regarding Draupadi: she was to be wife of each Pandava, by turn, for a year. If any Pandava was to enter the room where she was present with her husband-of-that-year, that Pandava was to be exiled for 12 years. It so happened that once Draupadi and Yudhishtir, her husband of that year, were present in the armoury when Arjuna entered it to take his bow and arrows. Consequently, he went off in exile during which he toured the entire country, down to its southernmost tip, and married three princesses he met along the way.

The prosperity of Indraprastha and the power of the Pandavas was not something that Duryodhan liked. He invited Yudhishtir to a dice game and got his uncle, Shakuni, to play on his (Duryodhan's) behalf. Shakuni was an accomplished player; Yudhishtir staked - and lost - step by step his entire wealth, his kingdom, his brothers, himself, and Draupadi. Draupadi was dragged into the dice hall and insulted. There was an attempt to disrobe her, and Bheem lost his temper and vowed to kill each and every one of the Kauravas. Things came to such a boil that Dhritarashtra intervened unwillingly, gave the kingdom and their freedom back to the Pandavas and Draupadi, and set them off back to Indraprastha. This angered Duryodhan, who talked his father around, and invited Yudhishtir to another dice game. This time, the condition was that the loser would go on a 12-year exile followed by a year of life incognito. If they were to be discovered during this incognito period, the loser would have to repeat the 12+1 cycle. The dice game was played. Yudhishtir lost again.




Draupadi Humiliated, Mahabharata

### The second exile

For this exile, the Pandavas left their ageing mother Kunti behind at Hastinapur, in Vidur's place. They lived in forests, hunted game, and visited holy spots. At around this time, Yudhishtir asked Arjuna to go to the heavens in quest of celestial weapons because, by now, it was apparent that their kingdom would not be returned to them peacefully after the exile and that they would have to

fight for it. Arjuna did so, and not only did he learn the techniques of several divine weapons from the gods, he also learnt how to sing and dance from the gandharvas. After 12 years, the Pandavas went incognito for a year. During this one-year period, they lived in the Virat kingdom. Yudhishtir took up employment as a king's counsellor, Bheem worked in the royal kitchens, Arjuna turned himself into a eunuch and taught the palace maidens how to sing and dance, the twins worked at the royal stables, and Draupadi became a handmaiden to the queen. At the end of the incognito period - during which they were not discovered despite Duryodhan's best efforts - the Pandavas revealed themselves. The Virat king was overwhelmed; he offered his daughter in marriage to Arjuna but he declined since he had been her dance teacher the past year and students were akin to children. The princess was married, instead, to Arjuna's son Abhimanyu.

At this wedding ceremony, a large number of Pandava allies gathered to draw out a war strategy. Meanwhile, emissaries had been sent to Hastinapur to demand Indraprastha back but the missions had failed. Krishna himself went on a peace mission and failed. Duryodhan refused to give away as much land as was covered by the point of a needle, let alone the five villages proposed by the peace missions. The Kauravas also gathered their allies around them, and even broke away a key Pandava ally - the maternal uncle of the Pandava twins - by trickery. War became inevitable.



Arjuna During the Battle of Kurukshetra

### **The Kurukshetra war & aftermath**

Just before the war bugle was sounded, Arjuna saw arrayed before him his relatives: his great-grandfather Bheeshm who had practically brought him up, his teachers Kripa and Drona, his brothers the Kauravas, and, for a moment, his resolution wavered. Krishna, the warrior par excellence, had given up arms for this war and had elected to be Arjuna's charioteer. To him Arjuna said, "Take me back, Krishna. I can't kill these people. They're my father, my brothers, my teach-

ers, my uncles, my sons. What good is a kingdom that's gained at the cost of their lives?" Then followed a philosophical discourse that has today become a separate book on its own - the **Bhagavad Gita**. Krishna explained the impermanence of life to Arjuna, and the importance of doing one's duty and of sticking to the right path. Arjuna picked up his bow again. If you proceed to war treating equally joy and sorrow, gain and loss, victory and defeat, you do not sin. [2.38] You have a right only to work; you have no claim to the fruits thereof. Do not let an expected result dictate your actions; do not sit idle either. [2.47] The battle raged for 18 days. The army totalled 18 akshauhinis, 7 on the Pandavaside and 11 on the Kaurava (1 akshauhini = 21,870 chariots + 21,870 elephants + 65,610 horses + 109,350 soldiers on foot). Casualties on both sides were high.

When it all ended, the Pandavas had won the war but lost almost everyone they held dear. Duryodhan and all of the Kauravas had died, as had all of the menfolk of Draupadi's family, including all of her sons by the Pandavas. The now-dead Karna was revealed to be a son of Kunti's from before her marriage to Pandu, and thus, the eldest Pandava and the rightful heir to the throne. The grand old man, Bheeshm, lay dying; their teacher Drona was dead as were several kinsfolk related to them either by blood or by marriage. In about 18 days, the entire country lost almost three generations of its men. It was a war not seen on a scale before, it was the Great Indian war, the Mahabharat.

After the war, Yudhishtir became king of Hastinapur and Indraprastha. The Pandavas ruled for 36 years, after which they abdicated in favour of Abhimanyu's son, Parikshit. The Pandavas and Draupadi proceeded on foot to the Himalayas, intending to live out their last days climbing the slopes heavenwards. One by one, they fell on this last journey and their spirits ascended to the heavens. Years later, Parikshit's son succeeded his father as king. He held a big sacrifice, at which this entire story was recited for the first time by a disciple of Vyasa called Vaishampayan.

## legacy

Since that time, this story has been retold countless times, expanded upon, and retold again. The Mahabharata remains popular to this day in **India**. It has been adapted and recast in contemporary mode in several films and plays. Children continue to be named after the characters in the epic. The Bhagvad Gita is one of the holiest of **Hindu** scriptures. Beyond India, the Mahabharata story is popular in south-east Asia in cultures that were influenced by **Hinduism** such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

## Rajdharma

As stated earlier, the purpose of governance is to ensure the people 'protection from fear, for there is nothing more degrading to human worth than living in fear.' The Mahabharata then goes on to enquire the limits to use of governance and the legitimacy of opposing it when it creates conditions of oppression and violence. Hence, given the fundamental importance of governance against anarchy, also the fundamental place of the philosophy of governance, 'the raja-dharma', the Mahabharata reiterates again that in all the acts of governance, the goal of the king, or of the state, is the protection of all living beings with kindness towards them and that is the highest dharma The Rajdharma of the king (state). Maharshi Vyas enjoins, therefore, Let the king protect his subjects from their fear of him; from their fear of others; from their fear of each other; and from their fear of things that are not human.

The main purpose of the state, according to Mahabharata, is to create conditions for freedom from fear, including the fear of violence. In other words, its purpose lies in 'protecting the small fish from the big fish', keeping in mind that in the process the state does not itself become the

'big fish'. That will lead to oppression and terror resulting in adharma by the state.


The king to create social and economic conditions not only of freedom from fear but, more positively, of human flourishing, where the individual is enabled to come into the fullness of his, or her, being. Ahimsa can be realized only in a society where trust, friendship, and caring - the elements of human bonding, individual and social - exist. Protection has, in the Mahabharata, the wider meaning of creating conditions of personal and social bonding. That is the function of the king, or of the state.

The state according to Mahabharata, was created to protect the weak, the poor, the exploited, the helpless, and the oppressed from the strong. That large class of the weak is only able to survive because of the power of the king and this is an important aspect of Rajadharma.

The Mahabharata further warns the king, 'Beware, the weak are, in actual fact, much stronger than the strong, for nothing is left of the strong that have been burnt by the weak'. And further, "When the king wipes the tears of the poor, the dispossessed, and the old. And creates happiness among the people thereby, such conduct on his part is called the king's dharma (Rajdharma)."

According to Mahabharata, Law and governance are the instruments for protection. The importance and meaning of protection requires a set of laws and governance which create social and economic conditions where one lives in a society without fear. Thus, there is a wider meaning of protection and the Mahabharata enjoins upon the king to create social and economic conditions not only of freedom from fear but, more positively, of human flourishing, where the individual is enabled to come into the fullness of his, or her, being. Ahimsa can be realized only in a society where trust, friendship, and caring - the elements of human bonding, individual and social - exist. Protection has, in the Mahabharata, the wider meaning of creating conditions of personal and social bonding. That is the function of the king, or of the state. In Mahabharata principles of governance require the state to be committed to social concerns which need to be attended for creating an ahimsa society. The institutions of the state have to be continuously vigilant for keeping order and curbing violence.

## The discipline of dharma



The discipline of the king is to be derived from the purpose for which he was invested with the power of governance, and Mahabharata asks the king (state) to exercise power subject to certain disciplines. The king should first discipline himself and then only try to discipline his subjects and subordinates. If he does so without realizing his own defects, he becomes an object of ridicule and should always remember that The interest of his subjects alone is his interest, their well-

being his well-being; and in their good lies his own good.



The Mahabharata says that power is never considered its own justification, for the state is not an end in itself and further, the power without dharma is as much the way to tyranny as dharma left unprotected is the way to anarchy. In other words, the power 'of the state has to exercise disciplines upon itself most of all, the discipline of dharma. Power is not to be exercised arbitrarily but in accordance with the dharma' exhorts Mahabharata.

## Social concerns



The Apastamba Dharmasutra proclaims with such finality, it is the primary duty of the king to ensure that none within his domain suffers from hunger, want or deprivation. Sage Apastamba lays down the discipline of the kings in this context, thus: let no one suffer from hunger and disease, or from extremes of heat and cold. No one in the kingdom ought to suffer thus, either because of general scarcity or because of specific design against him. Under such circumstances, people may become angry and the state might be lost to the enemies of the country.

And, Bhisma, in a particularly intense yet short chapter in the Anusasanaparvan, warns Yudhisthira that the hunger of even one person in a kingdom renders the life of the king meaningless; and if there be a king in whose kingdom young children eagerly watch the delicious meals of others and are not offered the same food with all ceremony and care, what indeed would be the fate of such a king? What indeed can be a sin greater than that. The king must protect the wealth of the old, the young, the blind and the poor. And he must not take away anything from the helpless women, or from the cultivators who have created their own irrigation system. The wealth that is taken away from the poor takes away the prosperity of the king and destroys the country. Therefore, instead of depriving the poor, offer them great comfort and gratification, and relieve the people of

all fear of hunger. And further, the king should not extinguish the opportunities of livelihood. The protection of the life and dignity of women is the primary aim of governance and the Mahabharata in unequivocal terms states, 'A king in whose kingdom crying and wailing women are forcibly carried away in front of their sons and husbands who cry and wail in vain, one feels that there is no governance. And Bhisma adds, having given his promise to protect the people and the state fails to protect then such a state is as good as non-existent.

### **Conduct during abnormal times**


If there is a situation which suddenly leads towards chaos and anarchy and the very existence of the state is in danger and it is no longer able to preserve and protect dharma, Mahabharata, under the circumstances allows the state to waive the normal ethical behaviour, only and only, till the duration such circumstances exist. This is known as conduct during distress - Apadh-Dharma. The state can take measures, though unethical, for collecting resources by force or even coercion. The Mahabharata says if the state exists then alone dharma can be protected and order can be restored when the very existence of the state becomes doubtful, the material resources required to counter the threat have to be collected.



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But the king is also warned that anything acquired by adharma ultimately leads to resentment and anger leading to violence in the society. Resources acquired by unethical means would never prove beneficial to the state and the people. In times of distress, it is the duty of both the state and the people to protect each other. Therefore, as soon as normalcy is restored the state should return back to the people whatever was acquired to save the existence of the state. Mahabharata warns that distressful times should not become an excuse for doing wrong things.

### **Capital punishment**



Perhaps for the first time anywhere, it is in the Mahabharata that an argument against capital punishment was advanced. It develops in answering the question of Yudhishtira, put to Bhishma: 'How should the king protect the people in a way without causing violence to anybody? Bhishma narrates an old conversation between Satyavan and his father, Dhyumatsena who says, 'One should use only that system of punishment that does not dismember the body. Neither should anybody be punished without first carefully examining the alleged offence of a person and applying to it the established principles of law.' On putting a criminal to death, the king renders his family without any means of sustenance, which is like putting them to death as well. Therefore, the king must think carefully. The purpose of governance is not to kill the wicked, but to create conditions in which the people can be good. One should use only that system of punishment that does not dismember the body. Neither should anybody be punished without first carefully examining the alleged offence of a person and applying to it the established principles of law.

The Mahabharata continues to stress that the power of governance must be exercised without anger and intolerance, the king must keep away from darpa (arrogance) and should be free from deviousness and cunning. The king should also be free from likes and dislikes. He should keep preferences, anger, greed and vanity far away and treat all beings with a sense of equality. Because the king holds power he is not authorized to oppress people and violate dharma. The king is placed more than anyone else under the fear of danda, law and governance. On putting a criminal to death, the king renders his family without any means of sustenance, which is like putting them to death as well. Therefore, the king must think carefully. The purpose of governance is not to kill the wicked, but to create conditions in which the people can be good.

The Mahabharata has narrated a story of a frightfully terrible war and its resultant consequences on either side and declares that nothing worthwhile has ever been achieved through war. The king should preserve and expand whatever he (state) possesses without recourse to war. Victories must be achieved by enhancing all areas of knowledge and not by cunningness and arrogance. In other words, Mahabharata proposes reconciliation as a process for resolving the two opposite view points. The crux of the foundation of governance is dharma based on truth and ahimsa. In other words, the state should also be accessible and transparent. The assembly or the sabha, that declares whether a law or an order is in accordance with the Dharma must have the trust of the people. Mahabharata prescribes that, 'An assembly without elders is no assembly. The elders who don't speak according to dharma are no elders. Dharma not based on truth is adharma. Finally truth full of cunning is no truth.

## **Spiritual Model of Good Governance and Sustainable Administration in Mahabharata**

A spiritual touch is essential for good and sustainable governance, as it gives a holistic approach that widens the scope of thinking. Money, time and human resources are scarce and can never be replenished. But effective use of these resources should be with a final objective of contributing towards the best interests of the society. Sustainable development includes the four interconnected domains of ecology, economics, politics and culture. Governance is "the process of decision-making and the process by which the decisions are implemented". For smooth functioning of the corporate there is an innate need for spirituality. We could definitely turn back to pages of history where we have found tried and trusted methods of successful governance which has contributed for sustainable development. Mahabharata is one such resource where, time and again, we have found out many answers to the perennial requirement of managerial skills.

Governance in Indian scriptures is called Rajadharma i.e. righteous duty of the king. Thus, as defined above, the conduct of those involved in governance requires adhering to righteousness which calls for exhibiting the highest standards of morality and ethical behaviour. The Hindu scriptures suggest that askings have been bestowed divine authority they are duty bound to rule only under God's command and by providing clean and ethical administration.

Moreover, a king is obligated to do justice to the public by treating them as if they were his own children, and punish any corrupt behaviour in the society. Unethical conduct, therefore, amounts to doing disservice to God, because the king acts only as His viceroy or a deputy. In a nutshell, the Indian philosophy lays emphasis on the premise that inner spirituality and character must govern the conduct and behaviour of the leaders in the society.

According to the Mahabharata there are a few important elements of a successful model for governance. They are Spirituality, goal setting, planning based on potential, persistence, competency mapping, rationality, value system or ethics, consolidating the strengths, reward system and most important of all, the coordination between various functions in the organization coupled with transparency and accountability in workplace. These are proven and specific elements which have similar prominence even in the administration of today's corporate houses where the elements and priorities have taken a paradigm shift into commercialization, lack of values etc.

Vidura Neeti and Shanti Parva are two parts of Mahabharata that have good and substantial material for managerial skills, leadership skills, skills requires for running high level administrative and government mechanisms. Apart from that the Book II of Mahabharata, otherwise known as "The Book of the Assembly Hall", also contains necessary instructions for carrying out a good governance where Narada came there to meet Pandavas affectionately and to witness the divine consecration ceremony of King Yudhistira.

### **Principles of Good Governance as Propounded by Narada**

Yudhishtira, accompanied by his brothers honoured Narada and pleased him. Narada felt very happy and asked Dharmaraja about matters regarding Dharma, Artha and Kama. He enquired him whether he had divided his time judiciously and following Dharma, Artha and Kama accordingly; whether, after considering his and foe's relative strengths, he was taking proper care of the fourteen possessions (such as country, forts, cars, elephants, cavalry, foot-soldiers. etc.) with the help of the six royal attributes (viz, cleverness of speech, readiness in providing means, intelligence in dealing with the foe, memory, and acquaintance with morals and politics), and the seven means

(viz., sowing dissensions, chastisement, conciliation, gifts, incantations, medicine and magic); whether he was employing a singly learned man by giving in exchange thousand foals. He advised that if rations and salary are delayed, the troops become angry which causes great misfortune. He asked whether the king was taking care of the families of those who died or faced great dangers for his sake; whether every day his accountants put before him in the forenoon the income and expenditure statement; whether the farmers in his kingdom were satisfied; whether he slept only in the first two quarters of night, and got up in the third quarter to reflect on Dharma and Artha. On hearing the words of Narada, Yudhishtira bowed to him and promised that he would act on his word only. His wise counsel had indeed enlightened him. He then followed the words of Narada and his kingdom spread up to the ocean. Thus this section of Mahabharata presents the principles of polity.

### **Importance of king as ruler & Role of citizens**

In the "Shanti Parva", Book XII of Mahabharata, Yudhishtira asked Bhishma: Please tell me what is main duty that the country (meaning citizens) must do? Bhishma explained: Main duty of citizens is to enthrone a worthy person as king, because, a country without a king becomes weak. Such a country will be regularly troubled by wicked elements like thieves and robbers. In a country without king dharma will not be sustainable. People will be trying to 'swallow' each other. Therefore, condemnation to a country without a king!. There is a shruti-vakya that when a nation chooses a king, they choose Indra himself. Therefore a citizen who desires good of all should worship the king. I do not like to live in a country without a king. Even agni does not carry havya to devatas in such a country.

### **What should the citizens do if another powerful king attempts to take over?**

In case a powerful king desirous of expanding attacks a country which either does not have a king or has a weak king, it is better for the citizens to come forward and welcome him. This is the best suggestion that can be given to citizens who do not have an efficient king, because, there is no sin greater than having a sinful anarchy. There is another advantage of welcoming a powerful king where there is none. It is possible that the attacking king will be pleased by the welcome and honour of the people and may look upon them with affection. Then the whole kingdom will enjoy happiness. In case these people were to oppose him and anger him, then that king being mighty and angry may destroy the kingdom. Therefore welcoming him is a better neeti.

### **Risks of Anarchy**

Therefore a nation which desires progress should enthrone a capable king; this will be their main duty. There is no use of money or wife in a kingdom without a king, because, in a country with anarchy neither can be protected. In a country with anarchy, the sinners will happily keep snatching the properties/assets of others. But if other mightier wicked persons snatch his assets, he will also desire the existence of a powerful king. Therefore in a country with anarchy there is no safety to sinners also. In an anarchic country even those who are free will be made slaves. Women will be snatched away by force. It is for this reason that devatas created king to govern & protect people. If there were no king with powers to punish, the mighty would have swallowed the weak just as bigger fish eat up the smaller ones.

If a king is defeated by the enemies it is not merely a defeat of the king. It is the defeat of citizens of the kingdom. Therefore the citizens should do everything to increase the might of the king. A king who is thus strengthened by the citizens becomes difficult to defeat and becomes efficient in governing them (Shanti parva; Rajadharmanushasana; 67).

## **Conclusion:**

It is evident that Dhritrashtra failed in giving good and clean governance to his citizens of Hastinapur despite suggestions by his minister Vidura. On the other hand, Yudhishtira was effective as a king and an able administrator as he took inputs both from Vidura and Bhishma, on the duties of a king (administrator). The quality of administration and the legal system during the period of Yudhishtira was one of the best in the history. When we compare the current governance in many corporates with the governance of Yudhishtira, we find that there is lack of value system and less coordination between various elements causing friction and low productivity. The current models of governance fail to identify the human touch that is required to handle employees, colleagues and competition alike to succeed and sustain in the industry for long term benefits. A close observation of the contemporary models of governance indicates a biased or one sided approach where success is momentary. We see the concentration on either the shareholders' wealth maximization or the accountability of the directors discussed by such models. But businesses are in pursuit of a sustainable model for governance that can come only through a holistic approach where the interests of all stakeholders are taken care of. There is an innate need for a multi-dimensional model that considers variety of factors empowering the management for a powerful tool of comprehensive and transparent governance.

## **Narada's Questions to King Yudhishtira**

Before taking charge of the sabha made for him by the danava Maya, king Yudhishtira pays homage to ten thousand brahmins with garments, garlands and eatables. We again see how every grand event among the kshatriyas – even one involving an exchange between kshatriyas and a danava – becomes a rent-seeking opportunity for the brahmins. The epic, certainly written by the priest class, does not miss many opportunities to show the kshatriyas as making deep obeisance to the brahmins.

At any rate, the upkeep of the varna system is an attitude central to the Mahabharata, and in as much as evidences of this attitude today rightly attract criticism, the Mahabharata also cannot save itself from the same. The impulse to rewrite the epic, to alter the shlokas where the epic reinforces the caste system, stems from identifying the text as a text of its times, from seeing it as a political tool more than it is.

Saying that the original text needs to be criticised in places does not mean that the epic, in and of itself, has no value for our times. There is a lot of wisdom that can be drawn from it. For one, the text alludes to, and promotes, strict principles of governance and proper conduct for kings. Perhaps the best example of this is seen in Narada rishi's visit to king Yudhishtira's sabha, in which the sage interrupts the revelries in the court and then poses a flurry of questions to the king. Note, here, that it is Narada's second visit to the Pandavas. In the first visit, he had advised them to establish a protocol of exclusivity with Draupadi and set up rules for punishment in case that protocol was breached.

Narada asks Yudhishtira many questions, one after the other, never waiting to get an answer to any one question. This method implies that the questions are rhetorical, their purpose not to see if Yudhishtira knows the answer but only to remind him of their relevance and complexity. Narada is giving a lecture. Narada asks Yudhishtira if he uses "the six royal qualities to judge the seven means?", or does he "follow the eight duties before concluding an alliance?", or are his "six chief officers" devoted to him? The usage of numbers in Narada's speech tells the reader that the details about royal qualities and means and duties, et cetera, have been enumerated in other texts

which are available for the king to study. Particularly interesting are the instances when Narada asks Yudhishthira about his mental health and personal habits. Eg. "Do you find happiness without making your mind suffer?" Or, "In the dead of night, do you think about what should be done and what should not?" Such questions suggest that while the ruler is expected to stay awake with the concerns of good governance, his (it's always a 'he' here) mental health is clearly seen as a crucial element in the overall structure. Narada's questions thus provide valuable insights into the persistent issues of governance and jurisprudence.

### **Kautilya: Sovereignty**

The sole leader of the entire territory or the kingdom was the monarch or the sovereign who has an absolute control over the entire state. Kautilya favored hereditary monarchy as it ensured continuity. He had great faith in the law of primo-geniture, that is, the eldest son taking over the reigns from the father or the king. Kautilya emphasized on the need for proper upbringing of the prince in order to avoid future problems.

Kautilya also explained the plausible dangers that a king can encounter with reference to his sovereign power. Kautilya made it very clear that dangers to the sovereignty come from three quarters, viz., from the enemy, within the territory and sometimes the wrong policy of the king himself. In some cases, even the ministers might be a part of the trouble when they feel neglected. It is for this reason that the king must always respect the ministers all the time. Further, weak fortification of the territory can be a serious threat to the sovereignty of the king. Similarly, lack of enough funds can also be a danger and efforts have to be made for the constant flow of funds to the treasury. It is also stated that a well-equipped and prepared army would ward off any dangers to the sovereign power of the king. Finally, if the king lacks enough number of allies or friends, then again his power would be in danger.

As regards the internal troubles, these are considered much more dangerous than the external troubles. In order to make sure that there is less likelihood of trouble within the kingdom, a king must be able to control the army as well the finances of the kingdom. It is for his own good that he must follow the policy of divide and rule. It is also important for the king to strictly audit the national income and sources of expenditure. Kautilya suggested that the construction of more forts on the borders and friendlier relations with the neighbours saves the sovereign power of the king or the monarch.

### **Six main impact of Globalisation on the Sovereignty of the State are as follows:**

#### **1. Lessened Role of State in Economic Relations:**

The acceptance and march of the process of liberalisation-privatisation has acted as a source of limitation on the role of the state in the economic sphere. The failure of the public sector to deliver the desired goods and services, the decline of faith in the ability of the state to organize and manage production of goods and services for the people have together led to a decline in the economic functions of the state.

#### **2. Regional Functionalism and Binding Decisions for Member States:**

The emergence of free trade, market competition, multinational corporations and international economic organisations and trading blocs like European Union, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN and others, have limited the scope of the operations of state sovereignty in the sphere of international eco-

conomic relations. The member states of the European Union, for example, have to abide by the rules and policies made by this organisation.

### **3. Limitations of Decisions of International Instructions:**

Increasing international inter-dependence has compelled the state to accept limitations on its external sovereignty. Each state now finds it essential to accept the rules of international economic system, the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF.

### **4. Emergence of Global People Movements:**

Globalisation has encouraged and expanded people-to-people socio-economic cultural relations among all the people of the world. IT revolution and development of fast means of transport and communications have been together making the world a real Global Community which, now appears to be developing towards a global village. The people of each state now deal with people of other states as members of the World Community. The loyalty towards their respective states continues, but now they do not hesitate to oppose those policies of their states which, they feel, are not in tune with the demands of globalisation. Even the movement for opposing globalisation has tended to bring the people of world on one platform and instill among them a feeling of community living at the global level.

### **5. Lessening Importance of Military Power:**

The state continues to maintain its military power as an important dimension of its national power. However, the strength being gained by movement for international peace and peaceful coexistence as the way of life has tended to reduce the importance of military power of the state.

### **6. Treaty Obligations of Each State:**

Several international conventions and treaties have placed some limitations upon all the states. All the states are today bound by the rules and norms laid down by several such conventions. The need to fight the menace of terrorism and rogue nuclear proliferation as well as the shared responsibilities to protect the environment and guarantee all human rights of all have compelled all the states to accept such rules and regulations as are considered essential for the securing of these objectives.

Thus, Globalisation and several other factors have been together responsible for putting pressure on the sovereignty of the state. The role of the state in the economic relations has undergone a big change. It has got reduced. The operation of the new international economic system with globalisation as its objective has been further reducing the role of the state sovereignty. Several scholars hold that Globalisation has essentially limited the concept of state sovereignty. While some of them, the 'die-hard pluralists' accept it as useful and ideal, some others, the 'die-hard nationalists' regard it as an undesirable and harmful development. Neither of these two views is however fully valid.

State sovereignty continues to be intact in its internal and external dimensions. The state continues to be sovereign state and its sovereignty continues to be comprehensive, permanent and absolute. While its functions have undergone a change, the world has now 193 sovereign independent and equal sovereign nation-states. People continue to live and enjoy their lives as citizens of their respective states. The new needs for global level economic and trade integration, protection of environment, protection and security of all human rights of all, the need to collectively fight the

menace of international terrorism and the need to fight a collective war against poverty, hunger, disease and under- development have changed the role of state in the 21st century. It does not, however, mean either the end of sovereignty or a serious limitation on the sovereignty of state.

### **Kautilay's View on War and Peace!**

No state can afford to live in a state of continuous war. Kautilya was of the opinion that when a particular issue can solve the problem from peace and war, one should prefer the former. Peace must be according to the circumstances and in the interests of the state. Kautilya described at length conditions under which a king must be ready to wage war. In his opinion, by being a king, it is his responsibility to protect and for this purpose he should be always prepared to wage a war. According to Kautilya, a king must attack enemy or an ally's enemy and should not be given any opportunity to attack him. As regards the neutral states, he was of the opinion that the king must respect their stance.

The king must attack, when he is financially in a better position compared to others. On the other hand, a superior enemy must be attacked at a time when he is embroiled in internal troubles. A king must also take into consideration bravery, energy and the personal drive of himself and also when the people are materially and morally in a better place than the enemy country's people. Kautilya also stated that a king must make use of spies and through methods like giving high inducements; he must ensure that the spies remain in their positions and assist him in espionage. Kautilya very clearly stated that the king must engage in wars at a time when there is less likelihood of monsoons.

### **Kautilya, in fact, categorized wars into the following three types:**

#### **1. Open Fight:**

Where the place and time indicated.

#### **2. Concealed Fighting:**

Involving the use of tactics on the battlefield.

#### **3. The Silent Fight:**

By using secret agents and killing the officials of the enemy. Kautilya, however, was very clear that a king cannot always keep waging wars and conquering territories. In fact, no state can afford to live in a state of continuous war. Kautilya was of the opinion that when a particular issue can solve the problem from peace and war, one should prefer the former. Peace must be according to the circumstances and in the interests of the state.

### **Seven Pillars of State-craft**

The Mauryan era of ancient India gave the world a significant treatise, the Arthashastra of Kautilya. It offers deep insights into political statecraft. Kautilya is known as the Indian Machiavelli because of his ruthless and shrewd tactics and policies reflecting an approach to statecraft including warfare.

## Nature of State



### Kautilya Saptang Theory of State

The state of 'nature' is imagined to be one of total anarchy, in which 'might was right'. When people were oppressed by **Matyanyaya**, the law of the fish, according to which the bigger fish swallows the smaller ones they selected Manu—son of Vivasvat the king. It was settled that the king should receive one-sixth of the grain and one-tenth of merchandise and gold, as his due. It was the revenue which made it possible for the king to ensure the security and prosperity of his subjects. People agreed to pay taxes and he ruled by one person in order that they might be able to enjoy well-being and security. In Kautilya's Arthashastra, there is no explicit theory of social contract as laid down by the contractualist. Neither does Kautilya use the contract to make the king allpowerful.

### Elements of State

Kautilya enumerated seven prakritis or essential organs of the state. They are as follow:

- (i) Swami (The Ruler)
- (ii) Amatya (The Minister)
- (iii) Janapada (The Population)
- (iv) Durga (The Fortified Capital)
- (v) Kosha (The Treasury)
- (vi) Danda (The Army)
- (vii) Mitra (Ally and Friend) Swami (The Ruler)

It is the first and the most important element. Swami means the monarch. He should be a native of the soil and born in a noble family. He should be brave and well learned. He makes all the important appointments and supervises the government. He has to be virtuous and should treat his subjects like his own children. Kautilya has given extensive powers to the monarch but those powers are meant for the welfare of them subjects. In the welfare and happiness of his subjects, lies his own happiness.

### Amatya (The Minister)

It refers to the council of ministers as well as the supporting officials and subordinate staffs.

They are meant for assisting the monarch in day to day affairs of the state. Amatya gives suggestions to king, collects taxes, develops new villages and cities, ensures defense of the state and all other tasks as assigned by the king.

### **Janpada (The Population)**

It refers to territory and people of the state. The territory of the state should be fertile and should have abundance of forest, rivers, mountains, minerals, wild life etc. It should have good climate. People should be loyal to their king, hard working, disciplined, religious, ready to fight for their motherland, should pay taxes regularly and happily.

### **Durga (The Fortified Capital)**

It refers to forts. The state should have sufficient number of forts across its territory at strategic locations for ensuring defense against foreign invasions. Forts should be built near hills/mountains, deserts, dense forests and big water bodies. They garrison soldiers, store food grains for emergency and also serve as a hideout for the king when his life is in danger.

### **Kosha (The Treasury)**

This means treasury of the state. Finance is life blood of any state without which it is almost impossible to run it. Money is needed for paying salaries, building new infrastructure, etc. The treasury should be full of money and valuable metals and gems. It can be increased through taxation and plundering enemy states in war.

### **Danda (The Army)**

It refers to military. The state should have a regular, large, disciplined and well trained military. It is crucial for the security of the state. The soldiers should be recruited from those families which are traditionally associated with military. The soldiers should be paid well and their families should be taken care of in most suitable way. Proper training and equipment should be made available. Well fed and well trained soldiers can win any battle. The king should take care of the soldiers and the soldiers will be ready to sacrifice even their life for him.

### **Mitra (Ally and Friend)**

It refers to friends of the king. The monarch should maintain friendly relationship with traditional friends of his forefathers. He should also make new friendships. He should send gifts and other pleasantries for his friends. They should be helped in times of emergency. They should be loyal. Friends add to the power of the state. They are also important from foreign trade view point.

### **Role of king**

Kautilya gives extensive powers to the kings and attaches an element of divinity. His foremost duty is protection of the subjects and their property. King's sources of power revolving around three sources – **Prabhu Shakti** (the power of the army and the treasury), **Manta Shakti** (advice of wise men, specially the council of ministers) and **Utsah Shakti** (charisma). Duties of Kings Kautilya's Arthashastra does not believe in the '**Theory of Divine**' origin of the Monarch. According to him, state is a human institution and it should be manned by a human being. So, the king should be the protector of the dharma of whole society. Arthashastra pointed out duties of kings are :

- Should follow his rajya dharma.
- Should exhibit attributes, i.e. Atma Vrata (self-control) | Should ease the six enemies – Kama

(lust), Krodha (anger), Lobh (greed), Mana (vanity), Mada (haughtiness), and Harsh (overjoy).

## **System of Law**

Although, Kautilya's state theory states the monarchical democracy, but the sole authority vested under the king to make law and that it derived from four sources **Dharma** (sacred law), **Vyavhara** (evidence), **Charita** (history and custom) and **Rajasasana** (edicts of the king).

Arthashastra represents a system of civil, criminal and mercantile law. For instance, the following were codified a procedure for interrogation, torture, trial, the rights of the accused, Constitution of permissible evidence, a procedure for autopsy in case of death in suspicious circumstances, Constitution of (deformation) and procedure for claiming damages, invalid and invalid contract.

## **Machinery of Government**

The Arthashastra catalogues a phalanx of officers called superintendents, lower in importance than the ministerial officers and much below them, belonging to the sixth order, according to remuneration. They are not heads of departments. The superintendents might be as chiefs of sections dealing with various economic and other activities of the government. Most of these sections are the modern business departments. A dual control is exercised over the superintendents. As far as control of the services of the personal and collection of revenue are concerned, they are under the Collector-General.

## **Conclusion**

The Arthashastra is a textbook of practical politics and statecraft. One of the outstanding contributions of Kautilya's Arthashastra to statecraft and governance in a monarchical state. Hence, Kautilya's theory of state envisages a rational approach to governance and state craft which conceptualizes the state and the office of the kingship to be human artifacts.

## **Kautilya Society**

**Kautilya Society for intercultural dialogue** is a non-profit organization, based in Varanasi, India. It aims at promoting dialogue and partnerships among people and cultures across the world and supports development cooperation actions and initiatives.

## **Concept of Better Society**

Kautilya Society is an Indian Non-governmental organization with an internationally open membership and worldwide operation. KS was originally founded in Varanasi, India (1998) by a group of students and scholars of Indian philosophy to promote Indian studies and interfaith dialogue. From a mainly academic concern, the Society gradually expanded its scope to include social action and media production. KS promotes partnership amongst people using electronic media platforms for knowledge exchange and manages a study centre cum residency in Varanasi for on-site personal interactions.

## **Kautilya Society Mission and Values**

In the 1980s, the group, that later created the Society, was composed of scholars that had come to learn and experience in Varanasi, the traditional hub of Indian studies. Initially, it was a group for reciprocal assistance in addressing the challenges of the city (both intellectual and organisational); later on, it became a network amongst those who had gone through "the Banaras" experience.

The first concrete actions of the newly created association was the publication of a book on Indian philosophy and the preparation of a documentary film for the Indian television (Doordarshan). In 2000, the KS started the "hospitality project", i.e. the utilisation of a building in the Varanasi historical city centre as a meeting ground, study centre and residence. The Kautilya Society centre was neither a hotel, where individuals are isolated and the environment is commercial, nor an ashram, where there is an uniform ideology and a "guru" centred hierarchy, but something in between, with some discipline and some autonomy, some community sentiment and essentially a respect for diversity and reciprocal privacy.

Later on, the Kautilya Society became an NGO acting as an "umbrella institution" under which members can undertake different projects in coherence with the organisational bye laws, each managed autonomously, all coordinated within the "Kautilya programme", with the overall objective of promoting dialogue amongst civilisations and traditions. At the centre in Varanasi, KS members independently carry out their studies, travels and social projects; however all Society members are invited to create occasions for peer-to-peer learning and for dissemination of the knowledge created through dialogue. The frequency and the intensity of such occasions depends on the generosity and brightness of the members who reside in the logistic hub at Varanasi or contribute to the community spaces in the Internet.

## **The name Kautilya**

Kautilya is the name of a historical figure from the 4th century B.C. (also called "Chanakya", i.e. "the Cunning") and the author of the *Arthashastra*. However it was not the historical figure but the myth around him, that inspired the founders of the Society. The myth narrates that Kautilya was a brahmin who rebuked a king, declaring in a public assembly that he was behaving without intelligence for the state and without ethical responsibility for the people. The king publicly offended Kautilya as a "talkative impotent" claiming that what gives real political power is the concrete force of the warriors and not the abstract intellectuality of the Brahmins. Kautilya challenged the king and claimed, in the public assembly, that he would have proved that intelligence and discipline are the source of all forms of power. He is generally represented with a long braid because he is believed to have promised not to cut his "choti" (braid) until he removed the king from the throne and put the crown on someone not born in the Kshatriya (warriors) caste, but was ready to learn from Kautilya the art of governance. If Kautilya was really, as is commonly believed in India, the guru of Chandragupta Maurya he really did it!! And he overthrew the king to reinstate one whom he had taught the art of governance! The founders of the Kautilya Society liked the myth and the idea of knowledge as the real "empowering factor": they wanted a name that referred to the classic culture of India without using the smoky connotations of asceticism and transcendentalism.

## **Kautilya Society Activities**

The Kautilya Society members value traditions but contrast bigotry and ethnocentrism (including the modern Western biases). They value difference and therefore do not accept any form of denigration of the others. They contrast all forms of oppression on other persons, especially when motivated by the desire to disempower certain groups or categories. In all activities, the KS requires that women are respected and empowered at all levels, be they members, guests, employees or friends; and that in all external communication, women rights are promoted and violence against women is contrasted. In all dialogues and research, KS requires that the authority of opinions is based on the degree to which it is freely accepted by the counterparts and that it leads to reciprocal understanding. We contrast any sort of absolutism and any attempt to undermine the

credibility of others.

## **Promoting Intercultural Dialogue**

In the study centre of Ram Bhawan in Varanasi, the Society animates occasions of personal and group interaction, seminars and cultural events; it maintains a library and a support cell for those who want to learn more about Varanasi culture and for newsmakers who want to cover events in India. On the terrace of Ram Bhawan, the KS hosts Filocafè, a space to study, read, network, converse, that has become popular among the younger generations of Varanasi that want to gather in a more international and multicultural context. So, communication now moves through both channels, towards foreigners that want to better understand local India and towards local Indians that want to have a more global horizon of thought.

## **Promoting Responsible Tourism**

Responsible Tourism is tourism that uses, in a responsible manner, the social and environmental assets that travellers are interested in visiting. This kind of tourism minimises negative economic, environmental and social impacts, generates greater economic benefits for local people, enhances the well being of host communities, involves local people in decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods, and makes positive contributions to the conservation of the local natural and cultural heritage.

Religious tourism in Varanasi has given to the city, for centuries, enormous economic benefits while maintaining the development of spiritual, philosophical and artistic knowledge. Temples, royal palaces, and ashrams have been the focal points for such tourism. Foreign tourism, interested in observing such traditions, was begun by the British and developed outside the cultural and religious centres of towns, usually in the cantonment areas. These have contributed to increasing the wealth of the area and to the success of large chains of hotels like the Clarks, Taj, etc. However, utilising these models to unsettle existing patterns of hospitality and tourism, especially in the old city area, is dangerous for the tourism industry itself.

Vrinda Dar - Destroying the ancientness of Varanasi is in fact destroying its potentiality for development. At KS, we believe that the construction of large hotels in the Varanasi heritage zone does not contribute to sustainable development in the city. Large chains of hotels usually bring their own personnel, managers, shops, etc. and employ the local labour only as their lower staff. They don't use the local boatmen, local shops, Brahmins, masseurs, etc. and their luxury tourists don't venture out to see the tiny and congested lanes that are the beauty of an old town like Varanasi. This not only has a negative economic impact on the local people but also contributes to killing local jobs and sustained employment patterns: it burdens the carrying capacity of the local infrastructure, traffic, water and electricity usage, pollutes the already congested areas with CFCs from air conditioners and poisonous fumes and noise from generators.

Ashrams, maths and small guest houses are undoubtedly much more integrated and in harmony with the existing social, religious and cultural dynamics of the town, the Ghat and the river w:Ganges. KS claims that tourism development should be managed in such a way that has a positive impact on human and physical environment. Construction of tourism infrastructures must not be dictated by large economic interests but must follow de-centralised patterns. This is also what Mahatma Gandhi advocated in his philosophy of khadi and swadeshi, an economic model that preserves local identities.

## **Protecting the Varanasi Heritage**

Hindu culture, have attributed supreme importance to the preservation of tradition. Classical civilizations, and especially the Indian one, have attributed supreme importance to the preservation of tradition. Its central idea was that social institutions, scientific knowledge and technological applications need to use "heritage" as a "resource". Using contemporary language, we would say that ancient Indians considered, as social resources, both economic assets (like natural resources and their exploitation structure) and factors promoting social integration (like institutions for preserving knowledge and maintaining civil order). Ethics considered that what had been inherited should not be consumed, but should be handed over, possibly enriched, to successive generations. This was a moral imperative for all, except in the final life stage of the sannyasa.

The KS members strongly feel, like many other citizens of the world, that India has a responsibility towards the world and towards herself to develop in harmony with her spiritual and cultural identity. Varanasi is a universal heritage city and not just for urban Indian or foreign tourists. Its architectural heritage is the frame of a natural Sun Temple, that rises on the banks of Ganges in the form of an amphitheater, where the Ghats form the platforms, the water the altar and the sun is the epiphany of God. In Varanasi, the river Ganges, that normally flows eastward, takes a sudden turn towards the North; where the sun rises perpendicularly to the river creating, at dawn, a burning line of refracting light that cuts across the river and allows the bathing devotee to pour the Ganges waters directly into the "yoni" of light. To betray Varanasi and allow its environmental and social decadence or unsustainable commercial exploitation of its unique heritage would be a betrayal to Indian tradition and to the patrimony of future generations.

In 2002, the KS prepared a draft dossier, commissioned by the Varanasi Development Authority, for proposing the enlistment of the Varanasi riverfront Ghats in the list World Heritage sites of Unesco. The Indian Government could not forward this proposal because one of UNESCO's requirements is that the site is protected by policies, plans and legislations made by local Governments. It was not enough that the Varanasi Development Authority declared it a "heritage zone"; nor that the UP Government had issued an order (no. 320/9-A-3-2000-127 of February 5, 2000, and 840/9-A-3-2001 of April 11, 2001) prohibiting new constructions within 200 meters from the Ganges river front: because these were not implemented! And there was a widespread pessimism about whether they would ever be really implemented in the near future.

Vrinda Dar - Awareness, documentation, legislation, implementation, monitoring are the processes required in order to protect the cultural heritage. In order to react against such pessimistic sloth, the KS started conducting an awareness creation campaign to sensitise the population and to advocate with the Public Authorities that they implement existing laws and constitute a Heritage Committee that proposes new laws and adequate management plans.

Vrinda Dar, the General Secretary of KS, had been personally leading the KS activities for heritage protection. She believes that the only way forward for sustainable development is to involve local communities, build their awareness about the cultural and economic value of local resources, build on local resources and hold governments accountable for their policies and actions. She maintains a blog where she informs about the progress on heritage preservation in Varanasi.

## **CONCEPT OF LAW, JUSTICE**

Kautilya deals with subject of law in the book- III of his Arthashastra. The basic objective of kau-

Kautilya's law has been to provide intellectual and spiritual freedom to man. In ancient India, law was the creation of divine revelations. During Dharmasatra period, the king had no law making power. But according to Kautilya, there are four sources of law like Dharma (sacred law), Vyavahara (evidence), Charitra (History) and Rajasasana Edicts of the king. Kautilya gives importance to rational law or king's law.

Kautilya talked of seventeen types of laws such as marriage and allied topics, division of inheritance, building, non-performance of agreements, recovery of debts, concerning deposits, rules regarding slaves and labourers, Cooperative undertakings, rescission of purchase and sale, resumption of gifts and sale without ownership law concerning ownership, robbery, defamation, assault, gambling and betting and miscellaneous.

Kautilya gives a detailed account of law. Kautilya says it is essential duty of government to maintain law. The ultimate source of all law is dharma. He appealed in the name of 'Dharma' to the sense of honour and duty and to humandignity, to moral responsibility and to enlightened patriotism. The judge in the Arthashastra was called 'dharmashta' or upholder of dharma. The judge was appointed by the king. The judges were appointed, controlled and removed by the executive, but were appointed, controlled and removed by the executive, but were independent in their imparting of justice. Kautilya makes a distinction between civil law and criminal law.

### **Civil law:**

Kautilya in his Arthashastra in detail, civil laws concerning marriage, the duty of marriage, the property of a woman and compensation for remarriage. He was quite liberal in his concept of marriage. According to him, any kind of marriage is approvable provided it pleases all those who are concerned in it. He gives the woman the right to remarry if a husband is of bad character or has long one abroad or has become a traitor of his king or is likely to endanger the life of his wife or has fallen from his caste or has lost virility.

Regarding the law of inheritance, Kautilya says a father distributing his property shall make no distinction in dividing it among his sons. If daughters are unmarried they will be given adequate property payable to them on the occasion of their marriage. Regarding the slaves and labourers, Kautilya suggested law prohibiting the selling of a Sudra who is not a born slave and Arya in birth. In case it is done by his kinsmen, the latter will be fined. If persons other than kinsmen do the same, they shall be liable to capital punishment. Purchaser as well as the abettors shall be punished. However, it is no crime for the mlechhas to sell or mortgage the life of their own offspring. But an Arya shall never be subjected to slavery.

### **Criminal law:**

Criminal law deals with matters of serious crimes and capital punishment. It includes robbery, theft, defamation, assault etc. On robbery, he says, sudden and direct seizure of articles lead to the act of robbery, fraudulent or indirect seizure is theft. Fine for direct seizure of articles shall be proportional to the gravity of the crime. On defamation, he says, character assassination, contemptuous, talk or intimidation constitutes defamation. If a person of superior rank is abused, the amount of the fines shall be doubled, if of lower rank, it shall be halved. If any of a lower caste abuses the habits of one of the higher castes, the fine imposed shall increase from 3 panas up to 100 panas. If any of the higher castes abuses one of the lower castes, the fine imposed shall decrease from 2 panas. Defamation of one's own nation and village shall be punished with first amercement, that of one's own caste with middle most and that of gods or temples, with highest amercement.

Kautilya does not condemn gambling outrightly nor does he prescribes punishment for gamblers. He suggests a state control or gambling. It to be centralized in places provided by the state and officers in-charge of such places are to control revenues from the gamblers on behalf of the state. Kautilya prescribed different types of laws.

## **JUSTICE**

Justice is the bedrock of society. Kautilya emphasises the need of justice, particularly in one direction. Taxation must be just and equitable. Law becomes meaningless if it is not enforced by judiciary. Law in the hands of ignorant people gets tempered and become partial. Kautilya deals with law and the process of giving justice to the people. The king was the fountain of justice. The king appoints the judges and also sees that justice is administered impartially. It was the duty of the king to protect his citizens with impartial justice as this would lead him to heaven.

## **ORGANISATION OF JUDICIARY**

Kautilya prescribes for three members acquainted with sacred law and three ministers to the king to carry on the administration of justice. Judges are to be guided by Dharma, they are known as Dharmasthas. The judges are to be appointed at different head quarters of 400 villages and at the chief city with 800 village around it. The purpose of arranging the judiciary in his way to make that doors of the judiciary very much nearer to the people. The Judicial system suggested by Kautilya is quite scientific and very well planned. He has laid down rules and regulations about the procedure for holding the court, acquiring evidence, listening to the witness, appointment of Judges, their control and punishment etc. The ultimate power of controlling the judges lay entirely in the hands of the king. There were two types of courts called Dharmastiya (Civil Court) and Kantakaso-dhana (Criminal Court). The courts should hold their sessions in the big towns. There were also village tribunals. In certain important cities justice was administered by three ministers and three other judges well acquainted with sacred law. The whole judicial administration was presided over by the Chief Justice. Above him there was the king assisted by his ministers and lawyers.

## **JUDICIAL PROCEDURE**

Kautilya has given complete Judicial procedure. Kautilya says before the trial starts, the year, month, season, the date, the nature and place of the deed, the residence, the caste, the gotra the name and occupation of both the plaintiff and the defendant both of whom must be registered first. Then the statement of the parties shall be taken down in such order as is required by the case. Both the plaintiff and the defendant are required to deposit the money so that the case can start. The judges will interrogate the parties as well as the witness who are called in if the defendant contests the claim. Only those persons who are present at the time of transactions can be placed as witness. Such witness are called hearers. Secondly the witnesses must be trustworthy and honest. In case a witness gives false statement, he has to be fined twenty-four panas.

Kautilya suggests five conditions to be followed by the judge to arrive at a decision. Such conditions are: a distinctly seen offence, a voluntary admission straight-forwardness in questions and answers put in the court, reasoning and oath. But he warns the Judges to be careful and impartial while delivering the judgement when a judge does not inquire into the necessary circumstances, makes unnecessary delay in his duty, helps witness, he shall be punished with highest amersement. If he repeats the offence, he shall both be punished with double the above fine and dismissed.<sup>60</sup> Kautilya was the first ancient law giver who gave every man and woman the right to move to court. He suggested for a system of immediate Justice, equity and natural justice.

## Principles of Public Administration

Kautilya attempts to elaborate on general principles for the running of public administration in a state. These principles can be grouped in two sets; one embodying the essential attributes of the state and the other linked to the operational principles of administration. **The principle of authority:** is the essence of administration along with obedience and discipline. People consisting of four castes and four orders of religious life will keep to their occupations and duties when the king guides them with due authority. Authority is obeyed by the people on account of sanctions backed by a series of punishments. The principle of unity of command: Unity of command and direction is maintained because of the king's authority. This is not merely for the purpose of security of the King's person, but also for the purpose of maintaining the integrity and stability of administration against internal dissension and external aggression. Kautilya outlines an elaborate system of spying and allurements. All members of the bureaucracy derive their authority from the King, stand before the people as representatives of royal authority, and are ultimately responsible to the king. This is evident from the reference in Arthshastra to the enforcement of orders, the sending of writs and the procedure of forming royal writs. As for the stability of command, Kautilya's preference is clearly towards a hereditary monarchy which he believes also helps in the continuity of the principles of governance and administration.

**Principles of motivation:** Arthshastra identifies four different methods of motivation, viz, sama, dama, danda and bheda. Sama is the persuasion method, dama is the incentive method, bheda is the internal competition method and danda is the punishment method of motivation. The bureaucracy can be enthused by any one method or a mix of various combinations of these methods. Government servants are to be enthused to activity by a sense of responsibility towards the people. The state motivates them with adequate salary, pension and permanent service. He underlines a series of qualities, for officers holding different positions of responsibility.

**Other Principles:** The second set of principles – division of labour, coordination of administration, hierarchy – governs the machinery of administration. All are needed for the smooth running of government. The principle of coordination automatically evolves out of the principle of division of labour. Unless coordination is effected between the parts divided for the sake of efficiency, the smooth working of division of labour would be futile. The principles of division of labour and coordination are affected at several levels of the hierarchy of government. The principle of hierarchy is followed to make coordination and execution possible. Authority would be diluted if it is not channelized through hierarchical organization and if it does not reach the lowest levels to oversee the implementation of orders from the top.

Kautilya identifies five elements of good administration, viz, the appropriate means to start undertakings, the excellence of men and materials, allocation of place and time, provision against failure and accomplishment of work. Fear, duty and interest, are among a number of motives behind the act of obedience to the orders of an administrator. Kautilya believes that good governance is only possible with the cooperation of the people as well as of the bureaucracy.

## Central Administrative Machinery

The King is the chief executive and the ministers are selected by the King on the basis of their qualities and they are individually responsible only to the monarch. The King, the Prime Minister, the High Priest and a chosen few form the Inner Cabinet whereas there is a larger body known as the Council of Ministers. Kautilya categorises the *amatyas*, *mantrins* and heads of departments

into 18 tirthas. They are:

- Mantrin – Minister
- Purohita – Priest
- Senapati – Commander of the Army
- Yuvaraja – Prince
- Dauvarika – Chief of Palace Attendants
- Antarramsika – Chief of the King's Guards
- Prasastr – Magistrate
- Samahatr – Collector General
- Samnidhatr – Chief Treasurer
- Pradestr – Commissioner
- Nayak – Town Guard
- Paur – Chief of the Town
- Karmanta – Superintendent of Mines
- Mantri Parishad Adhyaksa – Chief of the Council of Ministers
- Dandpala – Officer of the Army Department
- Durgapal – Guardian of the Forts
- Antapala – Officer-in-charge, Boundaries
- Ativanika – Officer-in-charge, Forests

In the hierarchy of Officers, Kautilya attaches importance to the superintendent, lower in position than the minister and belonging to the sixth order according to remuneration. He is not head of any department; he is the chief of the section dealing with varied economic and administrative activities of the government. e.g. the superintendent of commerce is under the dual control of the Collector General (for collection of revenue) and Treasurer General (Supply of produced and collected commodities).

The functions of the government have been arranged horizontally according to public service delivery needs. Under the Collector General are the Commissioner, the District officer and the Circle Officer, in charge of a division, a district and a circle of villages respectively. The major departments of administration were Revenue, Exchequer, Stores, Armoury, Prisons, Accounts, Agriculture, Mines, Metals, Forest, Cattle, Shipping, Commerce, Customs, Intelligence, Religious Institutions, Excise, Weights and Measures etc.

### **Local Administration – Urban and Rural**

Another distinctive feature of the administrative system is the marked preference for a decentralized polity. There are indications that a Janapada is to contain 800 gramas with a sthanika at its centre. It is also mentioned that a Samahatr (Collector General) should divide the Janapada into four divisions for revenue and administrative purposes. Under the sthanika, there are junior officers called gopaseach in charge of five or ten villages. With their help, the samahrta is to maintain a record of all towns and villages. The gopa is responsible for maintaining a record of all agricultural and other holdings in the village, census etc. For maintaining order, the samahrta has the pradestr who are stationed at the headquarters of the gopa and sthanikas. They operate both as revenue and police officers.

Next down the hierarchy is the village headman who is referred to as the gramika. Power in the ru-

ral areas was to be centred in the hands of the samaharta with subordinates spread over the country side. Decentralization in Arthshastra was for administrative convenience and efficiency alone. One cannot deduce a notion of village democracy from a reading of the scheme. Cities should be kept neat and clean. Kot-Palla was the officer-in-charge of the city and the Administrator was called Nagaradhyaksha. Each city was divided into 4 parts and each one was headed by a Sthanik assisted by a junior officer called gopa. Each looked after 20 houses. Nagarakas were to maintain peace and keep an eye on the income & expenditure of residents and foreigners. They were to take possession of unclaimed property and see that epidemics don't spread, maintain sanitary conditions and keep record of births and deaths. They could setup committees to take care of separate things like, collect taxes, maintain market standards, export and import of goods from cities etc. The affairs of the village were looked after by the Sangrahana. Every 200 villages constituted a Kharwatika, 400 constituted a Dronamukha and 800 constituted a sthania. Villages had maximum autonomy. Villages were run by Gramiks and gopas. They negotiated with the central government for getting development plans approved. Both gramiks and gopas were state employees posted in the village.

### **Personnel Administration**

Arthshastra gives great attention to the education and training of the King and the princes. Kautilya lays down a series of qualities, differing in number and order of officers holding different positions in the administrative hierarchy. The important competencies can be broadly classified as i) technical competence ii) decision making skills particularly during times of emergency iii) communication skills iv) interpersonal behavioral competence v) strength of character. Though the word 'recruitment' is not really used, Kautilya prescribes qualifications for each post which goes to prove that certain basic qualifications were made mandatory for entry into government service e.g. a prince is asked by Kautilya to study science and to observe its precepts under the authority of specialist teachers. All major appointments were made by the King himself or assisted by the Inner Cabinet and only persons having prajna (intelligence) and vakyasakti (power of expression) were to be considered suitable for state services.

He also prescribed tests such as dharmopadha, arthopadha, bhayopadha and kamopadha. Those who passed the dharma test were to be appointed as judges and magistrates, those who passed the artha test were to be appointed as revenue officers, those who passed the bhaya test would work in proximity to the King and those who passed the kama test would help in entertainment. Ministers were expected to be conversant with the teachings of the Shastras. Though Arthshastra places great importance to the training of the prince and the men in army there is very little discussion on the training of the personnel manning the civil departments. Superintendents were given the power to regulate the salaries, wages, transfer and appointments of the personnel under them (with salaries ranging from 100 to 1000 panas per annum). There are no definite rules about promotion. But the government servants who are loyal and doing good work should be rewarded according to their contribution. Every government servant is subject to punishment or transfer if he is found corrupt, slack or insensitive to public grievances. No transfer of officers were allowed in guarding royal buildings and forts. Salaries were liberal - from the highest 8000 panas for ministers to 60 panas for attendants. Pension was not allowed except to the dependents of those who died in harness. A strict code of conduct for civil servants was specified in Arthshastra.

### **Legal Administration**

Administrative courts consisting of three persons proficient in Dharmshastras and three ministe-

rial officers in the administration of law are mentioned in Arthshastra. A hierarchy of courts - from the court catering to a group of ten villages rising upto the King's court are to be maintained. Arthshastra contains references to a Code of Law. The code is set forth under 17 heads, including marriage, property, slaves, theft, injury and assault. There are four bases of law – dharma (sacred law) vyavahara (evidence) charitra (history) and rajasasana (King's edicts). In case of conflict, edicts override other bases. Judges should be knowledgeable, discerning, kind, balanced and incorruptible. Courts are of 2 types, civil and criminal. Arthshastra contains an elaborate scheme of punishment for all kinds of officers to be followed in courts of law.

## **Financial Administration**

A great deal of attention has been paid to financial administration in the Arthshastra. All undertakings depend on finance, hence foremost attention was paid to matters relating to the Treasury. Revenue generation and enhancement of the wealth of the nation were the primary tasks of the king. Loan, fabrication of accounts, self enjoyment, barter and defalcation are the causes that tend to deplete the Treasury. Increasing revenue was essential in retaining the support of the King's army and preventing it from going over to the enemy. The details of a modern budgeting system as a means to monitor the performance of various departments is given in Arthshastra. The concerned officer shall communicate the real nature of the work of his department together with the income and expenditure in detail and in the aggregate. In case the expenditures exceeds the budgeted grants, the official is personally liable to bear the excess expenditure.

Both revenues and expenditures were classified according to various parameters such as heads of income, source, period, quantity etc. This is geared towards monitoring of the revenues and expenditures as well as the other details associated with them. In addition to the financial information and control system, there is a very detailed audit and internal control system. A separate office of records and accounts and audit is assigned for this purpose. Arthshastra classified 67 sources of revenue, based predominantly on land, and grouped them under seven heads, resting essentially on the location of the activities and individuals concerned subject to taxation; e.g. those found in fortified and urban areas and those found in rural situations, those found at sites of minerals, or in pastoral, forest, or intensely cultivated areas and those situated along traffic carrying roads and waterways. Kautilya also named seven forms of revenue by type. He divided the kingdom into four districts, distinguished the urban centres from the villages, and classified the villages according to size and nature of tax liability.

## **Other aspects of administration**

Kautilya's Arthshastra is a comprehensive text attempting to detail every possible aspect of governance and administration – duties of the King, the structure and functions of the administrative machinery, municipal government, legal and financial administration, diplomacy and foreign policy, trade and commerce and social welfare administration. The king is to provide for the maintenance of the orphans, the aged, the sick and the unemployed. Special attention is to be given to town planning, housing in villages, maintenance of state buildings and forts. He also paid special attention to the use of statistics and the census. The district and circle officers were asked to collect a variety of statistics regarding land, property, families and persons, social customs and work habits. State intervention was recommended to regulate markets, fix prices and prevent unfair trade practices.

## **A Critical Appraisal**

One of the basic reasons for Kautilya's emphasis on a strong state capable of creating order and

providing good governance to his subjects is his acute awareness of the dangers of anarchy and being witness to the malady of his times - the prevalence of a number of small states constantly at war with one another. He was the first thinker who reached the pivot of realpolitik by stressing on a strong political centre in India and propounding a theory of politics which dealt with the practical concerns of administration and governance. He strongly believed that anarchy is worse than the highest tyranny. Although he was in favour of a powerful ruler, he made it very clear that this power is to be used only for the welfare of the ruled. The monarch's powers were to be hedged in with many restrictions. He was to work 18 hours a day and all questions of political importance would be discussed in the two houses of parliament (pura-janapada), a powerful instrument to curb the King's absolute authority. He also refers to the authority of canon law, customary law, usage and logical principles. Despite these restrictions on his absolute authority; the king is given the last say in all important matters of governance. This emphasis on the principle of kingship became the basis of consolidating perhaps the first centralized government in India.

The seeds of a welfare state are sown into Arthshastra with as much emphasis as an elaborate discussion on the state structure and the administrative machinery. There was nothing more important to the king than the welfare of his subjects. The idea of a welfare state is taken up and the King is authorized to create conditions for a good life by digging wells, canals, constructing dams, planting trees, providing impetus to trade and industry road construction and providing navigation facilities. A good state must have right laws and institutions besides honest and good administrators devoted to public welfare. If a king is to become a chakravartin, he must have all three assets, namely military power, financial prudence and wisdom. In his tasks the king must first use right means, but, if they fail, he may use intrigue and treachery. It is the duty of the king to reward the meritorious and punish the corrupt and in all his roles he should be a model for others. He was convinced that an unrighteous King who ignores the welfare of his subjects would fall a victim to popular revolt and become vulnerable to enemies.

For the preservation of the state, Kautilya was convinced that governance rules had to ignore the ordinary concepts of morality and utilize evil (spies, deceit, treachery, sex, violence and murder) if necessary for the good of society and the stability of the state. Kautilya often confused the preservation of the state with the preservation of the King, a stand which cannot be condoned from a modern democratic standpoint. However, Kautilya's famous definition of politics is worth quoting even today:

Politics is the acquisition of what has not been gained, the preservation of what has been acquired, the increase of what has been preserved, and the bestowal of the surplus upon the deserved.

His chief concerns - presentation and development of the state in terms of a certain concept of distributive justice, security of subjects and stability of society have been clearly stated and these concerns have a modern futuristic vision of politics that is truly remarkable for his age and times. His administrative scheme is unsurpassed in every detail: central administrative machinery, provincial, local, legal and financial administration have all been dealt with in Arthshastra which remains to this day the oldest and the longest written text of public administration in the world.

## **Kautilya and Machiavelli**

Kautilya's Arthshastra is often compared to the Prince of Machiavelli, since the two books are perhaps the world's most famous treatises on the art of Kingship. Both writers were in favour of a

strong monarchy with absolute powers. Kautilya however lived and wrote at least a thousand years before Machiavelli. They lived in similar kind of times: in an age of anarchy, turbulence and civil war. Machiavelli wrote the Prince with the professed object of advising Lorenzo de Medici to adopt all kinds of means to become master of unified Italy, just as Kautilya's sole object was the expansion of the Mauryan Empire under the aegis of Chandragupta Maurya. Both approached the problem of politics as scientists who separated private morality from a public version of the same. To both ends justified the means i.e. the end being the stability of the Kingdom and the preservation of a strong King. The realist that Kautilya was he did not attribute the degeneration of state and society to destiny or divinity but he perceived it as the direct consequence of misrule, misgovernance and lack of a political vision. Thus he evolved such principles of political conduct and good governance that would cover all such contingencies. Though he did not theorize about the postulates of statehood and society, Kautilya was the first political thinker in history to discuss politics in administrative terms (in the vocabulary of good and bad administration) recognizing the former as mandatory to the maintenance of a good and just state. A good administration touches on citizen's lives and therefore needs to continue on a sound and permanent basis is the ultimate message of the Arthshastra.

### **The many "firsts" of Kautilya**

- Arthshastra is the first comprehensive text on public administration in world literature
- He was the first to make Political Economy an independent discipline
- He was the first thinker to emphasize on the need for a strong political centre in India making its administration a major concern.
- First political realist in ancient Indian political thought
- First Indian political thinker to separate religion from politics giving the outline of a secular polity
- He focused on a professional bureaucracy based on merit, rather than caste considerations.
- Departmental system and a detailed job classification scheme were the other innovations of Kautilya
- Recognized the needs of a strong military administration
- Saptanga theory is an original contribution to political science and practice

### **Economic Ideas of Kautilya (With Critical Estimate)**

**The following points highlight the top ten economic ideas of Kautilya. The economic ideas are:**

1. Wealth
2. Varta
3. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
4. Labour
5. Trade
6. Value
7. Population
8. Slavery
9. Welfare State
10. Public Finance
11. Town Planning and Social Security

12. Private Property
13. Justification on Interest
14. Consumption and Production.

### **Economic Idea # 1. Wealth:**

The concept of wealth as held by Kautilya was very wide in its scope. To him, wealth included money, commodity, the acquired wealth, public or private property, precious metals, the accumulated wealth, negotiable and transferability and the power of appropriation.

He also included labour and forest produce in wealth. To him, "wealth is to be acquired grain by grain, as learning is to be acquired every moment. Acquisition of wealth is always beneficial if it is acquired for the sake of a good wife, a son or a friend, or for giving away charity". Thus Kautilya justified wealth which was earned through proper means, and also he thought that accumulation of wealth was a safe method for protecting the people against famines.

### **Economic Idea # 2. Varta:**

Ancient thinkers used the word Varta to mean the science of national economy. Kautilya included agriculture, animal husbandry and trade in Varta. According to Mahabharata, Varta was the roof of the world, a thing which was most essential for economic stability. It was necessary for the King to learn about the essentials of national economy from scholars and specialists in order to discharge his functions successfully as a ruler.

### **Economic Idea # 3. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry:**

Agriculture and Animal Husbandry formed the important components of Varta. These were regarded as the basic sources of new wealth. Agriculture was given the pride of place among the occupations adopted by the people. Shukracharya was of the firm belief that by birth nobody was a Brahmin or Kshatriya or Shudra. It was on the basis of their occupation that they are distinguished from one another. Agriculture occupies a place of first stage importance in Kautilya's Arthashastra.

The art of agriculture reached a high degree of perfection and our ancient scholars well understood the minutest details of agricultural techniques. They have mentioned in their books, rotation of crops, intensive and extensive cultivation, large and small scale farming, use of fertilizers, crop diseases and their eradication, irrigation by rivers and tanks, cattle farming, seed selection, evils of the fragmentation of holdings etc. To them the largest source of State income was land revenue.

In those days the state and the community were responsible for the development of agriculture for which the waste lands were to be cleared. The value of the land was determined on the basis of its fertility. The fair prices of agricultural produce were fixed by the state to save cultivators from the clutches of traders.

### **Economic Idea # 4. Labour:**

The ancient sages appreciated the dignity of labour for 100 years. Manu and Kautilya have dealt with the methods for the regulation of wages and for the settlement of disputes between employers and workers. Kautilya did not recommend slave labour. But hired labour was there. Kautilya had laid down a code of labour discipline. For instance, he suggested that a wage worker who abandoned his work before the term had expired, was to pay the whole amount of stipulated wag-

es to his employer and a fine to the King. On the other hand, if an employer dismissed a workman whom he had hired before the expiration of the term agreed upon, he must pay the full amount of wages stipulated and a fine to the King, unless the workman was to blame.

### **Economic Idea # 5. Trade:**

Gold and bullion was regarded as a means of producing wealth, and trade was the sum of industrialised capital. Kautilya devoted a good deal of attention to the problems of trade such as regulation and development of trade by the state and the different taxes to be levied on the commodities that entered into trade. He even advocated state trading in certain commodities through departmental agencies. Kautilya advised the state to build rest houses and store houses for the caravans of traders for whom police escorts were recommended. Also trade was approved only when the supplies of commodities were left over after satisfying local needs.

### **Economic Idea # 6. Value:**

Regarding value, the ancient thinkers of India seemed to have some ideas on value which are relevant to modern times. We should take the value of each commodity according to time and place but there can be no value (price) of that which is incapable of being exchanged. Again whatever one pays for obtaining a thing must be taken to be the cost. The value is determined by the easiness, or otherwise of obtaining, and also by the inherent utility of it (Shukracharya).

### **Economic Idea # 7. Population:**

The ancient thinkers had no fear of growing population. The Vedas were for more married couples. Population could not grow beyond a reasonable limit owing to the high death rate due to constant wars between small states and loss of life due to the inadequate medical facilities. Kautilya recommended that the king should establish colonies for facilitating immigration.

### **Economic Idea # 8. Slavery:**

In Ancient India, a slave was treated as a member of family, and was not asked to do a degrading work. A slave was a hereditary domestic servant who could not use his personal earnings and could not own property. But economically he was better than a hired labourer. Slaves could not be employed by Buddhist monks. In ancient India all slaves were as good as others and hence Megasthenes wrote that slavery was unknown in ancient India.

### **Economic Idea # 9. Welfare State:**

The ancient Indian writers had a clear idea of the welfare state. According to Shukracharya, the state is a tree of which the king is the root and the counselors are the main branches, the commanders are the lesser branches, the armies are blossoms and flowers, the people are the fruits and the land is the seed". The same idea has been echoed by Kautilya, "In the happiness of his (king's) subjects lies his happiness, in their welfare, his welfare". To Kautilya, the state was to promote the economic welfare of the people and fully regulate its economic life. The state had to give subsidies for the development of trade; agriculture/ irrigation, mines, cattle welfare etc.

### **Economic Functions of State:**

Kautilya's concept of state is founded on industrial edifice. According to him, there are guiding principles for the state, first, the state should undertake those industries which help directly in making the nation self-sufficient and self-reliant, and e.g., gold, silver, diamonds and iron and other metals should be in the charge of the state. Secondly, the activities related to farming, spinning

and weaving, arts and crafts should be left to the individuals and the right of the ownership should be recognised.

Finally, the state should see that the activities relating to production, distribution and consumption are carried out efficiently and in accordance with the rules framed by it. The duties of men, women, saints and sages, lords and the kings used to be clearly defined so that their observance may help in achieving the objective. The private people can also undertake the production of goods under the supervision of the State. In addition to the above function, the State regulated the wages and working condition of workers, and helped the farmers in times of calamities.

### **Economic Idea # 10. Public Finance:**

Taxation was one of the most important sources of revenue of the state. It was known as 'rajkar'. The rate of tax was determined in accordance with the dictates of Hindu religion. Land Revenue was an important source of taxation in ancient India.

The early writers have described the features of a good tax system. "The tax system should be such as not to prove a great burden to the public. The king should act like the bee which collects honey without inconveniencing the plant". Taxes were the remuneration for the services rendered by the king as a public functionary for providing internal security to his subjects. Kautilya suggested forced loans for meeting deficit budgets.

### **He divided income from taxes into the following three kinds:**

- (a) Income from taxes on commodities produced in the country.
- (b) Income from taxes on commodities produced in the capital and
- (c) Income from taxes imposed on imports and exports.

The usual import tax was 20 per cent which varied from time to time in case of precious stones and rare commodities. Heavy taxes were imposed on the importation of luxury goods. The policy of the state was to discourage the import of luxury goods and those which were harmful for the welfare of the State. Kautilya suggested an efficient machinery for audit.

### **Two principals were followed in connection with the realisation of taxes:**

- (i) A tax should be levied once a year, and should not prove burdensome and
- (ii) Taxes should be levied according to the ability to pay.

Sources of Revenue included taxes on land, forests, monopoly and property, customs and excise duties, fines, profits of state, factories and crown monopolies, from manufacture and sale of saffron, salt, intoxicants, trade in horses, fine wool and elephants and port dues, road tolls, fruit and tree tax etc. Similarly public expenditure included public administration, defence, salaries of ministers, Government departments, maintenance of national store houses and granaries and acquisition of valuable ornaments, gems and precious stones. Whatever amount was left unused, was deposited either with the treasury or the war chest.

### **Economic Idea # 11. Town Planning and Social Security:**

Town planning included the re-orientation of main roads and streets and the subdivision of city

areas. The villages were grouped together from the point of view of economic necessities and for national defence. The metropolitan city was established after a detailed and careful planning, and due emphasis was laid on the maintenance of sanitation and prevention of fire. Kautilya believed that it was the prime duty of the state to set up charitable institutions and poor houses. Further, the state should protect the weak and the aged, to provide jobs to the unemployed.

### **Economic Idea # 12. Private Property:**

Ancient economic thinkers supported the institution of private property, both movable and immovable. The right in land was transferable and saleable. As revealed by ancient law books, the following eight sources of property were recognised in those days—gift, conquest, inheritance, partition, purchase, gain of agriculture and trade, discovery and seizure. The owner of land on which a treasure was discovered, could get the large share of it, not the whole of it.

### **Economic Idea # 13. Justification on Interest:**

Though interest was justified in ancient India, no interest was allowed on the mortgaged property. The rate of interest was also varied from class to class depending upon the purpose for which money was borrowed, economic resources of the borrower etc. The same were the considerations for charging compound rate of interest. Thus, interest in those days was part of profit. If a loan made in kind or money was to be returned in kind, interest did not exceed half of the money value of the original capital.

### **Economic Idea # 14. Consumption and Production:**

For consumption purposes, family was regarded as an economic unit. Consumption should have four ideas, namely, Dharma, Artha, Kama, and Moksha. The individual was subordinate to the family or the community. As far as production was concerned, the four agents of production namely, land, labour, capital and organisation were recognised. Land was considered as the main source of wealth.

The importance of labour was also duly recognised. "An employer not-taking work from his labourer, or an employee not doing his employer's work, should be fined". The ancient writers believed that the accumulated wealth, earned through hard labour was sufficient for a man's life. The high rate of interest prevailed in the economy was due to shortage of private capital. So the state was asked to provide cash and kind to the farmers and cash to the industrialists.

### **Critical Estimate of Economic Ideas by Kautilya:**

The ancient thinkers did not regard economics as a separate discipline. The study of economics was combined with the study of religion, ethics, philosophy, law, politics and public administration. According to Kautilya, the study of four sciences namely, philosophy, ethics, economics and politics was combined together and was essential for the salvation of individual. The economic teaching emphasised a moral life.

Secondly, the concept of welfare state was the kernel of the ancient Indian economic thought. The state was responsible for the economic prosperity of the people. Finally, economic life as well as thought in ancient India was governed by moral sanctions and religious ideals. The social equilibrium was maintained by the system of 'Varna ashram' a system of mutual checks and balances emphasizing the virtues of hard work.

## Internal Security

What prescriptions does Kautilya offer for internal security? He starts the chapter on “internal and external dangers” by noting that these dangers arise due to wrongly concluded “treaties and other settlements”. He places threats into four categories. The most serious one arises from internal originators and internal abettors and is like the “fear from a lurking snake”. Second to this is the purely external threat, both originated and abetted by foreigners. Third comes the internally originated but externally abetted threat, followed by the externally originated, internally abetted threat. So how should the king deal with these? For the purely internal threat—when originators and abettors are locals—he advises a policy of conciliation and coercion. He may employ the policy of conciliation with regard to those who keep the appearance of contentment, or who are naturally discontented or otherwise. Gifts may be given under the pretext of having been satisfied with a favoured man’s steadfastness... or under the plea of anxious care about his weal or woe. [Arthashastra IX:5] In addition, he advocates the use of spies split the ranks of the conspirators and their sympathisers. Kautilya is ruthless when it comes to coercive tactics against leaders of the conspiracy—the punishment is usually death, including what might today be termed “extra judicial killings”. In fact, taking out the leaders is Kautilya’s central prescription for handling discontented and disaffected people.

Disaffection or disloyalty (viraga) can be got rid of by putting down the leaders; for in the absence of a leader or leaders, the people are easily governed (bhogya) and they will not take part in the intrigues of enemies. [Arthashastra VII:5] When the threat is purely external, Kautilya advocates a policy of sowing dissension and coercion—essentially through the use of covert means. This entails the use of double agents to create splits among the conspirators and assassins to kill them. In the other two contexts involving a combination of internal and external actors, Kautilya proposes the use of the dissension and coercion against the foreign element, and conciliation to suppress the local.

When local persons are abetting (with foreigners), the means to be employed to suppress them are conciliation (sama) and gifts (dana). The act of pleasing a man with a high rank and honour is conciliation; favour and remission of taxes or employment to conduct state-works is what is termed gifts. [Arthashastra IX:5] Kautilya’s approach makes a clear distinction between leaders and sympathisers of internal threats. Leaders are to be neutralised, either by co-opting them or by eliminating them. Sympathisers, on the other hand, are to be offered conciliation. The foreign element relies heavily on the use of spies and assumes that the state has the requisite covert action capability to execute disinformation, defections and assassinations.

## Attributes of Internal Security, Threats to Internal Security Internal Security:

- It is the act of keeping pace with the borders of a sovereign State or other self-governing territories by upholding National laws and defending against internal threats. Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which deals with protection of life and personal liberty, reads that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law
- The right to life enshrined by Article 21 has been literally interpreted more than survival and mere existence or animal existence. Thus the security of an individual is of paramount importance along with the assurance for better enjoyment of life with dignity.
- Subsequently, the question arises about the ecosystem of the person where he lives. If the ter-

territory, locality or the ecosystem of the person is disturbed, the concept of the existence is jeopardized. This capitulate the concept of security which is interwoven and interlinked with safety.

## **Attributes of Internal Security**

The main attributes of internal security are:

- Social, political and economic stability
- Prevalence of law and order and domestic peace
- Secure territorial integrity and protect internal sovereignty
- Rule of law and equality before law-law of land should protect everyone irrespective of status
- Peaceful co-existence and communal harmony and cultural cohesiveness Further, all the dimensions discussed under dimensions of national security can also be added under attributes of internal security.

## **Threats to Internal Security**

Kautilya or Chanakya in Arthashastra wrote about internal and external dangers of the State by configuring that these arise due to wrongly concluded treaties and settlements. He classified four types of threats to security of a country:

- Internal: Most serious and fearful threats are internal which arise from internal originators or internal abettors. Chanakya compared the fear similar to that from a lurking snake.
- External: Purely external which are originated and abetted by foreigner
- Internally originated but externally abetted threats.e.g:When internal terror groups aid hostile nations like Pakistan
- Externally originated but internally abetted threats.e.g: When hostile nations like China support the Maoists of the country.

India's internal security threat perceptions are a mix of all four shades of threats defined above.The changing external environment also impacts our internal security.Events in neighbouring countries like Pakistan, Srilanka, Banglades, Nepaletc have direct or indirect influence on our internal security.Therefore in today's information and digital age, both internal and external security threats are inter-related and cannot be seen in isolation from each other.

Furthermore, Kautilya has also attributed the measures of coercion and conciliation to cope with challenges of internal security.

## **Welfare and External affairs**

Introduction The historical process of tradition of Indian Politics is primeval and traced back to the period of Vedas. The deliberations regarding politics are found in 'Smritis' and 'Puranas' by the name 'dandaniti'. References to various political texts are available which studied and discovered the concept of 'dandaniti'. The study of ancient Indian political thought is considered incomplete without the knowledge of Arthashastra written by Kautilya. Arthashastra is one of the most persuasive and comprehensive treatises in political science in the Indian Vedic civilization [1] . Kautilya made politics a scientific study in ancient India, and attempted to test the political ideas on scientific lines with empirical orientation.Many stated Kautilya as the first political realist in the world. Kautilya was the minister in the Kingdom of Chandragupta Maurya during 317-293 B.C. He has been considered as one of the shrewdest ministers of the times. Kautilya's Arthashastra is a masterwork which includes an array of topics like statecraft, politics, strategy, selection and training of employees, leadership skills, legal systems, accounting systems, taxation, fiscal policies,

civil rules, internal and foreign trade etc. After alexander left India, The Mauryan Empire was the most powerful Kingdom in India and kautilya was minister who advised the king.

Chanakya (C.350- C.275BC) also known as Kautilya or Vishnugupta. He was the man to envision the first Indian empire by unification of the then numerous Kingdoms in the Indian sub-continent and provide the impetus for fights against the Greek conqueror Alexander. His foresight and wide knowledge coupled with politics of expediency helped found the mighty Mauryan Empire in India. Kautilya is perhaps less well known outside India compared to other social and political philosophers of the world like Confucius and Machiavelli, but is definitely considered to be the first genuine political theorist in Indian history.

Kautilya's Arthashastra is a draft constitution of an ideal state. Due to his political wisdom and diplomatic skills in empire building, Chanakya is called 'Machiavelli of India'. Kautilya several times more clever and superior political thinker. If we compare statesman on the four dimension framework of war and peace, Human Rights, International Economic Justice and World order Kautilya had a strong opinion on all the four aspects. In fact people like Bismark and Woodrow Wilson in recent history had been able to demonstrate their views only on two of the four dimensions. Kautilya's work is primarily a book of political realism where State is paramount and king shall carry out duties as advised in his book to preserve his state. Kautilya's work differed from existing political theory in that it talked about ways of running the administration which were based more on self-interest than on morality.

Kautilya was far more successful as he first taught his realist philosophy to Chandra Gupta right from his childhood and then helped him to become an emperor. In this way, Kautilya was a successful King-maker or he was successful in making a philosopher king. Kautilya was a proponent of a welfare state but definitely encouraged war for preserving the power of the state. He thought that the possession of power and happiness in a state makes a king superior hence a king should always strive to augment his power. This actually coincides with the Weber's view that there is no moral in international politics which means that states must be at war all the times.

Kautilya though did not state this explicitly but we can infer that he did presume to be at war is natural for a state. A war in certain cases is unavoidable, hence, preparation and maintenance of the army, the right moves in the battle field and warfare strategies all are essential in the defence of a country, subjects which Kautilya tackles with the extra sensory precision. Kautilya's goal remained to enable the king to achieve complete power. In his opinion, the king had to be disciplined and hardworking, sleeping only four hours a night. A king also had to avoid anger and lust, because a kingdom was at stake. Kautilya advocated three types of war – Open war, Concealed war and the Silent war. Open war he describes as the war fought between states, Concealed war as one which is similar to guerilla war and silent war which is fought on a continued basis inside the Kingdom so that the power of the king does not get diluted. War fighting tactics. Kautilya was also very harsh in narrating the exact methods of fighting a war and use of various tools to reduce the strength of a state. He believed that there were three types of Kings who go into warfare and it is important to understand the distinction between the types of Kings and the appropriate warfare strategy to be selected.

Kautilya wrote in detail explaining the war strategy because he was a strong proponent of social structure. He vehemently defends the state and believes that religion and morals are supposed to serve the state. Kautilya believes that war is a means to an end for wealth and stability. Kautilya

believed that nations acted in their political, economic and military self-interest. According to Kautilya, foreign policy or diplomacy will be practiced as long as the self-interest of the state is served because every state acts in a way to maximize the power and self-interest. He thought that diplomacy is a series of actions taken by a kingdom such that it gains strength and eventually conquers that nation with which diplomatic ties were created. He also thought that treaties should be made in such a way that king benefits and serves the self-interest of the kingdom. Kautilya described three types of political system such as rule making, rule application and rule adjudication and has been recognized for his contributions to bringing diplomacy at the helm of state's affairs. To understand Kautilya's concept of diplomacy it is important to understand the Mandala concept, six types of foreign policy and four solutions. "Your neighbour is your natural enemy and the neighbour's neighbour is your friend" – this was the basic thought behind Kautilya's Mandala theory.

According to this theory foreign rules are classified into four groups. Ari, Mitra, Madhyama and Udasina. Inimical and friendly rulers are divided into two kinds natural and artificial. Kautilya thought that the king and his immediate neighbours are the natural enemies to each other. A king who attempted to give trouble to another king without reasonable cause was an artificial enemy of that king. Kautilya believed that the best kind of friend who was constant, noble, straightforward and whose friendship is inherited from father or grandfather. A ruler whose friendship was courted for the sake of protection of life and property was the artificial friend. According to Kautilya, the ruler whose territory was situated close to that of a king and his wicked enemy and who was capable of helping both the kings or of resisting either of them was a Mediator and the ruler whose territory was situated between the territories of two rival kings and who was powerful enough to help or resist either of them or a mediating king was Neutral. The neighbouring king belong to either of four classes, Parshnigraha, Akaranda, Parshnigrahasana and Akarandasara.

According to Kautilya, a powerful king should always try to make himself Nabhi of the Mandala. Depending on the situation the king should adopt any of Asana, Yana, Samsraya and Dvaidhibhava. A ruler should adopt his foreign policy by deploying the well-established four-fold policy of Sama (persuasion, conciliation), Dana (monetary and other gainful incentives), Bedhna (divide and rule policy) and Danda (Punishment). Kautilya's Arthashastra is mainly a work on the art of government. In his political and administrative ideas, the focus of attention was the king. According to Kautilya, the state is made of seven constituent elements the king, ministers, fort, rural area, treasury, army and friend. Of all the seven elements, the king is the most important as he provides leadership, dynamism and energy to other six elements. 'Artha' is the dominant matter in this world and politics is also subjected to it. This view is largely similar to materialist philosophy of Marx. In modern terminology, Kautilya's Arthashastra can be dubbed as a book on political economy. Economic power precedes the political power. Kautilya's Arthashastra is, in essence, a book on science of government whose base is economic.

According to Kautilya, Artha implies vocation of man. The earth, on which humans inhabit and depend for their livelihood, is also called Artha. Arthashastra is science of "acquisition and maintenance of (inhabited) earth." Kautilya has said, "This science brings into beings and preserves spiritual good, material well-being and pleasures and destroys spiritual evil, material loss and hatred [7]. He thinks that politics must be treated as an independent science. Only it needs to be fitted into general scheme of knowledge. According to Kautilya's beliefs, for the smooth functioning of administration and for the welfare of the people, the king had to be acquainted in the four Vedas and four sciences of government.

First Anviksiki or philosophy including the materialistic Lokayata system which sharpens the intellect opens the heart and opens the gate to all knowledge and virtue. Secondly, the Trayi or the triple Vedas, Rig, Sam and Yjur. To these might be added the Atharvaveda and historical lore. Thirdly, Varta or economics was concerned with agriculture, Cattle – breeding and trade. Lastly, Dandaniti or politics was the science of government, of the enforcement of law and order. According to Kautilya, politics was the supreme science and supreme art. It lay at the root of all. The welfare of all sciences depended on the well - being of politics. Kautilya is exceptional Indian political philosopher who was both thinker and statesman. He contributed in various social and political revolutions of his age and abstracted from his study of conflicts some general principles capable of universal application and effective in all times and ages. With more and more studies in the field of politics and economics and with a modern outlook and understanding of world affairs, the significance and indebtedness of Kautilya's 'Arthashastra' is incontrovertible. In India today, the Arthashastra is considered analogous to Aristotle's Politics and Machiavelli's The Prince.

## **Conclusion**

Kautilya is one of the most renowned Indian political philosophers. Though, he lived a long time ago, Certain philosophies from his theory are still applicable in modern political frame work. The book, written in Sanskrit elucidates theories and principles of governing a state. Kautilya established an extremely vital imperative - governance, polity, politics and progress have to be linked to the welfare of the people. Covering various topics on administration, politics and economy. It is a book of law and a treatise on running a country which is pertinent even today. His philosophies remain prevalent today in India.

## **Welfare State:**

Arthashastra sets the conceptual groundwork for making India the first welfare state. He backed welfare in all spheres. He did not talk only about human welfare but paid attention to animal welfare also. He states that "In the happiness of his subjects lies the king's happiness, in their welfare lays his welfare. He shall not consider as good as only that which pleases him but treat as beneficial to him whatever pleases his subjects" He supported the protection of livelihood, of weaker section, consumer protection and even the welfare of prisoners also. The King's dharma is to be just, fair and liberal in protecting his people. His boldness to his people should be like attitude of a father towards his children. Kautilya demarcated the model ruler as one "who is ever active in promoting the welfare of the people and who endears himself by enriching the public and doing well to them."

Kautilya is not principally concerned with broad political speculation on the origin and nature of the state (India provides no philosophical text that can be compared with the major theoretical works of Europe), and his originality is not to be found in the monarchy of abstraction. The treatise is a collection and summary of earlier Arthashastra writings. Of the three ends of human life, virtue, wealth, and enjoyment, Kautilya allocates first importance to wealth, but he is always aware of the instrumental value of religion and principled norms in preserving the structure of society. He permitted the king to determine for himself what shall have the sanction of law, although the Vedas are accepted as sources of dharma, and statute law must be well-matched with the sacred texts. Despite the importance he ascribed to the role of the king, Kautilya is practical in his approach and would give importance to that component of dominance which happens to be of most consequence at any particular time.


In Indian theory, independence was usually thought to cover seven elements:

1. The king
2. The ministers
3. The populace
4. The fort
5. The treasury
6. The army
7. The ally

The theory, in which diplomacy is made an integral part of politics, is intended to show the necessary conditions for the effective functioning of the state.

**Kamandaki: Social Order and State Elements:** Niti-Sara, Varna System, Ashram-Dharma, Brahmacharya, Grihastha, Vanaprashtha, Sanyasa, Prakriti-Sampat, the Concept of Upayas.

**Niti-sara:**



Niti-sara or Niti-satra means the elements of polity, it is a work of literature by Kamandaka (also written as Kamandaki). It deals with general maxims of Niti. It is a work which comprises of di-

dactic maxims and it is influenced by Kautilya's Arthashastra. The major premise of the book highlights the importance of the king and the qualities a king must possess in-order to run the state in prosperity. It accepts some of Arthashastra's theories for example.

### **The Nitisara or the Elements of Polity by Kamandaka Major Arguments**

Since India is one of the longest surviving civilisations, there is likelihood that principles of statecraft are continuing through ages. This paper probes this possibility and argues that many concepts and principles of statecraft in India have not changed and that continuity is embedded in the vocabulary and concepts in the Indian tradition. They have survived due to their own enduring logic. This paper compares Arthashastra and Nitisara and analyses the enduring continuities in statecraft, diplomacy and aspects of warfare. It seeks answers to the following questions:

- (a) What are the continuities and changes in the vocabulary and concepts from Kautilya's Arthashastra to Nitisara?;
- (b) What is the vocabulary of Kamandaka in a stand-alone mode?; and,
- (c) What is the contemporary relevance of the answers to these findings?

The author found both texts are ahistorical, dealing with the acquisition of wealth and its distribution and emphasising on war as the last resort. Some common aspects adhered to in both the texts are: mastering of control over the senses including non-violence; the need to ensure that the state of matsyanyaya does not prevail; anvikshiki; maintaining balance among dharma, artha and kama; importance of intelligence; the seven prakrits and twelve vijigishus in a circle of kings or mandala theory; six measures of foreign policy; the upayas in which there is no war mongering and use of force is the last resort; issues of disasters (vysanas) that may afflict the constituent elements (prakrits) and how to overcome them prior to the execution of a policy; duties of diplomats and intelligence gathering; and, aspects of war and use of power by sticking to the priorities of mantra-shakti (counsel or diplomacy), prabhav-shakti (economic and military power), and utsah-shakti (leadership).

The paper also points out the dissimilarities in concepts employed by the two texts. To begin with, while Kautilya's work is inspired by statesmanship and is of a complex nature often questioning earlier scholars, Kamandaka's is a lucid and academic work and an abridged version of the Arthashastra. In terms of uniqueness, Kamandaka stands out for deliberating at length not only on the four upayas (as mentioned in the Arthashastra) of sama, dana, bheda and danda but also the powerful concept of Upeksha (a combination of neglect or diplomatic indifference and the supreme virtue of patience) which was the strategy adopted by the Indian freedom movement. The impact of Kamandaka can be further seen on the Hitopadesa by Narayana, which has 90 verses of Kamandaka including sixteen types of alliances.

In the end, the paper argues that India's geo-cultural space extends beyond the Himalayas up to Central Asia. This has also been highlighted by the History Division of the Ministry of External Affairs in the second White Paper published in 1959 "Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India," in which the Raghuvamsha of Kalidas is mentioned. In both this White Paper and in the text of Kamandaka, there is mention of the Kushan empire and Kanishka.


### **Major points of discussion and suggestions to the author**

- The time frame of both the Arthashastra and Nitisara as well as the context in which they were written forms a significant background for the comparison process. Further, the Buddhist influence on Kamandaka and Kautilya can enrich the paper by providing another dimension.
- Thematic structuring of the paper can be done on the basis of Kamandaka's notions on war, tactics, ethics, dharma, etc., and an overall idea can be given about what is distinctive about Indian texts as compared to western texts.
- When one approaches a non-western text, the method adopted should be devoid of an interpretative orientation and frames of comparison. Further, the techniques of communication should be picked carefully focusing on the inclusive macro tradition over multiple micro traditions.
- Methodology adopted by these texts can be discussed in the paper along with historical similarities and dissimilarities as well as political situation of that time while explaining the central themes of both, mentioning their categorization along with the reason for dissimilarities and commonalities.
- The difference between Nitisara and Arthashastra lies in the idea of legitimacy which changed over time. While Arthashastra was dependent on deliverance of kingly duties, Nitisara focuses on valour and the military qualities of the ruler.
- Author's personal opinion should come out more strongly amongst the commendable literature survey and referencing. And, to extend its reach to the masses, the paper can be made more lucid.

## **Constitutional Morality Introduction**

- According to Dr. Ambedkar, Constitutional morality would mean effective coordination between conflicting interests of different people and the administrative cooperation to resolve them amicably without any confrontation amongst the various groups working for the realization of their ends at any cost.
- Constitutional morality has been regarded as a paramount reverence for the constitution.
- Constitutional morality provides a principled understanding for unfolding the work of governance. It specifies norms for institutions to survive and an expectation of behaviour that will meet not just the text but the soul of the Constitution. It also makes the governing institutions and representatives accountable.
- Constitutional Morality is scarcely a new concept. It is written largely in the Constitution itself like in the section of **Fundamental Rights** (Article 12 to 35), **Directive Principle of State Policy** (Article 36 to 51), **Preamble** and **Fundamental duties**.

## **Elements of constitutional morality**



### Supreme Court's Judgements and Constitutional Morality

- Constitutional morality is not limited only to following the constitutional provisions literally but is based on values like individual autonomy and liberty; equality without discrimination; recognition of identity with dignity; the right to privacy.
- Constitutional morality means adherence to the core principles of constitutional democracy.
- For Example: In **Supreme Court's Sabarimala verdict** religious freedom, gender equality and the right of women to worship guaranteed **under Article 14, 21 and 25** of the Constitution was reinstated which struck down the practice of banning entry of women of a certain age to the Sabarimala temple in Kerala as unconstitutional.
- Constitutional morality here went against social morality that discriminates against women based on biological reasons like menstruation.
- Other Judgments by the Supreme Court defining Constitutional Morality:
  - In **Kesavananda Bharati Case**, the Supreme Court restricted the power of the Parliament to violate the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
  - In the **Naz Foundation case**, the Supreme Court opined that only Constitutional Morality and not Public Morality should prevail.
  - In **Lt Governor of Delhi case**, SC proclaimed constitutional morality as a governing idea that "highlight the need to preserve the trust of people in the institution of democracy."
  - In Sabarimala case, the Supreme Court bypassed the "**doctrine of essentiality**" to uphold the Constitutional morality

### Significance

- Constitutional morality **ensures the establishment of rule of law in the land** while integrating the changing aspirations and ideals of the society.

- Constitutional morality as a governing ideal that **highlights the need to preserve the trust of the people in institutions of democracy**. As such an ideal, it allows people to cooperate and coordinate to pursue constitutional aspirations that cannot be achieved single-handedly.
- Constitutional morality **can use laws and forms to impact and change the persisting social morality**. For example, by abolishing the practice of Sati by legislation, the right to dignity and life was passed on to the widows which later on affected the perception of the practice in the society.
- Constitutional morality **recognises plurality and diversity in society and tries to make individuals and communities in the society more inclusive** in their functioning by constantly providing the scope for improvement and reforms. For example in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the SC provided a framework to reaffirm the rights of LGBTQ and all gender non-conforming people to their dignity, life, liberty, and identity.

## Concerns

- The term has not been clearly defined by the SC, which leaves the scope of its subjective interpretation by the individual judges.
- This top-down approach to morality can affect the possibility of organic emergence of the solutions to the persisting ethical problems in society.
- Violates the principle of separation of powers: It establishes judicial supremacy over parliamentary supremacy. Against the very principle of democratic government.
- It is claimed that the application of this doctrine amounts to judicial overreach and are thereby pitting **“constitutional morality”** against **“societal/popular morality”** Need to Uphold Constitutional Morality
- The central elements of constitutional morality are **freedom and self-restraint**. Self-restraint was a precondition for maintaining freedom under a proper constitutional government.
- To uphold constitutional morality, the constitutional methods must be used for achieving social and economic objectives.
- Commitment to the **ideals and aspirations of the Constitution**.
- **Awareness creation** among the common public regarding their rights which are protected by the Constitution.
- Following the Fundamental Duties while exercising Fundamental Rights.

## Conclusion

- Constitutional Morality is a sentiment to be cultivated in the minds of a responsible citizen. Upholding constitutional morality is not just the duty of Judiciary or state but also of individuals.
- The preamble of the constitution explicitly mentions the type of society we wish to establish; it is only through constitutional morality it can become reality.
- The progressive and monumental precedents have been set-up by the judiciary in the past few years, where this doctrine has been applied especially in relation to the cases of gender-justice, institutional propriety, social uplift, checking majoritarianism and other such evils.

## Secularism

- The term “Secular” means being “separate” from religion, or having no religious basis.

- A secular person is one who does not owe his moral values to any religion. His values are the product of his rational and scientific thinking.
- Secularism means separation of religion from political, economic, social and cultural aspects of life, religion being treated as a purely personal matter.
- It emphasized dissociation of the state from religion and full freedom to all religions and tolerance of all religions.
- It also stands for equal opportunities for followers of all religions, and no discrimination and partiality on grounds of religion.

## Secularism in the History of India

- Secular traditions are very deep rooted in the history of India. Indian culture is based on the blending of various spiritual traditions and social movements.
- In ancient India, the **Santam Dharma (Hinduism)** was basically allowed to develop as a holistic religion by welcoming different spiritual traditions and trying to integrate them into a common mainstream.
- The development of four **Vedas** and the various interpretations of
- the **Upanishads** and the Puranas clearly highlight the religious plurality of Hinduism.
- **Emperor Ashoka** was the first great emperor to announce, as early as third century B.C. that, the state would not prosecute any religious sect.
- In his **12<sup>th</sup> Rock Edict**, Ashoka made an appeal not only for the toleration of all religion sects but also to develop a spirit of great respect toward them.
- Even after the advent of **Jainism, Buddhism** and
- later **Islam** and **Christianity** on the Indian soil, the quest for religious toleration and coexistence of different faiths continued.
- In medieval India, the **Sufi and Bhakti movements** bond the people of various communities together with love and peace.
- The leading lights of these movements were **Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti, Baba Farid, Sant Kabir Das, Guru Nanak Dev, Saint Tukaram and Mira Bai** etc.
- In medieval India, religious toleration and freedom of worship marked the State under **Akbar**. He had a number of Hindus as his ministers, forbade forcible conversions and **abolished Jizya**.
- The most prominent evidence of his tolerance policy was his promulgation of '**Din-i-Ilahi**' or the Divine Faith, which had elements of both Hindu and Muslim faith.
- That this was not imposed upon the subjects is obvious from the fact that there were few adherents to it. Along with this he emphasized the concept of '**sulh-i-kul**' or peace and harmony among religions.
- He even sponsored a series of religious debates which were held in the '**Ibadat Khana**' of the Hall of Worship, and the participants in these debates included theologians from amongst Brahmins, Jains and Zoroastrians.
- Even before Akbar, Babar had advised Humayun to "shed religious prejudice, protect temples, preserve cows, and administer justice properly in this tradition."
- The spirit of secularism was strengthened and enriched through the Indian freedom movement too, though the British have pursued the **policy of divide and rule**.
- In accordance with this policy, the British **partitioned Bengal** in 1905.

- Separate electorates were provided for Muslims through the Indian Councils Act of 1909, a provision which was extended to Sikhs, Indian Christians, Europeans and Anglo-Indians in certain provinces by the Government of India Act, 1919.
- Ramsay MacDonald Communal Award of 1932, provided for separate electorates as well as reservation of seats for minorities, even for the depressed classes became the basis for representation under the Government of India Act, 1935.
- However, Indian freedom movement was characterized by secular tradition and ethos right from the start.
- In the initial part of the Indian freedom movement, the liberals like Sir Feroz Shah Mehta, **Govind Ranade, Gopal Krishna Gokhale** and **large** pursued a secular approach to politics.
- The constitution drafted by Pandit Moti Lal Nehru as the chairman of the historic **Nehru Committee in 1928**, had many provision on secularism as: 'There shall be no state religion for the commonwealth of India or for any province in the commonwealth, nor shall the state, either directly or indirectly, endow any religion any preference or impose any disability on account of religious beliefs or religious status'.
- **Gandhiji's secularism** was based on a commitment to the brotherhood of religious communities based on their respect for and pursuit of truth, whereas, **J. L. Nehru's secularism** was based on a commitment to scientific humanism tinged with a progressive view of historical change.
- At present scenario, in the context of Indian, the separation of religion from the state constitutes the core of the philosophy of secularism.

## Philosophy of Indian Secularism

- The term 'secularism' is akin to the **Vedic concept of 'Dharma nirapekshata'** i.e. the indifference of state to religion.
- This model of secularism is adopted by western societies where the government is totally separate from religion (i.e. separation of church and state).
- **Indian philosophy of secularism is related to "Sarva Dharma Sambhava"** (literally it means that destination of the paths followed by all religions is the same, though the paths themselves may be different) which means equal respect to all religions.
- This concept, embraced and promoted by personalities like Vivekananda and Mahatma Gandhi is called '**Positive secularism**' that reflects the dominant ethos of Indian culture.
- India does not have an official state religion. However, different personal laws - on matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, alimony varies with an individual's religion.
- Indian secularism is not an end in itself but a **means to address religious plurality** and sought to achieve peaceful coexistence of different religions.

## Secularism and the Indian Constitution

- There is a clear incorporation of all the basic principles of secularism into various provisions of constitution.
- The term 'Secular' was added to the preamble by the **forty-second constitution Amendment Act of 1976**, (India is a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, republic).
- It emphasise the fact that constitutionally, India is a secular country which has no State religion. And that the state shall recognise and accept all religions, not favour or patronize any

particular religion.

- While **Article 14** grants equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to all, **Article 15** enlarges the concept of secularism to the widest possible extent by prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
- **Article 16 (1)** guarantees equality of opportunity to all citizens in matters of public employment and reiterates that there would be no discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth and residence.
- **Article 25** provides 'Freedom of Conscience', that is, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion.
- As per **Article 26**, every religious group or individual has the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes and to manage its own affairs in matters of religion.
- As per **Article 27**, the state shall not compel any citizen to pay any taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious institution.
- **Article 28** allows educational institutions maintained by different religious groups to impart religious instruction.
- **Article 29** and **Article 30** provides cultural and educational rights to the minorities.
- **Article 51A** i.e. Fundamental Duties obliges all the citizens to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood and to value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture.

## Indian vs. Western Model of Secularism Threats to Secularism

- While, the Indian Constitution declares the state being absolutely neutral to all religion, our society has steeped in religion.
- Mingling of **Religion and Politics** that is mobilisation of votes on grounds of primordial identities like religion, caste and ethnicity, have put Indian secularism in danger.
- **Communal politics** operates through communalization of social space, by spreading myths and stereotypes against minorities, through attack on rational values and by practicing a divisive ideological propaganda and politics.
- Politicisation of any one religious group leads to the **competitive politicisation** of other groups, thereby resulting in inter-religious conflict.
- One of the manifestations of communalism is **communal riots**. In recent past also, communalism has proved to be a great threat to the secular fabric of Indian polity.
- Rise of Hindu Nationalism in recent years have resulted into mob lynching on mere suspicion of slaughtering cows and consuming beef.
- In addition with this, forced closure of slaughterhouses, campaigns against 'love jihad', reconversion or ghar-wapsi (Muslims being forced to convert to Hinduism), etc. reinforces communal tendencies in society.
- Islamic fundamentalism or revivalism pushes for establishing Islamic State based on sharia law which directly comes into conflict with conceptions of the secular and democratic state.
- In recent years there have been stray incidences of Muslim youth being inspired and radicalized by groups like ISIS which is very unfortunate for both India and world.

## Way Forward

- In a pluralistic society, the best approach to nurture secularism is to expand religious freedom rather than strictly practicing state neutrality.
- It is incumbent on us to ensure value-education that makes the younger generation understands and appreciates not only its own religious traditions but also those of the other religions in the country.
- There is also a need to identify a common framework or a shared set of values which allows the diverse groups to live together.
- The prerequisites to implement the social reform initiative like Uniform Civil Code are to create a conducive environment and forging socio-political consensus.

## **Fundamental Rights**

Articles 12-35 of Indian Constitution deal with Fundamental Rights. These human rights are conferred upon the citizens of India for the Constitution tells that these rights are inviolable. Right to Life, Right to Dignity, Right to Education etc. all come under one of the six main fundamental rights.

6 fundamental rights of India:

### **Right to Constitutional Remedies**

1. Right to Equality
2. Right to Freedom
3. Right against Exploitation
4. Right to Freedom of Religion
5. Cultural and Educational Rights

### **What are the Fundamental Rights?**

Fundamental rights are the basic human rights enshrined in the Constitution of India which are guaranteed to all citizens. They are applied without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender, etc. Significantly, **fundamental rights are enforceable by the courts**, subject to certain conditions.

### **Why are they called Fundamental Rights?**

These rights are called fundamental rights because of two reasons:

1. They are enshrined in the Constitution which guarantees them
2. They are justiciable (enforceable by courts). In case of a violation, a person can approach a court of law.

### **List of Fundamental Rights**

There are six fundamental rights of Indian Constitution along with the constitutional articles related to them are mentioned below:

1. Right to Equality (Article 14-18)
2. Right to Freedom (Article 19-22)
3. Right against Exploitation (Article 23-24)
4. Right to Freedom of Religion (Article 25-28)
5. Cultural and Educational Rights (Article 29-30)

## 6. Right to Constitutional Remedies (Article 32) Why Right to Property is not a Fundamental Right?

There was one more fundamental right in the Constitution, i.e., the right to property. However, this right was removed from the list of fundamental rights by the 44th Constitutional Amendment. This was because this right proved to be a hindrance towards attaining the goal of socialism and redistributing wealth (property) equitably among the people.

**Note: The right to property is now a legal right and not a fundamental right.**

Introduction to Six Fundamental Rights (Articles 12 to 35) Under this section, we list the fundamental rights in India and briefly describe each of them.

### 1. Right to Equality (Articles 14 – 18)

Right to equality guarantees equal rights for everyone, irrespective of religion, gender, caste, race or place of birth. It ensures equal employment opportunities in the government and insures against discrimination by the State in matters of employment on the basis of caste, religion, etc. This right also includes the abolition of titles as well as untouchability.

### 2. Right to Freedom (Articles 19 – 22)

Freedom is one of the most important ideals cherished by any democratic society. The Indian Constitution guarantees freedom to citizens. The freedom right includes many rights such as:

- Freedom of speech
- Freedom of expression
- Freedom of assembly without arms
- Freedom of association
- Freedom to practise any profession
- Freedom to reside in any part of the country

Some of these rights are subject to certain conditions of state security, public morality and decency and friendly relations with foreign countries. This means that the State has the right to impose reasonable restrictions on them.

### 3. Right against Exploitation (Articles 23 – 24)

This right implies the prohibition of traffic in human beings, begar, and other forms of forced labour. It also implies the prohibition of children in factories, etc. The Constitution prohibits the employment of children under 14 years in hazardous conditions.

### 4. Right to Freedom of Religion (Articles 25 – 28)

This indicates the secular nature of Indian polity. There is equal respect given to all religions. There is freedom of conscience, profession, practice and propagation of religion. The State has no official religion. Every person has the right to freely practice his or her faith, establish and maintain religious and charitable institutions.

### 5. Cultural and Educational Rights (Articles 29 – 30)

These rights protect the rights of religious, cultural and linguistic minorities, by facilitating them to preserve their heritage and culture. Educational rights are for ensuring education for everyone

without any discrimination.

## 6. Right to Constitutional Remedies (32 – 35)

The Constitution guarantees remedies if citizens' fundamental rights are violated. The government cannot infringe upon or curb anyone's rights. When these rights are violated, the aggrieved party can approach the courts. Citizens can even go directly to the Supreme Court which can issue writs for enforcing fundamental rights.

### Features of Fundamental Rights

- Fundamental rights are different from ordinary legal rights in the manner in which they are enforced. If a legal right is violated, the aggrieved person
- cannot directly approach the SC bypassing the lower courts. He or she should first approach the lower courts.
- Some of the fundamental rights are available to all citizens while the rest are for all persons (citizens and foreigners).
- Fundamental rights are not absolute rights. They have reasonable restrictions, which means they are subject to the conditions of state security, public morality and decency and friendly relations with foreign countries.
- They are justiciable, implying they are enforceable by courts. People can approach the SC directly in case of violation of fundamental rights.
- Fundamental rights can be amended by the Parliament by a constitutional amendment but only if the amendment does not alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
- Fundamental rights can be suspended during a national emergency. But, the rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended.
- The application of fundamental rights can be restricted in an area which has been placed under martial law or military rule.

### Fundamental Rights Available Only to Citizens

The following is the list of fundamental rights that are available **only to citizens** (and not to foreigners):

1. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race, religion, caste, gender or place of birth (Article 15).
2. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment (Article 16).
3. Protection of freedom of: (Article 19)
  - Speech and expression
  - Association
  - Assembly
  - Movement
  - Residence
  - Profession

Protection of the culture, language and script of minorities (Article 29).

Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions (Article 30).

## Importance of Fundamental Rights

Fundamental rights are very important because they are like the backbone of the country. They are essential for safeguarding the people's interests. According to Article 13, all laws that are violative of fundamental rights shall be void. Here, there is an express provision for judicial review. The SC and the High Courts can declare any law unconstitutional on the grounds that it is violative of the fundamental rights. Article 13 talks about not just laws, but also ordinances, orders, regulations, notifications, etc.

## Amendability of Fundamental Rights

Any changes to the fundamental rights require a constitutional amendment that should be passed by both the Houses of Parliament. The amendment bill should be passed by a **special majority** of Parliament.

## As per the Constitution, Article 13(2) states that no laws can be made that take away fundamental rights.

The question is whether a constitutional amendment act can be termed law or not. In the Sajjan Singh case of 1965, the Supreme Court held that the Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution including fundamental rights. But in 1967, the SC reversed its stance taken earlier when in the verdict of the Golaknath case, it said that the fundamental rights cannot be amended.

In 1973, a landmark judgement ensued in the **Kesavananda Bharati case**, where the SC held that although no part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, was beyond the Parliament's amending power, the "basic structure of the Constitution could not be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment." This is the basis in Indian law in which the judiciary can strike down any amendment passed by Parliament that is in conflict with the basic structure of the Constitution. In 1981, the Supreme Court reiterated the Basic Structure doctrine. It also drew a line of demarcation as April 24th, 1973 i.e., the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgement, and held that it should not be applied retrospectively to reopen the validity of any amendment to the Constitution which took place prior to that date.

## Doctrine of Severability

This is a doctrine that protects the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. It is also known as the Doctrine of Separability.

It is mentioned in Article 13, according to which all laws that were enforced in India before the commencement of the Constitution, inconsistent with the provisions of fundamental rights shall **to the extent of that inconsistency** be void. This implies that only the parts of the statute that is inconsistent shall be deemed void and not the whole statute. Only those provisions which are inconsistent with fundamental rights shall be void.

## Doctrine of Eclipse

This doctrine states that any law that violates fundamental rights is not null or void ab initio, but is only non-enforceable, i.e., it is not dead but inactive. This implies that whenever that fundamental right (which was violated by the law) is struck down, the law becomes active again (is revived).

Another point to note is that the doctrine of eclipse applies only to pre- constitutional laws (laws that were enacted before the Constitution came into force) and not to post-constitutional laws. This means that any post-constitutional law which is violative of a fundamental right is void ab initio.

## Constitutionalism

The concept of constitutionalism is a mechanism that provides legitimacy to a democratic government. It cannot and should not be confused with the legality of the acts of the officials in a government setup. Constitutionalism is far more important than having a written Constitution. With some exceptions most of the countries have Constitutions but it in no way means that they practice constitutionalism. Some of the basic principles developed over time that embody the concept of constitutionalism are separation of powers, judicial control and accountable government.

- In India, constitutionalism is considered to be a natural corollary to the fundamental governance of the country.
- The Constitution of India with the aid of various legislations has developed a detailed and robust mechanism to put into place administrative mechanisms for the smooth functioning of the machinery of governance.
- However, due to a variety of factors, the distance between the government and the governed has been growing with every passing year. The rich are getting richer and the poor have resigned to their fates, areas which were backward sixty years ago remain as such.

The concept of constitutionalism has been recognised by the Supreme Court in *Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India*. The Court stated, "The constitutionalism or constitutional system of Government abhors absolutism – it is premised on the Rule of Law in which subjective satisfaction is substituted by objectivity provided by the provisions of the Constitution itself." In *IR Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu*, the Court held that Constitutionalism is a legal principle that requires control over the exercise of governmental power to ensure that the democratic principles on which the government is formed shall not be destroyed. Chandrachud, CJ, in *Minerva Mills* case observed, – "The Constitution is a precious heritage and, therefore, you cannot destroy its identity".

## Principles of Constitutionalism

Constitutionalism is an amalgamation of the following underlying principles:



## **Separation of Powers**

Separation of powers divides the mechanism of governance into three branches i.e., Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. This not only prevents the monopolization of power, but also creates a system of checks and balances. As this division of powers is in the Constitution itself, this becomes an effective tool for ensuring Constitutionalism.

## **Responsible and Accountable Government**

In a democratic setup, the government is elected so that it can serve the people who help elect it. It is in this sense that the electors have a right to demand accountability and answers from their government. Therefore, when the government fails the expectations of the electorate, the authorization to govern is revoked by voting them out.

## **Popular Sovereignty**

The concept of popular sovereignty lays down that the government derives its legitimacy from the people. No corporate body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not expressly emanate from it. Even though there is a certain sovereign entity that is empowered to govern, ultimate sovereignty resides in the nation. The power of such a sovereign entity emanates from the public.

## **Rule of Law**

The presence of rule of law means that the government does not belong to men but to the laws. Dicey lays down three essential components of Rule of Law:

- Nobody is to be punished except for a specific breach of law that is established in an ordinary legal manner before ordinary courts of law.
- No one is above the law.
- Courts play a vital role in protecting the rights and freedoms of an individual.

## **Independent Judiciary**

The independence of the Judiciary is the essence of any liberal democracy and the foundation of a free society. The Judiciary is the upholder of Rule of law and if its independence is taken away, it puts the entire rule of law in jeopardy. The Constitution also envisages the separation of the judiciary from the Executive under Article 50.

## **Individual Rights**

The rights of the individual shall be at the highest pedestal for constitutionalism to thrive. The constitutional setup in India gives these rights the importance that they deserve by engraving them in Part III of the Constitution. These individual rights have not only been protected by the courts but have also been interpreted in a manner where their effect and implementation has broadened. The enforcement of these rights is ensured by the Constitutional Courts i.e. the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

## **Civilian control of the military**

Apart from these features, constitutionalism envisages that the control of the military should be in the hands of a civilian government so that the military does not interfere in the democratic decision making or attempt a military coup.

## **Police Accountability**

Constitutionalism also envisages that police while performing its duties shall uphold the rights, freedoms and dignity of the individuals, the same can be ensured by bringing the police under the control of laws and courts.

## **Conclusion**

The concept of constitutionalism has existed and thrives in all functioning democracies. However, over the years the Governments have learned to use government apparatus for their own benefits instead of benefitting the citizens. The government by giving backdoor entries to corporate interests in policy-making has vitiated the policymaking process whose primary aim is the welfare of the larger population. The very document that was adopted to ensure the rights of individuals is being used to suppress and disenfranchise them. The problem is that the Constitution cannot interpret itself and has to be interpreted by the men who hold power. The institutions that were the bulwark of Constitutionalism are either crumbling or have been effectively rendered weak and incapable. Checks and balances have been diluted to a point where their importance is merely academic. The criminalisation and influence of money power into the corridors of politics and governance have worsened an already volatile system. The frustrations that are building up due to the apathy of the government in utter disregard of constitutionalism are extremely dangerous and this slide needs to be stopped.

## **The Idea of 'Total Revolution'**

Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-1979), the great Gandhian socialist leader, raised his famous slogan, Sampurn Kranti (Total Revolution), in a speech at a huge rally in Patna on June 5, 1974. (The rally is said to have been seven kilometres long).

Two weeks later, the "gist" of this speech made in Hindi appeared in English in *Everyman's*, a weekly edited by Jayaprakash Narayan (JP). Earlier in 1974, JP had accepted the leadership of the student movement in Bihar. He had initially wanted to work with the students as an advisor; but they had not listened. The high moral stature of seventy-one-year-old JP, who had chosen to work, after India's independence, as a social activist, outside electoral politics, had already convinced the students that he was their leader. Their choice had proved wise: the JP Movement, as we now know it, found great support across the country.

The translation of JP's speech titled, *Towards Total Revolution*, which has retained its spontaneous, spoken form, affords a glimpse of his political passions. It also lets us guess the electric appeal the speech must have had on the listeners. At the very beginning, JP clarifies that their struggle was not a "movement," but "a total revolution" for which the protestors had "to make sacrifices, undergo sufferings, face lathis and bullets, fill up jails."

Although the Patna rally sought the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly, the work required to "achieve that freedom for which thousands of the country's youth made sacrifices," was larger in scope, and needed more time. JP summed up the situation facing them: "Educational institutions are corrupt. Thousands of youth face a bleak future. Unemployment goes on increasing. The poor get less and less work. Land ceiling laws are passed, but the number of landless people is increasing. Small farmers have lost their lands."

While “a new programme for the future” was expected from him, he could only offer its “main points” now, which had emerged from his discussions with “students, intellectuals and (his) colleagues.” Before sharing these points, JP dismissed the frequent accusations of communists that his student days in the US had made him an agent of that capitalist country. His dismissal began with a stirring glimpse of his student life in the US: “In America I worked in mines, in factories and slaughter houses. I worked as a shoe shine boy and even cleaned commodes in hotels. During vacations, I worked and then three or more boys lived in a single room and we cooked our own food.” (Between 1922 and 1929, he had moved between five universities in the US. While financial hardship drove his decisions, his transfers also reveal a shift in intellectual interests. He studied science briefly at the University of California, Berkeley, before shifting to the study of chemical engineering at the University of Iowa. He then moved to the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he studied sociology with leading scholars.

Close involvements with radical student groups in Madison and the works of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Plekhanov, MN Roy and Rosa Luxemburg, among others, cultivated his passion for Marxism.

After getting a BA degree from the University of Ohio, where an American friend arranged for financial support, JP completed his MA from Ohio State University and returned to India soon after.)

JP clarified that he became a Marxist, and not a Stalinist. Sharing Lenin’s view that communists in colonial countries had to work with the freedom struggle, even if it was led by bourgeois leaders, he had joined the Congress on returning to India: “They (the Indian communists) said Gandhi is an agent of the capitalists...But they forgot Lenin.” During his work in the freedom struggle and after, Gandhi’s ideals of sarvodaya came to matter more for his political thought. His selfless, honest activism earned him admirers throughout India. JP found it hard to accept Indira Gandhi’s unwillingness to understand the seriousness of his struggles. He had in fact expected cooperation from her. Instead, she had indirectly accused him, two months before the Patna rally, of taking money from “capitalists” and losing therefore the moral authority to fight corruption. A deeply pained JP responded in *Everyman’s* that it was morally permissible for social workers without an independent means of income to seek the assistance of friends.

If that was corruption, he continued, then Gandhi, who had depended on the support of rich patrons, would be the most guilty. JP’s speech tacitly engaged Indira Gandhi’s accusation. His manner of engaging it exemplifies a depth of experience, political seriousness and oratorical style that have become rare to find: “There is fire in the hearts of the people. Countless children in Bihar go to sleep without food. I see numerous people getting emaciated. There is a barber from my own village. I was appalled to see how thin he has grown. When I asked Ramsujha Thakur why he was so reduced, he replied that there was nothing for him to eat. I don’t know how people manage to live. What do they eat. After the death of my wife, I have to keep account of my expenses and I am amazed at the amount I have to spend on food alone. Without the interest from the Magsaysay Award money and the help of some generous friends, I too would have possibly had to starve.” (To be concluded)

## **Terrorism**

Terrorism is a term that is seen in the news very regularly. It is a broad term and encompasses a wide variety of events and concepts. Terrorism affects the world deeply and India, particularly, has been a victim of various terror acts perpetrated by different groups.

## Definition of Terrorism

The term terrorism is very broad and there is no one definition of the term. Different people and organisations have come up with their own definition of what constitutes terrorism.

- Generally, the term terrorism indicates a criminal and violent activity performed by an individual or group of individuals or an organisation in order to strike terror among the general public and send messages to the public and governments, to fulfil a goal.
- Although the victims of the terror act may be a few people (depending upon the event), the intended target is usually larger than the number of victims alone.
- The terrorists' purpose is to send a strong message to the larger public and the government. They generally claim responsibility after conducting a violent act so as to let people know of their power and capabilities and thus, inflict terror upon the people.

### Some commonly-used definitions of terrorism are listed below:

**UN Definition:** Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for a particular purpose are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

**US Department of State Definition:** Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.

A definition according to the lapsed **Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act** is very inclusive and exhaustive:

"Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act." In 2002, the European Union described terrorism as having the "aim of destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country".

## Terrorist Activities

Terrorists indulge in a variety of activities for primarily three things:

1. Generate fear among people.
2. Create publicity for their goals/causes.
3. Try to convince people that the government is powerless against them.

Terrorists and/or terror groups engage in random killings/assassinations, bomb blasts in public places, suicide attacks, kidnappings, extortion, destroy public property/infrastructure, hijacking, cyber-attacks, etc. They also indulge in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare. Many terror groups also engage in an armed insurgency against governments. The aim of politi-

cal terror groups varies from toppling the established government of a country to having better representation for a group of people, to seceding from a country and forming another country, to acquiring a share in the government, etc. Many other groups of terror exist solely for making illicit money and expanding their own illegal criminal empires. Many groups of organised crime are also labelled terrorist groups.

### **Terrorism: Origin of the term**

The term 'terrorism' has been derived from the French 'terrorisme', which is in turn, taken from the Latin word, 'terreo' meaning 'I frighten'.

- The word was first used in the context of the French Revolution in France, especially in reference to the 'Reign of Terror'.
- Many cite the Irish Republican Brotherhood (1858 – 1924) as the first organisation to use modern terrorist techniques.

### **Types of Terrorism**

Although there are several types of terrorism, we can classify terrorism into the following broad types:

1. **Dissent Terrorism:** Groups that rebel against the government of a country. For example, the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
2. **Left-wing/right-wing terrorism:** Terror groups that adhere to ideological leanings on the extreme end of the left-right political spectrum. Read more on left-wing extremism in India.
3. **Religious terrorism:** Terror groups based on religious ideologies. For example, ISIS.
4. **Criminal terrorism:** Terror groups engaged in terror acts for criminal profit.

Terrorism can also be classified on the basis of the mode of operation such as cyber-terrorism, bioterrorism, etc.

### **Cross-border Terrorism**

Cross-border terrorism is when the soil of one country is used to create terror or engage in terrorism against its neighbouring countries across the border. India is a victim of cross-border terrorism, whose source is Pakistan.

### **Factors favouring cross-border terrorism**

- **Porous borders:** These indicate borders which are not highly protected. India's borders with most of her neighbours cannot be physically sealed or wired due to difficult terrain, and other factors. Terror groups take advantage of such porous borders and infiltrate into another country.
- **Support from non-state actors:** India's troubled relationship with Pakistan fuels the latter's support for secessionist groups, which are provided financial support, weapons and training by the establishment in Pakistan.
- **Internal support:** Many times, terrorists find support from the local population due to varying reasons like ideological or ethnic affinity, fear, monetary lure, etc.
- **Corrupt officials:** Unfortunately, many officials in the establishment of a country can abet terrorists and allow their illegal entry for terrorist activities purely for financial benefits.

## Terrorism in India

The current law in India enacted to tackle terrorism of all kinds is the **Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act**. Click on the linked article for a detailed description and also watch a video lecture on the same.

- India faces terrorism from secessionists in Kashmir, the north-east and to an extent in Punjab, from left-wing extremist groups in central, east-central and south-central India.
- India is one of the countries most affected by terrorism in the world. According to the **Institute for Economics and Peace**, India was the seventh-most affected country in 2018.
- It reported that from 2001 till 2018, more than 8000 people have died in terror attacks in India. Jammu & Kashmir is the region most affected by terrorist activities in the country.

**The Global Terrorism Index 2019** also places India on the 7th rank in terms of the most-affected country by terrorism. It was after the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai by terrorist groups that the government formed the National Investigation Agency (NIA). India is trying to push a global intergovernmental convention called the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) to counter-terrorism since the late 90s. India is also a member of the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), an organisation that works towards establishing global standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. India has a network of intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau (IB), etc. which are involved in fighting terrorism emanating both inside and outside the country. There is also a National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) that is an integrated intelligence framework connecting the databases of security agencies of the Indian Government to gather inclusive patterns of intelligence that can be accessed by intelligence agencies of India. The National Security Guard (NSG) is a paramilitary force that is primarily responsible for counterterrorism and anti-hijacking operations.

## Swadeshi

**Swadeshi** The word swadeshi derives from Sanskrit and is a conjunction of two Sanskrit words. 'Swa' means self or own and 'desh' means country. So swadeshi means one's own country. Swadeshi, the adjectival form, means of one's own country, but can be loosely translated in most contexts as self-sufficiency.

- Swadeshi is the focus on acting within and from one's own community, both politically and economically.
- It is the interdependence of community and self-sufficiency.
- Gandhi ji believed this would lead to independence (swaraj), as British control of India was rooted in control of her indigenous industries. Swadeshi was the key to the independence of India, and was represented by the charkha or the spinning wheel, the "center of the solar system" of Mahatma Gandhi's constructive program.

## Swadeshi Movement (1905-19011)

1. This was a **comprehensive movement** that lasted 6 years.
2. Although this was regarded as a cultural movement celebrating the rich harvest of history- the rich traditions like folk music, paintings, the culture of Bengal was highlighted. But very soon, it got integrated with the political upheavals that followed after the partition of Bengal. **Krishna**

**Kumar Mitra**, in his newspaper, '**Sanjivani**' highlighted the prospects of national education and 'Economic Swadeshi'.

3. Very soon, this movement started gaining momentum with the help of the entire Bengali middle-class intelligentsia.
4. After the partition of Bengal, the Swadeshi movement got a big boost, because of the integration of the boycott movement with the Swadeshi movement.
5. **Tilak** called this movement "**Bahishkar Yoga**" and most of the Bengali intelligentsia that was initially not in favour of the boycott movement got integrated with the Swadeshi movement.
6. This was primary learning for the national movement. According to Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and Lala Lajpat Rai, it was **training in 'self-determination', 'self-help', and 'self-reliance'**.
7. In fact, the Swadeshi movement can be called as a nursery of the further course that the Indian National Movement was to take. The programmes and ideas that were practised during the Swadeshi movement became the hallmark of the Gandhian movement as well.
8. Surendranath Bannerjee said that it is a '**protectionist movement**'. And that it 'generates the material prosperity of the masses'.
9. Very soon, the Swadeshi movement spread to different parts of India, like Bihar, U.P., C.P., Bombay and Madras.
10. Radicalism also became a part of the Swadeshi movement after the partition of Bengal. After the partition of Bengal, industrial strikes became the hallmark of the Swadeshi movement.
11. There were strikes carried out in various cotton and jute factories of Bengal. Railway workers also went on strike. The Burnpur mill also went on strike.
12. But, the context of the anti-partition movement made it a very aggressive movement.

## Problems with the Swadeshi Movement

1. But the problem with the Swadeshi movement was that it was not properly directed and it failed to unite the Hindus and Muslims because of the work of **Nawab Salimullah** of Dhaka and the establishment of the Muslim league.
2. The demand of separate electorates became an issue to seek political mileage for the Muslims. Thus, the Swadeshi movement lacked having a large mass-base. The grievances of the peasants were not at all taken into consideration- such as lack of uniformity of the land revenue system, rights of the tenants, prevention of land grabbing, were not taken up by the Swadeshi movement, and thus the peasants did not become a part of the Swadeshi movement.
3. But, overall, the period of 1903-1908, the partition of Bengal served as a catalyst for the Swadeshi Movement.

## Context of various Scholars:

1. **Surendranath Bannerjee** said that it is a '**protectionist movement**'. And that it 'generates the material prosperity of the masses'.
2. **R.C. Majumdar** opined that the Swadeshi Movement brought the realm of the national movement from 'theory to absolute practicality'.
3. **Sumit Sarkar**, a modern historian, said that one of the remarkable features of the Swadeshi movement was to 'shape the life of the people' which directed till 1947.

## Note:

1. The **Swadeshi Movement** anticipated the movements which were later started by Gandhi.
2. The Non-cooperation movement, the Civil Disobedience movement which was labelled as a 'constructive boycott', had its genesis in the Swadeshi movement itself.
3. **Even G.K. Gokhale** who had firm opposition to the ideas of boycott accepted the programmes of Swadeshi in the Swadeshi Movement. Thus the Swadeshi movement brought many streams of nationalism together under one political platform. This, later on, found expression in the mass-politics of Gandhi. Therefore, the Swadeshi movement was very short-lived, it had a great impact on Indian Nationalism.

## Impact of the movement

- People from all walks of life participated in the movement with the greatest contribution coming from students and women.
- It resulted in significant decline in the foreign imports during 1905-1908.
- It led to building of self-reliance or Atma Shakti asserting on national dignity, honor and confidence.
- The Swadeshi movement led the people to learn to challenge and disobey the British government explicitly without fearing the atrocities of the police and imprisonment.
- Movement received wide coverage through newspapers and got attention at national level highlighting the true nature of British rule.
- The movement however also set the undertones for communal disharmony by invoking religious sentiments, setting foundation for Muslim League.
- Movement resulted in growth of extreme nationalism amongst youth which took to violence and wanted to bring an instant end to British dominance.
- It forced British dispensation to offer some concession to Indians in forms of Morley-Minto reforms in 1909.
- Most of all its concept of constructive swadeshi and boycott was actively used by Gandhi in later nationalist movements.

## Satyagrah

The idea of satyagraha basically emphasised the power of truth and the demand to search for truth. It suggested that if the cause was true, if the struggle was against injustice, then the physical force was not necessary to fight the oppressor. Without asking vengeance or being aggressive, a satyagrahi could win the battle through nonviolence. This could be done by appealing to the conscience of the oppressor. The common people – including the oppressors – had to be persuaded to see the truth, rather than being forced to accept truth with the help of violence. By this huge and great struggle, the truth was bound to ultimately triumph. Mahatma Gandhi had a strong faith that this dharma of non-violence could unite all Indians.

**Satyagraha:** Gandhi called his overall method of nonviolent action Satyagraha. It means the exercise of the purest soul-force against all injustice, oppression and exploitation.

- It is a method of securing rights by personal suffering and not inflicting injury on others.
- The origin of Satyagraha can be found in the Upanishads, and in the teachings of Buddha, Mahavira and a number of other greats including Tolstoy and Ruskin.

## Gandhiji's Satyagrah movements

- After returning to India, Mahatma Gandhi successfully organised satyagraha movements in a number of places.
- In the year 1917, he travelled to Champaran in Bihar to inspire the peasants to struggle against the oppressive plantation system.
- Later in the year 1917, he organised another satyagraha movement to support the peasants of the Kheda district of Gujarat who were affected by crop failure and a plague epidemic. The peasants of Kheda place were not able to pay the revenue, and were demanding for the revenue collection to be relaxed.
- In the year 1918, Mahatma Gandhi went to Ahmedabad to organise a satyagraha movement amongst the cotton mill workers at the mill.

## Gandhian Philosophy of Sarvodaya & Its Principles

**Sarvodaya**- Sarvodaya is a term meaning 'Universal Uplift' or 'Progress of All'. The term was first coined by Gandhi ji as the title of his translation of **John Ruskin's** tract on political economy, "**Unto This Last**". 21st century is the era of globalization. New economic policy of globalization moves on to make the world a global village. New challenges and problems have emerged before youth. The belief that all emergent problems - ecological, social, economical, political and moral-could be resolved by discoveries and technological innovations persists, failures in the past notwithstanding. What is happening today is in line with what Gandhi almost predicted in Hind Swaraj as he prepared its manuscript in 1908. Gandhi put forward four main goals before youth for humanity, so as to move towards its destiny. These are Swaraj, Non-violence, Swadeshi and Sarvodaya. These are the main pillars of the thesis he has propounded in the Hind Swaraj. In this paper an attempt is made to focus on Sarvodaya as one of the pillars to bring Hind Swaraj. Objectives of this research paper are to know Gandhian philosophy of Sarvodaya for changing attitude of youth & aware youth for their rights & duties. Primary & secondary resources are used for this paper.

### Meaning of Sarvodaya:

Sarvodaya is a term meaning 'Universal Uplift' or 'Progress of All'. The term was first coined by Mohandas Gandhi as the title of his 1908 translation of John Ruskin's tract on political economy, "Unto This Last", and Gandhi came to use the term for the ideal of his own political philosophy.<sup>1</sup> Later Gandhian, like the Indian nonviolence activist Vinoba Bhave, embraced the term as a name for the social movement in post-independence India which strove to ensure that self-determination and equality reached all strata of India society.

### Inspirations from Ruskin's Book:

Gandhi received a copy of Ruskin's "Unto This Last" from a British friend, Mr. Henry Polak, while working as a lawyer in South Africa in 1904. In his Autobiography, Gandhi remembers the twenty-four hour train ride to Durban (from when he first read the book, being so in the grip of Ruskin's ideas that he could not sleep at all: "I determined to change my life in accordance with the ideals of the book."<sup>2</sup> Gandhi advances the concept of Sarvodaya, which were based on three basic principles:

- That the good of the individual is contained in the good of all.
- That a lawyer's work has the same value as the barber's in as much as all have the same right of earning their livelihood from their work.

- That is a life of labour, i.e., the life of the tiller of the soil and the craftsman is the life worth living.

The first of these I knew. The second I had dimly realized. The third have never occurred to me. 'Unto This Last' made it clear as daylight for me that the second and third were contained in the first. I arose with the dawn, ready to reduce these principal to practice."<sup>3</sup>

### **Simple Living & High Thinking:**

Mahatma Gandhi was of the firm view that the earth provides enough to satisfy every man's needs, but not for every man's greed. In the Sarvodaya society of his dream, therefore, every member will be free from any greed for limitless acquisition of material wealth and more and more luxurious living and they will follow the motto of simple living and high thinking. Everyone will, thus, get ample opportunity to produce and earn sufficiently through honest work for decent and dignified living. Consequently there will be no problem of unemployment. Of course, obviously, income of different people may be different, depending on their talent, ability and effort. But those who will earn more will use the bulk of their greater earnings for the good of the society as a whole. In such a society, all wealth, including land, will be assumed as common property to be utilized for the welfare of all. If an individual has more than his proportionate portion, he becomes a trustee of the excess wealth for the benefit of the less fortunate members of the society. As regards use of machinery in economic activity, Gandhi said that "If we feel the need of machines, we certainly will have them. But there should be no place for machines that concentrate power in a few hands and turn the masses into mere machine-minders, if, indeed, they do not make them unemployed." In order, therefore, to minimize use of machines in a Sarvodaya society, Gandhi strongly advocated that everyone should do some productive physical work at least to earn his/her daily bread as was also advocated by Leo Tolstoy – the great Russian thinker and writer and everyone should uphold the dignity of labour irrespective of the type of honest labour performed by an individual.<sup>4</sup>

### **Objects of Sarvodaya Movement:**

The Sarvodaya Movement has as its target the establishment of a whole network of such self-supporting village communities. The family relationships which are confined at present to the blood group will be extended to cover the whole village where distinctions based on race, creed, caste, language and so forth will completely be eliminated. Agriculture will be so planned that all the people will have enough to consume. Industry will be conducted on a cottage basis till all the people in the village are gainfully employed. The needs of the village will be determined by the people of the village themselves, through Village Council, representative of the whole village.

### **Principles of the Sarvodaya:**

- There is no centralized authority, and there is political and economic atmosphere in the villages.
- Politics will not be the instrument of power but an agency of service and Rajniti will yield place to Lokniti.
- All people will be imbued with the spirit of love, fraternity, truth, non-violence and self-sacrifices. Society will function on the basis on the non-violence.
- There will be no party system and majority rule and society will be free from the evil of the tyranny of the majority.

- The sarvodaya society is socialist in the true sense of the term. All calling will be the same moral, social and economical values. The individual personality has the fullest scope for development.
- The sarvodaya society is based on equality and liberty. There is no room for unwholesome competition, exploitation and class-hatred.
- Sarvodaya stands for the progress of the all. All individual should do individual labour and follow the ideal of non possession. Then it will be possible to realize the goal of: from each according to his work and to each according to his needs.
- There will be no private property, the instrument of exploitation and the source of social distinctions and hatred. Similarly, the profit motive will disappear, rent and interest will go.
- The Sarvodaya Movement is based on Truth, Non-violence and Self-denial.
- The Sarvodaya Movement makes a sincere and bold attempt to create the necessary atmosphere to bring together such individuals with an unwavering faith in the Welfare of All
- The gain to the individual would be small. The development of each quality depends upon every other. If all the qualities are improved a little, then the individual would gain more.

### **Sarvodaya Movement:**

Gandhi's ideals have lasted well beyond the achievement of one of his chief projects, Indian independence (Swaraj). His followers in India (notably, Vinoba Bhave) continued working to promote the kind of society that he envisioned, and their efforts have come to be known as the Sarvodaya Movement. Anima Bose has referred to the movement's philosophy as "a fuller and richer concept of people's democracy than any we have yet known." Sarvodaya workers associated with Vinoba, J. P. Narayan, Dada Dharmadhikari, Dharendra Mazumdar, Shankarrao Deo, K. G. Mashruwala undertook various projects aimed at encouraging popular self-organization during the 1950s and 1960s, including Bhoodan and Gramdan movements. Many groups descended from these networks continue to function locally in India today.<sup>5</sup>

### **Agency of Common Welfare:**

That Sarvodaya is an agency of Service for Common Welfare Sarvodaya sets its face squarely against the politics of power and exploitation. It lays great emphasis on moral and spiritual values. It seeks to create new social and economical values. The concept of possession yields place to the concept of trusteeship. People will work for the good of all and family feeling will animate the entire community. There will be fullest scope for freedom, fellowship and equality.

The state is to be an agency of power. Gramrajya is a base of non-violence. Sarvodaya stands for good of all and not for the good of any particular individual or class. Bhoodan at the early stage, Gramdan at a later stage and Sampattidan will bring about a change of heart. The rich and poor will give up their ideas of attachment to private property and will strive to work for the good of all.

### **Conclusion**

So, lastly we can conclude that Sarvodaya ideals are not practicable. Though the ideals of sarvodaya will be noble. Nobody can find fault with them, in the actual world. They will be found wanting. It will be almost impossible to establish a society strictly on the basis of great principles by Mahatma Gandhi and others. Sarvodaya doctrines are soaring and it is doubtful whether they can rest on the earth. The poor record of Panchayat Raj in India bears testimony to the backward condition in which people are. In the highly competitive world, one country can not succeed in having Gramraj. Unless all states in the world accept the Sarvodaya idea. The chances of having it is a par-

ticular country like India are bleak. As well as, it is difficult to bring a change of the heart in the youth, who is given to selfishness. People donated useless land in response to the Bhoodan. So, need of the present era for youth is 'Think Globally and Act Locally'.

## **Social democracy**

Here in India, much has been made of the fact that the economy has gracefully survived the recession. Both the Indian government and our corporate managements responded nimbly, and the companies are now well placed to take advantage of new opportunities. That is all to the good. Yet the language of crisis can also be a means of manipulation. Over the last two years, it's been used to eliminate competition and consolidate sectors of the economy in the form of a few, massive players. After the global shake-out among investment banks, airlines and the automobile industry, the surviving players are not just big. They're secure in the knowledge that they're far too big to fail.

Meanwhile they've parlayed the uncertainty about the financial climate into a trumping argument against worker concerns. They've pared costs, shed labour, reduced employment security. And now the citizen as consumer has less choice, the citizen as worker has more uncertainty, and a paradox has been laid bare. Today, as government feels for the optimum moment to take its foot off the stimulus pedal, it's important to remember that risk in the modern world takes a variety of forms. As work is casualized and benefits eliminated, as capital becomes still more focused on profit opportunities, as the state semi-privatizes in its striving for fiscal efficiency, social risk for working populations has increased.

Unemployment remains endemic and among those who do have some sort of job, worker protections fall by the wayside. Consider the migrant who leaves the coal-mining infernos of Jharia, a landscape literally aflame and collapsing. Travelling to the city to pursue new opportunities, he loses his family safety net while entering a new world of uncertainty and risk. As Mint documented in a brilliant series of articles last year, worker safety in India's dynamic industrial sector is a black hole in our growth story. Medical costs persist as an immovable barrier to moving up the social and economic ladder, while rapid development in urban areas creates laboratories for contagious disease. Other growing economies such as China, Brazil, and South Africa offer their citizens basic health and welfare protections. Here in India, we expect our migrants from Jharia, all our poor citizens, to go it alone in the brave new economic world.

## **Ours is a leaner capitalism—and a meaner one.**

Historically, crises in the form of external shocks have spurred reforms that societies need but habitually resist. The British welfare state, for instance, came out of the jolt of World War II, while the oil price hike of the early 1970s forced European economies to sharpen their energy efficiency. Yet, this most recent crisis, global in scale, seems to have passed gently into the night. This has much to do with the lack of critical alternatives, and a Left that seems worn out. It's telling that at this recent, vulnerable moment in the history of capitalism, Left parties are being rejected by voters across the West—in France, in Germany, in Italy, and most likely soon in Britain. In their heartlands, social democratic traditions and politics are in retreat.

In India, we have a chance—and a need—to create our own alternative: an Indian social democracy. Even as we prepare to resume our impressive growth path, we have to recognize that high growth itself brings insecurities and social risks. We might take this pause in our giddy progress

to ask a pointed question: Do rapid growth and widespread inequality necessarily go hand in hand? Or are there ways to lessen the latter without hampering the former? Neither our political leaders nor our intelligentsia have worked out a convincing answer to the basic question of how to reconcile economic growth with worker and citizen security. Is there a fairer way to distribute social risk?

Left intellectuals, airily dismissive of globalization, the market and the profit motive—the very elements that have created our growth—claim a monopoly of wisdom over how to distribute the benefits of growth. But they have no idea about how to sustain it. The corporate world, for its part, likes to talk about social responsibility: We make profits, yes, but we engage in philanthropy too. This is fine as far as it goes, but it frankly doesn't go very far. Given the scale and complexity of India's redistributive problem, corporate or private giving—often capricious, rarely accountable—will not be decisive in its effects.

Governments can, of course, be decisive, and successive ones have initiated a stupefying number of social welfare policies. Named after great leaders and immediately acronym-ized (can you tell your PMAGY from your RGVVY from your SGSY?), many of these programmes are aimed not at the citizenry as a whole, but at groups identified as disprivileged. There are legitimate reasons for such policies that seek to repair inequalities long ingrained in the social order. Yet such an approach also replicates a pattern that runs back to the colonial period—the dispensation of handouts that may set group against group. At worst, such policies become political strategies for delivering votes, not a way of thinking about social justice. It is an approach that does damage to the possibilities of solidarity and equality in one go.

Without a social democratic vision as an electoral option, the desire for redistribution will be pursued in other ways. Already in rural India, Maoist unrest marks a sharp rejection of electoral politics. At industrial plants, labour activism is on the rise, with management the target of physical attacks. Unless India's internal security is understood in the broadest sense—as being based on social security for the poorest, Balram Halwai, The White Tiger's grinning, psychopath anti-hero, may yet prove a case of reality catching up with fiction. The inequities of our current growth path indeed have even wider implications for our future. China's phenomenal economic surge over the past three decades traded on the build-up of massive global imbalances—its governing elites muzzled consumption by their own citizens, and commanded their factories to produce for America and the West. That Chinese strategy is unrepeatable for India: Western electorates and their governments will make sure of that. Our economy will have to grow by different means. In essence, our future growth will depend in very large part on domestic consumption; for that to increase, we will have to increase the purchasing power of most Indians, which involves some redistribution of income and entitlements. As part of that, social risk will have to be shared—we all have a stake in reducing it.

Obviously, an Indian social democracy will not look like the social democracy that emerged in northern Europe, in relatively small, homogeneous, highly educated and wealthy countries with export-oriented economies. India differs on every one of those counts, and the challenge of specifying an Indian social democracy is in every respect greater than Europe's politicians and intellectuals ever faced. The economic basis of an Indian social democracy cannot be based on nostalgia for public ownership. In scope, it will need to create both social protections as well as social opportunities. But, as India's tax base and takings grow, the resources for such a project will accrue; and an essential tool for delivering benefits to our citizens, in the form of a national identity

system, is being built.

The social contract that founders of the Indian republic such as Ambedkar and Nehru hoped to establish was one based on social democracy—not on socialism. They were committed to the values of democracy and social justice—and viewed both markets as well as the state as instrumental means towards achieving those values. These founding impulses, however, were fossilized and corrupted—in the form of reservations and in “socialist” economic policies that prescribed punitive taxation and stifling regulation. Fortunately, some of those negative legacies are being dismantled, the result of economic reforms over the past two decades.

The challenge now is to prune the rest of the policy jungle and move towards establishing certain minimal universal provisions for all Indians—targeted where necessary, but targeted at universal categories, like the poor, and not at caste groups. Our current obsession with pragmatism, with what “works” narrowly construed, has obscured our larger vision. Spreading capitalism’s risks more equitably across our society would protect our most vulnerable citizens. It would be good for social solidarity. And it might be good as well for the political party willing to risk espousing it. Sunil Khilnani is the author of *The Idea of India* and is currently working on a new book, *The Great Power Game: India in the New World*.

## **Socialism**

While the original Constitution did not mention any particular ideology, it did give expression to the resolve of securing to the citizen’s economic justice and equality of opportunity. This is the essence of socialism. The word ‘socialist’ was introduced in the Preamble by the 42<sup>nd</sup> Amendment. The term, however, is not defined in the Constitution. It may be pointed out that the socialism envisaged in India does not mean the abolition of private property or nationalization of all means of production. Thus a ‘mixed economy’ was envisaged, along with the provision of equal opportunity, the abolition of vested interests, and the elimination of inequality in income and status and standards of living. In the present context of economic liberalization, however, the socialist credentials of our State may well be questioned. Socialism is acknowledged as the cherished goal of the Indian political system in its constitution. Socialism lays emphasis on the welfare of the people, it seeks to ensure economic and political equality to the people and tries to remove exploitation of one class by the others.

- However, despite aiming for the same goals, India adopted socialism which drew inspiration from Gandhi and Nehru rather than Marxian socialism.
- Whereas Gandhian socialism was based on satya, ahimsa, trusteeship and decentralisation and Nehru’s socialism was a liberal and a type of Fabianist socialism, Marxian socialism emphasised on class wars and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

## **Body**

- Indian socialism was not an ideological dogma, but a broad guide to the development and social change and accommodated a lot of other ideas, apart from core socialism, which were necessary for the development of India.
- Moreover, challenges like resource crunch for the free market, apathy to capitalism due to colonial experience, challenges of inequality, and a newly independent nation already on fringes further made adoption of socialism or capitalism in its absolute form impractical.

- India in its modified socialist pursuit relied on three pillars of development strategy–
- **planning for rapid industrial and agricultural growth** which was not under the absolute control of State.
- **a public sector to develop strategic industries**, which was to progressively become a self-sustained profit-making sector.
- **a mixed economy**- Mixed economy was preferred earlier due to lack of adequate resources, but the private sector was to work under a broad framework of planning.
- It **differed from core socialism** as it went for a mixed economy rather than complete government control, the public sector had hold on only core industries, industrialists participated in planning (Bombay Plan), emphasis was on industrialisation along with agriculture and the aim was to make the public sector a profit-generating sector rather than being just a welfare tool for income redistribution.
- However, India also **imbibed core socialism spirit** through planned economic development, initiation of land reforms, labor laws, progressive taxation, expansion of education and health and rapid expansion of the public sector.

## Conclusion

- Despite its contributions to Indian economy and society through welfare policies, cooperative societies, planned growth, land reforms etc., socialism in India is yet to achieve all its intended objectives.
- Sluggish economic growth till the 1990s, mounting corruption, red-tapism and license raj of bureaucracy prevented industries and markets to grow to their full strengths and restricted foreign investment and competition due to inward-looking policies, a loss-making public sector and failure of trickle-down growth.
- Consequently, while retaining socialism as a principal constitutional value, as declared in Preamble, Fundamental Rights and DPSP, India didn't shy away from approaching a more liberal economy and means of distributive justice when needed. It smoothly transitioned to LPG reforms in the 1990s, opened its sectors and markets to global opportunities and competition, to continue its growth story keeping up with the changing times and needs.

## Affirmative Action

Affirmative action refers to a set of policies that support members of disadvantaged groups that have previously suffered discrimination in any form.

### Nature of Affirmative Action

The nature of affirmative action policies varies from region to region and exists on a spectrum from a hard quota to merely targeting encouragement for increased participation. Some countries use a quota system, whereby a certain percentage of government jobs, political positions, and school vacancies must be reserved for members of a certain group; an example of this is the reservation system in India. Historically and internationally, support for affirmative action has sought to achieve goals such as bridging inequalities in employment and pay, increasing access to education, promoting diversity, and redressing apparent past wrongs, harms, or hindrances.

### How is Affirmative Action Categorized in India

Affirmative actions in India can be categorized into 3 main dimensions, which are given below.

1. Appointment and promotion in government services.
2. Reservations in public education institutions.
3. Reservation of seats in Central and State legislatures.

### **Who Does Affirmative Action apply to?**

Affirmative action refers to the set of policies of the Governments to support members of disadvantaged groups that have historically faced discrimination in the areas of education, employment, housing and respect in the society. The main goals of affirmative action are to bridge inequalities in access to education, employment, equal pay, better standards of living.

### **Example of Affirmative Actions**

In the Government-run education institutions, the Indian government provides reservations for SC, ST and OBC students. To give them better political representation, constituencies are reserved for SC and ST's in proportion to their population. Reservation is provided in Public Sector Undertakings (PSU's), civil services, statutory bodies. Reservation is not provided in defence and judiciary.

### **Implementation Issues of Affirmative Actions**

1. Quality of representation in legislature – Studies have indicated lower participation in the legislative proceedings.
2. Data on justice-related matters showed that they were facing discrimination.
3. There is no time limit on reservation policies.

### **Social Justice**

The Protection of Civil Rights (PCR) Act, 1955, and the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (POA Act) are two important legislations to address the problems of social discrimination, the prevalence of social evils like untouchability and the increasing cases of exploitation and atrocities against disadvantaged groups. The POA Act provides for special courts/mobile courts for on-the-spot trials and prompt disposal of cases.

A Centrally sponsored scheme, Implementation of PCR Act and POA Act, was initiated in 1955 to ensure effective implementation of these Acts. Under the scheme, financial assistance is provided for strengthening the administrative, enforcement and judicial machinery related to these legislations, publicity and relief and rehabilitation of the affected persons. As the practice of untouchability still prevails, either directly or indirectly, there is a need for stringent enforcement of the existing legislations along with spreading awareness.

Top priority has been accorded to efforts for achieving the national goal of complete eradication of manual scavenging by the end of the Tenth Plan (2007). The programme has two components – conversion of dry latrines into water-borne latrines and training and rehabilitation of scavengers (whose number is estimated at 6,76,000) and to provide them alternative and dignified occupations.

The first component of the scheme is being implemented by the Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation. The National Scheme of Liberation and Rehabilitation of Scavengers and Their Dependents has been transferred to the Ministry of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation in 2003-04 to ensure its effective implementation.

## Below table gives a broad classification of Social Justice

Classification	Details
Low Human Development Index	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Unemployment</li><li>2. Unequal distribution of wealth</li><li>3. Health status in India</li><li>4. Education status in India</li></ol>
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Swachh Bharat Abhiyan</li></ol>
Global Hunger Index	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Poverty and Hunger in India</li></ol>
Community Level Healthcare	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Health for All</li></ol>

### Human Development Index (HDI)

Human Development Index (HDI) is one of the indicators of social justice prevalent in a nation. The 2 best measurements are the United Nations Human Development Index and the World Bank's Human Capital Index. As per the United Nations Human Development Index, India is ranked very low at 130 out of 189 countries. These indicators take into account the life expectancy at birth, enrollment in schools etc. There are various reasons that contribute to lower rankings.

### Unemployment

1. India has a very huge population and the majority of the labour force lack the required skill sets.

### Unequal Distribution of Wealth

1. Richest 10% of Indians own 4 times more wealth than the remaining 90% of the population which has resulted in a high degree of inequality, non-inclusive growth and low development index.

### Health

1. India spends just 1.5% of its GDP on the health sector.
2. India has a very high percentage of deaths due to air pollution
3. India has a very high malnutrition rate, Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR), and Infant Mortality Rate (IMR).
4. Government is taking various measures to tackle the above problem.
5. The government must increase its public health expenditure to 2.5% of GDP as suggested in the National health policy 2017.
6. Ayushman Bharat Yojana was launched in 2018 by the Government to address the primary, secondary and tertiary health care systems in India.

### Education

1. India spends just 3% of its GDP on the Education Sector.
2. As per the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2018, the quality of education in India is highly unsatisfactory.
3. High dropouts, low employability of graduates, low productivity, low wages are results of the poor education system.

4.

## **Water, Sanitation and Hygiene**

A huge number of Indians still don't have access to safe drinking water, and sanitation facilities.

### **Swachh Bharat Abhiyan**

1. The objective of this mission is to make India open defecation free through the construction of household-owned toilets and community-owned toilets.
2. A UNICEF report shows that this mission has helped in improving sanitation coverage to 90%.

## **Social Institutions**

Social institutions have been created by man from social relationships in society to meet such basic needs as stability, law and order and clearly defined roles of authority and decision making. Every organisation is dependent upon certain recognised and established set of rules, traditions and usages. These usages and rules may be given the name of institutions. These are the forms of procedure which are recognised and accepted by society and govern the relations between individuals and groups.

### **Social Institutions: Marriage**

Sociologists define marriage as a socially supported union involving two or more individuals in what is regarded as a stable, enduring arrangement typically based at least in part on a sexual bond of some kind.

### **Key Takeaways: Marriage**

1. Marriage is considered by sociologists to be a cultural universal; that is, it exists in some form in all societies.
2. Marriage serves important social functions, and social norms often determine the role each spouse takes in a marriage.
3. Because marriage is a social construct, cultural norms and expectations determine what a marriage is and who can marry.

## **Overview**

Depending on the society, marriage may require religious and/or civil sanction, although some couples may come to be considered married simply by living together for a period of time (common law marriage). Though marriage ceremonies, rules, and roles may differ from one society to another, marriage is considered a cultural universal, which means that it is present as a social institution in all cultures. Marriage serves several functions. In most societies, it serves to socially identify children by defining kinship ties to a mother, father, and extended relatives. It also serves to regulate sexual behavior, to transfer, preserve, or consolidate property, prestige, and power, and most importantly, it is the basis for the institution of the family.

### **Social Characteristics of Marriage**

In most societies, a marriage is considered a permanent social and legal contract and relationship between two people that is based on mutual rights and obligations among the spouses. A marriage is often based on a romantic relationship, though this is not always the case. But regardless, it typically signals a sexual relationship between two people. A marriage, however, does not simply exist between the married partners, but rather, is codified as a social institution in legal, economic, social, and spiritual/religious ways. Because a marriage is recognized by law and by

religious institutions, and involves economic ties between the spouses, a dissolution of marriage (annulment or divorce) must, in turn, involve a dissolution of the marriage relationship in all of these realms.

Typically, the institution of marriage begins with a period of courtship that culminates in an invitation to marry. This is followed by the marriage ceremony, during which mutual rights and responsibilities may be specifically stated and agreed to. In many places, the state or a religious authority must sanction a marriage in order for it to be considered valid and legal. In many societies, including the Western world and the United States, marriage is widely considered the basis of and foundation for family. This is why a marriage is often greeted socially with immediate expectations that the couple will produce children, and why children that are born outside of marriage are sometimes branded with the stigma of illegitimacy.

### **The Social Functions of Marriage**

Marriage has several social functions that are important within the societies and cultures where the marriage takes place. Most commonly, marriage dictates the roles that spouses play in each other's lives, in the family, and in society at large. Typically these roles involve a division of labor between the spouses, such that each is responsible for different tasks that are necessary within the family. American sociologist Talcott Parsons wrote on this topic and outlined a theory of roles within a marriage and household, wherein wives/mothers play the expressive role of a caregiver who takes care of socialization and emotional needs of others in the family, while the husband/father is responsible for the task role of earning money to support the family. In keeping with this thinking, a marriage often serves the function of dictating the social status of the spouses and the couple, and of creating a hierarchy of power between the couple. Societies in which the husband/father holds the most power in the marriage are known as patriarchies. Conversely, matriarchal societies are those in which wives/mothers hold the most power.

Marriage also serves the social function of determining family names and lines of familial descent. In the U.S. and much of the Western world, a common practice is patrilineal descent, meaning the family name follows that of the husband/father. However, many cultures, including some within Europe and many in Central and Latin America, follow matrilineal descent. Today, it is common for newly married couples to create a hyphenated family name that preserves the named lineage of both sides, and for children to bear the surnames of both parents.

### **Different Types of Marriages**

In the Western world, monogamous marriage between two spouses is the most common form of marriage. Other forms of marriage that occur around the world include polygamy (a marriage of more than two spouses), polyandry (a marriage of a wife with more than one husband), and polygyny (the marriage of a husband with more than one wife). (In common usage, polygamy is often misused to refer to polygyny.) As such, the rules of marriage, the division of labor within a marriage, and what constitutes the roles of husbands, wives, and spouses generally are subject to change and are most often negotiated by the partners within the marriage, rather than firmly dictated by tradition.

### **Expanding the Right to Marry**

Over time, the institution of marriage has expanded, and more individuals have won the right to marry. Same-sex marriage is increasingly common and in many places, including the United States, has been sanctioned by law and by many religious groups. In the U.S., the 2015 Supreme

Court decision Obergefell v. Hodges struck down laws banning same-sex marriage. This change in practice, law, and cultural norms and expectations for what a marriage is and who can participate in it reflects the fact that marriage itself is a social construct.

## Family

Family is a key social institution in all societies, which makes it a cultural universal. Similarly, values and norms surrounding marriage are found all over the world in every culture, so marriage and family are both cultural universals. Statuses (i.e. wife, husband, partner, mom, dad, brother, sister, etc.) are created and sanctioned by societies. While marriage and family have historically been closely linked in U.S. culture with marriages creating new families, their connection is becoming more complex, as illustrated in the opening vignette and the subsequent discussion of cohabitation. Sociologists are interested in the relationship between the institution of marriage and the institution of family because families are the most basic social unit upon which society is built but also because marriage and family are linked to other social institutions such as the economy, government, and religion. So what is a family? **Family** is a socially recognized group (usually joined by blood, marriage, cohabitation, or adoption) that forms an emotional connection and serves as an economic unit of society. Sociologists identify different types of families based on how one enters into them. A **family of orientation** refers to the family into which a person is born. A **family of procreation** describes one that is formed through marriage. These distinctions have cultural significance related to issues of lineage. Generally the family is recognised as an element of a broader kinship network that links ancestors and descendants of a person. It is the most permanent and most persistent of all social institutions which exerts constant influence in life of the members from the moment of birth to the moment of death.

## Elements of Family

- It is formed by robust companionship of husband, wife, father, mother, children and other members in it.
- Family propagates and up bring children, nurture them, fulfil their needs (Economic or Biological).
- There is sense of togetherness, love, emotional attachment and protection among the family member.
- Family is configured as a large or small by size, large family constitute family members of several generation whereas small family has limited members.
- All the family members reside in common residence.
- It is an institute where social norms and customs are taught to the family members in order to build a society and contribute for its wellbeing.

## Characteristics of the Family

The characteristic of family depicts the need of human whether biological that is sexual and affection or sociological that is every member of family has responsibility towards each other.

Family is said to be complete when there is permanent relationship between the members and this is possible only when they are psychologically attached to each other. There is no such social institution which can be compared with family that forms a permanent relationship with its members that are bonded to each other psychologically and sociologically.

## Main characteristics Universality

Family is universal social unit. There is no human society in which some form of the family does not appear. It is present throughout the communities whether barbarians or in civilized world.

### **Emotions**

Members of the family is emotionally attached to each other based on desires of maternal and fraternal love, parental care, mating and procreation. The base of family is built upon sentiments of love, compassion, cooperation and friendship.

### **Limited size**

Being a primary social unit its size is necessarily limited, as it is a smallest social unit.

### **Formative influence**

It is the family that creates an environment that surrounds trains and educates the members in it. It plays an important role in shaping the personality and help to mould the character of the member on it.

### **Central position in the social structure**

Family is the nucleus of all other social organizations as the whole social structure is built on family units.

### **Responsibility of the members**

Each member of the family has responsibilities and obligations towards each other and also towards society.

### **Structure of family**

The structure of the family is mainly based on the three pillars the nature of residence, the authority in the family and the size of the family.

### **Nature of Residence**

It can be broadly described in three types:

#### **Patrilocal**

Practiced commonly in India, where the bride resides with the groom's family or house.

#### **Matrilocal**

Here the groom resides with the bride's family. This is seen in few clans of India like the Khasis of Meghalaya and Nayar taravad of Kerala.

#### **Neolocal**

In this the family is individualistic that resides separately in newly constructed house. It is commonly practiced in urban industrial society.

### **Nature of authority in the family Patriarchial**

Here, father has the highest status in the family. He is the head of the family who controls the social life of the family. It is commonly practiced throughout India.

## **Matriarchial**

Here mother has the highest status in the family. She is the head of the family who controls the other members of the family. This system is seen very rarely in India, the Khasi clan of Meghalaya, the Nair clan of Kerala.

## **Based on the size**

Family is mainly constituted in two types

### **Nuclear family**

It is smallest family in size which has only a husband, wife and their children living together. The current industrial urban system has reduced the size of the family due to economic and social reason. It is further divided into two types.

1. The family of orientation: Here in this family the individual is born and resides with his parents and brothers and sisters.
2. The family of procreation: Here an individual gets married and procreates children with its companion to form a separate individual family.

### **Joint family**

In a joint family more than two generations resides together who has common ancestors following common duties and have common property. They also has common kitchen and probably follows same traditional occupation.

### **Advantages of Joint family:**

- In a joint family all members comes together to solve any social or economical problems on its member.
- This family gives moral support to its members in difficult times.
- Since the family members are large in numbers their strength and weightage is more in the society they live.
- Here more importance is given to all members rather than the individual member.
- The festivals and rituals are carried away all together thus distributing the task among each other minimises the time and efforts.
- In joint family the blood relation is given more relevance over the marital relationship.

### **On the basis of Ancestors:**

The family is classified into two types

#### **Patrilineal**

This family line is traced from its male ancestors. Here the new generations inherits the name or title, rights, property from their male ancestors.

#### **Matrilineal**

It is traced from their female ancestors. Here the new generations inherits the name or title, property and rights from their female ancestors.

## **Functions of family**

The family as a social institution performs several functions which is categorised into primary and secondary.

### **Primary functions:**

#### **Biological functions**

- It regulates and satisfies the sexual behaviour of Husband and wife through the marriage.
- It fulfills the desire of human to procreate children and thus regulates the perpetuation of human race.
- It is the family that rears the child, protects it, trains it and creates personality thus it performs a function of maintenance of its members.

### **Socialization of family members:**

- Family socialises its members through cultural continuity of the society of which it is a part.
- The social norms, moral values, beliefs and ideals of society are indoctrinated into its child to help the child to shape its personality and make it a civilized adult to build a better society.

### **Psychological Function**

- Affection – Family provides emotional satisfactions to its members through love, sympathy and affection.
- Mental Security: It is the family which provides the most intimate and the dearest relationship for all its members that makes them mentally secure.

### **Secondary functions Economic function:**

- The family fulfills the basic economic needs of its members and supports them in financial crisis.
- There is no other institute than family where the members feel free to ask for support during financial crisis.

### **Educational Functions**

- The child gets its basic and formal learning within the family. It provides training in social attitudes and habits which are important for an adult in its social life.

### **Religious functions**

- The child gets the knowledge of the religion it follows. Family is the centre for the religious training to its members as it inherits the religious teaching to the next generation.
- It teaches its members all religious values, way of worship, morals precepts.

### **The Recreational Functions**

- Family always aims to bring its member together and this is possible through the recreational activities. It is foster by various family functions such as reunions, hoisting relatives, playing indoor games, social gatherings, sport etc.

## **Structural and functional changes in the system of family**

The traditional system of family has undergone qualitative changes till the date. The following are the driving factors responsible for the changes witnessed in system of family.

### **Influence of Industrialization**

- Industrialization separated the home from the work and now the working members themselves bear the entire burden connected with their job. Earlier their families used to lend support in this regard.
- Family members have been disintegrated in search of jobs. Earlier the family workers worked together in an integrated economic enterprise.
- The traditional skills and crafts of household industries associated with the joint family have declined.
- It was a principal unit of production now has been transformed in the consumption unit.

### **Influence of urbanization.**

- Due to costly life style in urban areas small nuclear families are preferred and this has weakened the joint family pattern and has strengthened nuclear family patterns.

### **Changes in children status**

- Children's demands have been increased. They are considered as a liability as earlier they were the economic assets to the family.

### **Changes in Marriage System.**

- The freedom granted to individuals in mate-selection, change in age of marriage and change in the attitude towards marriage have also affected family system.
- Modern marriage has diminished the role of parents in mate-selection, marriage is now considered as social ceremony earlier it was a religious affair.
- Marriage contract today is entered into more autonomously by both men and women

### **Legislative Measures.**

- Legislative changes in certain laws like child marriage Restraint Act, 1929 and the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 that prohibits early marriage have lengthened the period of education.
- Through the special Marriage Act, 1954 there is freedom of mate-selection and marriage in any caste and religion without the Parent's consent after
- certain age is permitted, has modified the composition and traditions of the family.
- The Widow Remarriage Act, 1856, Hindu succession Act, 1956 and Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 have modified inter personal relations within the family and the stability of the joint family.

### **Influence of western values:**

- There has been tremendous change in Indian family system due to the influence of western

values that relates to modern science, equality, rationalism, democracy, individualism, free life, freedom of women etc.

## **Modern education**

Hinduism is the oldest religion in the world. Hinduism is world's third largest religion after Christianity and Islam. Hinduism is the dominant religion in India, where Hindus form about 84 per cent of the total population. Hinduism is also known as "Sanatan Dharma" or the everlasting religion.

One of the prominent religions of India, Islam forms about 14 per cent of India's population. Though India's contact with Islam had begun much earlier, the real push came in the 8th century when the province of Sindh was conquered. Though the Muslims form only 14 per cent of the total population of India but the influence of Islam on Indian society is much stronger.

At present Buddhism is one of the major world religions. The philosophy of Buddhism is based on the teachings of Lord Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama (563 and 483 BC), a royal prince of Kapilvastu, India. After originating in India, Buddhism spread throughout the Central Asia, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Southeast Asia, as well as the East Asian countries of China, Mongolia, Korea, Japan and Vietnam.

Modern education has brought about change in ideology of joint family system in India. It has changed the attitude, values, beliefs and ideologies of the people and has created individualistic feelings amongst the females.

Christianity is one of the prominent religions in India. At present there are about 25 million Christians in India. It is interesting to note that the Christian population in India is more than the entire population of Australia and New Zealand or total population of a number of countries in Europe.

Sikhs form about 2 per cent of Indian population. In comparison to other religions, Sikhism is a younger religion. The word 'Sikh' means a disciple and thus Sikhism is essentially the path of discipleship. The true Sikh remains unattached to worldly things.

Though the total number of Zoroastrians in Indian population is very less yet they continue to be one of the important religious communities of India. According to the 2001 census, there were around 70,000 members of the Zoroastrian faith in India. Most of the Parsis (Zoroastrians) live in Maharashtra (mainly in Mumbai) and the rest in Gujarat.

## **Religion**

India is a land of diversities. This diversity is also visible in the spheres of religion. The major religions of India are Hinduism (majority religion), Islam (largest minority religion), Sikhism, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and the Bahá'í Faith. India is a land where people of different religions and cultures live in harmony. This harmony is seen in the celebration of festivals. The message of love and brotherhood is expressed by all the religions and cultures of India. Whether it's the gathering of the faithful, bowing in prayer in the courtyard of a mosque, or the gathering of lamps that light up houses at Diwali, the good cheer of Christmas or the brotherhood of Baisakhi, the religions of India are celebrations of shared emotion that bring people together. People from the different religions and cultures of India, unite in a common chord of brotherhood and amity in this fascinating and diverse land.

Jains form less than one percent of the Indian population. For centuries, Jains are famous as community of traders and merchants. The states of Gujarat and Rajasthan have the highest concentration of Jain population in India. The Jain religion is traced to Vardhamana Mahavira (The Great Hero 599-527 B.C.).

## **Religion and the Indian Constitution**

Checking political tyranny, protecting the basic interests of dissenting minorities, and saving all citizens from taking decisions now that they might regret later are important objectives of all liberal-democratic constitutions. But the Indian Constitution goes further – it attempts a comprehensive social transformation, to effect a social revolution. Religion appears to be the main target of this attempted transformation. If so, how does this transformative potential of the Constitution impact a society saturated by religion? To answer this question, I begin with a distinction between individual ethics of self-fulfilment and social norms of everyday conduct. By the first, I mean a framework for meaningful living and dying, say, a full life in this world, swarga (heaven) in another world, or freedom from recurrent births and deaths (moksha or nirvana), or obeying the commands of God.

By social norms of everyday conduct, I mean rituals and ceremonies of social interaction, but primarily norms governing interpersonal relations – with whom one should or should not interact, who one should or should not marry, with whom one should or should not dine, who is to perform which job in society, etc. Ethics of self-fulfilment and norms of social conduct may be so tightly connected that they form one single system. Or the connection between them may be so loose that they are seen to constitute two separate systems.

### **Ethics and social norms**

In the Abrahamic traditions, the connection between ethics and social norms was forged so tightly that they became part of a single deeply connected system. And the term 'Religion' was invented to refer to this whole. Thus, if a person chose to be, say, a Latin Christian, he instantly became part of this entire system. Adopting a particular set of Christian beliefs on salvation went hand in hand with taking part in specific Christian rituals and ceremonies, and entering a web of unequal social relations with non-Christians. It would be wrong and impermissible for a person with Christian beliefs to participate in non-Christian social rituals or tolerate pagans.

For this reason, a religion-centred social revolution in Europe meant (a) breaking the monopoly of Christianity, presenting options other than dominant Christian ideas of self-fulfilment – pluralisation of ethics; (b) loosening the connection between ethics and social norms, freeing social norms from Christian ethics, building norms of social equality that transcended religious identities – secularisation; and (c) fighting a church that blocked secularisation and pluralisation.

By contrast, the connection between ethics and social norms remained very loose in the Indian tradition. Because social norms and power hardly ever dictated the choice of ethics, there was greater innovation, and so ethical frameworks proliferated. There were always many ethical frameworks to choose from. People could move freely from one framework to another and sometimes, without any discomfort, participate in several. And yet, precisely because social norms existed independently of ethics, this very ethical flexibility went hand in hand with great rigidity within social norms. This is so because hierarchical and fixed caste relations lay at the core of these norms. Ironically, they even complemented each other; as long as one remained within the caste system, one could choose any ethical framework, any path to self-fulfilment. A person could find fulfilment in a loving relationship with Krishna, in achieving swarga, or in liberation from the cycle of rebirth and at the same time follow common norms governing unequal social relations. A person may quit a this-worldly Vedic ethic in order to lead an ascetic Jain life but all the while continue to belong to the Vaishya caste, and therefore remain enmeshed in hierarchical caste relations.

This was true even for those who became Christians or Muslims; they chose a modified Abrahamic ethic but remained entrenched in the caste system.

## **'Religion' in India**

Given that the term 'religion' was invented to refer to a single system, it was not easily applicable in the subcontinent where ethics and social norms do not cohere into one single whole. Yet, such is the force and sway of the term 'religion' that it has been simultaneously used to refer to two relatively distinct and independent systems of ethics and social norms. This has generated many problems and much confusion.

Consider the following simple example from the natural sciences to grasp the absurdity of this profound misnaming. The term 'water' refers to a single entity composed of two distinct elements, oxygen and hydrogen. Where the two gases are deeply connected to form a single compound, the term 'water' is appropriate but we rightly use two distinct terms 'hydrogen' and 'oxygen' for each when the two remain disconnected from each other. How utterly erroneous to call them 'water' when they exist separately! Calling distinct systems of ethics and social norms in India by the common term 'religion' is equally insane. But then once a term grips the popular imagination, it is difficult to dislodge.

Some scholars have tried to get out of this hole by using 'religion' in two different senses – ethical religion and social religion. Though not entirely satisfactory, we might accept this and say that in India, a profound pluralism of ethical religions exists. Yet, followers of different ethical religions participate in much the same caste-ridden social religion.

How does all this help us understand the relationship of our Constitution to Indian religions? Unlike Europe, where people have to fight for pluralisation of ethics, here: (a) We strive to conserve our immense pluralism of ethical religions, to act against any attempt at religious homogenisation or exclusion. This conservative function the Indian Constitution performs. (b) By preventing a tight connection between social norms and ethical religion, the Indian Constitution also ensures that we do not have 'Religion' as originally conceived, something as totalising as Latin Christianity had been or Saudi Islam now is. (c) Finally, its main objective is to destroy what is at the core of India's dominant social religion – its deeply hierarchical caste system. This last feature alone marks it as an instrument for social revolution.

## **Property**

"Property may be described as the set of rights and obligations which define the relations between individuals or groups in respect of their control over material things (or persons treated as things). The essential point in the notion of property is that there is a recognised right of control over things vested in a particular person or persons, and within various limits, excluding interference by others. By saying that there is a recognised right, we mean that there are regular sanctions attached to it, that is, approved methods of dealing with infringements. The amount and nature of the control with which owners are endowed varies considerably in different legal systems, and there is not always precise correspondence between legal theory and economic usage". According to Kigsley Davis, property "consists of the rights and duties of one person or group (the owner) as against all other persons and groups with respect to some scarce good. It is thus exclusive, for it sets off what is mine from what is thine; but it is also social, being rooted in custom and protected by law". It appears from these two definitions that 'property' refers to the whole pattern of rights and obligations with respect to the possession, use, acquisition and disposal of

scarce valuable things. It is to be noted that the term 'property' is used both for rights and for the things in which rights are held. The context should always make it clear which reference is intended.

### **Characteristics of Property:**

**Understood in terms of rights, the following are the characteristics of property rights:**

- (i) Property can be transferred by its owner by way of sale, exchange or gift.
- (ii) The things in which an individual may hold property rights may be both tangible and intangible. Examples of the latter are copyrights of books or goodwill of a business.
- (iii) Property rights do not necessarily imply actual use and enjoyment of the relevant things by the owner. Law makes a distinction between ownership and possession. The many kinds of property right may be summarized as possession, use, alteration, using up, usufruct, income and disposition. These are explained *adseriatim*.

A tenant has the right of possession or occupation. The right of possession leads to various rights of use, depending on the nature of the object. Thus, the borrower of a book from a public library may use the book for his study. But rights of use do not include all rights of alteration.

For example, the book-borrower may not make marginal notes. Likewise, a tenant may not pull down a portion of the building in his occupation without prior permission of the owner. The right to use up is illustrated by the right of an oil company to take the oil from ground belonging to another. The owner may, of course, get some compensation in return. The right of usufruct may be discussed with reference to the following example. The right to the produce of land may be distinguished from ownership itself, and also from rights of use.

The owner of a mango garden may lease out the fruits of trees in a particular season to another. The lessee in this case has rights to the produce of mango trees without any rights whatsoever to the use of the land for other purposes. Such rights are called rights of usufruct. The rights to income may be explained with reference to royalties received by the author of a book from his publisher who publishes the book for profit. Rights of disposition include the right to destroy as well as the right to alienate—that is, the right of alienation by gift, sale or lease.

- (iv) The possession of property may mean possession of power over others. Money and such other tangibles as well as intangibles like one's good reputation may be bases of power. "The possession of exclusive rights to something that is scarce and valuable necessarily implies the possession of power over others who also desire the scarce and valuable things ... The amount of power which gives to the owner depends not only upon the definition of his rights but also on the intensity of others' needs for that which is owned".
- (v) The institution of property is, like all other institutions, a normative patterning of the relations between individuals and/or groups. Thus, property owners are under the obligation to use property according to social norms. Similarly, those who do not possess a particular property right are under the general obligation not to infringe upon the right of the possessor.

### **Stages in the Development of the Property System:**

The development of the property system has been a subject of speculation for a long time. Different writers have indicated the stages differently. We may consider some of these views.

Vinogradoff appears to distinguish four principal phases: First, the formation of property in tribal and communal surroundings. Second, the application to landed property of the notion of tenure. Third, the growth of individual appropriation. Fourth, the restrictions which are being imposed upon such appropriation by collectivist tendencies in modern times. Hobhouse speaks of three phases in the growth of property system. During the first phase, there is little social differentiation, little inequality. Economic resources are owned in common, or are strictly controlled by the community.

During the second phase, wealth increases, great inequalities appear and individual or collective ownership escapes from community control. During the third phase, a conscious attempt is made to diminish inequality and to restore community control. This scheme of Hobhouse has some resemblances to the Marxist distinction into three stages: that of primitive classless society, followed by class differentiation and the growth of inequality, and the final stage of a classless society at a higher level. Many recent writers have emphasized the complexity of property systems and have rejected the notion of a unilinear evolution. There have been a number of comparative studies of property in primitive societies which illustrate the difficulty of determining the character and extent of property rights.

Recent sociological studies of property in industrial societies have been largely concerned with two aspects: first, the distribution of property and its social effects; second, the separation between the ownership and the control of industrial enterprises in modern capitalist societies. Studies on distribution of property indicate that there has been some movement towards greater equality in many of the advanced industrialised societies since the beginning of the twentieth century, though it has been more marked in respect of incomes than in respect of property. The equalisation of incomes has proceeded more rapidly as a result of high progressive taxation and the expansion of social services.

The separation of ownership and control in industrial enterprises is a phenomenon which has attracted much attention from sociologists concerned with the development of modern capitalism. It has resulted from the extension of the joint stock principle. The industrial capitalists of the early nineteenth century were both owners and managers of their enterprises. But as the enterprises grew larger, more and more capital had to be drawn from outside. This was made possible by the sale of shares among innumerable shareholders.

### **Psychological and Social Aspects of Property:**

It is still not conclusively proved as to whether the desire to acquire and amass property has anything to do with the instinct of man. Some say that it is instinctive. Some dispute this contention and hold that it is a craze conditioned by circumstances. Morris Ginsberg argues that the interest in ownership of property is very complex and that it has its roots in several fundamental needs. To us, a commodity acquires value for two different reasons. When a commodity directly satisfies our need, it is naturally valuable to us. Our consumption articles and even consumer durables fall within this category.

There are, however, some commodities which do not satisfy our needs either directly or indirectly, but these are, nevertheless, considered to be valuable. For example, gold, diamond and many such stones are considered to be very precious and people are prepared to offer fancy prices in order to acquire these metals or stones. Apparently, these have nothing to do with the satisfaction of our needs, either directly or indirectly. Why, then, are these considered to be so valuable?

These have come to acquire value "through a process of conditioning or assimilation". Since these are scarce, those who acquire possession of these scarce commodities to the exclusion of many others find pleasure in, and feel proud of, such possessions. Disappointment sets in when we fail to acquire them, and we feel happy and proud when we have them. "In this way, habits of attachment may be formed in relation to objects which may have no intrinsic or prima facie attractiveness". Such objects "gather around them groups of emotional dispositions, including especially the prospective and retrospective emotions of desire, hope, fear, anxiety, disappointment, as well as pleasure in attainment, and joy in mastery".

Ginsberg argues that all these primary needs, which "may serve as nuclei for the sentiments of property", are "aided by the tendency to confuse means and ends". That which is essentially a means to an end, is accepted uncritically as an end in itself. In *One Dimensional Man* Herbert Marcuse points to this kind of distortion in perspective and says that an individual feels gratified by the satisfaction of 'false needs' which are largely imposed by the mass media. A feverish attempt to acquire various types of electronic gadgets even at a great personal sacrifice of many other essential goods is an example of pursuit of 'false needs'. It is, thus, obvious that "interest in ownership is very complex and has its roots in several fundamental needs".

Comparative jurisprudence teaches us that there are three original forms of acquiring property. First, goods; may be taken directly from nature. Second, goods may be obtained by the sweat of one's brow. Third, possession of goods may be obtained by the assertion of power over other people. "In all these forms of acquisition, but especially in the last, the self-assertive tendencies of man come into play. Men come to love things because they have put their energy into them, and because they are instruments of general satisfaction, but especially because they give them power over nature and other human beings.

It is not so much the direct use of things, as the exercise of power, which they at once embody and facilitate, that gives to property its tremendous drive, and makes it one of the roots of ambition" If, therefore, we look at the subject from a psychological point of view, property arises, not from a direct need to acquire and possess, but from the interweaving of myriad basic interests with self-regard and self-assertion. We may also look at property ownership from another angle. "Ethically, the function of property is to provide the material conditions of a free, secure, and purposeful life". In actual practice, however, this object remains unfulfilled in the case of a large majority of the population in all societies.

The reasons for this failure of the economic system to ensure carefree and meaningful life lie deep in the history and psychology of property. It is clear from the brief outline of the evolution of property that ownership of property has gradually passed on in the hands of a limited number of people, resulting in deprivation of the bulk of the population from ownership rights. Another parallel development has been the gradual institutionalization of the rights of property. Several consequences flow from this.

The owners of property have come to enjoy their property rights without any interference from others. They have also been able to exercise power and domination over those bereft of property. To make matters worse still, the bulk of the population are denied the opportunities, in the context of minute division of labour calling for specialisation, for making work a vehicle for "self-expression and self-fulfillment".

Ginsberg, therefore, concludes that "as far as the masses of workers are concerned, property cannot be said to have fulfilled its primary social functions of providing security and permanence, a basis of freedom and initiative, and an opportunity for the active expression of faculty". The solution to this intricate problem lies in devising appropriate methods for curbing and restricting within prescribed limits the opportunities of a few to establish domination over others. At the same time, conditions must be created so as to enable the vast majority of the population to release their creative talents and make their lives joyous and meaningful. Obviously, the institution of property must be suitably modified, so as to serve these twin purposes.

### **Principal Forms of the Institution of Property:**

Broadly, we may distinguish common, collective and individual property. Common property is that over which several individuals have rights. They, however, hold this property collectively as against the rest of the community. The rights of sharing this property are defined by customary rules of distribution and supervised by the community. There are numerous forms of collective property, the variation being based on the type of collective entity: that is, whether it is a private corporation, or a quasi-public corporation, or a public corporation. Finally, in private property the control of property is vested in an individual, subject, of course, to varying types of control imposed by the society in respect of its enjoyment, alienation and bequest?

It is difficult to make a reliable assessment as to when and among whom a particular ownership right was prevalent. However, the picture which emerges as a result of investigations conducted by social anthropologists among primitive people may be briefly indicated. Among primitive peoples, private property is recognized in such things as clothing, implements, dwelling huts or divisions within these huts. In respect of these sharing is governed by customary rules and by exchange of gifts. With regard to land, there are great variations. Common property prevails among hunters, pastoralists and early agriculturists.

With development and expansion of agriculture, the principle of common property is gradually given up. But the abandonment of common property does not, as can be generally expected, lead directly to the acceptance of the principle of private ownership. On the contrary, "the gainers are the chiefs and the nobles, and we find more and more cases in which the mass of the people become dependent cultivators: slaves, serfs, or tenants of a landed class". It should, however, be remembered that alongside the emergence of individual ownership, common property also exists in a modified form.

"The principle of private property is seen more closely at work among the pastoral people where communal restrictions are probably less effective and the chances for individual accumulation of property greater. At the stage in which 'barbarism' is beginning to pass into 'civilization', the different principles are found interwoven, and the seigniorial and the communal principles are still fairly balanced. Thereafter, the tendency is for the preponderance of power to pass to the nobles, leaving the commoners in an increasingly dependent position". Gradually, feudalism appears. There are varieties of feudal tenure which appear in different places according as circumstances demand. Eventually, industrial revolution demolishes the foundation of feudalism, paving the way for the establishment of the capitalistic order. Explanations about the nature and characteristic features of capitalism vary. Capitalism has also, like all other social institutions, undergone changes in response to environmental changes and historical conditions. Keeping this in view, we may consider a few definitions in order to find out the sociological significance of capitalism.

Sidney Webb defines capitalism as “that particular stage in the development of industry and legal institutions, in which the bulk of the workers find themselves divorced from the ownership of the instruments of production, in such a way as to pass into the position of wage-earners whose subsistence, security and personal freedom seem dependent on a relatively small proportion of the nation; namely, those who own, and through their ownership, control the organisation of the land, the machinery and labour force of the community, and do so with the object of making for themselves individual and private gains”.

Hobhouse defines it as **“the employment in the production of goods for sale of those who have not the means of production by some who have or can command this means”**. From a sociological point of view, the essence of capitalism lies in the relationship that develops between those who own the means of production and those who do not, between those who enrich themselves at the cost of the bulk of the population.

In course of time, the people press for removal of the inequities of the system by extending communal control over capitalist enterprises through legislative and administrative regulations. As a consequence, there has been an extension of the collective types of property in the forms of the co-operative systems and of public ownership, an increase in the public control of quasi-public bodies, and public ownership of ‘natural monopolies’. At the same time, the workers have organised themselves into trade unions and they seek thereby to check the attempts of owners to exploit the workers. Their attempts are, generally speaking, considerably successful.

It may also be noted that socialism as an ideal and as a programme of work has emerged as a reaction to the inequities of the capitalist system. Opinions differ as regards the meaning of socialism. Some socialists advocate social ownership of the means of production while some advocate merely social control and regulation of enterprises in private ownership. The form and extent of social control “belongs to the bitterest controversies of today”. Various alternative proposals are suggested, debated and even tried with an eye to the attainment of the twin objectives of distributive justice and economic growth.

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**Education:** is the process of socialisation, which begins informally at home and then formally in educational institutions. Education as an institution helps develop knowledge, skill, attitude and understanding of the people and strive to make them competent members of the society. Education widens the mental horizon of the people and make them receptive to new ideas.

### **Meaning of Education:**

The term education has different meanings. Each person interprets the word in terms of his past experience, his needs and purposes. The parents, the teachers, administrators, religious leaders, politicians and artists interpret the term education in their own ways. For example, to a student, education means acquisition of knowledge, receiving a degree or diploma. A statesman may claim that it means to train individuals as ideal citizens. A teacher may interpret education as means for creation a new man and new society. The meaning of education differs from place to place and from time to time. It has passed through many ages and stages of evolution. At every

stage it has had a different meaning according to existing social conditions.

The term education is derived from the Latin word 'educate' which means to 'educate', to 'bring up' or to 'draw out' the latent powers of child. Confirming to this meaning Durkheim defined education as "the action exercised by the older generations upon those who are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to awaken and develop in the child those physical, intellectual and moral states which are required of him both by his society as a whole and by the milieu for which he is specially designed". He conceives of education as "the socialisation of the younger generation". Hence, education may be broadly regarded as the way in which people learn to take part in the life of society in which they live. Education is the social process by which individual learns the things necessary to fit him to the social life of his society.

Education is primarily deliberate learning which fits the individual for his adult role in society. As Counts and Mead phrase it, education is an induction into the learner's culture. It is a deliberate instruction throughout which we acquire a large part of our social and technical skills. Accordingly says Lowie, "it is as old as organised social life. Schooling is merely a highly specialised form of education. According to Samuel Koenig, Education may also be defined as the process whereby the social heritage of a group is passed on from one generation to another as well as the process whereby the child becomes socialised, i.e. learns the rules of behaviour of the group into which he is born.

It is again believed that the term education is derived from the Latin word 'educatum' which means the act of teaching or training. Thus, education is both acquisition of knowledge or art of teaching and learning of values, norms and skills. The education a system, first of all, may be viewed as a part of the total social system. It both reflects and influences the social and cultural order of which it is apart. However, in modern society, education is viewed as formal training. As A.W. Green writes, Historically, it (education) has meant the conscious training of the young for the later adoption of adult roles.

By modern convention, however, education has come to mean formal training by specialists within the formal organisation of the school". Education, according Western scholars, is deliberate and organised activity through which the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual potentialities of the child are developed, both in individual as an individual and also as a member of society. So that he may lead the fullest and richest life possible in this world. All practical aims such as the development of character, the attainment of knowledge both for use and enjoyment, the acquisition of skills, the making of worthy citizen and others that have been proposed from time to time are subordinate to the ultimate aim in life.

The educational system may be viewed as subsystem within social organisation of its own. It has a system of status and roles, a body of skills, values and traditions. Each schools and each classroom within the school forms an interacting group.

### **Aspects of Education:**

Now, we can indicate several sociological aspects of education. First, learning is a creative experience. When a man responds to stimuli, he acts in a creative manner. In other words, education is a creative act for the learner. Second, education is of two ways of learning such as informal education and formal education. The first serves continuously through life, as mechanism for learning as well as for reinforcing previous learning. Third, formal education is a socially devised technique, a highly elaborated procedure for creating situations in which the pupil may learn. Individu-

als go through formal education only a Short period of their life. Forth, education is both the living of life (in the network of social relationships, inthe classroom and outside) and a preparation for life. Preparation for life involves

- (a) capacity to earn a livelihood,
- (b) capacity to enrich one's life through enjoyment of the cultural heritage and of one's inner resources,
- (c) capacity to function efficiently and constructively as a member of society, as a citizen of the State. Fifth, education involves
  - (a) mastery of the tools of learning, such as reading, writing arithmetic and
  - (b) mastery of our relations to our inner self, to our neighbour, to the universe.

Education is interpreted in two senses, "narrow' and 'broader' sense. Education, in narrow sense, is a planned, organised and formalised process. It is imparted at a particular place (School, College, and University) and at a definite time. Its curriculum is also formal. In narrow sense education is limited to classroom. In broader sense education is not related to schooling or teaching. Each and every individual acquires some sort of education, even he has never spent a day in a school, because his acquired characteristics are the products of experiences and activities which are the products of experiences and activities which are educational in nature. Education, in wider sense, is used for the purpose of teaching people all characteristics which will enable them to live in the society. Education is a continuous 'process'. Education of human being begins at birth and it ends with his death. He leans throughout his life. There is no end to it. Education is much more than schooling. The child goes on reconstructing his experiences throughout the whole life. Instruction ends in the classroom, but education ends only with life.

### **Social Functions of Education:**

Education as social institution, plays a vital role in our society. The function of education is multi-dimensional within the school system and outside it. It performs the function of socialising the individual for a variety of social roles and development of personality. It is also an important part of the control mechanisms of society. Education is a necessity right from the simple society to modern complex industrial society.

#### **1. Socialisation:**

The most important function of education is socialisation. The people have no knowledge about the culture of their society. They must learn them and they must learn the way which their society is functioning. Hence, the children as they grow up must be introduced into the culture which they are going to face. Society, therefore, provides a conscious teaching programme to inculcate values, norms and social skills that will fit the individuals for their adult role in society. Society creates educational institutions such as school and colleges to perform certain functions in accomplishing this general end.

Besides, providing the children with tools of knowledge – how to write, spell and master arithmetic, the school also exposes them to social norms and values beyond those which are available for learning in the family and other groups. The learners acquire academic knowledge through schools and college which they will need later on and some will be practical or technical to fit him for some sort of job. At the same time the schools and colleges inculcate social values and norms among them.

Though people learn a great deal from their parents or in clubs and among groups of friends, they learn more of the culture of their society through educational system. For it is in the educational institutions that the young are exposed to social norms and values beyond those which are available for learning in the family and other social groups. History books tend to be written from an ethnocentric viewpoint and to inculcate nationalistic attitudes.

Through education, the child is able to develop reasoning in social relations, cultivates social virtues and thus becomes socially efficient as says Dewey. When he speaks about social efficiency, he refers to economic and cultural efficiency, and he calls it 'socialisation of individual'. Thus, education, may be only part of the process of socialisation, but it is a very important part.

## **2. Development of Personality:**

Education plays an important role in the development of personality. The object of education, as said Durkheim "is to awaken and develop in the child those physical, intellectual and moral states which are required of him both by his society as a whole and by the milieu for which he is specially designed". Education helps the development of the qualities of an individual, such as physical, mental and emotional make-up as well as his temperament and character.

The self, the core of personality, develops out of the child's interaction with other. Subsequently, the habits, traits, attitudes and ideals of an individual is patterned by the process of education. A learner's personality is also developed indirectly when he is encouraged to form his own attitudes and values by studying outstanding people in history and literature. Moreover, a learner is also influenced by the outlook and attitudes of fellow students and teachers.

## **3. Social Control:**

Education plays a vital role in regulating individual behaviour through transmitting a way of life and communicating ideas and values to the new generations. One way that education contributes to the regulations of social conduct, says Bottomore, "is in the early socialisation of the child". In order to transmit its social heritage and survive as a social order all societies develop educational systems to train its younger generations. The young must be consciously trained for their adult roles to maintain the society. Through the process of education society regulates the behaviour of its members and enforces conformity to its norms.

"Education in a broad sense", as says Bottomore, "From infancy to adulthood, is thus a vital means of social control". Formal education in modern societies communicate ideas and values which play a part in regulating behaviour. The new generations are instructed to observe the social norms, the violation of which may invite punishment.

## **4. Social Integration:**

Education, by imparting values, also integrates people into the broader society. The curriculum of the school, its 'extra-curricular' activities and the informal relationship among students and teachers communicate certain values and social skills such as cooperation or team-spirit, obedience, fair play.

## **5. Determination of Status:**

Determination of status of an individual is an important function of education. Amount of education is a good indicator of socio-economic status, from lower working class to upper class, educa-

tion leads to economic opportunity. It is through education young people secure higher status jobs than their parents. With higher incomes they come to associate with the persons of higher status. Thus, education provides the channel to better socio-economic status.

## **6. Provides Route for Social Mobility:**

Educational qualifications increasingly form the basis for the allocation of individuals to social statuses and social mobility. There has been steady move from one status to other due to educational attainment. An industrial society like United States or Great Britain places increasing emphasis on the attainment of both of the skills acquired in elementary, secondary and higher education and of the educational credentials that a person has acquired the skills for a job.

The educational system is expected to provide opportunity for social and economic mobility by selecting and training the most able and industrious youth for higher-status position in society. The educational system places those with the greater abilities and training in higher positions and those with the lesser abilities and training in lower ones. Thus, education tends to generate vertical social mobility by increasing their earning power and by preparing them for higher-status occupation than that of their parents.

The educational system whether industrial societies or in developing societies like India tend to create and maintain a broad division between elites and masses, between education for intellectual and for manual occupations. Such differentiation within the educational system is closely linked to the system of social stratification and mobility.

## **7. Social Development:**

Skills and values learned in education are directly related to the way to which the economy and the occupational structure operate. Education trains the individuals in skills that are required by the economy. In modern planned economy the output of skilled people must be consciously geared to the economic and social priorities of the society. That explains the vital role of education in social development. Literacy, for example, stimulates economic and social development and that is why all developing countries have undertaken large-scale literacy programmes.

Literacy increases political consciousness among poor people who now organize themselves into various forms of organization.

## **Colonialism**

Colonialism implies domination of people's life and culture. The main goal of colonialism is extraction of economic benefits from the colony. Colonialism results in control over life of natives in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. It is more subtle whereas Imperialism is more formal and aggressive.

### **Historically, two main types of the colonization can be differentiated.**

- **Settler colonialism** is that type of colonialism wherein a large number of the immigrants, often motivated by religious, political, or economic reasons, settle in a new place and dominate the local indigenous population in economic, political as well as social aspects.
- **Exploitation colonialism** involves relatively less number of immigrants and predominantly focuses on exploitation of the resources of the colonial country.

Thus colonialism denotes a set of unequal relationships between the colonial power and the

colony, and often between the colonists and the indigenous population; relationships in which the colonists acquire benefits (disproportionally), at the expense of the local population.

## **Colonialism, Imperialism And New Imperialism**

**Colonialism**, as said earlier, denotes a system in which a country conquers and rules over other regions. It involves exploiting the resources of the conquered country for the benefit of the conqueror.

**Imperialism** means the ability of a state (or empire) to exert its influence beyond its borders. This influence can be exerted in multiple manners, like colonialism, militarism, cultural hegemony etc. Thus it can be safely argued that **colonialism is a practice and imperialism is the idea driving that practice**.

**New Imperialism** refers to period of territorial expansion by European powers, the United States, and Japan during the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, which resulted in subjugation of almost all of Africa and parts of Asia. It was distinct from the earlier phases of imperialistic expansion, known as old imperialism.

Historically speaking, **new imperialism started with the advent of industrial revolution**. In fact, it was a new strategy of imperialism which was devised by the industrialized countries for maximising their economic benefits. It contrasts with the old form of imperialism, in which Colonialism formed the main method of pursuing the imperialistic ambitions and goals.

## **Causes of Colonialism**

- **Discovery of New Lands And Trade Routes**
- **Economic Consideration:** The countries like England, France, Spain and Portugal established their colonies primarily for the economic benefits.
- **Mercantilism:** The policy of Mercantilism was based on the premise that the economic development of the mother country (Metropolis) was most important and the colonies should be governed in such a way that they lead to the benefit of the mother country.
- **European Rivalry:** The exploration and colonization was started by Spain and Portugal. Gradually, other countries like France and England also entered the race. Acquiring new colonies became a thing of national pride. Moreover, due to various economic benefits of colonization, a stage of 'competitive colonialism' started among the European powers.
- **To Spread Christianity:** During the Age of Discovery; the Catholic Church started a major effort to spread Christianity in the New World by converting indigenous peoples. As such, the establishment of Christian missions went simultaneously with the colonizing efforts of European powers such as Spain, France and Portugal.
- **Push Factors:** The enclosure movement, taking land out of cultivation and converting it into pastureland for sheep, was creating a surplus population. Sheep raising, more profitable than traditional agriculture, required fewer labourers. The new lands in America gave these unemployed a place to work.

In Asia, the Europeans met ancient and well populated societies, and hence direct colonization was not feasible. Rather, armed coastal trading posts along maritime trade routes (such as Goa, Malacca and Macau), were established. Nonetheless, in certain areas both Spanish and Portuguese became the effective rulers. On the contrary, in the Western Hemisphere, the European

colonization involved the emigration of large numbers of settlers, soldiers and administrators intent on owning land and exploiting the relatively pristine landscape. The result was that the colonization in Asia was indirect while the colonization of Americas was direct (i.e., actual settlement).

- **European Colonies In India:** Vasco da Gama's discovery of a new sea route to India in 1498 started the process of direct Indo-European commerce. The Portuguese soon set up trading posts in Goa, Daman, Diu and Bombay. The next to arrive were the Dutch, the English and finally the French. The internal conflicts among Indian Kingdoms, the technological superiority of Europeans and financial benefits of commerce enabled the European traders to gradually gain political and military influence and appropriate lands. Although all European powers controlled various regions of southern and eastern India, ultimately they lost all their territories in India to the British, with the exception of the few outposts, like French of Pondichéry, the Dutch port of Travancore, and the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman, and Diu.

## Impact of Colonialism

- **Columbian Exchange:** The term Columbian Exchange refers to the widespread exchange of plants, animals, culture, human populations, technology, and ideas that occurred between the new world (Americas) and the Old World (Eurasia) in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, as a result of European colonization and trade.
- **Slave Trade:** To effectively utilize the resources, colonizers needed immense amount of labour. During the initial years, the European settlers met labour requirements by enslaving the native populations. However, the decline in the native population led to importing slaves from Africa which emerged as a lucrative alternative.
- **Boost to Mercantilism:** Mercantilism, in a way, was both the cause as well as the effect of colonialism. Mercantile economic policies were definitely an impetus for the start of colonization. But subsequently, the benefits due to colonial exploitation further reinforced the ideology of mercantile capitalism and augmented its spread across Europe. As a result these countries saw very rapid increase in trade volume while colonies suffered proportionally.

# MCQs

1. Society symbolises the network of
  - (a) human relationships
  - (b) social relationships
  - (c) orientations
  - (d) inter-connectionsAns. (b)
  
2. 'Society is the web of social relationships' whose definition is this?
  - (a) Maclver
  - (b) H. Maine
  - (c) Pluto
  - (d) AristotleAns. (a)
  
3. There are two types of definition of society. These are-
  - (a) Structural and interactional
  - (b) Functional and structural
  - (c) Evolutionary and diffusive
  - (d) Structural and evolutionaryAns. (b)
  
4. Society is
  - (a) Natural
  - (b) Deliberate
  - (c) Practical
  - (d) FunctionalAns. (b)
  
5. Marriage is a/an
  - (a) important and universal social institution of society
  - (b) important basis for group formation
  - (c) helpful in strengthening the caste system
  - (d) helpful in calming down the anger of two conflicting groups.Ans. (a)
  
6. The largest written constitution belongs to-
  - (a) USA,
  - (b) India,
  - (c) China,
  - (d) AustraliaAnswer: b
  
7. The federal system of India adopted from-
  - (a) Canada,
  - (b) Russia,
  - (c) Britain,
  - (d) GermanyAnswer: a

8. Arthasastra is a book of –  
(a) Economics,  
(b) statecraft,  
(c) Education,  
(d) Political parties Answer: b
9. What do you mean by “A state does not have its own religion”-  
(a) secular state,  
(b) religious state,  
(c) both A&B,  
(d) none of these Answer: a
10. How many fundamental rights are there in India-  
(a) 7,  
(b) 6,  
(c) 5,  
(d) 8 Answer: b
11. How many Lok Sabha seats are there in Kerala-  
(a) 30,  
(b) 20,  
(c) 25,  
(d) 23 Answer: b
12. Ramarajya is a concept of –  
(a) Gandhiji,  
(b) Nehru,  
(c) Patel,  
(d) None of these Answer: a
13. The ideal state of Gandhiji is known as-  
(a) polity,  
(b) ramarajya,  
(c) republic,  
(d) county Answer: b
14. The concept of trusteeship is introduced by-  
(a) Gandhiji,  
(b) Tagore,  
(c) C.R.Das,  
(d) M.N.Roy Answer: a
15. Who was the first law minister of India-  
(a) Nehru,

- (b) Ambedkar,
  - (c) Patel,
  - (d) none of these
- Answer: b

16. Indian constitution is a –
- (a) written,
  - (b) unwritten,
  - (c) evolved,
  - (d) no constitution
- Answer: a

17. The highest court of India is-
- (a) supreme court,
  - (b) high court
  - (c) parliament,
  - (d) none of these
- Answer: a

18. In ancient Greek, Athens was famous for-
- (a) commerce,
  - (b) education,
  - (c) logic,
  - (d) handicraft
- Answer: a

19. Which articles of Indian constitution prohibits racial discrimination-
- (a) articles 14,17,
  - (b) 15,16,
  - (c) 17,23,
  - (d) 17,18
- Answer: b

20. "Territory" is an element of –
- (a) state,
  - (b) executive,
  - (c) government,
  - (d) legislature
- Answer: a

21. The highest law making body in India is-
- (a) judiciary,
  - (b) executive,
  - (c) legislature,
  - (d) parliament
- Answer: a

22. India follows –
- (a) constitutional supremacy,
  - (b) parliamentary supremacy,
  - (c) both A&B,
  - (d) none of these
- Answer: a

23. In India, "right to property" is a –

- (a) legal right,
  - (b) civil right,
  - (c) fundamental right,
  - (d) political right Answer: b
24. "giving to everyman his due" pertains to-
- (a) equality,
  - (b) justice,
  - (c) discrimination,
  - (d) all of these Answer: b
25. How many states are there in India-
- (a) 30,
  - (b) 29,
  - (c) 25,
  - (d) 28 Answer: b
26. Social justice is primarily concerned with
- (a) Who governs society
  - (b) How society is governed
  - (c) How society is defined
  - (d) Who should get what in society Answer: d
27. State is an –
- (a) institution,
  - (b) organisation,
  - (c) group,
  - (d) agency Answer: a
28. Indian democracy follows-
- (a) single party system,
  - (b) biparty system,
  - (c) multiparty system,
  - (d) all of these Answer: c
29. Kamandaka accepts \_\_\_\_\_ Upayas Options:
- (a) Three
  - (b) Four
  - (c) Six
  - (d) Seven Answer: D
30. Niti-sara means Options:
- (a) Elements of Polity
  - (b) Science of Polity
  - (c) Both A and B
  - (d) Science of Governance Answer: A
31. The major premise of \_\_\_\_\_ highlights the importance of the king and the qualities a king

must possess in-order to run the state in prosperity.

- (a) Niti-sara
  - (b) Artha-sastra
  - (c) Kautilya-niti
  - (d) All of these
- Answer: A

32. Satyagraha means

- (a) insistence on non-violence
- (b) Insistence on truth
- (c) insistence on justice
- (d) none of these

33. Satyagraha is also called

- (a) Truth force
- (b) violence force.
- (c) Karmic force
- (d) None of these

34. Gandhi adopted ---as the moral equivalent to war and conflict

- (a) Himsa
- (b) Satyagraha
- (c) Fasting
- (d) dharnna

35. The major premise of \_\_\_\_\_ highlights the importance of the king and the qualities a king must possess in-order to run the state in prosperity.

- (a) Niti-sara
  - (b) Artha-sastra
  - (c) Kautilya-niti
  - (d) All of these
- Answer: a

36. In the Industrialised western societies, the chief aim of marriage is not only procreation but

- (a) companionship
  - (b) emotional and psychological support and companionship
  - (c) emotional and psychological support
  - (d) divorce
- Ans. (b)

37. Marriage is considered to be necessary because

- (a) This is the only way to acquire paternal property
  - (b) This is the only way of sexual gratification
  - (c) This provides societal sanction
  - (d) It is regularised and provides socially sanctioned sex gratification
- Ans. (d)

38. Risley have given this statement put in question No. 4 to support his views on \_\_\_\_\_ regarding marriage.

- (a) Exogamy
- (b) Acculturation
- (c) Preference and prohibition

- (d) Cousin marriage Ans. (d)
39. Which one of the following is the first stage of the evolution of an institution?
- (a) Tradition
  - (b) Ideology
  - (c) Collective Experience
  - (d) Mores Ans. (B)
40. In society differences are always:
- (a) Inborn
  - (b) Adopted
  - (c) Environmental
  - (d) Both adopted and natural Ans. (d)
41. Force theory about origin of society is not accepted because it is believed that:
- (a) It is not historically correct
  - (b) State was given by God
  - (c) It creates fear in the minds of the people
  - (d) It is by now clear that state is expansion of families Ans. (a)
42. According to \_\_\_\_\_, self and society are not identical.
- (a) Cooley
  - (b) Mead
  - (c) Freud
  - (d) Marx Ans. (c)
43. Socialism is a \_\_\_\_\_ not a process.
- (a) Theory
  - (b) Virtue
  - (c) biological specialization
  - (d) state of nature Ans. (a)
44. In society differences grow due to:
- (a) Socialisation
  - (b) Non-specialisation
  - (c) Non-socialisation
  - (d) Isolation Ans. (a)
45. Force theory about origin of society makes us believe that:
- (a) Society was given by God
  - (b) Force brought society into existence
  - (c) Force has nothing to do with the emergence of society
  - (d) Force has no relevance with the coming of society Ans. (b)
46. In India, the institution of family has a trend towards:
- (a) Joint family
  - (b) Single family
  - (c) Patriarchal family

- (d) Matriarchal family Ans. (b)
47. These days in India the institution of marriage is weakening because:
- (a) Our religious leaders are becoming rigid
  - (b) women are becoming economically self-sufficient
  - (c) less number of people are liking to marry
  - (d) people prefer small size family Ans. (b)
48. Which one of the following is not correct about institutional structure?
- (a) There is rule to codify its working
  - (b) There are no codified rules of its working
  - (c) There are symbols which synthesize relationship
  - (d) It is bound with the others Ans. (b)
49. Industry is institutional structure of an institution which by nature is:
- (a) Political
  - (b) Cultural
  - (c) Economic
  - (d) Social Ans. (c)
50. Pick up one which is not true of an institution:
- (a) It is least concerned with customs and mores
  - (b) Customs and mores are its distinguishing feature
  - (c) It meets primary needs of the people
  - (d) It is very stable Ans. (a)
51. Which of the following is not the characteristic of an institution?
- (a) It must follow some well-established rules
  - (b) Its strength is based on obedience to rules
  - (c) These grow with the society
  - (d) These have no definite objectives Ans. (d)
52. Who of the following has said that "A social institution is a functional configuration of culture pattern"?
- (a) Kimball Young
  - (b) Maclver
  - (c) Ginsberg
  - (d) Gillin and Gillin Ans. (d)
53. "Social institutions are sets of organised human relationships established by common will" was said by:
- (a) C.H. Colley
  - (b) E.A. Ross
  - (c) Kingsley Davis
  - (d) Sheriff and Sheriff Ans. (b)
54. In India, education is the responsibility of
- (a) Central Government.

- (b) State Government.
- (c) Both of them.
- (d) None of these. Answer: c

55. Which institution has maximum control over education?

- (a) Family
- (b) State
- (c) Religion
- (d) Economy. Answer: b

56. The future of education in India depends on

- (a) Government.
- (b) Society.
- (c) Family.
- (d) Economy. Answer: a

57. Who gives the system of education in India?

- (a) Family
- (b) Society
- (c) State
- (d) Economy. Answer: c

58. What is the status of political interference in education?

- (a) Justified
- (b) Society
- (c) Both of them
- (d) Economy. Answer: c

59. Political aim of education is

- (a) Democracy.
- (b) Secularism.
- (c) Constitutionalism.
- (d) Cosmopolitanism. Answer: a

60. On whose help are the educational institutions depend maximum?

- (a) Society
- (b) Community
- (c) State
- (d) Family. Answer: c

61. In early Hindu society, widow remarriage was

- (a) Permitted.
- (b) Protected.
- (c) Promoted.
- (d) Prohibited. Answer: a

62. The laws of Muslim marriage are based on

- (a) Quran.

- (b) Muslim law.
  - (c) Indian contract act.
  - (d) Constitution of India. Answer: a
63. Mehar given by husband to the wife immediately after marriage is known as
- (a) Settled Dower.
  - (b) Meharul Misl.
  - (c) Muwajjal Mehar.
  - (d) Dower after dissolution of marriage. Answer: c
64. The preventive Detention Act curtailed the
- (a) Right to Freedom.
  - (b) Right to Equality.
  - (c) Right to Constitutional Remedies.
  - (d) Right to Freedom of Religion. Answer: a
65. Which one of the following Fundamentals Rights has been the subject of maximum litigation and controversy?
- (a) Right to Property.
  - (b) Right to Equality.
  - (c) Right to Freedom of Religion.
  - (d) Right to Freedom. Answer: a
66. Which one of the following features has been wrongly listed as a feature of Right to Equality?
- (a) It ensures equality in the matter of appointment to offices under the State .
  - (b) It abolishes all titles, other than academic and military.
  - (c) It abolishes untouchability.
  - (d) It prohibits special treatment of any section of society including the women and children, etc. Answer: d
67. The Six Freedoms of the Indian Citizens have been enshrined in :
- (a) Article 14 to 18.
  - (b) Article 14 to 35.
  - (c) Article 19.
  - (d) Articles 21 to 26. Answer: c
68. Which one of the following has been wrongly shown as freedom granted under the Right to Freedom?
- (a) Freedom to assemble peacefully without arms.
  - (b) Freedom to profess, practice and propagate any religion.
  - (c) Freedom to reside and settle in any part of the country .
  - (d) Freedom of profession, occupation, trade or business. Answer: b
69. Which of the following Articles contain the right to religious freedom?
- (a) 25-28
  - (b) 29-30
  - (c) 32-35
  - (d) 23-24 Answer: a

70. Which of the following articles guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law for all individuals residing within the territory of India?
- (a) 15
  - (b) 14
  - (c) 17
  - (d) 18 Answer: b
71. Which article of the Constitution abolishes Untouchability?
- (a) Article 18
  - (b) Article 15
  - (c) Article 14
  - (d) Article 17 Answer: d
72. Which of the following is correct with respect to "Right against exploitation"?
- (a) Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour
  - (b) Freedom as to payment of taxes for the promotion of any particular religion
  - (c) Protection of interests of minorities
  - (d) Equality before law Answer: a
73. In which part of the Indian Constitution, the Fundamental rights are provided?
- (a) Part II
  - (b) Part III
  - (c) Part V
  - (d) Part IV Answer: a
74. Secularism means-
- (a) State is against to all religious
  - (b) State accept only one religion
  - (c) State will not give any special concern with any religion
  - (d) None of these Ans : (c)
75. Is India a secularism country?
- (a) yes
  - (b) No
  - (c) Can't say
  - (d) may be Ans : (a)
76. Resolving constitutional disputes is a more complicated process than submitting questions to judges because\_\_\_\_\_.
- (a) judges do not always know the correct answers
  - (b) elected representatives and other actors have historically played a central role in settling major constitutional controversies
  - (c) the Constitution does not give judges the power to decide constitutional cases
  - (d) initiating lawsuits is a time-consuming and cumbersome activity Answer: b
77. In this text constitutionalism is considered a form of\_\_\_\_\_ rather than an activity involving mere

- textual interpretation.
- (a) politics as usual
  - (b) permanent revolution
  - (c) governance
  - (d) philosophy Answer: c
78. Under liberal constitutionalism\_\_\_\_\_.
- (a) it is assumed that
  - (b) The Attitudinal Model; the Strategic Model
  - (c) Political scientists; cynics
  - (d) Presidents; senators Answer: b
79. When constitutions promote\_\_\_\_\_they facilitate private investment, the management of public debt, and the reassurance of vulnerable constituencies.
- (a) compromise
  - (b) national aspirations
  - (c) the empowerment of public officials
  - (d) credible commitments Answer: d
80. Which of the following is not one of the six described approaches to interpreting constitutional provisions?
- (a) Prudentialism
  - (b) Aspirationalism
  - (c) Structuralism
  - (d) Professionalism Answer: d
81. \_\_\_\_\_and\_\_\_\_\_tend to discount the influence of law or sincerely-held constitutional views as explanations for how judges and other constitutional authorities reach decisions. a. The Legal Model; Historical Institutionalism assumption that the Supreme Court has supreme authority to interpret the Constitution.
- (a) textualism
  - (b) originalism
  - (c) aspirationalism
  - (d) departmentalism Answer: d
83. Empirical work within political science challenges the notion that Supreme Court decisions should usually be considered\_\_\_\_\_.
- (a) countermajoritarian
  - (b) legally binding
  - (c) part of a system of checks and balances
  - (d) legitimate Answer: a
84. When citizens and elected officials internalize constitutional values, so that they regard constitutional processes as the only legitimate means for resolving legal and policy disputes, we

say that\_.

- (a) constitutions constrain politics
  - (b) constitutions construct politics
  - (c) constitutions constitute politics
  - (d) written constitutions eventually become unnecessary
- Answer: c

85. Who gave the concept of Total Revolution?

- (a) Jayaprakash Narayan
  - (b) Mahatma Gandhi
  - (c) Karl Marx
  - (d) Lenin
- Answer: A

86. Terrorism can be defined as

- (a) The use of violence, or the threat of it, in service of a broadly political or religious aim
- (b) The use of violence by one state against another
- (c) Indirect justice
- (d) None of the options a. The use of violence, or the threat of it, in service of a broadly political or religious aim

87. Terrorism is wrong because it is an indiscriminate attack on innocent civilians.

- (a) True
- (b) False
- (c) It is more complicated than this simple categorisation.
- (d) True

88. The distinctions between combatant and non-combatant in contemporary wars involving terrorists are

- (a) Easy to establish
  - (b) Useless
  - (c) Often unclear
  - (d) Not worth bothering about
- c. Often unclear

89. Jihad is an example of what type of terrorism?

- (a) Revolutionary
  - (b) State-sponsored
  - (c) Religious
  - (d) Political
- c. Religious

90. Why is terrorism difficult to define?

- (a) Terrorist acts are not always universally regarded as either illegal or immoral
  - (b) Terrorists may be looked upon as martyrs not criminals by certain states
  - (c) The moral status of those involved in terrorist acts changes over time
  - (d) All of the above
- d. All of the above

91. Why do you think contemporary terrorist groups are so concerned with achieving massive publicity for their violent activities?

- (a) Publicity draws attention to the terrorists' motives

- (b) Those in power react negatively to terrorist acts which further publicises the motives of the terrorists themselves
- (c) There are many people around the globe that may sympathise with the terrorists' motives and therefore publicity produces sympathy
- (d) All of the options

92. When was the word "terrorism" was used the first time?

- (a) French Revolution 1794
- (b) Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 1937
- (c) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963
- (d) Iranian Revolution 1979

93. Which of the following is a form of terrorism?

- (a) Hostage taking
- (b) Organized crime
- (c) Extremism
- (d) Trafficking

94. Find the correct option:

- (a) Swadeshi movement had its genesis in the anti-partition movement for Bengal.
  - (b) The government decision for partition was made public in 1903.
  - (c) The official reason of administration differed from the actual reason, that was to check the rising nationalism.
  - (d) The western half was Hindu dominated region and Eastern half was Muslim dominated region.
- i) Only A and B
  - ii) Only B and C
  - iii) Only C and D
  - iv) All of the above

ANSWER: iv) All of the above

95. Swadeshi movement led to :

- (a) Boycott of foreign goods
  - (b) Corps of Volunteers or "samitis"
  - (c) Emphasis on atma shakti or self reliance
  - (d) Programme of Swadeshi or national education
- i) Only A and B
  - ii) Only B and C
  - iii) Only C and D
  - iv) All of the above

ANSWER: iv) All of the above

96. Who was the Viceroy of India during Swadeshi Movement?

- (a) Lord Curzon
- (b) Lord Irwin
- (c) Lord Willingdon
- (d) Lord Lansdowne

97. Who among the following is not the chief architect of Swadeshi Movement?
- Aurobindo Ghosh
  - MK Gandhi
  - Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak
  - Bipin Chandra Pal
- Ans: B
98. Who among the following opened cooperative stores and headed the Swadeshi Wastu Pracharini Sabha during Swadeshi Movement?
- Lala Lajpat Rai
  - Syed Haider Raza
  - Lokmanya Tilak
  - Chidambaram Pillai
- Ans: C
99. Who set up Swadesh Bandhab Samiti to propagate the Swadeshi Movement?
- Surendranath Banerjee
  - Rabindra Nath Tagore
  - G K Gokhale
  - Ashwini Kumar Dutt
- Ans: D
100. Who was the president of Indian National Congress during Swadeshi Movement?
- Dadabhai Naoroji
  - A O Hume
  - M K Gandhi
  - B G Tilak
- Ans: A
101. What was/were the serious consequence of the Swadesh Movement?
- Emergence of Communal politics
  - Split of Indian National Congress
  - Partition of Bengal
  - Both B & C
- Ans: D
102. Which of the following extremist leader murdered Kennedy on April 30, 1908?
- Subramaniam Bharati
  - Khudiram Bose and Prafulla Chaki
  - Hemachandra Kanungo
  - Sachindranath Sanyal
- Ans: B
103. Who promoted Swadeshi Movement in Punjab through the Brahmo-leaning group which began 'The Tribune newspaper'?
- Sunder Lal
  - Lala Lajpat Roy
  - Lala Harkishan Lal
  - Kalisankar Sukul
- Ans: C
104. Who among the founder of the Anushilan Samiti in Calcutta during Swadeshi Movement?
- Promotha Mitter
  - Barindrakumar Ghosh
  - Jatindranath Bannerjee

(d) All of the above Ans: D

105. Who supported the Swadeshi Movement during the Banaras session of the Indian National Congress?

- (a) G K Gokhale
- (b) Abdul Halim Guznavi
- (c) BG Tilak
- (d) Satish Chandra Mukherjee Ans: A

106. Gandhiji founded the Satyagraha Sabhato protest against the:

- (a) Communal Award
- (b) Simon Commission
- (c) Rowlatt Act
- (d) Cripps Mission

Correct Answer: C [Rowlatt Act] Notes:

In February 1919 Gandhiji founded the Satyagraha Sabha to protest against the Rowlatt Act. Members took a pledge to disobey the Act and thus to court arrest. It was characterized by refusal to cooperate with the government, boycott of foreign cloth and schools or individual acts of terrorism were the only forms of political work known to the nationalists

107. Why did Gandhiji organise Satyagrahain 1917 in Kheda district of Gujarat?

- (a) To support the plantation workers
- (b) To protest against high revenue demand
- (c) To support the mill workers to fulfil their demand
- (d) To demand loans for the farmers Answer: b

108. Why was Satyagraha organised in Champaran in 1916?

- (a) To oppose the British laws
- (b) To oppose the plantation system
- (c) To oppose high land revenue
- (d) To protest against the oppression of the mill workers Answer: b

109. Why was the Simon Commission sent to India?

- (a) To look into the Indian constitutional matter and suggest reform
- (b) To choose members of Indian Council
- (c) To settle disputes between the government and the Congress leaders
- (d) To set up a government organisation Answer: a

110. Why was Alluri Sitarama Raju well known?

- (a) He led the militant movement of tribal peasants in Andhra Pradesh.
- (b) He led a peasant movement in Avadh.
- (c) He led a satyagraha movement in Bardoli.
- (d) He set up an organisation for the upliftment of the dalits. Answer: a

111. What does satyagraha mean? Choose one from the following options.

- (a) 'Satyagraha' means use of physical force to inflict pain while fighting.
- (b) 'Satyagraha' does not inflict pain, it is a non-violent method of fighting against oppression.
- (c) 'Satyagraha' means passive resistance and is a weapon of the weak.

(d) 'Satyagraha' was a racist method of mass agitation. Answer: b

112. Satyagraha at which of the following places earned Vallabhbhai Patel the title of Sardar

- (a) Kheda
- (b) Ahmedabad
- (c) Bardoli
- (d) Dandi Answer (c).

113. At which of the following places did Mahatma Gandhi launch a Satyagraha to help the oppressed indigo farmers?

- (a) Kheda
- (b) Bardoli
- (c) Champaran
- (d) Dandi Answer (c).

114. Satyagraha at which of the following places was NOT related to the problems of farmers?

- (a) Ahmedabad
- (b) Kheda
- (c) Bardoli
- (d) Champaran Answer (a).

115. Sarvodaya stands for

- (a) Total revolution
- (b) Non-cooperation
- (c) Upliftment of all
- (d) Non-violence Answer: Option C

118. The Sarvodaya Movement was initiated by

- (a) Mahatma Gandhi
- (b) J P Narayan
- (c) Vinoba Bhave
- (d) Bhagat Singh Answer: Option C

119- What democracies ensure regarding the decision making?

- (a) Decisions that are taken by the head of the country
- (b) The process of transparency
- (c) Decisions are taken by the council of ministers
- (d) Restricted popular participation in the decision making

Ans- The correct answer is- The process of transparency

120- If a government is providing its citizens a right and means to examine the process of decision, then it is:

- (a) A responsible government
- (b) An accountable government
- (c) A stable government
- (d) A transparent government

Ans- The correct answer is An accountable government.

121- Which of the following statements is not true about democracy?

- (a) It brings improvement in the quality of decision making
- (b) It allows room to correct mistakes
- (c) Decision making is much faster and quicker
- (d) It worries about the majorities and public opinion

Ans- The correct answer is- Decision Making is much faster and quicker.

122- On which of the following Economic growth depends?

- (a) Territory or area of the country
- (b) Global Scenario
- (c) Size of the country's population
- (d) Cooperation among the various nations

Ans- The correct answer is- Cooperation among various nations.

123- Which country tops in the inequality of income?

- (a) South Africa
- (b) Russia
- (c) UK
- (d) Hungary

Ans- The correct answer is South Africa.

124. The basic outcome of democracy is:

- (a) Military Outcome
- (b) Political, Social and Economic Outcome
- (c) Elimination of Poverty
- (d) Restricted and limited welfare policies

Ans- The correct answer is- Political, Social and Economic Outcomes.

125- A democratic government is:

- (a) A responsive government
- (b) An accountable government
- (c) A legitimate government
- (d) All of the above

Ans- The correct answer is- All of the above.

126- When democracy was introduced in India?

- (a) 1950
- (b) 1952
- (c) 1949
- (d) 1947

Ans- The correct answer is – 1950

127- If in a democracy, a citizen has a right and means to examine the process the decision making, it is known as

- (a) Transparency
- (b) Dictatorship
- (c) Equality

(d) Legitimacy

Ans- The correct answer is- Transparency

128- A democratic government is much better than non-democratic because:

(a) Overwhelming support for the idea all over the world

(b) Legitimate form of government

(c) It ensures faster growth

(d) Leads to just distribution of goods and services

Ans- The correct answer is- it is a legitimate form of government.

129. The word 'Democracy' comes from the Greek word –

(a) Democracia

(b) Demokratia

(c) Demos

(d) Kratia

Answer: (b) Demokratia

130. The head of the government in Nepal is the:

(a) President

(b) Prime Minister

(c) King

(d) Vice President Answer: (a) President

131. In which case was the real power with external powers and not with the locally elected representatives?

(a) India in Sri Lanka

(b) US in Iraq

(c) USSR in Communist Poland

(d) Both (b) and (c) Answer: (d) Both (b) and (c)

132. How many members are elected to the National People's Congress from all over China?

(a) 3050

(b) 3000

(c) 4000

(d) 2000 Answer: (b) 3000

133. Which party always won elections in Mexico since its independence in 1930 until 2000?

(a) Revolutionary Party

(b) Mexican Revolutionary Party

(c) Institutional Revolutionary Party

(d) Institutional Party

Answer: (c) Institutional Revolutionary Party

134. When did Zimbabwe attain independence and from whom?

(a) 1970, from Black minority rule

(b) 1880, from White minority rule

(c) 1980, from Americans

(d) 1980, from White minority rule

Answer: (d) 1980, from White minority rule

135. which of these features is/are necessary to provide the basic rights to the citizens?

- (a) Citizens should be free to think
  - (b) should be free to form associations
  - (c) Should be free to raise protest
  - (d) All the above
- Answer: (d) All the above

136. What is Constitutional Law?

- (a) Provisions given in the Constitution
- (b) Law to make Constitution
- (c) Law to set up Constituent Assembly
- (d) none of the above

Answer: (a) Provisions given in the Constitution

137. Some of the drawbacks of democracy is

- (a) Instability and delays
  - (b) corruption and hypocrisy
  - (c) Politicians fighting among themselves
  - (d) all the above
- Answer: (d) all the above

138. In which period did China face one of the worst famines that have occurred in the world?

- (a) 1932-36
- (b) 1958-61
- (c) 2001-2002
- (d) 2004-2007

Answer: (b) 1958-61

139. Democracy improves the quality of decision-making because

- (a) Decisions are taken by educated people
- (b) Decisions are taken by consultation and discussion
- (c) Decisions are taken over a long period of time
- (d) All decisions are approved by judiciary

Answer: (b) Decisions are taken by consultation and discussion

140. The most common form that democracy takes in our time is that of

- (a) Limited democracy
- (b) representative democracy
- (c) Maximum democracy
- (d) none of the above

Answer: (b) representative democracy

141. Which of these is an example of perfect democracy?

- (a) USA
- (b) UK
- (c) India
- (d) None of the above Answer: (d) None of the above

142. Arthasastra is a work of

- (a) Kamandaka
- (b) Kautilya
- (c) Chandra Gupta Maurya
- (d) None of these Answer: B

143. Sutrani (Maxims) and Rajaniti Shastram (Guide to Politics) are the work of

- (a) Kamandaka
- (b) Kautilya
- (c) Chandra Gupta Maurya
- (d) None of these Answer: B

144. According to Kautilya \_\_\_\_\_ is the backbone of the state

- (a) Kosha
- (b) Danda
- (c) Surhit
- (d) Swamin Answer: A

145. According to Kautilya the state has \_\_\_\_\_ major elements or constituents

- (a) Seven
- (b) Six
- (c) Eight
- (d) Nine Answer: A

146. Which of the following statements are false in relation to Kautilya's Artha-sastra?

- (a) He advocated the saptanga theory
- (b) He advocated the importance of all four Purusarthas
- (c) Arthasastra is known to be the first comprehensive manual on statecraft
- (d) He accepted four sciences Answer: B

147. Mahabharat highlights several qualities of a King. Which one of the following has been wrongly listed?

- (a) He should enormous energy through which he can promote efficiency.
- (b) He should trust his ministers and personally transact and dispose of all important cases.
- (c) He should subdue his senses and enjoy control over his soul.
- (d) None of the above. Answer: d

148. According to Kautilya, Amatya was

- (a) the Finance Minister of the State
- (b) the Prime Minister of the State
- (c) the Defence Minister of the State
- (d) None of the above Answer: d

149. Who seized Draupadi by her hair and dragged her into the court?
- (a) Duhshasana
  - (b) Duryodhana
  - (c) Drushtadyumna
  - (d) Vidura Answer: A
150. Where was Gandhi's first satyagraha in India ?
- (a) Champaran
  - (b) Dandi
  - (c) Delhi
  - (d) Agra Answer: a
151. Universal religion is associated with
- (a) Gandhi
  - (b) Swami Vivekananda
  - (c) Tagore
  - (d) Gandhi Answer: b
152. The watchword of universal religion is
- (a) Tolerance
  - (b) Acceptance
  - (c) Ritual
  - (d) custom Answer: b
153. The method of self enquiry is related with
- (a) Sree Narayanaguru
  - (b) Vagbadanatha
  - (c) Ramana Maharshi
  - (d) Krishnamurthi Answer: c
154. 'Freedom From the Known' is written by
- (a) Gandhi
  - (b) J. Krishnamurthi
  - (c) S. Radhakrishnan
  - (d) Aurobindo Answer: b
155. 'One caste, One religion and One god for man' - is a dictum of
- (a) Aurobindo
  - (b) Gandhi
  - (c) Sree Narayanaguru
  - (d) Ramana Maharshi Answer: c
156. Involution and evolution is related with
- (a) Aurobindo
  - (b) S. Radhakrishnan
  - (c) Tagore
  - (d) Ramana Maharshi Answer: a

157. Economic boycott is implied in the vow of\_?

- (a) Videshi
- (b) Desha tyaga
- (c) Non-swadeshi
- (d) Swadeshi

Answer: d

158. \_\_\_\_\_ is an active, strong and extreme form of satyagraha?

- (a) Satagraha
- (b) Fasting and Prayer
- (c) Non-co-operation
- (d) Civil-disobedience

Answer: d

159. Great hero from Mahabharata who lived a life such a way today he is another name for generosity and loyalty today –

- (a) Nakul
- (b) Karna
- (c) Arjun
- (d) Bhishma

Answer: B

160. is a term which denotes a mode of production in which capitalism in its various forms is the principal means of production.

- (a) Colonialism
- (b) Capitalism
- (c) Feudalism
- (d) Liberalism

Answer: a

161. The gunpowder had been actually invented by the.....

- (a) Indians
- (b) Chinese
- (c) Arabs
- (d) None of the above

Answer: b

162. Cape of Good Hope was discovered by.....

- (a) Columbus
- (b) Vespucci
- (c) Diaz
- (d) King John

Answer: c

163. The work The Wretches of the Earth was written by.....

- (a) Andrew Gunder Frank
- (b) Frantz Fanon
- (c) Christopher Hill
- (d) Werner Zombart

Answer: b

164. On Capitalist Underdevelopment was written by.....

- (a) Andrew Gunder Frank
  - (b) Max Webber
  - (c) Christopher Hill
  - (d) Frantz Fanon
- Answer: a

165. Studies in the Development of Capitalism was written by.....

- (a) Andrew Gunder Frank
  - (b) Maurice Dobb
  - (c) Rodney Hilton
  - (d) Frantz Fanon
- Answer: b

166. According to Marx..... determine the character of distinct types of society

- (a) Mode of production
  - (b) Wealth
  - (c) Developments
  - (d) None of the above
- Answer: a

167 is not a new mode of production but a stage in the development of Capitalism

- (a) Exploitation
  - (b) Monopoly
  - (c) Imperialism
  - (d) Colonialism
- Answer: a

168 is a body of knowledge relating to several aspects of the culture of Eastern Countries?

- (a) Colonialism
  - (b) Orientalism
  - (c) Imperialism
  - (d) Capitalism
- Answer: b

169 regions benefited the most from the Capitalist World Economy

- (a) Core
  - (b) Periphery
  - (c) Semi-periphery
  - (d) None of the above
- Answer: a

170. There is a threefold task for every scholar who study Orientalism-

- (a) True
  - (b) False
- Answer: a

171. It is the Capitalism builds and distributes more wealth by building on the worth and potential of each in an environment of trust and co-operation.

- (a) True
  - (b) False
- Answer: a

172. Capitalist society is a class less society.

- (a) True
- (b) False Answer: b

173. A governmental or organizational system where decision makers are selected through bureaucratic processes is called Communism.

- (a) True
- (b) False Answer: a

174. What can we not do in government schools?

- (a) Sing national anthem
- (b) Sing Rashtriya Geet
- (c) Celebrate any religious festival
- (d) None of these

Answer: (c) Celebrate any religious festival

175. What refers to the State's effort to influence a particular matter in accordance with the principles of the constitution?

- (a) Intervene
- (b) Coercion
- (c) Meditation
- (d) None of these Answer: (a) Intervene

176. Which is the sect of Jainism?

- (a) Arya Samaj
- (b) Khalsa
- (c) Digamber
- (d) Sanatan Dharm

Answer: (c) Digamber

177. What is celebrated on 2nd October of every year?

- (a) Christmas Day
- (b) Children's Day
- (c) Gandhi Jayanti
- (d) Diwali

Answer: (c) Gandhi Jayanti

178. With reference to Constitutionalism which of the following statements is most appropriate?

- (a) It is an ideology which promotes supremacy of a written Constitution
- (b) It means Constitution is necessary in a democratic country
- (c) It denotes the principle that the government derives its authority from a body of fundamental law and is limited by it
- (d) It means that Constitution must provide certain inalienable rights to the citizens

Answer: c

179. Which of the following functions were performed by the Constituent Assembly?

1. It passed certain statutes as a legislative assembly
2. It ratified India's membership of the Commonwealth
3. It abolished the office of the Secretary of State of the President of India

Select the correct answer using the code given below:

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 1 and 2 only
  - (c) 2 and 3 only
  - (d) 1, 2 and 3
- Answer: b

180. With reference to Dickey's Rule of Law" which of the following elements has/have been imbibed in the Constitution India?

1. A absence of Arbitrary Power
2. Equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law
3. The Constitution is the result of the rights of an individual

Select the correct answer using the code given below

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 2 only
  - (c) 1 and 2 only
  - (d) 1, 2 and 3
- Answer: c

181. The beginning of Parliamentary System in India can be traced back to which of the following Acts?

- (a) Charter Act of 1853
  - (b) Government of India Act, 1858
  - (c) Government of India Act, 1919
  - (d) Government of India Act, 1935
- Answer: a

182. Which of the following is not the reason for the bulky Indian Constitution?

- (a) Country's diversity
- (b) Elaborate provisions for center and state
- (c) Cater the needs of huge population of the country
- (d) To enable smooth functioning of Infant democracy of India at the time of independence

Answer: c

183. The Second Schedule contain the provisions related to which of the following?

1. The President
2. The Speaker of the legislative Assembly in the States
3. The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India
4. The Chairman Union Public Service Commission

Select the correct answer using the code given below

- (a) 1 and 3 only
  - (b) 2 and 4 only
  - (c) 1, 2 and 3 only
  - (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4
- Answer: c

184. Which of the following provisions of the Constitution of India have a bearing on Equality?

1. Directive Principles of Policy
2. Fundamental Rights
3. Preamble

Select the correct answer using the code given below

- (a) 1 and 2 only
  - (b) 1, 2 and 4 only
  - (c) 1, 3 and 4 only
  - (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4
- Answer: b

185. Which of the following is a federal feature of the government?

- (a) Written constitution
  - (b) All India Services
  - (c) Integrated Judiciary
  - (d) Single Citizenship
- Answer: a

186. All the Lands; minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters or the continental shelf of India vests in

- (a) Respective States along the coasts
  - (b) Land is vested with the union, mineral resources come under the state
  - (c) Land comes under the state and mineral resources are vested in the Union.
  - (d) All of them are vested in the Union
- Answer: d

187. With reference to the linguistic reorganization of States, consider the following statements:

1. Dhar Commission recommended the reorganization of the states mainly on linguistic basis.
2. JVP Committee accepted language as the basis for reorganization of the states. Fazal Ali Commission rejected one language one state theory,

Which of the statements given above is / are correct?

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 3 only
  - (c) 2 and 3 only
  - (d) 1, 2 and 3
- Answer: b

188. It divided the central subjects into reserved and transferred. Select the correct answer using the code given below.

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 2 only
  - (c) Both 1 and 2
  - (d) Neither 1 nor 2
- Answer: a

189. With reference to Caretaker Government, which of the following statements is / are correct?

1. There is no provision in the Constitution of India for a Caretaker Government.
2. President may ask the Council of Ministers to continue as Caretaker Government till alternative arrangements are made. Select the correct answer using the code given below.

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 2 only
  - (c) Both 1 and 2
  - (d) Neither 1 nor 2
- Answer: c

190. Which of the following exercised the most profound influence in framing the Indian Constitution?

- (a) British Constitution
  - (b) U.S. Constitution
  - (c) Irish Constitution
  - (d) The Government of India Act, 1953
- Answer: d

191. Which of the following marked the beginning of bicameralism. System in India?

- (a) Government of India Act, 1858
  - (b) Government of India Act, 1935
  - (c) Morley Minto Reforms
  - (d) Montagu Chelmsford Reforms
- Answer: d

192. States and Union territories and their territorial spread are dealt in which of the following Schedule of Indian Constitution?

- (a) First Schedule
  - (b) Second Schedule
  - (c) Fourth Schedule
  - (d) Fifth Schedule
- Answer: a

193. With reference to Indian Constitution consider the following statements:

1. Indian constitution has no provision for ban on cow slaughter
2. Free legal aid to the poor is a justiciable right under Indian constitution

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 2 only
  - (c) Both 1 and 2
  - (d) Neither 1 nor 2
- Answer: d

194. Which of the following restricts the supremacy of the Indian Parliament?

1. Written Nature of Constitution
  2. Federal System of Government
  3. System of Judicial Review
  4. Directive principle of state policy
  5. Fundamental rights
- Select the correct answer using the code given below

- (a) 1 only
  - (b) 1 and 3 only
  - (c) 1, 2, 3 and 5 only
- Answer: c

195. With regard to Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Indian Constitution consider the following statements:

- (a) Right against discrimination on ground of religion race, caste sex or place of birth
- (b) Equality before law and equal protection of law
- (c) Right to elementary education
- (d) Freedom of speech and expression
- (e) Freedom to manage religious affairs

Which of the fundamental rights given above are available to citizens of India and foreigners?

Answer: b

196. With reference to Government of India Act, 1935 consider the following statements:

1. It provided for the establishment of an All-India Federation
2. It preserve for the establishment of Reserve Bank of India
3. It abolished Dyarchy in the provinces but provided for the adoption of Dyarchy at the Centre
4. It provided for the establishment of a Federal court

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

- (a) 1 and 2 only
  - (b) 2, 3 and 4 only
  - (c) 1, 2 and 4 only
  - (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4 only
- Answer: d

197. The First Law Commission was established under which of the following?

- (a) Charter act of 1833
  - (b) Government of India Act, 1858
  - (c) India council Act 1861
  - (d) Charter Act of 1853
- Answer: a

198. Which of the above is/are classified under the Right to Freedom of Religion?

1. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion
2. Freedom of conscience and free profession of religion.
3. Protection of culture of minorities.
4. Freedom to manage religious institution and affairs. Select the correct answer using the code given below.

- (a) 1 and 2 only
  - (b) 1, 2 and 4 only
  - (c) 2 and 4 only
  - (d) 2, 3 and 4 only
- Answer: c

199. In which session did D. Naoroji declare Swaraj or Self- government to be the goal of Congress?

- (a) Calcutta Session 1907
- (b) Lahore Session 1929
- (c) Karachi session 1931
- (d) Calcutta Session 1906

ANSWER: D) Calcutta Session 1906

200. Swadeshi movement led to :

- a. Boycott of foreign goods
  - b. Corps of Volunteers or "samitis"
  - c. Emphasis on atma shakti or self reliance
  - d. Programme of Swadeshi or national education
- i) Only A and B
  - ii) Only B and C
  - iii) Only C and D

iv) All of the above

ANSWER: iv) All of the above

201. Find the correct option:

- (a) Swadeshi movement had its genesis in the anti-partition movement for Bengal.
  - (b) The government decision for partition was made public in 1903.
  - (c) The official reason of administration differed from the actual reason, that was to check the rising nationalism.
  - (d) The western half was Hindu dominated region and Eastern half was Muslim dominated region.
- i) Only A and B
  - ii) Only B and C
  - iii) Only C and D
  - iv) All of the above

ANSWER: iv) All of the above

202. Which of the following movements immediately followed the partition of Bengal?

- a. Non-cooperation Movement
  - b. Swadeshi Movement
  - c. Civil Disobedience Movement
  - d. Ghadar Movement
- Answer (b).

203. Swadeshi Movement started in India during :

- a. The Champaran Satyagrah of Gandhi
  - b. Anti-Bengal Partition agitation
  - c. The protest against Rowlatt Act
  - d. The first non-co-operation movement of 1919-22
- Answer (b).

204. Which of the following was NOT the outcome of Jallianwala Bagh massacre?

- a. Renunciation of the British titles and positions by many Indians
  - b. Change in Gandhiji's attitude towards the British Government
  - c. Temporary peace in Punjab
  - d. Suspension of Gen. Dyer from service
- Answer (c).

205. Religious and Social Philosophy has been dealt by Kant in

- (A) Critiques of judgement
  - (B) Critique of pure reason
  - (C) Religion within the limits of reason
  - (D) Critique of practical reason
- Answer: (C)

206. Which theory covers the interest of maximum number of people in the society?

- (A) Perfectionism
  - (B) Utilitarianism
  - (C) Rationalism
- (a) the understanding reached between the Congress and the Muslim league
  - (b) the concessions given to Muslims by the British
  - (c) accession of Kemal Pasha to the throne of Turkey

(d) none of the above reasons

Answer (c)

207. Duty for the sake of duty is included in

- (a) Categorical Dialectic
- (b) Categorical Imperative
- (c) Categorical Logic
- (d) Categorical Discourse

Answer: (B)

208. As per whose ethics Rational law is the Universal Law that holds for all and acceptable to all?

- (a) Mill
- (b) Sidgewick
- (c) Kant
- (d) Bentham

Answer: (C)

209. 'Morality is led beyond itself into a higher form of goodness, it ends in what we may call religion' is stated by

- (a) McTaggart
- (b) Schleinmacher
- (c) Mathew Arnold
- (d) F.H. Bradley

Answer: (D)

210. Which one of the following pairs is incorrectly matched?

- (a) Similar moral principles do not exist in all societies: Cultural Absolutism
- (b) There is an extreme variation in customs, taboos and so on from culture to culture: Cultural relativism
- (c) Freedom is compatible with determinism: Hard determinism
- (d) There is no causality at all: Soft determinism

Answer: (B)

211. Honesty is not a good policy does not logically imply which one of the following?

- (a) Either honesty is not a good policy or dishonest persons will be punished.
- (b) It is false that honesty is a good policy but dishonest persons are not punished.
- (c) If honesty is a good policy then dishonest persons will be punished.
- (d) Honesty is a good policy if and only if dishonest persons are punished.

Answer: (B)

212. Which theory of punishment approves capital punishment?

- (a) Reformative
- (b) Retributive
- (c) Both Reformative and Retributive
- (d) Preventive

Answer: (B)

213. If A proposition is true, E, I and Opropositions are

- (a) False, true & false
- (b) False, false & false
- (c) True, false & false
- (d) True, true & false

Answer: (A)

214. The mood of a syllogism depends on

- (a) Quality of premises
- (b) Quantity of premises
- (c) Both quality and quantity of premises
- (d) Quality and quantity of premises andthe conclusion

Answer: (D)

215. Determining the validity or invalidity ofarguments is the special province of

- (a) Inductive Logic
- (b) Deductive Logic
- (c) Symbol Logic
- (d) Traditional Logic

Answer: (B)

216. Read the following syllogism and pointout the fallacy in it: " All graduates are voters John is not a graduate John is not a voter."

- (a) The fallacy of Four Terms.
- (b) The fallacy of undistributed middle.
- (c) Illicit Major
- (d) Illicit Minor

Answer: (C)

217. In categorical syllogism, the middleterm is the term that occurs in

- (a) Major premise only
- (b) Minor premise only
- (c) Both major and minor premises
- (d) Conclusion only

Answer: (C)

218. Match List – I with List – II and select the correct answer by using the code givenbelow:

List – I

List – II

(Philosopher)

(Doctrine)

- |                    |                              |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| a. J.L. Austin     | i. Language Games            |
| b. L. Wittgenstein | ii. Speech Acts              |
| c. W.V. Quine      | iii. Theory ofIntentionality |
| d. John Searle     | iv. Two dogmas ofEmpiricism  |

Codes:

a b c d

(a) iv iii ii i

(b) iii iv i ii

(c) ii i iv iii

(d) iii iv ii i

Answer: (C)

219. Which one of the following does not come under the category of Vaishnavism?

(a) Ramanuja

(b) Samkara

(c) Madhva

(d) Vallabha

Answer: (B)

220. Who, among the following, advocates Pushti?

(a) Ramanuja

(b) Madhva

(c) Vallabha

(d) Samkara

Answer: (C)

221. Which one of the following makes provision for eternal hell?

(a) Samkara

(b) Madhva

(c) Nimbarka

(d) Vallabha

Answer: (B)

222. Which one of the following is the advocate of five differences (Panchabheda)?

(a) Samkara

(b) Ramanuja

(c) Madhva

(d) Vallabha

Answer: (C)

223. When anyone objected to non-violence as the creed of the coward, Gandhi

(a) Reproached the person

(b) Simply did not react

(c) remained mute

(d) Just brushed out the person

Answer: (A)

224. The spirit of Gandhian concept of 'Svadeshi' implies

(a) Only using that which is produced by oneself

- (b) Absolutely denying foreign goods
  - (c) Restricting to use services of immediate surroundings
  - (d) Not going beyond native production
- Answer: (C)

225. The principle of bread labour for Gandhi essentially consist on

- (a) Mental work
- (b) Physical work
- (c) Social work
- (d) All the above

Answer: (B)

226. The Gandhian economic programmes were based on

- (a) Theoretical principles of economic grasping
- (b) By producing all wants of the people
- (c) The ideal of self-sufficiency
- (d) Sharing all economic productions

Answer: (C)

227. Who says that 'Upanishad' means 'secret instructions'?

- (a) Paul Dason
- (b) Keith
- (c) Radhakrishnan
- (d) Shankar

Answer: (A)

229. The movements of stars and planets according to Vedic literature is guided by

- (a) The Will of God
- (b) The Will of the Devatas
- (c) \_\_\_\_\_ R.ta
- (d) Yajña

Answer: (C)

230. 'Ātmā is\_\_dehāparimāa 'this view is upheld by

- (a) Baudha
- (b) Cārvāka
- (c) Both Bauddha & Cārvāka
- (d) Jaina

Answer: (D)

231. Select the right order of five Skandhas according to Buddhism:

- (a) Roop, Saskār, Vijān, Samanya and Vednā
- (b) Roop, Samj ā, Vednā, Saskārand Vijān
- (c) Roop, Vednā, Samj ā, Saskārand Vijān

(d) Roop, Vijān, Samj ā, Saskārand Vednā

Answer: (C)

232. Jain Metaphysics is known as

(a) Idealistic Pluralism

(b) Realistic Pluralism

(c) Idealistic Monism

(d) Realistic Monism

Answer: (B)

233. According to Mimamsakas the following are included among the Śrutivākyas:

(a) Vidhi, Ni edha, Tarkavākya

(b) Vidhi, Tarkavākya, Arthavāda

(c) Vidhi, Ni edha, Arthavāda

(d) Tarkavākya, Arthavāda, Ni edha

Answer: (C)

234. Who among the following divided Veda into four?

(a) Ka

(b) Vyāsa

(c) Manu

(d) None of the above

Answer: (D)

235. According to Jaina Philosophy, which one of the following is not the characteristic of Reality?

(a) Origination

(b) Decay

(c) Permanence

(d) Impermanence

Answer: (D)

236. Kumaril accepts soul as

(a) Only partially un-conscious

(b) Only partially conscious

(c) Partially conscious and partially unconscious both

(d) None of these

Answer: (A)

237. The theory of causation as proposed by Sankaradwaita is corroborated by

(a) Experience

(b) Logic

(c) Scriptures

(d) All the above

Answer: (B)

238. The theory that the effect is only the apparent result of the cause is known as

- (a) Satkaryavada
- (b) Asatkaryavada
- (c) Parin.amavada
- (d) Vivartavada

Answer: (D)

239. Which one of the following is the most important quality of a good teacher ?

- (a) Punctuality and sincerity
- (b) Content mastery
- (c) Content mastery and reactive
- (d) Content mastery and sociable

Answer: (C)

240. The primary responsibility for the teacher's adjustment lies with

- (a) The children
- (b) The principal
- (c) The teacher himself
- (d) The community

Answer: (B)

241. Concept means

- (a) A mental image
- (b) A reality
- (c) An idea expressed in language form
- (d) All the above

Answer: (C)

242. The relation of Percept to Concept is

- (a) Positive
- (b) Negative
- (c) Reflective
- (d) Absolute

Answer: (C)

243. In the passage, the earth is taken as

- (a) The Globe
- (b) The Human Habitat
- (c) A Celestial Body
- (d) A Planet

Answer: (C)

244. Percept means

- (a) Direct observation through the senses

- (b) A conceived idea
- (c) Ends of a spectrum
- (d) An abstract image

Answer: (B)

245. Action research means

- (a) A longitudinal research
- (b) An applied research
- (c) A research initiated to solve an immediate problem
- (d) A research with socioeconomic objective

Answer: (C)

246. Which of the following is an example of circular argument?

- (a) God created man in his image and man created God in his own image.
- (b) God is the source of a scripture and the scripture is the source of our knowledge of God.
- (c) Some of the Indians are great because India is great.
- (d) Rama is great because he is Rama.

Answer: (B)

247. Lakshmana is a morally good person because

- (a) he is religious
- (b) he is educated
- (c) he is rich
- (d) he is rational

Answer: (D)

248. Two statements I and II given below are followed by two conclusions (a) and (b). Supposing the statements are true, which of the following conclusions can logically follow?

- I. Some religious people are morally good.
  - II. Some religious people are rational. Conclusions:
    - (a) Rationally religious people are good morally.
    - (b) Non-rational religious persons are not morally good.
- (a) Only (a) follows.
  - (b) Only (b) follows.
  - (c) Both (a) and (b) follow.
  - (d) Neither (a) nor (b) follows.

Answer: (C)

249. Certainty is

- (a) an objective fact
- (b) emotionally satisfying
- (c) logical
- (d) ontological

Answer: (B)

250. According to B.R. Ambedkar the ideal religion should:

- i be consistent with science
  - ii rationalize rituals and superstitious
  - iii support liberty, equality and fraternity
  - iv not glorify poverty
  - v be based on Buddhist canons
  - vi have sacred morality as its core concept
- Choose from the codes given below:

- (a) i, ii and iii
- (b) iii, iv and vi
- (c) iii, iv and v
- (d) i, iii and iv

Answer: (D)

251. One of the permanent legacies of Platonism to Aristotle is

- (a) The conviction that reality exists by itself.
- (b) The conviction that reality is parasitic on God.
- (c) The conviction that reality is a myth.
- (d) The conviction that reality lies in form.

Answer: (D)

252. Both Plato and Aristotle upheld that the true explanation of things is to be sought

- (a) right in the beginning
- (b) Not in the beginning but in the end
- (c) Not in the end but in the beginning
- (d) Neither in the beginning nor in the end

Answer: (B)

253. According to St. Thomas Aquinas the existence of God can be proved in

- (a) Three ways
- (b) Five ways
- (c) Seven ways
- (d) Nine ways

Answer: (Wrong question)

254. The chief concern of Aristotle is

- (a) To proposed transcendental theories of knowledge.
- (b) To prove the existence of God.
- (c) To prove the reality of the external world.
- (d) To protect the knowledge of the plural and multifarious world we live in.

Answer: (D)

255. The relation between self and the body

- (a) Samavāya
- (b) Samyoga
- (c) Svarūpa
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

256. Who holds the theory of Saptaprajñāvāda?

- (a) Yoga Philosophy
- (b) Vedānta Philosophy
- (c) Sāṃkhya Philosophy
- (d) Vaiśeṣika Philosophy

Answer: (A)

257. Which one is the correct match? Answer by using the given code:

- |                 |                           |
|-----------------|---------------------------|
| a. Praśastapāda | i. Tattvopaplabsimha      |
| b. Nāgārjuna    | ii. Nyāya Kusumāñjali     |
| c. Vācaspati    | iii. Tattvakaumidi        |
| d. Udayana      | iv. Padārthadharmasagraha |

Codes:

a b c d

- (a) i ii iii iv
- (b) iv i iii ii
- (c) ii i iii iv
- (d) iii ii i iv

Answer: (B)

258. Select the correct option:

- (a) Kamalsila is the predecessor of Dharmakīrti and Jayanta Bhatta
- (b) Rāṅga Rāmanujācārya is the contemporary of Gauṇapādācārya and Madhvācārya
- (c) Saṃkarācārya is the predecessor of Gauṇapādācārya and Madhvācārya
- (d) Gauṇapādācārya is the predecessor of Saṃkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya

Answer: (D)

259. In the context of Sāṃkhya Philosophy consider the following:

Assertion (A): Purusa is ultimate reality.

Reason (R): Purusa is the substratum of all the pleasures and pains.

Options:

- (a) (A) is true and (R) is false and (R) does not provide correct explanation of (A).
- (b) (A) is false and (R) is true and (R) provides correct explanation of (A).
- (c) Both (A) and (R) are false and (R) provides correct explanation of (A).
- (d) All the above mentioned options are incorrect.

Answer: (A)

260. Which one among the following is not a means of Śaktigraha?

- (a) Āptavākya
- (b) Vrddhavyavahāra
- (c) Tarka
- (d) Vyākaraṇa

Answer: (C)

261. Followings are the three levels of Reality according to Advaita Vedanta:

- (a) Pārmārthika, Prātibhāsika, Vyāvahārika
- (b) Sāmv tika, Samvyāvaharika, Pārmārthika
- (c) Pārmarthika, Samprātibhāsika, Samvyāvaharika
- (d) Sāmvrttika, Loka-samvrtti, A-loka-samvrtti

Answer: (A)

262. Match correctly and answer with the help of the code given:

Idea Thinker

- |                |                |
|----------------|----------------|
| a. Shunyavāda  | i. Maddhva     |
| b. Advaitavāda | ii. Shankara   |
| c. Ajativāda   | iii. Gaudapāda |
| d. Dvaitavāda  | iv. Nagarjunā  |

i ii iii iv

- (a) a c b d
- (b) d b c a
- (c) a b c d
- (d) d c b a

Answer: (B)

263. The path of Rāja-yoga in modern period was propounded by

- (a) Swami Ram Tīrth
- (b) Mahātmā Gandhi
- (c) S. Rādhākṛishnan
- (d) Swami Vivekānand

Answer: (D)

264. The book My Experiments with Truth is written by

- (a) Jiddu Krishnamurty
- (b) Swami Yoganand
- (c) Shri Raman Maharshi
- (d) Mahātmā Gandhi

Answer: (D)

265. Which one of the following pairs is incorrectly matched?

- (a) Dr. M. Iqbal – Integral Intuition
- (b) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar - Removal of Casteism
- (c) Sri. K.C. Bhattacharya – The Subject as Freedom
- (d) Sri. R. Tagore - Jivana- Devatā

Answer: (A)

266. According to Sri. Aurobindo, the ascent from mind to supermind takes place through the fol-

Following order of steps:

- (a) Illumined mind, over mind, Intuition
- (b) Illumined mind, higher mind, Intuition, over mind
- (c) Higher mind, Illumined mind, Intuition, over mind
- (d) Intuition, over mind, Illumined mind

Answer: (C)

267. Who amongst the following thinkers gave prominent emphasis on the concept of 'Intellect and Intuition'?

- (a) Dr. K.C. Bhattacharya
- (b) Dr. S. Rādhākṛishnan
- (c) Dr. M. Iqbal
- (d) Dr. M.N. Roy

Answer: (B)

268. Which one of the following statements illustrates the theory of Akhyātivāda?

- (a) Error emerges due to amalgamation of perception and memory.
- (b) Error emerges due to incorrect perception.
- (c) Error emerges due to misapprehension of the object.
- (d) Error emerges due to a defect in sense-organ.

Answer: (A)

269. For Descartes, the idea of soul

- (a) Is not related to reason
- (b) is identical with reason
- (c) Contradicts reason
- (d) Does not contradict reason

Answer: (A)

270. 'Okham's razor' is basically a method of:

- (a) Deduction
- (b) Explanation
- (c) Elaboration
- (d) Elimination

Answer: (D)

271. Who upholds that 'beings' are the objects of our common experience?

- (a) Heidegger
- (b) Frege
- (c) Kant
- (d) Husserl

Answer: (A)

272. Match the List – I with List – II and select the correct answer from the codes given below:

List – I

List – II

- |                            |              |
|----------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Clear and Distinct idea | i. Leibnitz  |
| 2. Pre-established harmony | ii. Kant     |
| 3. Solipsism               | iii.         |
| Descartes                  |              |
| 4. Phenomenon and noumenon | iv. Berkeley |

Codes:

1 2 3 4

- (a) iii ii i iv
- (b) iii i iv ii
- (c) i iii ii iv
- (d) iv ii iii i

Answer: (B)

273. Husserl in his later works

- (a) Abandoned naturalism in favour of transcendental idealism
- (b) Abandoned transcendental idealism in favour of naturalism
- (c) Continued to uphold both naturalism and transcendental idealism
- (d) abandoned both naturalism and transcendental idealism

Answer: (A)

274. Who has advocated the idea of 'Pañchabheda' in Indian thought?

- (a) Madhavacharya
- (b) Ramanujacharya
- (c) Shankaracharya
- (d) Nimbarkacharya

Answer: (A)

275. According to Plato the business of philosophy is to fit the soul

- (a) To stay permanently in the material world
- (b) To return to the limitations of the mortal frame
- (c) To stay permanently with God
- (d) To stay permanently in the world of ideas

Answer: (D)

276. According to Spinoza

- a. Substance is always the subject
- b. Substance exists in itself and concerned by itself
- c. Substance is material
- d. Substance is the unknown foundation of qualities

Answer: (Wrong question)

277. According to Leibnitz, city of God is

- (a) Non-existent
- (b) A moral world distinct from natural world
- (c) A moral world in the natural world
- (d) A natural world

Answer: (C)

278. According to Kant belief in God is:

- (a) Accidental to ethics
- (b) Totally irrelevant to ethics
- (c) Contingent to ethics
- (d) A presupposition of ethics

Answer: (D)

279. What does Shankara's Satkaryavada known as?

- (a) Vijnan-Vivartvada
- (b) Brahma-Vivartvada
- (c) Prakriti-Parinamvada
- (d) Brahma-Parinamvada

Answer: (B)

280. 'Free-will' in ethics means

- (a) The individual is free to do anything
- (b) The individual is not free to do anything
- (c) The individual is free to act keeping in view of some norms
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

281. Who highlighted the problem of personal identity first in modern western philosophy?

- (a) Strawson
- (b) Locke
- (c) Kripke
- (d) Descartes

Answer: (B)

282. Which one of the following systems of Indian Philosophy designated Moksha as Nirvana?

- (a) Jainism
- (b) Buddhism
- (c) Yoga
- (d) Samkhya

Answer: (B)

283. Who says that the function of Philosophy is wholly critical?

- a. Aristotle
- b. Ayer
- c. Plato
- d. Hegel

Answer: (A)

284. On the ground of 'relation' propositions are divided into

- (a) Categorical and conditional
- (b) Affirmative and negative
- (c) Universal and particular
- (d) Necessary and problematic

Answer: (A)

285. 'Universal Affirmative' and 'Particular Negative' propositions are symbolized as

- (a) A and E
- (b) A and I
- (c) E and O
- (d) A and O

Answer: (D)

286. Which one of the following is known as '\_\_\_triśara a' according to Buddhism?

- (a) Sravana, Manana, Nididhyasana
- (b) Darshana, Jnāna, Caritra
- (c) Maitri, Karuna, Mudita
- (d) Buddha, Dhamma, Sa gha

Answer: (D)

287. Bhāgavadgītā has been considered as the most important work due to

- (a) Harmonious philosophy of life
- (b) Synthesis of action, devotion and knowledge
- (c) Moral teachings
- (d) All the above

Answer: (D)

288. The four moral sanctions by Bentham are

- (a) Natural, Cultural, Political, Social
- (b) Natural, Political, Social, Religious
- (c) Natural, Economical, Political, Religious
- (d) Natural, Economical, Cultural, Religious

Answer: (B)

289. All the following orders of the Purusharthas are wrong except:

- (a) Dharma, Artha, Kāma, Mok a
- (b) Artha, Kāma, Mok a, Dharma
- (c) Dharma, Kāma, Artha, Mok a
- (d) Dharma, Mok a, Artha, Kāma

Answer: (A)

290. Tirthankar means

- (a) follower of a faith
- (b) propounder of faith

- (c) A neutral man
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

291. Which of the following is a prophetic religion?

- (a) Hinduism
- (b) Islam
- (c) Buddhism
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

292. Who is the author of 'The Essential Unity of all Religions'?

- (a) Radhakrishnan
- (b) Tagore
- (c) Bhagwandas
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

293. Aristotle identified good as

- (a) Happiness
- (b) Perfection
- (c) Utility
- (d) Self-respect

Answer: (A)

294. Retributive theory of punishment holds the view that

- (a) Criminals can be reformed
- (b) Criminals are ought to be punished
- (c) Criminals can be set free without any punishment
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

295. Cardinal virtues according to Plato,

- (a) Right speech, Right action, Right mindedness
- (b) Wisdom, Courage, Temperance and Justice
- (c) Intellectual virtues and Moral virtues
- (d) Truth, Non-violence, Celibacy, Non-Stealing

Answer: (B)

296. Eudaemonism means

- (a) Well being
- (b) Hedonism
- (c) Utilitarianism
- (d) Perfectionism

Answer: (A)

297. What is the \_\_\_\_\_ Samavāyikāra of a table?

- (a) Table itself
- (b) Colour of the table
- (c) The parts of the table
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

298. "Casuistry is the goal of ethical investigation" is advocated by

- (a) G.E. Moore
- (b) Bradley
- (c) Kant
- (d) Rashdul

Answer: (A)

299. Which one of the following statements according to Advait Vedanta is true to knowledge of Brahman?

- (a) Both Pratyaksha and Anuman give us knowledge of Brahman
- (b) Arthapatti alone gives us knowledge of Brahman
- (c) Sruti is the only source of knowledge of Brahman
- (d) Both Arthapatti and Anuplabdhi give us knowledge of Brahman

Answer: (C)

300. Which one among the following is not a Nityadravya?

- (a) Paramā u
- (b) Akāśa
- (c) Dvyan. uka
- (d) Dik

Answer: (C)

301. According to Nyaya 'Shell is Silver' is a false cognition because

- (a) Silver is present any where
- (b) Silver shines
- (c) Silver is supplied through memory
- (d) Perceiver is a silversmith

Answer: (C)

302. According to Nyāya Philosophy, Pramāis

- (a) Yathārtha anubhava
- (b) Manifestation of an object
- (c) That which is practicable
- (d) Knowledge of an unknown object

Answer: (A)

303. According to Nyaya Philosophy, 'Water looks cold' is an example of

- (a) Janalaksana Pratyaksa
- (b) Samanya Laksana Pratyaksa
- (c) Yogaja Pratyaksa
- (d) Laukika Sannikarsa

Answer: (A)

304. According to Naiyāyikas Śabda-ārthaSambandha is

- (a) Natural
- (b) Conventional
- (c) Both (A) and (B)
- (d) Neither (A) nor (B)

Answer: (B)

305. The name of the theory advocated byPrabhakara School regarding sentence meaning

- (a) Abhihitānvyavāda
- (b) Anvitabhīdhānavāda
- (c) Tatparyavāda
- (d) None of the above Answer: (B)

306. Nyay Theory of Knowledge is anexample of

- (a) Absolute Idealism
- (b) Realism
- (c) Subjective Idealism
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

307. The following inference is an exampleof:

'No non-soul is animate. All living beings areanimate. Therefore all living beings have souls'.

- (a) Kevalanvayi
- (b) Kevala vyatireki
- (c) Anvaya-vyatireki
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (B)

308. "Woman is not born, but made" is thestatement of

- (a) Mary Wollstonecraft
- (b) Emma Goldman
- (c) Simone de Beauvoir
- (d) Luce Irigaray

Answer: (C)

309. Who among the following Philosophershas propounded the concept of 'Becoming'?

- (a) Pythagoras
- (b) Thales

- (c) Heraclitus
- (d) Democritus

Answer: (C)

310. Which of the following paths was advocated by Buddha?

- (a) Shreya
- (b) Madhyampratipada
- (c) Kaivalya
- (d) Preya

Answer: (B)

311. Who says that space and time are empirically real but transcendently ideal?

- a. Pythagoras
- b. Spinoza
- c. Kant
- d. Hegel

Answer: (C)

312. Which theory of the following holds that 'universal' means universal concepts and not anything external to our minds?

- (a) Realism
- (b) Nominalism
- (c) Conceptualism
- (d) Resemblance theory

Answer: (C)

313. Essential feature of the phenomenological method is

- (a) Intentionality
- (b) Doubting the world
- (c) Technique of bracketing
- (d) None of the above

Answer: (C)

314. Which of the philosophers given below made a distinction between grammatical interpretation and psychological interpretation?

- (a) Dilthey
- (b) Heidegger
- (c) Schleiermacher
- (d) Gadamer

Answer: (C)

315. Consider List – I with List – II and select the code correctly matched:

- | List – I   | List – II (Praman) |
|------------|--------------------|
| a. Nyaya   | i. Two             |
| b. Bauddha | ii. Four           |

- c. Carvaka                      iii. Three  
d. Samkhya                    iv. OneCodes:  
a b c d  
a) ii i iv iii  
b) iii ii iv i  
c) iv i iii ii  
d) i ii iii iv

Answer: (A)

316. Brahmacharya is the means to meet

- a) R.i a  
b) Pit a  
c) Deva a  
d) Manusya na

Answer: (A)

## **UNIT – 8**

**Social and Political Philosophy:  
Western**

## Plato's Ideal State

"Until philosophers are kings or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and the power of philosophy and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, cities will never rest from their evils." (Plato) The Republic of Plato is interpreted as Utopia to end all Utopias, not because it is a romance, but because he constructed an ideal state in it. He compares the construction of an ideal state with an act of an artist who sketches an ideal picture without concerning himself with the fact whether individual characteristic features of imaginative picture are to be found anywhere or not? In the same way, Plato never thought of the possibility of the institutions of his ideal state, being capable of ever becoming a reality. He never thought of the impracticability of this idea concerning his ideal state.

Plato built his state on the analogy of an individual organism. He believed that the virtues of an individual and of the state were identical. He was of the view that an individual presented almost the same features and qualities on a smaller scale as society on a bigger scale.

Parts of an organism	What it symbolizes	Its counter symbol in State
Belly	Appetite or desire	Laborers, agriculturists, industrialists, clerks, businessmen
Heart	Courage or Spirit	Soldiers and military officers
Brain	Reason or knowledge	Philosophers, thinkers and rulers

## Features of an Ideal State

### 1. Rule of Philosophy

Plato was of the view that in an ideal state the philosopher-ruler should be prominent. He should have a broad vision of unity of knowledge. Philosopher-kings are immune from the provisions of law and public opinion.

### 2. No unqualified absolutism

Though, neither, there is any restraint of law nor of public opinion over philosopher-rulers but that is not an unqualified absolutism. It is not all despotism, because rule of philosophy is not free from the basic articles of the constitution.

### 3. Control over the education system

Philosopher ruler should control the education system in an ideal state.

### 4. Justice in ideal state

Justice is the main feature of Plato's Republic and it is also present in his ideal state. Justice is the bond which binds every member of society together. It forms a harmonious union of individuals.

### 5. Censorship of art and literature

In ideal state, there should be a complete censorship of art and literature. It is necessary so that

nothing immoral things might fall into the hands of the young individuals.

## **6. System of Communism**

Plato was of the view that guardian class should live under the system of communism of property and family. The rulers and soldiers do not possess any property of their own.

## **7. Equality among men and women**

According to Plato, equal opportunities should be given to both men and women for their economic, social, intellectual and political uplift. We can say that Plato was the first feminist of his time.

## **8. Principle of Functional Specialization**

Plato was of the view that due to multiple wants, an individual could not fulfill all his desires by himself alone due to lack of capacity. Thus co-operation among individuals should be necessary to satisfy their mutual desires. Some people are specialized in performing some certain tasks.

## **Criticism**

1. Plato built his ideal state on the analogy of individual and this identification leads to confusion. He failed to distinguish ethics from politics. His ideal state is based not merely on analogy but almost identification between the individual and the state, which is quite wrong.
2. Plato fails to condemn the institution of slavery and regard it as fundamental evil.
3. Plato's system of communism of women and temporary marriage is detestable and unethical.
4. Plato is a moralist rather than a political idealist. His assumption that the state should control the entire lives of its citizens is false and contrary to human liberty.
5. By the system of functional specialization, Plato tends to dwarf the personality of the individual. There is no possibility of any full development of human personality in his ideal state.
6. Plato completely ignores the lower class in his ideal state which forms the great bulk of population. Such negligence may divide the society into two hostile groups.

## **Plato's Concept Of Justice**

Plato in his philosophy gives very important place to the idea of justice. He used the Greek word "Dikaisyne" for justice which comes very near to the work 'morality' or 'righteousness', it properly includes within it the whole duty of man. It also covers the whole field of the individual's conduct in so far as it affects others. Plato contended that justice is the quality of soul, in virtue of which men set aside the irrational desire to taste every pleasure and to get a selfish satisfaction out of every object and accommodated themselves to the discharge of a single function for the general benefit. Plato was highly dissatisfied with the prevailing degenerating conditions in Athens. The Athenian democracy was on the verge of ruin and was ultimately responsible for Socrates' death. Plato saw in justice the only remedy of saving Athens from decay and ruin, for nothing agitated him in contemporary affairs more than amateurishness, needlesomeness and political selfishness which was rampant in Athens of his day in particular and in the entire Greek world in general. In addition, Sophistic teaching of the ethics of self-satisfaction resulted in the excessive individualism also induced the citizens to capture the office of the State for their own selfish purpose and even-

tually divided "Athens in to two hostile camps of rich and poor, oppressor and oppressed. "Evidently, these two factors amateur needlessness and excessive individualism became main targets of Plato's attack. The attack came in the form of the construction of an ideal society in which "Justice" reigned supreme, since Plato found in justice the remedy for curing these evils. Thus, we are to inquire in this study the nature of justice as propounded by Plato as a fundamental principle of well-order society.

It is to be noted that before Plato many theories of justice were prevalent. The inquiry about justice goes from the crudest to the most refined interpretation of it. It remains therefore to inquire what were the reasons for which he rejected those views. Thus before discussing Plato's own concept of justice, it is necessary to analyze those traditional theories of justice were rejected by him.

Cephalus who was a representative of traditional morality of the ancient trading class established the traditional theory of justice. According to him 'justice consists in speaking the truth and paying one's debt. Thus Cephalus identifies justice with right conduct. Polemarchus also holds the same view of justice but with a little alteration. According to him "justice seems to consist in giving what is proper to him". The simple implication of this conception of justice may be that "justice is doing good to friends and harm to enemies." This is also a traditional maxim of Greek morality.

The views propounded by Cephalus and Polemarchus were criticized by Plato. The view point of Cephalus was criticised on the ground that there may be cases in which this formula may involve the violation of the spirit of right and his formula does not admit of being taken as a sound universal principle of life. It is not right to restore deadly weapons to a man after he has gone mad. And the contention of Polemarchus was condemned by Plato on the ground that it was only easy to speak of giving good to friend and evil to enemies. But if the friend only a friend in seeming, and an enemy in reality, then what will happen? Then under such circumstances whether we should rigidly follow the definition and do him good or we may use discretion and do him evil? But to do evil to anybody, including one's enemy was inconsistent with the most elementary conception of morality. Thus, this conception of justice regulated the relations between individuals on individualistic principles and ignores the society as a whole. Thrasymachus who represented the new and critical view, propounded the radical theory of justice. He defines justice as "the interest of the stronger". In other words, might is right. For while, every man acts for himself and tries to get what he can, the strongest is sure to get what he wants and as in a state the Government is the strongest, it will try to get and it will get, whatever it wants for itself. Thus, for Thrasymachus justice means personal interest of the ruling group in any state or we can further define it as "another's good". Laws are made by the ruling party in its own interest. Those who violate such laws are punished because violation of such laws is treated as violation of justice. Socrates criticises the definition of justice given by Thrasymachus and he says just as a physician studies and exercises his power not in his interest but in the interest of a patient, the Government of any kind shall do what is good for the people for whom it exercises its art. But Thrasymachus advances some more arguments in support of his concept of justice and injustice. An unjust is superior to a just in character and intelligence. Injustice is a source of strength. Injustice brings happiness. Socrates attacks these points of Thrasymachus and throws light on the nature of justice.

Justice implies superior character and intelligence while injustice means deficiency in both respects. Therefore, just men are superior in character and intelligence and are more effective in action. As injustice implies ignorance, stupidity and badness, It cannot be superior in character and intelligence. A just man is wiser because he acknowledges the principle of limit.

Unlimited self-assertion is not a source of strength for any group organized for common purpose, Unlimited desire and claims lead to conflicts. Life of just man is better and happier. There is always some specific virtue in everything, which enables it to work well. If it is deprived of that virtue, it works badly. The soul has specific functions to perform. When it performs its specific functions, it has specific excellence or virtue. If, it is deprived of its peculiar virtue, it cannot possibly do its work well. It is agreed that the virtue of the soul is justice. The soul which is more virtuous or in other words more just is also the happier soul. Therefore, a just man lives happy. A just soul, in other words a just man, lives well; an unjust cannot.

At this juncture the new point of view is stated by Glaucon and he put Forward a form of what was later to be known as a social contract theory, arguing we are only moral because, it pays us or we have to be. Glaucon describes the historical evolution of the society where justice as a necessity had become the shield of the weaker. In the primitive stage of society without law and government, man was free to do whatever he likes. So the stronger few enjoyed the life at the sufferance of the weaker many. The weaker, however, realised that they suffered more injustice. Faced with this situation they came to an agreement and instituted law and government through a sort of social contract and preached the philosophy of just. Therefore, justice in this way something artificial and unnatural. It is the "product of convention". It is through this artificial rule of justice and law that the natural selfishness of man is chained. A dictate of the weaker many, for the interest of the weaker many, as against the natural and superior power of the stronger few.

Plato realises that all theories propounded by Cephalus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, contained one common element. That one common element was that all the them treated justice as something external "an accomplishment, an importation, or a convention, they have, none of them carried it into the soul or considered it in the place of its habitation." Plato prove that justice does not depend upon a chance, convention or upon external force. It is the right condition of the human soul by the very nature of man when seen in the fullness of his environment. It is in this way that Plato condemned the position taken by Glaucon that justice is something which is external. According to Plato, it is internal as it resides in the human soul. "It is now regarded as an inward grace and its understanding is shown to involve a study of the inner man." It is, therefore, natural and no artificial. It is therefore, not born of fear of the weak but of the longing of the human soul to do a duty according to its nature.

Thus, after criticising the conventional ideas of justice presented differently by Cephalus, Polymarchus, Thrasymachus and Glaucon, Plato now gives us his own theory of justice. Plato strikes an analogy between the human organism on the one hand and social organism on the other. Human organism according to Plato contains three elements-Reason, Spirit and Appetite. An individual is just when each part of his or her soul performs its functions without interfering with those of other elements. For example, the reason should rule on behalf of the entire soul with wisdom and forethought. The element of spirit will sub-ordinate itself to the rule of reason. Those two elements are brought into harmony by combination of mental and bodily training. They are set in command over the appetites which form the greater part of man's soul. Therefore, the reason and spirit have to control these appetites which are likely to grow on the bodily pleasures. These appetites should not be allowed, to enslave the other elements and usurp the dominion to which they have no right. When all the three agree that among them the reason alone should rule, there is justice within the individual. Corresponding to these three elements in human nature there are three classes in the social organism-Philosopher class or the ruling class which is the representative of reason; auxiliaries, a class of warriors and defenders of the country is the representative of spirit; and the appetite instinct of the community which consists of farmers, artisans and are the lowest

rung of the ladder. Thus, weaving a web between the human organism and the social organism, Plato asserts that functional specialization demands from every social class to specialize itself in the station of life allotted to it. Justice, therefore to Plato is like a manuscript which exists in two copies, and one of these is larger than the other. It exists both in the individual and the society. But it exists on a larger scale and in more visible form in the society. Individually "justice is a 'human virtue' that makes a man self consistent and good: Socially, justice is a social consciousness that makes a society internally harmonious and good."

Justice is thus a sort of specialization. It is simply the will to fulfill the duties of one's station and not to meddle with the duties of another station, and its habitation is, therefore, in the mind of every citizen who does his duties in his appointed place. It is the original principle, laid down at the foundation of the State, "that one man should practice one thing only and that the thing to which his nature was best adopted". True justice to Plato, therefore, consists in the principle of non-interference. The State has been considered by Plato as a perfect whole in which each individual which is its element, functions not for itself but for the health of the whole. Every element fulfils its appropriate function. Justice in the platonic state would, therefore, be like that harmony of relationship where the Planets are held together in the orderly movement. Plato was convinced that a society which is so organized is fit for survival. Where man are out of their natural places, there the co-ordination of parts is destroyed, the society disintegrates and dissolves. Justice, therefore, is the citizen sense of duties.

Justice is, for Plato, at once a part of human virtue and the bond, which joins man together in society. It is the identical quality that makes good and social. Justice is an order and duty of the parts of the soul, it is to the soul as health is to the body. Plato says that justice is not mere strength, but it is a harmonious strength. Justice is not the right of the stronger but the effective harmony of the whole. All moral conceptions revolve about the good of the whole-individual as well as social.

## **Social Contract Theory**

Social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view that persons' moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. Socrates uses something quite like a social contract argument to explain to Crito why he must remain in prison and accept the death penalty. However, social contract theory is rightly associated with modern moral and political theory and is given its first full exposition and defense by Thomas Hobbes. After Hobbes, John Locke and Jean- Jacques Rousseau are the best known proponents of this enormously influential theory, which has been one of the most dominant theories within moral and political theory throughout the history of the modern West. In the twentieth century, moral and political theory regained philosophical momentum as a result of John Rawls' Kantian version of social contract theory, and was followed by new analyses of the subject by David Gauthier and others. More recently, philosophers from different perspectives have offered new criticisms of social contract theory. In particular, feminists and race-conscious philosophers have argued that social contract theory is at least an incomplete picture of our moral and political lives, and may in fact camouflage some of the ways in which the contract is itself parasitical upon the subjugations of classes of persons.

## **Thomas Hobbes: Social Contract Theory**

Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679, lived during the most crucial period of early modern England's history: the English Civil War, waged from 1642-1648. To describe this conflict in the most general of terms, it was a clash between the King and his supporters, the Monarchists, who preferred the tra-

ditional authority of a monarch, and the Parliamentarians, most notably led by Oliver Cromwell, who demanded more power for the quasi-democratic institution of Parliament. Hobbes represents a compromise between these two factions. On the one hand he rejects the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which is most eloquently expressed by Robert Filmer in his *Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings*, (although it would be left to John Locke to refute Filmer directly). Filmer's view held that a king's authority was invested in him (or, presumably, her) by God, that such authority was absolute, and therefore that the basis of political obligation lay in our obligation to obey God absolutely. According to this view, then, political obligation is subsumed under religious obligation. On the other hand, Hobbes also rejects the early democratic view, taken up by the Parliamentarians, that power ought to be shared between Parliament and the King. In rejecting both these views, Hobbes occupies the ground of one who is both radical and conservative. He argues, radically for his times, that political authority and obligation are based on the individual self-interests of members of society who are understood to be equal to one another, with no single individual invested with any essential authority to rule over the rest, while at the same time maintaining the conservative position that the monarch, which he called the Sovereign, must be ceded absolute authority if society is to survive.

Hobbes' political theory is best understood if taken in two parts: his theory of human motivation, Psychological Egoism, and his theory of the social contract, founded on the hypothetical State of Nature. Hobbes has, first and foremost, a particular theory of human nature, which gives rise to a particular view of morality and politics, as developed in his philosophical masterpiece, *Leviathan*, published in 1651. The Scientific Revolution, with its important new discoveries that the universe could be both described and predicted in accordance with universal laws of nature, greatly influenced Hobbes. He sought to provide a theory of human nature that would parallel the discoveries being made in the sciences of the inanimate universe. His psychological theory is therefore informed by mechanism, the general view that everything in the universe is produced by nothing other than matter in motion. According to Hobbes, this extends to human behavior. Human macro-behavior can be aptly described as the effect of certain kinds of micro-behavior, even though some of this latter behavior is invisible to us. So, such behaviors as walking, talking, and the like are themselves produced by other actions inside of us. And these other actions are themselves caused by the interaction of our bodies with other bodies, human or otherwise, which create in us certain chains of causes and effects, and which eventually give rise to the human behavior that we can plainly observe. We, including all of our actions and choices, are then, according to this view, as explainable in terms of universal laws of nature as are the motions of heavenly bodies. The gradual disintegration of memory, for example, can be explained by inertia. As we are presented with ever more sensory information, the residue of earlier impressions 'slows down' over time. From Hobbes' point of view, we are essentially very complicated organic machines, responding to the stimuli of the world mechanistically and in accordance with universal laws of human nature.

In Hobbes' view, this mechanistic quality of human psychology implies the subjective nature of normative claims. 'Love' and 'hate', for instance, are just words we use to describe the things we are drawn to and repelled by, respectively. So, too, the terms 'good' and 'bad' have no meaning other than to describe our appetites and aversions. Moral terms do not, therefore, describe some objective state of affairs, but are rather reflections of individual tastes and preferences. In addition to Subjectivism, Hobbes also infers from his mechanistic theory of human nature that humans are necessarily and exclusively self-interested. All men pursue only what they perceive to be in their own individually considered best interests – they respond mechanistically by being drawn to that which they desire and repelled by that to which they are averse. This is a universal claim: it is meant to cover all human actions under all circumstances – in society or out of it, with regard to

strangers and friends alike, with regard to small ends and the most generalized of human desires, such as the desire for power and status. Everything we do is motivated solely by the desire to better our own situations, and satisfy as many of our own, individually considered desires as possible. We are infinitely appetitive and only genuinely concerned with our own selves. According to Hobbes, even the reason that adults care for small children can be explicated in terms of the adults' own self-interest (he claims that in saving an infant by caring for it, we become the recipient of a strong sense of obligation in one who has been helped to survive rather than allowed to die).

In addition to being exclusively self-interested, Hobbes also argues that human beings are reasonable. They have in them the rational capacity to pursue their desires as efficiently and maximally as possible. Their reason does not, given the subjective nature of value, evaluate their given ends, rather it merely acts as "Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired" (139). Rationality is purely instrumental. It can add and subtract, and compare sums one to another, and thereby endows us with the capacity to formulate the best means to whatever ends we might happen to have. From these premises of human nature, Hobbes goes on to construct a provocative and compelling argument for why we ought to be willing to submit ourselves to political authority. He does this by imagining persons in a situation prior to the establishment of society, the State of Nature.

According to Hobbes, the justification for political obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests. Hobbes argues for this by imagining men in their natural state, or in other words, the State of Nature. In the State of Nature, which is purely hypothetical according to Hobbes, men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are more or less equal to one another, (even the strongest man can be killed in his sleep), there are limited resources, and yet there is no power able to force men to cooperate. Given these conditions in the State of Nature, Hobbes concludes that the State of Nature would be unbearably brutal. In the State of Nature, every person is always in fear of losing his life to another. They have no capacity to ensure the long-term satisfaction of their needs or desires. No long-term or complex cooperation is possible because the State of Nature can be aptly described as a state of utter distrust. Given Hobbes' reasonable assumption that most people want first and foremost to avoid their own deaths, he concludes that the State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the state of perpetual and unavoidable war.

The situation is not, however, hopeless. Because men are reasonable, they can see their way out of such a state by recognizing the laws of nature, which show them the means by which to escape the State of Nature and create a civil society. The first and most important law of nature commands that each man be willing to pursue peace when others are willing to do the same, all the while retaining the right to continue to pursue war when others do not pursue peace. Being reasonable, and recognizing the rationality of this basic precept of reason, men can be expected to construct a Social Contract that will afford them a life other than that available to them in the State of Nature. This contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the State of Nature. Second, they must imbue some one person or assembly of persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. In other words, to ensure their escape from the State of Nature, they must both agree to live together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. Since the sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete out punishments for breaches of the contract which are worse than not being able to act as one pleases, men have good, albeit self-interested, reason

to adjust themselves to the artifice of morality in general, and justice in particular. Society becomes possible because, whereas in the State of Nature there was no power able to “overawe them all”, now there is an artificially and conventionally superior and more powerful person who can force men to cooperate. While living under the authority of a Sovereign can be harsh (Hobbes argues that because men’s passions can be expected to overwhelm their reason, the Sovereign must have absolute authority in order for the contract to be successful) it is at least better than living in the State of Nature. And, no matter how much we may object to how poorly a Sovereign manages the affairs of the state and regulates our own lives, we are never justified in resisting his power because it is the only thing which stands between us and what we most want to avoid, the State of Nature.

According to this argument, morality, politics, society, and everything that comes along with it, all of which Hobbes calls ‘commodious living’ are purely conventional. Prior to the establishment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live together and the contract to embody a Sovereign with absolute authority, nothing is immoral or unjust – anything goes. After these contracts are established, however, then society becomes possible, and people can be expected to keep their promises, cooperate with one another, and so on. The Social Contract is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we depend upon to live well. Our choice is either to abide by the terms of the contract, or return to the State of Nature, which Hobbes argues no reasonable person could possibly prefer. Given his rather severe view of human nature, Hobbes nonetheless manages to create an argument that makes civil society, along with all its advantages, possible. Within the context of the political events of his England, he also managed to argue for a continuation of the traditional form of authority that his society had long since enjoyed, while nonetheless placing it on what he saw as a far more acceptable foundation.

## **John Locke: Social Contract Theory**

For Hobbes, the necessity of an absolute authority, in the form of a Sovereign, followed from the utter brutality of the State of Nature. The State of Nature was completely intolerable, and so rational men would be willing to submit themselves even to absolute authority in order to escape it. For John Locke, 1632-1704, the State of Nature is a very different type of place, and so his argument concerning the social contract and the nature of men’s relationship to authority are consequently quite different. While Locke uses Hobbes’ methodological device of the State of Nature, as do virtually all social contract theorists, he uses it to a quite different end. Locke’s arguments for the social contract, and for the right of citizens to revolt against their king were enormously influential on the democratic revolutions that followed, especially on Thomas Jefferson, and the founders of the United States.

Locke’s most important and influential political writings are contained in his Two Treatises on Government. The first treatise is concerned almost exclusively with refuting the argument of Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, that political authority was derived from religious authority, also known by the description of the Divine Right of Kings, which was a very dominant theory in seventeenth-century England. The second treatise contains Locke’s own constructive view of the aims and justification for civil government, and is titled “An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government”.

According to Locke, the State of Nature, the natural condition of mankind, is a state of perfect and complete liberty to conduct one’s life as one best sees fit, free from the interference of others. This does not mean, however, that it is a state of license: one is not free to do anything at all one

pleases, or even anything that one judges to be in one's interest. The State of Nature, although a state wherein there is no civil authority or government to punish people for transgressions against laws, is not a state without morality. The State of Nature is pre-political, but it is not pre-moral. Persons are assumed to be equal to one another in such a state, and therefore equally capable of discovering and being bound by the Law of Nature. The Law of Nature, which is on Locke's view the basis of all morality, and given to us by God, commands that we not harm others with regards to their "life, health, liberty, or possessions" (par. 6). Because we all belong equally to God, and because we cannot take away that which is rightfully His, we are prohibited from harming one another. So, the State of Nature is a state of liberty where persons are free to pursue their own interests and plans, free from interference, and, because of the Law of Nature and the restrictions that it imposes upon persons, it is relatively peaceful.

The State of Nature therefore, is not the same as the state of war, as it is according to Hobbes. It can, however devolve into a state of war, in particular, a state of war over property disputes. Whereas the State of Nature is the state of liberty where persons recognize the Law of Nature and therefore do not harm one another, the state of war begins between two or more men once one man declares war on another, by stealing from him, or by trying to make him his slave. Since in the State of Nature there is no civil power to whom men can appeal, and since the Law of Nature allows them to defend their own lives, they may then kill those who would bring force against them. Since the State of Nature lacks civil authority, once war begins it is likely to continue. And this is one of the strongest reasons that men have to abandon the State of Nature by contracting together to form civil government.

Property plays an essential role in Locke's argument for civil government and the contract that establishes it. According to Locke, private property is created when a person mixes his labor with the raw materials of nature. So, for example, when one tills a piece of land in nature, and makes it into a piece of farmland, which produces food, then one has a claim to own that piece of land and the food produced upon it. (This led Locke to conclude that America didn't really belong to the natives who lived there, because they were, on his view, failing to utilize the basic material of nature. In other words, they didn't farm it, so they had no legitimate claim to it, and others could therefore justifiably appropriate it.) Given the implications of the Law of Nature, there are limits as to how much property one can own: one is not allowed to take more from nature than one can use, thereby leaving others without enough for themselves. Because nature is given to all of mankind by God for its common subsistence, one cannot take more than his own fair share. Property is the linchpin of Locke's argument for the social contract and civil government because it is the protection of their property, including their property in their own bodies, that men seek when they decide to abandon the State of Nature.

According to Locke, the State of Nature is not a condition of individuals, as it is for Hobbes. Rather, it is populated by mothers and fathers with their children, or families – what he calls "conjugal society" (par. 78). These societies are based on the voluntary agreements to care for children together, and they are moral but not political. Political society comes into being when individual men, representing their families, come together in the State of Nature and agree to each give up the executive power to punish those who transgress the Law of Nature, and hand over that power to the public power of a government. Having done this, they then become subject to the will of the majority. In other words, by making a compact to leave the State of Nature and form society, they make "one body politic under one government" (par. 97) and submit themselves to the will of that body. One joins such a body, either from its beginnings, or after it has already been established by others, only by explicit consent. Having created a political society and government

through their consent, men then gain three things which they lacked in the State of Nature: laws, judges to adjudicate laws, and the executive power necessary to enforce these laws. Each man therefore gives over the power to protect himself and punish transgressors of the Law of Nature to the government that he has created through the compact.

Given that the end of “men’s uniting into common-wealths”( par. 124) is the preservation of their wealth, and preserving their lives, liberty, and well-being in general, Locke can easily imagine the conditions under which the compact with government is destroyed, and men are justified in resisting the authority of a civil government, such as a King. When the executive power of a government devolves into tyranny, such as by dissolving the legislature and therefore denying the people the ability to make laws for their own preservation, then the resulting tyrant puts himself into a State of Nature, and specifically into a state of war with the people, and they then have the same right to self-defense as they had before making a compact to establish society in the first place. In other words, the justification of the authority of the executive component of government is the protection of the people’s property and well-being, so when such protection is no longer present, or when the king becomes a tyrant and acts against the interests of the people, they have a right, if not an outright obligation, to resist his authority. The social compact can be dissolved and the process to create political society begun anew. Because Locke did not envision the State of Nature as grimly as did Hobbes, he can imagine conditions under which one would be better off rejecting a particular civil government and returning to the State of Nature, with the aim of constructing a better civil government in its place. It is therefore both the view of human nature, and the nature of morality itself, which account for the differences between Hobbes’ and Locke’s views of the social contract.

## **Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Social Contract Theory**

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778, lived and wrote during what was arguably the headiest period in the intellectual history of modern France—the Enlightenment. He was one of the bright lights of that intellectual movement, contributing articles to the Encyclopedie of Diderot, and participating in the salons in Paris, where the great intellectual questions of his day were pursued. Rousseau has two distinct social contract theories. The first is found in his essay, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men*, commonly referred to as the *Second Discourse*, and is an account of the moral and political evolution of human beings over time, from a State of Nature to modern society. As such it contains his naturalized account of the social contract, which he sees as very problematic. The second is his normative, or idealized theory of the social contract, and is meant to provide the means by which to alleviate the problems that modern society has created for us, as laid out in the *Social Contract*.

Rousseau wrote his *Second Discourse* in response to an essay contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon. (Rousseau had previously won the same essay contest with an earlier essay, commonly referred to as the *First Discourse*.) In it he describes the historical process by which man began in a State of Nature and over time ‘progressed’ into civil society. According to Rousseau, the State of Nature was a peaceful and quixotic time. People lived solitary, uncomplicated lives. Their few needs were easily satisfied by nature. Because of the abundance of nature and the small size of the population, competition was non-existent, and persons rarely even saw one another, much less had reason for conflict or fear. Moreover, these simple, morally pure persons were naturally endowed with the capacity for pity, and therefore were not inclined to bring harm to one another.

As time passed, however, humanity faced certain changes. As the overall population increased, the means by which people could satisfy their needs had to change. People slowly began to live together in small families, and then in small communities. Divisions of labor were introduced, both

within and between families, and discoveries and inventions made life easier, giving rise to leisure time. Such leisure time inevitably led people to make comparisons between themselves and others, resulting in public values, leading to shame and envy, pride and contempt. Most importantly however, according to Rousseau, was the invention of private property, which constituted the pivotal moment in humanity's evolution out of a simple, pure state into one characterized by greed, competition, vanity, inequality, and vice. For Rousseau the invention of property constitutes humanity's 'fall from grace' out of the State of Nature.

Having introduced private property, initial conditions of inequality became more pronounced. Some have property and others are forced to work for them, and the development of social classes begins. Eventually, those who have property notice that it would be in their interests to create a government that would protect private property from those who do not have it but can see that they might be able to acquire it by force. So, government gets established, through a contract, which purports to guarantee equality and protection for all, even though its true purpose is to fossilize the very inequalities that private property has produced. In other words, the contract, which claims to be in the interests of everyone equally, is really in the interests of the few who have become stronger and richer as a result of the developments of private property. This is the naturalized social contract, which Rousseau views as responsible for the conflict and competition from which modern society suffers.

The normative social contract, argued for by Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (1762), is meant to respond to this sorry state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral ills that have been produced by the development of society. The distinction between history and justification, between the factual situation of mankind and how it ought to live together, is of the utmost importance to Rousseau. While we ought not to ignore history, nor ignore the causes of the problems we face, we must resolve those problems through our capacity to choose how we ought to live. Might never makes right, despite how often it pretends that it can.

The *Social Contract* begins with the most oft-quoted line from Rousseau: "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains" (49). This claim is the conceptual bridge between the descriptive work of the *Second Discourse*, and the prescriptive work that is to come. Humans are essentially free, and were free in the State of Nature, but the 'progress' of civilization has substituted subservience to others for that freedom, through dependence, economic and social inequalities, and the extent to which we judge ourselves through comparisons with others. Since a return to the State of Nature is neither feasible nor desirable, the purpose of politics is to restore freedom to us, thereby reconciling who we truly and essentially are with how we live together. So, this is the fundamental philosophical problem that *The Social Contract* seeks to address: how can we be free and live together? Or, put another way, how can we live together without succumbing to the force and coercion of others? We can do so, Rousseau maintains, by submitting our individual, particular wills to the collective or general will, created through agreement with other free and equal persons. Like Hobbes and Locke before him, and in contrast to the ancient philosophers, all men are made by nature to be equals, therefore no one has a natural right to govern others, and therefore the only justified authority is the authority that is generated out of agreements or covenants.

The most basic covenant, the social pact, is the agreement to come together and form a people, a collectivity, which by definition is more than and different from a mere aggregation of individual interests and wills. This act, where individual persons become a people is "the real foundation of society" (59). Through the collective renunciation of the individual rights and freedom that one has in

the State of Nature, and the transfer of these rights to the collective body, a new 'person', as it were, is formed. The sovereign is thus formed when free and equal persons come together and agree to create themselves anew as a single body, directed to the good of all considered together. So, just as individual wills are directed towards individual interests, the general will, once formed, is directed towards the common good, understood and agreed to collectively. Included in this version of the social contract is the idea of reciprocated duties: the sovereign is committed to the good of the individuals who constitute it, and each individual is likewise committed to the good of the whole. Given this, individuals cannot be given liberty to decide whether it is in their own interests to fulfill their duties to the Sovereign, while at the same time being allowed to reap the benefits of citizenship. They must be made to conform themselves to the general will, they must be "forced to be free".

For Rousseau, this implies an extremely strong and direct form of democracy. One cannot transfer one's will to another, to do with as he or she sees fit, as one does in representative democracies. Rather, the general will depends on the coming together periodically of the entire democratic body, each and every citizen, to decide collectively, and with at least near unanimity, how to live together, i.e., what laws to enact. As it is constituted only by individual wills, these private, individual wills must assemble themselves regularly if the general will is to continue. One implication of this is that the strong form of democracy which is consistent with the general will is also only possible in relatively small states. The people must be able to identify with one another, and at least know who each other are. They cannot live in a large area, too spread out to come together regularly, and they cannot live in such different geographic circumstances as to be unable to be united under common laws. (Could the present-day U.S. satisfy Rousseau's conception of democracy? It could not. ) Although the conditions for true democracy are stringent, they are also the only means by which we can, according to Rousseau, save ourselves, and regain the freedom to which we are naturally entitled.

Rousseau's social contract theories together form a single, consistent view of our moral and political situation. We are endowed with freedom and equality by nature, but our nature has been corrupted by our contingent social history. We can overcome this corruption, however, by invoking our free will to reconstitute ourselves politically, along strongly democratic principles, which is good for us, both individually and collectively.

### **Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty"**

Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts" is undoubtedly among the most influential of essays in the history of postwar political philosophy in the analytic tradition. Even critics of the essay – Quentin Skinner, for example – laud praise upon Berlin's clear articulation of a distinction between two opposed understandings of liberty or freedom.

In this post, I'll summarize Berlin's essay. Three points of note. First, although Berlin's paper was originally delivered in 1958, I'll be citing the following version of the text that appears in *Liberty* (ed. Henry Hardy), OUP: Oxford, 2002: 166-217. Second, I will only sketch the main lines of Berlin's essay, not some of the important, though not central details. Finally, though Berlin's essay is needs to be located within its cold-war context – Berlin was born in Riga, then in Russian, and was a fervent anti-communist – none of his arguments depend on that particular belief.

Berlin's essay contrasts two "central" (though perhaps not the only) senses of liberty or freedom (he uses the terms interchangeably): a negative and a positive sense. He begins with the negative idea.

## Negative Freedom Defining Negative Liberty

Negative liberty is opposed to interference or coercion. Berlin characterizes it as follows: Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. You lack political liberty...only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by human beings" (169). Or, as he puts it latter: negative liberty "means liberty

### Four features are of note here:

- Mere Incapacity Is Not Lack of Freedom: You are only free to do what you could otherwise do, but for interference (so, although you cannot fly, you are neither free nor unfree to do so).
- Only Human Violations Count, not unfavorable natural circumstances.
- The Definition is Incomplete: it depends on an analysis of interference or coercion.
- One can measure the 'width' of freedom by measuring the area of 'non- interference'.

## Economic Freedom

Berlin first applies this analysis to the idea of 'economic freedom'. He suggests that a worker who is too poor to buy bread can only be regarded as unfree if his inability is "due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements" that prevent him from doing so.

## The Classical English Tradition

Then, he argues that this conception of freedom can be traced back to "the classical English philosophers"—originally to Hobbes, then to Locke, Mill and Bentham. All agreed: (1) freedom could not be unlimited: it could be curtailed for various ends—at least for the sake of freedom itself, perhaps for the interests of order, equality or justice; and (2) there ought to be a certain level of liberty—a minimum of liberty—which on no account be violated. Regarding (1), Berlin argues that, when do curtail freedom for the sake of (e.g.) liberty, we must nevertheless acknowledge that a loss of liberty occurs. Regarding (2), Berlin notes that, although meeting people's basic needs comes before freedom, the meaning of freedom is the same everywhere.

## Berlin on Mill

The difficult issues about negative freedom concern, Berlin then notes, concern "how wide [the area of freedom] could or should be" (170) or what "a minimum of personal freedom" amounts to. He examines J.S. Mill's work as illustrative of the liberal view. According to Mill, justice demands that all individuals be entitled to a minimum of freedom, and thus that other individuals must be restrained from depriving people of it. Mill confuses two liberal justifications for freedom—(a) Freedom as an intrinsic good and (b) freedom as necessary condition for developing certain perfectionist, individualist values (a certain kind of character). These two might be inconsistent

## Three Further Points

- Negative freedom, in Berlin's sense, is a 'comparatively modern' political idea, not present until (at the latest) the 1600s (176).
- Negative freedom is "not incompatible with...the absence of self- government" (176): a benevolent despot who does not interfere with his subjects does not impinge on negative liberty.
- Thus, negative freedom does not imply democracy: 'the answer to the question "Who governs me?" is logically distinct from the question 'How far does the government interfere with me?" (177).

- It is difficult to estimate the extent of negative freedom in any given case (see fn 1, 177).

## **Positive Freedom Defining Positive Freedom**

Positive freedom derives from 'the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master'. It concerns my desire to be self-directed, self-governing or self-realizing. Berlin has in mind here what often goes under the heading autonomy, and he links the idea to many historical figures: Hegel, Fichte, Kant, and Rousseau, for example.

## **Berlin's Argument**

Although positive and negative liberty might seem quite similar, Berlin will ultimately argue that certain understandings of positive freedom have led, at times, to "a specious disguise for brutal tyranny" (178) because of some of the peculiarity of the way in which the notion of positive freedom has "historically developed" (179). In this section, and several of the next, he begins to survey some of those directions (III-V). I won't go into the details of each, but only sketch the basic critique Berlin offers.

## **The Dangers of Positive Freedom Two Selves**

When talking about being 'one's own master', one can think of both external (a coercer) and internal obstacles (an insatiable desire or passion). Thus we arrive at a distinction of a 'real' or authentic and a less real or inauthentic self. This view takes two forms. A first view identifies one's 'real' self with reason. A second view widens the gap between the two selves, by identifying (as Berlin thinks Hegel and Fichte do) the 'real' self with society at large. In both cases, it is thus open to justify a kind of paternalism or coercion: "Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or society, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name...of their 'real' selves (180). Berlin then identifies several directions in which such 'two selves' views have developed.

## **Self-Abnegation**

Suppose I am autonomous. I have a set of desires I want to fulfill, but which cannot be realized. Then, my only option is to get rid of my desires (rather than wanting to be rich, I stop desiring money). But this way of making people 'realize' then ends – by expunging them—is in many cases hardly satisfactory.

## **Self-Realization**

Berlin then criticizes the metaphysical rationalist view, which equates freedom with the use of critical reason. The fundamental premise he disputes is that one I understand the necessity of X, I cannot rationally will otherwise. Thus, if X is a historical necessity, it is irrational for me to (and I am not truly free if I) resist it.

## **Social Freedom**

To be free is to accept certain rational principles. It is assumed that all rational agents would endorse the same principles, and to be free is incompatible with being irrational. If I know what these principles are, I may then impose them on others. Berlin then sums up the premises he takes to be problematic (200):

- All men have one true purpose—rational self direction
- The ends of all rational beings must fit a certain pattern which some may detect better than others

- All conflict is due to irrationality
- When men have been made rational, they will obey their own natures. Thus, from seemingly liberal premises, we arrive, perversely, at illiberal conclusions.

### **The Search for Status**

Before reconsidering his own view, Berlin points on one other “historically important approach” to the topic which confounds freedom with “her sisters, equality and fraternity” and thus “leads to similarly illiberal conclusions”. The idea here—again, Hegelian—is that human beings are social creatures in a deep sense, and require “proper recognition” (200-1) to be free.

Berlin makes two comments about the need for recognition:

First, although it might be important (204) and “in certain respects, very close to the desire to be an independent agent” (205), it should not be confused with liberty per se. Second, especially when applied to groups, the drive for recognition can be a source of illiberal oppression

### **The Liberal View Reconsidered**

In the final sections of the essay, Berlin reconsiders the liberal view of negative liberty. He makes several remarks:

- While any view of freedom must include ‘a minimum’ of negative liberty, liberals like Mill and Constant typically wanted to maximize the freedom (to the extent compatible with the demands of social life) (207).
- For such liberals, the important question was not who wields authority over me – whether I rule myself (e.g., through democracy), but how much authority should be placed in any set of hands (209).
- Liberalism involves a belief in the absolute inviolability of some minimum of individual liberty (210)
- Thus, a society is not free unless (a) no power, but only rights, can be regarded as absolute and (b) there are frontiers within which individuals are inviolably not to be interfered with.

### **Value Pluralism**

Berlin concludes (VIII) by making some general remarks about value and political philosophy.

First, he argues that there is a plurality of values – freedom, equality justice, and the like – and it is not possible for all these values to all be fully instantiated together. The thought that they can is dangerous, a prejudice, and in any case, not warranted by empirical observation or history (212-3). Conflict among values is inevitable. As he puts it, “If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict – and of tragedy – can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition” (214). Second, although freedom is valuable in itself, it is not the sole, or the most important value. There are sometimes grounds for curtailing it. It must be weighed against other goods (214-215). Third, negative liberty is nevertheless the ‘truer’ and ‘more humane’ meaning of freedom, when compared to positive liberty. It allows people to choose between ultimate values.

Finally, Berlin suggests that a kind of temporal relativism about values: although principles may hold absolutely in certain context, they may not be eternal. To want anything more is perhaps a metaphysical need, but is also a sign of immaturity.

## **Bernard Williams: Idea of Equality**

### **Two equality claims**

Williams begins by distinguishing two claims about equality: (Factual claim) Men are equal. (Normative claim) Men should be treated as equal. 'Men' here is intended to include women, but not people with severe psychological disorders.

### **A dilemma**

Williams considers a dilemma for someone who makes either the factual or the normative claim. The dilemma is that either the claim is too strong or too weak, depending on how it is interpreted. I shall focus on the factual claim to illustrate this dilemma. (A too weak interpretation) All men are men. This is true but trivial. It is not politically significant. (A too strong interpretation) All men are equal in their capacities. This would be politically significant if true, but it is obviously false. Williams rejects the dilemma because he thinks that the weak interpretation – that to say 'men are equal' is to say all men are men – is not too weak, because it is politically significant.

**Williams' argument for the political significance of saying, 'All men are men.'** According to Williams, saying all men are men is a way of drawing attention to certain important universal features of human beings: "That all men are human is, if a tautology, a useful one, serving as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to the species homo sapiens, and can speak a language, use tools, live in societies, can interbreed despite racial differences, etc., are also alike in certain other respects more likely to be forgotten. These respects are notably the capacity to feel pain, both from immediate physical causes and from various situations represented in perception and in thought; and the capacity to feel affection for others, and the consequences of this, connected with the frustration of this affection, loss of its objects, etc." Williams denies that this is politically trivial because there are social arrangements which neglect that some groups of men have these qualities, i.e. they treat these groups as if they did not have these qualities.

### **An objection Williams considers**

Williams considers an objection that is quite strange unless one is familiar with the doctrine that one cannot derive a claim about what one should do from only a claim about what is the case. According to this doctrine, even if it is the case that all men have the features Williams draws attention to, it does not follow that all men should be treated as equal. The objection Williams considers is that there could be a society in which a group of people are acknowledged by official bodies to have the universal features that Williams draws attention to yet are still treated as if they do not have these features, in the belief that it is morally permissible or morally required to treat them in this way. For example, the official bodies may say that it is morally required of them to treat black people as if they do not have these features.

### **Williams' response to the objection**

Williams' response is that a society whose official institutions operated in this way would be operating on an arbitrary principle and an arbitrary principle is not a moral principle. He thinks that those who recommend prejudiced behaviour generally acknowledge this point by trying to establish that there is a group that lacks some of the features that Williams regards as universal. (I think Williams needs to consider people who say, 'Even if the practices we encourage do not treat all groups as having these universal features, it is our tradition to engage in such practices and you should respect that, as we respect your traditions when in your territory.' Such a response does not involve trying to establish that those discriminated against lack the universal features.)

## **Williams on the too strong interpretation**

Williams agrees that it is too strong to claim that men are equal in their capacities. Some can run faster than others, some have greater numerical skills, and so on. What about the claim that, even if men vary in some capacities, they have equal capacity to be moral – equal capacity to recognize what is right and good and to live their lives in accordance with this recognition? Williams agrees with the following view: there are capacities that are not in themselves moral, because they can be used for bad as well as good, but they are of much value for being moral – ability to appreciate the point of view of others, impulse control, and more; since these capacities vary between people and are of much value for being moral, it is mistaken to think that people have equal capacity to be moral.

## **An objection to this view**

Williams then considers an objection to this view: “there is a powerful strain of thought that centres on a feeling of ultimate and outrageous absurdity in the idea that the achievement of the highest kind of moral worth should depend on natural capacities, unequally and fortuitously distributed as they are...” Williams focuses on Kant as providing the most important philosophical formulation of this way of thinking. Kant, on Williams’ reading, says that our moral capacity has nothing to do with capacities that vary between men.

## **Williams’ response:**

If whether a person is responsible for a particular act depends on certain non-moral capacities that they possess, capacities that vary between people, then it is false that moral capacity is independent from these non-moral capacities. Whether a person is responsible for a particular act depends on certain non-moral capacities that they possess, capacities that vary between people. Therefore: It is false that moral capacity is independent from certain non-moral capacities, capacities that vary between people.

## **Williams on each person should be treated as an end in themselves**

On the basis of a conception of moral capacity as independent of variable natural capacities, Kant argues that each person should be treated as an end in themselves. Williams poses the question of whether we can make sense of this claim without relying on Kant’s outlook on moral capacity. Williams focuses on the claim that each person should be treated with respect, as another way of putting the Kantian claim and as an interpretation of the normative claim that men should be treated as equal. He proposes an interpretation of what it is to treat each person with respect: Respecting another person, on Williams’ conception, involves:

- (i) Not letting our fundamental attitudes towards them be dictated by their technical success or social position;
- (ii) Trying to understand them from their human point of view;
- (iii) Not suppressing or distorting their consciousness of what they are doing.

## **Understanding them from their human point of view**

Williams introduces the notion of understanding a person from their human point of view through the example of a failed inventor. From the perspective of the history of inventions, he does not figure or he figures only as a failed inventor. But from the human point of view, he is someone who wanted to be a successful inventor, who believed he could be, who had certain feelings upon not succeeding, etc.

Williams develops an interpretation of what it is to respect each person, using concepts formed through reflecting on this example: “[Respect] enjoins us not to let our fundamental attitudes to men be dictated by the criteria of technical success or social position, and not to take them at the value carried by these titles and by the structures in which these titles place them. This does not mean, of course, that the fundamental view that should be taken of men is in the case of every man the same: on the contrary. But it does mean that each man is owed the effort of understanding...” The failed inventor example provides us with components (i) and (ii) of Williams’ notion of respect. Component (iii) comes from reflecting on a hierarchical society.

## **A hierarchical society**

Williams imagines a hierarchical society in which each man is content with their station within it. (He does not clarify a hierarchical society, but he seems to have in mind something like a caste system and not, say, a society with merit-based job hierarchies.) If respect consists in just (i) and (ii), then Williams thinks that a hierarchical society could potentially be a respectful one.

Williams, however, thinks that there is more to respect than considering each individual from their human point of view. “For it is precisely a mark of extreme exploitation or degradation that those who suffer it do not see themselves differently from the way they are seen by the exploiters; either they do not see themselves as anything at all, or they acquiesce passively in the role for which they have been cast. Here we evidently need something more than the precept that one should respect and try to understand another man’s consciousness of his own activities; it is also that one may not suppress or destroy that consciousness.”

Williams says that hierarchical societies depend for their stability on people having a mistaken conception of hierarchy as a necessity and a distorted conception of what they are doing within this society as a consequence. Owing to component (iii), an attitude of respect, or treating a person as an end in themselves, is against this kind of society in the long-term.

## **Liberalism**

Liberalism, political doctrine that takes protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual to be the central problem of politics. Liberals typically believe that government is necessary to protect individuals from being harmed by others, but they also recognize that government itself can pose a threat to liberty. As the revolutionary American pamphleteer Thomas Paine expressed it in *Common Sense* (1776), government is at best “a necessary evil.” Laws, judges, and police are needed to secure the individual’s life and liberty, but their coercive power may also be turned against him. The problem, then, is to devise a system that gives government the power necessary to protect individual liberty but also prevents those who govern from abusing that power. The problem is compounded when one asks whether this is all that government can or should do on behalf of individual freedom. Some liberals—the so-called neoclassical liberals, or libertarians—answer that it is. Since the late 19th century, however, most liberals have insisted that the powers of government can promote as well as protect the freedom of the individual. According to modern liberalism, the chief task of government is to remove obstacles that prevent individuals from living freely or from fully realizing their potential. Such obstacles include poverty, disease, discrimination, and ignorance. The disagreement among liberals over whether government should promote individual freedom rather than merely protect it is reflected to some extent in the different prevailing conceptions of liberalism in the United States and Europe since the late 20th century. In the United States liberalism is associated with the welfare-state

policies of the New Deal program of the Democratic administration of Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, whereas in Europe it is more commonly associated with a commitment to limited government and laissez-faire economic policies.

## **General Characteristics**

Liberalism is derived from two related features of Western culture. The first is the West's preoccupation with individuality, as compared to the emphasis in other civilizations on status, caste, and tradition. Throughout much of history, the individual has been submerged in and subordinate to his clan, tribe, ethnic group, or kingdom. Liberalism is the culmination of developments in Western society that produced a sense of the importance of human individuality, a liberation of the individual from complete subservience to the group, and a relaxation of the tight hold of custom, law, and authority. In this respect, liberalism stands for the emancipation of the individual.

Liberalism also derives from the practice of adversariality in European political and economic life, a process in which institutionalized competition—such as the competition between different political parties in electoral contests, between prosecution and defense in adversary procedure, or between different producers in a market economy—generates a dynamic social order. Adversarial systems have always been precarious, however, and it took a long time for the belief in adversariality to emerge from the more traditional view, traceable at least to Plato, that the state should be an organic structure, like a beehive, in which the different social classes cooperate by performing distinct yet complementary roles. The belief that competition is an essential part of a political system and that good government requires a vigorous opposition was still considered strange in most European countries in the early 19th century.

Underlying the liberal belief in adversariality is the conviction that human beings are essentially rational creatures capable of settling their political disputes through dialogue and compromise. This aspect of liberalism became particularly prominent in 20th-century projects aimed at eliminating war and resolving disagreements between states through organizations such as the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the International Court of Justice (World Court). Liberalism has a close but sometimes uneasy relationship with democracy. At the centre of democratic doctrine is the belief that governments derive their authority from popular election; liberalism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the scope of governmental activity. Liberals often have been wary of democracy, then, because of fears that it might generate a tyranny by the majority. One might briskly say, therefore, that democracy looks after majorities and liberalism after unpopular minorities.

Like other political doctrines, liberalism is highly sensitive to time and circumstance. Each country's liberalism is different, and it changes in each generation. The historical development of liberalism over recent centuries has been a movement from mistrust of the state's power on the ground that it tends to be misused, to a willingness to use the power of government to correct perceived inequities in the distribution of wealth resulting from economic competition—inequities that purportedly deprive some people of an equal opportunity to live freely. The expansion of governmental power and responsibility sought by liberals in the 20th century was clearly opposed to the contraction of government advocated by liberals a century earlier. In the 19th century liberals generally formed the party of business and the entrepreneurial middle class; for much of the 20th century they were more likely to work to restrict and regulate business in order to provide greater opportunities for labourers and consumers. In each case, however, the liberals' inspiration was the same: a hostility to concentrations of power that threaten the freedom of the individual and pre-

vent him from realizing his full potential, along with a willingness to reexamine and reform social institutions in the light of new needs. This willingness is tempered by an aversion to sudden, cataclysmic change, which is what sets off the liberal from the radical. It is this very eagerness to welcome and encourage useful change, however, that distinguishes the liberal from the conservative, who believes that change is at least as likely to result in loss as in gain.

### **Rawls' Theory of Liberalism Rawls and Mill:**

Almost all the analysts of liberalism pay special attention to J.S. Mill's conception about liberty and liberalism. Because Mill was the first systematic philosopher who thought that if the role of the state is not reduced to the minimum level, the liberty of the individuals will never be properly realised and this he analysed from various angles and one such angle is utilitarianism. Before him others dealt with the subject but Mill's erudition surpassed their analysis. But in spite of these plus points Mill's approach to liberty and liberalism could not satisfy the scholars because of certain shortcomings which we have analysed. The passing away, of times, the advent of new age and ideas did not suppress people's interest about liberalism. In our earlier analysis we have noted the liberalism of Hayek and Robert Nozick. Now we shall turn our attention to John Rawls' analysis. We here quote a relevant passage from Gray.

He writes: The failings in the Millian project are in part a central motivation in the recent revival of contractarian approaches in the justification of liberal principles. In its most powerful and plausible form in the work of John Rawls... Rawls's contractarian approach is authentically individualist in a way. Mill's utilitarian ethics cannot be since it confers on individuals in the original position a veto against policies which would maximise general welfare while invading the liberty and damaging the interests of some".

### **Various Aspects of Rawls' Liberalism:**

#### **Concept of Liberty:**

Rawls' conception about liberalism is scattered throughout his book A Theory of Justice consisting of 514 pages (except index). It is very difficult to analyse all his views in precise form. Some are stated. One such concept is theory of liberty. Strictly speaking, it is connected with his views on liberalism. First we start how he defines liberty.

#### **He says that liberty can be explained by a reference to three items:**

- (1) The agents who are free.
- (2) The restrictions or limitations which they are free from.
- (3) Finally, what it is that they are free to do or not to do.

#### **In the light of these issues Rawls defines liberty in the following words:**

Liberty is a certain structure of institutions. A certain system of public rules defining rights and duties. In true liberty or a true liberal state it is very much essential to see that which agents are free. Here agent is used to denote various parts of society. For example, individuals, organisations, institutions. The term liberty relates not only to individuals because in today's society individuals are not alone, they form group and organisations which moved and removed the ideas and views of the individuals and in various other ways influence them. Naturally we can say that a society can be called free or liberal if its members and organisations are free.

A society or political system cannot function without law and restrictions. Naturally we can treat the restrictions are inexorable parts of the political system. The pertinent point is whether these re-

strictions are impeding the smooth functioning of individuals and numerous agents. If they considerably and unjustifiably impede the functions and freedom of all agents we can conclude that the political system is deprived of liberty and, hence, the political system cannot be called liberal. Rawls again raises the questions what functions the individuals and organisations are free to do. If they are prevented from performing very vital functions then the progress of the agents will receive great set back. It is also to be seen that whether the basic liberties are restricted or not. While considering liberty we must see that in its application if there is any type of discrimination. That is, if liberties are equally distributed or not. It is also found that in some political systems more important liberties are neglected or in one way or other limited. It is absolutely uncalled for. Rawls says that the aim of liberty shall always be the proper development of individual personality to achieve justice. Liberty will promote toleration and general interest in the people and at the same time reduce the scope or possibility of intolerance. When all these conditions are properly fulfilled the society will be assumed to have liberty and it is liberal.

### **Justice and Liberalism:**

John Rawls is remembered by students of political science for his thought-provoking analysis of the theory of justice. But his theory of justice is only a part of his philosophy and the philosophy is liberalism. We can say he has analysed justice, liberty etc. in the background of his liberalism and, as a result of it, it has always come to the limelight. A close analysis of his political ideas reveals that his liberalism comes very close to classical type. What he has said in his *A Theory of Justice* as Fairness constitutes the core of his liberalism. At least Gray thinks so. A well-ordered society must have a clear and comprehensive idea about justice. Not only this, justice must pervade to all spheres and institutions of society. When this comes to be true we shall call the society just and liberal. Rawls says that in a just society all the individuals shall have rights equal with others.

In other words, all the members of society shall have equal rights and this is the primary condition of justice. Rawls also says that inequalities in the allotment of rights is also to be granted provided that this system will benefit all and opportunities are opened to all.

### **Justice, Free Market and Liberalism:**

Rawls' theories of justice, liberty and liberalism harbour upon the free market concept. The chain of relationship among justice, liberty, liberalism and free market system may be stated briefly in the following way. The theory of private property is the most fundamental right and without it citizens cannot develop their qualities. In Locke's analysis its place is quite prominent.

Again, without free market economy right to property can never be attained. It is rather a corollary of free market system. All these combinedly build up the structure of liberal society or concept of liberalism.

### **Why Rawls and other liberal philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century focused their analysis on free market economy is based on the following arguments:**

- (1) Free market system is the most fundamental precondition of right to private property and liberty and liberalism cannot be imagined without them.
- (2) Right to property and free market are the basic constituents of justice. He (Rawls) argues that it is the natural liberty to have property and to deprive a man of this natural liberty is tantamount to violation of natural liberty and also the concept of justice.

(3) Along with the other votaries of free market system John Rawls believes that free market economy ensures the efficiency in production, distribution and pricing system. In state controlled economy or socialist systems, it is alleged, this is not possible to achieve. The decisions regarding production, pricing and distribution emanate from the top. So, for the sake of efficiency it is essential that private entrepreneurs are to be entrusted with the job of all the above-noted matters.

The attainment of efficiency, Rawls believes, is also an important aspect of liberalism. Both justice and liberalism want to see a society well-ordered. In the opinion of John Rawls only in a liberal state and liberal social system can there exist and flourish justice. It is also the view of other liberals.

(4) Rawls argues that the market economy is the best system and scheme. This conclusion is not based on the fantasy of some bourgeois economists, but on the experience gathered during the past several hundred years. Competitive economic arrangement and efficiency, Rawls says, cannot be separated from each other.

(5) Another important advantage of free market economy has been pointed out by him (Rawls): "A further and more significant advantage of a market system is that given the requisite background institution, it is consistent with equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity. Citizens have a free choice of carriers and occupations. There is no reason at all for the forced and central direction of labour".

(6) Establishment of market economy decentralises the economic power and it is a great and powerful step towards decentralisation. Liberalism believes that the citizens will participate in the economic activities and decision-making processes of the state.

### **First Principle of Justice and Liberalism:**

John Rawls has analysed two great principles of justice and here we shall discuss only one. Each person will have the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties. When these basic liberties are guaranteed by the state and all measures are adopted for their realisation the state or political system will aptly be called liberal. As well as the realisation of basic liberties forms a part of justice. Justice and liberalism are inseparable concepts. Rawls has pointed out some basic liberties: right to vote, right to contest any office of the state (of course if qualification permits), freedom of speech and expression, freedom to move freely and peaceably, freedom to assemble together, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of the person which includes freedom from psychological and physical oppression or assault, right to hold personal property and to dispose it, freedom from arbitrary arrest or freedom from seizure of personal property, equality before law and equal protection of law.

According to Rawls these are the basic liberties and for the attainment of justice these are to be distributed among all citizens. Rawls demands that no distinction shall be made arbitrarily while making arrangements for their allotment. This leads to both justice and liberalism. If we look at these rights and liberties we shall find that these are especially important for the proper development of individual's personality and according to philosophers of liberalism the concept of justice relates to the proper fulfilment of rights and liberties.

### **Liberalism and Autonomy:**

It has been observed that realisation of rights and liberties are a very important part of justice and to us of liberalism. Gray says, "A free man is one who possesses the rights and privileges needed for him to think and act autonomously—to rule himself and not to be ruled by another". One point is here quite clear. The realisation of liberties will never fall from heaven or they will not thrive in vac-

uum.

For their realisation a social structure is necessary and the structure must be, in all senses, autonomous. The core of the idea 'autonomy' is—one will be ruled by himself alone and not by anybody else. Rawls has discussed autonomy in his book. Defining autonomy, Rawls says that "it is the complete freedom to form our opinions and that the conscientious judgment of every moral agent ought absolutely be respected".

The activities of the individuals will not be unnecessarily restricted and everyone will have freedom to pursue his objectives. This is not only a fundamental freedom but also a constituent of liberalism. Without autonomy liberalism will not get any opportunity to flourish. Liberalism also does not overlook accountability. In all autonomous society the authority will have to give explanation for all its activities and decisions. Autonomy also implies that the society shall be administered in accordance with certain rules and regulations—that is, the state shall have limited powers.

### **Assessment:**

What Rawls says about liberalism in his A Theory of Justice is not final. He has updated his concepts and views in his Political Liberalism published in 1993. His theory of justice as well as concept of liberalism is based on justice as fairness. It is generally observed that the concept justice as fairness has been borrowed by him from the German philosopher Kant. Kant viewed the entire idea of justice in the background of philosophy.

But justice is not only a subject of philosophy; it also belongs to economics and politics. Particularly, the political scientists are generally interested in the subject. They are concerned with the realisation of justice and it is firmly believed that the realisation falls within the jurisdiction of government. Rawls does neglect this aspect but his analysis revolves around philosophy. Rawls has taken it for granted that only in a liberal state or in a democratic state people can have justice because these states have favourable atmosphere for the development of justice. But we are of opinion that non-liberal and particularly socialist states can have wide infrastructure which will favour justice and liberalism.

Socialists have reservations about the liberal theory of justice. So long the property and sources of production are controlled by few hands, economic and other inequalities will continue to exist and justice will not be within the reach of the people who constitute the majority part of the population. Marx, Engels and other socialists have emphasised it.

But in liberalism there is no scope of transferring the ownership of production and distribution from private hand to the authority of state and the liberals or supporters their of liberalism do not approve such a scheme because it is against their philosophy. Rawlsian theory of liberalism also deals with welfare of individuals. But the welfare functions, for their proper implementation, required the intervention of state and laws are to be enacted to that extent. There arises a confusion. Rawls, Nozick and many others have emphasised the limitations upon the activities of state. To what extent the functions of the state are to be restricted? We do not get any idea about it from Rawls.

John Gray (Liberalism) claims that Rawls does not conceal his allegiance to classical liberalism and he has made best efforts to revive it. It is believed by many the revival of classical liberalisation would be the best reply to the requirements of the present-day society. The collapse of Soviet so-

cialism, the acceptance of market economy by China and globalisation clearly demonstrate that the relevance of socialism to the needs of modern industrialised society is more or less exhausted. It has been asserted by some (including Rawls, Hayek and Nozick) that roll-back to classical liberalism can provide a suitable way. We do not know what shape this expectation will take in the coming years. People's ideas about society, role of the state and outlook of the individuals are undergoing rapid changes.

### **Recent Trends in Liberalism:**

From the eighties of the last century certain spectacular trends are perceptible in the domain of liberalism.

### **These may briefly be stated:**

- (1) After the fall of Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in that and other East European countries certain new ideological trends have emerged. One is, people's sympathy for socialism is downward-moving. Second is, number of Third World states are proceeding towards free market economy which is an indication of liberalism. Third, people's apathy to capitalism is gradually diminishing and they have taken the capitalist mode of production as granted. This is particularly evident in many states of Asia and Africa.
- (2) Simultaneously, there has emerged another trend. Some disquieting features have entered into the thought system of liberalism and this has forced many defenders of liberalism to give second thought to it. It has been well stated by Andrew Heywood in the following words: "Liberal triumphalism needs to be tempered by the recognition of new challenges that have forced liberals to rethink and same time, to revise their views. Indeed, in some respects, liberal ideology is suffering from a crisis of confidence evident in the growing reluctance of liberals to present their ideas as universal or fundamental principles".
- (3) The rise of feminism has posed a formidable challenge to liberalism. From seventies to eighties of the last century there had occurred a meteoric rise of feminist movement. The advocates of feminism have argued that women are deliberately neglected by various sections of the society and even liberal movement or liberalism has not paid any attention to the cause of feminism.  
This mentality has thrown a great assault to liberalism. Many feminists believe that liberalism is an unsuitable way or method of advancing the cause of feminism. This negative attitude of feminism about liberalism has inflicted "irreparable loss" for liberalism.
- (4) Liberalism is faced with another challenge. After the collapse of communism in Soviet Russia and East European states some people thought that liberalism would find fertile soil and congenial atmosphere for its growth and ramification but, ultimately, this did not happen. In Russia and Eastern European states two forces developed simultaneously. One is nationalism enveloped by ethnicity, and the other is liberalism. Russia is still in the grip of ethnic struggle although free market has been accepted as the basic form of social policy. In many Afro-Asian states people's sympathy to nationalism based on security, certainty and strength is prominent. Sympathy to liberalism is feeble. In many Afro-Asian states authoritarian rule has spread its roots to the depth of society which is a very intriguing development. Particularly in the West Asian states the authoritarianism has become a general feature.
- (5) We can still locate another trend. We know that liberalism gleefully embraces all opposite views and thoughts and strongly advocates for toleration. But the rise and rapid growth of fundamentalism and religious fanaticism have eclipsed the noble thoughts and outlook of liberal-

ism. Along with fundamentalism there has arisen terrorism. Both of them have put liberalism to litmus test.

On the one hand there is liberalism, strong urge for rapid development, free and peaceful cooperation among all the nations of the globe, and, on the other hand, fundamentalism and terrorism are creating chaos and unsurmountable problems. The adherents of religious fundamentalism and terrorism are arguing for right to self-determination and progress for particular social groups and communities.

### **Conclude with the following observation:**

“Far from moving towards a unified, liberal world, political development in the twenty-first century may be characterised by growing ideological diversity. Political Islam, Confucianism and even authoritarian nationalism may yet prove to be enduring rivals to Western liberalism”.

### **Nature of Neoliberalism:**

Recent developments have demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt that people’s interest about liberalism has not ebbed at all, though it is faced with several challenges. Many thinkers in different parts of the globe take interest about the functioning of liberalism. This is mainly due to the fact that in the eighties and nineties of the last century in America, Europe, Asia and Africa many changes had occurred which cannot be delinked from liberalism.

Some such events may be noted to trace the changes in people’s attitude towards liberalism:

- (1) J. M. Keynes suggested some policies and schemes to combat the post-Second World War (1939-1945) economic crises and Keynesian policies bore fruits up to the sixties. Keynesian policies helped the resuscitation of economy by reducing unemployment and arresting the depression in economy.
- (2) In the seventies and eighties the situation dramatically changed. There was a downward trend in the productivity of labour, accumulation of capital or savings declined perceptively, the unemployment rate increased very rapidly and there was an upward trend of inflation. All these happened in those countries which adopted liberal economic policies and accepted liberalism as a political ideology.  
People’s faith on liberalism was faced with problems or challenges. Many of them began to doubt the potency of liberalism or the ability of liberalism to solve the basic problems of economics from which the liberal society suffered.
- (3) Not only crises engulfed liberalism but socialism was not free from crises. In no country socialism was successful. So both liberalism and socialism were in the grip of problems. The policy-makers, statesmen, and intellectuals began to think seriously about liberalism because socialism was foredoomed.
- (4) Many people in Britain and USA began to think the whole episode in new perspective. It was their conclusion that too much articulation on the increasing role of the state in welfare activities and encroachment on the freedom of individual entrepreneurs was the major cause of crisis in liberalism. Reagan administration in the USA and the elevation of Margaret Thatcher to the post of Prime Minister in the UK brought about rejuvenation in liberalism.

Both Reagan and Thatcher forcefully argued for the drastic cut of state’s expenditure on welfare activities and projects, revival of state initiative in deregulation and granting more freedom to individual entrepreneurs. Many people were also vocal about the rise in the rate of interest.

The overall political import of the new course became clear. Repression of workers' claims for better living standards and working conditions.

These changes in the matured capitalist countries were grouped under the head of neoliberalism. The term neoliberalism has been defined by many in different ways. For example, one writer says that "it is an updated version of classical political economy that was developed in writings of free market economists". It simply means that neoliberalism is nothing but the revival of classical liberalism. Market economy, allowance of more scope for the businessmen etc. are the chief characteristics.

But the authors of the article published in the Socialist Register (2002) have looked into the idea in a different way. They observed that the changes and policies that were adopted in the eighties and nineties encouraged many people to think about it.

### **The writers have made the following observation:**

"The new framework of rules to which the functioning of capitalism was subjected is now known as neoliberalism, a return to liberalism in a new configuration". The adoption of new policies produced results as desired.

There was a sharp decline in the unemployment rate, recession was no longer threatened, capital formation advanced forward. These were the overall achievements of capitalist economy under the banner of neoliberalism or 'old liberalism in new garb or bottle. But is it really liberalism? Let us observe.

### **Liberalism Liberalised:**

We have noted that one of the basic elements of liberalism is free market economy where there are large number of producers and investors and there is keen competition among them. This is called competitive economy and profits and prices are determined by the interplay between demand and supply.

But during the last two or three decades some new trends have developed and some of them are:

- (a) Ownership in the means of production and distribution is concentrated in the hands of few persons. It has led to the creation of large corporation. And thus the concept of free market has appeared to be a misnomer. In the earlier epochs there were large number of business organisations who competed among themselves and corporation has replaced it.
- (b) The supply of finance is also controlled by few financial institutions. Capital is no longer dependent on the personal savings. Numerous sources of capital formation are being devised or created by giant financial houses. In the field of capital formations banks are taking leadership.
- (c) "Capitalism gradually developed centralised institutions and mechanisms charged with the control of the macro-economy, with major consequences for the issuing of money, the level of activity and employment (Socialist Register 2002) Thus the concentration was not confined to any particular section of economy, it spreads its wings in all branches of economy and sectors of society thus nullifying the ideology of liberalism.
- (d) There was also the centralisation of management. The progress and better management of the economy necessitated the creation of good, expert and educated managers and the own-

ers of industry took care of it. Management was given high priority and different training schools or institutions were set up for better management. Ultimately, the management of the business or economy went out of the hands of individual industries. Like the supply of capital management was also controlled by few persons or institutions and in this way competition was buried.

- (e) "Neoliberalism strengthened the separation between the ownership and management. It accelerated the development of large non-financial corporations managed by business staffs; salaried management grew within financial institutions".

The above is the list of trends of capitalism in the era of neoliberalism. It is interesting to note that the defenders of these new trends did not abandon or criticise liberalism. They did not say that neoliberalism was unsuitable for the new era. We rather witness peaceful coexistence between liberalism or neoliberalism and the new ramifications of capitalist development.

Neoliberalism did not obstruct this. "Neoliberalism was possible because it did not interrupt the developments (of new capitalism) but strengthened them. Liberalism or neoliberalism proved its flexibility by welcoming the new systems of management and capital-formation.

## **Distributive Justice**

Theories of distributive justice seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of goods among members of society. All liberal theories (in the sense specified below) may be seen as expressions of laissez-faire with compensations for factors that they consider to be morally arbitrary. More specifically, such theories may be interpreted as specifying that the outcome of individuals acting independently, without the intervention of any central authority, is just, provided that those who fare ill (for reasons that the theories deem to be arbitrary, for example, because they have fewer talents than others) receive compensation from those who fare well.

Liberal theories of justice consider the process, or outcome, of individuals' free actions to be just except insofar as this depends on factors, in the form of personal characteristics, which are considered to be morally arbitrary. In the present context these factors may be individuals' preferences, their abilities, and their holdings of land. Such theories may, then, be categorized according to which of these factors each theory deems to be morally arbitrary.

## **John Rawls on the Theory of Justice! Introductory:**

John Rawls is a top political scientist and academician of United States. He was born in 1921 and passed away in 2002. His most famous work is *A Theory of Justice* first published in 1970 and its revised edition was published in 1990. In the revised edition, Rawls claims, some important sections and views have been revised. Some political scientists claim that it is the most important work in the English speaking world after the Second World War. Rawls championed the cause of liberalism and challenged the conventional thought of equality and attainment of justice. In 1993 his another important work— *Political Liberalism* was published. Mainly these two works constituted his thought system which is modern liberalism. Even the social democrats and opponents of liberalism could not keep themselves away from the tremendous influence Rawls created in the academic circle. It is interesting to note that during the heyday of Soviet communism and Cold War Rawls offered an alternative scheme of political liberalism which was based on minimal state concept. He did not regard inequality as basis of society and enemy of social progress. Equality cannot be accepted as an important highway leading to the big capital of justice. Equality, inequali-

ty and other related ideas are to be judged in the background of social justice and social progress. He propounded his theory keeping the idea in mind that American capitalist system cannot be thoroughly revised or rejected. It has revised itself frequently.

### **Definition of Justice:**

Rawls says that the conception of justice is an inherent nature of our social as well as practical life. Barker has expressed a similar idea. However, in the opinion of Rawls "Justice in the first virtue of social institutions as truth is of system of thought". Justice is related to the social institutions which guide and mould the actions and ideas of social beings. We cannot imagine of a well ordered society whose core concept is not justice. Justice binds all men and institutions of society. The joining capacity and feature of justice has been forcefully advocated by Barker and Rawls shares the views of Barker. John Rawls has viewed justice in the background of society and for this reason he says that the main concern of the subject matter of justice is social structure which is the core of the society. That is justice deals with the basic social structure. The social institutions are very important in the sense that they take the responsibility of distributing the fundamental rights and duties efficiently.

It is also the important task of the social institutions to allocate judiciously the privileges and advantages for the people of society. Constitution, social, political and economic arrangements are included into these social institutions. Thus justice may conveniently be regarded as a social principle which determines the ways and procedure of distributing the rights and duties for the members of society. He further calls justice a social scheme on the basis of which rights, duties, opportunities and condition are allotted. Thus justice is both a principle and a scheme. In the opinion of Barker justice is a social reality and is originates from social thought. But social thought does not arise or develop in a single day or at a particular point of time. Different views and cross currents of opinion help the formation of social thought and it relates to the conception of justice.

So we can say after Rawls that "various conceptions of justice are the outgrowth of different notions of society against the background of opposing views of the natural necessities and opportunities of human life". In any liberal society opposing views must exist side by side and out of them a common opinion will one day emerge which will give rise to justice. So justice may duly be regarded as a "proper balance between competing claims (emphasis added)". This point of Rawls reminds us of Rousseau's general will which is the outcome of deliberations held at open general meeting and participated by all citizens.

Rawls' theory of justice consists of "certain distributive principles for the basic structure of society". In the light of this analysis John Rawls defines justice in the following words. "The concept of justice I take to be defined by the role of its principles in assuming rights and duties in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role". Justice is, thus, an interpretation of principles that are suggested for the distribution of rights and duties and at the same time division of social advantages among all the members of body politic.

### **Justice as Fairness:**

The main theme of Rawls' theory of justice is it is interpreted as fairness. The dictionary meaning of fairness is appropriateness or just: In Rawls' conception that arrangement can be called just or appropriate which does not create any scope of partiality or inappropriate. The principles for the distribution of rights, duties and advantages will be applied in such manner as will give no contro-

versy.

### **Rawls explains the term fairness in the following way:**

"I shall try to use this principle to account for all requirements that are obligations as distinct from natural duties. This principle holds that a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met, first the institution is just (or fair) that is it satisfies the two principles of justice and second, one has voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangement".

From the above definition of fairness we can form certain features some of which are the following:

- (1) According to John Rawls fairness denotes obligations. Obligation means an act which a person morally or legally is bound to do. Obligations are different from natural duties.
- (2) When a person is legally or morally bound to do an act or perform a duty his liberty will be restricted.
- (3) Fairness also implies that the members of the society are engaged in advantageous cooperative venture. Here two things are important. Individuals cooperate with each other. This co-operation places all the individuals participating in the act creates an atmosphere of mutual advantages for them all. This means that cooperation will create no disadvantage to anybody.
- (4) Rawls further says that the institutions must be fair or just. They must keep themselves above parochial interests. In many societies there are such institutions which have been created to serve group's interests and such institutions cannot serve the interests of justice.
- (5) General public will accept the arrangements of the institutions ungrudgingly. They will have no reservations or objections.
- (6) While discussing the nature of obligation one point is required to be mentioned here. Obligations give rise to the performance of duties which are not moral duties. The institutional or constitutional obligations impose duties upon individuals.

The constitutional or institutional obligations induce a man to perform some duties which ensure the realisation of justice. The performance of institutional duties enables an individual to manage a democratic society and furtherance of general welfare. We, therefore, conclude that the obligations with a strong emphasis on its nature, institutional arrangement and to actively cooperate with the duties made by the institution or any other official declaration are included into the fairness principle.

When the condition of fairness is fully satisfied the concept of justice will not remain far behind. We thus see that fairness, defined by Rawls, in his own way, practically constitutes the core of the theory of justice. But in close analysis it will be found that it is nearer to the traditional idea of justice which states that justice means to give everyone his due share.

### **Contract Theory and Justice:**

We have just now elaborated Rawls' view of justice as fairness. We now turn our attention to the origin of justice as fairness. After good deal of labour Rawls concludes that justice as fairness can aptly be traced to the social contract theory explained by Locke, Rousseau and Kant. He states that the contract theory has several facets such as formation of civil society set up a government. But Rawls is not concerned with all these facets. His chief aim is how the original agreement helped

the establishment of justice in society.

The rational and free individuals met together and settled among themselves the principles of original contract:

- (1) One such principle is they would cooperate among themselves to further their interests.
- (2) The society shall be established on the principle of equality.
- (3) Subsequently other terms of agreement may be finalised but these two terms—Cooperation and equality shall guide and control these terms.
- (4) On the basis of contract a society or government will be constituted but the purpose of this government (or society) shall be to ensure justice. John Rawls claims that the justice established in this way can be called justice as fairness.

The basic condition of the contract is that the persons who made the contract agreed to cooperate with each other and Rawls believes that this is a very important condition for furthering justice. Through the instrumentality of cooperation all the contracting individuals will fix up the principles that will determine the division of social benefits and allot fundamental rights and duties to which they are all entitled. Not only this the terms of the agreement will regulate the claims of persons.

This indicates that none will be allowed to claim anything which he cannot do. So far as this interpretation is concerned it is quite correct to say that contract theory builds up the foundation of justice as fairness.

### **Modus Operandi:**

Rawls has very briefly stated how contract established justice as fairness. In the state of nature all its inhabitants enjoyed equality and after forming a contract they finalised certain terms and conditions for the realisation of a number of purposes. This contract opened the way of attaining justice. They decided the principles for the allotment of rights, duties and all the social advantages. But the interesting fact is that all the members of the state of nature were absolutely ignorant of various aspects of society. For example, the relationship among the members of the state of nature, position of the individuals in the society, relationship between individual and the society etc. They did not know their fortune. Rawls calls this un-awareness as the veil of ignorance. (The veil of ignorance, we shall discuss later on.)

For the sake of clarification let us quote Rawls, “The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances”. Justice originated from the fair agreement or bargain. The members of the state of nature entered into contract to make their lives easy, hurdle-free and more comfortable. This made way for arrival of justice.

### **Reason of Fairness:**

We have discussed how a contract initiated justice of fairness and at present we shall lay our hands on the analysis of reasons. According to Rawls the initial position (before the civil so-

ciety was set up) was appropriate because all the members of the state of nature were similarly advantaged and disadvantaged. None had the capacity to manipulate the situation in his favour. This appropriate position at the original stage that is at the state of nature was quite congenial for justice which would be fair. The people of the state of nature had very few choices and alternatives and they had to act and decide with those limited choices.

Another reason of why contract theory provided justice as fairness is the people of the state of nature voluntarily assembled together to set up a society and all of them were on equal footing. In the contract theory we find this interesting premise. Though the contention of the contract theoreticians is not founded on historical fact and data the premise they thought was to some extent real. Mention has been made that the parties to the contract were rational. The main argument behind this assumption is that they abandoned the state of nature and adopted a judicious decision. Rawls thinks that rationality also acts for achieving justice as fairness. Irrational or self interest seeking men cannot be regarded as builders of justice as fairness, because they will manipulate everything in their favour ignoring the general interests of the community.

### **Veil of Ignorance:**

One of the very strong pillars of Rawls' theory of justice is veil of ignorance which is an imaginary or hypothetical situation. When the members of the state of nature built up a civil society all of them were the prisoners of veil of ignorance. This veil of ignorance is a very important element of justice as fairness. Rawls has explained the concept elaborately in his book.

### **Different aspects of the concept are stated below:**

1. The parties to the contract were not well conversant with the particulars which are associated with society. For instance the nature, formation, function etc., of the society. The ignorance of these facts did not deter them from setting up civil society.
2. People were not well acquainted with their own position such as to what class they belonged? What was their exact status in society? What position people occupied in society.
3. They were also ignorant of the rights, duties, privileges, opportunities etc. Naturally they could not determine the principles and modus operandi of their distribution.
4. They had not formed any idea about good or bad, just and unjust; rationality and irrationality; abilities and inabilities; strength and weakness. Because of this ignorant people were not in a position to form an opinion in favour of any one. They had not the ability to disapprove anything. In fact, all of them started their life (which may be called civil life) with a clean slate. This was a very important factor for attaining justice. At least Rawls thinks so.
5. People at the initial situations did not develop any idea about economics, political condition or institution about civilisation or cultural condition.
6. Restricted knowledge or ignorance about the environment in which they lived stood on the way of acquiring adequate idea about certain basic facts. Some of the basic facts are: production of necessary goods, the employment of capital, protection of environment, proper and economic use of natural resources. All these elements of ignorance were the characteristic features of the people of the original position. According to Rawls the original position or situation is the state of nature.

Rawls in this way has analysed the different aspects of the veil of ignorance. We treat this concept as an important part of his theory of justice. But all these aspects of ignorance did not stand on the

way of achieving justice. Rawls says, "As far as possible the only particular facts which the parties know is that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies." Rawls further says that the veil of ignorance was not a peculiar characteristic feature of the people of original position but was absolutely natural for them.

The great German philosopher Kant had an idea about this veil of ignorance and he referred it in his famous doctrine of categorical imperatives. Kant was not alone. Even in Rousseau's writing we get a reference to it. People of the state of nature were ignorant of civil society and because of that they enjoyed liberty. In the opinion of Rousseau civilisation threw a great assault upon the realisation of liberty and because of this they felt the necessity of a new form of society.

### **Reflective Equilibrium:**

Reflective equilibrium occupies an important place in Rawls' methodology. How Rawls explains it? "I assume that eventually we find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective, since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their derivation".

Put the idea of John Rawls in a comparatively simple language. "We must constantly check the conclusion of our moral reasoning against our initiative moral motions and possibly readjust the conditions of the original position so as to derive principles which are consistent with these fundamental moral beliefs". In order to arrive at certain conclusions in regard to justice individuals prepare judgments of the distribution of right, duties and privileges. We at the same time decide the principle. Rawls says that there shall be an equilibrium between principles on the one hand and judgments on the other. We check the conclusions in the background of morality or ethics. Until an equilibrium situation is reached adjustment and readjustment process continues.

Rawls further observes that this equilibrium position cannot be stable because when new situation emerges the old equilibrium position changes or is disturbed. Since society is in a fluctuating condition an equilibrium can never be stable. Individuals always check the condition in the light of new situation or circumstances. Naturally the old equilibrium cannot remain in its position. The old equilibrium disappears and makes way for a new one. In this way the whole process moves from one place or position to another.

Justice would be fair if there is a consistency between the principles decided in the light of the original position and our judgments. If there is inconsistency that would give birth to a faulty view about justice. In Rawls' analysis several factors have been found to interfere and the most important one is the individuals always analyse the entire phenomenon in the background of their moral reasoning. In other words, morality always guides them to take an action or to deceive about the attainment of justice.

In support of our contention we again quote a very lengthy passage from Rawls' book. "From the standpoint of moral theory the best account of a person's sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining any conception of justice but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium? This state is one reached after a person has weighed various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions".

## **Intuitionism:**

While explaining justice as fairness Rawls has briefly discussed intuitionism to support the theory. Dictionary defines intuitionism as the theory that primary truth and principles are known by intuition. The intuition means an ability to understand without the need for conscious reasoning. We want to see how Rawls has applied these ideas to his analysis of justice as fairness.

When the individuals are confronted with the task of taking a decision about justice they start to analyse various matters which they think relevant. First of all their duty is to weigh various principles which conform to the concept of justice.

This the individuals do by weighing different principles against one another and this they do by applying intuition and not conscious reasoning. Intuition and not reason is the technique they apply. The aim of the individuals is to arrive at what is just and what is unjust. If we scan Rawls' analysis in regard to the importance of intuitionism in the determination of justice we shall find it has a great role in finalising the concept of justice and its principles. Intuitionism or intuitionist theory is based on two ideas. One is there are number of first principles "which may conflict to give contrary directives". In the second place in intuitionism there is no specific method. Individuals try to reach a balance through the mechanism of intuitionism. Rawls' view point is for deciding what is justice as fairness men apply intuitionism and no empirical methods.

## **Two Principles of Justice:**

Two Principles Stated:

We have now reached the most crucial section of Rawls' theory of justice. The main structure of his theory is based on two principles and these he has stated in his book. The first principle is: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others."

### **The second principles runs as follows:**

"Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both

- (a) Reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage and
- (b) Attached to positions and offices open to all."

These two principles are so much important that concept of justice cannot be analysed without them. Not only this the theory of justice revolves around these two basic principles. The principles relate to the fundamental structure of society. Again how the rights, duties and privileges are to be distributed among the individuals is decided by these principles.

## **Interpretation of the First Principle:**

Rawls admits that it is very difficult to make a list of all liberties which individuals can claim. Because in different socio-economic and political structures nature and number of liberties shall differ. In spite of this preliminary drawback we must try to show what the principle exactly means.

In a society there shall exist an extensive list of equal basic liberties. All the persons shall have equal right to all these liberties. No one can claim more than what others have got. Several things are very important here. (1) A society must publicly announce all the liberties to which its members shall be entitled. In other words, the members shall have equal right to all these liberties. These may alternatively be called social values. The social values include economic, cultural, political, religious freedom. In distributing these rights the authority of the state will not make any discrimina-

tion on the basis of race, sex, caste, language etc. Though Rawls does not categorically state, we surmise that the picture of a democratic state was very much active in his mind because only in a democracy an extensive list of liberties can be found. In fact, Rawls has prepared his theory of justice completely in the background of liberal state and politics. Such states have an elaborate scheme of liberties.

Rawls reminds us that mere announcement of liberties is not of prime importance. The authority must take care that none (because of manipulation or partiality adopted by authority) gets more than the other. The simple implication is that unequal distribution of liberties is not only intriguing but also the main cause of injustice. In the scheme of Rawls liberty has been prioritized. It means that justice is vital no doubt but if liberty is not given priority and a discrimination crops up in allotting rights and liberties injustice will be an inevitable consequence. For this reason in Rawls' scheme liberty has been given first preference. Hence we find that mere declaration of rights and liberties does not constitute justice, implementation is of vital importance.

### **Interpretation of the Second Principle:**

We believe that the second principle is more important than the first principle. The second principle has two parts. In these two parts there are two phrases:

- (1) Everyone's advantage and
- (2) Open to all. Rawls himself admits that both these phrases are ambiguous.

So it is not at all easy to arrive at any definite conclusion. But in spite of this ambiguity these two famous phrases cannot be abandoned. In the first place, government will make utmost efforts to decide the principles on the basis of which all the rights, liberties, duties and privileges will be equally distributed. This principle further asserts that the political system shall not make any discrimination. We have already mentioned this earlier. This principle has another aspect. Primarily the authority will not allow any type of inequality. Because strictly

viewed, inequality or unequal distribution of rights and privileges is an anathema of justice. But in the second principles Rawls makes heavy concessions for inequalities. He, here, imposes two powerful conditions. Inequalities or unequal distribution of rights, liberties duties and privileges will be allowed on the condition that it will be to everybody's advantage or in other words, one will not be in disadvantageous position and the other will be in advantageous position. This type of discrimination is harmful for the society.

Again Rawls observes that some may get greater privileges while others will get less. But the reason of this unequal distribution will be allowed on the condition that the privileges and opportunities shall be open to all. Its implication is every one shall have adequate freedom to reach the door of privileges. There shall be no restrictions. In any political system there are many agencies which allocate the rights, liberties and privileges on behalf of the state. Rawls is of opinion that the agencies must be efficient. If it is not so the advantages or privileges generated by society will not be able to reach every one. Moreover, the allocation of privileges will be so efficient that it cannot be altered further. Allocation of privileges will reach the maximum level. While distributing the privileges among the citizens the authority must take care of the fact that its doors shall be open to all. That is it must be accessible to all. This accessibility is part of the ambitious scheme—all rights, duties and privileges are open to all. The two things—accessibility to government and open to all—are inseparable. If any person feels that he is deterred from having opportunities which are allotted

to others and behind this deprivation there is no valid reason.

The rectification is possible only, if the citizen or the aggrieved person enjoys the accessibility to the authority, "Assigning rights and duties" writes John Rawls "is thought to give a scheme which allocates wealth and income," authority and responsibility, in a fair way (emphasis added) whatever this allocation turns out to be. It is clear from Rawls' view that allocation denotes not simply the income and wealth but also the opportunity to participate in the affairs of the government.

### **Other Aspects of Two Conditions:**

For the realisation of equal liberty it is essential that the economy will have a free market system. It is a very important precondition and if it is not satisfied there is no question of equal liberty. Free market means the market or the operation of the market shall be regulated by the basic principles of supply and demand and there shall be no interference of state or any other authority on behalf of the state. In such an economy individuals will have ample opportunity to enjoy equal liberty. Of course, the state will lay down the principles which will be carried out by all concerned. In this connection Norman Barry observes: The competitive market shall be regulated by the fair equality of opportunity principle. This principle then sanctions those social policies which are designed to mitigate the effects of social contingencies which give some groups and individuals, unfair advantages over others.

But there is one objection against this assumption or principle and this is it is egalitarian in nature. We believe that it is to some extent Utopian. It cannot be expected that everybody will have the opportunity to enjoy equal liberty in an economic structure which is regulated by this principle. Utopian because those who control and manage the economy will not allow others to reap full benefit of such an economy. Rawls has offered us a way out. While implementing the scheme of distributing opportunities, rights and duties the authority must give due consideration to natural talents. Rawls has argued that if the structure of society is modified that will provide ample scope for the distribution of wealth and income on the basis of natural abilities and talents.

The holder/owner of natural abilities and talents will get higher returns or remuneration. This will lead to inequality. But Rawls and many others apprehend that this type of distribution of income and wealth on the basis of natural talents is arbitrary and may encourage criticism. Rawls, therefore, suggests a midway by pointing out that prioritization of natural talents and abilities will give no problem if this goes to the benefit of the least advantaged. "Those with natural talents are entitled to high earnings only if such inequalities are to the benefit of the least advantaged."

The moot point here is that inequalities are not, Rawls assumes, harmful for society if they are capable for generating benefits for all including the least advantaged and by pronouncing this Rawls made a welcome for the inequalities directly and bestowing good wishes to capitalism. We now turn to the concept of efficiency which has a very important role in the field of the distribution of goods and privileges. The realisation of justice is closely connected with this distribution. Rawls has said that if the distribution of goods and privileges and the production of commodities are efficient then the realisation of justice will be possible.

If on the other hand there is inefficiency the victim will be justice. Instead of justice there will come injustice. From the analysis of Rawls it appears to us that the concept of justice is really a complex notion and its attainment largely depends upon the good deal of efficiency of production of goods and articles and their distribution. Now the question is what is efficiency and inefficiency? If the

distribution of goods, income, wealth and privileges is efficient there will be no further scope of distribution no scope for arrangement and rearrangement. That is the distribution system will be excellent.

On the other hand, if it is inefficient there will be scope for further arrangement and redistribution. Rawls says: "An arrangement of the basic structure is efficient when there is no way to change this distribution so as to raise the prospects of some without lowering the prospects of others". It is necessary to add few words to the idea of benefit. The aim of justice is to give maximum benefit to all including the least advantaged. Should benefit be interpreted in terms of utility? Do the two terms carry identical meaning? It can categorically be stated that Rawls does not use the term benefit in the sense of utility used by the utilitarians.

The utilitarian's thought of maximisation of utility irrespective of the distribution and remodelling of social structure. In the existing structure of society individuals will maximise their utility. But Rawls enters into the depth the matter He has also discussed justice in a greater perspective. "The striking feature of utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter how the sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals any more than it matters".

### **Pure Procedural Justice:**

According to Norman Barry Rawlsian theory of justice is blessed with certain advantages and this is chiefly due to the reason that his theory of justice is based on a system of pure procedural justice. We are to go through his ideas about procedural justice. Explaining procedural justice as pure form Rawls says that the activities of a person depend on what the rules empower him to do. Without the authority of rules/laws man cannot do anything. Of course, if he does anything without the authorisation of law that will be illegal. Simply stated, procedural justice envisages that individuals at first claim some rights and privileges, the principles determine the process/procedure by which these claims are to be satisfied and this in turn is legitimised by the basic structure.

What is pure procedural justice? The "pure procedural justice obtains when there is not independent criterion for the right result; instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct or fair provided that the procedure has been properly followed". This is, in brief, the pure procedural justice. Rawls claims that in order to understand the pure procedural justice it is necessary to compare it with perfect and imperfect procedural justice.

What do we mean by perfect procedural justice? The fairness of justice and other things such as division of wealth etc. is decided by an independent criterion. Again before the commencement of procedure the criterion must exist. The Persons concerned with the attainment of the procedural justice are sure that they would be able to reach the goal. If we look at the real situation we shall find that such type of perfect procedural justice is rare. In order to explain the imperfect procedural justice Rawls cites an example. He says that such form of justice is generally found in criminal trial cases. The lawyers adopt various procedures and arrangements to find out the culprit. The arrangements are selected to fit the situation and they are not previously selected. The important feature of imperfect procedural justice is there is no flexible procedure to arrive at conclusion.

In the light of the above analysis we can reasonably point out certain features of pure procedural justice.

These are briefly stated below:

- (1) In procedural justice no separate or independent criterion is used.
- (2) For pure procedural justice a fair or correct procedure is followed so that a fair justice can be built up.
- (3) Determination of the fair procedure is not enough. Such a procedure must be scrupulously observed.
- (4) There is another aspect of pure procedural justice and summarily stated it is— an impartial institution is to be set up or there shall be a number of impartial institutions.
- (5) Mere setting up of impartial institutions is not sufficient; they must have opportunity to function impartially and efficiently.
- (6) All the institutions or branches of the political system must cooperate with each other. This cooperation is indispensable and without it there shall arise chaos.

### **Basic Structure:**

Any analysis of justice is bound to remain incomplete without any reference to basic structure because basic structure according to John Rawls is basic or fundamental to the theory/concept of justice. "The basic structure" defines Rawls, "is a public system of rules defining a scheme of activities that leads men to act together so as to produce a greater sum of benefits and assigns to each certain recognised claims to a share of proceeds." It is of prime importance for a comprehensive analysis of justice. It can be explained in a slightly different way. It is a way in which the most important social institutions allocate rights, duties, privileges and responsibility among the members of the community. It further denotes the cooperation between the individuals and the various segments of the basic structure.

The important institutions include the constitution the major political, social and economic institutions which are involved in a number of activities connected with the administration of state. The effects of the basic structure on justice are profound. Its presence in the stages of justice is felt from the very beginning to the end. It is also an integral part of pure procedural justice.

### **Assessment:**

Rawlsian theory of justice is confronted with a number of criticisms and some of them are stated below:

1. Rawls' theory of justice has been framed in the background of liberal capitalist system. There is a general grievance against the capitalist system that the division of society into clear-cut classes, ownership of the means of production by very few persons, gross inequality of income between the classes etc. create injustice and the rectification of this situation was strongly felt. Rawls' theory of justice was a type of palliative to this condition. David Easton wanted to justify the capitalist system by his behaviouralism which indirectly stated that liberal political system possessed some self regulatory mechanisms which could withstand the onslaught on capitalism.

Rawls justified the inequalities in the distribution of income, wealth and privileges on the ground that it might be in the advantages to all. He does not utter a single word about the change of basic structure of society. He has introduced some concepts such as "veil of ignorance" "re-

flective equilibrium” etc. to elaborate his core ideas and support the existing liberal economy’s basic structure.

But we believe that all these are in vain and our stand will be strengthened if we seek the assistance of Ralph Miliband’s critical analysis of capitalist system which he has made in *The State in Capitalist Society* (1973). Our humble submission is so long as the capitalist system remains intact justice in real sense will remain a far cry.

2. Rawls has said that natural talents and abilities are to be properly rewarded. Our objection is to what extent these natural talents and abilities will come to the benefit of the society as a whole and the least advantaged in particular still is a matter of conjecture. Who are least advantaged? Who will decide it? There may be several categories of benefit and which category is most wanted who will settle it?  
All these are highly vexed issues and a balanced theory of justice requires an acceptable solution to all these issues and questions. But, the critics are of opinion that by rewarding the natural talents and abilities to their holders, an illuminating theory of justice cannot be constructed.
3. Rawls has said that economic inequalities are acceptable if they are everyone’s advantage and if offices are open to all. Rawls himself admits that “everyone’s advantages” and “open to all”—these two phrases are ambiguous and we also agree with him.  
How can an ordinary citizen deprived of all amenities and economic strength or opportunities compete with other persons for the post of American presidency. Cost of campaign requires millions of dollars and a poor or middle class man cannot imagine to contest for the post of presidency.
4. From his analysis we come to know that justice can be achieved through the implementation of efficiency. But who will implement it? Will the owners of capital and means of production invite the most efficient person to shoulder the responsibility of management in order to ensure efficiency? If anybody feels that the owners of production, in order to ensure an efficient system of production, will invite others to start an efficient system that will be a Utopian idea.
5. “A very difficult problem for Rawls is the identification of the least advantaged. This clearly cannot be literally the worst-of in any society and must refer to some class of persons. Rawls always refers to the representative man of the least advantaged group. He gives definitions of such a person but his whole approach has been vehemently criticised. This is because his methodology precludes him from considering the actual disadvantages of individuals”.  
It has further been observed that Rawls’ definition precludes many individuals from the scope of special need and care. Barry believes that Rawls’ analysis creates a big loophole in the body of his theory and this makes his theory, to a large extent, incomplete. He has however made a scope for necessary changes in his prescription when he says that various refinements can be made in practice.
6. Barry has drawn our attention to another limitation of Rawls’ theory of justice. “The nature and justification of the priority rule has been criticised. While in principle this provides a determinate solution to the possible conflicts between principles the priority of equal liberty over economic advantage has been challenged”.
7. The liberals also have strongly criticised his theory on the ground that it is very much egalitari-

an in nature and Rawls could not deny this charge. Rawls thought that the criteria suggested by him are difficult to apply and they are extremely egalitarian. Even Nozick could not fully support his theory.

## **Nozick's View on Theory of Justice**

### **Introductory:**

After throwing light on important aspects of Rawls' theory of justice we now embark on another theory of justice propounded by Robert Nozick in his *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (1974). Robert Nozick (1938-2002) was an American academic and a renowned political philosopher. His *Anarchy, State and Utopia* created a profound influence upon the contemporary academic world of political science and political philosophy. Rawls' theory of justice was based on liberty, equality and inequality.

The policy makers shall pursue a scheme for the furtherance of liberty, equality and inequalities where such inequalities will benefit the least advantaged. But Nozick developed his theory in response to Rawls' theory and he based his theory of justice on rights. Though both Rawls and Nozick have developed two theories of justice it cannot be said that Nozick was in any form critical of Rawls.

Rather he has showered huge accolade on the former. Rawls' theory of justice, Nozick cautiously maintains, "is a fountain of illuminating ideas, integrated together into a lovely whole. Political philosophers now must either work within his theory or explain why not". In his early years Nozick was a great supporter of extreme libertarianism and in the fag end of life he considerably modified his extreme libertarianism. Some are of opinion that ultimately Nozick appears to us as a strong supporter of a political doctrine which is known to us as neo-liberalism and in this respect he is to some extent at par with Hayek.

### **Concept of Distributive Justice:**

Before Starting analysis about distributive justice put forward by Robert Nozick, Analyse very briefly the concept of minimal state. In the classical political as well as liberal political theory the state was primarily known as night watchman state which implied that the state had to discharge minimum functions.

These were to maintain law and order, to take action against violence, to fight the foreign aggressors, to stop theft and fraud, to implement all sorts of contracts. In order to establish its existence and credibility the state had to do all these functions. But subsequently it was felt that the functions of the state could not be confined within the above noted categories and for this reason the state that did these functions came to be designated as minimal state.

Many liberal thinkers are of opinion that the greater the functions of the state the greater are the infringement of rights of the individuals. Though the minimal state performs minimum functions still it is held that such a state has enough power to enter into the domain the rights of the individuals. In spite of this situation the minimal state is known as the most extensive state and such a state is justified.

The reason of justifying it is such a state is the most powerful vehicle for arriving at distributive justice. It is the duty of a political system to see that none is deprived of justice and for that goal the state will have to take action.

## **Entitlement Theory:**

Mention has been made that Robert Nozick bases his theory of justice on rights. The rights come from the concept of entitlement. In other words rights mean entitlement. One has right or claim to anything means that one is entitled to it. If justice means the distribution of right, duties, privileges etc. then the idea of justice can appropriately be interpreted as entitlement theory of justice. Nozick is reluctant to give preference to distributive justice because this concept does not give proper idea about the theory. He observes: "it would be best to use a terminology that clearly is neutral". Implementation or realisation of the entitlement to holdings creates the foundation of the theory of justice. Thus Nozick's theory of distributive justice and entitlement theory are same and convey identical meaning.

## **There are three different principles or three major topics of holdings:**

1. When a man acquires a holding (we can interpret it as property though Nozick does not use this particular term) according to the principle of justice and law, then the person concerned is entitled to that holding. In other words, property acquired in a legal and justifiable way shall cause under the authority of the person who has acquired it and it is a type of justice.
2. If a person happens to acquire a holding by means of transfer and here in this case the basic principles of justice has been strictly adhered to, then this justice- based transfer can reasonably be called an entitlement. The transfer takes place from one person to another. There are different forms of transfer such as voluntary exchange, gifts or any other type.
3. In all societies not all transfers or acquisitions take place in proper or legal or justifiable ways. There may be illegal transfers or acquisitions and it has been found that such cases are not at all rare. Naturally the rectification of this injustice or wrong can lead to another type of holding. Nozick calls it the "rectification of injustice in holding".

When the three above noted holdings are conglomerated under one head that gives birth to a concrete shape of the theory of justice. It can be better put in the words of Nozick. He writes: "The general outlines of a theory of justice in holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer, or, by the principle of rectification of injustice. If each person's holdings are just then the total set of holdings is just".

How do people come to know that injustice has been done to them in matter of holding? Nozick answers that from the fact/records of history or from various sources of information people gather the news that something wrong has been done to them and in that case they will move for the rectification of the wrong. If this does not happen, one cannot expect that justice will prevail.

## **Historical Principles and End-Result Principles:**

### **What is Historical Principle?**

For a better and illuminating formulation of a theory of justice Nozick has devised two principles- historical and end-result principles. Nozick has demonstrated that from distribution emanates entitlement and now the problem is how to decide that a distribution is just. If it is not just there cannot be justice.

In order to decide this problem Nozick has applied the criterion of historical principle. It says that the justness or unjustness of a distribution can be decided by the fact that whether it is historical

or not. Historical principle means how it come about? Past records will show to what extent a distribution is able to satisfy the requirements of justice. How he defines. "Historical principles of justice hold that past circumstances or actions of people can create differential entitlements or differential deserts to things".

If a scheme or distributive system is unjust or defective this can be rectified (of course if possible) or removed and in this way the distributive process moves from one stage to another or one scheme to another.

In the concept of historical principle there lies a clear hint of evolution of the theory of justice. There has occurred a gradual development of justice and this is chiefly due to the reason that the material circumstances of society change and this influences justice.

### **The End Result Principles:**

Nozick has awarded another name to end-result principles and it is current time- slice principles. This concept demonstrates that how things, rights, duties and privileges are distributed and as a result of distribution who has got what is to be decided. Here we find that the question is not about distribution per se, we are to look into the consequences of distribution.

If the end result is satisfactory then it can be held that justice will be the result of distribution. Let us put the matter in his own words. "According to current time- slice principles (also read end-result principles), all that needs to be looked at, in judging the justice of a distribution, is who ends up with what (ital added), in comparing any two distributions one need look only at the matrix presenting the distribution". Two important points to be noted here. Distribution must clearly state that who is getting what. The other point is this is possible only through comparison.

Nozick demands that only the end result principles can tell us what would be the exact nature of justice. If the procedure of distribution is incomplete or defective or cannot assure us of justice then the procedure can be changed. He also claims that this is the most reliable way of building up a theme of justice. We also partially agree with Robert Nozick. Partially because other factors are to be considered.

We thus come across the idea that the time-slice principles are also called unhistorical principles. Time-slice principles, end-result principles and unhistorical principles according to Nozick denote almost same thing. Norman Barry and many others say that utilitarianism and social justice theories are end-state doctrines. According to Nozick the socialist theory about workers' share in the profit of the company is based on historical principles. The workers claim that they also have a major share in the profit which the industry generates because this profit is the result of their labour. They have drawn this conclusion from the past history.

They have observed that the capitalists/owners of sources of production have gobbled the entire profit by nefarious means. "The socialist rightly holds onto the notions of earning producing, entitlement, desert and so forth and he rejects current time-slice principles that look only to the structure of the resulting set of holdings". From these two principles we form the idea that for a concrete theory of justice it is necessary to emphasise the entitlement concept. If there are any wrong doings in the acquisition of transfer of holding that must be rectified. Otherwise the justness of the distribution of entitlement will remain defective.

## **Patterned Principles:**

After analysing the historical and end-result principles, Nozick has introduced another principle which he has designated as patterned principle. In the opinion of Nozick : "Let us call a principle of distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension (emphasis added), weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions". Distribution of things, rights etc. should be controlled by other criteria. It may be moral, merit, usefulness to society or weighted sum of merit etc. It implies that the distribution will depend on merit, deserve, usefulness to society or natural dimension. The entitlement theory we have just now sketched does not fall in the category of patterned principle. If a person possesses greater moral merit or if he has greater usefulness to society then he may naturally claim shares, greater reward or higher shares. And to deprive him of this rational claim will be tantamount to injustice. When the distribution is based on patterned principle it is also called patterned distribution. Hence the whole sequence of justice is not based on equal liberty or any other principle enunciated by John Rawls rather patterned principle and the pattern relates to various elements such as usefulness to society moral merit etc. By enunciating all these Nozick wants to establish a new doctrine.

## **Criticism of Patterned Principle:**

Nozick was quite conscious of the shortcomings of the patterned principle of justice and he has mentioned some of them.

### **We mention here few:**

- (1) Patterned principles only stress the patterned way of distribution of property and rights. But it is silent on the entitlement principles of holding and Nozick believes that only through the strengthening of this principle can justice be achieved. Hence its inability is not helpful for justice.
- (2) In the opinion of Nozick justice depends on both receiving and giving of holdings or property. These two combinedly form the fabric of justice. But patterned principle only emphasises the receiving aspect and ignores the giving of property. So the patterned principle of distributive justice is a theory of recipient justice.
- (3) Again there is a conflict between patterned principle and end-state principle. The patterned principle emphasises that men should be "rewarded according to the deserts is historical because it directs attention towards their past action".

What is the conclusion? "Nozick's own theory of justice is an historical un-patterned theory. It is an entitlement theory in which the distribution of individual property-holding is just if it is a consequence of fair acquisition. The only other aspect of justice is rectification, the principle which allows past injustices that is unfair acquisition to be corrected".

## **Locke's Theory of Acquisition:**

Nozick's theory of justice, sketched above, is a theory of entitlement and since it is a theory of entitlement it is also theory of acquisition or holding of property. Any theory of acquisition without any reference to Locke is bound to be unsatisfactory. Explaining the various aspects of social contract theory Locke has dealt with the concept of property. He maintains that in a society the person

who first lay his hand on a part of nature and made it usable with the help of labour that finally became his property. Here lies the idea of acquisition. Acquisition, thus, arises from man's intention to use something for his personal use which will satisfy his requirement. But there is a problem. Has every one opportunity to acquire holding/property through the utilisation of labour? This question originates from the concern that if everybody follows the same procedure ultimately there shall arise a shortage of property which means that everybody will not have any scope to acquire property. The labour is the main factor behind the acquisition and every one will have the opportunity to acquire property by dint of his labour. Locke arrived at this conclusion because he believed that there would be enough in the nature and none would be deprived of property. "Whatever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it is he has mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own and thereby makes his property. There is enough and as good left in common for others."

In this way acquisition was established in Lockean concepts of contract theory and property. This proves that even after the acquisition process continues enough portions of state of nature will remain for the acquisition of others. This process will not worsen the right and position of others in respect of the acquisition of property. But there is a complicated problem. If everybody goes on acquiring property freely or without any limitation, then time will come when nothing will be left or very little will be left for others which will not be enough for the sake of justice. A thorough study of Locke's The Second Treatise of Government assures us that he was quite aware of it. Nobody will be permitted to acquire more than what he needs. "A theory of appropriation incorporating the Lockean proviso will handle correctly the cases where someone appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life".

Whenever a person proceeds to appropriate holding/property he must not violate the Lockean proviso because any violation will go against justice. "Thus a person may not appropriate the only water hole in a desert and charge what he will. Nor may he charge what he will if he possesses one". "But this proviso would not, in Nozick's theory, prevent someone who discovered a cure for a fatal disease charging whatever price he liked".

### **Criticisms:**

Nozick's theory of justice is apparently attractive and convincing but in final analysis it is not so.

### **Critics have raised several objections against it:**

1. Nozick has given undue importance to distributive aspect of justice. Through the entitlement of holding he has built up the entitlement theory. Entitlement of holding may be in the form of acquisition or transfer or rectification of injustice. These are the cases of distribution but what about production? He has neglected it and we think that it is unjust. Both production and distribution are closely connected and to ignore one will lead to an incomplete theory.
2. Robert Nozick was in strong favour of minimal state which is equivalent to night watchman state. It means that in any society the state has a role to play, though the role may be minimum. Nozick's theory does not make it clear what role the state will exactly play in establishing justice. Moreover, since Nozick's theory falls into the category of distributive justice the state, through its elaborate machinery, must ensure proper distribution of holding, and at the same time entitlement to holding. If legal and other problems arise on the way of acquisition or trans-

fer or rectification of previous wrong who will take the responsibility of rectifying this or solving the problem? In Nozick's theory it remains unsolved.

3. Nozick has taken it for granted that people will strictly adhere to Locke's proviso that enough will be left for the use of others for their use and the situations of others will not worsen. This implies too much reliance on the rationality of holders or users of property. But we cannot say that all the property owners will resist them from acquiring property/holding beyond their necessity. If this happens in actual world, we are sure, there would not arise necessity of state or enforcing authority. Even the Utopian socialists and Rousseau could not imagine such a situation.
4. It is unfortunate that both Rawls and Nozick have offered us a theory of justice which they wanted to formulate in a society plagued by class divisions. If a society is divided into two opposing classes, and if one class is economically dominant the comparatively weak class would definitely be deprived of justice. For a real theory of justice, we firmly believe, there shall exist equality in its various manifestations.
5. Nozick, in his thorough analysis of distributive justice intends to highlight a greater philosophy and wants to draw the attention of his readers to politics which is popularly called liberalism. But though liberal philosophy has many good aspects, its black spots and irritating aspects are not to be ignored. The real picture of liberal political philosophy of USA, Britain, and other states is not unknown to us and in that perspective we can say that neither Rawls' nor Nozick's theory of justice attracts us. They are meant for capitalism.
6. Justice can be divided into social, economic and political and all are connected with each other. Rawls' and Nozick's theory speaks least about their connection. Their theory is based upon certain principles.

## Entitlements

Nozick's entitlements theory (as an extreme) treats no personal attributes as being arbitrary, and thus defines justice simply as laissez-faire, provided that no one's rights are infringed. In this view "the complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution" (1974, 151).

## The Basic Schema

Nozick introduces his approach to "distributive justice" by noting that the term is not a neutral one, but presupposes some central authority that is effecting the distribution. But that is misleading, for there is no such body. Someone's property holdings are not allocated to her by some central planner: they arise from the sweat of her brow or through voluntary exchanges with, or gifts from, others. There is "no more a distributing or distribution of shares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in which persons choose whom they shall marry" (1974, 150). Accordingly, Nozick holds that the justice of a state of affairs is a matter of whether individuals are entitled to their holdings. In Nozick's schema, individuals' entitlements are determined by two principles, justice in acquisition and justice in transfer: If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is

entitled to that holding.

2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice intransfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. (1974, 151)  
However, the world may not be wholly just: as Nozick observes, "not all actual situations are generated in accordance with the two principles of justice in holdings". The existence of past injustice "raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of injustice in holdings" (1974, 152).

## Patterns

Nozick distinguishes entitlement principles of justice from patterned principles. A principle is patterned if "it specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions". A distribution that is determined by peoples' ages or skin colours, or by their needs or merits, or by any combination of these, is patterned. Nozick claims that "almost every suggested principle of distributive justice is patterned" (1974, 156), where by "almost" he means "other than entitlement principles". The fundamental problem with patterned principles is that liberty upsets patterns. As Hume expresses it, "render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and industry will immediately break that equality" (1751, 3.2). Nozick argues this using his famous Wilt Chamberlain example.

Suppose that a distribution that is (uniquely) specified as just by some patterned principle of distributive justice is realized: this may be one in which everyone has an equal share of wealth, or where shares vary in any other patterned way. Now there is a basketball player, one Wilt Chamberlain, who is of average wealth but of superior ability. He enters into a contract with his employers under which he will receive 25 cents for each admission ticket sold to see him play. As he is so able a player a million people come to watch him. Accordingly, Mr Chamberlain earns a further \$250,000. The question is, is this new distribution, in which Mr Chamberlain is much better off than in the original distribution, and also much better off than the average person, just? One answer must be that it is not, for the new distribution differs from the old, and by hypothesis the old distribution (and only that distribution) was just. On the other hand, the original distribution was just, and people moved from that to the new distribution entirely voluntarily. Mr Chamberlain and his employers voluntarily entered into the contract; all those who chose to buy a ticket to watch Mr Chamberlain play did so voluntarily; and no one else was affected. All holdings under the original distribution were, by hypothesis, just, and people have used them to their advantage: if people were not entitled to use their holdings to their advantage (subject to not harming others) it is not clear why the original distribution would have allocated them any holdings. If the original distribution was just and people voluntarily moved from it to the new distribution then the new distribution must be just.

## Justice in Acquisition

Acquisition of material is considered to be just if what is acquired is freely available and if acquiring it leaves sufficient material for others. Giving an operational meaning to this requires the specification of what acquisition means, what is freely available, and how leaving sufficient material for

others is to be interpreted. In these, Nozick, albeit with reservations, follows Locke. Locke interprets “acquiring” as “mixing one’s labour with” (1689, 2.5.27). I own my labour, and if I inextricably mix my labour with something that no one else owns then I make that thing my own. However, as Nozick points out (without proposing any resolution of these) there are a number of problems with this interpretation. It is not clear why mixing something that I own with something that I do not own implies that I gain the latter rather than lose the former. In Nozick’s example, “if I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea ... do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” Further, it is not clear what determines how much of the unowned resource I come to own. If I build a fence around a previously unowned plot of land do I own all that I have enclosed, or simply the land under the fence? In Nozick’s example, “if a private astronaut clears a place on Mars, has he mixed his labor with (so that he comes to own) the whole planet, the whole uninhabited universe, or just a particular plot?” (1974, 174-175). Locke interprets “freely available” as being “in the state that nature hath provided”, and Nozick (without any argument) follows Locke in equating “freely available” with “unowned”. There are however, other possibilities. Virgin resources may be seen as being owned in common, or as being jointly owned in equal shares.

Locke interprets leaving sufficient for others as there being “enough, and as good, left in common for others” (1689, 2.5.27); this is the famous Lockean proviso. There are two possible interpretations of this: I may be made worse off by your appropriating a particular plot of land by no longer being able to appropriate it myself, or by no longer being able to use it. Nozick adopts the second, weaker, version.

### **Justice in Transfer**

The essence of Nozick’s principle of justice in transfer is that a transfer is just if it is voluntary, in that each party consents to it. Justice in transfer also involves the satisfaction of the Lockean proviso. This is both indirect and direct. It is indirect in that I cannot legitimately transfer to you something that has been acquired, by me or by anyone else, in violation of the proviso, for that thing is not rightfully mine to transfer. But the proviso is also direct, in that I may not by a series of transfers, each of which is legitimate on its own, acquire property that does not leave enough, and as good, for others.

### **Justice in Rectification**

Nozick’s basic schema applies to a world that is “wholly just”. However, the world may not be wholly just: people may have violated the principle of justice in acquisition, for example, by appropriating so much of a thing that an insufficient amount is left for others; or they may have violated the principle of justice in transfer, for example, by theft or fraud. Then, as Nozick observes, “the existence of past injustice (previous violations of the first two principles of justice in holdings) raises the third major topic under justice in holdings: the rectification of injustice in holdings”. Nozick identifies a number of questions that this raises: if past injustice has shaped present holdings in ways that are not identifiable, what should be done; how should violators compensate the victims; how does the position change if compensation is delayed; how, if at all, does the position change if the violators or the victims are no longer living; is an injustice done to someone whose holding which was itself based upon an injustice is appropriated; do acts of injustice lose their force over time; and what may the victims of injustice themselves do to rectify matters? However, these questions are not answered: as Nozick admits, “I do not know of a thorough or theoretically sophisticated treatment of such issues” (1974, 152).

## Summary

The strength of Nozick's entitlements theory of justice is that it uncompromisingly respects individual liberty, and thus avoids all the problems associated with patterned approaches to justice. However, by avoiding patterns it introduces its own problems, for in asking how distributions came about, rather than in simply assessing them as they are, Nozick necessarily delves into the mists of time. Here lie the two most significant, and related, problems with Nozick's theory: that of the relatively unsatisfactory nature of the principle of justice in initial acquisition, and that of the predominantly unexplained means of rectifying any injustice resulting from that.

## Dworkin; Justice as equality Equality of Resources

Equality of resources, as developed by Dworkin, treats individuals' abilities and external resources as arbitrary, but makes no adjustments for their preferences. The essence of this approach is the distinction between ambition-sensitivity, which recognizes differences which are due to differing ambitions, and endowment-sensitivity, which recognizes differences that are due to differing endowments.

## Initial Resources

Dworkin accepts that inequalities are acceptable if they result from voluntary choices, but not if they result from disadvantages that have not been chosen. However, initial equality of resources is not sufficient for justice. Even if everyone starts from the same position one person may fare better than another because of her good luck, or, alternatively, because of her lesser handicaps or greater talents. Dworkin motivates his theory of justice with the example of a number of survivors of a shipwreck who are washed up, with no belongings, on an uninhabited island with abundant natural resources. The survivors accept that these resources should be allocated among them in some equitable fashion, and agree that for a division to be equitable it must meet "the envy test", which requires that no one "would prefer someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle" (1981, 285). The envy test, however, is too weak a test: Dworkin gives examples of allocations that meet this test but appear inequitable. Can you give an illustration here To deal with such cases Dworkin proposes that the survivors appoint an auctioneer who gives each of them an equal number of tokens. The auctioneer divides the resources into a number of lots and proposes a system of prices, one for each lot, denominated in tokens. The survivors bid for the lots, with the requirement that their total proposed expenditure in tokens not exceed their endowment of tokens. If all markets clear, that is, if there is precisely one would-be purchaser for each lot, then the process ends. If all markets do not clear then the auctioneer adjusts the prices, and continues to adjust them until they do.

## Fortune

Dworkin seeks to make people responsible for the effects of their choices, but not for matters beyond their control. To take account of the latter, he distinguishes between "option luck" and "brute luck". Option luck is "a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out". Brute luck is "a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles" (1981, 293). People should be responsible for the outcomes of option luck, but not of brute luck. Dworkin's key argument concerning luck is that "insurance, so far as it is available, provides a link between brute and option luck, because the decision to buy or reject catastrophe insurance is a calculated gamble". Then because people should be responsible for the outcomes of option luck they should be responsible for the outcomes of all luck, at least if they could have bought insurance. Accordingly, Dworkin amends his envy test by requiring that "any resources gained through a successful gamble should be represented by the opportunity to take the gamble at the odds in force, and compa-

able adjustments made to the resources of those who have lost through gambles” (1981, 293-295).

## **Handicaps**

Insurance cannot remove all risks: if someone is born blind he cannot buy insurance against blindness. Dworkin seeks to take account of this through a hypothetical insurance scheme. He asks how much an average person would be prepared to pay for insurance against being handicapped if in the initial state everyone had the same, and known, chance of being handicapped. He then supposes that “the average person would have purchased insurance at that level” (1981, 298), and proposes to compensate those who do develop handicaps out of a fund that is collected by taxation but designed to match the fund that would have been provided through insurance premiums. The compensation that someone with a handicap is to receive is the contingent compensation that he would have purchased, knowing the risk of being handicapped, had actual insurance been available. Accordingly, the auction procedure is amended so that the survivors “now establish a hypothetical insurance market which they effectuate through compulsory insurance at a fixed premium for everyone based on speculations about what the average immigrant... would have purchased by way of insurance had the antecedent risk of various handicaps been equal” (1981, 301).

This process establishes equality of effective resources at the outset, but this equality will typically be disturbed by subsequent economic activity. If some survivors choose to work more than others they will produce, and thus have, more than their more leisurely compatriots. Thus at some stage the envy test will not be met. This, however, does not create a problem because the envy test is to be applied diachronically: “it requires that no one envy the bundle of occupation and resources at the disposal of anyone else over time, though someone may envy another’s bundle at any particular time” (1981, 306). Since everyone had the opportunity to work hard it would violate rather than endorse equality of resources if the wealth of the hardworking were from time to time to be distributed to the more leisurely.

## **Talents**

The essential reason why differential talents create a problem is that equality of resources at the outset will typically be disturbed, not because of morally acceptable differences in work habits, but because of morally arbitrary differences in talents. Requiring equality of resources only at the outset would be what Dworkin calls a starting-gate theory of fairness, which Dworkin sees as being “very far from equality of resources” and strongly rejects: “indeed it is hardly a coherent political theory at all”. Such a theory holds that justice requires equality of initial resources, but accepts laissez-faire thereafter. The fundamental problem with a starting-gate theory is that it relies on some purely arbitrary starting point. If the requirement of equality of resources is to apply at one arbitrary point, then presumably it is to apply at other points. If justice requires a Dworkinian auction when the survivors arrive, then it must require such an auction from time to time thereafter; and if justice accepts laissez-faire thereafter, it must accept it when they arrive. Dworkin requires neither that there be periodic auctions nor that there be laissez-faire at all times. His theory does not suppose that an equal division of resources is appropriate at one point in time but not at any other; it argues only that the resources available to someone at any moment be a function of the resources available to or consumed by him at others.

Dworkin’s aim is to specify a scheme that allows the distribution of resources at any point of time to be both ambition-sensitive, in that it reflects the cost or benefit to others of the choices people

make, but not be endowment-sensitive, in that it allows scope for differences in ability among people with the same ambitions. To achieve this, Dworkin proposes a hypothetical insurance scheme that is analogous to that for handicaps. In this scheme it is supposed that people know what talents they have, but not the income that these will produce, and choose a level of insurance accordingly. An imaginary agency knows each person's talents and preferences, and also knows what resources are available and the technology for transforming these into other resources. On the basis of this it computes the income structure, that is, the number of people earning each level of income that will emerge in a competitive market. Each person may buy insurance from the agency to cover the possibility of his income falling below whatever level he cares to name. Dworkin asks "how much of such insurance would the survivors, on average, buy, at what specified level of income coverage, and at what cost?" (1981, 317) and claims that the agency can answer this question.

This, however, is not clear. Consider four very weak requirements of such a scheme: it should distribute resources in such a way that not everyone could be better off under any alternative scheme; an increase in the resources available for allocation should not make anyone worse off; if two people have the same preferences and abilities then they should be allocated the same resources; and the scheme should not damage those whom it seeks to help. As is shown by Roemer, there is in Dworkin's framework no scheme that satisfies these requirements, so that "resource egalitarianism is an incoherent notion" (1985, 178).

## Summary

The strength of Dworkin's equality of resources theory of justice is that it seeks to introduce ambition-sensitivity without allowing endowment-sensitivity. To the extent to which it succeeds in this it thus, in Cohen's words, incorporates within egalitarianism "the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility" (1989, 933). However, it is not entirely successful in this endeavour. There are a number of problems with Dworkin's auction scheme: for example, it is not clear that the auctioneer will ever discover prices at which there is precisely one would-be purchaser for each lot. However, these may be avoided by adopting the intended outcome of the auction, that is, as a free-market outcome in which everyone has the same wealth, as a specification of justice in its own right. But the problems with the insurance scheme are deeper, as Roemer's argument (presented above) demonstrates.

## Amartya Sen and the Idea of Justice

What is justice? What does a just society look like? And what principles should guide us there? These questions have occupied an entire tradition - the dominant tradition - of political philosophy, led above all by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and among contemporary philosophers by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. But ask Amartya Sen and he will tell you they are precisely the wrong ones to ask. In his most recent book, *The Idea of Justice*, he argues that this traditional strain of political philosophy, which seeks to identify 'the just', or a single set of just principles that can then be used to design perfectly just institutions for governing society, reveals little about how we can identify and reduce injustices in the here and now.

According to Sen, the dominant approach, which he refers to as 'transcendental institutionalism', is beleaguered by two central problems: the problem of feasibility and the problem of redundancy. The first is a result of the practical difficulty, even impossibility, of arriving at a single set of principles that can help us to select just institutions through a process of impartial reasoning. In Rawls'

theory of justice, for instance, his two lexically ordered principles of justice are, it is argued, those that would be unanimously selected through an impartial decision procedure - through the hypothetical original position using the 'veil of ignorance' device. These principles then provide the basis for choosing actual institutions in the 'legislative stage'. Clearly, however, much depends on the assumption that Rawls' two principles of justice are those that would indeed emerge from the original position. And Sen is skeptical that this is so.

In fact, Sen maintains that there are many principles that can pass the test of impartiality. He illustrates this point, first, using an anecdote about the competing claims of three children over the distribution of a single flute. One child argues that they should receive the flute because they are the best flautist; the second, because they are the poorest of the lot; and the third, because they crafted the flute without help from the others. The three arguments are based, in turn, on principles of utility, economic equity, and the entitlement to the fruits of one's unaided efforts. Each can be defended with strong, impartial arguments. And, returning to Rawls, it is similarly possible, for example, to provide substantial reasons for selecting Harsanyi's utilitarian principle in the place of Rawls' maximin principle as the basis for resolving distributional questions within a situation similar to the original position.

But this indeterminacy has profound implications for Rawls' theory of justice, for 'if there is no unique emergence of a given set of principles of justice that together identify the institutions needed for the basic structure of society, then the entire procedure of justice as fairness, as developed in Rawls' classic theory, would be hard to use'. Sen even suggests that Rawls' basic claim about the emergence of a unique set of principles of justice from the original position (as defended in *A Theory of Justice*) was considerably qualified in his later writings, such as *The Law of Peoples*, and that accepting the full implications of these qualifications would mean abandoning the stage-by-stage theory of justice.

The second problem - the redundancy problem - is that the identification of fully just social arrangements is neither a necessary nor sufficient guide to reasoned choice of just policies, strategies or institutions. It is insufficient because, as Sen explains, 'the characterization of spotless justice, even if such a characterization were to emerge clearly, would not entail any delineation whatsoever of how diverse departures from spotlessness would be compared and ranked'. In other words, using an analogy with paintings, the fact that a person regards Da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* as the most perfect picture in the world does not reveal anything about how they would rank a Picasso against a Van Gogh. But it is also unnecessary because in adjudicating between the various merits of a Picasso and a Van Gogh there is no reason to identify the most perfect picture in the world, just as when determining the relative heights of Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount McKinley knowing that Mount Everest is taller than both is an entirely redundant fact.

In contrast to transcendental institutionalism, Sen advocates what he calls a 'realization-focused comparative approach'. In doing so, he sides with thinkers such as Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx, and JS Mill, among others, who each attempted to evaluate the desirability of particular 'social realizations', rather than search for a set of perfectly just first principles. It may not be possible to agree on perfectly just institutions, but, Sen contends, using a comparative approach we can at least arrive at widespread consensus on the injustice of certain practices or outcomes relative to others.

Such a comparative approach to questions of justice, he believes, is closely aligned with social

choice theory, one of the many fields in which Sen made his mark as an economist, earning him a Nobel-prize in 1998. Social choice theory assumes that, like the plurality of impartial principles of justice that can plausibly sustain critical scrutiny, there can be a variety of competing principles that figure in our assessments of various social orderings. And while it may sometimes appear to be impossible to satisfy all or even most of these competing principles at once - as in Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem, for example - such impasses can often be resolved by incorporating more information about interpersonal comparisons of well-being and relative advantages. Similarly, Sen insists, 'for an adequate understanding of the demands of justice, the needs of social organizations and institutions, and the satisfactory making of public policies, we have to seek much more information and scrutinizing evidence'.

This, in particular, is something that Sen believes that Rawls' theory does not do well. Sen offers Rawls' use of the original position as an example of what he calls 'closed impartiality'. The 'veil of ignorance' device is, Sen admits, a useful, if hypothetical, way of reaching an impartial social choice, free of various vested interests. But it does not ensure the open scrutiny of the values of the people within the original position. The vast plurality of alternative views held by outsiders - their unique moral perspectives and rankings of social realizations that can reveal hidden biases in our choice of basic principles - are simply beyond the scope of Rawls' theory. Furthermore, by limiting moral claims of outsiders we may be doing an injustice to those that fall outside the artificially closed circle of the original position.

Sen contrasts this example of 'closed impartiality' with the 'open impartiality' of Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator'. Smith's reflective device, which asks us to observe our actions and institutions from the standpoint of an outsider, specifically refrains from limiting the extent to which the views of others can be considered, refusing to confine moral discussion within the boundaries of a nation-state or any other locality. And, as in social choice theory, such openness to, and critical reflection upon, alternative views and different ways of approaching social problems, Sen believes, can provide a more solid ground for ranking the 'just-ness' or, at least, manifest injustice of certain social realizations, even if they are merely partial and ordinal rather than comprehensive, cardinal rankings.

Of course, an engagement with contrary arguments does not imply that we will be able to arrive at agreed positions on every issue (and Sen does not see this as a drawback in his theory - not at all), nor does it oblige us to accept any of them. But there is a connection between what Sen calls the 'objectivity' of an ethical judgment and its ability to withstand open public scrutiny. Sen thus underscores the importance of public reasoning for justice throughout the book, and he regards democracy, especially when understood as 'government by discussion'

rather than the Schumpeterian 'government by elections', as a particularly appropriate form of public reasoning, which can serve to increase the 'objectivity' of political solutions.

Without doubt, the argument Sen presents in *The Idea of Justice* deserves to be seriously considered by contemporary political philosophers and lay-readers alike. It commands respect, for even if it fails to convince it will surely sharpen the arguments of others. Much of what passes for philosophy, including political philosophy, has been repeatedly accused of being irrelevant to the real choices and concerns of those outside of philosophy departments. And in *The Idea of Justice* Sen presents a serious challenge to those departments, forcing them to prove their relevance and demonstrate how they can actually inform tough decision-making.

However, if we are convinced by Sen's argument, this raises interesting questions about the role of the philosopher and their claim to any authority or special knowledge. According to Sen, 'philosophers' should not - and cannot - strive to become the architects of castles in the sky. Instead, he asks us all to start right at the foundations: to share, explore, and debate our perspectives on how to repair the edifices in which we currently live. Justice arises not from a blueprint, but from a process of open public reasoning in which as many potential policies, strategies or institutions are considered as possible. However, in this process it is not clear that the people who currently occupy philosophy departments have any special standing. They become, according to Sen, purveyors rather than adjudicators of wisdom, on an even standing with economists, doctors, scientists and lawyers, with whom they should collaborate intensely. Sen's Philosopherturns out to be anyone willing to cross boundaries, willing to explore alternative ways of thinking and living across disciplines, communities and time. What matters is that people know more about what's out there and make more informed choices - that they are smarter - because, for Sen, smarter is better.

### **Amartya Sen's Development as Freedom**

Amartya Sen's *Development as Freedom* has been widely praised as a way forward for a more humane society since it was published a decade ago in 1999, the year after its author won the Bank of Sweden prize in economics (otherwise known as the Nobel Prize for economics). To many, it is the standard for ethical economics, so much so that one critic laments 'until now the issue of ethics and economics, especially in the context of development, has been dominated by Amartya Sen, almost to the extent of being a one-man show with supporting acts' (Fine, 2004). Kofi Annan says of Amartya Sen that 'the world's poor and dispossessed could have no more articulate or insightful a champion'. It has almost reached the point where criticizing Amartya Sen, like Mother Theresa, is out of bounds. In this critical assessment of Sen's much lauded book, **Denis O'Hearn** considers its central thesis and impact on development.

### **The argument**

Sen's thesis is simple. Freedom is both the primary end and the principal means of development. Insofar as many of us have been critical of approaches to development that emphasize growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rising personal incomes, industrialization, technological advance, or social modernization, we should be glad that such a distinguished economist is apparently tooting our horn. Yet there are deeply troubling elements in Sen's basic assumptions about the nature of people and his lack of a feasible prescription for reaching his stated goals that make *Development as Freedom* not just misguided but even rather dangerous.

Sen gives two reasons why freedom should be the primary element of development: first, the only acceptable evaluation of human progress is primarily and ultimately enhancement of freedom; second, the achievement of development is dependent on the free agency of people. Many people will agree with the first assertion, as long as the definition of freedom is wide enough to include freedom from material or spiritual want, which it does for Sen. The second assertion is more controversial within mainstream economics and popular discourse: the reason usually given by economists to cut back on public expenditures, including education, housing, healthcare and social welfare, is that poor economies cannot afford such expenditures and that development (in terms of economic growth) must happen first and only then can societies afford to look after the social welfare of their people (for a classic version of this 'stage' thesis, see Rostow, 1960). Sen breaks with this orthodoxy, providing evidence that high incomes do not necessarily lead to wellbeing (for instance, in terms of life expectancy), and arguing that welfare expenditures can be a spur to rather

than a drain on economic growth, especially since they are labor-intensive and since labor is so cheap in poor countries. Thus, he argues against the 'Lee Thesis', named for President Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, which states that denying political and civil rights is acceptable if it promotes economic development and the general wealth of the population (Sen, 1999:15). He rightly insists that we should approach political freedoms and civil rights not through the means of eventually achieving them (GDP growth) but as a direct good in their own right. Freedom is also good because it creates growth.

Sen mentions five distinct freedoms: political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. Freedom, he says, is a principle determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness; it is good primarily because it enhances the ability of individuals to help themselves, a property that Sen describes as the 'agency aspect' of the individual (Sen, 1999:19). Thus, his definition of poverty is individual: it is the deprivation of basic capabilities, always defined as individual capabilities. Having stated the prerequisites of freedom and capability in individual terms, Sen never attempts to derive the social origins of ethics, or their historical or cultural specificity, or the ways in which some kinds of capability may be socially organized rather than just a sum of individual capacities. Social capabilities are derived from individual ones and, although Sen recognizes a need for social institutions, it is only to buttress individual freedoms that may be suppressed by imperfections of capitalism that arise from wrong-headed approaches to development. In echoing the political economist Adam Smith, Sen sees social institutions as having a limited role as you cannot replace individual responsibility by social regulation: 'there is no substitute for individual responsibility' (Sen, 1999:283). Unemployment is bad because of its 'far-reaching debilitating effects on individual freedom, initiative, and skills'. Sen thus asserts the positive role of the market and opposes regulations that impede the freedom of people to decide where to work, what to produce, and what to consume. In his argument for economic freedom, he oddly cites Marx, saying that his support for the end of bondage and use of terms such as 'free labor' meant that Marx was an advocate of capitalist freedoms. His conception of democracy is limited to pluralist or electoral democracy, without knowledge of critiques of the exercise of power within pluralism (Lukes, 1974) or conception of alternative models of democracy such as confederalism (see Bookchin, 1989).

The center of Sen's vision is what he calls a 'capability approach', where the basic concern of human development is 'our capability to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value', rather than the usual concentration on rising GDP, technical progress, or industrialization (Sen, 1999:285). His approach 'inescapably focuses on the agency and judgment of individuals' (ibid.:288) including their capability, responsibility, and opportunity. Raising human capability is good because it improves: the choices, wellbeing, and freedom of people; their role in influencing social change; and their role in influencing economic production.

He painstakingly distinguishes human capability from human capital. Human capital is important, as it refers to the agency of people in augmenting production possibilities. Yet human capability is more important because it refers to the substantive freedom of people to lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real choices they have. Education, for example, is crucial beyond its role in production; its most important role being that of increasing human capability and therefore choice. Again, Sen cites Adam Smith who links productive abilities to lifestyles to education and training, and presumes the improvability of each. While the popularity of the concept of human capital is for Sen 'certainly an enriching move', it needs supplementation by an approach that takes human capability as its central concern.

## Another side to Sen?

The apparently progressive and humane aspects of Sen's thesis are outweighed, fatally I believe, by several problems: individualism, microeconomic foundations to the exclusion of macroeconomics, localism, and lack of historical understanding. For a supposedly progressive analysis, Sen's sources of inspiration are rather strange. Most frequently quoted is Adam Smith, particularly on the subject of freedom to engage in exchange and transaction as a basic liberty but also in his defenses of the state's limited role in certain aspects of general social welfare and his concern with 'necessities' and 'conditions of living'. Also quoted as champions of freedom are: Aristotle, for his focus on 'flourishing' and 'capacity'; Montesquieu and James Stuart, for their invocation of interest as a bulwark against despotism; and Friedrich Hayek, for championing liberties and freedoms as a foundation of economic progress. In the end, Sen is ultimately revealed as a champion of capitalism with good values such as transparency, where people can be trusted to do what they say they will do, and good behavioral ethics.

It is unsurprising that Sen should invoke Hayek in such a positive light, for his economics while humane are almost entirely centred on the individual, and he usually cites freedom in the context of 'individual freedom', saying that the most important aspect of freedom is its 'opportunity aspect...the extent to which people have the opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value' (Sen, 1999:291). Essentially, then, Sen proposes that development is driven by capitalism laced with good values: transparency, where folks can be trusted to do what they say they will do, decent behavioral ethics, etc.. Yet he provides no theory of where such ethics originate, apart from the apparent righteousness of arguments like his own about the superiority of being good and trustworthy. In capitalism, as we have been shown time and again, reasoned argument is simply not enough.

His 'entitlement' and 'capability' approaches are individualistic in methodology, derived from microeconomics and generalized by adding problems of access to non-market-related entitlements. As Ben Fine (2004) says, Sen's conception of development boils down to 'what can I get from what I have, given the conditions for transforming one to the other?' It is 'profoundly neutral' with respect both to underlying social relations and the historical specificity of unequal entitlements. His is a quite Eurocentric understanding of equity that goes back to Hobbes' seventeenth century definition of equal insecurity and equal subordination to the market. Although Sen explains that his conception of ethics sprang from a racist murder of a Muslim that he witnessed in Bangladesh during his youth, it is surprising that his understanding of ethics and economic man is so resolutely Western. However, Fine suggests that this may be explained by his Cambridge economics training and by the degree to which economics as a discipline and way of thinking has colonized the other social sciences.

What is most surprising about Sen's analysis, given his subject is development among the less wealthy regions of the world, is the absence of a theory of global capitalism. Indeed, he ignores problems of unequal trade, including disadvantageous international divisions of labor, the exercise of global power and the behavior of International Financial Institutions. Sen's lack of historical or global consideration is most apparent in his analysis of famine, which he provides as the major reason why freedom must accompany development. Economic security, he insists, derives from freedom. 'It is not surprising', he says, 'that no famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy'. Rather, famines tend to occur in one-party governments and military dictatorships and colonies ruled from elsewhere. Economic security is one of the 'advantages of democratic pluralism'. Or, again, 'a society that allows famines to occur when pre-

vention is possible is unjust in a clearly significant way'. Societies need to identify 'patent injustices'. This begs the question, what is a 'society'? For Sen society simply appears to be the nation state, or state governments within a federal system, with no conception of how 'patent injustices' may arise because of and be reproduced by world-systemic processes and interrelations.

Obviously Sen has either not read or simply decided to ignore the role of the West and global processes in causing famine. In his book, *Victorian Holocausts*, Mike Davis makes a compelling case that the third world was created by famine, which was a tool both invented and used by Western colonial powers to move people off of the land and enable the institution of private property and excessive rents. Thus, in his consistent effort to place all economic consequences in the hands of individuals (who have more or less capability), and their governments (which enable or not), Sen fails to consider that the best of pluralist parliaments face world economic processes and powers over which they have little or no control. The West has enjoyed pluralist democracy (which, by the way, is no utopia) in many cases because the rest of the world starved.

### **Conclusion: Sen today?**

It is not surprising that Amartya Sen's work has received such universal acclaim, even by mainstream economists. Clearly his vision is a humane one. Yet because he remains on the safe ground of Western individualism and avoids critical analysis of major western states and institutions, his work is hardly threatening. It provides plenty of wiggle room for states and institutions that want to show 'improvement' in freedom, equality, life expectancy, education and capacity, and so on, without really questioning or much less changing their status quo. There is a whole other part of the world that is not touched by Sen's analysis of development and it is now going through one of its deepest crises. The basic developmental focus that has been with us since at least Aristotle, the development of possessive individualism where freedom is defined by security of property and the ability to trade it on markets, is extended into Sen's conceptions of development. This individualistic world predominates today in the Washington Consensus, trade liberalization, and in agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). These policies aim to reinforce the impact of possessive individualism by extending the freedom of transnational corporations (TNCs) and rich investors to 'engage in exchange and transaction' throughout the world.

In the name of liberalization, communities are broken down and they lose capacity and capability. Even those few of their members who manage to gain more education and skills or accumulate some capital through micro-financing find themselves constrained by the way that the market limits where they can sell their labor, to whom, for what price, and in how it is used. Meanwhile, speculators on the futures market use their greatly expanded rights of the past two decades to 'engage in exchange and transaction' in a way that has caused sharp increases in the price of food staples like lentils, wheat and rice, and severe housing instability. Countries such as India that try to regulate such speculation are subject to sanctions as the International Financial Institutions liberalize financial services under GATS (see for example Vander Stichele, 2008). Privatization of water, gas, and other basic resources under the guise of freedom to 'engage in exchange and transaction' mean that more people than ever are vulnerable to ill-health or death through the lack of these basic necessities.

Increasingly, observers of global capitalism and privatisation conclude that we now require concepts of development that recognize and emphasize the collective rights of communities, women, and the poor to find alternative routes to 'development as freedom'. In many places today, particu-

larly in Latin America, there is a struggle not so much between Washington and the global South, but between emerging movements and progressive governments of different shades about whether and to what degree a livable world is really possible under the old rules of global liberalization.

## **Sen's Capability Approach**

The Capability Approach is defined by its choice of focus upon the moral significance of individuals' capability of achieving the kind of lives they have reason to value. This distinguishes it from more established approaches to ethical evaluation, such as utilitarianism or resourcism, which focus exclusively on subjective well-being or the availability of means to the good life, respectively. A person's capability to live a good life is defined in terms of the set of valuable 'beings and doings' like being in good health or having loving relationships with others to which they have real access.

The Capability Approach was first articulated by the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen in the 1980s, and remains most closely associated with him. It has been employed extensively in the context of human development, for example, by the United Nations Development Programme, as a broader, deeper alternative to narrowly economic metrics such as growth in GDP per capita. Here 'poverty' is understood as deprivation in the capability to live a good life, and 'development' is understood as capability expansion.

Within academic philosophy the novel focus of Capability Approach has attracted a number of scholars. It is seen to be relevant for the moral evaluation of social arrangements beyond the development context, for example, for considering gender justice. It is also seen as providing foundations for normative theorising, such as a capability theory of justice that would include an explicit 'metric' (that specifies which capabilities are valuable) and 'rule' (that specifies how the capabilities are to be distributed). The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has provided the most influential version of such a capability theory of justice, deriving from the requirements of human dignity a list of central capabilities to be incorporated into national constitutions and guaranteed to all up to a certain threshold.

This article focuses on the philosophical aspects of the Capability Approach and its foundations in the work of Amartya Sen. It discusses the development and structure of Sen's account, how it relates to other ethical approaches, and its main contributions and criticisms. It also outlines various capability theories developed within the Capability Approach, with particular attention to that of Martha Nussbaum.

## **The Development of Sen's Capability Approach**

### **a. Sen's Background**

Amartya Sen had an extensive background in development economics, social choice theory (for which he received the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics), and philosophy before developing the Capability Approach during the 1980s. This background can be pertinent to understanding and assessing Sen's Capability Approach because of the complementarity between Sen's contributions to these different fields. Sen's most influential and comprehensive account of his Capability Approach, *Development as Freedom* (Sen 1999), helpfully synthesizes in an accessible way many of these particular, and often quite technical, contributions.

Sen first introduced the concept of capability in his Tanner Lectures on Equality of What? (Sen 1979) and went on to elaborate it in subsequent publications during the 1980s and 1990s. Sen

notes that his approach has strong conceptual connections with **Aristotle's** understanding of human flourishing (this was the initial foundation for Nussbaum's alternative Capability Theory); with **Adam Smith**, and with Karl Marx. Marx discussed the importance of functionings and capability for human well-being. For example, Sen often cites Smith's analysis of relative poverty in *The Wealth of Nations* in terms of how a country's wealth and different cultural norms affected which material goods were understood to be a 'necessity'. Sen also cites Marx's foundational concern with "replacing the domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances".

## **b. Sen's Concerns**

The Capability Approach attempts to address various concerns that Sen had about contemporary approaches to the evaluation of well-being, namely:

- (1) Individuals can differ greatly in their abilities to convert the same resources into valuable functionings ('beings' and 'doings'). For example, those with physical disabilities may need specific goods to achieve mobility, and pregnant women have specific nutritional requirements to achieve good health. Therefore, evaluation that focuses only on means, without considering what particular people can do with them, is insufficient.
- (2) People can internalize the harshness of their circumstances so that they do not desire what they can never expect to achieve. This is the phenomenon of 'adaptive preferences' in which people who are objectively very sick may, for example, still declare, and believe, that their health is fine. Therefore, evaluation that focuses only on subjective mental metrics is insufficient without considering whether that matches with what a neutral observer would perceive as their objective circumstances.
- (3) Whether or not people take up the options they have, the fact that they do have valuable options is significant. For example, even if the nutritional state of people who are fasting and starving is the same, the fact that fasting is a choice not to eat should be recognized. Therefore evaluation must be sensitive to both actual achievements ('functionings') and effective freedom ('capability').
- (4) Reality is complicated and evaluation should reflect that complexity rather than take a shortcut by excluding all sorts of information from consideration in advance. For example, although it may seem obvious that happiness matters for the evaluation of how well people are doing, it is not all obvious that it should be the only aspect that ever matters and so nothing else should be considered. Therefore, evaluation of how well people are doing must seek to be as open-minded as possible. (Note: This leads to the deliberate 'under-theorization' of the Capability Approach that has been the source of some criticism, and it motivated the development of Nussbaum's alternative Capability Theory.)

## **2. Sen's Critiques of Utilitarianism and Resourcism**

An important part of Sen's argument for the Capability Approach relates to his critique of alternative philosophical and economics accounts. In particular, he argues that, whatever their particular strengths, none of them provide an analysis of well-being that is suitable as a general concept; they are all focused on the wrong particular things (whether utility, liberty, commodities, or primary goods), and they are too narrowly focused (they exclude too many important aspects from evalua-

tion). Sen's criticisms of economic utilitarianism and John Rawls' primary goods are particularly important in the evolution of his account and its reception.

## **a. Utilitarianism**

Economics has a branch explicitly concerned with ethical analysis ('Welfare Economics'). Sen's systematic criticism of the form of utilitarianism behind welfare economics identifies and rejects each of its three pillars: act consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking.

### **i. Act-Consequentialism**

According to act consequentialism, actions should be assessed only in terms of the goodness or badness of their consequences. This excludes any consideration of the morality of the process by which consequences are brought about, for example, whether it respects principles of fairness or individual agency. Sen argues instead for a 'comprehensive consequentialism' which integrates the moral significance of both consequences and principles. For example, it matters not only whether people have an equal capability to live a long life, but how that equality is achieved. Under the same circumstances women generally live longer than men, for largely biological reasons. If the only thing that mattered was achieving equality in the capability to live a long life this fact suggests that health care provision should be biased in favor of men. However, as Sen argues, trying to achieve equality in this way would override important moral claims of fairness which should be included in a comprehensive evaluation.

### **ii. Welfarism**

Welfarism is the view that goodness should be assessed only in terms of subjective utility. Sen argues that welfarism exhibits both 'valuational neglect' and 'physical condition neglect'. First, although welfarism is centrally concerned with how people feel about their lives, it is only concerned with psychological states, not with people's reflective valuations. Second, because it is concerned only with feelings it neglects information about physical health, though this would seem obviously relevant to assessing well-being. Not only does subjective welfare not reliably track people's actual interests or even their urgent needs, it is also vulnerable to what Sen calls 'adaptive preferences'. People can become so normalized to their conditions of material deprivation and social injustice that they may claim to be entirely satisfied. As Sen puts it, Our mental reactions to what we actually get and what we can sensibly expect to get may frequently involve compromises with a harsh reality. The destitute thrown into beggary, the vulnerable landless labourer precariously surviving at the edge of subsistence, the overworked domestic servant working round the clock, the subdued and subjugated housewife reconciled to her role and her fate, all tend to come to terms with their respective predicaments. The deprivations are suppressed and muffled in the scale of utilities (reflected by desire-fulfilment and happiness) by the necessity of endurance in uneventful survival. (Sen 1985, 21-22).

### **iii. Sum Ranking**

Sum-ranking focuses on maximizing the total amount of welfare in a society without regard for how it is distributed, although this is generally felt to be important by the individuals concerned. Sen argues, together with liberal philosophers such as Bernard Williams and John Rawls, that sum-ranking does not take seriously the distinction between persons. Sen also points out that individuals differ in their ability to convert resources such as income into welfare. For example, a disabled person may need expensive medical and transport equipment to achieve the same level of welfare. A society that tried to maximize the total amount of welfare would distribute resources so that the marginal increase in welfare from giving an extra dollar to any person would be the same. Resources would therefore be distributed away from the sick and disabled to people who are more

efficient convertors of resources into utility.

## **b. Resourcism**

Resourcism is defined by its neutrality about what constitutes the good life. It therefore assesses how well people are doing in terms of their possession of the general purpose resources necessary for the construction of any particular good life. Sen's criticism of **John Rawls'** influential account of the fair distribution of primary goods stands in for a criticism of resourcist approaches in general. Sen's central argument is that resources should not be the exclusive focus of concern for a fairness-based theory of justice, even if, like Rawls's primary goods, they are deliberately chosen for their general usefulness to a good life. The reason is that this focus excludes consideration of the variability in individuals' actual abilities to convert resources into valuable outcomes. In other words, two people with the same vision of the good life and the same bundle of resources may not be equally able to achieve that life, and so resourcists' neutrality about the use of resources is not as fair as they believe it is. More specifically, Sen disputes Rawls' argument that the principles of justice should be worked out first for the 'normal' case, in terms of a social contract conceived as a rational scheme for mutually advantageous cooperation between people equally able to contribute to society, and only later extended to 'hard' cases, such as of disability. Sen believes such cases are far from abnormal and excluding them at the beginning risks building a structure that excludes them permanently. The general problem is that such accounts 'fetishize' resources as the embodiment of advantage, rather than focusing on the relationship between resources and people. Nevertheless Sen acknowledges that although the distribution of resources should not be the direct concern in evaluating how well people are doing, it is very relevant to considerations of procedural fairness.

## **3. Core Concepts and Structure of Sen's Capability Approach**


This section provides a technical overview of Sen's account.

### **a. Functionings and Capability**

When evaluating well-being, Sen argues, the most important thing is to consider what people are actually able to be and do. The commodities or wealth people have or their mental reactions (utility) are an inappropriate focus because they provide only limited or indirect information about how well a life is going. Sen illustrates his point with the example of a standard bicycle. This has the characteristics of 'transportation' but whether it will actually provide transportation will depend on the characteristics of those who try to use it. It might be considered a generally useful tool for most people to extend their mobility, but it obviously will not do that for a person without legs. Even if that person, by some quirk, finds the bicycle delightful, we should nevertheless be able to note within our evaluative system that she still lacks transportation. Nor does this mental reaction show that the same person would not appreciate transportation if it were really available to her. The Capability Approach focuses directly on the quality of life that individuals are actually able to achieve. This quality of life is analyzed in terms of the core concepts of 'functionings' and 'capability'.

- Functionings are states of 'being and doing' such as being well-nourished, having shelter. They should be distinguished from the commodities employed to achieve them (as 'bicycling' is distinguishable from 'possessing a bike').
- Capability refers to the set of valuable functionings that a person has effective access to. Thus, a person's capability represents the effective freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different kinds of life – that she has reason to value. (In later work, Sen refers to 'capabilities' in the plural (or even 'freedoms') instead of a single ca-

pability set, and this is also common in the wider capability literature. This allows analysis to focus on sets of functionings related to particular aspects of life, for example, the capabilities of literacy, health, or political freedom.)



**Figure 1. Outline of the core relationships in the Capability Approach**

Figure 1 outlines the core relationships of the Capability Approach and how they relate to the main alternative approaches focused on resources and utility. Resources (such as a bicycle) are considered as an input, but their value depends upon individuals’ ability to convert them into valuable functionings (such as bicycling), which depends, for example, on their personal physiology (such as health), social norms, and physical environment (such as road quality). An individual’s capability set is the set of valuable functionings that an individual has real access to. Achieved functionings are those they actually select. For example, an individual’s capability set may include access to different functionings relating to mobility, such as walking, bicycling, taking a public bus, and so on. The functioning they actually select to get to work may be the public bus. Utility is considered both an output and a functioning. Utility is an output because what people choose to do and to be naturally has an effect on their sense of subjective well-being (for example, the pleasure of bicycling to work on a sunny day). However the Capability Approach also considers subjective well-being – feeling happy – as a valuable functioning in its own right and incorporates it into the capability framework.

**b. Valuation: Which Functionings Matter for the Good Life?**

Sen argues that the correct focus for evaluating how well off people are is their capability to live a life we have reason to value, not their resource wealth or subjective well-being. But in order to begin to evaluate how people are performing in terms of capability, we first need to determine which functionings matter for the good life and how much, or at least we need to specify a valuation procedure for determining this.

One way of addressing the problem is to specify a list of the constituents of the flourishing life, and do this on philosophical grounds (Martha Nussbaum does this for her Capability Theory of Justice). Sen rejects this approach because he argues that it denies the relevance of the values

people may come to have and the role of democracy (Sen 2004b). Philosophers and social scientists may provide helpful ideas and arguments, but the legitimate source of decisions about the nature of the life we have reason to value must be the people concerned. Sen therefore proposes a social choice exercise requiring both public reasoning and democratic procedures of decision-making.

One reason that social scientists and philosophers are so keen to specify a list is that it can be used as an index: by ranking all the different constituents of the flourishing life with respect to each other it would allow easier evaluation of how well people are doing. Sen's social choice exercise is unlikely to produce collective agreement on a complete ranking of different functionings, if only because of what Rawls called the 'fact of reasonable disagreement'. But Sen argues that substantial action-guiding agreement is possible. First, different valuational perspectives may 'intersect' to reach similar judgments about some issues, though by way of different arguments. Second, such agreements may be extended by introducing 'ranges' of weights rather than cardinal numbers. For example, if there are four conflicting views about the relative weight to be attached to literacy vis-à-vis health, of  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$  and  $\frac{1}{5}$ , that contains an implicit agreement that the relative weight on education should not exceed  $\frac{1}{2}$ , nor fall below  $\frac{1}{5}$ , so having one unit of literacy and two of health would be better than having two units of literacy and one of health.

Sen does suggest that in many cases a sub-set of crucially important capabilities associated with basic needs may be relatively easily identified and agreed upon as urgent moral and political priorities. These 'basic capabilities', such as education, health, nutrition, and shelter up to minimally adequate levels, do not exhaust the resources of the capability approach, only the easy agreement on what counts as being scandalously deprived. They may be particularly helpful in assessing the extent and nature of poverty in developing countries. However, taking a basic capability route has implications for how the exercise of evaluating individuals' capability can proceed, since it can only evaluate how well people's lives are going in terms of the basics.

### **c. Evaluation: What Capability do People Have to Live a Good Life?**

Evaluating capability is a second order exercise concerned with mapping the set of valuable functionings people have real access to. Since it takes the value of functionings as given, its conclusions will reflect any ambiguity in the valuation stage. Assessing capability is more informationally demanding than other accounts of advantage since it not only takes a much broader view of what well-being achievement consists in but also tries to assess the freedom people actually have to choose high quality options. This is not a purely procedural matter of adding up the number of options available, since the option to purchase a tenth brand of washing powder has a rather different significance than the option to vote in democratic elections. For example, Sen argues that the eradication of malaria from an area enhances the capability of individuals living there even though it doesn't increase the number of options those individuals have (since they don't have the 'option' to live in a malarial area anymore). Because the value of a capability set represents a person's effective freedom to live a valuable life in terms of the value of the functionings available to that individual, when the available functionings are improved, so is the person's effective freedom. The capability approach in principle allows a very wide range of dimensions of advantage to be positively evaluated ('what capabilities does this person have?').

This allows an open diagnostic approach to what is going well or badly in people's lives that can be used to reveal unexpected shortfalls or successes in different dimensions, without aggregating them all together into one number. The informational focus can be tightened depending on the

purpose of the evaluation exercise and relevant valuational and informational constraints. For example, if the approach is limited to considering 'basic capabilities' then the assessment is limited to a narrower range of dimensions and attempts to assess deprivation – the shortfall from the minimal thresholds of those capabilities – which will exclude evaluation of how well the lives of those above the threshold are going.

As well as being concerned with how well people's lives are going, the Capability Approach can be used to examine the underlying determinants of the relationship between people and commodities, including the following (Sen 1999, 70-71):

- (1) Individual physiology, such as the variations associated with illnesses, disability, age, and gender. In order to achieve the same functionings, people may have particular needs for non-standard commodities – such as prosthetics for a disability – or they may need more of the standard commodities – such as additional food in the case of intestinal parasites. Note that some of these disadvantages, such as blindness, may not be fully 'correctable' even with tailored assistance.
- (2) Local environment diversities, such as climate, epidemiology, and pollution. These can impose particular costs such as more or less expensive heating or clothing requirements.
- (3) Variations in social conditions, such as the provision of public services such as education and security, and the nature of community relationships, such as across class or ethnic divisions.
- (4) Differences in relational perspectives. Conventions and customs determine the commodity requirements of expected standards of behaviour and consumption, so that relative income poverty in a rich community may translate into absolute poverty in the space of capability. For example, local requirements of 'the ability to appear in public without shame' in terms of acceptable clothing may vary widely.
- (5) Distribution within the family – distributional rules within a family determining, for example, the allocation of food and health-care between children and adults, males and females. The diagnosis of capability failures, or significant interpersonal variations in capability, directs attention to the relevant causal pathways responsible. Note that many of these interpersonal variations will also influence individuals' abilities to access resources to begin with. For example, the physically handicapped often have more expensive requirements to achieve the same capabilities, such as mobility, while at the same time they also have greater difficulty earning income in the first place.

#### **4. Applying Sen's Capability Approach**

The concept of a capability has a global-local character in that its definition abstracts from particular circumstances, but its realization depends on specific local requirements. For example, the same capability to be well-nourished can be compared for different people although it may require different amounts and kinds of food depending on one's age, state of health, and so on. This makes the Capability Approach applicable across political, economic, and cultural borders. For example, Sen points out that being relatively income poor in a wealthy society can entail absolute poverty in some important capabilities, because they may require more resources to achieve. For example, the capability for employment may require more years of education in a richer society

Many capabilities will have underlying requirements that vary strongly with social circumstances (although others, such as adequate nourishment, may vary less). For example, the ‘ability to appear in public without shame’ seems a capability that people might generally be said to have reason to value, but its requirements vary significantly according to cultural norms from society to society and for different groups within each society (such as by gender, class, and ethnicity). Presently in Saudi Arabia, for example, women must have the company of a close male relative to appear in public, and require a chauffeur and private car to move between private spaces (since they are not permitted to use public transport or drive a car themselves). Strictly speaking the Capability Approach leaves open whether such ‘expensive’ capabilities, if considered important enough to be guaranteed by society as a matter of justice, should be met by making more resources available to those who need them (subsidized cars and chauffeurs), or by revising the relevant social norms. The Capability Approach only identifies such capability failures and diagnoses their causes. However, if there is general agreement in the first place that such capabilities should be equally guaranteed for all, there is a clear basis for criticizing clearly unjust social norms as the source of relative deprivation and thus as inconsistent with the spirit of such a guarantee.

The capability approach takes a multi-dimensional approach to evaluation. Often it may seem that people are generally well-off, yet a closer analysis reveals that this ‘all-things-considered’ judgement conceals surprising shortfalls in particular capabilities, for example, the sporting icon who can’t read. Capability analysis rejects the presumption that unusual achievement in some dimensions compensates for shortfalls in others. From a justice perspective, the capability approach’s relevance here is to argue that if people are falling short on a particular capability that has been collectively agreed to be a significant one, then justice would require addressing the shortfall itself if at all possible, rather than offering compensation in some other form, such as increased income. Capability evaluation is informationally demanding and its precision is limited by the level of agreement about which functionings are valuable. However, Sen has shown that even where only elementary evaluation of quite basic capabilities is possible (for example, life-expectancy or literacy outcomes), this can still provide much more, and more relevant, action-guiding information than the standard alternatives. In particular, by making perspicuous contrasts between successes and failures the capability approach can direct political and public attention to neglected dimensions of human well-being. For example, countries with similar levels of wealth can have dramatically different levels of aggregate achievement – and inequality – on such non-controversially important dimensions as longevity and literacy. And, vice versa, countries with very small economies can sometimes score as highly on these dimensions as the richest. This demonstrates both the limitations of relying exclusively on economic metrics for evaluating development, and the fact that national wealth does not pose a rigid constraint on such achievements (that GNP is not destiny). Such analyses are easily politicized in the form of the pointed question, Why can’t we do as well as them?

	<b>Philippines</b>	<b>South Africa</b>
Gross National Income per capita (ppp)	\$ 4,002	\$9,812
Life expectancy (years)	72.3	52
Mean years of schooling	8.7	8.2

Figure 2. Perspicuous contrasts: The Philippines does more with less

## Criticisms of Sen's Capability Approach

This section outlines important criticisms of Sen's approach, together with his responses.

### a. Illiberalism

Liberal critics of Sen often identify the focus of the Capability Approach – 'the ability to achieve the kind of lives we have reason to value' – as problematic because it appears to impose an external valuation of the good life, whatever people may actually value. Rawls, for example, notes that the reason for liberals to focus on the fair allocation of general purpose resources rather than achievement is that this best respects each individual's fundamental right to pursue their own conception of the good life. This relates to Rawls' conception of justice as political rather than meta-physical: it is not the task of justice to assess people's achievements, but rather to ensure the fairness of the conditions of participation in a society. Justice should be neutral with regard to judging different people's conceptions of the good. But this neutrality seems incompatible with the Capability Approach's concern with assessing people's achievements, which would seem to require a much more substantive view of what counts as a good life than one needs for assessing general purpose resources. Rawls suggests that this constitutes the privileging of a particular (non-political) comprehensive conception of rational advantage or the good.

In replying to this criticism, Sen particularly points to the heterogeneity (variability) in people's abilities to convert the same bundle of resources into valuable functionings. Theories of justice that focus on the distribution of means implicitly assume that they will provide the same effective freedom to live the life one has reason to value to all, but this excludes relevant information about the relationship between particular people and resources. Even if one abstracts from existing social inequalities or the results of personal choices ('option luck'), as many liberal theories of justice do, one will still find a substantial and pervasive variation in the abilities of different members of a society to utilize the same resources – whether of specific goods like education or general purpose goods like income. That means that even if it happened that everyone had the same conception of the good, and the same bundle of resources, the fact of heterogeneity would mean that people would have differential real capability to pursue the life they had reason to value. Therefore, Sen argues, a theory of justice based on fairness should be directly and deeply concerned with the effective freedom – capability – of actual people to achieve the lives they have reason to value.

### b. Under-Theorisation

Both capability theorists and external critics express concern that the content and structure of Sen's Capability Approach is under-theorised and this makes it unsuitable as a theory of justice. Sen does not say which capabilities are important or how they are to be distributed: he argues that those are political decisions for the society itself to decide. Many philosophers have argued that without an objectively justified list of valuable capabilities the nature of the life 'we have reason to want' is unclear and so it is hard to identify the goal that a just society should be aiming towards, to assess how well a society is doing, or to criticize particular shortfalls. Different capability theorists have taken different approaches to the valuation of capabilities, from procedural accounts to ones based on substantive understandings of human nature. There are related concerns about the institutional structure of the Capability Approach, for example, brought by the Rawlsian social justice theorist, Thomas Pogge (Pogge 2002). How should capabilities be weighted against each other and non-capability concerns? For example, should some basic capabilities be prioritized as more urgent? What does the Capability Approach imply for interpersonal equality? How should capability enhancement be paid for? How much responsibility should individuals take for the results of their own choices? What should be done about non-remediable deprivations, such as

blindness? Sen's main response to such criticisms has been to admit that the Capability Approach is not a theory of justice but rather an approach to the evaluation of effective freedom.

### **c. Individualism**

Sen's emphasis on individual effective freedom as the focal concern of the Capability Approach has been criticized as excessively individualistic. There are several components to this family of criticisms. Some communitarians see Sen's account as lacking interest in, and even sometimes overtly hostile to, communal values and ways of life because of an excessive focus on individuals. Charles Gore, for example, has argued that Sen's approach only considers states of affairs and social arrangements in terms of how good or bad they are for an individual's well-being and freedom (Gore 1997). But this excludes consideration of certain other goods which individuals may have reason to value which are 'irreducibly social' because they cannot be reduced to properties of individuals, such as a shared language, set of moral norms, or political structure. A related criticism argues that Sen's emphasis on individual freedom is vague and fails to consider how one individual's freedom may affect others. Martha Nussbaum, for example, points out that a just society requires balancing and even limiting certain freedoms, such as regarding the expression of racist views, and in order to do so must make commitments about which freedoms are good or bad, important or trivial (Nussbaum 2003). Others have noted that 'freedom' though broad, is a poor way of conceptualizing certain inter-personal goods such as friendship, respect, and care. A third line of critique takes issue with Sen's 'thin' agency based picture of persons as too abstract and rationalistic. It is said to be founded too closely in Sen's personal dialectical relationship between economics and philosophy, and not enough in the perspectives and methods of anthropology, sociology, or psychology (see, for example, Giri 2000; Gasper 2002). As a result Sen's account is said to have a poor grasp, for example, of the centrality and complexity of personal growth and development.

With regard to 'irreducibly social goods' like culture, Sen argues that they not only enter into the analysis instrumentally (such as in the requirements for appearing in public without shame) but also as part of the lives people have reason to value. Nevertheless Sen is clear in his view that the value of social goods is only derivative upon the reflective choices of those concerned (see, for example, Sen 2004a). So if people on reflection don't value such social goods as the traditional religious institutions of their society or continuing to speak a minority language then that should trump the 'right' of those institutions to continue. With regard to freedom, Sen distinguishes the ability to choose between different options from the value of those options. These two together make up effective freedom or capability. Simple freedom to choose may be vulnerable to the objection that it is compatible with invidious freedoms, but the Capability Approach is concerned with people's ability to live a life they have reason to value, which incorporates an ethical evaluation of the content of their options. It is not concerned only with increasing people's freedom-as-power. Finally, Sen's Capability Approach is particularly concerned with grasping the dimensions of human well-being and advantage missing from standard approaches. This relates to its concern with tracing the causal pathways of specific deprivations, with how exactly different people are able or unable to convert resources into valuable functionings.

Although this remains somewhat abstractly presented in the formal structure of the Capability Approach, Sen's analysis of, for example, adaptive preferences and intra-household distribution do go at least some way to a situated and sociological analysis.

#### **d. Information Gaps**

Sen's Capability Approach is founded on the idea that much more information about the quality of human lives can and should be taken into account in evaluating them. The Human Development Index developed by Amartya Sen and the economist Mahbub ul Haq in 1990 for the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Reports is the most influential capability metric currently used. However it has been criticized for its crudeness. It contains only three dimensions – longevity, literacy (mean years of schooling), and Gross National Income per capita – which are weighted equally. The Capability Approach is supposed to be interested in assessing how people fare on many dimensions of life including some which seem very difficult to obtain information about, such as people's real choice sets or such complicated capabilities as the ability to appear in public without shame or to form relationships with others. It also requires detailed information on the real inter-personal variations in translating commodities into functionings. It is not clear however that such informational ambitions could ever be realized. Furthermore even the effort of trying to collect such detailed information about people's lives and their 'real' disabilities can be seen as invasive.

Sen was concerned about the crudeness of the Human Development Index (HDI) from the start, but was won over by Mahbub ul Haq's argument for the rhetorical significance of a composite index of human well-being that could compete directly with the crude GDP per capita numbers that have been so influential in development thinking. Thus the HDI does not fully reflect the scope or methodology of the Capability Approach. Nevertheless it has succeeded in demonstrating that capability related information can be used systematically as a credible supplement to economic metrics. Sen accepts that some information about capabilities is easier to obtain than others. Firstly, he argues that we already have quite extensive information about some basic capabilities even for many quite poor countries, such as about health, that can and should be systematically assessed. There is therefore no need to limit our assessment to economic metrics which firstly count the wrong things (means) and secondly also come with significant measurement error despite their apparent numerical precision. Secondly, he argues that if researchers accept the capability space as the new priority for evaluation that will motivate the development of new data collection priorities and methods. As a result more information will become available about how people are faring on the currently 'missing dimensions' of the lives we have reason to value, for example, relating to employment or gender equality in domestic arrangements. Nevertheless, the Capability Approach is not concerned with information collection for its own sake, but rather with the appropriate use of information for assessment. It is therefore not committed to, nor does its effective use require, building a perfect information collection and assessment bureaucracy.

#### **6. Theorising the Capability Approach**

A number of philosophers sympathetic to Sen's foundational concerns have nevertheless been dissatisfied with the vagueness and under-elaboration of the theoretical structure of his Capability Approach (although these features seem to be quite deliberate on Sen's part). A number of theoretical accounts have been developed that seek to elaborate the Capability Approach more systematically and to address these philosophers' particular concerns. Some theoretical accounts are primarily concerned with operationalising the evaluative dimension of the Capability Approach: the assessment of quality of life, well-being and human development. Others focus on developing a capability based 'Theory of Justice' in the spirit of its concerns. This section provides a brief outline of some of these.

#### **a. Generating Lists for Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (Ingrid Robeyns)**

Ingrid Robeyns argues that attempting to develop a single all-purpose list of capabilities would be incompatible with Sen's concern with a general framework of evaluation. Instead she proposes a procedural approach to the selection of capabilities for particular purposes, such as the evaluation of gender inequality in terms of capabilities (Robeyns 2003). She claims that valuational procedures that meet her criteria provide epistemic, academic, and political legitimacy for empirically evaluating capability. Her five criteria are:

- (1) Explicit formulation. All proposed list elements should be explicit, so they can be discussed and debated.
- (2) Methodological justification. The method of generating the list should be made explicit so it can be scrutinized.
- (3) Sensitivity to context. The level of abstraction of the list should be appropriate to its purposes, whether for philosophical, legal, political, or social discussion.
- (4) Different levels of generality. If the list is intended for empirical application or public policy then it should be drawn up in two distinct stages, first an ideal stage and then a pragmatic one that reflects perhaps temporary feasibility constraints on information and resources.
- (5) Exhaustion and non-reduction. The list should include all important elements and those elements should not be reducible to others (though they may overlap).

### **b. A Participatory Approach to Evaluating Capability Expansion (Sabina Alkire)**

Sabina Alkire has developed a philosophically grounded framework for the participatory valuation and evaluation of development projects in terms of capability enhancement (Alkire 2005). This allows her to go beyond standard cost-benefit analyses of development projects in financial terms to investigate which capabilities that the people concerned have reason to value are enhanced and by how much.

Alkire's approach has 2 stages of evaluation: i) a theoretical one-off stage in which 'philosophers' employ practical reason to reflexively identify the basic spheres or categories of value, and ii) a local participatory phase in which members of a social group deliberate, with the aid of a facilitator, about what their needs are and what, and how, they would like to do about them (with the basic categories employed as prompts to ensure that all main dimensions of value are discussed). For the first, philosophical, stage Alkire proposes an adaptation of the practical reasoning approach of John Finnis to identify the basic dimensions of human well-being by asking iteratively, 'why do I/others do what we do?' until one comes to recognize the basic reasons for which no further reasoned justification can be given. This method is intended to yield substantive and objective descriptions of the fundamental, non-hierarchically ordered, dimensions of human flourishing, while allowing the content and relative importance of these dimensions to be specified in a participatory process according to a particular group's historical, cultural, and personal values. The intrinsically important dimensions identified by this method are: Life; Knowledge; Play; Aesthetic experience; Sociability; Practical reasonableness; Religion.

One of the advantages Alkire claims for her approach is its ability to elicit what the people whose lives are the subject of development projects really consider valuable, which may some-

times surprise external planners and observers. Her use of the participatory approach for assessing NGO fieldwork in Pakistan showed, for example, that even the very poor can and do reasonably value other things than material well-being, such as religion and social participation.

### **c. Justice as Equal Capability of Democratic Citizenship (Elizabeth Anderson)**

Elizabeth Anderson has proposed a partial theory of justice based on equal capability of democratic citizenship (Anderson 1999). Anderson takes equality in social relationships as the focus for her egalitarian theory of justice and argues that one should analyze the requirements of such equality in terms of the social conditions supporting it as a capability. Although Anderson's primary concern is for equality in the particular dimension of democratic citizenship, she suggests that this has extensive egalitarian implications for the nature of the society as a whole, because other capabilities – such as relating to health, education, personal autonomy and self-respect, and economic fairness – are required as supporting conditions to realize truly equal citizenship. She argues that, "Negatively, people are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary to enable them to avoid or escape entanglement in oppressive social relationships. Positively, they are entitled to whatever capabilities are necessary for functioning as an equal citizen in a democratic state (Anderson 1999, 317)."

### **d. Capability as Freedom from Domination (John Alexander)**

John Alexander has proposed a capability theory based on a Republican understanding of the importance of freedom as non-domination (Alexander 2008). He argues that the Capability Approach's concern with people's 'real freedom' sets it outside and against the standard liberal egalitarian theory of justice framework which understands freedom as the absence of constraints. But he argues that the Capability Approach should go further to elaborate this commitment to real freedom in Republican terms. In this perspective it is not only important that one be able to achieve certain functionings, such as mobility, but whether one's achievement of these are conditional on the favor or goodwill of other people or are independently guaranteed by one's own rights and powers. Capability is standardly understood as mapping one's range of choices over valuable functionings regardless of their content. For example, the ability of a physically disabled but socially well-connected person to travel outside whenever she wants by arranging the help of friends, family and voluntary organizations. In addition the Republican perspective requires that her capability for mobility should be independent of context. For example, in the form of a guaranteed legal right to government assistance on demand, or by the provision of her own specially adapted self-drive vehicle. Otherwise she may be said to be still deprived since her capability is not completely free.

Domination should also be integrated into capability evaluation because it will often be a cause of capability deprivation. It is no coincidence that the people who are most capability deprived are often the poorest and weakest in society, and as a result also vulnerable to yet further exploitation. This emphasis on freedom from domination also gives a strong normative orientation to the Capability Approach's evaluation of the causes of capability failure: some causes are simply unacceptable, such as social norms restricting women's freedom of movement and employment, and should be removed rather than mitigated.

## **7. Martha Nussbaum's Capability Theory of Justice**

This section outlines Martha Nussbaum's work on the Capability Approach: its structure, criticisms, and relationship to Amartya Sen's work.

## **a. Structure and Development of Nussbaum's Capability Theory**

Martha Nussbaum has developed the most systematic, extensive, and influential capability theory of justice to date. Nussbaum aims to provide a partial theory of justice (one that doesn't exhaust the requirements of justice) based on dignity, a list of fundamental capabilities, and a threshold. Nussbaum's list of The Central Human Capabilities (Reproduced from *Creating Capabilities* 2011, 33-4)

1. **Life.** Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. **Bodily Health.** Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. **Bodily Integrity.** Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
4. **Senses, Imagination, and Thought.** Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
5. **Emotions.** Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)
6. **Practical Reason.** Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. **Affiliation.**
  - A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
  - B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8. **Other Species.** Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control Over One's Environment.
  - A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
  - B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason, and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

In her early contributions to the capability approach, Nussbaum justified the composition of her list by explicitly Aristotelian argument about the perfectionist requirements of the truly human life (Nussbaum 1988). In the mid-1990s however she converted the structure of her account to a Rawlsian style 'politically liberal' account. This means that she now presents her list as a proposal that is neutral with respect to particular conceptions of the good, but can be endorsed by many different groups in a society through an overlapping consensus. However the list components themselves remain almost identical and retain a distinctively Aristotelian cast.

Nussbaum's account is motivated by a concept of human dignity (in contrast to Sen's emphasis on freedom), which she links to flourishing in the Aristotelian sense. She argues that her list of 10 fundamental capabilities follow from the requirements of dignity and have been tested and adapted over the course of an extensive cross-cultural dialogue she has carried out, particularly in India (as related in her book, *Women and Human Development*, 2001). The threshold is a 'sufficiency' principle that specifies the minimum requirements of justice: everyone must be entitled to each capability at least to this degree by their governments and relevant international institutions. Access to these capabilities is required by human dignity, Nussbaum argues, but this does not mean that a life lacking in any of these, whether from external deprivation or individual choice, is a less than human life. Choice and deprivation are different however. If someone lacks access to these capabilities, for example, to be well-nourished (bodily health), that reflects a failure by society to respect her human dignity. If someone chooses not to take up her opportunities to certain capabilities, for example, to adopt an ascetic life-style and fast for religious reasons at the expense of her bodily health, respecting that choice is also an aspect of respecting her dignity.

Nussbaum suggests that her list, together with the precise location of the threshold, should be democratically debated and incorporated into national constitutional guarantees, international human rights legislation and international development policy. In keeping with its commitment to political liberalism, the components of Nussbaum's list have a 'thick-vague' character in that while they have a universal claim to be of central importance to any human life, their definition is vague enough to allow their specification in multiple ways that reflect the values, histories, and special circumstances of particular political societies. For example, freedom of speech may be defined differently in law in the USA and Germany, because of their different histories, without endangering the fundamental capability. Nevertheless, because each capability is equally centrally important and a shortfall in any area is significant in itself, the scope for governments to make trade-offs between them, for example, on the basis of quantitative cost-benefit analysis, is limited.

## **b. Criticisms of Nussbaum's Theory**

Nussbaum's capability theory of justice received quite intense criticism. Some have questioned the epistemological basis of her approach, finding it rather suspicious that after all her years of cross-cultural discussion her list remains basically the same rather 'intellectualized' Aristotelian one she had suggested in the first place (Okin 2003), and suggest that it rather reflects the values of a typical 21<sup>st</sup> century American liberal than a set of timeless universal values or a contemporary global overlapping consensus (Stewart 2001). Others have argued that her legal-moral-philosophical orientation is elitist and over-optimistic about what constitutions and governments are like and are capable of (Menon 2002); is over-specified and paternalistic yet still misses out important capabilities and is inappropriate for many uses, such as quality of life measurement or development field-work (Alkire 2005, 35-45).

In response to such criticisms, Nussbaum has defended the contents of her list as having cross-cultural credibility, but also emphasised that she is not trying to impose a definitive capability theory on everyone. She makes a clear and explicit distinction between the dimensions of justification (why her theory is best) and implementation (its more humble meta-status as an object for democratic deliberation and decision by those concerned) (Nussbaum 2004).

### **c. Sen and Nussbaum**

Nussbaum and Sen collaborated in the late 1980s and early 1990s and since they are the most high-profile writers in the Capability Approach their accounts are often elided, despite significant differences. When they are distinguished, Nussbaum's account is often seen as the more 'philosophical' because she has developed the Capability Approach in a more orthodox philosophical way, for example, by focusing on theoretical rigor, coherence and completeness. As a result, Sen's approach is sometimes perceived merely as a predecessor to Nussbaum's more developed second generation account, and therefore of primarily historical interest to understanding the Capability Approach rather than a parallel account in its own right.

The accounts of Sen and Nussbaum differ significantly in ways that relate to their different concerns and backgrounds. In particular:

- Nussbaum is concerned to produce a philosophically coherent normative (partial) theory of justice; Sen is concerned with producing a general framework for evaluating the quality of lives people can lead that can incorporate the very diverse concerns and dimensions that may be applicable.
- While Sen's approach is founded on enhancing individual freedom, Nussbaum's theory is founded on respecting human dignity.
- Sen's comprehensive consequentialism makes room for incorporating empirical information about feasibility and instrumental relationships between capabilities when considering policies; Nussbaum largely rejects such instrumental analysis because she is wary of its 'Utilitarian associations'.
- Sen's Capability Approach in its normative 'developmental' aspect, is mainly concerned with practical incremental improvements; Nussbaum's approach is rather more utopian in that it demands the full implementation of minimal justice (achievement of the minimum thresholds of all fundamental capabilities) for all, and this is specified so demandingly that no country yet meets it (though she has suggested that Finland may be close).

### **Introduction**

Marxism, or Scientific Socialism, is the name given to the body of ideas first worked out by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). In their totality, these ideas provide a fully

worked-out theoretical basis for the struggle of the working class to attain a higher form of human society - socialism. The study of Marxism falls under three main headings, corresponding broadly to philosophy, social history and economics - Dialectical Materialism, Historical Materialism and Marxist Economics. These are the famous "Three component parts of Marxism" of which Lenin wrote. The Education for Socialists series was launched to promote the study of Marxism. They are intended to assist the student of Marxism by providing an introduction to the subject matter, with suitable Marxist texts that we hope will whet their appetite for further reading and study. In the first of these Education for Socialists study guides, we provide a selection of material on Dialectical Materialism. The other "component parts", as well as other fundamental questions, will be dealt with in future issues. The guides are suitable for individual study or as the basis of a Marxist discussion group. In beginning this study of Dialectical Materialism the editors are publishing an introductory article by Rob Sewell. While this is a good start to the subject, there is no substitute for proceeding from there to tackle the philosophical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Plekhanov and others. Unfortunately Marx and Engels never wrote a comprehensive work on dialectical materialism, although they intended to do so. On his death, Engels left a pile of manuscripts, which he intended to work up into an account of dialectics, or the laws of motion of nature, human society and human thought. These were later published as the Dialectics of Nature. Even in their rough, unfinished form these notes give a brilliant insight into the method of Marxism and its relation to the sciences.

The newer reader should not be put off by the sometimes difficult and abstract ideas expressed in these writings. Whatever the initial difficulty, a certain perseverance will pay just rewards. Marxism is a science with its own terminology, and therefore makes heavy demands upon the beginner. However, every serious worker and student knows that nothing is worthwhile if attained without a degree of struggle and sacrifice.

The theories of Marxism provide the thinking worker with a comprehensive understanding. It is the duty of every worker and student to conquer for himself or herself the theories of Marx and Engels, as an essential prerequisite for the conquest of society by working people. We recognise that there are real obstacles in the path of the worker's struggle for theory. A man or woman who is obliged to toil long hours in work, who has not had the benefit of a decent education and consequently lacks the habit of reading, finds great difficulty in absorbing some of the more complex ideas, especially at the outset. Yet it was for workers that Marx and Engels wrote, and not for "clever" academics. "Every beginning is difficult" no matter what science we are talking about. To the class conscious worker who is prepared to persevere, one promise can be made: once the initial effort is made to come to grips with unfamiliar and new ideas, the theories of Marxism will be found to be basically straight-forward and simple.

Once the basic concepts of Marxism are conquered, they open up a whole new outlook on politics, the class struggle, and every aspect of life. As a further introduction to dialectics, we are also re-publishing in this issue Trotsky's *ABC of Materialist Dialectics*, also by Trotsky *A Triumph of Dialectical Materialism*, an extract from Lenin's *The Three Sources and Three Components parts of Marxism*, Lenin's *Elements of Dialectics*, and an extract from Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*.

For further study, we recommend the following works by Engels, especially chapters 12 and 13 in *Anti-Duhring*, the introduction to the *Dialectics of Nature*, and *Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy*. Those who wish to go into greater depth should try reading Plekhanov's *The Monist View of History*, Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, as well as his *Philo-*

sophical Notebooks (Collected Works, Vol. 38). Although these books are not an easy read, they are nonetheless very rewarding if studied thoroughly.

## **What is Dialectical Materialism? Do we need a philosophy?**

Scientific socialism or Marxism is composed of three component parts: Dialectical Materialism, Historical Materialism and Marxist Economics. This pamphlet, the first in this series, is an introduction to the concepts of Dialectical Materialism - the method of Marxism. For those unacquainted with Marxist philosophy, dialectical materialism may seem an obscure and difficult concept. However, for those prepared to take the time to study this new way of looking at things, they will discover a revolutionary outlook that will allow them an insight into and understanding of the mysteries of the world in which we live. A grasp of dialectical materialism is an essential prerequisite in understanding the doctrine of Marxism. Dialectical materialism is the philosophy of Marxism, which provides us with a scientific and comprehensive world outlook. It is the philosophical bedrock - the method - on which the whole of Marxist doctrine is founded. According to Engels, dialectics was "our best working tool and our sharpest weapon." And for us also, it is a guide to action and our activities within the working class movement. It is similar to a compass or map, which allows us to get our bearings in the turmoil of events, and permits us to understand the underlying processes that shape our world.

Whether we like it or not, consciously or unconsciously, everyone has a philosophy. A philosophy is simply a way of looking at the world. Under capitalism, without our own scientific philosophy, we will inevitably adopt the dominant philosophy of the ruling class and the prejudices of the society in which we live. "Things will never change" is a common refrain, reflecting the futility of changing things and of the need to accept our lot in life. There are other such proverbs as "There is nothing new under the sun", and "History always repeats itself", which reflect the same conservative outlook. Such ideas, explained Marx, form a crushing weight on the consciousness of men and women.

Just as the emerging bourgeoisie in its revolution against feudal society challenged the conservative ideas of the old feudal aristocracy, so the working class, in its fight for a new society, needs to challenge the dominant outlook of its own oppressor, the capitalist class. Of course, the ruling class, through its monopoly control of the mass media, the press, school, university and pulpit, consciously justifies its system of exploitation as the most "natural form of society". The repressive state machine, with its "armed bodies of men", is not sufficient to maintain the capitalist system. The dominant ideas and morality of bourgeois society serve as a vital defence of the material interests of the ruling class. Without this powerful ideology, the capitalist system could not last for any length of time.

"In one way or another," states Lenin, "all official and liberal science defends wage-slavery... To expect science to be impartial in a wage-slave society is as foolishly naïve as to expect impartiality from manufacturers on the question of whether workers' wages ought not to be increased by decreasing the profits of capital."

Official bourgeois ideology conducts a relentless war against Marxism, which it correctly sees as a mortal danger to capitalism. The bourgeois scribes and professors pour out a continual stream of propaganda in an attempt to discredit Marxism - particularly the dialectic. This has especially been the case since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the ferocious ideological offensive against Marxism, communism, revolution, and such like. "Marxism is dead", they repeatedly proclaim like

some religious incantation. But Marxism refuses to lie down in front of these witch doctors! Marxism reflects the unconscious will of the working class to change society. Its fate is linked to that of the proletariat.

The apologists of capitalism, together with their shadows in the labour movement, constantly assert that their system is a natural and permanent form of society. On the other hand, the dialectic asserts that nothing is permanent and all things perish in time. Such a revolutionary philosophy constitutes a profound threat to the capitalist system and therefore must be discredited at all cost. This explains the daily churning out of anti-Marxist propaganda. But each real step forward in science and knowledge serves to confirm the correctness of the dialectic. For millions of people the growing crisis of capitalism increasingly demonstrates the validity of Marxism. The objective situation is forcing working people to seek a way out of the impasse. "Life teaches", remarked Lenin. Today, to use the famous words of the Communist Manifesto, "A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of communism."

In the fight for the emancipation of the working class, Marxism also wages a relentless war against capitalism and its ideology, which defends and justifies its system of exploitation, the "market economy". But Marxism does more than this. Marxism provides the working class with "an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression." (Lenin) It seeks to reveal the real relationships that exist under capitalism and arms the working class with an understanding of how it can achieve its own emancipation. Dialectical materialism, to use the words of the Russian Marxist Plekhanov, is more than an outlook, it is a "philosophy of action."

## **The Limits of Formal logic**

Men and women attempt to think in a rational manner. Logic (from the Greek logos, meaning word or reason) is the science of the laws of thinking. Whatever thoughts we think, and whatever language they are expressed in, they must satisfy the requirements of reasoning. These requirements give rise to laws of thought, to the principles of logic. It was the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 - 322BC) more than 2,000 years ago who formulated the present system of formal logic - a system that is the basis of our educational establishments to this very day. He categorised the method of how we should reason correctly and how statements are combined to arrive at judgements, and from them, how conclusions are drawn. He laid down three basic laws of logic: the principle of Identity ( $A = A$ ), of contradiction ( $A$  cannot be  $A$  and not- $A$ ), and the excluded middle ( $A$  is either  $A$  or not- $A$ ; there is no middle alternative).

Formal logic has held sway for more than two millennia and was the basis of experiment and the great advances of modern science. The development of mathematics was based on this logic. You cannot teach a child to add up without it. One plus one equals two, not three. Formal logic may seem like common sense and is responsible for the execution of a million and one everyday things, but - and this is the big but - it has its limits. When dealing with drawn out processes or complicated events, formal logic becomes a totally inadequate way of thinking. This is particularly the case in dealing with movement, change and contradiction. Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless. Of course, this is not to deny the everyday usefulness of formal logic, on the contrary, but we need to recognise its limits.

"The dialectic is neither fiction or mysticism," wrote Leon Trotsky, "but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an un-

derstanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics." (The ABC of Materialist Dialectics) With the development of modern science, the system of classification (of Linnaeus) was based on formal logic, where all living things were divided into species and orders. This constituted a great leap forward for biology compared to the past. However, it was a fixed and rigid system, with its rigid categories, which over time revealed its limits. Darwin in particular showed that through evolution it was possible for one species to be transformed into another species. Consequently, the rigid system of classification had to be changed to allow for this new understanding of reality.

In effect, the system of formal logic broke down. It could not cope with these contradictions. On the other hand, dialectics - the logic of change - explains that there are no absolute or fixed categories in nature or society. Engels had great fun in pointing to the duck-billed platypus, this transitional form, and asking where it fitted into the rigid scheme of things! Only dialectical materialism can explain the laws of evolution and change, which sees the world not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, which go through an uninterrupted transformation of coming into being and passing away. For Hegel, the old logic was exactly like a child's game, which sought to make pictures out of jigsaw pieces. "The fundamental flaw in vulgar thought", wrote Trotsky, "lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of reality which consists of eternal motion." Before we look at the main laws of dialectical materialism, let us take a look at the origins of the materialist outlook.

## **Materialism versus idealism**

"The philosophy of Marxism is materialism", wrote Lenin. Philosophy itself fits into two great ideological camps: materialism and idealism. Before we proceed, even these terms need an explanation. To begin with, materialism and idealism have nothing whatsoever in common with their everyday usage, where materialism is associated with material greed and swindling (in short, the morality of present-day capitalism) and idealism with high ideals and virtue. Far from it!

Philosophical materialism is the outlook which explains that there is only one material world. There is no Heaven or Hell. The universe, which has always existed and is not the creation of any supernatural being, is in the process of constant flux. Human beings are a part of nature, and evolved from lower forms of life, whose origins sprung from a lifeless planet some 3.6 billion or so years ago. With the evolution of life, at a certain stage, came the development of animals with a nervous system, and eventually human beings with a large brain. With humans emerged human thought and consciousness. The human brain alone is capable of producing general ideas, i.e., thinking. Therefore matter, which existed eternally, existed and still exists independently of the mind and human beings. Things existed long before any awareness of them arose or could have arisen on the part of living organisms.

For materialists there is no consciousness apart from the living brain, which is part of a material body. A mind without a body is an absurdity. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is the highest product of matter. Ideas are simply a reflection of the independent material world that surrounds us. Things reflected in a mirror do not depend on this reflection for their existence. "All ideas are taken from experience, are reflections - true or distorted - of reality," states Engels. Or to use the words of Marx, "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." Marxists do not deny that mind, consciousness, thought, will, feeling or sensation are real. What materialists deny is that the thing called "the mind" exists separately from the body. Mind is not distinct from the body. Thinking is the product of the brain, which is the organ of thought.

Yet this does not mean that our consciousness is a lifeless mirror of nature. Human beings relate to their surroundings; they are aware of their surroundings and react accordingly; in turn, the environment reacts back upon them. While rooted in material conditions, human beings generalise and think creatively. They in turn change their material surroundings. On the other hand, philosophical idealism states that the material world is not real but is simply the reflection of the world of ideas. There are different forms of idealism, but all essentially explain that ideas are primary and matter, if it exists at all, secondary. For the idealists, ideas are dis severed from matter, from nature. This is Hegel's conception of the Absolute Idea or what amounts to God. Philosophical idealism opens the road, in one way or another, to the defence of or support for religion and superstition. Not only is this outlook false, it is also profoundly conservative, leading us to the pessimistic conclusion that we can never understand the "mysterious ways" of the world. Whereas materialism understands that human beings not only observe the real world, but can change it, and in doing so, change themselves. The idealist view of the world grew out of the division of labour between physical and mental labour. This division constituted an enormous advance as it freed a section of society from physical work and allowed them the time to develop science and technology. However, the further removed from physical labour, the more abstract became their ideas. And when thinkers separate their ideas from the real world, they become increasingly consumed by abstract "pure thought" and end up with all types of fantasies. Today, cosmology is dominated by complex abstract mathematical conceptions, which have led to all sorts of weird and wonderful erroneous theories: the Big Bang, beginning of time, parallel universes, etc. Every break with practice leads to a one-sided idealism.

The materialist outlook has a long history stretching back to the ancient Greeks of Anaxagoras (c.500 - 428 BC) and Democritus (c.460 - c.370 BC). With the collapse of Ancient Greece, this rational outlook was cut across for a whole historical epoch, and only after the reawakening of thought following the demise of the Christian Middle Ages was there a revival of philosophy and natural science. From the seventeenth century, the home of modern materialism was England. "The real progenitor of English materialism is Bacon," wrote Marx. The materialism of Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) was then systemised and developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), whose ideas were in turn developed by John Locke (1632 - 1704). The latter already thought it possible that matter could possess the faculty of thinking. It is no accident that these advances in human thought coincided with the rise of the bourgeoisie and great advances in science, particularly mechanics, astronomy and medicine. These great thinkers in turn provided the breakthrough for the brilliant school of French materialists of the eighteenth century, most notably René Descartes (1596 - 1650).

It was their materialism and rationalism that became the creed of the Great French Revolution of 1789. These revolutionary thinkers recognised no external authority. Everything from religion to natural science, from society to political institutions, was subjected to the most searching criticism. Reason became the measure of everything. This materialist philosophy, consistently championed by Holbach (1723 - 1789) and Helvetius, was a revolutionary philosophy. "The universe is the vast unity of everything that is, everywhere it shows us only matter in movement," states Holbach. "This is all that there is and it displays only an infinite and continuous chain of causes and actions; some of these causes we know, since they immediately strike our senses; others we do not know since they act on us only by means of consequences, quite remote from first causes." This rational philosophy was an ideological reflection of the revolutionary bourgeoisie's struggle against the church, the aristocracy and the absolute monarchy. It represented a fierce attack on

the ideology of the Old Order. In the end, the kingdom of Reason became nothing more than the idealised kingdom of the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois property became one of the essential rights of man. The revolutionary materialists paved the way for the new bourgeois society and the domination of new private property forms. "Different times, different circumstances, a different philosophy," stated Denis Diderot (1713 - 1784).

The new materialism, although a revolutionary advance, tended to be very rigid and mechanical. These new philosophers attacked the church and denied the self-sufficiency of the soul and held that man was simply a material body as all other animals and inorganic bodies. Man was regarded as a more complex and more delicate mechanism than other bodies. According to La Mettrie (1709 - 1751) in his principal work *Man the Machine*, "We are instruments endowed with feeling and memory."

For the French materialists the origin of knowledge - the discovery of objective truth - lay through the action of nature on our senses. The planets and man's place within the solar system and nature itself was fixed. For them, it was a clockwork world, where everything had its logical static place, and where the impulse for movement came from outside. The whole approach, while materialist, was mechanical, and failed to grasp the living reality of the world. It could not grasp the universe as a process, as matter undergoing continuous change. This weakness led to the false dichotomy between the material world and the world of ideas. And this dualism opened the door to idealism.

Others held to a monist view that the universe was one system which was not pure spirit or pure matter. Spinoza was the first to work out such a system. While he saw the need for a God, the universe was one system, which was wholly material from end to end.

## **Dialectics and Metaphysics**

The Marxist view of the world is not only materialist, but also dialectical. For its critics, the dialectic is portrayed as something totally mystical, and therefore irrelevant. But this is certainly not the case. The dialectical method is simply an attempt to understand more clearly our real interdependent world. Dialectics, states Engels in *Anti-Duhring*, "is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." Put simply, it is the logic of motion.

It is obvious to most people that we do not live in a static world. In fact, everything in nature is in a state of constant change. "Motion is the mode of existence of matter," states Engels. "Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be." The earth revolves continually around its axis, and in turn itself revolves around the sun. This results in day and night, and the different seasons that we experience throughout the year. We are born, grow up, grow old and eventually die. Everything is moving, changing, either rising and developing or declining and dying away. Any equilibrium is only relative, and only has meaning in relation to other forms of motion.

"When we consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where, and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being, and passes away," remarks Engels. "We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections rather than the things that move, combine, and

are connected. This primitive, naïve but intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away."

The Greeks made a whole series of revolutionary discoveries and advances in natural science. Anaximander made a map of the world, and wrote a book on cosmology, from which only a few fragments survive. The Antikythera mechanism, as it is called, appears to be the remains of a clockwork planetarium dating back to the first century BC. Given the limited knowledge of the time, many were anticipations and inspired guesses. Under slave society, these brilliant inventions could not be put to productive use and were simply regarded as playthings for amusement. The real advances in natural science took place in the mid-fifteenth century. The new methods of investigation meant the division of nature into its individual parts, allowing objects and processes to be classified. While this provided massive amount of data, objects were analysed in isolation and not in their living environment. This produced a narrow, rigid, metaphysical mode of thought that has become the hallmark of empiricism. "The Facts" became the all important feature. "Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life," states the Dickensian character Thomas Gradgrind in *Hard Times*.

"To the metaphysician things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once and for all", states Engels. "He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in rigid antithesis one to another.

"At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence it forgets the beginning and the end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees."

Engels goes on to explain that for everyday purposes we know whether an animal is alive or not. But upon closer examination, we are forced to recognise that is not a simple straightforward question. On the contrary, it is a complex question. There are raging debates even today as to when life begins in the mothers' womb. Likewise, it is just as difficult to say when the exact moment of death occurs, as physiology proves that death is not a single instantaneous act, but a protracted process. In the brilliant words of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, "It is the same thing in us that is living and dead, asleep and awake, young and old; each changes place and becomes the other. We step and we do not step into the same stream; we are and we are not."

Not everything is as appears on the surface of things. Every species, every aspect of organic life, is every moment the same and not the same. It develops by assimilating matter from without and simultaneously discards other unwanted matter; continually some cells die, while others are renewed. Over time, the body is completely transformed, renewed from top to bottom. Therefore,

every organicity is both itself and yet something other than itself.

This phenomenon cannot be explained by metaphysical thought or formal logic. This approach is incapable of explaining contradiction. This contradictory reality does not enter the realm of common sense reasoning. Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things in their connection, development, and motion. As far as Engels was concerned, "Nature is the proof of dialectics." Here is how Engels described the rich processes of change in his book the *Dialectics of Nature*:

"Matter moves in an eternal cycle, completing its trajectory in a period so vast that in comparison with it our earthly year is as nothing; in a cycle in which the period of highest development, namely the period of organic life with its crowning achievement - self-consciousness, is a space just as comparatively minute in the history of life and self-consciousness; in a cycle in which every particular form of the existence of matter - be it the sun or a nebula, a particular animal or animal-species, a chemical combination or decomposition - is equally in transition; in a cycle in which nothing is eternal, except eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws of its movement and change. But however often and pitilessly this cycle may be accomplished in time and space, however many countless suns and earths may arise and fall, however long it may be necessary to wait until in some solar system, on some planet appear conditions suitable for organic life, however many countless beings may fall and rise before, out of their midst, develop animals with a thinking brain that find an environment that permits them to live, be it even only for a short period, we are, nevertheless, assured that matter in all its changes remains eternally one and the same, that not one of its attributes may perish, and that that same iron necessity which compels the destruction of the highest early bloom of matter - the thinking spirit - also necessitates its rebirth at some other place, at some other time."

Along with, and following the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, arose a new radical German philosophy. Through Emmanuel Kant, the culmination of this philosophy was epitomised by the system of George F. Hegel, who had greatly admired the French Revolution. Hegel, although an idealist, was the most encyclopaedic mind of his age. The great contribution of this genius was the rescuing of the dialectical mode of thought originally developed by the ancient Greek philosophers some 2,000 years before.

"Changes in being consist not only in the fact that one quantity passes into another quantity, but also that quality passes into quantity, and vice versa," wrote Hegel. "Each transition of the latter kind represents an interruption, and gives the phenomenon a new aspect, qualitatively distinct from the previous one. Thus water when cooled grows hard, not gradually... but all at once; having already cooled to freezing-point, it can still remain a liquid only if preserves a tranquil condition, and then the slightest shock is sufficient for it suddenly to become hard... In the world of moral phenomena... there take place the same changes of quantitative into qualitative, and differences in qualities there also are founded upon quantitative differences. Thus, a little less, a little more constitutes that limit beyond which frivolity ceases and there appears something quite different, crime..." (*Science of Logic*).

Hegel's works are full of references and examples of dialectics. Unfortunately, Hegel was not only an idealist, but wrote in the most obscure and abstruse fashion imaginable, making his works very difficult to read. Lenin, while re-reading Hegel in exile during the First World War, wrote: "I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism which has been stood on its head (according to Engels) - that is to say, I cast aside for the most part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc." Lenin was greatly impressed by Hegel, and, despite his idealism, later recommend-

ed that young communists study his writings for themselves.

The young Marx and Engels were followers of the great Hegel. They learned a colossal amount from this teacher. He opened their eyes to a new outlook on the world epitomised by the dialectic. By embracing the dialectic, Hegel freed history from metaphysics. For the dialectic, there is nothing final, absolute, or sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything. However, Hegel was limited by his knowledge, the knowledge of his age, and the fact he was an idealist. He regarded thoughts within the brain not as more or less abstract pictures of real things and processes, but as realisations of the "Absolute Idea", existing from eternity. Hegel's idealism turned reality on its head.

Nevertheless, Hegel systematically outlined the important laws of change, touched upon earlier.

### **The law of quantity into quality (and vice versa)**

"It has been said that there are no sudden leaps in nature, and it is a common notion that things have their origin through gradual increase or decrease," states Hegel. "But there is also such a thing as sudden transformation from quantity to quality. For example, water does not become gradually hard on cooling, becoming first pulpy and ultimately attaining a rigidity of ice, but turns hard at once. If temperature be lowered to a certain degree, the water is suddenly changed into ice, i.e., the quantity - the number of degrees of temperature - is transformed into quality - a change in the nature of the thing." (Logic).

This is the cornerstone of understanding change. Change or evolution does not take place gradually in a straight smooth line. Marx compared the social revolution to an old mole burrowing busily beneath the ground, invisible for long periods, but steadily undermining the old order and later emerging into the light in a sudden overturn. Even Charles Darwin believed that his theory of evolution was essentially gradual and that the gaps in the fossil record did not represent any breaks or leaps in evolution, and would be "filled in" by further discoveries. In this Darwin was wrong. Today, new theories, essentially dialectical, have been put forward to explain the leaps in evolution. Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge termed their dialectical theory of evolution "punctuated equilibria". They explained that there were long periods of evolution where there were no apparent changes taking place, then suddenly, a new life form or forms emerged. In other words, quantitative differences gave rise to a qualitative change, leading to new species. The whole of development is characterised by breaks in continuity, leaps, catastrophes and revolutions.

The emergence of single-cellular life in the earth's oceans some 3.6 billion years ago was a qualitative leap in the evolution of matter. The "Cambrian explosion", some 600 million years ago, where complex multicellular life with hard parts exploded onto the scene was a further qualitative leap forward in evolution. In the lower Palaeozoic, some 400 to 500 million years ago, the first vertebrate fish emerged. This revolutionary design became dominant and advanced through the amphibians (which lived both in water and on land), through reptiles, and finally branched off into warm-blooded creatures: birds and mammals. Such revolutionary leaps culminated in human beings that have the capacity to think. Evolution is a long process whereby an accumulation of changes inside and outside the organism leads to a leap, a qualitatively higher state of development.

Just as colossal subterranean pressures that accumulate and periodically break through the earth's crust in the form of earthquakes, so gradual changes in the consciousness of workers lead to an explosion in the class struggle. A strike in a factory is not caused by outside "agitators", but

is produced by an accumulation of changes within the factory that finally pushes the workforce to strike. The "cause" of the strike maybe something quite small and incidental, a tea-break for instance, but it has become "the last straw that breaks the camel's back", to use a popular (dialectical) expression. It has become the catalyst whereby quantity changes into quality.

Today, a whole series of left wing electoral victories within the British trade unions are a product of a long accumulation of discontent within the union rank and file. Twenty years of bitter attacks on the working class has resulted in these changes at the top of the trade unions. Only those armed with a Marxist philosophy could foresee this development, which is rooted in the changing objective situation. These changes of mood, which are already taking place in the trade unions, will inevitably be reflected within the Labour Party at a certain stage that will result in the demise of the right wing under Blair. The ultra-lefts on the fringes of the Labour movement have continually written off the Labour Party as something that could never be changed. They are incapable of thinking dialectically, and have an empirical and formalistic outlook that only sees the surface of reality. They fail to draw a distinction between appearance and reality - between the immediate appearance evident to observation and the hidden processes, interconnections and laws that underlie the observed facts. In other words, they are blind to the subterranean processes taking place before their very eyes. "Blairism dominates the Labour Party!" they exclaim and throw up their hands in despair. They are under the spell of formal logic, and do not understand the process at work that will inevitably undermine Blairism, and lead to its collapse, as night follows day. As they wrote off the right wing unions in the past, they write off the Labour Party today. On the basis of events and the pressures of the leftward moving trade union movement, the Labour Party, given its roots in the trade unions, will inevitably move in a similar direction.

Marx stressed that the task of science is always to proceed from the immediate knowledge of appearances to the discovery of reality, of the essence, of the laws underlying the appearances. Marx's Capital is a fine example of this method. "The way of thinking of the vulgar economists", wrote Marx to Engels, "derives from the fact that it is always only the immediate form in which relationships appear which is reflected in the brain, and not their inner connections." (June 27, 1867) The same could be said of those who in the past wrote off the Soviet Union as "state capitalist". Stalinism had nothing in common with socialism; it was a repressive regime, where workers had less rights than in the west. However, instead of a scientific analysis of the Soviet Union, they simply pronounced it state capitalist. As Trotsky explained the theorists of state capitalism looked at the USSR through the eyes of formal logic. It was either-or, black or white. The USSR was either a wonderful socialist state, as the Stalinists said, or it must be a (state) capitalist state. Such thinking is pure formalism. They never understood the possibility of a degeneration of the workers' state into a chronically deformed variant of proletarian rule, as explained by Trotsky. It is clear that the revolution, due to its isolation in a backward country, went through a process of degeneration. However, while the nationalised planned economy remained, not everything was lost. The bureaucracy was not a new ruling class, but a parasitic growth on the state, which usurped political power. Only a new political revolution could eliminate the bureaucracy and reintroduce soviets and workers' democracy.

The supporters of state capitalism tied themselves in knots, confusing counterrevolution with revolution and vice versa. In Afghanistan, they supported the reactionary fundamentalist mujahideen as "freedom fighters" against Russian "imperialism". With the collapse of the USSR and the move to restore capitalism from 1991 onwards, they remained neutral in face of real capitalist counterrevolution.

## The unity of Opposites

"The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect." (Hegel). "In brief", states Lenin, "dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics..." The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above-below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on. The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world. Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, - being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. "Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time - and it is this which first makes motion possible." (Hegel) To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, - cause can become effect and effect can become cause - is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"The negative is to an equal extent positive," states Hegel. Dialectical thought is "comprehending the antithesis in its unity." In fact Hegel goes further: "Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity...Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself." Therefore for Hegel, something is living insofar as it contains contradiction, which provides it with self-movement.

The Greek atomists first advanced the revolutionary theory that the material world was made up of atoms, considered the smallest unit of matter. The Greek word atomos means indivisible. This was a brilliant intuitive guess. Twentieth century science proved that everything was composed of atoms, although it was subsequently discovered that even smaller particles existed. Every atom contains a nucleus at its centre, composed of sub-atomic particles called protons and neutrons. Orbiting around the nucleus are particles known as electrons. All protons carry a positive electrical charge, and would therefore repel each other, but they are bound together by a type of energy known as the strong nuclear force. This shows that everything that exists is based on a unity of opposites and has self-movement of "impulse and activity", to use Hegel's words.

In humans, the level of blood sugar is essential for life. Too high a level is likely to result in diabetic coma, too little and the person is incapable of eating. This safe level is regulated by the rate at which sugar is released into the bloodstream by the digestion of carbohydrates, the rate at which stored glycogen, fat or protein is converted into sugar, and the rate at which sugar is removed and utilised. If the blood sugar level rises, then the rate of utilisation is increased by the release of more insulin from the pancreas. If it falls, more sugar is released into the blood, or the person gets hungry and consumes a source of sugar. In this self-regulation of opposing forces, of positive and

negative feedbacks, the blood level is kept within tolerable limits.

Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, "Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical - under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another - why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." Lenin also laid great stress on the importance of contradiction as the motive force of development. "It is common knowledge that, in any given society, the strivings of some of its members conflict with the strivings of others, that social life is full of contradictions, and that history reveals a struggle between nations and societies, as well as within nations and societies, and, besides, an alternation of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline." (Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism). This is best illustrated by the class struggle. Capitalism requires a capitalist class and a working class. The struggle over the surplus value created by the workers and expropriated by the capitalists leads to an irreconcilable struggle that will provide the basis for the eventual overthrow of capitalism, and the resolution of the contradiction through the abolition of classes.

### **The Negation of the Negation**

The general pattern of historical development is not one of a straight line upward, but of a complex interaction in which each step forward is only achieved at the cost of a partial step backwards. These regressions, in turn, are remedied at the next stage of development.

The law of the negation of the negation explains the repetition at a higher level of certain features and properties of the lower level and the apparent return of past features. There is a constant struggle between form and content and between content and form, resulting in the eventual shattering of the old form and the transformation of the content.

This whole process can be best pictured as a spiral, where the movement comes back to the position it started, but at a higher level. In other words, historical progress is achieved through a series of contradictions. Where the previous stage is negated, this does not represent its total elimination. It does not wipe out completely the stage that it supplants.

"The capitalist method of appropriation, which springs from the capitalist method of production, and therefore capitalist private property, is the first negation of individual private property based on one's own labour. But capitalist production begets with the inevitableness of a natural process its own negation. It is the negation of the negation," remarked Marx in volume one of Capital.

Engels explains a whole series of examples to illustrate the negation of the negation in his book Anti-Duhring. "Let us take a grain of barley. Millions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which for it are normal, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture a specific change takes place, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and, as soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten, twenty or thirty fold."

The barley lives and evolves by means of returning to its starting point - but at a higher level. One

seed has produced many. Also over time, plants have evolved qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Successive generations have shown variations, and become more adapted to their environment. Engels gives a further example from the insect world. "Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg through a negation of the egg, they pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, they pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs."

## **Hegel and Marx**

Hegel, who had a giant intellect, illuminated a great many things. It was a debt that Marx repeatedly recognised. "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner," states Marx. Nevertheless, Hegel's philosophical system was a huge miscarriage. It suffered from an incurable internal contradiction. Hegel's conception of history is an evolutionary one, where there is nothing final or eternal. However, his system laid claim to being the absolute truth, in complete contradiction to the laws of dialectical thought. While Hegel defended the status quo in Germany, the dialectic embraced a revolutionary view of constant change. For Hegel, all that was real was rational. But using the Hegelian dialectic, all that is real will become irrational. All that exists deserves to perish. In this lay the revolutionary significance of the Hegelian philosophy. The solution of this contradiction led back to materialism, but not the old mechanical materialism, but one based upon the new sciences and advances. "Materialism rose again enriched by all the acquisitions of idealism. The most important of these acquisitions was the dialectical method, the examination of phenomena in their development, in their origin and destruction. The genius who represented this new direction of thought was Karl Marx," writes Plekhanov. Spurred on by revolutionary developments in Europe in 1830-31, the Hegelian School split into left, right and centre. The most prominent representative of the Hegelian Left was Ludwig Feuerbach who challenged the old orthodoxy, especially religion, and placed materialism at the centre of things again. "Nature has no beginning and no end. Everything in it is in mutual interaction, everything at once effect and cause, everything in it is all-sided and reciprocal..." writes Feuerbach, adding that there is no place there for God. "Christians tear out the spirit, the soul, of man out of his body and make this torn-out, disembodied spirit into their God." Despite Feuerbach's limitations, Marx and Engels welcomed the new breakthrough with enthusiasm.

"But in the meantime", noted Engels, "the Revolution of 1848 thrust the whole of philosophy aside as unceremoniously as Feuerbach himself was also pushed into the background." It was left to Marx and Engels to consistently apply the dialectic to the new materialism, producing dialectical materialism. For them, the new philosophy was not an abstract philosophy, but directly linked to practice. "Dialectics reduces itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought - two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents." (Engels) Neither Marx nor Engels left behind them a comprehensive book on dialectics as such. Marx was pre-occupied with Capital. Engels intended to write such a book, but was overtaken by the need to complete Capital after Marx's death. He nevertheless wrote quite extensively on the subject, especially in *Anti-Dühring* and *the Dialectics of Nature*. Lenin commented, "If Marx did not leave behind him a 'Logic' (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of Capital, and this ought to be utilised to the full. In Capital, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism (three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing) which has

taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further."

Today, a small number of scientists, mainly from the natural sciences, have become conscious of the dialectic, which has opened their eyes to problems in their specialised fields. This relationship between science and dialectical materialism has been fully discussed in the book by Alan Woods and Ted Grant *Reason in Revolt*. They showed, along with Engels, that nature is completely dialectical. Apart from Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge, Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, who regard themselves as dialectical materialists, have also

written about the application of the dialectic to the field of biology in their book *The Dialectical Biologist*: "What characterises the dialectical world, in all its aspects, as we have described it is that it is constantly in motion. Constants become variables, causes become effects, and systems develop, destroying the conditions that gave rise to them. Even elements that appear to be stable are in a dynamic equilibrium of forces that can suddenly become unbalanced, as when a dull grey lump of metal of a critical size becomes a fireball brighter than a thousand suns. Yet the motion is not unconstrained and uniform. Organisms develop and differentiate, then die and disintegrate. Species arise but inevitably become extinct. Even in the simple physical world we know of no uniform motion. Even the earth rotating on its axis has slowed down in geological time. The development of systems through time, then, seems to be the consequence of opposing forces and opposing motions.

"This appearance of opposing forces has given rise to the most debated and difficult, yet the most central, concept in dialectical thought, the principle of contradiction. For some, contradiction is an epistemic principle only. It describes how we come to understand the world by a history of antithetical theories that, in contradiction to each other and in contradiction to observed phenomena, lead to a new view of nature. Kuhn's (1962) theory of scientific revolution has some of this flavour of continual contradiction and resolution, giving way to new contradiction. For others, contradiction becomes an ontological property at least of human social existence. For us, contradiction is not only epistemic and political, but also ontological in the broadest sense. Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human social institutions. This tradition of dialectics goes back to Engels (1880) who wrote, in *Dialectics of Nature*, that 'to me there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics of nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.'" (*The Dialectical Biologist*, p.279) Marxists have always stressed the unity of theory and practice. "Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it", as Marx pointed to in his thesis on Feuerbach. "If the truth is abstract it must be untrue," states Hegel. All truth is concrete. We have to look at things as they exist, with a view to understanding their underlying contradictory development. This has very important conclusions, especially for those fighting to change society. Unlike the Utopian socialists who viewed socialism as a wonderful idea, Marxists see the development of socialism as arising out of the contradictions of capitalism. Capitalist society has prepared the material basis for a classless society with its highly developed productive forces and its world division of labour. It has brought into being the working class, whose very life existence brings it into conflict with capitalism. On the basis of experience, it will become fully conscious of its position in society and it will be transformed, in the words of Marx, from a "class in-itself" to a "class for-itself".

Dialectics bases itself on determinism, but this has nothing in common with fatalism which denies the existence of accident in nature, society and thought. Dialectical determinism asserts the unity

of necessity and accident, and explains that necessity expresses itself through accident. All events have causes, necessary events and accidental ones alike. If there were no causal laws in nature everything would be in a state of utter chaos. It would be an impossible position where nothing could exist. So everything is dependent upon everything else, as in a continuous chain of cause and effect. Particular events always have a chance or accidental character, but these arise only as the result of a deeper necessity. In fact, necessity manifests itself through a series of accidents. Without doubt, accidents have their place, but the essential thing is to discover what laws determine this deeper necessity.

From the point of view of superficial observation, everything may appear to be accidental or open to chance. This can appear especially so when we have no knowledge of the laws that govern change and their interconnections. "Where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws," remarked Engels in Ludwig Feuerbach. In nature, the evolution of matter follows a certain path, although how, when, and in what form this is realised, depends upon accidental circumstances. For example, whether life was created or not on earth depended on a whole series of accidental factors, such as the presence of water, different chemical elements, the earth's distance from the sun, an atmosphere, etc. "It is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings", states Engels, "hence, too, this always necessarily occurs whenever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are present...what is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents, and the so-called accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself."

Superficial historians have written that the First World War was "caused" by the assassination of a Crown Prince at Sarajevo. To a Marxist this event was an historical accident, in the sense that this chance event served as the pretext, or catalyst, for the world conflict which had already been made inevitable by the economic, political and military contradictions of imperialism. If the assassin had missed, or if the Crown Prince had never been born, the war would still have taken place, on some other diplomatic pretext or other. Necessity would have expressed itself through a different "accident".

In the words of Hegel, everything which exists, exists of necessity. But, equally, everything which exists is doomed to perish, to be transformed into something else. Thus what is "necessary" in one time and place becomes "unnecessary" in another. Everything begets its opposite, which is destined to overcome and negate it. This is true of individual living things as much as societies and nature generally.

Every type of human society exists because it is necessary at the given time when it arises: "No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it, have been developed: and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve, since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or at least are in the process of formation." (Marx, Critique of Political Economy.)

Slavery, in its day, represented an enormous leap forward over barbarism. It was a necessary stage in the development of productive forces, culture and human society. As Hegel brilliantly explained it: "It is not so much from slavery as through slavery that man becomes free." Similarly capi-

talism was originally a necessary and progressive stage in human society. However, like primitive communism, slavery, and feudalism, capitalism has long since ceased to represent a necessary and progressive social system. It has foundered upon the deep contradictions inherent in it, and is doomed to be overcome by the rising forces of the new society within the old, represented by the modern proletariat. Private ownership of the means of production and the nation state, the basic features of capitalist society, which originally marked a great step forward, now serve only to fetter and undermine the productive forces and threaten all the gains made in centuries of human development.

Capitalism is now a thoroughly degenerate social system, which must be overthrown and replaced by its opposite, socialism, if human culture is to survive. Marxism is determinist, but not fatalist. Men and women make history. The transformation of society can only be achieved by men and women consciously striving for their own emancipation. This struggle of the classes is not predetermined. Who succeeds depends on many factors, and a rising, progressive class has many advantages over the old, decrepit force of reaction. But ultimately, the result must depend upon which side has the stronger will, the greater organisation and the most skilful and resolute leadership. The victory of socialism will mark a new and qualitatively different stage of human history. To be more accurate it will mark the end of the prehistory of the human race, and start a real history. However on the other hand, socialism marks a return to the earliest form of human society - tribal communism - but on a much higher level, which stands upon all the enormous gains of thousands of years of class society. The negation of primitive communism by class society is in turn negated by socialism. The economy of superabundance will be made possible by the application of conscious planning to the industry, science and technique established by capitalism, on a world scale. This in turn will once and for all make redundant the division of labour, the difference between mental and manual labour, between town and countryside, and the wasteful and barbaric class struggle and enable the human race at last to set its resources to the conquest of nature: to use Engels' famous phrase, "the leap of man from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom".

### **The ABC of Materialist Dialectics**

The dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics. I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concise form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that A is equal to A. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality A is not equal to A. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens - they are quite different from each other.

But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities: for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true - all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself "at a given moment." Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this 'axiom,' it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes.

Or is the 'moment' a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom  $A$  is equal to  $A$  signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist. At first glance it could seem that these "subtleties" are useless. In reality they are of decisive significance. The axiom  $A$  is equal to  $A$  appears on one hand to be the point of departure for all our knowledge, on the other hand the point of departure for all the errors in our knowledge.

To make use of the axiom  $A$  is equal to  $A$  with impunity is possible only within certain limits. When quantitative changes in  $A$  are negligible for the task at hand, then we can presume  $A$  is equal to  $A$ . This is, for example, the manner in which a buyer and a seller consider a pound of sugar. We consider the temperature of the sun likewise. Until recently we considered the buying power of the dollar in the same way. But quantitative changes beyond certain limits become converted into qualitative. A pound of sugar subjected to the action of water or kerosene ceases to be a pound of sugar. A dollar in the embrace of a president ceases to be a dollar. To determine at the right moment the critical point where quantity changes into quality is one of the most important and difficult tasks in all the spheres of knowledge, including sociology.

Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of bearing-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits (this is called tolerance). By observing the norms of tolerance, the cones are considered as being equal ( $A$  is equal to  $A$ ). When the tolerance is exceeded, the quantity goes over into quality; in other words, the cone bearings become inferior or completely worthless.

Our scientific thinking is only a part of our general practice, including techniques. For concepts there also exists "tolerance" which is established not by formal logic issuing from the axiom  $A$  is equal to  $A$  but by dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing. "Common sense" is characterized by the fact that it systematically exceeds dialectical "tolerance." Vulgar thought operates with such concepts as capitalism, morals, freedom, workers' state, etc., as fixed abstractions, presuming that capitalism is equal to capitalism, morals are equal to morals, etc. Dialectical thinking analyses all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which  $A$  ceases to be  $A$ , a workers' state ceases to be a workers' state.

The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of reality, which consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of closer approximations, corrections, concretisations, a richness of content and flexibility, I would even say a succulence, which to a certain extent brings them close to living phenomena. Not capitalism in general but a given capitalism at a given stage of development. Not a workers' state in general, but a given workers' state in a backward country in an Imperialist encirclement etc. Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion. Dialectics does not deny the syllogism, but teaches us to combine syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the eternally changing reality.

Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development

through contradictions, conflict of content and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc., which are just as important for theoretical thought as is the simple syllogism for more elementary tasks. Hegel wrote before Darwin and before Marx. Thanks to the powerful impulse given to thought by the French Revolution, Hegel anticipated the general movement of science. But because it was only an anticipation, although by a genius, it received from Hegel an idealistic character. Hegel operated with ideological shadows as the ultimate reality. Marx demonstrated that the movement of these ideological shadows reflected nothing but the movement of material bodies.

We call our dialectic materialist since its roots are neither in heaven nor in the depths of our "free will" but in objective reality, in nature. Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, the solar system out of nebula. On all the rungs of this ladder of development the quantitative changes were transformed into qualitative. Our thought including dialectical thought is only one of the forms of the expression of changing matter. There is place within this system for neither God, nor Devil, nor immortal soul nor eternal norms of laws and morals. The dialectic of thinking, having grown out of the dialectic of nature, possesses consequently a thoroughly materialist character.

Darwinism, which explained the evolution of species through quantitative transformations passing into qualitative, was the highest triumph of the dialectic in the whole field of organic matter. Another great triumph was the discovery of the table of atomic weights of chemical elements and further the transformation of one element into another. With these transformations (species, elements, etc.) is closely linked the question of classifications, just as important in the natural as in the social sciences. Linnaeus's system (eighteenth century), utilizing as its starting point the immutability of species, was limited to the description and classification of plants according to their external characteristics.

The infantile period of botany is analogous to the infantile period of logic, since the forms of our thought develop like everything that lives. Only decisive repudiation of the idea of fixed species, only the study of the history of the evolution of plants and their anatomy prepared the basis for a really scientific classification. Marx, who in distinction from Darwin was a conscious dialectician, discovered a basis for the scientific classification of human societies in the development of their productive forces and the structure of the relations of ownership, which constitute the anatomy of society. Marxism substituted for the vulgar descriptive classification of societies and states, which even up to now still flourishes in the universities, a materialistic dialectical classification. Only through using the method of Marx is it possible correctly to determine both the concept of a workers' state and the moment of its downfall.

All this, as we see, contains nothing "metaphysical" or "scholastic," as conceited ignorance affirms. Dialectical logic expresses the laws of motion in contemporary scientific thought. The struggle against materialist dialectics on the contrary expresses a distant past conservatism of the petty bourgeoisie, the self-conceit of university routinists and . . . a spark of hope for an afterlife.

### **From 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy'**

Out of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, however, there developed still another tendency, the only one which has borne real fruit. And this tendency is essentially connected with the name of Marx.

The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world - nature and history - just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently - at least in its basic features - in all domains of knowledge concerned.

Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist - unknown where - from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it "alienates" itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man's consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history - that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression - is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought - two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2)

In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end - this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things. If, however, in-

investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for final solutions and eternal truths ceases once for all; one is always conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it was acquired. On the other hand, one no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antithesis, insuperable for the still common old metaphysics, between true and false, good and bad, identical and different, necessary and accidental. One knows that these antitheses have only a relative validity; that that which is recognized now as true has also its latent false side which will later manifest itself, just as that which is now regarded as false has also its true side by virtue of which it could previously be regarded as true. One knows that what is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents and that the so-called accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself - and so on. The old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls "metaphysical", which preferred to investigate things as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt people's minds, had a great deal of historical justification in its day. It was necessary first to examine things before it was possible to examine processes. One had first to know what a particular thing was before one could observe the changes it was undergoing. And such was the case with natural science. The old metaphysics, which accepted things as finished objects, arose from a natural science which investigated dead and living things as finished objects. But when this investigation had progressed so far that it became possible to take the decisive step forward, that is, to pass on the systematic investigation of the changes which these things undergo in nature itself, then the last hour of the old metaphysic struck in the realm of philosophy also. And in fact, while natural science up to the end of the last century was predominantly a collecting science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a systematizing science, a science of the processes, of the origin and development of these things and of the interconnection which binds all these natural processes into one great whole. Physiology, which investigates the processes occurring in plant and animal organisms; embryology, which deals with the development of individual organisms from germs to maturity; geology, which investigates the gradual formation of the Earth's surface - all these are the offspring of our century.

### **The Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism (extract)**

The philosophy of Marxism is materialism. Throughout the recent history of Europe, and particularly at the end of the eighteenth century in France, which was the scene of the decisive battle against every kind of medieval rubbish, against serfdom in institutions and ideas, materialism proved to be the only consistent philosophy, true to all the teachings of natural science, hostile to superstitions, cant, etc. The enemies of democracy tried, therefore, with all their energy, to "overthrow," undermine and defame materialism, and defended various forms of philosophic idealism, which always leads, in one way or another, to the defence and support of religion. Marx and Engels always defended philosophic materialism in the most determined manner, and repeatedly explained the profound error of every deviation from this basis. Their views are more dearly and fully expounded in the works of Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and Anti-Duhring, which, like the Communist Manifesto, are household books for every conscious worker.

However, Marx did not stop at the materialism of the eighteenth century but moved philosophy forward. He enriched it by the achievements of German classical philosophy especially by Hegel's system, which in its turn had led to the materialism of Feuerbach. Of these the main achievement is dialectics, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fuller, deeper form, free from one-sidedness-the doctrine, also, of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. The latest discoveries of natural science-radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements-are a remarkable confirmation of the dialectical materialism of Marx, despite the doc-

trines of bourgeois philosophers with their "new" returns to old and rotten idealism.

While deepening and developing philosophic materialism, Marx carried it to its conclusion; he extended its perception of nature to the perception of human society. The historical materialism of Marx represented the greatest conquest of scientific thought. Chaos and arbitrariness, which reigned until then in the views on history and politics, were replaced by a strikingly consistent and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how out of one order of social life another and higher order develops, in consequence of the growth of the productive forces - how capitalism, for instance, grows out of serfdom. Just as the cognition of man reflects nature (i.e., developing matter) which exists independently of him, so also the social cognition of man (i.e., the various views and doctrines-philosophic, religious, political, etc.) reflects the economic order of society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of modern European states serve the purpose of strengthening the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. The philosophy of Marx completes in itself philosophic materialism which has provided humanity, and especially the working class, with a powerful instrument of knowledge.

### **Lenin's Collected Works**

The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the essence (one of the "essentials", one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. That is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the matter. The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the history of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of examples ("for example, a seed", "for example, primitive communism". The same is true of Engels. But it is "in the interests of popularisation ...") and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world.)

In mathematics: + and -, differential and integral, In mechanics: action and reaction, In physics: positive and negative electricity, In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms, In social science: the class struggle. The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their "unity", -although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their "self-movement", in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the "struggle" of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)!

In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external - God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of "self"-movement. The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to "leaps", to the "break in continuity," to the transformation into the opposite", to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute. NB: The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute.

In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz., the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the Sum of its individual parts. From its beginning to its end. Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general (for with Marx the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics). To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognised); the individual is the universal.

Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a "nucleus" (:cell") the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. And natural science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simple instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the "aspect" of the matter (it is not "an aspect" but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.

Knowledge is represented in the form of a series of circles both by Hegel (see Logic) and by the modern epistemologists" of natural science, the eclectic and foe of Hegelianism (which he did not understand!!), Paul Volkman. "Circles" in philosophy: [is a chronology of persons - essential? No! Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus. Renaissance: Descartes versus Gassendi (Spinoza?)

Modern: Holbach-Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel - Feuerbach – Marx Dialectics as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of

shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade) - here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with metaphysical materialism, the fundamental misfortune of which is its inability to apply dialectics to the theory of reflection, to the process and development of knowledge.

Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated, development (inflation, distension) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge, into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. But philosophical idealism is ("more correctly" and "in addition") a road to clerical obscurantism through one of the shades of the infinitely complex knowledge (dialectical) of man. Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness - voila the epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.

### **Marx's Theory of Alienation**

The alienation of labour that takes place specifically in capitalist society is sometimes mistakenly described as four distinct types or forms of alienation. It is, on the contrary, a single total reality that can be analyzed from a number of different points of view. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx discusses four aspects of the alienation of labour, as it takes place in capitalist society: one is alienation from the product of labour; another is alienation from the activity of labour; a third is alienation from one's own specific humanity; and a fourth is alienation from others, from society. There is nothing mysterious about this fourfold breakdown of alienation. It follows from the idea that all acts of labour involve an activity of some sort that produces an object of some sort, performed by a human being (not a work animal or a machine) in some sort of social context.

Alienation in general, at the most abstract level, can be thought of as a surrender of control through separation from an essential attribute of the self, and, more specifically, separation of an actor or agent from the conditions of meaningful agency. In capitalist society the most important such separation, the one that ultimately underlies many, if not most other forms, is the separation of most of the producers from the means of production. Most people do not themselves own the means necessary to produce things. That is, they do not own the means that are necessary to produce and reproduce their lives. The means of production are, instead owned by a relatively few. Most people only have access to the means of production when they are employed by the owners of the means of production to produce under conditions that the producers themselves do not determine.

So alienation is not meant by Marx to indicate merely an attitude, a subjective feeling of being without control. Although alienation may be felt and even understood, fled from and even resisted, it is not simply as a subjective condition that Marx is interested in it. Alienation is the objective

structure of experience and activity in capitalist society. Capitalist society cannot exist without it. Capitalist society, in its very essence, requires that people be placed into such a structure and, even better, that they come to believe and accept that it is natural and just. The only way to get rid of alienation would be to get rid of the basic structure of separation of the producers from the means of production. So alienation has both its objective and subjective sides. One can undergo it without being aware of it, just as one can undergo alcoholism or schizophrenia without being aware of it. But no one in capitalist society can escape this condition (without escaping capitalist society). Even the capitalist, according to Marx, experiences alienation, but as a "state", differently from the worker, who experiences it as an "activity". Marx, however, pays little attention to the capitalist's experience of alienation, since his experience is not of the sort which is likely to bring into question the institutions that underpin that experience. The first aspect of alienation is alienation from the product of labour. In capitalist society, that which is produced, the objectification of labour, is lost to the producer. In Marx's words, "objectification becomes the loss of the object". The object is a loss, in the very mundane and human sense, that the act of producing it is the same act in which it becomes the property of another. Alienation here, takes on the very specific historical form of the separation of worker and owner. That which I produced, or we produced, immediately becomes the possession of another and is therefore out of our control. Since it is out of my control, it can and does become an external and autonomous power on its own.

In making a commodity as a commodity (for the owner of the means of production) I not only lose control over the product I make, I produce something which is hostile to me. We produce it; he possesses it. His possession of what we produce gives him power over us. Not only are we talking here about the things that are produced for direct consumption. More basically, we are talking about the production of the means of production themselves. The means of production are produced by workers, but completely controlled by owners. The more we, the workers, produce, the more productive power there is for someone else to own and control. We produce someone else's power over us. He uses what we have produced in order to wield his power over us. The more we produce, the more they have and the less we have. If I make a wage, I can work for forty or fifty years, and at the end of my life have not much more than I had at the beginning, and none of my fellow workers do either. Where has all this work gone? Some has gone into sustaining us so that we can go on working, but a great deal has gone into the expanded reproduction of the means of production, on behalf of the owners and their power. "Society" gets wealthier, but the individuals themselves do not. They do not own or control a greater proportion of the wealth.

The hostility of the product over which I relinquish my control in selling my labour – this also refers to the inhuman power of the impersonal laws of production. The laws of capitalist production have power over me. The boss, the capitalist owner himself, may simply be regarded as merely the representative of more remote, hidden, and inscrutable forces. His excuse, when he informs me that I am no longer needed, that he would have to close up the place or go broke if he didn't do this, is no mere excuse. The capitalist himself is merely a priest who lives well off the service of capital, and not a god. When the god speaks, he too must jump, or he will find himself in my place, where god knows, no one wants to be. So, between him and me, it's "nothing personal". But this is exactly the problem, not an excuse.

The second aspect of alienation, alienation from the activity of labour, means that in labouring I lose control over my life-activity. Not only do I lose control over the thing I produce, I lose control over the activity of producing it. My activity is not self-expression. My activity has no relation to my desires about what I want to do, no relation with the ways I might choose to express myself, no re-

lation with the person I am or might try to become. The only relation that the activity has with me is that it is a way of filling my belly and keeping a roof over my head. My life activity is not life-activity. It is merely the means of self-preservation and survival. In alienated labour, Marx claims, humans are reduced to the level of an animal, working only for the purpose of filling a physical gap, producing under the compulsion of direct physical need.

Alienation from my life-activity also means that my life-activity is directed by another. Somebody else, the foreman, the engineer, the head office, the board of directors, foreign competition, the world-market, the very machinery I am operating, it/they decide what and how and how long and with whom I am going

to act. Somebody else also decides what will be done with my product. And I must do this for the vast majority of my waking hours on earth. What could and should be free conscious activity, and what they tell me I have contracted to do as a free worker, becomes forced labour. It is imposed by my need and by the other's possession of the means of satisfying all needs. As a result I relate to my own activity as though it were something alien to me, as though it were not really mine, which it isn't. I do not truly belong in this place, doing this thing over and over and over again, until I cannot even think or feel anything but the minutes ticking over until quitting time. The real me wants to be doing something.

My activity becomes the activity of another. Life comes to be split between alien work and escape from working, which for us is "leisure". Because our own life activity becomes an alien power over our lives, activity itself gets a bad name. and we tend to avoid it when we are on our own, in our "free time". Free time itself tends to become equated with freedom from activity, because activity is compulsion. Freedom is equated with the opposite of action and production; freedom is consumption, or just passive, mindless "fun", or just blowing off steam. Only in class society is there such an equation of activity with pain and of leisure with inactivity or sloth, for activity under alienated labour is not self-expression but self-denial. All our capacities are parceled out into marketable skills. We talk about "human resources" or youth as "our most precious resource", all of which pseudo-humanist jargon expresses the same reality, that human labour is turned into a commodity to be bought and sold like any other.

As this civilization moves on we get, of course, an ever finer and more detailed separation of hand and brain, of sense and intelligence, manifested in the truncated capacities of both masters and wage-slaves. Some people are likely to spend their entire lives developing the capacity to locate defects in the ends of cans. This becomes their forced contribution to the human species. And it is in this sense that we are not without cause, in the latest stages of capitalism, of thinking of ourselves as appendages of a machine. In a sense, capitalism involves a devolution even behind the work-animal. At least the work-animal is an enslaved total organism. Even a tool or a slave can be used to carry out many different things. But by the time you get to the highest stage of capitalism, human functions can be more dehumanized than that of a tool: you become the appendage of a machine, just part of a tool, a cog in the vast machine of production.

By many routes, then, alienation from the product and from the activity of labour lead up to and involve alienation in its third aspect, alienation from the self or from the human essence. It is not only the product that becomes an alien power. It is not only that self-development becomes self-denial. Internally related to these others is a loss of self. To alienate my labour-power, to be forced to sell it as a commodity on the market, is to lose my life-activity, which is my very self. It is to become other than myself. Sometimes we speak innocently enough of being beside ourselves or

feeling remote from ourselves; or sometimes we use the language of the search for identity and authenticity, of not knowing who we are or not recognizing who we've become. From a Marxian point of view, we are talking about something social and historical rather than something metaphysical or existential. At a deeper level still, the sense of loss of identity or loss of meaning is an expression, but one still alienated itself, of our real loss of humanity, alienation from the human "species-being", as Marx sometimes calls it. This is one thing Marxists mean when they talk about de-humanization.

There is a further aspect of alienation from self which Marx pays little attention to in his later work, but which receives some mention in the Manuscripts and remains important at an implicit level. And it is perhaps most appropriate to discuss it in relation to alienation from self. This further aspect is alienation from sensuousness. Marx conceives of the history of human labour as, among other things, a formation of the human senses themselves. The human senses are not passive mechanisms, a blank slate on which the world leaves its mark more or less clearly and strongly. Marx understands sense perception itself to be the outcome of a process of the labour of a historical subject. The sensuous forms in which we perceive things and their relations is therefore the product of the history of an active subject. The sense themselves are not given, once and for all, but open to education, broadening, refining, formation and re-formation.

If the senses themselves are a product of the process of human collective self-constitution, it is meaningful to speak of an alienation of sensuousness. In capitalist society, our life activity is alienated. As a result we engage in inherently sensuous activities, but in an alienated fashion, almost exclusively, that is, for non-sensuous, extrinsic, extraneous purposes. In order to satisfy virtually any need, we must in capitalist society, work through the medium of money. Most of the things we do, we do in order to make money or to put ourselves in the position to make money, or improve our capacities to make money. There is very little, if anything that a human being could imagine wanting, that is not offered to us as a possible object of a cash transaction. Thus the things with which we are engaged are never approached with an eye to either their own intrinsic value or to their human value in a broader sense. We do not relate most of the time to most things in terms of their intrinsically sensuous and aesthetic reality. The imperatives of capitalist society thus enter into our conscious and semi-conscious experience even at the level of sense and perception itself. We are taught to literally see and feel things as utilities, as abstract counters in the process of making still more money. We become alienated from what Marx calls our subjective human sensibilities. Our senses are not so much animalized or brutalized as they are mechanized. If our life-activity were our own, this would necessarily involve the intensive cultivation of our capacity for aesthetic appreciation of sensuous reality. Humans are, after all, according to Marx, the only species that can produce in conscious appreciation of the laws of beauty. Under alienated labour, sense experience becomes a modifiable sign for things and relations that can be turned into money, the sign of all things. Because our activity is degraded to the level of mechanical subservience to crude needs, or, in reaction to that we perhaps become aesthetes, we regard everything only from the standpoint of the use it can be put. Or we come to attach a perception of beauty or aesthetic value to that which commands a high price. We can be impressed with the supposed aesthetic value of something because it is expensive.

This relation to everything, even the objects of sense and beauty, in terms of its usefulness to the expanded reproduction of capital means we no longer have an eye for the thing itself. Oriented mainly to pieces of the world whose monetary value means that they are essentially interchangeable, we are brought that much more easily to relate to ourselves and each other in this way. We

begin to evaluate ourselves and each other in terms of the amount of money we can make. Or parts of ourselves can be ranked in such terms. We are less able, if still able, to perceive and appreciate the intrinsic qualities of anything, even including ourselves. This dehumanization of the senses, and of perception and of judgement, is not something accidental to the dehumanization of humans.

We are thus led to the fourth aspect, alienation from other people, or from society. Once the traditional community (which understood itself as natural) is broken down, human beings become essentially potentially useful or threatening objects. One can now have enemies in a new sense. Only with the breakdown of primitive communism does man become a wolf to man. "Man is a wolf to man" (*homo homini lupus*) was one of Hobbes's favourite sayings. "Wolflike" behaviour can and does occur in "primitive" societies and between such societies, but it is not the principle of those societies. It does become the central and organizing principle of class societies. In the market it is hard to say that the antagonism of classes becomes more severe, but the antagonism among individuals certainly increases. Now, according to Marx, "human nature" must be grasped as "the ensemble of social relations". It is not simply our neuro-physiological constitution or our DNA that makes us behave or act selfishly. We live, according to Marx, in a society in which each individual must see in every other, not the possibility of his liberty, but its limitation. Every other becomes an obstacle to me, but – and this is important too – a needed obstacle, a customer, a client, a creditor, a debtor, an employer or employee. (We haven't even come up with a better replacement for patriarchal terms such as husband and wife than "partner" – which suggests nothing so much as a boardroom full of lawyers). The other is a rival. It is not that cooperation here is impossible. In fact we learn to coordinate our activities on an ever more grand scale and complex level. It is that this cooperation can only take place as the coincidence of separate and competing "enlightened" self-interests.

In feudal society, or in Aristotle's polis, one's life-activity was directly determined by one's pre-ordained social status. Along with this, however, came a solidary bond integrating the occupants of the various strata. The lord-peasant relationship was a direct, personal bond of two-way loyalty and duty (and even affection). The exploitation of the peasant was an integral part of a patriarchal relation. Even though the solidarity of such societies was a pseudo-solidarity, a solidarity based upon exploitation, it was still a solidarity. What the market society does is to relentlessly smash the patriarchal links between lord and peasant. Each individual is to be thrown upon his own resources in order to make his fortune or not, as the case may be. The market society severs the patriarchal link between lord and peasant, lord and lord, peasant and peasant, and substitutes for it the cash nexus. For the personal relationship is substituted one of personal indifference. The bottom line of the contractual relationship is cash. Previously the worker worked for the community either directly or in personal subservience to his superior, and the subservience of labour was an essential feature of a community felt to have the unity of an organism. Previously it was assumed that community was only possible as the subordination of one social organ to another.

Now, however, my work is not service. Now I work for money, which I will spend any damn way I feel like. As a result, for Marx, although this is in one way a less illusory of living, since it doesn't need to depend on religious or mythical foundations to justify an explicit and clear hierarchy, in another way it is more illusory. My freedom is largely only in appearance. In reality my life-activity is still given up to a superior who is a superior, even though he is formally and by law my equal. In his later work, Marx will especially concentrate on the fact that everything is translated into money terms, and that all relations are mediated by money. In capitalist society, he says, "everyone carries

the social bond in his pocket.”

Although Marx does not in the 1844 Manuscripts make the point directly and explicitly, there is a direct connection between Marx's thoughts on alienation from society and his critique of the state. Those who wish to follow this theme further should read *On the Jewish Question*. For Marx, the existence of the state implies what we could call a political alienation. Often the Marxian notion of the abolition or the withering away of the state is met by the sort of puzzled reaction one might reserve for the abolition of the sun, moon and stars. But Marx would not call the operation of something like Rousseau's general will a state. The form of direct self-government comprised in the idea of the sovereignty of the general will would not be considered a state form. The state, according to Marx, is the set of institutions that arises in order to hold together a society that is continually falling apart. The state is a function of other, deeper social antagonisms that are in principle corrigible. It is a function of the universal individual antagonisms of class societies, but especially a function of class division itself, and of the possibility of open class antagonism. The state is a necessary means of coercion and coordination once society can no longer hold itself together by other means, or before it has learned how to do so once again.

The state is an integral part of class society, not something apart from or beyond it; not something neutral and capable of standing disinterestedly above all particular interests. Whereas theorists like Hegel would argue that in the modern state individuals were in actual reality reconciled and unified, Marx maintains that the state is necessary only because of the real antagonisms class societies generate and sustain among individuals. Nor do individuals in the modern, liberal or even democratic-capitalist state really find a community of equals. Instead, in the state, they come together to deny the inequality and separateness that is their real existence in social and economic life. Their coming together in the political community of the state is thus an illusion, because they are separated in fact. The solidarity of earlier, more organic forms of society is supposedly recovered, in bourgeois society, in the political relationship of free and equal citizens. But this is a pseudo-solidarity, given the lie by the many substantial inequalities outside the formal equality established by constitutional law, and by the fact that the powerful within the private sphere have the power to reach out and have the state work primarily in their fundamental interests. As the French writer, Anatole France once said, “the law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike from begging alms, stealing bread and sleeping under bridges.” It is only because in real life people are alienated from one another through the cash nexus that is increasingly the only thing that connects them, that they must solidarize in an ideal and false unity a formally equal citizens.

Here the notion of an “inverted” or “double” world appears that will become important later on in Marx's notion of “commodity fetishism”. As a corrective to, and also as a mystification of, a contradictory reality, a supplementary but illusory reality is invented and, as it were, laid on top of the first. What is illusory is not the actual power of the state, but the notions that the state is the only thing that can hold a society of human beings together, and that it can do this while sustaining and expressing the freedom and equality of all its citizens. The state is just such an illusory reality, existing by virtue of the misperception that the antagonisms of bourgeois society are the natural and inevitable, eternal and essential antagonisms of human beings as such. And, in truth, it is a necessary and real illusion – to bourgeois society. Thus, the state cannot be abolished, as some anarchists would have it, by the fiat of individuals. The abolition of the state depends on the prior transformation and abolition of class society. The state functions essentially to maintain society in its present form, as a society based upon class divisions rooted in the way material life is produced and reproduced. But the abolition of class society and its state would not mean the disappearance

of differences or of the need for politics. If anything politics would be more prevalent than ever (as opposed to the administration of a subject population) – if what we mean by politics is something like individuals communicating and acting together to resolve conflicts between human needs and social conditions. The existence of processes through which individuals decide upon common policies and common action is not what Marx would call the state.

## The Marxist Critique of Capitalism

Karl Marx saw capitalism as a progressive historical stage that would eventually be followed by socialism.

### Key Points

- Karl Marx saw capitalism as a progressive historical stage that would eventually stagnate due to internal contradictions and be followed by socialism.
- Marxists define capital as “a social, economic relation” between people (rather than between people and things). In this sense they seek to abolish capital.
- Revolutionary socialists believe that capitalism can only be overcome through revolution.
- Social democrats believe that structural change can come slowly through political reforms to capitalism.
- Marxists define capital as “a social, economic relation” between people (rather than between people and things).
- Normative Marxism advocates a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism that would lead to socialism, before eventually transforming into communism after class antagonisms and the state ceased to exist.

### Key Terms

- **revolution:** A political upheaval in a government or nation-state characterized by great change.
- **socialism:** Any of various economic and political philosophies that support social equality, collective decision-making, distribution of income based on contribution and public ownership of productive capital and natural resources, as advocated by socialists.
- **progressive:** Favoring or promoting progress; advanced.

Capitalism has been the subject of criticism from many perspectives during its history. Criticisms range from people who disagree with the principles of capitalism in its entirety, to those who disagree with particular outcomes of capitalism. Among those wishing to replace capitalism with a different method of production and social organization, a distinction can be made between those believing that capitalism can only be overcome with revolution (e.g., revolutionary socialism) and those believing that structural change can come slowly through political reforms to capitalism (e.g., classic social democracy).

Karl Marx saw capitalism as a progressive historical stage that would eventually stagnate due to internal contradictions and be followed by socialism. Marxists define capital as “a social, economic relation” between people (rather than between people and things). In this sense they seek to abolish capital. They believe that private ownership of the means of production enriches capitalists (owners of capital) at the expense of workers. In brief, they argue that the owners of the means of production exploit the workforce.

In Karl Marx's view, the dynamic of capital would eventually impoverish the working class and thereby create the social conditions for a revolution. Private ownership over the means of production and distribution is seen as creating a dependence of non-owning classes on the ruling class, and ultimately as a source of restriction of human freedom.

Marxists have offered various related lines of argument claiming that capitalism is a contradiction-laden system characterized by recurring crises that have a tendency towards increasing severity. They have argued that this tendency of the system to unravel, combined with a socialization process that links workers in a worldwide market, create the objective conditions for revolutionary change. Capitalism is seen as just one stage in the evolution of the economic system.

Normative Marxism advocates for a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism that would lead to socialism, before eventually transforming into communism after class antagonisms and the state cease to exist. Marxism influenced social democratic and labor parties as well as some moderate democratic socialists, who seek change through existing democratic channels instead of revolution, and believe that capitalism should be regulated rather than abolished.

### **Marx's Theory of Class Struggle**

Marx's sociology is in fact, sociology of class struggle. According to Bendix and Lipset, "A social class in Marx's terms is any aggregate of persons who perform the same function in the organization of production." According to Marx, "Class is the manifestation of economic differentiation."

The concept of class struggle, though not originally propounded by Karl Marx, is yet one of his great contributions to Sociology. To Marx, "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." (The first line of communist manifesto (1848) reads.) According to Raymond Aron, "the classes are the principal actors in the historical drama of capitalism in particular and of history in general."

Classes refer to the groups of people having their own role to play in the relations of production. Relations of production refer to the fact that in the process of industrial production the labour and capital stands in specific relation to each other. Labour is the capacity which the working class possesses.

Capital is the instrument invested out of which profit is derived. Those who possess capital they are the owners of capital. Those who are labourers—they are the owners of labour power. Capital gets profit, labour gets wage. Labour and capital are interrelated, they are inseparable. One cannot be thought of without the other.

### **Marx says:**

Classes are hence the groups of people identified and distinguished from each other on the basis of their relations to the economic means of production. Economic means of production refers to the economic infrastructure that few people own as against many. Few people are capitalists and many are labourers. Economic infrastructure refers to all those land, machinery, tools, technology and the skills that assist the process of production.

### **The Class Structure:**

The word "class" originated from the Latin term "Classis" a group called to arms, a division of the people. In the rule of legendary Roman king, Servius Tullius (678- 534 B.C), the Roman society was divided into five classes or orders according to their wealth. Subsequently the word 'class' was ap-

plied to large groups of people into which human society came to be divided. Marx recognized class as a unique feature of capitalist societies. Marx has used the term Social class throughout his works but explained it only in a fragmented form. The clearest passages on the concept of class structure can be found in the third volume of his famous work Capital (1894). Under the title of "Social classes", Marx distinguished three classes related to the three sources of income.

- (i) Owners of simple labour power or labourers whose main source of income is labour.
- (ii) Owners of capital or capitalists whose main source of income is profit or surplus value.
- (iii) Landowners whose main source of income is ground rent.

In this way the class structure of modern capitalist society is composed of three major classes' i.e. salaried labourers of workers, capitalists and landowners. At a broader level, society could be divided into two major classes—Haves and Have-not's. Haves are the owners of land/or capital often called as Bourgeoisie and the Have-not's are those who own nothing but their own labour power, often called as Proletariates. According to Marx, "a social class occupies a fixed place in the process of production."

### **Bendix and Lipset have identified five variables that determine a class in the Marxian sense:**

1. Conflicts over the distribution of economic rewards between the classes.
2. Easy communication between the individuals in the same class position so that ideas and action programs are readily disseminated.
3. Growth of class consciousness in the sense that the members of the class have a feeling of solidarity and understanding of their historical role.
4. Profound dissatisfaction in the lower class over its inability to control the economic structure of which it feels itself to be the exploited victim.
5. Establishment of a political organization resulting from the economic structure, the historical situation and maturation of class-consciousness.

### **Criteria for Determination of Class: A social class has two major criteria:**

- (a) Objective Criteria
- (b) Subjective Criteria.

#### **(a) Objective Criteria:**

People sharing the same relationship to the means of production comprise a class. For example, all labourers have a similar relationship with the land owners. On the other hand all the landowners as a class have a similar relationship with the land and labourers. In this way, labourers on one hand and land owners on the other hand could be seen as classes. However, for Marx, this relationship is not sufficient to determine the class. Because according to him it is not sufficient for class to be "Class in itself" but it should also be "Class for itself". Marx means by "Class in itself" the objective criteria of any social class. He is not satisfied with the objective criteria. Hence, he equal-

ly emphasizes upon the other major criteria i.e. "class for itself" or the subjective criteria.

### **(b) Subjective Criteria:**

Any collectivity of human grouping with a similar relationship would make a category not a class, if subjective criteria are not included. The members of any one class not only have similar consciousness but they also share a similar consciousness of the fact that they belong to the same class. This similar consciousness of a class serves as the basis for uniting its members for organising social action. Here this similar consciousness towards acting together for their common interest is what Marx class-"Class for itself." In this way these two criteria together determine a class and class structure in any given society.

### **Classification of Societies in History and Emergence of Classes:**

Marx differentiated stages of human history on the basis of their economic regime or modes of production.

### **He distinguished four major modes of production:**

6. The Asiatic
7. The Ancient
8. The Feudal
9. The Capitalistic

He predicted that all social development will culminate into a stage called Communism.

### **He simplified this classification of societies or various stages of human history into:**

10. Primitive-Communal
11. Slave-owning
12. Feudal
13. Capitalist
14. Communist stage.

### **1. The Primitive:**

Communal system was the first and the lowest form of organization of people. It existed for thousands of years. Man started using primitive tools like sticks and stones for hunting and food gathering. Gradually man improved these tools. He learned to make fire, cultivation and animal husbandry.

In this system of very low level of forces of production, the relations of production were based on common ownership of the means of production. Therefore, these relations were based on mutual assistance and co-operation. These relations were conditioned by the fact that people with their primitive implements could only withstand the mighty forces of nature together, collectively.

In such a situation, exploitation of man by man did not exist because of two reasons. Firstly, the tools used (means of production) were so simple that they could be reproduced by any one. These were implements like spear, stick, bow and arrow etc. Hence no person or group of people had the monopoly of ownership over the tools.

Secondly, production was at a low scale. The people existed more or less on a subsistence level.

Their production was just sufficient to meet the needs of the people provided everybody worked. Therefore it was a situation of no master and no servant. All were equal. Gradually, with time man started perfecting his tools, his craft of producing and surplus production started taking place. This led to private property and primitive equality gave way to social inequality. Thus, the first antagonistic classes, slaves and slave owners appeared. This is how the development of the forces of production led to the replacement of primitive communal system by slavery.

## **2. Slave-owning:**

In the slave-owning society, primitive tools were perfected and bronze and iron tools replaced the stone and wooden implements. Large scale agriculture, live stock raising, mining and handicrafts developed. The development of this type of forces of production also changed the relations of production.

These relations were based on the slave owners absolute ownership of both the means of production and the slave himself and everything he produced. The owner left the slave only with the bare minimum necessities to keep him from dying of starvation. In this system, the history of exploitation of man by man and the history of class struggle began.

The development of productive forces went on and slavery became an impediment to the expansion of social production. Production demanded the constant improvement of implements, higher labour productivity but the slave had no interest in this as it would not improve his position.

With the passage of time the class conflict between the classes of slave owners and the slaves became acute and it was manifested in slave revolts. These revolts together with the raids from neighbouring tribes undermined the foundations of slavery leading to a new stage, i.e. Feudal system.

## **3. Feudal:**

The Progressive development of the productive forces continued under feudalism. Man started using inanimate sources of energy, i.e. water and wind, besides human labour. The crafts advanced further, new implements and machines were invented and old ones are improved.

The labour of craftsmen was specialized raising productivity considerably. The development of forces of production led to emergence of feudal relations of production. These relations were based on the feudal lord's ownership of the serfs or landless peasants. The production relations were relations of domination and subjection, exploitation of the serfs by the feudal lords.

Nevertheless, these relations were more progressive than in slavery system, because they made the labourers interested to some extent, in their labour. The peasants and the artisans could own the implements or small parts of land. These forces of production underwent changes due to new discoveries, increasing demands for consumption caused by population increase and discovery of new markets through colonialism.

All this led to the need and growth of mass scale manufacture. This became possible due to advances in technology. This brought the unorganized labourers at one place, i.e. the factory. This sparked off already sharpened class conflict leading to peasant revolution against landowners.

The new system of production demanded free labourer whereas the serf was tied to the land; therefore the new forces of production also changed the relations of production culminating into a change in the mode of production from feudalism to capitalism.

## **Intensification of Class Conflict under Capitalism:**

Large-scale machine production is the specific feature of the productive forces of capitalism. Huge factories, plants and mines took place of artisan workshops and manufactures. In a century or two, capitalism accomplished much more in developing the productive forces than had been done in all the proceeding eras of human history. The vigorous growth of the forces of production was helped by the capitalist relations of production based on private capitalist ownership.

Under capitalism, the producer, the proletariat, is legally free, being attached neither to the land nor to any particular factory. They are free in the sense that they can go to work for any capitalist, but they are not free from the bourgeois class as a whole. Possessing no means of production, they are compelled to sell their labour power and thereby came under the yoke of exploitation.

Due to this exploitation the relatively free labourers became conscious of their class interest and organize themselves into a working class movement. This working class movement intensified its struggle against the bourgeois class. It begins with bargaining for better wages and working conditions and cultivates into an intensified class conflict which is aimed at over throwing the capitalist system. Marx said that the capitalist system symbolises the most acute form of inequality, exploitation and class antagonism. This paves the way for a socialist revolution which would lead to a new stage of society i.e. Communism.

## **Class Struggle:**

The theory of class struggle is central to Marxian thought. The first line of Communist Manifesto (1848) reads: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." "Free-man and, slave, patricians and plebian, lord and serf, guild master and journey man, in a word, oppressor and the oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on uninterrupted now hidden and now open fight, a fight that each time ended in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in common ruin of the contending classes."

The perpetual tension, conflict or the antagonism between the owning and the non-owning class is called Class struggle. Not only the classes but also the class struggle is economically conditioned. Therefore Marx says that economic relationship is the very basis of all other types of relationships. i.e., social, political and legal and these are called the super structures. Economic relationship decides, defines and determines all other forms of relationships; i.e. social, political and legal. This is what is called the concept of economic determinism by Marx.

## **Criticisms:**

Marxian theory of class struggle has been put to various criticisms. This theory is having propaganda value. The theory of revolution that Marx presents on the basis of the conflict of interest between the social classes is not convincing. There may be revolution due to causes other than these; and the same may not involve force or violence. The technological revolution of 18th and 19th century, the constitutional changes in the 19th century England, Arya Samaj movement of Dayanand Saraswati are illustrations of the revolutionary changes brought about in the respective areas, without the use of force. The abolition of caste system by the legislative measures is no less revolutionary.

Marx has made many predictions in regard to the development of the future capitalistic society especially in regard to its relations with the proletariat and about the inevitable struggle between the capitalist and the proletariat has not come off. Marx has ignored social conditions. He has failed to distinguish between the social and economic classes. It has been said that it is not correct to believe that all struggle is always a class struggle. He has not followed the nature of struggle.

The concept of alienation of individual from his social system is a complete ambiguity. Marx sociology reduces him to mere zero. There is however, no change in his position. Karl Marx leaves him as much hand and foot bound in his system, as he found him under the established one. The hope of achieving the total man is thus completely lost.

Max Weber considered the philosophy of Marx as "false"; "because it is incompatible with both the nature of science and nature of human existence." Max Weber does not support that only economic factor can influence the course of history. Marxian concept of classless society remains only as a political instrument in the hands of the communists. This concept is being misused for gaining political benefits. It is thus reduced to the level of a tool of political propaganda. Marxian theory of classless society is a kind of Utopian dream. Bogardus says, "Marxian communism is the result of the Plato's communism and Moore's Utopianism." In spite of the above criticisms, shortcomings, the theory of the classless society, class & class struggle has, had a tremendous appeal to the people with a sense of social justice.

### **Classless society**

**Classless society** is a term used by political and social theorists in a variety of contexts. It is used to describe societies in which classes have never developed, such as tribal and nomadic communities in which all the members have similar economic roles. It is also used to describe an ideal state in which every member of society has an equal status. "Classless society" can refer to a hierarchical society in which social classes have been deliberately abolished, such as a commune or an Israeli kibbutz. "Classless society" is an important term in Marxist theory, where it refers to the ultimate ideal condition of social organization, expected to occur when true communism is achieved. According to Marxist theory, social classes emerged with the development of agriculture and the production of surplus food, a circumstance which allowed one group to become dominant over the rest of society. In a society where every worker owns the means of production, Marx theorized that the state would no longer be necessary and would gradually disappear.

Some social theorists argue that modern democratic society is a "classless society" because social and economic mobility have obliterated the dominance of a single group of people.

### **Social Class**

A social class is, basically, a group of people that have similar social status. The relative importance and definition of membership in a particular class differs greatly over time and between societies, particularly in societies having a legal differentiation of groups of people by birth or occupation. Many scholars view societies as stratifying into a hierarchical system of "socioeconomic classes" based on economic status, wealth, or income. From ancient history until the development of trade and industry, many historians and economists used a bi-partite model to view societies as consisting of an upper class of the immensely wealthy and powerful, and a lower class of the poor and weak. The development of urbanization and trade, and later of industrialization, resulted in the emergence of an increasingly powerful economic middle class of artisans, merchants, manufacturers, and highly paid professionals.

### **Marxist Theory of Classless Society Marx and Engels**

Karl Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels adopted Hegel's explanation of history as a dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Instead of Hegel's theory that historical conflict occurred among nation-states constantly jockeying for power, Marx and Engels proposed that the conflict was between socio-economic classes. Their theories appeared to explain the social and

political disorders arising from the Industrial Revolution, and to offer a satisfactory solution in which the establishment of a truly communist society would give everyone equal status. The state would then wither away and man at last become "fully human" in a classless society. The theory of Marx and Engels was developed in response to the unbridled capitalism of laissez-faire, but failed to address the problem of the control of political power. Marx's fellow revolutionary the Russian anarchist M.A. Bakunin observed, "[The revolutionaries would vivisect society in the name of dogmas]and destroy the present order, only to erect their own rigid dictatorship among its ruins."

### **Marx's Classless Society**

According to Marxist theory, tribal society, primitive communism, was classless, because everyone was equally poor and carried out the same work. The transition to agriculture created the possibility of producing a surplus product, more than was necessary to satisfy an individual's immediate needs. The development of productive forces made possible the development of a class society, because the surplus product could be used to nourish a ruling class which did not participate in production. Surplus product was stored until a time of need in special repositories, which then had to be guarded. During times of need, the consumption of the stored products had to be regulated so that they were not all immediately consumed. Those in control of distributing the stored food had the power to deny food to certain individuals, and therefore had to be more powerful than the masses of the population. Thus the ruling class was born. Marx termed this "the first negation," the negation of the classless society. Three societies followed the classless tribal society: ancient society, in which the major class distinction was between master and slave; feudal society, in which lord and serf were opponents in a class war; and bourgeois society, or capitalism, in which the class division existed between factory owner and worker. According to Marx, there would be a classless society once again at the end of development, which would negate class society.

This ideal classless society would be a co-operative union of free producers, who would be both owners of the means of production and workers. There would be no private ownership of the means of production, which would be the property of the whole society. All decisions would be made in a grassroots democratic system, and the state as an instrument of class rule become superfluous and die off. Following the proletarian revolution the economic system would no longer be plagued by rivalry and economic crises, and production would greatly increase. Agriculture would be organized and practiced on larger farms. It would be possible to eliminate all shortages, so that the reasonable needs of all people could be satisfied. The worker would no longer be alienated from the products of his labor; work would become an expression of an individual's personality.

### **Class Theory of Max Weber**

When sociologists speak of "class" they usually mean economically based classes in modern or near pre-modern society. Modern usage of the word "class" outside of Marxism generally considers only the relative wealth of individuals or social groups, and not the ownership of the means of production.

The sociologist Max Weber formulated a three-component theory of stratification, with social, status and party classes (or politics) as conceptually distinct elements. Social class is based on an individual's economic relationship to the market, including those of owner, renter, employee, or financier. A status class or group is differentiated by non-economic qualities such as prestige,

honor, religion, and intelligence. Party classes are determined by affiliations in the political domain. All three of these dimensions have consequences for what Weber called "life chances," or possibilities for success as defined by the individual or by society.

## **Classlessness**

The term classlessness has been used to describe several different social phenomena.

- Societies in which classes have never developed. These are usually societies in which all people naturally play similar economic roles and have never created a division of labor; they include most early human groups, as well as many modern tribal and nomadic societies. Some of these are forms of primitive communism.
- Societies where classes have been deliberately abolished. Such a situation is usually the result of a voluntary decision by the members of a certain society, to abolish that society's class structure. This includes many modern communes and social experiments, such as the Paris Commune, and the Israeli kibbutzes. The abolition of social classes and the establishment of a classless society is the ultimate ideological goal of communism, libertarian socialism and anarchism.
- The term 'classless society' is sometimes also used to describe a hierarchical society in which a person's status is not determined by their birth. For example, the British Prime Minister John Major said in 1990, "I want changes to produce across the whole of this country a genuinely classless society so people can rise to whatever level from whatever level they started."
- The term "classlessness" has also been used to describe the intelligentsia in a society by some political writers, who argue that the intelligentsia do not feel allegiance to any particular class and are best placed to articulate the needs of society without bias. Critics argue that the intelligentsia are, more often than not, associated with the middle or upper class.
- Classlessness also refers to the state of mind required in order to operate effectively as a social anthropologist. Anthropological training includes making assessments of, and therefore becoming aware of, one's own class assumptions, so that these can be set aside from conclusions reached about other societies. Classlessness requires the recognition and avoidance of ethnocentric biases, and the achievement of a "neutral axiology" as described by Max Weber, in order to avoid reaching conclusions about the societies being studied which are colored by the anthropologist's own class values.

## **Modern Democracy and Classless Society**

Some modern scholars argue that traditional social classes do not exist in modern democratic society. Their argument is based on a definition of "class" which includes specific measures of class identity. Some of these are the demographic and ethnic similarity among members of a class; the extent to which the members of a class share a common cultural orientation; whether the members of a class share distinct, life-defining experiences and a common sentiment about their class status; and whether the members of a class have a common political affiliation. In a modern democratic society in which education is universally available and social mobility is tied to economic success, these criteria could be used to conclude that it is a classless society.

Critics argue that because economic status determines access to education and opportunity, a self-perpetuating upper class does exist even in a democratically mobile society. Perceptions of a dominant social class are strong in democratic nations, such as the United Kingdom, which have a historical aristocracy.

## COMMUNITARIANISM

Communitarianism is a social philosophy that core assumption is the required shared ("social") formulations of the good. The assumption is both empirical (social life exhibits shared values) and normative (shared values ought to be formulated). While many sociologists may consider such an assumption as subject to little controversy, communitarianism is in effect a highly contested social philosophy. It is often contrasted with liberalism (based on the works of John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill, not to be confused with liberalism as the term is used in contemporary American politics). Liberalism's core assumption is that what people consider right or wrong, their values, should strictly be a matter for each individual to determine. To the extent that social arrangements and public policies are needed, these should not be driven by shared values but by voluntary arrangements and contracts among the individuals involved, thus reflecting their values and interests. Communitarians, in contrast, see social institutions and policies as affected by tradition and hence by values passed from generation to generation. These become part of the self through nonrational processes, especially internalization, and are changed by other processes such as persuasion, religious or political indoctrination, leadership, and moral dialogues.

In addition, communitarianism emphasizes particularism, the special moral obligations people have to their families, kin, communities, and societies. In contrast, liberalism stresses the universal rights of all individuals, regardless of their particular membership. Indeed, liberal philosopher Jeremy Bentham declared that the very notion of a society is a fiction.

Until 1990, sociological and social psychological researchers and theorists and communitarian philosophers often ignored one another's works, despite the fact that they dealt with closely related issues. It should be noted, though, that communitarians were much more inclined to be openly and systematically normative than many social scientists.

## HISTORY

Like many other schools of thought, communitarianism has changed considerably throughout its history, and has various existing camps that differentiate significantly. As far as can be determined, the term "communitarian" was not used until 1841, when Goodwyn Barmby, an official of the Communist Church, founded the Universal Communitarian Association. Communitarian issues were addressed long before that date, however, for instance in Aristotle's comparison of the isolated lives of people in the big metropolis to close relationships in the smaller city. Both the Old and the New Testament deal with various issues one would consider communitarian today, for instance the obligations to one's community. The social teaching of the Catholic Church (for instance, concerning subsidiarity) and of early utopian socialism (for example, regarding communal life and solidarity), all contain strong communitarian elements, although these works are not comprehensive communitarian statements and are not usually considered as communitarian works per se.

Among early sociologists whose work is strongly communitarian, although this fact is as a rule overlooked by social philosophers, are Ferdinand Tönnies, especially his comparison of the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, (or community and society); Emile Durkheim, especially his concerns about the integrating role of social values and the relations between the individual and society; and George Herbert Mead. These works are extensively examined elsewhere in this encyclopedia and hence are not discussed here. A communitarian who combined social philosophy and sociology Martin Buber. Especially relevant are Buber's contrast between I-It and I-Thou relations, his interest in dialogue, and his distinction between genuine communal relationships and objectified ones.

Other sociologists whose work contains communitarian elements are Robert E. Park, William Kornhauser, and Robert Nisbet. Philip Selznick, Robert Bellah and his associates, and Amitai Etzioni wrote books that laid the foundations for new (or responsive) communitarianism, which Etzioni launched as a "school" and somewhat of a social movement in 1990. Selznick's *The Moral Commonwealth* is especially key in forming a strong intellectual grounding for new communitarian thinking, and presents an integration of moral and social theory in a synthesis of "communitarian liberalism." According to Selznick, communitarianism does not reject basic liberal ideals and achievements; it seeks reconstruction of liberal perspectives to mitigate the excesses of individualism and rationalism, and to encourage an ethic of responsibility (in contrast to liberalism, where the concept of responsibility has no major role). In a community there is an irrepressible tension between exclusion and inclusion, and between civility and piety. Thus community is not a restful idea, a realm of peace and harmony. On the contrary, competing principles must be recognized and dealt with.

## **AUTHORITARIAN, POLITICAL THEORETICAL, AND RESPONSIVE COMMUNITARIANISM**

Different communitarian camps are no closer to one another than National Socialists (Nazis) are to Scandinavian Social Democrats (also considered socialists). It is hence important to keep in mind which camp one is considering. The differences concern the normative relations between social order and liberty, and the relations between the community and the individual.

**Authoritarian Communitarians.** Authoritarian communitarians (some of whom are often referred to as "Asian" or "East Asian" communitarians) are those who argue that to maintain social order and harmony, individual rights and political liberties must be curtailed. Some believe in the strong arm of the state (such as former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian head of state Mahathir Bin Mohamad), and some in strong social bonds and the voice of the family and community (especially the kind of society Japan had, at least until 1990). Among the arguments made by authoritarian communitarians is that social order is important to people, while what the West calls "liberty" actually amounts to social, political, and moral anarchy; that curbing legal and political rights is essential for rapid economic development; and that legal and political rights are a Western idea, which the West uses to harshly judge other cultures that have their own inherent values. The extent to which early sociological works, for instance, by Tönnies and *Community and Power* by Robert Nisbet, include authoritarian elements, is open to question.

**Political Theoreticians** . In the 1980s communitarian thinking became largely associated with three scholars: Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer. They criticized liberalism for its failure to realize that people are socially "situated" or contextualized, and its negligence of the greater common good in favor of individualistic self-interests. In addition, as Chandran Kukathas relates in *The Communitarian Challenge to Liberalism* (Paul, Miller, Paul, eds. 1990, p.90), communitarians argue that political community is an important value which is neglected by liberal political theory. Liberalism, they contend, views political society as a supposedly neutral framework of rules within which a diversity of moral traditions coexist. . [Such a view] neglects the fact that people have, or can have, a strong and 'deep' attachment to their societies—to their nations. While for many outside sociology, especially until 1990, these three scholars were considered the founding fathers of communitarian thinking, none of them uses the term in their work, possibly to avoid being confused with authoritarian communitarians. These scholars almost completely ignored sociological work that preceded them, and were largely ignored by sociologists.

## **New or Responsive Communitarians**

Early in 1990, a school of communitarianism was founded in which sociologists played a key role, although it included scholars from other disciplines such as William A. Galston (political theory), Mary Ann Glendon (law), Thomas Spragens, Jr. (political science), and Alan Ehrenhalt (writer) to mention but a few. The group, founded by Amitai Etzioni, took communitarianism from a small and somewhat esoteric academic discipline and introduced it into public life, and recast its academic content. Its tools were The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, a joint manifesto summarizing the guiding principles of the group; an intellectual quarterly, The Responsive Community, whose editors include several sociologists; several books; position papers on issues ranging from a communitarian view of the family to organ donation and to bicultural education; and numerous public conferences, op-eds.

## **Key Assumptions and Concepts**

Responsive communitarianism methodologically is based on the macro- sociological assumption that societies have multiple and not wholly compatible needs and values, in contrast to philosophies that derive their core assumptions from one overarching principle, for instance liberty for libertarianism. Responsive communitarianism assumes that a "good society" is based on a carefully crafted balance between liberty and social order, between individual rights and social responsibilities, between particularistic (ethnic, racial, communal) and society- wide values and bonds. In that sense, far from representing a Western model, the communitarian good society combines 'Asian' values (also reflecting tenets of Islam and Judaism that stress social responsibilities) with a Western concern with political liberty and individual rights.

While the model of the good society is applicable to all societies, communitarianism stresses that different societies, during various historical periods, may be off balance in rather contrasting ways and hence may need to move in different directions in order to approximate the same balance. Thus, contemporary East Asian societies require much greater tolerance for individual and communal differences, while in the American society—especially at the end of the 1980s—excessive individualism needs to be reigned in. To put it differently, communitarianism suggests that the specific normative directives that flow from the good society model are historically and culturally contingent.

Responsive communitarians stress that the relationship between liberty and social order is not a zero-sum situation; up to a point they are mutually supportive. Thus, in situations such as those prevailing in late-1990s Moscow, where liberty and social order are neglected, increasing order might well also enhance people's autonomy and life choices. The same might be said about reducing crime in American cities when it reached the point where people did not venture into parks, and were reluctant to ride the subway or walk the streets after dark. Moreover, totalitarian regimes, the ultimate loss of freedom, are said to arise when order is minimized.

While up to a point social order and liberty enhance one another, if the level of social order is increased further and further, responsive communitarians expect it to reach a level where it will erode people's liberty. And, if the scope of liberty is extended ever more, it will reach a point where it will undermine the social order. This idea is expressed in the term inverting symbiosis, which indicates that up to a point liberty and order nourish one another, and beyond it they turn antagonistic.

The same point applies to the relationship between the self and the community. Political theorists have tended to depict the self as "encumbered," "situated," or "contextualized," all of which imply that it is constrained by social order. Responsive communitarians stress that individuals within communities are able to be more reasonable and productive than isolated individuals, but if social pressure to conform reaches a high level, such pressures undermine the development and expression of the self.

The next question is: Under what conditions can the zone of symbiosis be expanded, and that of antagonism between liberty and order be minimized? To answer that question the communitarian view of human nature must be introduced. While sociologists tend to avoid this term, on the grounds that it is not testable and can lead to racism (as evident in the notion that some groups of people are more intelligent by nature), communitarians use the term with less reluctance.

The view of human nature most compatible with responsive communitarian thinking is a dynamic (developmental) view, which holds that people at birth are akin to animals. But unlike social conservatives, who tend to embrace a dour view of human nature, and tend to view even adults after socialization as impulsive, irrational, dangerous, or sinful—communitarians maintain that people can become increasingly virtuous if the proper processes of value-internalization and reinforcement of undergirding social institutions, the "moral infrastructure," are in place. At the same time, communitarians do not presume that people can be made as virtuous as liberals assume them to be from the onset. (Liberals tend to assume that crime and forms of deviant behavior reflect social conditions, especially government interventions that pervert good people, rather than criminals' innate nature.)

The moral infrastructure, an essential foundation of a good society, draws on four social formations: families, schools, communities, and the community of communities. The four core elements of the moral infrastructure are arranged like Chinese nesting boxes, one within the other, and in a sociological progression. Infants are born into families, which communitarians stress have been entrusted throughout human history with beginning the process of instilling values and launching the moral self. Schools join the process as children grow older, further developing the moral self ("character"), or trying to remedy character neglect suffered under family care. Schools are hence viewed not merely or even primarily as places of teaching, where the passing of knowledge and skills occur, but as educational institutions in the broadest sense of the term.

Human nature, communitarians note, is such that even if children are reared in families dedicated to child raising and moral education, and children graduate from strong and dedicated schools, these youngsters are still not sufficiently equipped for a good, communitarian society. This is a point ignored by social philosophers who often assume that once people have acquired virtue and are habituated, they will be guided by their inner moral compass. The very concept of "conscience" assumes the formation of a perpetual inner gyroscope.

In contrast, communitarians—following standard sociological positions—assume that the good character of those who have acquired it tends to degrade. If left to their own devices, individuals gradually lose much of their commitments to their values, unless these are continuously reinforced. A major function of the community, as a building block of the moral infrastructure, is to reinforce the character of its members. This is achieved by the community's "moral voice," the informal sanction of others, built into a web of informal affect-laden relationships, which communities provide. In general, the weaker the community—because of high population turnover, few

shared core values, high heterogeneity, etc.—the thinner the social web and the slacker the moral voice. The strength of the moral voice and the values it speaks for have been studied using a series of questions such as, Should one speak up if child abuse is witnessed? Or if children are seen painting swastikas? What about less dire situations, such as insisting that friends wear their seatbelts, or admonishing a nondisabled person one witnesses parking in a handicap space?

Informal surveys show that Americans in the 1980s were very reluctant to raise their moral voice; many accepted the liberal ideology that what is morally sound is to be determined by each individual, and one should not pass judgments over others. Alan Wolfe's study, *One Nation After All*, found that Americans, even in conservative parts of the country, have grown very tolerant of a great variety of social behavior. Increase in tolerance is of course by itself virtuous; communitarians, though, raise the question: At which point does such increased tolerance engendering an amoral culture where spousal abuse, discrimination, child neglect, drunk drivers, obsessive materialism, and other forms of antisocial behavior become matters the community should ignore, leaving them to individual discretion or the law.

More specifically, communitarians inquire various elements of the moral infrastructure whether they reinforce, neglect, or undermine it. In this context, the special communitarian perspective of voluntary associations is especially important. Previously, the significance of these associations has been highlighted as protecting individuals from the state (a protection they would not have if they faced the state as isolated or "atomized" individuals), and as intermediating bodies that aggregate, transmit, and underwrite individual signals to the state.

Communitarians argue that, in addition, the very same voluntary associations often fulfill a rather different role: They serve as social spaces in which members of communities reinforce their social webs and articulate their moral voice. That is, voluntary associations often constitute a basis of communal relationships. Thus, the members of a local chapter of the Masons, Elks, or Lions care about one another and reinforce each other's particular brand of conservative views. Similarly, the members of the New York City Reform Clubs, Americans for Democratic Action, and local chapters of the ACLU reinforce one another's particular brand of liberal views.

Communitarians pay special attention to the condition of public spaces as places communities happen (as distinct from private places like homes and cars). Even though one may carpool with friends or have them over for a visit, these are mainly activities of small friendship groups (what Robert Putnam calls "bowling alone"). Communities need more encompassing webs, and those are formed and reinforced in public gathering places—from school assembly halls to parks, from plazas to promenades. To the extent that these spaces become unsafe, communities lose one of their major sources of reinforcement; recapturing them for community use is hence a major element of community regeneration.

Most important, drawing again on sociology, and particularly on what has been called the "consensus" rather than the "conflict" model, communitarians tend to maintain that if in addition to strong families and schools that build character, a society has communities, where social webs are intact and that moral voice is clearly articulate, that society will be able to base its social order largely on moral commitments rather than the forces of the state. This is the case, communitarians argue, drawing on sociological assumptions and studies, because once moral commitments are internalized and reinforced they help shape people's preferences in favor of prosocial behavior—thus reducing the need for coercion by the state and diminishing the tension between liberty and social

order.

Many discussions of community and of the moral infrastructure stop at this point, having explored the moral agency of family, school, and community. However, social and moral communities are not freestanding; they are often parts of more encompassing social entities. Moreover, communitarians note that unless communities are bound socially and morally into more encompassing entities, they may war with one another. Hence, the importance of communities of communities, the society.

Communitarians argue that one should not view society as composed of millions of individuals, but as pluralism within unity. They further maintain that subcultures and loyalties are not a threat to the integrity of society as long as a core of shared values and institutions (such as the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, the democratic way of life, and mutual tolerance) are respected. Communitarians draw on the four elements of the moral infrastructure—families, schools, communities, and communities of communities—as a sort of a checklist to help determine the state of the moral infrastructure in a given society. They argue that the decline of the two-parent family (due to high divorce rates, growing legitimization of single-parent families, and psychological disinvestment of parents in children), the deterioration of schools (due to automatic promotions and deterioration of social order in schools), the decline of communities (due to modernization), and the decline of the community of communities (as a result of excessive emphasis on diversity without parallel concern over shared bonds) resulted in the decline of moral and social order in the American society during the 1970s and 1980s. This was evidenced by the sharp rise in violent crime, drug abuse, teen pregnancy, and in the decline of voluntarism, among other factors. The fact that some of these trends slowed down and reversed in the 1990s is viewed in part by communitarians as a reflection of changes in social thinking and practices they helped champion.

Here lies a great difference between the communitarian position and that of various religious social conservatives. Both groups recognize the need to regenerate the moral infrastructure, but conservatives favor returning to traditional social formations while communitarians point to new ways of shoring up society's ethical framework. For instance, many social conservatives favor women "graciously submitting to their husbands" and returning to homemaking, while communitarians argue for peer marriage, a concept introduced by Pepper Schwartz. Peer marriage suggests equal rights and responsibilities for mothers and fathers, but favors marriages that last, as compared to the liberal argument that single-parent families or child care centers can socialize children as well if not better than two-parent families. (Among the sociologists who have struck a communitarian position in this matter are Linda Waite, Glen Elder, Alice Rossi, and David Popenoe).

The communitarian argument over the role of communities in maintaining social order is strongly supported by sociological research of the kind conducted by Robert Sampson on the role of communities in fighting crime and drug abuse. David Karp and Todd Clear have also studied community involvement in criminal justice, focusing on ideas of restorative justice and policies that are concerned more with reintegrating offenders into their communities than merely punishing them. Other communitarian themes examined by sociologists include topics explored by Edward W. Lehman, especially his writing on macro-sociology; Martin Whyte's work on the family; and Richard Coughlin's comparison of communitarian thinking to socioeconomics.

## **CIVIL SOCIETY, THE THIRD WAY, AND THE GOOD SOCIETY**

Much of the normative debate in the West, at least since the middle of the nineteenth century, has

focused on the merit of the free market (or capitalism) versus the role of the state in securing the citizens' well-being. Communitarians have basically leapfrogged this debate, focusing instead on the importance of the third element of social life, that of the civic society, which is neither state nor market. Communitarians have played a key role in the debate over the condition of civic society in the West, such as examining whether participation in voluntary associations, voting, and trust in institutions have declined, and to what effect. The work of Robert Bellah and his associates has been particularly influential here, demonstrating the rise of first expressive and then instrumental individualism, and their ill effects.

Communitarians have argued that rather than dumping people (often the most vulnerable members of society) into the marketplace as the welfare state is curtailed, civic society's various institutions can empower these individuals to help one another in attending to some of their social needs. Communal institutions (including places of worship) can shoulder important parts of care previously provided by state agencies, although the state will have to continue to shoulder an important part of the burden. Communitarians stress that mutuality, rather than charity, is the basis for community-wide action that is not solely limited to helping one particular vulnerable group or another. The CPR training of some 400,000 Seattle citizens, who are thus able to help one another without public costs or private charges, is held up as a key case in point. Other examples include voluntary recycling programs, crime watch patrols, and above all the massive assistance given to immigrants by members of their own ethnic group. Communitarians have also pointed to the importance of a culture of civility in maintaining a society's ability to work out differences without excessive conflict.

Communitarians have argued that a civic society is good, but not good enough. Civic society tends to be morally neutral on many matters other than values concerning its own inherent virtue and the attributes citizens need to make them into effective members of a civic society, for instance, to be able to think critically. Thus, all voluntary associations, from the KKK to the Urban League, from militias to Hadassah, are considered to have the same basic standing. In contrast, a good society seeks to promote a core of substantive values, and thus views some social associations and activities as more virtuous than others. In the same vein, communitarians have stressed that while everyone's legal right to free speech should be respected, there is no denying that some speech—seen from the community's viewpoint—is morally sound while other speech is abhorrent. For instance, the (legal) right to speak does not make hate speech (morally) right. Communitarians would not seek to suppress hate speech by legal means, however, but they urge communities to draw on their moral voice to chastise those who speak in ways that are offensive.

## **CRITICS AND RESPONSES**

Critics of responsive communitarianism argue that the concept of community is vague; indeed that the term "community" itself cannot be well defined. In response, community has been defined as a combination of two elements: a) A web of affect-laden relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another (rather than merely one-on-one or chainlike individual relationships) and b) A measure of commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity to a particular culture.

Some critics also contend that the quest for community is anachronistic, that contemporary societies are urban and populations geographically highly mobile, and thus bereft of community. Communitarians respond that communities exist in contemporary societies in small towns, suburbs, campuses and within city neighborhoods, often based on ethnic ties in places such as Korea

Town in Los Angeles, Little Italy in New York City, the Irish section of South Boston, and so on. Moreover, communitarians point out that communities need not be geographic, members can be spread among nonmembers. For instance, homosexual groups often constitute communities even if they are not all neighbors.

Critics maintain that communities are authoritarian and oppressive, and have charged communitarians with seeking "Salem without witches." Communitarians respond that communities vary regarding this assessment. Contemporary communities tend to be relatively freer, given the relative ease of intercommunity mobility as well as shifting loyalties and psychic investments among various groups of which the same person is a member. Critics also maintain that communities are exclusionary, and hence bigoted. Communitarians respond that communities must respect the laws of the society in which they are situated, but do tend to thrive on a measure of homogeneity and on people's desire to be with others of their own kind. Moreover, given the human benefit of community membership, a measure of self-segregation should be tolerated. Critics of responsive communitarianism claim that communitarians ignore matters of power and injustice as well as economic considerations, and are generally inclined to adopt a consensus rather than a conflict model. Communitarians agree that they ought to pay more attention to the effects of these factors on communities. However, they do envision the possibilities of conflict within communities, and responsive communitarians do propose that one should not treat conflict and community as mutually exclusive. Extending this idea to the treatment of diversity and multiculturalism, communitarians argue in favor of a society in which many differences can be celebrated as long as a set of commitments to the overarching society is upheld.

## **VALUES AND VIRTUES**

While sociologists greatly altered and enriched communitarian thinking, communitarian thinking's main contribution to sociology is the challenge of facing issues raised by the moral standing of various values, and the related question of cross-cultural moral judgments. Sociologists tend to treat all values as conceptually equal; a sociologist may refer to racist Afrikaners' beliefs and to humanitarian beliefs using the same "neutral" term, calling both "values." Communitarians use the term virtue to denote that some values (or belief systems) have a higher standing than others because they are compatible with the good society, while other values are not (and hence aberrant).

In the same vein, communitarians do not shy away from passing cross-cultural moral judgments, rejecting cultural relativism's claim that all cultures have basically equal moral standing. Thus, they view female circumcision, sex slaves, and hudud (chopping off the right hand of thieves) as violations of liberty and individual rights, and abandoning children, violating implicit contracts built into communal mutuality, or neglecting the environment, as evidence of a lack of commitment to social order and neglect of social responsibilities.

## **IMPACT**

So far this examination has focused on the place of communitarian thinking in academic, conceptual, theoretical, and imperial works. Responsive communitarians have also been playing a considerable public role, presenting themselves as the founders of a new kind of environmental movement, one dedicated to shoring up society (not the state) rather than nature. Like environmentalism, communitarianism appeals to audiences across the political spectrum, although it has found greater acceptance with some groups rather than others. British Prime Minister Tony Blair is reported to have adopted the communitarian platform, and German Social Democrat Rudolf Scharping has suggested that his party should meet the communitarians "half way." President Bill

Clinton and his wife Hillary Rodham Clinton (author of *It Takes a Village*) have combined communitarian with welfare-liberal themes. Among conservatives, Jack Kemp, a group of Tory members of the British parliament (especially David Willet), and German governor Kurt Biedenkopf are often listed as influenced by communitarianism. While this is only a partial list, it serves to illustrate the scope of communitarianism's influence and its cross over traditional ideological lines.

Communitarian terms have become part of the public vocabulary in the 1990s, especially references to "assuming responsibilities to match rights," while "communitarianism" itself is used much less often. The number of articles about communitarian thinking in the popular press increased twelvefold during the last decade of the twentieth century. The increase in the number of books, articles, and Ph.D. dissertations in academia for the same period, has been about eightfold. Interestingly, taking communitarianism from academia to the "streets" in the early 1990s resulted in the middle and late 1990s into a significant increase in academic interest. In the process, bridges have been built between social philosophers, sociologists, and community members and leaders, although they still sometimes travel on parallel rather than convergent pathways.

## **Communitarianism**

Communitarianism is the idea that human identities are largely shaped by different kinds of constitutive communities (or social relations) and that this conception of human nature should inform our moral and political judgments as well as policies and institutions. We live most of our lives in communities, similar to lions who live in social groups rather than individualistic tigers who live alone most of the time. Those communities shape, and ought to shape, our moral and political judgments and we have a strong obligation to support and nourish the particular communities that provide meaning for our lives, without which we'd be disoriented, deeply lonely, and incapable of informed moral and political judgment.

Communitarian ideas have a long history, in the West, China, and elsewhere, but modern-day communitarianism began in the upper reaches of Anglo-American academia in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls' landmark 1971 book *A Theory of Justice* (Rawls 1971). Drawing primarily upon the insights of Aristotle and Hegel, political philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer disputed Rawls' assumption that the principal task of government is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and economic resources individuals need to lead freely chosen lives. These critics of liberal theory never did identify themselves with the communitarian movement (the communitarian label was pinned on them by others, usually critics), much less offer a grand communitarian theory as a systematic alternative to liberalism. Nonetheless, certain core arguments meant to contrast with liberalism's devaluation of community recur in the works of the four theorists named above (Avineri & de-Shalit 1992, Bell 1993, Berten et al. 1997, Mulhall & Swift 1996, and Rasmussen 1990), and for purposes of clarity one can distinguish between claims of three sorts: methodological claims about the importance of tradition and social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or metaphysical claims about the social nature of the self, and normative claims about the value of community.

This essay is therefore divided in three parts, and for each part I present the main communitarian claims, followed by an argument (in each part) that philosophical concerns in the 1980s have largely given way to the political concerns that motivated much of the communitarian critique in the first place.

## **Universalism Versus Particularism**

Communitarians have sought to deflate the universal pretensions of liberal theory. The main target has been Rawls' description of the original position as an "Archimedean point" from which the structure of a social system can be appraised, a position whose special virtue is that it allows us to regard the human condition "from the perspective of eternity", from all social and temporal points of view. Whereas Rawls seemed to present his theory of justice as universally true, communitarians argued that the standards of justice must be found in forms of life and traditions of particular societies and hence can vary from context to context. Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor argued that moral and political judgment will depend on the language of reasons and the interpretive framework within which agents view their world, hence that it makes no sense to begin the political enterprise by abstracting from the interpretive dimensions of human beliefs, practices, and institutions (Taylor 1985, ch. 1; MacIntyre 1978, chs. 18–22 and 1988, ch. 1; Benhabib 1992, pp. 23–38, 89n4). Michael Walzer developed the additional argument that effective social criticism must derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places. Even if there is nothing problematic about a formal procedure of universalizability meant to yield a determinate set of human goods and values, "any such set would have to be considered in terms so abstract that they would be of little use in thinking about particular distributions" (Walzer 1983, 8; Young 1990, 4). In short, liberals who ask what is just by abstracting from particular social contexts are doomed to philosophical incoherence and liberal theorists who adopt this method to persuade people to do the just thing are doomed to political irrelevance.

Rawls has since tried to eliminate the universalist presuppositions from his theory. In *Political Liberalism*, (Rawls 1993) he argues in a communitarian vein that his conception of the person as impartial citizen provides the best account of liberal-democratic political culture and that his political aim is only to work out the rules for consensus in political communities where people are willing to try for consensus. In *The Law of Peoples*, (Rawls 1999) he explicitly allows for the possibility that liberalism may not be exportable at all times and places, sketching a vision of a "decent, well-ordered society" that liberal societies must tolerate in the international realm. Such a society, he argues, need not be democratic, but it must be non-aggressive towards other communities, and internally it must have a "common good conception of justice", a "reasonable consultation hierarchy", and it must secure basic human rights. Having said that, one still gets the sense that the liberal vision laid out in *A Theory of Justice* is the best possible political ideal, one that all rational individuals would want if they were able to choose between the available political alternatives. There may be justifiable non-liberal regimes, but these should be regarded as second best to be tolerated and perhaps respected, not idealized or emulated.

Other liberal theorists have taken a harder line against communitarian concessions, arguing that liberal theory can and should present itself as a universally valid ideal. Brian Barry, for one, opens his widely cited book *Justice as Impartiality* by boldly affirming the universality of his theory: "I continue to believe in the possibility of putting forward a universally valid case in favor of liberal egalitarian principles" (Barry 1995, 3). Barry does recognize that a theory of justice must be anchored in substantive moral considerations, but his normative vision appears to be limited to the values and practices of liberal Western societies. He seems distinctly uninterested in learning anything worthwhile from non-Western political traditions: for example, his discussion of things Chinese is confined to brief criticisms of the Cultural Revolution and the traditional practice of foot-binding. One might consider the reaction to a Chinese intellectual who puts forward a universal theory of justice that draws on the Chinese political tradition for inspiration and completely ignores the history and moral argumentation in Western societies, except for brief criticisms of slavery and imperialism.

Still, it must be conceded that 1980s communitarian theorists were less-than- successful at putting forward attractive visions of non-liberal societies. The communitarian case for pluralism for the need to respect and perhaps learn from non-liberal societies that may be as good as, if not better than, the liberal societies of the West may have been unintentionally undermined by their own use of (counter) examples. In *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre defended the Aristotelian ideal of the intimate, reciprocating local community bound by shared ends, where people simply assume and fulfill socially given roles (MacIntyre 1984). But this pre-modern *Gemeinschaft* conception of an all-encompassing community that members unreflectively endorse seemed distinctly ill-suited for complex and conflict-ridden large-scale industrialized societies. In *Spheres of Justice*, Michael Walzer pointed to the Indian caste system, “where the social meanings are integrated and hierarchical” (Walzer 1983, 313) as an example of a non-liberal society that may be just according to its own standards. Not surprisingly, few readers were inspired by this example of non-liberal justice (not to mention the fact that many contemporary Indian thinkers view the caste system as an unfortunate legacy of the past that Indians should strive hard to overcome). In short, this use of ill-informed examples may have unintentionally reinforced the view that there are few if any justifiable alternatives to liberalism in modern societies. Communitarians could score some theoretical points by urging liberal thinkers to be cautious about developing universal arguments founded exclusively on the moral argumentation and political experience of Western liberal societies, but few thinkers would really contemplate the possibility of non-liberal practices appropriate for the modern world so long as the alternatives to liberalism consisted of Golden Ages, caste societies, fascism, or actually-existing communism. For the communitarian critique of liberal universalism to have any lasting credibility, thinkers need to provide compelling counter-examples to modern-day liberal-democratic regimes and 1980s communitarians came up short.

By the 1990s, fairly abstract methodological disputes over universalism versus particularism faded from academic prominence, and the debate now centers on the theory and practice of universal human rights. This is largely due to the increased political salience of human rights since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet bloc. On the liberal side, the new, more political voices for liberal universalism have been represented by the likes of Francis Fukuyama, who famously argued that liberal democracy’s triumph over its rivals signifies the end of history (Fukuyama 1992). This view also revived (and provoked) the second wave communitarian critique of liberal universalism and the debate became much more concrete and political in orientation.

Needless to say, the brief moment of liberal euphoria that followed the collapse of the communism in the Soviet bloc has given way to a sober assessment of the difficulties of implementing liberal practices outside the Western world. It is now widely recognized that brutal ethnic warfare, crippling poverty, environmental degradation, and pervasive corruption, to name some of the more obvious troubles afflicting the developing world, pose serious obstacles to the successful establishment and consolidation of liberal democratic political arrangements. But these were seen as unfortunate (hopefully temporary) afflictions that may delay the end of history when liberal democracy has finally triumphed over its rivals. They were not meant to pose a challenge to the ideal of liberal democracy. It was widely assumed that liberal democracy is something that all rational individuals would want if they could get it.

The deeper challenge to Western liberal democracy has emerged from the East Asian region. In the 1990s, the debate revolved around the notion of “Asian values”, a term devised by several Asian officials and their supporters for the purpose of challenging Western-style civil and political

freedoms. Asians, they claim, place special emphasis upon family and social harmony, with the implication that those in the chaotic and crumbling societies of the West should think twice about intervening in Asia for the sake of promoting human rights and democracy. As Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew put it, Asians have "little doubt that a society with communitarian values where the interests of society take precedence over that of the individual suits them better than the individualism of America". Such claims attracted international attention primarily because East Asian leaders seemed to be presiding over what a U.N. human development report called 'the most sustained and widespread development miracle of the twentieth century, perhaps all history'. In 1997–98, however, the East Asian miracle seemed to have collapsed. And it looks like Asian values was one casualty of the crisis.

The political factors that focused attention on the East Asian challenge remain in place, however. East Asian economies did eventually recover. China in particular looks set to become an economic and political heavyweight with the power to seriously challenge the hegemony of Western liberal democratic values in international fora (see Bell 2015). Thus, one hears frequent calls for cross-cultural dialogue between the West and the East designed to understand and perhaps learn from the other side. Failing to take seriously East Asian political perspectives risks widening misunderstandings and setting the stage for hostilities that could have been avoided.

From a theoretical point of view, however, it must be conceded that the official debate on Asian values has not provided much of a challenge to dominant Western political outlooks. The main problem is that the debate has been led by Asian leaders who seem to be motivated primarily by political considerations, rather than by a sincere desire to make a constructive contribution to the debate on universalism versus particularism. Thus, it was easy to dismiss—rightly so, in most cases—the Asian challenge as nothing but a self-serving ploy by government leaders to justify their authoritarian rule in the face of increasing demands for democracy at home and abroad.

Still, it would be a mistake to assume that nothing of theoretical significance has emerged from East Asia. The debate on Asian values has also prompted critical intellectuals in the region to reflect on how they can locate themselves in a debate on human rights and democracy in which they had not previously played a substantial part. Neither wholly rejecting nor wholly endorsing the values and practices ordinarily realized through a liberal democratic political regime, these intellectuals are drawing on their own cultural traditions and exploring areas of commonality and difference with the West. Though often less provocative than the views of their governments in the sense that few argue for the wholesale rejection of Western-style liberal democracy with an East Asian alternative these unofficial East Asian viewpoints may offer more lasting contributions to the debate. Let me (briefly) note three relatively persuasive East Asian arguments for cultural particularism that contrast with traditional Western arguments for liberal universalism:

1. Cultural factors can affect the prioritizing of rights, and this matters when rights conflict and it must be decided which one to sacrifice. In other words, different societies may rank rights differently, and even if they face a similar set of disagreeable circumstances they may come to different conclusions about the right that needs to be curtailed. For example, U.S. citizens may be more willing to sacrifice a social or economic right in cases of conflict with a civil or political right: if neither the constitution nor a majority of democratically elected representatives support universal access to health care, then the right to health care regardless of income can be curtailed. In contrast, the Chinese may be more willing to sacrifice a civil or political liberty in cas-

es of conflict with a social or economic right: there may be wide support for restrictions on the right to form independent labor associations if they are necessary to provide the conditions for economic development. Different priorities assigned to rights can also matter when it must be decided how to spend scarce resources. For example, East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage will place great emphasis upon the value of education, and they may help to explain the large amount of spending on education compared to other societies with similar levels of economic development.

2. Cultural factors can affect the justification of rights. In line with the arguments of “1980s communitarians” such as Michael Walzer, it is argued that justifications for particular practices valued by Western-style liberal democrats should not be made by relying on the abstract and unhistorical universalism that often disables Western liberal democrats. Rather, they should be made from the inside, from specific examples and argumentative strategies that East Asians themselves use in everyday moral and political debate. For example, the moral language (shared even by some local critics of authoritarianism) tends to appeal to the value of community in East Asia, and this is relevant for social critics concerned with practical effect. One such communitarian argument is that democratic rights in Singapore can be justified on the grounds that they contribute to strengthening ties to such communities as the family and the nation.
3. Cultural factors can provide moral foundations for distinctive political practices and institutions (or at least different from those found in Western-style liberal democracies). In East Asian societies influenced by Confucianism, for example, it is widely held that children have a profound duty to care for elderly parents, a duty to be forsaken only in the most exceptional circumstances.<sup>[7]</sup> In political practice, it means that East Asian governments have an obligation to provide the social and economic conditions that facilitate the realization of this duty. Political debate tends to center on the question of whether the right to filial piety is best realized by means of a law that makes it mandatory for children to provide financial support for elderly parents as in mainland China, Japan, and Singapore or whether the state should rely more on indirect methods such as tax breaks and housing benefits that simply make at-home care for the elderly easier, as in Korea and Hong Kong. But the argument that there is a pressing need to secure this duty in East Asia is not a matter of political controversy.

Thinkers influenced by East Asian cultural traditions such as Confucianism have also argued for distinctive as-yet-unrealized political practices and institutions that draw on widely-held cultural values for inspiration. For example, the Chinese thinker Jiang Qing has argued for a tricameral legislature appropriate for the Chinese context, with a meritocratic “House of Exemplary Persons” and a “House of Cultural Continuity” that would complement and balance a democratic legislature (Jiang 2012). Korean scholars Hahm Chaihark and Jongryn Mo argue for the need to revive and adapt for the contemporary era such Choson dynasty institutions as policy lectures and the Confucian censorate, traditional institutions that played the role of monitoring the dealings of the Emperor (Hahm (Chaihark) 2003, Mo 2003, Bell 2000, ch. 5).

In contrast to 1980s communitarian thinkers, East Asian critics of liberal universalism have succeeded in pointing to particular non-liberal practices and institutions that may be appropriate for the contemporary world. Some of these may be appropriate only for societies with a Confucian heritage, others may also offer insights for mitigating the excesses of liberal modernity in the West. What cannot be denied is that they have carried forward the debate beyond the implausible

alternatives to liberalism offered by 1980s communitarian thinkers.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that contemporary communitarians have not been merely defending parochial attachments to particular non-liberal moralities. Far from arguing that the universalist discourse on human rights should be entirely displaced with particular, tradition-sensitive political language, they have criticized liberals for not taking universality seriously enough, for failing to do what must be done to make human rights a truly universal ideal. These communitarians—let us label them the “cosmopolitan critics of liberal universalism”—have suggested various means of improving the philosophical coherence and political appeal of human rights.

In fact, there is little debate over the desirability of a core set of human rights, such as prohibitions against slavery, genocide, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination. These rights have become part of international customary law, and they are not contested in the public rhetoric of the international arena. Of course many gross violations occur off the record, and human rights groups such as Amnesty International have the task of exposing the gap between public allegiance to rights and the sad reality of ongoing abuse. This is largely practical work, however. There is not much point writing about or deliberating about the desirability of practices that everyone condemns at the level of principle.

But political thinkers and activists around the world can and do take different sides on many pressing human rights concerns that fall outside what Walzer terms the “minimal and universal moral code” (Walzer 1987, 24; Walzer 1994). This gray area of debate includes criminal law, family law, women’s rights, social and economic rights, the rights of indigenous peoples, and the attempt to universalize Western-style democratic practices. The question is: how can the current thin list of universal human rights be expanded to include some of these contested rights?

Charles Taylor has put forward the following proposal (Taylor 1999). He imagines a cross-cultural dialogue between representatives of different traditions. Rather than argue for the universal validity of their views, however, he suggests that participants should allow for the possibility that their own beliefs may be mistaken. This way, participants can learn from each others’ “moral universe”. There will come a point, however, when differences cannot be reconciled. Taylor explicitly recognizes that different groups, countries, religious communities, and civilizations hold incompatible fundamental views on theology, metaphysics, and human nature. In response, Taylor argues that a “genuine, unforced consensus” on human rights norms is possible only if we allow for disagreement on the ultimate justifications of those norms. Instead of defending contested foundational values when we encounter points of resistance (and thus condemning the values we do not like in other societies), we should try to abstract from those beliefs for the purpose of working out an “overlapping consensus” (to borrow from Rawls’s 1993 terminology) of human rights norms. As Taylor puts it, “we would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they were the right norms, and we would be content to live in this consensus, undisturbed by the differences of profound underlying belief” (Taylor 1999, 124).

While Taylor’s proposal moves the debate on universal human rights forward, it still faces certain difficulties. For one thing, it may not be realistic to expect that people will be willing to abstract from the values they care deeply about during the course of a global dialogue on human rights. Even if people agree to abstract from culturally specific ways of justifying and implementing norms, the likely outcome is a withdrawal to a highly general, abstract realm of agreement that fails to resolve actual disputes over contested rights. For example, participants in a cross-cultural

dialogue can agree on the right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment while radically disagreeing upon what this means in practice—a committed Muslim can argue that theft can justifiably be punished by amputation of the right hand, whereas a Western liberal will want to label this an example of cruel and unusual punishment.

As we have seen, the debate on universalism versus particularism has moved from fairly abstract methodological disputes between Anglo-American philosophers to relatively concrete international political disputes between philosophers, social scientists, government officials, and NGO activists. The distinctive communitarian contribution has been to cast doubt on universal theories grounded exclusively in the liberal moralities of the Western world, on the grounds that cultural particularity should both make one sensitive to the possibility of justifiable areas of difference between the West and the rest and to the need for more cross-cultural dialogue for the purpose of improving the current thin human rights regime. Various contributions from East Asia and elsewhere have given some meat to these challenges to liberal universalism. In any case, let us now turn to the second main area of controversy between liberals and communitarians—the debate over the self that has similarly moved from philosophy to politics.

## THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM

- I. Intellectual fashions are notoriously short-lived, very much like fashions in popular music, art, or dress. But there are certain fashions that seem regularly to reappear. Like pleated trousers or short skirts, they are inconstant features of a larger and more steadily prevailing phenomenon - in this case, a certain way of dressing. They have brief but recurrent lives; we know their transience and expect their return. Needless to say, there is no afterlife in which trousers will be permanently pleated or skirts forever short. Recurrence is all. Although it operates at a much higher level (an infinitely higher level?) of cultural significance, the communitarian critique of liberalism is like the pleating of trousers: transient but certain to return. It is a consistently intermittent feature of liberal politics and social organization. No liberal success will make it permanently unattractive. At the same time, no communitarian critique, however penetrating, will ever be anything more than an inconstant feature of liberalism. Someday, perhaps, there will be a larger transformation, like the shift from aristocratic knee-breeches to plebian pants, rendering liberalism and its critics alike irrelevant. But I see no present signs of anything like that, nor am I sure that we should look forward to it. For now, there is much to be said for a recurrent critique, whose protagonists hope only for small victories, partial incorporations, and when they are rebuffed or dismissed or coopted, fade away for a time only to return. Communitarianism is usefully contrasted with social democracy, which has succeeded in establishing a permanent presence alongside of and some times conjoined with liberal politics. Social democracy has its own intermittently fashionable critics, largely anarchist and libertarian in character. Since it sponsors certain sorts of communal identification, it is less subject to communitarian criticism than liberalism is. But it can never escape such criticism entirely, for liberals and social democrats alike share a commitment to economic growth and cope (although in different ways) with the deracinated social forms that growth produces. Community itself is largely an ideological presence in modern society; it has no recurrent critics of its own. It is intermittently fashionable only because it no longer exists in anything like full strength, and it is criticized only when it is fashionable. The communitarian critique is nonetheless a powerful one; it would not recur if it were not capable of engaging our minds and feelings. In this essay, I want to investigate the power of its current American versions and then offer a version of my own -less power-

ful, perhaps, than the ones with which I shall begin, but more available for incorporation within liberal (or social democratic) politics. I do not mean (I hardly have the capacity) to lay communitarianism to rest, although I would willingly wait for its reappearance in a form more coherent and incisive than that in which it currently appears. The problem with communitarian criticism today - I am not the first to notice this - is that it suggests two different, and deeply contradictory, arguments against liberalism. One of these arguments aimed primarily at liberal practice, the other primarily at liberal theory, but they cannot both be right. It is possible that each one is partly right - indeed, I shall insist on just this partial validity - but each of the arguments is right in a way that undercuts the value of the other.

- II. The first argument holds that liberal political theory accurately represents liberal social practice. As if the Marxist account of ideological reflection were literally true, and exemplified here, contemporary Western societies (American society especially) are taken to be the home of radically isolated individuals, rational egotists, and existential agents, men and women protected and divided by their inalienable rights. Liberalism tells the truth about the asocial society that liberals create - not, in fact, *ex nihilo* as their theory suggests, but in a struggle against traditions and communities and authorities that are forgotten as soon as they are escaped, so that liberal practices seem to have no history. The struggle itself is ritually celebrated but rarely reflected on. The members of liberal society share no political or religious traditions they can tell only one story about themselves and that is the story of *ex nihilo* creation, which begins in the state of nature or the original position. Each individual imagines himself absolutely free, unencumbered, and on his own - and enters society, accepting its obligations, only in order to minimize his risks. His goal is security, and security is, as Marx wrote, "the assurance of his egoism." And as he imagines himself, so he really is, that is, an individual separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice.... The only bond between men is natural necessity, need, and private interest. (I have used masculine pronouns in order to fit my sentences to Marx's. But it is an interesting question, not addressed here, whether this first communitarian critique speaks to the experience of women: Are necessity and private interest their only bonds with one another?) The writings of the young Marx represent one of the early appearances of communitarian criticism, and his argument, first made in the 1840s, is powerfully present today. Alastair MacIntyre's description of the incoherence of modern intellectual and cultural life and the loss of narrative capacity makes a similar point in updated, state-of-the-art, theoretical language.<sup>2</sup> But the only theory that is necessary to the communitarian critique of liberalism is liberalism itself. All that the critics have to do, so they say, is to take liberal theory seriously. The self-portrait of the individual constituted only by his willfulness, liberated from all connection, without common values, binding ties, customs, or traditions - sans eyes, sans teeth, sans taste, sans everything - need only be evoked in order to be devalued: It is already the concrete absence of value. What can the real life of such a person be like? Imagine him maximizing his utilities, and society is turned into a war of all against all, the familiar rat race, in which, as Hobbes wrote, there is "no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost."<sup>3</sup> Imagine him enjoying his rights, and society is reduced to the coexistence of isolated selves, for liberal rights, according to this first critique, have more to do with "exit" than with "voice."<sup>4</sup> They are concretely expressed in separation, divorce, withdrawal, solitude, privacy, and political apathy. And finally, the very fact that individual life can be described in these two philosophical languages, the language of utilities and the language of rights, is a further mark, says MacIntyre, of its

incoherence: Men and women in liberal society no longer have access to a single moral culture within which they can learn how they ought to live.' There is no consensus, no public meeting-of-minds, on the nature of the good life, hence the triumph of private caprice, revealed, for example, in Sartrean existentialism, the ideological reflection of everyday capriciousness. We liberals are free to choose, and we have a right to choose, but we have no criteria to govern our choices except our own wayward understanding of our wayward interests and desires. And so our choices lack the qualities of cohesion and consecutiveness. We can hardly remember what we did yesterday; we cannot with any assurance predict what we will do tomorrow. We cannot give a proper account of ourselves. We cannot sit together and tell comprehensible stories, and we recognize ourselves in the stories we read only when these are fragmented narratives, without plots, the literary equivalent of atonal music and nonrepresentational art. Liberal society, seen in the light of this first communitarian critique, is fragmentation in practice; and community is the exact opposite, the home of coherence, connection, and narrative capacity. But I am less concerned here with the different accounts that might be provided of this lost Eden than I am with the repeated insistence on the reality of fragmentation after the loss. This is the common theme of all contemporary communitarianisms: neoconservative lamentation, neo-Marxist indictment, and neoclassical or republican hand-wringing. (The need for the prefix "neo" suggests again the intermittent or recurrent character of communitarian criticism.) I should think it would be an awkward theme, for if the sociological argument of liberal theory is right, if society is actually decomposed, without residue, into the problematic coexistence of individuals, then we might well assume that liberal politics is the best way to deal with the problems of decomposition. If we have to create an artificial and ahistorical union out of a multitude of isolated selves, why not take the state of nature or the original position as our conceptual starting point? Why not accept, in standard liberal fashion, the priority of procedural justice over substantive conceptions of the good, since we can hardly expect, given our fragmentation, to agree about the good? Michael Sandel asks whether a community of those who put justice first can ever be more than a community of strangers.<sup>6</sup> The question is a good one, but its reverse form is more immediately relevant: If we really are a community of strangers, how can we do anything else but put justice first?

- III. We are saved from this entirely plausible line of argument by the second communitarian critique of liberalism. The second critique holds that liberal theory radically misrepresents real life. The world is not like that nor could it be. Men and women cut loose from all social ties, literally unencumbered, each one the one and only inventor of his or her own life, with no criteria, common standards, to guide the invention - these are mythical figures. How can any group of people be strangers to one another when each member of the group is born with parents, and when these parents have friends, relatives, neighbors, comrades at work, coreligionists, and fellow citizens - connections, in fact, which are not so much chosen as passed on and inherited? Liberalism may well enhance the significance of purely contractual ties, but it is obviously false to suggest, as Hobbes sometimes seemed to do, that all our connections are mere "market friendships," voluntarist and self-interested in character, which cannot outlast the advantages they bring. It is in the very nature of a human society that individuals bred within it will find themselves caught up in patterns of relationship, networks of power, and communities of meaning. That quality of being caught up is what makes them persons of a certain sort. And only then can they make themselves persons of a (marginally) different sort by reflecting on what they are and by acting in more or less distinctive ways within the patterns, networks, and communities that are willy-nilly theirs. The

burden of the second critique is that the deep structure even of liberal society is in fact communitarian. Liberal theory distorts this reality and, insofar as we adopt the theory, deprives us of any ready access to our own experience of communal embeddedness. The rhetoric of liberalism -this is the argument of the authors of *Habits of the Heart* - limits our understanding of our own heart's habits, and gives us no way to formulate the convictions that hold us together as persons and that bind persons together into a community. The assumption here is that we are in fact persons and that we are in fact bound together. The liberal ideology of separatism cannot take personhood and bondedness away from us. What it does take away is the sense of our personhood and bondedness, and this deprivation is then reflected in liberal politics. It explains our inability to form cohesive solidarities, stable movements and parties, that might make our deep convictions visible and effective in the world. It also explains our radical dependence (brilliantly foreshadowed in Hobbes's *Leviathan*) on the central state. But how are we to understand this extraordinary disjunction between communal experience and liberal ideology, between personal conviction and public rhetoric, and between social bondedness and political isolation? That question is not addressed by communitarian critics of the second sort. If the first critique depends on a vulgar Marxist theory of reflection, the second critique requires an equally vulgar idealism. Liberal theory now seems to have a power over and against real life that has been granted to few theories in human history. Plainly, it has not been granted to communitarian theory, which cannot, on the first argument, overcome the reality of liberal separatism and cannot, on the second argument, evoke the already existing structures of social connection. In any case, the two critical arguments are mutually inconsistent; they cannot both be true. Liberal separatism either represents or misrepresents the conditions of everyday life. It might, of course, do a little of each - the usual muddle - but that is not a satisfactory conclusion from a communitarian standpoint. For if the account of dissociation and separatism is even partly right, then we have to raise questions about the depth, so to speak, of the deep structure. And if we are all to some degree communitarians under the skin, then the portrait of social incoherence loses its critical force.

**IV.** But each of the two critical arguments is partly right. I will try to say what is right about each, and then ask if something plausible can be made of the parts. First, then, there cannot be much doubt that we (in the United States) live in a society where individuals are relatively dissociated and separated from one another, or better, where they are continually separating from one another-continually in motion, often in solitary and apparently random motion, as if in imitation of what physicists call Brownian movement. Hence we live in a profoundly unsettled society. We can best see the forms of unsettlement if we track the most important moves. So, consider (imitating the Chinese style) the Four Mobilities:

1. Geographic mobility. Americans apparently change their residence more often than any people in history, at least since the barbarian migrations, excluding only nomadic tribes and families caught up in civil or foreign wars. Moving people and their possessions from one city or town to another is a major industry in the United States, even though many people manage to move themselves. In another sense, of course, we are all self-moved, not refugees but voluntary migrants. The sense of place must be greatly weakened by this extensive geographic mobility, although I find it hard to say whether it is superseded by mere insensitivity or by a new sense of many places. Either way, communitarian feeling seems likely to decline in importance. Communities are more than just locations, but they are most often successful when they are permanently located.

2. Social mobility. This article will not address the arguments about how best to describe social standing or how to measure changes, whether by income, education, class membership, or rank in the status hierarchy. It is enough to say that fewer Americans stand exactly where their parents stood or do what they did than in any society for which we have comparable knowledge. Americans may inherit many things from their parents, but the extent to which they make a different life, if only by making a different living, means that the inheritance of community, that is, the passing on of beliefs and customs, is uncertain at best. Whether or not children are thereby robbed of narrative capacity, they seem likely to tell different stories than their parents told.
  
3. Marital mobility. Rates of separation, divorce, and remarriage are higher today than they have ever been in our own society and probably higher than they have ever been in any other (except perhaps among Roman aristocrats, although I know of no statistics from that time, only anecdotes). The first two mobilities, geographic and social, also disrupt family life, so that siblings, for example, often live at great distances from one another, and later as uncles and aunts, they are far removed from nephews and nieces. But what we call "broken homes" are the product of marital breaks, of husbands or wives moving out - and then, commonly, moving on to new partners. Insofar as home is the first community and the first school of ethnic identity and religious conviction, this kind of breakage must have countercommunitarian consequences. It means that children often do not hear continuous or identical stories from the adults with whom they live. (Did the greater number of children ever hear such stories? The death of one spouse and the remarriage of the other may once have been as common as divorce and remarriage are today. But, then, other sorts of mobility have to be considered: Both men and women are more likely today to marry across class, ethnic, and religious lines; remarriage will therefore often produce extraordinarily complex and socially diverse families - which probably are without historical precedent.)
  
4. Political mobility. Loyalty to leaders, movements, parties, clubs, and urban machines seems to decline rapidly as place and social standing and family membership become less central in the shaping of personal identity. Liberal citizens stand outside all political organizations and then choose the one that best serves their ideals or interests. They are, ideally, independent voters, that is, people who move around; they choose for themselves rather than voting as their parents did, and they choose freshly each time rather than repeating themselves. As their numbers increase, they make for a volatile electorate and hence for institutional instability, particularly at the local level where political organization once served to reinforce communal ties.

The effects of the Four Mobilities are intensified in a variety of ways by other social developments which we are likely to talk about in the common metaphor of movement: the advance of knowledge, technological progress, and so on. But I am concerned here only with the actual movement of individuals. Liberalism is, most simply, the theoretical endorsement and justification of this movement.<sup>9</sup> In the liberal view, then, the Four Mobilities represent the enactment of liberty, and the pursuit of (private or personal) happiness. And it has to be said that, conceived in this way, liberalism is a genuinely popular creed. Any effort to curtail mobility in the four areas described here would require a massive and harsh application of state power. Nevertheless, this popularity has an underside of sadness and discontent that are intermittently articulated, and communitarianism is, most simply, the intermittent articulation of these feelings. It reflects a sense of loss, and the loss is real. People do not always leave their old neighborhoods or hometowns willingly or happily.

Moving may be a personal adventure in our standard cultural mythologies, but it is as often a family trauma in real life.

The same thing is true of social mobility, which carries people down as well as up and requires adjustments that are never easy to manage. Marital breaks may sometimes give rise to new and stronger unions, but they also pile up what we might think of as family fragments: single-parent households, separated and lonely men and women, and abandoned children. And independence in politics is often a not-so-splendid isolation: Individuals with opinions are cut loose from groups with programs. The result is a decline in "the sense of efficacy," with accompanying effects on commitment and morale. All in all, we liberals probably

know one another less well, and with less assurance, than people once did, although we may see more aspects of the other than they saw, and recognize in him or her a wider range of possibilities (including the possibility of moving on). We are more often alone than people once were, being without neighbors we can count on, relatives who live nearby or with whom we are close, or comrades at work or in the movement.

This is the truth of the first communitarian argument. We must now fix the limits of this truth by seeking what is true in the second argument. In its easiest version, the second argument - that we are really, at bottom, creatures of community - is certainly true but of uncertain significance. The ties of place, class or status, family, and even politics survive the Four Mobilities to a remarkable extent. To take just one example, from the last of the Four: It remains true, even today in this most liberal and mobile of societies, that the best predictor of how people will vote is our knowledge of how their parents voted.<sup>10</sup> All those dutifully imitative young Republicans and Democrats testify to the failure of liberalism to make independence or waywardness of mind the distinctive mark of its adherents.

The predictive value of parental behavior holds even for independent voters: They are simply the heirs of independence. But we do not know to what extent inheritances of this sort are a dwindling communal resource; it may be that each generation passes on less than it received. The full liberalization of the social order, the production and reproduction of self-inventing individuals, may take a long time, much longer, indeed, than liberals themselves expected. There is not much comfort here for communitarian critics, however; while they can recognize and value the survival of older ways of life, they cannot count on, and they must have anxieties about, the vitality of those ways. But there is another approach to the truth of the second critical argument. Whatever the extent of the Four Mobilities, they do not seem to move us so far apart that we can no longer talk with one another. We often disagree, of course, but we disagree in mutually comprehensible ways. I should think it fairly obvious that the philosophical controversies that MacIntyre laments community. For there is no imaginable community that would not be alien to the eternally transgressive self. If the ties that bind us together do not bind us, there can be no such thing as a community. If it is anything at all, communitarianism is antithetical to transgression. And the transgressive self is antithetical even to the liberal community which is its creator and sponsor.<sup>1</sup>

Liberalism is a self-subverting doctrine; for that reason, it really does require periodic communitarian correction. But it is not a particularly helpful form of correction to suggest that liberalism is literally incoherent or that it can be replaced by some preliberal or antiliberal community waiting somehow just beneath the surface or just beyond the horizon. Nothing is waiting; American communitarians

have to recognize that there is no one out there but separated, rights-bearing, voluntarily associating, freely speaking, liberal selves. It would be a good thing, though, if we could teach those selves to know themselves as social beings, the historical products of, and in part the embodiments of, liberal values. For the communitarian correction of liberalism cannot be anything other than a selective reinforcement of those same values or, to appropriate the well-known phrase of Michael Oakeshott, a pursuit of the intimations of community within them.

V. The place to begin the pursuit is with the liberal idea of voluntary association, which is not well-understood, it seems to me, either among liberals or among their communitarian critics. In both its theory and its practice, liberalism expresses strong associative tendencies alongside its dissociative tendencies: Its protagonists form groups as well as split off from the groups they form; they join up and resign, marry and divorce. Nevertheless, it is a mistake, and a characteristically liberal mistake, to think that the existing patterns of association are entirely or even largely voluntary and contractual, that is, the product of will alone. In a liberal society, as in every other society, people are born into very important sorts of groups, born with identities, male or female, for example, working class, Catholic or Jewish, black, democrat, and so on. Many of their subsequent associations (like their subsequent careers) merely express these

underlying identities, which, again, are not so much chosen as enacted."4 Liberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups on the basis of these identities than the freedom to leave the groups and sometimes even the identities behind. Association is always at risk in a liberal society. The boundaries of the group are not policed; people come and go, or they just fade into the distance without ever quite acknowledging that they have left. That is why liberalism is plagued by free-rider problems - by people who continue to enjoy the benefits of membership and identity while no longer participating in the activities that produce those benefits." Communitarianism, by contrast, is the dream of a perfect free-riderlessness.

At its best, the liberal society is the social union of social unions that John Rawls described: a pluralism of groups bonded by shared ideas of toleration and democracy.<sup>6</sup> But if all the groups are precarious, continually on the brink of dissolution or abandonment, then the larger union must also be weak and vulnerable. Or, alternatively, its leaders and officials will be driven to compensate for the failures of association elsewhere by strengthening their own union, that is, the central state, beyond the limits that liberalism has established. These limits are best expressed in terms of individual rights and civil liberties, but they also include a prescription for state neutrality. The good life is pursued by individuals, sponsored by groups; the state presides over the pursuit and the sponsorship but does not participate in either. Presiding is singular in character; pursuing and sponsoring are plural. Hence it is a critical question for liberal theory and practice whether the associative passions and energies of ordinary people are likely over the long haul to survive the Four Mobilities and prove themselves sufficient to the requirements of pluralism. There is at least some evidence that they will not prove sufficient without a little help. But, to repeat an old question, whence cometh our help? A few of the existing social unions live in the expectation of divine assistance. For the rest, we can only help one another, and the agency through which help of that sort comes most expeditiously is the state.

But what kind of a state is it that fosters associative activities? What kind of a social union is it that includes without incorporating a great and discordant variety of social unions? Obviously, it is a liberal state and social union; any other kind is too dangerous for communities and individuals alike. It would be an odd enterprise to argue in the name of communitarianism for an alternative

state, for that would be to argue against our own political traditions and to repudiate whatever community we already have. But the communitarian correction does require a liberal state of a certain sort, conceptually though not historically unusual: a state that is, at least over some part of the terrain of sovereignty, deliberately nonneutral. The standard liberal argument for neutrality is an induction from social fragmentation. Since dissociated individuals will never agree on the good life, the state must allow them to live as they think best, subject only to John Stuart Mill's harm principle, without endorsing or sponsoring any particular understanding of what "best" means.

But there is a problem here: The more dissociated individuals are, the stronger the state is likely to be, since it will be the only or the most important social union. And then membership in the state, the only good that is shared by all individuals, may well come to seem the good that is "best." This is only to repeat the first communitarian critique, and it invites a response like the second critique: that the state is not in fact the only or even, for ordinary people in their everyday lives, the most important social union. All sorts of other groups continue to exist and to give shape and purpose to the lives of their members, despite the triumph of individual rights, the Four Mobilities in which that triumph is manifest, and the free-riding that it makes possible. But these groups are continually at risk. And so the state, if it is to remain a liberal state, must endorse and sponsor some of them, namely, those that seem most likely to provide shapes and purposes congenial to the shared values of a liberal society.'

No doubt, there are problems here too, and I do not mean to deny their difficulty. But I see no way to avoid some such formulation - and not only for theoretical reasons. The actual history of the best liberal states, as of the best social democratic states (and these tend increasingly to be the same states), suggest that they behave in exactly this way, although often very inadequately.

Three relatively familiar examples of state behavior of this kind. First, the Wagner Act of the 1930s: This was not a standard liberal law, hindering the hindrances to union organization, for it actively fostered union organization, and it did so precisely by solving the free-rider problem. By requiring collective bargaining whenever there was majority support (but not necessarily unanimous support) for the union, and then by allowing union shops, the Wagner Act sponsored the creation of strong unions capable, at least to some degree, of determining the shape of industrial relations."

Of course, there could not be strong unions without working class solidarity; unionization is parasitic on underlying communities of feeling and belief. But those underlying communities were already being eroded by the Four Mobilities when the Wagner Act was passed, and so the Act served to counter the dissociative tendencies of liberal society. It was nevertheless a liberal law, for the unions that it helped create enhanced the lives of individual workers and were subject to dissolution and abandonment in accordance with liberal principles should they ever cease to do that. The second example is the use of tax exemptions and matching grants of tax money to enable different religious groups to run extensive systems of day-care centers, nursing homes, hospitals, and so on - welfare societies inside the welfare state. I do not pretend that these private and pluralist societies compensate for the shoddiness of the American welfare state. But they do improve the delivery of services by making it a more immediate function of communal solidarity.

The state's role here, beside establishing minimal standards, is to abate, since in this case it cannot entirely solve the free-rider problem. If some number of men and women end up in a Catholic nursing home, even though they never contributed to a Catholic charity, they will at least have paid their taxes. But why not nationalize the entire welfare system and end free-ridership? The liberal response is that the social union of social unions must always operate at two levels: A welfare system run entirely by private, nonprofit associations would be dangerously inadequate and inequitable.

ble in its coverage; and a totally nationalized system would deny expression to local and particularist solidarities.<sup>9</sup> The third example is the passage of plant-closing laws designed to afford some protection to local communities of work and residence. Inhabitants are insulated, although only for a time, against market pressure to move out of their old neighborhoods and search for work elsewhere. Although the market "needs" a highly mobile work force, the state takes other needs into account, not only in a welfarist way (through unemployment insurance and job retraining programs) but also in a communitarian way.

But the state is not similarly committed to the preservation of every neighborhood community. It is entirely neutral toward communities of ethnicity and residence, offering no protection against strangers who want to move in. Here, geographic mobility remains a positive value, one of the rights of citizens. Unions, religious organizations, and neighborhoods each draw on feelings and beliefs that, in principle if not always in history, predate the emergence of the liberal state. How strong these feelings and beliefs are, and what their survival value is, I cannot say. Have the unions established such a grip on the imaginations of their members as to make for good stories? There are some good stories, first told, then retold, and sometimes even re-enacted. But the narrative line does not seem sufficiently compelling to younger workers to sustain anything like the old working class solidarity. Nor is it sufficient for a religious organization to provide life cycle services for its members if they are no longer interested in its religious services. Nor are neighborhoods proof for long against market pressure. Still, communal feeling and belief seem considerably more stable than we once thought they would be, and the proliferation of secondary associations in liberal society is remarkable - even if many of them have short lives and transient memberships. One has a sense of people working together and trying to cope, and not, as the first communitarian critique suggests, just getting by on their own, by themselves, one by one.

**VI.** A good liberal (or social democratic) state enhances the possibilities for cooperative coping. John Dewey provided a useful account of such a state in *The Public and Its Problems*. Published in 1927, the book is a commentary on and a partial endorsement of an earlier round of communitarian criticism. Dewey shared with the critics of his time, who called themselves "pluralists," an uneasiness with the sovereign state, but he was not quite as uneasy as most of them were. He also shared an admiration for what he called "primary groupings" within the state, but he was more inclined than the pluralists were to qualify his admiration. Primary groupings, he wrote, are "good, bad, and indifferent," and they cannot by their mere existence fix the limits of state activity. The state is not "only an umpire to avert and remedy trespasses of one group upon another." It has a larger function: "It renders the desirable association solid and more coherent. It places a discount upon injurious groupings and renders their tenure of life precarious . . . [and] it gives the individual members of valued associations greater liberty and security; it relieves them of hampering conditions. It enables individual members to count with reasonable certainty upon what others will do."

These may seem like tasks too extensive for a liberal state, but they are constrained by the constitutional establishment of individual rights - which are themselves (on the pragmatic understanding) not so much recognitions of what individuals by nature are or have as expressions of hope about what they will be and do. Unless individuals act together in certain ways, state action of the sort that Dewey recommended cannot get started. When we recognize the "right of the citizens peacefully to assemble," for example, we are hoping for assemblies of citizens. If we then discriminate among such assemblies, we do so on limited grounds, fostering only those that really do express communities of feeling and belief and do not violate liberal principles of association. It is often ar-

gued these days that the non neutral state, whose activities I have made some attempt to justify, is best understood in republican terms. A revival of neoclassical republicanism provides much of the substance of contemporary communitarian politics. The revival, I have to say, is largely academic; unlike other versions of communitarianism in Dewey's time and ours, it has no external reference. There really are unions, churches, and neighborhoods in American society, but there are virtually no examples of republican association and no movement or party aimed at promoting such association. Dewey would

probably not recognize his "public," nor Rawls his "social union," as versions of republicanism, if only because in both these cases, energy and commitment have been drained from the singular and narrowly political association to the more various associations of civil society. Republicanism by contrast is an integrated and unitary doctrine in which energy and commitment are focused primarily on the political realm. It is a doctrine adapted (in both its classical and neoclassical forms) to the needs of small, homogeneous communities, where civil society is radically undifferentiated. Perhaps the doctrine can be extended to account for a "republic of republics," a decentralized and participatory revision of liberal democracy. A considerable strengthening of local governments would then be required in the hope of encouraging the development and display of civic virtue in a pluralist variety of social settings. This indeed is a pursuit of the intimations of community within liberalism, for it has more to do with John Stuart Mill than with Rousseau. Now we are to imagine the nonneutral state empowering cities, towns, and boroughs; fostering neighborhood committees and review boards; and always on the look-out for bands of citizens ready to take responsibility for local affairs.<sup>2</sup> None of this is any guarantee against the erosion of the underlying communities or the death of local loyalties. It is a matter of principle that communities must always be at risk. And the great paradox of a liberal society is that one cannot set oneself against this principle without also setting oneself against the traditional practices and shared understandings of the society. Here, respect for tradition requires the precariousness of traditionalism. If the first communitarian critique were true in its entirety, if there were no communities and no traditions, then we could just proceed to invent new ones. Insofar as the second critique is even partly true, and the work of communal invention is well begun and continually in progress, we must rest content with the kinds of corrections and enhancements - they would be, in fact, more radical than these terms suggest - that Dewey described.

**VII.** I have avoided until now what is often taken to be the central issue between liberals and their communitarian critics - the constitution of the self. Liberalism, it is commonly said, is founded on the idea of a presocial self, a solitary and sometimes heroic individual confronting society, who is fully formed before the confrontation begins. Communitarian critics then argue, first, that instability and dissociation are the actual and disheartening achievement of individuals of this sort and, second, that there really cannot be individuals of this sort. The critics are commonly said in turn to believe in a radically socialized self that can never "confront" society because it is, from the beginning, entangled in society, itself the embodiment of social values. The disagreement seems sharp enough, but in fact, in practice, it is not sharp at all - for neither of these views can be sustained for long by anyone who goes beyond staking out a position and tries to elaborate an argument.

Nor does liberal or communitarian theory require views of this sort. Contemporary liberals are not committed to a presocial self, but only to a self capable of reflecting critically on the values that have governed its socialization; and communitarian critics, who are doing exactly that, can hardly go on to claim that socialization is everything. The philosophical and psychological issues here go

very deep, but so far as politics is concerned, there is little to be won on this battlefield; concessions from the other side come too easily to count as victories. The central issue for political theory is not the constitution of the self but the connection of constituted selves, the pattern of social relations. Liberalism is best understood as a theory of relationship, which has voluntary association at its center and which understands voluntariness as the right of rupture or withdrawal. What makes a marriage voluntary is the permanent possibility of divorce. What makes any identity or affiliation voluntary is the easy availability of alternative identities and affiliations. But the easier this easiness is, the less stable all our relationships are likely to become.

The Four Mobilities take hold and society seems to be in perpetual motion, so that the actual subject of liberal practice, it might be said, is not a presocial but a postsocial self, free at last from all but the most temporary and limited alliances. Now, the liberal self reflects the fragmentation of liberal society: It is radically underdetermined and divided, forced to invent itself anew for every public occasion. Some liberals celebrate this freedom and self-invention; all communitarians lament its arrival, even while insisting that it is not a possible human condition. I have argued that insofar as liberalism tends toward instability and dissociation, it requires periodic communitarian correction. Rawls's "social union of social unions" reflects and builds on an earlier correction of this kind, the work of American writers like Dewey, Randolph Bourne, and Horace Kallen. Rawls has given us a generalized version of Kallen's argument that America, after the great immigration, was and should remain a "nation of nationalities."

In fact, however, the erosion of nationality seems to be a feature of liberal social life, despite intermittent ethnic revivals like that of the late 1960s and 1970s. We can generalize from this to the more or less steady attenuation of all the underlying bonds that make social unions possible. There is no strong or permanent remedy for communal attenuation short of an antiliberal curtailment of the Four Mobilities and the rights of rupture and divorce on which they rest. Communitarians sometimes dream of such a curtailment, but they rarely advocate it. The only community that most of them actually know, after all, is just this liberal union of unions, always precarious and always at risk. They cannot triumph over this liberalism; they can only, sometimes, reinforce its internal associative capacities. The reinforcement is only temporary, because the capacity for dissociation is also strongly internalized and highly valued. That is why communitarianism criticism is doomed - it probably is not a terrible fate - to eternal recurrence.

## **The Debate Over the Self**

Communitarian thinkers in the 1980s such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argued that Rawlsian liberalism rests on an overly individualistic conception of the self. Whereas Rawls argues that we have a supreme interest in shaping, pursuing, and revising our own life-plans, he neglects the fact that our selves tend to be defined or constituted by various communal attachments (e.g., ties to the family or to a religious tradition) so close to us that they can only be set aside at great cost, if at all. This insight led to the view that politics should not be concerned solely with securing the conditions for individuals to exercise their powers of autonomous choice, as we also need to sustain and promote the social attachments crucial to our sense of well-being and respect, many of which have been involuntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing. First, however, let us review the ontological or metaphysical debate over the self that led to this political conclusion.

In an influential essay titled "Atomism", Charles Taylor objected to the liberal view that "men are self-sufficient outside of society". (Taylor 1985, 2000) Instead, Taylor defends the Aristotelian view

that “Man is a social animal, indeed a political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-sufficient outside a polis” (Taylor 1985, 190). Moreover, this atomistic view of the self can undermine liberal society, because it fails to grasp the extent to which liberalism presumes a context where individuals are members of, and committed to, a society that promotes particular values such as freedom and individual diversity. Fortunately, most people in liberal societies do not really view themselves as atomistic selves.

But do liberal thinkers actually defend the idea that the self is created ex-nihilo, outside of any social context and that humans can exist (and flourish) independently of all social contexts? In fact, Taylor’s essay was directed at the libertarian thinker Robert Nozick. As it turns out, the communitarian critique of the atomistic self does not apply to Rawlsian liberalism: in Part III of *Theory of Justice*, Rawls pays close attention to the psychological and social conditions that facilitate the formation of liberal selves committed to justice. But few readers ever got to Part III of Rawls’ massive tome, so communitarians got quite a bit of mileage from their critique of liberal atomism. This charge didn’t stick, however.

While liberals may not have been arguing that individuals can completely extricate themselves from their social context, the liberal valuation of choice still seemed to suggest an image of a subject who impinges his will on the world.<sup>[9]</sup> Drawing on the insights of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, communitarians argued that this view neglects the extent to which individuals are embodied agents in the world. Far from acting in ways designed to realize an autonomously arrived-at life-plan, vast areas of our lives are in fact governed by unchosen routines and habits that lie in the background. More often than not we act in ways specified by our social background when we walk, dress, play games, speak, and so on without having formulated any goals or made any choices. It is only when things break down from the normal, everyday, unchosen mode of existence that we think of ourselves as subjects dealing with an external world, having the experience of formulating various ways of executing our goals, choosing from among those ways, and accepting responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. In other words, traditional intentionality is introduced at the point that our ordinary way of coping with things is insufficient. Yet this breakdown mode is what we tend to notice, and philosophers have therefore argued that most of our actions are occasioned by processes of reflection. Liberals have picked up this mistaken assumption, positing the idea of a subject who seeks to realize an autonomously arrived-at life-plan, losing sight of the fact that critical reflection upon one’s ends is nothing more than one possibility that arises when our ordinary ways of coping with things is insufficient to get things done.

Some liberals have replied by recognizing the point that vast areas of our lives are governed by unchosen habits and routines, that the deliberate, effortful, choosing subject mode may be the exception rather than the rule. They emphasize, however, that the main justification for a liberal politics concerned primarily with securing the conditions for individuals to lead autonomous lives rests on the possibility and desirability of normative self-determination, that is, on the importance of making choices with respect to things that we value (Doppelt 1989). While it may be true that certain communal practices often, or even mostly, guide our behavior behind our backs, it doesn’t follow that those practices ought to be valued, or reflectively endorsed in non-ordinary moments of existence, much less that the government ought somehow to promote these practices. And what liberals care about ultimately is the provision of the rights, powers, and opportunities that individuals need to develop and implement their own conceptions of the good life.

This qualified version of the liberal self, however, still seems to imply that moral outlooks are, or

should be, the product of individual choice. One's social world, communitarians can reply, provides more than non-moral social practices like table manners and pronunciation norms—it also provides some sort of orientation in moral space. We cannot make sense of our moral experience unless we situate ourselves within this given moral space, within the authoritative moral horizons. What Charles Taylor calls “higher, strongly evaluated goods” (Taylor 1989)—the goods we should feel committed to, those that generate moral obligations on us regardless of our actual preferences are not somehow invented by individuals, but rather they are located within the social world which provides one's framework of the lower and the higher. Thus, the liberal ideal of a self who freely invents her own moral outlook, or private conception of the good, cannot do justice to our actual moral experience.

But once again, liberals need not deny the assumption that our social world provides a framework of the higher and the lower nor need it be presumed that we must regard our own moral outlook as freely invented. Will Kymlicka, for example, explicitly recognizes that things have worth for us in so far as they are granted significance by our culture, in so far as they fit into a pattern of activities which is recognized by those sharing a certain form of life as a way of leading a good life (Kymlicka 1989, 166). That one's social world provides the range of things worth doing, achieving, or being does not, however, undermine the liberal emphasis on autonomy, for there is still substantial room for individual choice to be made within this set. The best life is still the one where the individual chooses what is worth doing, achieving, or being, though it may be that this choice has to be made within a certain framework which is itself unchosen.

Communitarians can reply by casting doubt on the view that choice is intrinsically valuable, that a certain moral principle or communal attachment is more valuable simply because it has been chosen following deliberation among alternatives by an individual subject. If we have a highest-order interest in choosing our central projects and life-plans, regardless of what is chosen, it ought to follow that there is something fundamentally wrong with unchosen attachments and projects. But this view violates our actual self-understandings. We ordinarily think of ourselves, Michael Sandel says, “as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic”, (Sandel 1981, 179) social attachments that more often than not are involuntarily picked up during the course of our upbringing, rational choice having played no role whatsoever. I didn't choose to love my mother and father, to care about the neighborhood in which I grew up, to have special feelings for the people of my country, and it is difficult to understand why anyone would think I have chosen these attachments, or that I ought to have done so. In fact, there may even be something distasteful about someone who questions the things he or she deeply cares about—certainly no marriage could survive too long if fundamental understandings regarding love and trust were constantly thrown open for discussion! Nor is it obvious that, say, someone who performs a good deed following prolonged calculation of pros and cons is morally superior than a Mother-Teresa type who unreflectively, spontaneously acts on behalf of other people's interests.

Liberals can reply that the real issue is not the desirability of choice, but rather the possibility of choice. There may well be some unchosen attachments that need not be critically reflected upon and endorsed, and it may even be the case that excessive deliberation about the things we care about can occasionally be counter-productive. But some of our ends may be problematic and that is why we have a fundamental interest in being able to question and revise them. Most important is not choosing our own life-plans; rather, liberalism founded on the value of self-determination requires only that we be able to critically evaluate our ends if need be, hence that “no end or goal is

exempt from possible re-examination” (Kymlicka 1989, 52; Dworkin 1989, 489; Macedo 1990, 247). For example, an oppressed woman has a fundamental interest in being able to critically reflect upon traditional understandings of what it means to be a good wife and mother, and it would be unjust to foreclose her freedom to radically revise her plans.

This response, however, still leaves open the possibility of a deep challenge to liberal foundations. Perhaps we are able to reexamine some attachments, but the problem for liberalism arises if there are others so fundamental to our identity that they cannot be set aside, and that any attempt to do so will result in serious and perhaps irreparable psychological damage. In fact, this challenge to liberalism would only require that communitarians be able to identify one end or communal attachment so constitutive of one’s identity that it cannot be revised and rejected. A psychoanalyst, for example, may want to argue that (at least in some cases) it is impossible to choose to shed the attachment one feels for one’s mother, and that an attempt may lead to perverse and unintended consequences. A feminist theorist may point to the mother-child relationship as an example of a constitutive feature of one’s identity and argue that any attempt to deny this fails to be sensitive to women’s special needs and experiences (Frazer & Lacey 1993, 53–60). An anthropologist may argue on the basis of field observations that it is impossible for an Inuit person from Canada’s far north to suddenly decide to stop being an Inuit and that the only sensible response is to recognize and accept this constitutive feature of his identity. Or a gay liberation activist may claim that it is both impossible and undesirable for gays to repress their biologically-given sexual identity. These arguments are not implausible, and they seem to challenge the liberal view that no particular end or commitment should be beyond critical reflection and open to revision.

Assume, for the sake of argument, that we can identify one particular attachment so deeply embedded that it is impossible to really bring to conscious awareness and so significant for one’s well-being that an individual can only forsake commitment to its good at the cost of being seriously psychologically disturbed. This end is beyond willed change and one loses a commitment to it at the price of being thrown into a state of disorientation where one is unable to take a stand on many things of significance (Taylor 1989, 26–7). Does this really threaten liberal politics? It may, if liberal politics really rests on the liberal self. Fortunately, that is not the case. Rereading some of the communitarian texts from the 1980s, there seems to have been an assumption that once you expose faulty foundations regarding the liberal self, the whole liberal edifice will come tumbling down. The task is to criticize the underlying philosophy of the self, win people on your side, and then we can move on to a brand new communitarian society that owes nothing to the liberal tradition. This must have been an exhilarating time for would-be revolutionaries, but more level-headed communitarians soon realized that overthrowing liberal rights was never part of the agenda. Even if liberals are wrong to deny the existence of constitutive ends—even if the philosophical justifications for a liberal form of social organization founded on the value of reflective choice are rotten to the core—there are still many, relatively pragmatic reasons for caring about rights in the modern world. To name some of the more obvious benefits, liberal rights often contribute to security, political stability and economic modernization.

In short, the whole debate about the self appears to have been somewhat misconceived. Liberals were wrong to think they needed to provide iron-clad philosophies of the self to justify liberal politics, and communitarians were wrong to think that challenging those foundations was sufficient to undermine liberal politics. Not surprisingly, both sides soon got tired of debating the pros and cons of the liberal self. By the early 1990s, this liberal-communitarian debate over the self had effectively faded from view in Anglo-American philosophy.

So what remains of the communitarian conception of the self? What may be distinctive about communitarians is that they are more inclined to argue that individuals have a vital interest in leading decent communal lives, with the political implication that there may be a need to sustain and promote the communal attachments crucial to our sense of well-being. This is not necessarily meant to challenge the liberal view that some of our communal attachments can be problematic and may need to be changed, thus that the state needs to protect our powers to shape, pursue, and revise our own life-plans. But our interest in community may occasionally conflict with our other vital interest in leading freely chosen lives, and the communitarian view is that the latter does not automatically trump the former in cases of conflict. On the continuum between freedom and community, communitarians are more inclined to draw the line towards the latter.

But these conflicts cannot be resolved in the abstract. Much turns on empirical analyses of actual politics—to what extent our interest in community is indeed threatened by excess liberal politics, to what extent the state can play a role in remedying the situation, to what extent the nourishment of communal ties should be left to civil society, and so on. This is where the political communitarians of the last decade have shed some light. Now turn to the politics of community, the third major strand of the communitarian thought.

### **The Politics of Community**

In retrospect, it seems obvious that communitarian critics of liberalism may have been motivated not so much by philosophical concerns as by certain pressing political concerns, namely, the negative social and psychological effects related to the atomistic tendencies of modern liberal societies. Whatever the soundness of liberal principles, in other words, the fact remains that many communitarians seem worried by a perception that traditional liberal institutions and practices have contributed to, or at least do not seem up to the task of dealing with, such modern phenomena as alienation from the political process, unbridled greed, loneliness, urban crime, and high divorce rates. And given the seriousness of these problems in the United States, it was perhaps inevitable that a second wave of 1990s communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni and William Galston would turn to the more practical political terrain of emphasizing social responsibility and promoting policies meant to stem the erosion of communal life in an increasingly fragmented society. Much of this thinking has been carried out in the flagship communitarian periodical, *The Responsive Community*, which is edited by Amitai Etzioni and includes contributions by an eclectic group of philosophers, social scientists, and public policy makers [this periodical, regrettably, folded in 2004 due to financial constraints]. Etzioni is also the director of a think-tank, Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, that produces working papers and advises government officials in Washington.

Such political communitarians blame both the left and the right for our current malaise. The political left is chastised not just for supporting welfare rights economically unsustainable in an era of slow growth and aging populations, but also for shifting power away from local communities and democratic institutions and towards centralized bureaucratic structures better equipped to administer the fair and equal distribution of benefits, thus leading to a growing sense of powerlessness and alienation from the political process. Moreover, the modern welfare state with its universalizing logic of rights and entitlements has undermined family and social ties in civil society by rendering superfluous obligations to communities, by actively discouraging private efforts to help others (e.g., union rules and strict regulations in Sweden prevent parents from participating voluntarily in the governance of some day care centers to which they send their children), and even by providing incentives that discourage the formation of families (e.g., welfare payments are cut

off in many American states if a recipient marries a working person) and encourage the break-up of families (e.g., no-fault divorce in the US is often financially rewarding for the non custodial parent, usually the father).

Libertarian solutions favored by the political right have contributed even more directly to the erosion of social responsibilities and valued forms of communal life, particularly in the UK and the US. Far from producing beneficial communal consequences, the invisible hand of unregulated free-market capitalism undermines the family (e.g., few corporations provide enough leave to parents of newborn children), disrupts local communities (e.g., following plant closings or the shifting of corporate headquarters), and corrupts the political process (e.g., US politicians are often dependent on economic interest groups for their political survival, with the consequence that they no longer represent the community at large). Moreover, the valorization of greed in the Thatcher/Reagan era justified the extension of instrumental considerations governing relationships in the marketplace into spheres previously informed by a sense of uncalculated reciprocity and civil obligation. This trend has been reinforced by increasing globalization, which pressures states into conforming to the dictates of the international marketplace. More specifically in the American context, communitarian thinkers such as Mary Ann Glendon indict a new version of rights discourse that has achieved dominance of late (Glendon 1991). Whereas the assertion of rights was once confined to matters of essential human interest, a strident rights rhetoric has colonized contemporary political discourse, thus leaving little room for reasoned discussion and compromise, justifying the neglect of social responsibilities without which a society could not function, and ultimately weakening all appeals to rights by devaluing the really important ones.

To remedy this imbalance between rights and responsibilities in the US, political communitarians proposed a moratorium on the manufacture of new rights and changes to our "habits of the heart" away from exclusive focus on personal fulfillment and towards concern with bolstering families, schools, neighborhoods, and national political life, changes to be supported by certain public policies. Notice that this proposal takes for granted basic civil and political liberties already in place, thus alleviating the concern that communitarians are embarking on a slippery slope to authoritarianism. Still, communitarian thinkers quietly lifted the call for a moratorium on the minting of new rights, presumably because of growing consensus that marginalized groups, such as same-sex couples seeking the right to legally sanctioned marriage, have a legitimate claim to new rights (Macedo, 2015) and would be paying the price for the excesses of others if the moratorium is put into effect.

More serious from the standpoint of those generally sympathetic to communitarian aspirations, however, is the question of what exactly this has to do with community. For one thing, Etzioni himself seeks to justify his policies with reference to need to maintain a balance between social order and freedom, (Etzioni 1996) as opposed to appealing to the importance of community. But there is nothing distinctively communitarian about the preoccupation with social order; both liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Burkean conservatives affirm the need for order. And when the term community is employed by political communitarians, it seems to mean anything they want it to mean. Worse, as Elizabeth Frazer has argued, it has often been used to justify hierarchical arrangements and delegitimize areas of conflict and contestation in modern societies (Frazer 1999).

Still, it is possible to make sense of the term community as a normative ideal. Communitarians begin by positing a need to experience our lives as bound up with the good of the communi-

ties out of which our identity has been constituted. This excludes contingent attachments such as golf-club memberships, that do not usually bear on one's sense of identity and well-being (the co-authors of *Habits of the Heart* (Bellah et al. 1985) employ the term "lifestyle enclaves" to describe these attachments). Unlike pre-modern defenders of *Gemeinschaft*, however, it is assumed that there are many valued forms of communal life in the modern world. So the distinctive communitarian political project is to identify valued forms of community and to devise policies designed to protect and promote them, without sacrificing too much freedom. Typically, communitarians would invoke the following types of communities:

1. Communities of place, or communities based on geographical location. This is perhaps the most common meaning associated with the word community. In this sense, community is linked to locality, in the physical, geographical sense of a community that is located somewhere. It can refer to a small village or a big city. A community of place also has an affective component—it refers to the place one calls "home", often the place where one is born and bred and the place where one would like to end one's days even if home is left as an adult. At the very least, communitarians posit an interest in identifying with familiar surroundings. In terms of political implications, it means that, for example, political authorities ought to consider the existent character of the local community when considering plans for development (Jane Jacobs famously documented the negative effects of razing, instead of renovating, run-down tenements that are replaced by functionally adequate but characterless low-income housing blocs (Jacobs 1965). Even big cities can and should strive to protect and promote a distinctive ethos (Bell and de-Shalit 2011). Other suggestions to protect communities of place include: granting community councils veto power over building projects that fail to respect existent architectural styles; implementing laws regulating plant closures so as to protect local communities from the effects of rapid capital mobility and sudden industrial change; promoting local-ownership of corporations; (Shuman 1999) and imposing restrictions on large-scale discount outlets such as Wal-Mart that threaten to displace small, fragmented, and diverse family and locally owned stores (Ehrenhalt 1999).
2. Communities of memory, or groups of strangers who share a morally- significant history. This term—first employed by the co-authors of *Habits of the Heart*—refers to imagined communities that have a shared history going back several generations. Besides tying us to the past, such communities turn us towards the future—members strive to realize the ideals and aspirations embedded in past experiences of those communities, seeing their efforts as being, in part, contributions to a common good. They provide a source of meaning and hope in people's lives. Typical examples include the nation and language-based ethnocultural groups. In Western liberal democracies, this typically translates into various nation- building exercises meant to nourish the bonds of commonality that tie people to their nations, such as national service and national history lessons in school textbooks. Self-described republicans such as Michael Sandel place special emphasis upon the national political community and argue for measures that increase civic engagement and public-spiritedness (Sandel 1996). However, there is increased recognition of the multi-national nature of contemporary states, and modern Western states must also try to make room for the political rights of minority groups. These political measures have been widely discussed in the recent literature on nationalism, citizenship, and multiculturalism.
3. Psychological communities, or communities of face-to-face personal interaction governed by sentiments of trust, co-operation, and altruism. This refers to a group of persons who partici-

pate in common activity and experience a psychological sense of togetherness as shared ends are sought. Such communities, based on face-to-face interaction, are governed by sentiments of trust, cooperation, and altruism in the sense that constituent members have the good of the community in mind and act on behalf of the community's interest. They differ from communities of place by not being necessarily defined by locality and proximity. They differ from communities of memory in the sense that they are more "real", they are typically based on face to face social interaction at one point in time and consequently tend to be restricted in size. The family is the prototypical example. Other examples include small-scale work or school settings founded on trust and social cooperation.

Communitarians tend to favor policies designed to protect and promote ties to the family and family-like groups. This would include such measures as encouraging marriage and increasing the difficulty of legal marriage dissolution. These policies are supported by empirical evidence that points to the psychological and social benefits of marriage (Waite 1996). Communitarians also favor political legislation that can help to restructure education in such a way that peoples deepest needs in membership and participation in psychological communities are tapped at a young age. The primary school system in Japan, where students learn about group cooperation and benefits and rewards are assigned to the classroom as a whole rather than to individual students, could be a useful model (Reid 1999).

What makes the political project of communitarianism distinctive is that it involves the promotion of all three forms of valued communal life. This leads, however, to the worry that seeking the goods of various communities may conflict in practice. Etzioni, for example, argues for a whole host of pro-family measures: mothers and fathers should devote more time and energy to parenting (in view of the fact that most childcare centers do a poor job of caring for children), labor unions and employers ought to make it easier for parents to work at home, and the government should force corporations to provide six months of paid leave and another year of unpaid leave. The combined effect of these changes of the heart and public policies in all likelihood would be to make citizens into largely private, family-centered persons.

Yet Etzioni also argues that the American political system is corrupt to the core, concluding that only extensive involvement in public affairs by virtuous citizens can remedy the situation: "once citizens are informed, they must make it their civic duty to organize others locally, regionally, and nationally to act on their understanding of what it takes to clean up public life in America" (Etzioni 1993, 244) But few can afford sufficient time and energy to devote themselves fully to both family life and public affairs, and favoring one ideal is most likely to erode the other. Surely it is no coincidence that republican America in Jefferson's day relied on active, public-spirited male citizens largely freed from family responsibilities. Conversely, societies composed of persons leading rich and fulfilling family lives (such as contemporary Singapore) tend to be ruled by paternalistic despots who can rely on a compliant, politically apathetic populace.

Communitarians who advocate both increased commitment to public affairs and strengthened ties to the workplace (to the point that it becomes a psychological community) also face the problem of conflicting commitments. Michael Sandel, for example, speaks favorably of "proud craftsmen" in the Jacksonian era and of Louis Brandeis's idea of "industrial democracy, in which workers participated in management and shared responsibilities for running the business" (Sandel 1996, 170, 213) Identification with the workplace and industrial democracy are said to improve workers civic

capacities, but that may not be the case. In the same way that extensive involvement in family life can conflict with commitments to public life, few persons will have sufficient time and energy for extensive participation in both workplace and public affairs. Recall that the republican society of ancient Athens relied on active, public-spirited males freed from the need to work (slaves did most of the drudge labor).

It is also worth noting that devotion to the workplace can undermine family life. As Tatsuo Inoue of Tokyo University argues, Japanese-style communitarianism—strong communal identity based on the workplace—sometimes leads to *karoshi* (death from overwork) and frequently deprives workers of “the right to sit down at the dinner table with their families” (Inoue 1993). Just as liberals (pace Ronald Dworkin) sometimes have to choose between ideals (e.g., freedom and equality) that come into conflict with one another if a serious effort is made to realize any one of them fully, so communitarians may have to make some hard choices between valued forms of communal life. Still, there may be some actual or potential win-win scenarios cases where promoting a particular form of communal life can promote, rather than undermine, other forms—and political communitarians will of course favor change of this sort. For example, critics have objected to residential community associations, or “walled communities”, on the grounds that they undermine attachment to the polity at large and erode the social cohesion and trust needed to promote social justice and sustain the democratic process (McKenzie 1994). Might it then be possible to reform urban planning so that people can nurture strong local communities without undermining attachment to the national community, perhaps even strengthening broader forms of public-spiritedness? Many practical suggestions along these lines have been raised. Architects and urban planners in the US known as the New Urbanists, for example, have proposed various measures to strengthen community building—affordable housing, public transport, pedestrian focused environments, and public space as an integral part of neighborhoods—that would not have the “privatizing” consequences of gated communities. The problem, as Gerald Frug points out, is that “virtually everything they want to do is now illegal. To promote the new urbanist version of urban design, cities would have to revise municipal zoning laws and development policy from top to bottom.” This points to the need for public policy recommendations explicitly designed to favor complementing forms of communal attachments.

Just as it would be wrong to assume that communitarian goals always conflict, so one should allow for the possibility that individual rights and communitarian goals can co-exist and complement each other. In Singapore, for example, it can be argued that more secure democratic rights would have the effect of strengthening commitment to the common national good. The Singapore government does not hide the fact that it makes life difficult for many who aim to enter the political arena on the side of opposition parties: Between 1971 and 1993, according to Attorney General Chan Sek Keong, eleven opposition politicians were made bankrupt (and hence ineligible to run in elections). Whether intended or not, such actions send an unpatriotic message to the community at large: Politics is a dangerous game for those who haven't been specially anointed by the top leadership of the ruling party, so you should stick to your own private affairs. As Singaporean journalist Cherian George puts it, one can hardly blame people for ignoring their social and political obligations “when they hear so many cautionary tales: Of Singaporeans whose careers came to a premature end after they voiced dissent; of critics who found themselves under investigation; of individuals who were detained without trial even though they seemed not to pose any real threat; of tapped phones and opened letters”. The moral of these stories: In Singapore, better to mind your own business, make money, and leave politics to the politicians.’ Put positively, if the aim is to secure attachment to the community at large, then implementing genuinely competitive elections,

including the freedom to run for the opposition without fear of retaliation, is an important first step (see also Chan 2014). The communitarian case for democratic elections is particularly powerful in small communities where it is easier to establish a sense of communal solidarity.

The Singapore case, however, points to another dimension of the politics of community that brings us back to the communitarian defense of cultural particularism. Democratic reformers in Singapore typically think of democracy in terms of free and fair competitive elections what Western analysts often label “minimal democracy”. In Hong Kong, the situation is similar—the aspiration to “full” democracy put forward by social critics turns out to mean (nothing more than) an elected legislature and Chief Executive. Put differently, it is quite striking that the republican tradition in communitarian thought with its vision of strong democracy supported by active, public-spirited citizens who participate in political decision-making and help shape the future direction of their society through political debate seems largely absent from political discourse in Singapore and Hong Kong, and perhaps East Asia more generally. Many East Asians are clamoring for secure democratic rights, but this rarely translates into the demand that all citizens should be committed to politics on an ongoing basis or the view that, as David Miller puts it, “politics is indeed a necessary part of the good life” (Miller 2000). At one level, the relative absence of republican ideals can be explained by the fact that there are no equivalents of Aristotle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in East Asian philosophy. It can also be argued that republicanism fails to resonate because East Asians typically place more emphasis on other forms of communal life—the family in particular has been an important theme in Confucian ethical theory and practice (relative to Western philosophy). To the extent that different forms of communal life do conflict in practice, in short, it may be the case that different cultures will draw the line in different places.

But this is not to suggest that each community draws the line in its own way, and there is no more room for moral debate or social critique. While there may be a strong case for endorsing “the way things are done” if shared understandings conform to the views shared by both defenders and critics of the political status quo, more often than not social critics will find fault with the communitarian excesses in particular societies. For example, Chang Kyung-Sup argues that Korean “familism” harms individuals and poses a serious stumbling block to the establishment of a democratic polity in Korea (see Chang 2004). In this context, it may well be counter-productive to place too much emphasis on the moral qualities of family life. But other societies—relatively individualistic societies suffering from the undesirable social consequences of divorce and single-parent families or communitarian societies that justify sacrificing families in the interests of the workplace—may need to rejuvenate family life and they may well look to Korean “familism” for ideas. In other words, what seems like a communitarian excess in one society can be a source of inspiration for another. So, the conclusion is, yes, community is valuable—at least as valuable as the need for freedom, if not more so. Communitarians have usefully distinguished between forms of valuable communities and Anglo-American political communitarians have designed menus of policy options to promote those forms of communities. The varieties of communitarian politics in East Asia offers further possibilities. However, which form of community to emphasize and which form to deemphasize depends upon the needs and problems of particular societies. The political implications of communitarianism, in short, depend upon the cultural outlooks and social priorities of particular contexts.

Let me end with the question of why East Asians should look to communitarianism when the rich and diverse Confucian tradition can be drawn upon to express communitarian values. After all, there is substantial overlap between the two philosophies—both emphasize the value of relation-

ships for the good life as well as stress the importance of education and non-coercive modes of moral education with legal rights as last resort fall-back mechanisms (see Bell 2008, ch. 9)—so why not stick to the “local” philosophy of Confucianism? In an East Asian context, it seems strange to promote a communitarian philosophy that was shaped by concerns about individualistic excesses in Western countries when the communitarian Confucian tradition continues to shape values and inform “habits of the heart” (see Sun 2013; Hammond and Richey 2015; Billioud and Thorel 2015). And it’s still a matter of argument whether communitarianism really constitutes a philosophy or tradition, as opposed to a critical extension of the liberal tradition. But nobody doubts that Confucianism constitutes its own tradition. So what good reason can there be for East Asians to identify with communitarianism rather than Confucianism?

One response is that Confucianism has been tainted by its apparent endorsement of immoral practices, such as patriarchal values that have contributed to the subordination and suffering of women. But contemporary feminist theorists have reinterpreted Confucianism to make it more compatible with modern-day values while maintaining commitment to central Confucian values (see, e.g., Chan 2007). And those central Confucian values—commitment to the family, to the material well-being of the people, to meritocracy in education and politics, to ritual (*li*), humaneness (*ren*), diversity in harmony (*he*), and this-worldly outlooks—may in fact be more appropriate for modern-day societies than many other philosophies (consider the fact that most Western philosophers prior to the twentieth century devalued the family). Bai Tongdong, for example, argues that a modernized form of central Confucian values can inspire humane governance both at home and abroad (Bai 2019).

In an East Asian context, what communitarianism can do is help to remedy the drawbacks of Confucianism. For example, there is a tension between the universalizing impulses of early Confucianism—Confucius and Mencius did not consider the possibility of morally legitimate alternatives to their values—and the moral pluralism that tends to characterize the modern world. Communitarians can remind Confucians that their philosophy may be more appropriate in certain settings than others, and that they should allow for the possibility of morally legitimate alternatives in different contexts. It seems strange, for example, for Confucians to think that Christian believers should change their primary religious allegiance from God to family ancestors (just as it seems strange for Christians to ask Confucians to do the opposite).

Communitarian insights about civil society as the sites for moral education can help to remedy the Confucian focus on the family as the only (or main) springboard for moral learning. Confucians have long argued that it is possible and desirable to extend family values outside the family, but the family-centered reality in most East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage suggests that Confucianism may not be sufficient. There has been some work exploring the ‘intermediary associations’ in Confucianism (see, e.g., de Bary 1998), but the communitarians debates in the West may offer more insights in this respect. Also, the Confucian emphasis on meritocratic rule by the most talented and virtuous members of the community may encourage excessive political passivity on the part of ordinary citizens. Again, Confucians can look to communitarianism (as well as contemporary debates about deliberative democracy) for insights about values and practices that allow ordinary citizens to make meaningful contributions to the political process, even in political contexts (such as China) without democratic elections to choose top leaders. Democratic education is not, to say the least, a Confucian imperative. In short, communitarian insights can usefully supplement Confucian values in an East Asian context, just as they can supplement liberal values in Western societies.

Overall, though, it must be conceded that communitarianism has lost salience as a motivating political ideal in both East Asia and the West. Do we have any reason to think it might be revived? In East Asia, we can expect that communitarian themes will continue to take the form of Confucian values. In the West, however, the excesses of populism may present an opportunity for communitarian-inspired political activists. Populism, arguably, is a response to the decline of valued forms of community. Strongmen such as Donald Trump rail against elites and promise to restore traditional sources of meaning to disempowered and atomized individuals. But the problem is not elitism or hierarchy per se. Any modern society needs hierarchies and the task is to distinguish between bad forms of hierarchy that benefit the powerful and oppress the weak, and good forms of hierarchy that express morally defensible values (Bell and Wang 2020). Hierarchical forms of communal life can be reinterpreted and modernized so they are compatible with progressive values. What's missing is a social and political movement that can restore and reinterpret forms of communal life appropriate for the modern world.

## **Multiculturalism**

The idea of multiculturalism in contemporary political discourse and in political philosophy reflects a debate about how to understand and respond to the challenges associated with cultural diversity based on ethnic, national, and religious differences. The term "multicultural" is often used as a descriptive term to characterize the fact of diversity in a society, but in what follows, the focus is on multiculturalism as a normative ideal in the context of Western liberal democratic societies. While the term has come to encompass a variety of normative claims and goals, it is fair to say that proponents of multiculturalism find common ground in rejecting the ideal of the "melting pot" in which members of minority groups are expected to assimilate into the dominant culture. Instead, proponents of multiculturalism endorse an ideal in which members of minority groups can maintain their distinctive collective identities and practices. In the case of immigrants, proponents emphasize that multiculturalism is compatible with, not opposed to, the integration of immigrants into society; multiculturalism policies provide fairer terms of integration for immigrants.

Modern states are organized around the language and culture of the dominant groups that have historically constituted them. As a result, members of minority cultural groups face barriers in pursuing their social practices in ways that members of dominant groups do not. Some theorists argue for tolerating minority groups by leaving them free of state interference (Kukathas 1995, 2003). Others argue that mere toleration of group differences falls short of treating members of minority groups as equals; what is required is recognition and positive accommodation of minority group practices through what the leading theorist of multiculturalism Will Kymlicka has called "group-differentiated rights" (1995). Some group-differentiated rights are held by individual members of minority groups, as in the case of individuals who are granted exemptions from generally applicable laws in virtue of their religious beliefs or individuals who seek language accommodations in education and in voting. Other group-differentiated rights are held by the group qua group rather than by its members severally; such rights are properly called "group rights," as in the case of indigenous groups and minority nations, who claim the right of self-determination. In the latter respect, multiculturalism is closely allied with nationalism.

Multiculturalism is part of a broader political movement for greater inclusion of marginalized groups, including African Americans, women, LGBTQ people, and people with disabilities (Glazer 1997, Hollinger 1995, Taylor 1992). This broader political movement is reflected in the "multiculturalism" debates in the 1980s over whether and how to diversify school curricula to recognize the

achievements of historically marginalized groups. But the more specific focus of contemporary theories of multiculturalism is the recognition and inclusion of minority groups defined primarily in terms of ethnicity, nationality, and religion. The main concern of contemporary multiculturalism are immigrants who are ethnic and religious minorities (e.g. Latinx people in the U.S., Muslims in Western Europe), minority nations (e.g. the Basque, Catalans, Québécois, Welsh) and indigenous peoples (e.g. Native peoples and indigenous groups in Canada, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand).

### **The claims of multiculturalism**

Multiculturalism is closely associated with “identity politics,” “the politics of difference,” and “the politics of recognition,” all of which share a commitment to revaluing disrespected identities and changing dominant patterns of representation and communication that marginalize certain groups (Gutmann 2003, Taylor 1992, Young 1990). Multiculturalism involves not only claims of identity and culture as some critics of multiculturalism suggest. It is also a matter of economic interests and political power: it includes demands for remedying economic and political disadvantages that people suffer as a result of their marginalized group identities.

Multiculturalists take for granted that it is “culture” and “cultural groups” that are to be recognized and accommodated. Yet multicultural claims include a wide range of claims involving religion, language, ethnicity, nationality, and race. Culture is a contested, open-ended concept, and all of these categories have been subsumed by or equated with the concept of culture. Disaggregating and distinguishing among different types of claims can clarify what is at stake (Song 2008). Language and religion are at the heart of many claims for cultural accommodation by immigrants. The key claim made by minority nations is for self-government rights. Race has a more limited role in multicultural discourse. Antiracism and multiculturalism are distinct but related ideas: the former highlights “victimization and resistance” whereas the latter highlights “cultural life, cultural expression, achievements, and the like” (Blum 1992, 14). Claims for recognition in the context of multicultural education are demands not just for recognition of aspects of a group’s actual culture (e.g. African American art and literature) but also for acknowledgment of the history of group subordination and its concomitant experience (Gooding-Williams 1998).

Examples of cultural accommodations or “group-differentiated rights” include exemptions from generally applicable law (e.g. religious exemptions), assistance to do things that members of the majority culture are already enabled to do (e.g. multilingual ballots, funding for minority language schools and ethnic associations, affirmative action), representation of minorities in government bodies (e.g. ethnic quotas for party lists or legislative seats, minority-majority Congressional districts), recognition of traditional legal codes by the dominant legal system (e.g. granting jurisdiction over family law to religious courts), or limited self-government rights (e.g. qualified recognition of tribal sovereignty, federal arrangements recognizing the political autonomy of Québec) (for a helpful classification of cultural rights, see Levy 1997).

Typically, a group-differentiated right is a right of a minority group (or a member of such a group) to act or not act in a certain way in accordance with their religious obligations and/or cultural commitments. In some cases, it is a right that directly restricts the freedom of non-members in order to protect the minority group’s culture, as in the case of restrictions on the use of the English language in Québec. When the right-holder is the group, the right may protect group rules that restrict the freedom of individual members, as in the case of the Pueblo membership rule that excludes the children of women who marry outside the group. Now that you have a sense of the

kinds of claims that have been made in the name of multiculturalism, we can now turn to consider different normative justifications for these claims.

### **Justifications for multiculturalism Recognition**

One justification for multiculturalism arises out of the communitarian critique of liberalism. Liberals tend to be ethical individualists; they insist that individuals should be free to choose and pursue their own conceptions of the good life. They give primacy to individual rights and liberties over community life and collective goods. Some liberals are also individualists when it comes to social ontology (what some call methodological individualism or atomism). Methodological individualists believe that you can and should account for social actions and social goods in terms of the properties of the constituent individuals and individual goods. The target of the communitarian critique of liberalism is not so much liberal ethics as liberal social ontology. Communitarians reject the idea that the individual is prior to the community and that the value of social goods can be reduced to their contribution to individual well-being. They instead embrace ontological holism, which acknowledges collective goods as, in Charles Taylor's words, "irreducibly social" and intrinsically valuable (Taylor 1995).

An ontologically holist view of collective identities and cultures underlies Taylor's argument for a "politics of recognition." Drawing on Rousseau, Herder, and Hegel, among others, Taylor argues that we do not become full human agents and define our identity in isolation from others; rather, "we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us" (1994, 33). Because our identities are formed dialogically, we are dependent on the recognition of others. The absence of recognition or mis-recognition can cause serious injury: "A person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves". The struggle for recognition can only be satisfactorily resolved through "a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals". Taylor distinguishes the politics of recognition from the traditional liberal "politics of equal respect" that is "inhospitable to difference, because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals". By contrast, the politics of recognition is grounded on "judgments about what makes a good life—judgments in which the integrity of cultures has an important place". He discusses the example of the survival of French culture in Quebec. The French language is not merely a collective resource that individuals might want to make use of and thereby seek to preserve, as suggested by a politics of equal respect. Instead, the French language is an irreducibly collective good that itself deserves to be preserved: language policies aimed at preserving the French language in Québec "actively seek to create members of the community" by assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers. Because of the indispensable role of cultures in the development human agency and identity, Taylor argues, we should adopt the presumption of the equal worth of all cultures.

### **Equality**

A second justification for multiculturalism comes from within liberalism but a liberalism that has been revised through critical engagement with the communitarian critique of liberalism. Will Kymlicka has developed the most influential liberal theory of multiculturalism by marrying the liberal values of autonomy and equality with an argument about the value of cultural membership (1989, 1995, 2001). Rather than beginning with intrinsically valuable collective goals and goods as Taylor does, Kymlicka views cultures as instrumentally valuable to individuals, for two main reasons. First, cultural membership is an important condition of personal autonomy. In his first

book, *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (1989), Kymlicka develops his case for multiculturalism within a Rawlsian framework of justice, viewing cultural membership as a “primary good,” things that every rational person is presumed to want and which are necessary for the pursuit of one’s goals (Rawls 1971, 62). In his later book, *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), Kymlicka drops the Rawlsian scaffolding, relying instead on the work of Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz on national self-determination (1990). One important condition of autonomy is having an adequate range of options from which to choose (Raz 1986). Cultures serve as “contexts of choice,” which provide meaningful options and scripts with which people can frame, revise, and pursue their goals (Kymlicka 1995, 89). Second, cultural membership plays an important role in people’s self-identity. Citing Margalit and Raz as well as Taylor, Kymlicka views cultural identity as providing people with an “anchor for their self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging”. This means there is a deep and general connection between a person’s self-respect and the respect accorded to the cultural group of which she is a part. It is not simply membership in any culture but one’s own culture that must be secured in order for cultural membership to serve as a meaningful context of choice and a basis of self-respect.

Kymlicka moves from these premises about the instrumental value of cultural membership to the egalitarian claim that because members of minority groups are disadvantaged in terms of access to their own cultures (in contrast to members of the majority culture), they are entitled to special protections. It is important to note that Kymlicka’s egalitarian argument for multiculturalism rests on a theory of equality that critics have dubbed “luck egalitarianism” (Anderson 1999, Scheffler 2003). According to luck egalitarians, individuals should be held responsible for inequalities resulting from their own choices, but not for inequalities deriving from unchosen circumstances (Dworkin 1981; Rakowski 1993). The latter inequalities are the collective responsibility of citizens to address. For example, inequalities stemming from one’s social starting position in life are unchosen yet so strongly determine our prospects in life. Luck egalitarians argue that those born into poor families are entitled to collective support and assistance via a redistributive tax scheme. Kymlicka adds cultural membership to this list of unchosen inequalities. If one is born into the dominant culture of society, one enjoys good brute luck, whereas those who belong to minority cultures suffer disadvantages in virtue of the bad brute luck of their minority status. Insofar as inequality in access to cultural membership stems from luck (as opposed to individual choices) and one suffers disadvantages as a result of it, members of minority groups can reasonably demand that members of the majority culture must share in bearing the costs of accommodation. Minority group rights are justified, as Kymlicka argues, “within a liberal egalitarian theory...which emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities”.

One might question whether cultural minority groups really are “disadvantaged” and thereby, owed positive accommodations. Why not just enforce antidiscrimination laws, stopping short of any positive accommodations for minority groups? Kymlicka and other liberal theorists of multiculturalism contend that antidiscrimination laws fall short of treating members of minority groups as equals; this is because states cannot be neutral with respect to culture. In culturally diverse societies, we can easily find patterns of state support for some cultural groups over others. While states may prohibit racial discrimination and avoid official establishment of any religion, they cannot avoid establishing one language for public schooling and other state services (language being a paradigmatic marker of culture. Linguistic advantage translates into economic and political advantage since members of the dominant cultural community have a leg up in schools, the workplace, and politics. Linguistic advantage also takes a symbolic form. When state action extends symbolic affirmation to some groups and not others by adopting a particular language or by organ-

izing the work week and public holidays around the calendar of particular religions, it has a normalizing effect, suggesting that one group's language and customs are more valued than those of other groups.

In addition to state support of certain cultures over others, state laws may place constraints on some cultural groups over others. Consider the case of dress code regulations in public schools or the workplace. A ban on religious dress burdens religious individuals, as in the case of Simcha Goldman, a U.S. Air Force officer, who was also an ordained rabbi and wished to wear a yarmulke out of respect to an omnipresent God (*Goldman v. Weinberger*, 475 US 503 (1986)). The case of the French state's ban on religious dress in public schools, which burdens Muslim girls who wish to wear headscarves to school, is another example (Bowen 2007, Laborde 2008). Religion may command that believers dress in a certain way (what Peter Jones calls an "intrinsic burden"), not that believers refrain from attending school or going to work (Jones 1994). Yet, burdens on believers do not stem from the dictates of religion alone; they also arise from the intersection of the demands of religion and the demands of the state ("extrinsic burden"). Individuals must bear intrinsic burdens themselves; bearing the burdens of the dictates of one's faith, such as prayer, worship, and fasting, just is part of meeting one's religious obligations. When it comes to extrinsic burdens, however, liberal multiculturalists argue that justice requires assisting cultural minorities bear the burdens of these unchosen disadvantages.

It is important to note that liberal multiculturalists distinguish among different types of groups. For instance, Kymlicka's theory develops a typology of different groups and different types of rights for each. It offers the strongest form of group-differentiated rights—self-government rights—to indigenous peoples and national minorities for the luck egalitarian reason that their minority status is unchosen: they were coercively incorporated into the larger state. By contrast, immigrants are viewed as voluntary migrants: by choosing to migrate, they relinquished access to their native culture. Immigrant multiculturalism, what Kymlicka calls "polyethnic rights", is understood as a demand for fairer terms of integration into the broader society through the granting of exemptions and accommodations, not a rejection of integration or a demand for collective self-determination.

### **Freedom from domination**

Another set of arguments for multiculturalism rests on the value of freedom. Some theorists such as Phillip Pettit (1997) and Quentin Skinner (1998) have developed the idea of freedom from domination by drawing on the civic republican tradition. Building on this line of argument to argue for recognition, Frank Lovett (2009) maintains that domination presents a serious obstacle to human flourishing. In contrast to the conception of freedom as non-interference dominant in liberal theory, freedom as non-domination, drawn from the civic republic tradition, focuses on a person's "capacity to interfere, on an arbitrary basis, in certain choices that the other is in a position to make" (Pettit 1997, 52). On this view of freedom, we can be unfree even when we are not experiencing any interference as in the case of a slave of a benevolent master. We are subject to domination to the extent that we are dependent on another person or group who can arbitrarily exercise power over us (Pettit 1997, ch. 2).

Frank Lovett has explored the implications of the value of freedom from domination for questions of multicultural accommodation (2010). He begins from the premise that freedom from domination is an important human good and that we have a prima facie obligation to reduce domination. He argues that the state should not accommodate social practices that directly involve domination. Indeed, if freedom from domination is a priority, then one should "aim to bring such practices

to an end as quickly as possible, despite any subjective value they happen to have for their participants” (2010, 256). As for practices that do not involve subjecting individuals to domination, accommodation is permissible but not necessarily required. Accommodation is only required if accommodation would advance the goal of reducing domination. He discusses one stylized example based on a familiar real-world case: the practice among Muslim women and girls of wearing headscarves. Suppose, Lovett suggests, a detailed study of a particular Muslim community in a liberal democratic society is undertaken and it reveals that women’s educational and employment opportunities are discouraged, generating “severe patriarchal domination,” but the study also shows that the practice of wearing headscarves does not (2010, 258). Lovett argues that the practice of wearing headscarves should be accommodated because failure to do so might strengthen the community’s commitment to other shared practices that reinforce patriarchal domination.

A key empirical assumption here is that combating patriarchal practices within minority communities would be easier if the burdens on more benign practices, such as wearing headscarves, are lessened. Cecile Laborde’s analysis of the headscarf controversy in France provides support for this assumption: the effect of preventing Muslim girls from wearing headscarves is to encourage their parents to withdraw their daughters from civic education and send them to religious schools where they would not be exposed to the diversity of world views found in public schools. Formal restrictions on Muslim religious expression in the public sphere may make, in Laborde’s words, “members of dominated groups close ranks around the denigrated practice, precipitating a defensive retreat into conservative cultural forms and identities” (2008, 164).

Another situation in which accommodation is warranted on Lovett’s account is when individuals’ subjective attachment to particular practices makes them vulnerable to exploitation. He discusses the case of Mexican immigrant laborers with limited English language skills and limited knowledge of American laws and policies. Lovett argues that extending “special public measures,” such as exceptions to general rules and regulations and public legal assistance, is required insofar as such measures would reduce the domination of these workers (2010, 260). In contrast to the communitarian or liberal egalitarian arguments considered above, the basis for the special accommodations is not a desire to protect intrinsically valuable cultures or considerations of fairness or equality but the desire to reduce domination.

Mira Bachvarova has also argued for the merits of a non-domination-based multiculturalism as compared to liberal egalitarian approaches. Because of its focus on the arbitrary use of power and the broader structural inequalities within which groups interact, a non-domination approach may be more sensitive to power dynamics in both inter-group and intra-group relations. Also, in contrast to approaches developed out of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that focus on distributing different types of rights, a non-domination approach focuses on the “moral quality of the relationship between the central actors” and insists on continuity of treatment between and within groups.

### **Addressing historical injustice**

Other theorists sympathetic to multiculturalism look beyond liberalism and republicanism, emphasizing instead the importance of grappling with historical injustice and listening to minority groups themselves. This is especially true of theorists writing from a postcolonial perspective. For example, in contemporary discussions of aboriginal sovereignty, rather than making claims based on premises about the value of Native cultures and their connection to individual members’ sense of self-worth as liberal multiculturalists have, the focus is on reckoning with history. Such proponents of indigenous sovereignty emphasize the importance of understanding indigenous claims against the historical background of the denial of equal sovereign status of indigenous groups, the dispos-

session of their lands, and the destruction of their cultural practices. This background calls into question the legitimacy of the state's authority over aboriginal peoples and provides a prima facie case for special rights and protections for indigenous groups, including the right of self-government. Jeff Spinner-Halev has argued that the history of state oppression of a group should be a key factor in determining not only whether group rights should be extended but also whether the state should intervene in the internal affairs of the group when it discriminates against particular members of the group. For example, "when an oppressed group uses its autonomy in a discriminatory way against women it cannot simply be forced to stop this discrimination" (2001, 97). Oppressed groups that lack autonomy should be "provisionally privileged" over non-oppressed groups; this means that "barring cases of serious physical harm in the name of a group's culture, it is important to consider some form of autonomy for the group".

Theorists adopting a postcolonial perspective go beyond liberal multiculturalism toward the goal of developing models of constitutional and political dialogue that recognize culturally distinct ways of speaking and acting. Multicultural societies consist of diverse religious and moral outlooks, and if liberal societies are to take such diversity seriously, they must recognize that liberalism is just one of many substantive outlooks based on a specific view of man and society. Liberalism is not free of culture but expresses a distinctive culture of its own. This observation applies not only across territorial boundaries between liberal and nonliberal states, but also within liberal states and its relations with nonliberal minorities. James Tully has surveyed the language of historical and contemporary constitutionalism with a focus on Western state's relations with Native peoples to uncover more inclusive bases for intercultural dialogue (1995). Bhikhu Parekh contends that liberal theory cannot provide an impartial framework governing relations between different cultural communities (2000). He argues instead for a more open model of intercultural dialogue in which a liberal society's constitutional and legal values serve as the initial starting point for cross-cultural dialogue while also being open to contestation.

More recent work has emphasized the importance of developing more contextual approaches that engage with actual political struggles for recognition and give greater voice to minority groups. Through detailed examination of how national museums in Canada and the U.S. have sought to represent and recognize indigenous groups, Caitlin Tom identifies three principles for the practice of recognition: self-definition, responsiveness, and internal contestation. Whether it be museum officials seeking to exhibit the history and culture of minority groups or government officials deciding whether official apologies for historical injustices are in order, they should respect individual and collective self-definition, respond to demands for recognition on terms that align with the terms of those being recognized, and accommodate internal contestation of group meanings. As Tom argues, practices of recognition guided by these principles come closer to fostering freedom and equality of minority groups than existing approaches.

### **Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition"**

"A number of strands in contemporary politics," Taylor begins, "turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for recognition". In "The Politics of Recognition", Taylor explores these strands, and tries to make sense of their historical emergence and relation to liberalism, in part through an incisive look at their emergence in the Canadian context.

Taylor's essay is a tour de force: intricate, historical and sensitive to many (if not all) of a family of difficult issues; even those inclined to disagree have much to learn from the text's honest treatment of the issues.

## A Historical Step Back

Recognition, Taylor thinks, looms large in contemporary politics. From nationalist movements to demands behalf of minority or subaltern groups in feminism and multiculturalism, the invocation of recognition is a mainstay of politics discourse. And partly for good reason. Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, and failures of recognition can cause real harms: misrecognition is not just lack of due respect, but “a vital human need”.

In order to examine recognition and its importance, Taylor begins by taking a “step back” to look at “how this discourse of recognition came to seem familiar...to us”. Taylor thinks we can distinguish “two changes” that have made preoccupation with these ideas “inevitable”. First, a “collapse of social hierarchies”, which used to be the basis for “honor”. Honor, in this sense at least, was “intrinsically linked to inequalities”: Taylor is thinking of the sort of honors one lavishes upon a duke, or that one bestows along with “some public award, for example, the Order of Canada”. Instead of honor, we now “have the modern notion of dignity”, which is “universalist and egalitarian”: the underlying premise is that everyone shares it. This latter idea, dignity, is obviously “the only one compatible with a democratic society”. Taylor doesn’t say much about how exactly honor collapsed. Second, “the importance of recognition has been modified and intensified by the new understanding of individual ideality” that emerges in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. It is not that identity is new, but that “individualized identity” is new, along with “the ideal of authenticity”, of being true to oneself. Taylor says considerably more about how exactly this ideal emerged.

His story begins with the thought that “human beings are endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling” for right and wrong. Earlier, what we needed to be ‘in touch with’ was good. With modernity, however, the source of moral sense moves interior. Authenticity develops by “displacing” the “moral accent” in this idea”: being in touch with our feelings or true selves takes on independent (moral) significance.

Key in this process were Rousseau, Herder (and latter, Hegel). Rousseau, “articulate[ed] something that was in a sense already occurring in the culture” by presenting morality as “following a voice of nature within us”. Herder then adds the idea that “each person has her own ‘measure’; that is, that “there is a certain way of being human that is my way”, and it is of moral important to be in touch with that way. This idea of “originality, for Herder, operates “at two levels”: at the level of the individual person and at the level of ‘culture-bearing’ people [Volk]. We will return to this distinction later.

The need for recognition, however, is not new. Human life is “fundamentally dialogical” in character. Recognition has always been a central need. It is not just a need during a period of “genesis” – say, in childhood—but our need for recognition “continues indefinitely”: though this need may be resisted by some of us, it shows up, for example, in love as a defining commitment that structures one’s identity.

But the development of an ideal of the ‘inward generation’ of identity together with “the decline of hierarchical society” gave recognition a new importance. In the earlier age, a failure of recognition never really arose: “general recognition was built into the socially derived identity by virtue of [being]...based on categories that everyone took for granted”. So recognition, in a way, couldn’t fail. But “original identity” –the kind a person or a Volk generate—doesn’t enjoy this recognition so easily.

In short, “what has come about with the modern age is not the need for recognition but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognized can fail”. That brings us to Hegel, who distinguished “two planes” of recognition. On the intimate plane, our identities are initially formed by “contact with significant others”. On the social plane “the understanding that identities are formed in open dialogue...has made the politics of equal recognition more central and stressful” (36). Taylor will focus on this later form of political recognition.

## **Two Forms of Recognition**

Recognition, he notes, “has come to mean two rather different things”. First, connected with the move from honor to dignity, one form of politics has come to emphasize “the equal dignity of all citizens” in an effort to avoid the existence of first and second class citizens. Here, the emphasis is on equality, similarity and equal (the same) treatment. Second, connected with the development of identity has come a “politics of difference” which emphasizes that everyone is owed “recognition of the unique identity” of each individual or group. This politics has a universal, egalitarian basis –equal recognition for all—but “it asks we give acknowledgment and status to something that is not universal shared”.

Just call these models the politics of dignity and the politics of difference respectively. To proponents of the politics of dignity, the latter model can seem like a negation of their principles. Some arguments are thus made to justify the politics of difference on the basis of dignity. These arguments should be familiar – for example, the claim that affirmative action policies for African Americans are justified “as a temporary measure that will eventually level the playing field and allow the old ‘blind’ rules to come back into force in a way that doesn’t disadvantage anyone”—and Taylor thinks the work “up to a point”.

Where they don’t work is when measures are put in place to “maintain and cherish distinctness” (say, of some cultural minority) “not just now but forever”. We’ll return to case of this kind later. But, for now, given that the two models diverge, Taylor directs us to consider “the underlying intuitions of value” that animate each. The politics of dignity is motivated by “the idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect” because based on a “capacity that all humans share”. Canonically, “our status as rational agents” has been singled out, though there are problems with this justification.

The politics of difference, while it has “a universal potential as its basis, namely, the potential for forming and defining one’s own identity” departs significantly from the former, for it demands (at least recently) “that one accord equal respect to actually evolved cultures”. That is, it demands that whatever a cultural produces, it ought to be accorded equal value. The dialectic between the two thus runs as follows: the politics of dignity requires, it is thought, that we treat people in a difference-blind manner. For the politics of difference, we ought to recognize and foster particularity. The former reproaches the latter for violating the principle of nondiscrimination. The latter reproaches the former, not only by claiming that it “negates identity” but – and this is crucial –by claiming that “the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles...is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture”. In short, it charges the politics of dignity with “imposing a false homogeneity”. Having laid out the dialectic, Taylor then moves to assess the merits of the various charges.

## **The Politics of Dignity and Liberalism**

The “standard-bearers” of politics of dignity are Kant’s and Rousseau’s accounts. Taylor examines these accounts in order to determine “to what extent they are guilty of...imposing a false homoge-

neity" (44).

## **Rousseau**

Rousseau "begins to think out the importance of equal respect". Rousseau was concerned about individual's "other-dependence" because he thought it made people "slaves to 'opinion'". He was particularly concerned about honor, which was "a positional good" linked to one's social rank (Ibid). But he does not do away the notion of opinion and its important entirely. Rather, he thinks "esteem" – when placed in circumstances of reciprocity, plays an important role in his thought. The remedy to the system of honor is "entering into a quite different system, characterized by equality, reciprocity and unity of purpose". Under this system, "all virtuous citizens are equally honored".

Taylor thinks Rousseau's solution here is "crucially flawed", for links esteem to a "unity of purpose" (in the general will) that is "incompatible with any differentiation". Because all citizens have to be at one in the general will, when opinions and conceptions of the good diverge, the model breaks down.

## **Liberalism**

Thus, if Rousseau's model doesn't work, we might ask whether the Kantian model fares better. These models "simply look to an equality of rights accorded to citizens". Yet this model, too, has been criticized for failing to "give due acknowledgment to distinctness. Taylor then distinguishes two forms of liberalism: a "restrictive view", which can indeed only give limited acknowledgment to distinctness, and an "alternative view", which Taylor will later defend. He discusses both issues "in the contest of the Canadian case", so it is best to outline the case first.

## **The Canadian Case—Two Models of Liberalism**

Taylor's discussion centers on the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights, which sought to work out how a political system of equal rights and judicial review. In particular, the Charter (1) "defines a set of individual rights" and (2) "guarantees [citizens] equal treatment" of citizens and protects them against discrimination. The issue arose, in discussions of the Charter, about how to balance these aims with the claims of distinctness put forward by Quebecers and aboriginal peoples. Of particular interest was whether the laws Quebec passed regarding were compatible with the aims of the charter. These laws (1) regulated who can send their children to English-language schools (not francophones), and (2) required that businesses of over fifty be run in French. Their aim was to ensure the "collective survival" of French Quebecers, which was enshrined in the "distinct society clause" in the proposed "Meech amendment" to the Charter.

The amendment and the corresponding laws were accused of (1) enshrining collective goals that require violations of individuals rights (the right to decide which school to send your child to, and (2) the provisions were thought of as inherently discriminatory because they favored French-speakers over others. Put philosophically (in Dworkin's language), the Meech amendment was charged with (contra to what liberalism requires), taking an interest in the "substantive" ends of life, as opposed to the merely "procedural" mechanisms for dealing with one another (which traditional liberal rights are thought to represent). Given the diversity of substantive norms in modern society, anything more than the procedural norms might be thought to favor one group over another and thus be unfair. This objection is based on the view that "human dignity largely consists in autonomy"—the ability of each to determine her own conception of the good— and the Quebec model violates this norm by placing collective goals in the citizen in trying to "create members of the community" who will be future French speakers. The Quebec model just violates the "restrictive

tive view” of liberalism mentioned earlier.

Taylor accuses this model of liberalism – which (a) insists on uniform rights across the board, and (b) is suspicious of collective goals – of being guilty of being unable to accommodate difference because it cannot accommodate “what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is survival”.

But, he thinks, there is an alternative form of liberalism which fares better. As a matter of fact, Quebeckers tended to put forward a different conception of liberalism. On this view, a liberal society may be “organized around a definition of the good life” but what defines a liberal society is “the way in which it treats minorities”—that is, those who do not share this view. A liberal society accords, not a bare liberty right to its members, but a certain set of fundamental rights: e.g. to life, liberty, free speech, and so on. A liberal society must give these rights equally to all, but it can nevertheless provide some with “privileges and immunities” provided to certain groups that are less fundamental.

### **In short, on this alternative model:**

Liberalism does “call for the invariant defense of certain rights...but [...] distinguish[es] these fundamental rights from the broad range of immunities and presumptions of uniform treatment that have sprung up in modern cultures of judicial review. [This form of liberalism is] willing to weigh the importance of certain forms of uniform treatment against the importance of cultural survival, and [to] opt sometimes in favor of the latter.” Taylor “endorse[s] this kind of model”, and thinks it can be “cleared of the charge of homogenizing difference”.

### **The Charge Reconsidered**

But, Taylor thinks “there is another way of formulating the charge that is harder to rebut” (61). The charge here is that, despite liberalism’s claim to offering “a neutral ground on which people of all cultures can meet and coexist”, liberalism in fact “is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures”. Rather, it is “the political expression of one range of cultures” – certain Western ones, and perhaps many others—but it is “incompatible with other ranges”—certain Muslim societies and cultures, perhaps.

The charge, Taylor thinks is disturbing; but Taylor thinks this charge ought not to be an indictment of liberalism. Indeed, it is true that “liberalism can’t and shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality” (62). It is not compatible with all cultures. But, if this is true, what sort of reply should liberals make to non-liberal citizens living in liberal polities? These people often demand that liberals “recognize the equal value of different cultures” (64), not just the equal value of different people in those cultures.

But this, Taylor thinks, is false. We do (perhaps) owe all cultures a “presumption” of equal worth – that is, we should work from the starting hypothesis that all actually existing cultures produce ideas and works of value—“the validity of the claim has to be demonstrated concretely in the actual study of the culture”. This kind of presumption is a way to combat making unjustified judgments about other cultures and avoiding arrogance .

But, for all that, we are not obligated to make the stronger judgment that all actual cultures—and all the ideas in each—are of equal worth. Making that claim is false, and demands for recognition based upon it need not be acknowledged.

## **Will Kymlicka; conception of Minority Rights Introduction**

Today the issue of minority rights is a debating point for many nation-states. It often throws challenges to liberal democratic governments. On one hand communitarian thinkers are critical about liberal theory for its emphasis on individualism. In the wake of identity politics, demands for rights of specific social group/community have not only got currency but have its moral legitimacy on different grounds. Especially the rights of recognition for ethnic, cultural, social, linguistic, religious minorities located in a nation state require a different kind of political and philosophical articulation against the existing political practices and theories. The liberal theory is one such grand political theory based on the principles of individualism, egalitarianism and universalism, has been adopted by the nation states of the world in one form or other. Individualism and individual rights are often viewed as the defining characteristic of liberalism. The liberalism has often been criticized for being excessively individualistic and for not recognizing group rights. The liberal theory is under attack from different fronts such as communitarians, Marxists, feminists and post modernists on different grounds. The autonomy and freedom/rights of the individual have taken a new turn in the context of demands for collective rights. Especially, the struggles of new social movements and claims of ethnic groups, immigrant groups, indigenous and aboriginal groups both in the West and Postcolonial nations have compelled them to reformulate the existing principles of governance.

In recent times, Will Kymlicka, the Canadian philosopher addresses minority rights as group specific rights in multicultural societies in the backdrop of liberal and communitarian debates. He made an attempt to accommodate criticisms against liberal democratic theory by developing a liberal conception of multiculturalism. Kymlicka argues for the cultural specific rights of the minorities rather the rights given or allowed by the liberal state in general. He viewed that it is important to strengthen and to provide protection for the societal culture of the minority groups. The liberal theory has a different context and meaning in India. The postcolonial nation state has addressed the problem of social and religious minorities in its own way against the wish of Hindu majoritarianism. Ambedkar, the Indian philosopher argued for the rights of social minorities by reformulating the liberal theory in his own way to suit the Indian context. This paper is an attempt to revisit Ambedkar's conception of rights of social minorities (dalits) in the light of Kymlicka's conception of minority rights in western liberal multiculturalism.

## **Kymlicka's Conception of Minority Rights**

Will Kymlicka is a contemporary Canadian philosopher known for his contribution to the theoretical understanding of minority rights in contemporary times. In political theory, his works are largely identified with the liberal tradition and had a systematic attempt to defend and expand the liberal view of rights, and the individual and society. His work *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* deals about issues of citizenship and multiculturalism for the federal government by responding to communitarians regarding cultural membership. (Kymlicka 1985). He argues against the popular conception of liberalism as commonly interpreted. The common conception of liberalism is that it gives no independent weight to our cultural membership, and hence demands equal rights of citizenship, regardless of the consequences for the existence of minority cultures. Against this view, he reinterprets the liberal tradition, to show that a respect for minority rights is indeed compatible with liberal equality: Post-war liberal clichés need to be rethought, for they misrepresent the issue, and the liberal tradition itself (Kymlicka 1985:152).

His arguments are further elaborated in *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority*

Rights which theoretically deals with the nexus between individual and society/culture and implied meanings of freedom, liberty and good life by discussing the issues related to aboriginal peoples, Quebec, immigrant groups, and multiculturalism. The debate is centered on the adequacy of the liberal model to deal with group rights (Kymlicka 1995). This has its importance in the context of racial, cultural and ethnic conflicts and social movements focusing on identity and rights. In *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka staunchly adheres to his long-standing claim that cultural membership must be brought within the locus of liberal justice. He had refashioned the liberal democratic theory in his own way. Will Kymlicka's *Multicultural Odysseys* is an impressive evaluation of the effort to deploy liberal multiculturalism as a model for addressing ethnic and racial hierarchies in Western democracies, post-communist states and post-colonial states (Kymlicka 2007). He proposes liberal multiculturalism in the context of fear of spread of ethnic violence after collapse of communism and postcolonial democracies. He hoped for the possibility of a viable liberal-democratic form of multiculturalism by approaching norms and minority rights such as publicizing best practices, devising minimum legal, liberal norms and formulating case specific solutions. Will Kymlicka argues for minority rights within the tradition of liberalism. In general, liberalism looks on the individual as autonomous and able to act. The liberal theory emphasizes individual freedom. As a political philosophy, liberalism has often been seen as primarily concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state, and with limiting state intrusions on the liberties of citizens. That is, the liberal model is often considered to be concerned exclusively with individual rights.

All rights adhere to the individual, and liberalism has often been criticized for being excessively individualistic. Individualism and individual rights are often viewed as the defining characteristic of liberalism, so that there are minimal or no group rights that are part of collectivities. Against this opinion, Kymlicka argues that liberalism also contains a broader account of the relationship between the individual and society - and, in particular, of the individual's membership in a community and a culture (Kymlicka 1985:1). He argues that group rights are part of liberal thought. Group rights can be viewed as admissible within liberalism and even necessary for freedom and equality. For Kymlicka these are not temporary rights, but are rights that should be recognized on a permanent basis, because these are inherent rights of the national minority. He explained how minority rights relate to the broad political values such as freedom, equality, democracy and citizenship and broader normative frameworks such as liberalism, communitarianism and republicanism. Kymlicka's idea of cultural embeddedness of the individual creates theoretical space for cultural rights, thereby making liberalism hospitable to the moral imperatives of cultural pluralism.

In dealing with minority rights, Kymlicka distinguishes two types of ethno-cultural groups: National minorities in multinational states and Ethnic groups in polyethnic states. National minorities arise from the voluntary or involuntary incorporation of an entire nation, whereas ethnic minorities arise from individual and familial immigration from different nations. Kymlicka argues that immigrant groups are generally ethnic groups, and can be accorded what he calls polyethnic rights in a polyethnic state. National minorities are groups that have in common some or all of history, community, territory, language, or culture. Each of these is sometimes referred to as a nation, people, or culture. Each of these may have become a minority involuntarily through conquest, colonization, or expansion, or it could have voluntarily agreed to enter a federation with one or more other nations, peoples, or cultures. Kymlicka defines national minorities in terms of culture, and argues that if these minorities wish to retain their cultures, they should be recognized as distinct. The group rights that may be associated with national minorities are self-government rights or special representation rights. For Kymlicka these are not temporary rights, but are rights that should be recog-

nized on a permanent basis, because these are inherent rights of the national minority. Although Kymlicka argues that national minorities and ethnic groups both make legitimate claims for minority rights, his most interesting line of argument relates to national minorities. The central justification proceeds in two stages. First, he argues that individual autonomy "is dependent on the presence of a societal culture, defined by language and history, and that most people have a very strong bond to their own culture." The second stage of the argument holds that liberal justice "is not only consistent with, but even requires, a concern with cultural membership." Minority rights can thus be justified not just by a claim but as the rights of these groups. As it is forcefully argued by Kymlicka: [I]t is ... unjust to individuals to say that those who belong to dominant groups can enjoy the attendant advantages and satisfactions, whereas those who belong to non dominant and minority groups must either abandon their culture or accept second-class status. It is not enough for political theorists to contemplate simply the individual and society, or relationships between man and the state. It is time for them to contemplate mankind in its great variety." Insofar as they ensure that the (collective) good of cultural membership is equally protected for the members of cultural minorities and majorities alike. Without such rights, minority members do not have "the same opportunity to live and work in their own culture as members of the majority" (Kymlicka 1995).

Kymlicka argues for minority rights based on his assumption of societal cultures. In *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, the importance of cultural membership was ascribed to a "cultural community" or "cultural structure." In *Multicultural Citizenship*, the focus changes to "societal cultures." The particular culture that it discusses is societal culture, the history, traditions, and conventions that go along with the society, and the set of social practices and institutions that are associated with the societal culture. For Kymlicka, a societal culture is "a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres." Like nations, societal cultures are typically territorially based and grounded on a common language. Societal cultures thus provide "the everyday vocabulary of social life" which, in the modern world, means they "must be institutionally embodied—in schools, media, economy, government, etc." In essence, then, the societal culture is one that can, in a modern sense, be lived within not in the sense that it is wholly independent, but because it provides a full range of options for a fulfilling human life (Kymlicka 1995).

Kymlicka put forward his idea of minority rights by relating to the specific nature of societal culture. Culture of origin provides a basic resource for people, and integration into a new culture is difficult for people. In these circumstances, it may be important to strengthen the culture and provide protections for various minority groups. But note that this leads in quite different directions for national minorities than for immigrant ethnic groups. The latter generally wish to integrate, the protections may not need be permanent, and are often fairly limited. For national minorities, the argument may lead in the direction of strengthening their societal culture, as a permanent feature, with extensive self-government rights. Kymlicka does not argue for self-government rights for ethnic groups. According to Kymlicka, ethnic groups also have a legitimate claim to minority rights. More specifically, they have a claim to "polyethnic rights," which ensure that they are incorporated into the dominant culture on fair terms, enabling ethnic groups and religious minorities "to express their cultural particularity and pride." Not only should common rights of citizenship be more strictly enforced to eliminate all forms of discrimination and prejudice, but some group-specific rights should also be justified. Further Kymlicka defends group rights as a move towards equality. The equality argument considers that some minority rights actually increase equality, and that true

equality requires different treatment for different groups. To protect these rights of culturally disadvantaged groups, state could not be culturally neutral.

### **Indian liberal democracy: Negotiating the Individual as well as Group Rights**

As Rajeev Bhargava rightly pointed out that for all talk of pluralism and multiculturalism in western political theory, a mention of how these issues arise or are tackled in places such as India is barely mentioned. Worse, political philosophers still show little curiosity about the experience of non-western societies. Further he argues that Indian experience of plurality and affirmative action has a long history and is even older than many western countries. The debates around group rights, self-determination, differentiated citizenship, gendered equality, secularism and constitutionalism are considerably enriched by the Indian experience (Bhargava 2010:58). However, Kymlicka's concerns for minority rights in the multicultural set up of western societies indirectly facilitate the need to recognize rights of oppressed social groups in India. Will Kymlicka's conception of minority rights have different context and different meanings across nations. In European nations, with the struggles of indigenous groups, immigrants, ethnic and other religious groups the debate of minority rights got its importance. There are efforts from the nation states to accommodate these groups in multicultural set up. In Indian context, the conception of minority rights had different meanings. The pluralistic nature of society and its specific historical conditions provide new meaning to the minority as explained in the case of western societies. Indian state is not typically liberal as most of the western states. As Manoranjan Mohanty explains, the rights in Indian constitution are neither individualist in nature in the strict sense of classical liberal theory nor collective in an idealistic sense (Mohanty 2001: 1-13). In the same line Thomas Pantham considers Indian constitutional framework can be appropriately referred to as communitarian-liberal democracy; it is liberal in the sense that in some respects it takes the individual to be prior to the community, and it is communitarian in that in some respects it takes the community to be prior to the individual (Pantham 1995:171).

Gurpreet Mahajan explains how the Indian state considers both the rights of the individual and a group. By focusing on the cultural policies of the state and devising ways by which cultural communities receive equal consideration in the public realm, the Indian constitution deviated from the liberal framework. While it accepted and endorsed the twin ideals of autonomy and non-discrimination, it acted on the assumption that equal treatment to all religious and cultural communities could not be ensured by providing equal political rights or civil liberties to individuals. Consequently the Indian constitution devised a two fold policy. On the one hand it tried to ensure that no community is out rightly excluded or systematically disadvantaged in the public arena, and on the other, it provided autonomy to each religious community to pursue its own way of life (Mahajan 1998: 4). She argues that if individual rights by themselves provide little protection against forces of cultural homogenization, then accommodating diversity through special consideration for vulnerable groups also neglects the primary concerns of individuals as citizens. It is only when both sets of concerns are suitably addressed that democracy is deepened and multicultural polities are nurtured and made more sustainable (Mahajan 2006: 122).

In contemporary times, Will Kymlicka's conception of minority rights renewed the debate of individual versus group rights and argues for reformulation of political theory in the context of multiculturalism. India had its own historical tradition in accommodating the rights of individuals and community. In post independent India, its constitution too ensures the rights of individuals and communities in a broad liberal democratic framework. But the demands for special provisions/rights of oppressed communities, religious and ethnic minorities often came up for debate

with the assertion of these communities. The majoritarian and privileged communities are forcefully negating the claims of these groups in the name of equality or uniformity as informed by liberalism. The complexity of Indian situation in this regard was not theorized properly. Will Kymlicka's claim of minority rights within the liberal context in the west may facilitate to revisit the Indian situation through the political philosophy of Ambedkar. Ambedkar provides the framework for minority rights prior to the initiation of Will Kymlicka. Ambedkar has not only pointed out the weak foundation of liberalism of the West but also recognized the specificity of the Indian context in adopting the liberal wisdom. The way he negotiated individual versus group rights and political theories of liberalism, Marxism, communitarianism enriches our approaches to political theory. His notion of individual, community and religion is strikingly different from that of others in ensuring reason, justice and ultimately a moral community. Ambedkar's conception of rights for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (Dalit rights) as minority rights provides a different kind of framework to understand individual/group rights debated by liberalism and communitarianism. He treats dalits as a minority in majoritarian hindu society. Dalit rights are viewed as group specific rights for dignity, self-respect and development in all fields of life for realization of fuller human beings. He further maintains that state has to play an interventionist role to protect the rights of dalits rather than being neutral.

### **Ambedkar: Dalit Rights as Minority Rights**

Ambedkar argues for dalit rights in the context where dalits have no rights other than submitting to the majority hindus. He puts a first condition to place depressed classes under a majority rule in self-governing India : The depressed classes must be made free citizens entitled to all the rights of citizenship in common with other citizens of the state (Rodrigues 2002:369). He articulated dalit rights in the name of rights for untouchables, depressed classes, scheduled castes and tribes in a given historical context. There is no doubt that Ambedkar was inspired by the ideals of equality, freedom and democracy prompted by liberalism. He finds the resources for these ideals in Indian tradition. Equality and freedom are treated as core values of liberalism. Ambedkar supplies content to the equality. In the west, the idea of equality is addressed in a limited sense and mostly confined to political equality and is silent about economic equality. He extended the idea of equality to social and economic realms. He argues for equality in the context of a caste ridden society which is based on graded inequality. He argues for the equality of untouchable communities in terms of dignity and self-respect. In principle he argues for one man, one value and equality before law in a hierarchical society. At the same time he demands for special considerations for certain groups based on disadvantages, disability, subordination, oppression and injustice. As Valerian Rodrigues observed Ambedkar was the first major theoretician in India who argued that consideration for the disadvantaged should be the constitutive basis of the state. He developed a complex set of criteria to determine the disadvantage and attempted to specify its various gradations. Untouchability was one such socially engendered disadvantage in case of dalits. He further argues for a need for a system of safeguards for the disadvantaged in general and untouchables in particular (Rodrigues 2002:36). Ambedkar observed that the rights guaranteed by the state is not enough to protect the rights of dalits but also requires social and moral conscience to protect laws. Ambedkar holds a position that which is permitted by society to be exercised can alone be called a right. The right which is guaranteed by law but opposed by society is of no use at all. The untouchables are in more need of social liberty than that which is guaranteed by law (Pritchett 1988).

In addressing the rights of dalits, Ambedkar poses dalits as a minority social community. Ambedkar in *States and Minorities* (1947) explains the rights of minorities and argued for the

mechanism for these rights to be secured in the constitution of free India. Ambedkar's conception of minority goes in the line of Kymlicka, to a certain extent. He differentiates minorities into two categories, religious minorities and social minorities. He treats Dalits as a social minority and provides a broader framework for dalit rights. He addressed dalit rights within the framework of liberal philosophical tradition, but differs from the way it is introduced in the western liberal tradition. In States and Minorities he argues for dalit rights by considering them as cultural minorities against a hindu majority. He was of the view that minorities – Muslims, Dalits, Anglo-Indians or Sikhs in the Indian context – ought to have greater representation in a legislative body than their actual share in the population if the minority were not to be 'crushed and overwhelmed by the communal majority.' He considers dalits too as a minority at par with other minorities such as religious minorities, Muslims, and Sikhs. This has to be read in the context where the Muslims, Sikhs are recognized and represented by the state as a minority but failed to take note of dalits as a distinct social group from hindus. Even Gandhi strongly views dalits as a part of Hinduism and argues against any attempt to consider dalits as a specific community. In his theoretical framework, Ambedkar not only projects dalits as a minority but also demands the state to ensure special rights for dalits. He proposed that Scheduled Castes (dalits) have to get benefit of fundamental rights of citizens, all the benefit of the provisions for the protection of minorities and in addition, special safeguards.

Ambedkar defines and differentiates fundamental rights, minority rights and safeguards for the scheduled castes. He counters the various views on whether to consider scheduled castes as minorities or not. Ambedkar argued that scheduled castes are a minority in a hindu majoritarian society. And at the same time he differentiates them from other religious minorities and demands special safeguards for the scheduled castes. Ambedkar believed that rights are real if they are accompanied by remedies. It is no use giving rights if the aggrieved person has no legal remedy to which he can resort when his rights are invaded. Consequently when the constitution guarantees rights it also becomes necessary to make provisions to prevent the legislature and the executive from overriding them (Ambedkar 1989:406). Ambedkar had the opinion that fundamental rights have no meaning unless until state protects the weak, and the marginalized. In the hindu social order, dalits are often discriminated in everyday life experiences, both in private and in public. Ambedkar argues that discrimination is another menace which must be guarded against if the fundamental rights are to be real rights. In a country like India where it is possible for discrimination to be practiced on a vast scale and in a relentless manner fundamental rights can have no meaning. The remedy follows the lines adopted in the bill which was recently introduced in the congress of USA, the aim of which is to prevent discrimination being practiced against the blacks (Ambedkar 1989:408).

Effective representation for minorities depends upon its being large enough to give the minority the sense of not being entirely overwhelmed by the majority (Ambedkar 1989: 420). For effective representation he proposes separate electorates for the scheduled castes. Against this demand it is argued by the critics that the scheduled castes are not minorities and are Hindus. And separate electorates will perpetuate untouchability and anti-national feelings. Ambedkar replies that to say the scheduled castes are not a minority is to misunderstand the meaning of the word 'minority'. Separation in religion is not the only test of a minority. Nor is it a good and efficient test. Social discrimination constitutes the real test for determining whether a social group is or is not a majority. Even Gandhi thought it logical and practical to adopt this. On the question of scheduled castes being hindus, he counters, to make religious affiliation the determining factor for constitutional safeguards is to overlook the fact that the religious affiliation may be accompanied by an

intense degree of social separation and discrimination. In this connection he argued that muslims are given separate electorates not because they are different from hindus in point of religion. Precisely, it is because muslims are marked by social discrimination (Ambedkar 1989:422). He further argued that it is baseless to say that separate electorates for untouchables will perpetuate separation between them and hindus.

Ambedkar argues that to insist separate electorates create anti-national spirit is contrary to experience. Nationalism and anti-nationalism have nothing to do with the electoral system. They are the result of extra-electoral forces.

Ambedkar points out the advantages and privileges enjoyed by the majority community of the nation against its minorities. The majority's opinions are considered as normal, secular and legitimate whereas opinions of minorities are viewed as negative, illegitimate, anti-national, narrow, communal and religious. By observing this Ambedkar argues for rights of minorities. As he says no country which has the problem of communal majority and communal minority is without some kind of an arrangement whereby they agree to share political powers. He provides South Africa and Canada as examples. Unfortunately for minorities in India, Indian nationalism has developed a new doctrine which may be called the Divine right of the majority to rule the minorities according to the wishes of the majority. Any claim for the sharing of power by the minority is called communalism while the monopolizing of power by the majority is called nationalism. Guided by such political philosophy the majority is not prepared to allow the minorities to share political power. Under these circumstances there is no way left but to have the rights of the scheduled castes embodied in the constitution (Ambedkar 1989:427-428).

Ambedkar concludes that whether scheduled castes are a minority or not has become a matter of controversy. However, the scheduled castes are in a worst position as compared to any other minority in India. As such they required and deserve much more protection than any other minority does. The least one can do is to treat them as minority (Ambedkar 1989: 428).

Ambedkar foresees the connection between rights, social order and economic structure. The purpose is to protect the liberty of the individual from invasion by other individuals which is the object of enacting fundamental rights. The connection between individual liberty and the shape and form of the economic structure of society may not be apparent to every one. Nonetheless the connection between the two is real. There is no economic independence for the untouchables so long as they live in a ghetto as a dependent part of the hindu village. Ambedkar further points out that the majoritarian hindu religion as a code of life gives hindus many privileges and heaps upon the untouchables many indignities which are incompatible with the dignity and sanctity of human life (Ambedkar 1989: 426). Ambedkar's conception of minority rights is very much connected with equality that goes against the unjust social order and oppression ascribed in the name of religion. In other words, his emphasis on recognition of difference or arguing for special provisions for dalits in legislature, education and opportunities is very much internalized in the spirit of liberalism but adapted in the specific context of the Indian nation.

### **Liberal Democracy, Dalit Rights and Moral Theory**

On the issue of recognizing minority rights the liberal theory is facing challenges in contemporary times. The individual autonomy and obligations are incompatible to each other in the liberal framework. There are several attempts to resolve these tensions in contemporary political theory.

This surfaces as the liberal and communitarian debate and individual versus group rights. Moral theory played a critical role in evaluating the merit of each claim. In the West, Kymlicka made an attempt to accommodate the group rights such as minority rights within liberalism. It is confined to cultural rights. In non-western nations such as India, the recognition of group based or community rights has its established tradition in a pluralistic society. Ambedkar provides deeper meaning for minority rights as a move towards equality and social justice in a liberal democracy.

In maintaining that this is a liberal theory of minority rights, Kymlicka is unambiguous in his commitment to "moral individualism"—the belief that what matters most from the moral point of view is the individual person (Mc Donald 1997:306). However, it should be emphasized that Kymlicka does not accept "ontological individualism," a version of individualism often associated with liberalism. Ontological individualists insist that human beings exhaust our understanding of social reality. At one level, moral individualism is little more than the acceptance of the view that our evaluative judgments are ultimately based upon what contributes to the quality of human life. As such, this position is not a complete moral theory in itself, but is "a necessary condition for the acceptability of moral theories." Thus, perhaps what makes Kymlicka's defence of minority rights distinctively liberal is that they are endorsed only "in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of individuals." Chandran Kukathas considers Kymlicka's theory seems both to grant cultural minorities too much recognition and to give them too little. It gives them too much insofar as liberal equality does not appear to sanction special rights, and it gives them too little insofar as regarding choice or autonomy as the fundamental liberal commitment disregards the interests of cultural communities which do not value the individual's freedom to choose. If so, then it cannot mount a serious liberal challenge to the individualist view (Kukathas 1992:105-139).

On the other hand, Ambedkar's conception of democracy and the rights of minorities or dalits are different from the West. Ambedkar observed the failure of parliamentary democracy associated with liberalism in the West. He considers that the reason for discontent is due to the realization that it has failed to assure to the masses the right to liberty, property or the pursuit of happiness. The causes for this failure may be found either in wrong ideology or wrong organization or in both. He points out that parliamentary democracy in standing out as a protagonist of liberty has continuously added to economic wrongs of the poor, downtrodden and disinherited class. The wrong ideology which has vitiated parliamentary democracy is the failure to realize that political democracy cannot succeed where there is no social and economic democracy (Roudrigues 2002:62). As Ambedkar argues, social and economic democracy are the tissues and fibre of a political democracy. The tougher the tissue and fiber, the greater the strength of the body.

He further argues that parliamentary democracy developed a passion for liberty. It never made even a nodding acquaintance with equality. It failed to realize the significance of equality and did not even strike a balance between liberty and equality, with the result that liberty swallowed equality and has made democracy a name and farce. Ambedkar accused the western writers that they are superficial and not provided a realistic view of democracy. Ambedkar proposed a written constitution for effective democracy. The habits of constitutional morality may be essential for the maintenance of a constitutional form of government. He puts more emphasis on moral society and its custom than the written legal law in governing people. He heavily invested in social morality for effective functioning of democratic form of government. The framework for Dalit rights has to be viewed in this moral framework and progressive liberalism. Ambedkar is critical about cultural practices which are oppressive, exploitative and inherently violent by using critical reason. He is critical about hindu community which is not recognizing the individual worth and capabilities. At

the same time he proposes a moral community based on the principles of equality, liberty and fraternity. He believes that individuals make sense of their identity in a moral community and proposes reflexive individualism. Individual autonomy and identity are compatible in the normative political framework of Ambedkar.

## **Conclusion**

This is to conclude that Ambedkar's conception of minority rights shares with Kymlicka that minority groups have their own rights and it is the duty of the state to protect the rights rather than being neutral. Kymlicka explores minority rights within the western liberal tradition. In arguing for minority rights, he puts more emphasis on cultural rights of minorities. Ambedkar revised liberalism in the Indian context. In other words, he mediates both liberal and communitarian traditions. He recognizes the individual merit which is negated by the hindu social order and the need to protect the rights of the oppressed groups from the majoritarian hegemony. His conception of dalit rights has evolved from utter helplessness, humiliation, discrimination and exploitation of oppressed community by the dominant caste hindu community. Unlike Kymlicka's minority rights which are more inclined for cultural rights, Ambedkar's conceptions of cultural rights of minority/dalits are very much linked with social and economic equality along with political equality. He substantiates the value of equality and freedom. His conception of minority rights goes beyond western liberalism and offers one kind of liberal and democratic multiculturalism evolved from Indian experience. This may provide fresh insight to revisit the liberal and communitarian debate with reference to individual and group rights.

## **Feminism**

Feminism is a complex set of ideologies and theories, that at its core seeks to achieve equal social, political, and economic rights for women and men. Feminism refers to a diverse variety of beliefs, ideas, movements, and agendas for action. It refers to any actions, especially organized, that promote changes in society to end patterns that have disadvantaged women.

### **The Origin of the Word "Feminism"**

While it is common to see the word "feminist" used for figures such as Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797), the terms feminist and feminism were not used in the modern sense until a century after her 1792 book "A Vindication of the Rights of Women" was published. The term first appeared during the 1870s in France as *féminisme*—although there has been some speculation that it may have been used before then. At the time, the word referred to women's freedom or emancipation. In 1882, Hubertine Auclert, a leading French feminist and a campaigner for women's suffrage, used the term *féministe* to describe herself and others working for women's freedom. In 1892, a congress in Paris was described as "feminist." This launched a more widespread adoption of the term in the 1890s, with its use appearing in Great Britain and then America beginning about 1894.

### **Feminism and Society**

Almost all modern societal structures are patriarchal and are constructed in such a way that men are the dominant force in making the majority of political, economic, and cultural decisions. Feminism focuses on the idea that since women comprise one-half of the world population, true social progress can never be achieved without the complete and spontaneous participation of women. Feminist ideals and beliefs focus on what culture is like for women as compared to what the world is like for men. The feminist assumption is that women are not treated equally to men and as a result, women are disadvantaged in comparison to men.

Feminist ideology considers in which ways culture can and should be different between genders: Do different genders have different goals, ideals, and visions? There's a great deal of value placed on the importance of moving from point A (the status quo) to point B (female equality) through a statement of commitment to behavior and action to produce that change.

## **Feminism and Sexuality**

One arena in which women have long been oppressed is with regard to sexuality, which includes behavior, interactions with men, posture, and exposure of the body. In traditional societies, men are expected to be the commanders, standing tall and allowing their physical presence to represent their role in society, while women are expected to be quieter and more subservient. Under such societal conventions, women are not supposed to take up much space at the table, and most certainly, they should not be seen as a distraction to the men around them. Feminism seeks to embrace female sexuality and celebrate it, as opposed to so many societal conventions that condemn women who are sexually aware and empowered. The practice of elevating sexually active men while denigrating sexually women creates a double standard between the genders. Women are shunned for having multiple sexual partners, whereas men are celebrated for the same behaviors. Women have long been subjected to sexual objectification by men. Many cultures still cling to the notion that women must dress so as to not arouse men, and in many societies, women are required to fully cover their bodies.

On the other hand, in some so-called enlightened societies, female sexuality is routinely exploited in the mass media. Scantly clad women in advertising and full nudity in movies and television are commonplace—and yet, many women are shamed for breastfeeding in public. These conflicting views on female sexuality create a confusing landscape of expectations that women and men must navigate on a daily basis.

## **Feminism in the Workforce**

There are many differences within the constellation of feminist ideals, groups, and movements related to workplace unfairness, discrimination, and oppression that result from the real disadvantages women experience. Feminism assumes that sexism, which disadvantages and/or oppresses those identified as women, is not desirable and should be eliminated, however, it continues to be an issue in the workplace.

Unequal salaries are still pervasive in the workforce. Despite the Equal Pay Act of 1963, on average, a woman still earns only 80.5 cents for every dollar a man earns. According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, women's median annual earnings in 2017 were \$14,910 less than that of their male counterparts.

## **What Feminism Is and What it Isn't**

There is a common misconception that feminists are reverse sexists, however, unlike male sexists who oppress women, feminists do not seek to oppress men. Rather, they seek equal compensation, opportunities, and treatment for both genders.

Feminism seeks to achieve equal treatment and opportunity for women and men in order to achieve similar opportunities across different fields of work and culture and equal respect in a variety of roles. Feminist theorists often explore the concepts with regard to which of women's experiences are taken as normative: Do women of different races, classes, age groups, etc. experience inequality in significantly different ways or is the common experience as women more im-

portant?

The goal of feminism is to create non-discrimination, which is essential for creating equality to ensure that no one is denied their rights due to factors such as race, gender, language, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, political or other beliefs, nationality, social origin, class, or wealth status.

## **Feminism: Patriarchy**

Patriarchy refers to a **society dominated by men** i.e. society, state and the economy are characterised by systematic, institutionalised and pervasive **gender oppression**.

In a literal sense, **patriarchy means rule by the father**. A patriarchal family is therefore dominated by the father with power transferred down the male line, whereas a **patriarchal society is based upon male dominance**.

All feminists are highly critical of how the various instruments of patriarchy impact adversely upon women. For example, feminists claim that marriage works in favour of the husband because he gains an unpaid servant to take care of both his conjugal needs and the upkeep of the home. The exploitation of women within a marriage reflects deeper structural inequalities within a male-dominated society.

As an ideology, feminism seeks to highlight the disastrous **impact of patriarchy upon women's lives**. They claim that the exploitation and subjugation of women occurs both within the private sphere and the public realm. The socialistfeminist Simone de Beauvoir argued that only man has the freedom to choose and set himself up as essential and subject. In contrast, women are both inessential and object. To address the problem, she advocated a family structure centred upon a balanced couple that displayed "equality in difference, and difference in equality." Eco-feminists such as Carolyn Merchant extend this critique of patriarchy towards the damage done by men to the environment, advocating a more maternal relationship with Mother Earth.

Patriarchal institutions and practices have to some extent been challenged in recent years via legislative measures and changing social attitudes. In the context of the former, workplaces who employ a specific number of employees are under a legal obligation to publish the pay gap between men and women. There are also laws to prevent sexual discrimination in the workplace with employers liable if found guilty. Cases are often heard in employment tribunals in which grievances may be resolved. In terms of the latter, there is also a greater level of sensitivity towards sexist attitudes in the public sphere.

Having said this, patriarchy has shown itself able to reproduce itself from one generation to the next. Sexist attitudes within the classroom, the workplace, the boardroom and those expressed online continue to blight the lives of many females. Sexism is one of the most significant barriers towards fulfilling life chances, and one that many women (and men) would readily identify in their everyday lives. To address the problem of misogyny, liberal feminists advocate a constructive engagement with the political process. In contrast, radical feminists believe that the conventional approach is characterised by sluggish progress towards gender equality. The eradication of a system based upon systematic and institutionalised gender oppression thereby demands a more militant approach.

## **Misogyny, feminism, and sexual harassment**

The term “misogyny” is derived from the Ancient Greek word “mīsoḡunīā” which means hatred towards women. Misogyny has taken shape in multiple forms such as male privilege, patriarchy, gender discrimination, sexual harassment, belittling of women, violence against women, and sexual objectification. The roots of misogyny can be traced back to ancient Greek mythology. According to Hesiod before women came into existence, men were coexisting peacefully as companions to Gods until Prometheus decided to steal the secret of fire from the God which angered Zeus. Zeus punished mankind with an evil thing for their delight called Pandora, the first woman who carried a box which unleashed all evils such as labor, sickness, old age, and death.

As mythology spilled its vices about women, every religion had their own viewpoint. Hinduism presents diverse view about the position of women and some text place women as the highest goddess and some restrict them to the role of a mother, daughter and wife, as described in Manusmriti. Tertullian, the father of Latin Christianity, said that being a female is a curse given by God and they are the Devil's Gateway.[3] In Islam, the holy book Quran has a 4<sup>th</sup> chapter called An-Nisa meaning Women. The 34<sup>th</sup> verse is a key verse in feminist criticism of Islam which reads: Men are in charge of women by [right of] what Allah has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient... But those [wives] from whom you fear arrogance-[ first] advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike them. But if they obey you [once more], seek no means against them.

Misogyny over years has evolved as an ideology which has engulfed the society as a smog which diminishes their site to aurora. Great philosophers, socialist, and thinkers of golden era were subdued by roars of male dominant society which narrowed their vision and made them a supporter of patriarchal society. Aristotle who was an ancient Greek philosopher and scientist was also a misogynist. He thought of women as a deformity, an incomplete male. He preached that men should always command and women should follow as they are the inferior being created by God. Misogyny at its front had male supporters, but over years, few females also supported the ideology as stated by Sociologist Michael Flood.

Over centuries, women have been suppressed, their rights were neglected as a human being, they were treated as an lower part of the society, and their roles were restricted to household chores and birthing. Prolonged oppression raised many voices and collectively led to a concept of feminism which started the longest movement in history which still continues.

Feminism is a gamut of socio political movements and ideologies that share a common goal to delineate, establish, and achieve political, economic, personal, and social equality of sexes. Feminist movements over decades have campaigned for rights of women, including the right to vote, to hold public office, to work, to earn fair wages or equal pay, to own property, to receive education, to enter contracts, to have equal rights within marriage, and to have maternity leave. Feminists have also worked to promote bodily autonomy and integrity and to protect women and girls from brutal crimes such as rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence.

The modern feminist movement could be divided into four waves. Each wave dealt with different aspects of the same feminist issues. The first wave of feminism started with the “Women's suffrage movement” in 1848 in New York under the leadership of Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. The movement aimed at promoting women's right to vote. The second wave which started somewhere in 1960s campaigned for the legal and social equality for women, it included issues about their reproductive rights, legal inequalities, domestic violence, marital rape and di-

force law. The third wave which began in the 1990s dealt with issues such as sex positive feminism, intersectionality, transfeminism, vegetarian ecofeminism, and postmodern feminism. Sex-positive feminism or sexually liberal feminism, propagates the idea of sexual freedom being an essential component of women's freedom.

The term intersectionality was coined by civil rights advocate Kimberle Williams Crenshaw. This theory considers that various aspects of humanity such as class, race, sexual orientation, and gender are not separate, but are interwoven and their relationships are essential to an understanding of human conditions. It focused on abolishing gender role stereotypes and expanding feminism to include women of various culture. Transfeminism as defined by scholar and activist Emi Koyama constituted a movement for liberation of transwomen. Vegetarian ecofeminism postulates that all types of oppression, like casteism, racism and sexism, are associated with each other. It is a kind of inter human oppression. A major belief of ecofeminism is that there is a strong connection between the domination of women and the domination of nature, and that both must be eradicated in order to end oppression.

Postmodern feminism has two components, i.e., liberal feminism and radical feminism, the former being an individualistic form of feminist theory which focuses on women's ability to maintain their equality by uplifting themselves in the field of academics, and other domains by which they can make better decisions and attain equal political and legal rights. Radical feminism on the other hand demands drastic reordering of society in which male supremacy is eliminated in all social and economic contexts.

The fourth-wave feminism refers to a kind of feminism that began around 2012 which targets sexual harassment, campus sexual harassment, rape culture, workplace discrimination, body shaming, sexist imagery in the media, online misogyny, assault on public transport, and other type of harassment that is associated with the use of social media. The recent issues which were shocking and horrid like Nirbhaya Delhi Gang Rape, Harvey Weinstein allegations, and Bill Cosby allegations gave birth to campaigns like Everyday Sexism Project, No More Page 3, and the recent #Me-Too.

These issues had drawn significant focus and brought legal reforms in issues such as sexual harassment at workplace as many women are employed in private, government, or unorganized sectors. Sexual harassment constitutes a gross violation of human right and women's right to equality and dignity. It is illegal to harass a person because of their gender and sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature. Workplace sexual harassment, like other forms of violence, is not harmless. It involves serious health, human, and economic and social costs, which manifest themselves in the overall development indices of a nation. Its prevalence and the constant uproar brought legal actions like sexual harassment act 2012 to cease the silent menace.

It is commendable to note the progress made by the women over centuries and the fight will continue until the roots of misogyny is removed from the world. With the wave of liberalization as a part of globalization, it was expected that religious and conservative societies would become more gender sensitive and provide equal access to education and employment. However, in some places, these hopes have been belied, due to rise of religious fundamentalism. It is important to note that even "liberal" Christian societies are yet to attain complete gender equality, so one should not despair at tardy progress in our country. Without equal access to education, equal opportunity, and

economic emancipation, gender equality will remain a chimera.

## **Feminism: Sex and Gender**

The distinction between sex and gender is a highly pertinent one when seeking an understanding of feminist ideology. "**Sex**" reflects biological differences between men and women whereas "**gender**" refers to cultural and social distinctions. A consideration of the biological and cultural dimension casts light upon a major point of departure within feminist ideology. Whereas all feminists seek the emancipation of women from the shackles of a patriarchal society, there is considerable disagreement as to the proper means to secure that change.

Certain feminists emphasise the cultural dimension because they see that as the most appropriate means by which to enable women to benefit from empowerment. For them, the main source of female oppression is via the social construct of femininity because "**women are not born, they are made**" (Simone de Beauvoir). A fundamental change in our conception of gender is essential in order that women escape the confines of patriarchy and journey towards a more fulfilling life.

Essentialists however emphasise **biological differences** as they see it as more appropriate to the goals of the women's movement. They believe that women should rejoice in that which makes them biologically different to men (such as giving birth and the ability to breastfeed). These biological abilities are superior to anything a man could ever do. Either way, there is an underlying assumption that women are biologically superior. On this basis, the psychologist Carol Gilligan claims that women adopt a fundamentally different and superior moral psychology to their male counterparts. Under patriarchy, women are under pressure to achieve an unrealistic goal that means suppression of the true self.

Another leading exponent of the essentialist argument is Mary Daly. She claims that women should be proud of the biological differences between women and men (namely motherhood). Rather than adopting an androgynous ideal advocated by socialist and equality feminists, women should seek a woman-only culture untainted by a patriarchal construction of femininity; thereby enabling women to express their "lusty selves". Post-modern feminists also seek to facilitate women's voyage of self-discovery, thereby allowing a level of separation from male-imposed identities (i.e. how the marital status of a woman is always a part of their formal identification). Rather than pursue gender equality, women must adopt a degree of **separateness** to experience true liberation from male oppression.

## **Liberal Feminism**

In 1983, Alison Jaggar published *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* where she defined four theories related to feminism:

Her analysis was not completely new; the varieties of feminism had begun to emerge as early as the 1960s. Jaggar's contribution was in clarifying, extending and solidifying the various definitions, which are still often used today.

## **Goals of Liberal Feminism**

Jaggar described liberal feminism as theory and work that concentrates more on issues such as equality in the workplace, in education, and in political rights. Liberal feminism also focuses on how private life impedes or enhances public equality.

Thus, liberal feminists tend to support marriage as an equal partnership, and more male involve-

ment in child care. Support for abortion and other reproductive rights have to do with control of one's life and autonomy. Ending domestic violence and sexual harassment remove obstacles to women achieving on an equal level with men.

Liberal feminism's primary goal is gender equality in the public sphere, such as equal access to education, equal pay, ending job sex segregation, and better working conditions. From this standpoint, legal changes would make these goals possible.

Private sphere issues are of concern mainly as they influence or impede equality in the public sphere. Gaining access to and being paid and promoted equally in traditionally male-dominated occupations is an important goal.

### **What do women want? Liberal feminists believe they want the same things men want:**

- to get an education
- to make a decent living
- to provide for one's family.

### **Means and Methods**

Liberal feminism tends to rely on the state to gain equality—to see the state as the protector of individual rights.

Liberal feminists, for example, support affirmative action legislation requiring employers and educational institutions to make special attempts to include women in the pool of applicants, on the assumption that past and current discrimination may simply overlook many qualified women applicants.

Passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) has been a key goal for liberal feminists. From the original women's suffrage proponents who moved to advocate a federal equality amendment to many of the feminists of the 1960s and 1970s in organizations including the National Organization for Women, each generation viewed the amendment as necessary to create a more just society. The amendment is one state shy of the 38 needed for passage, but ERA supporters in 2019 saw renewed hope as the 100th anniversary of women's suffrage approached.

A vote that could have made Virginia the 38th state to ratify the ERA missed by a single vote in early 2019. But the U.S. Supreme Court upheld new redistricting lines in the state later in 2019 and a move was underway in Congress to officially extend the ratification deadline.

The text of the Equal Rights Amendment, as passed by Congress and sent to the states in the 1970s, is classical liberal feminism: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex." While not denying there may be biologically-based differences between men and women, liberal feminism cannot see these differences as adequate justification for inequality, such as the wage gap between men and women.

### **Critics**

Critics of liberal feminism point to a lack of critique of basic gender relationships, a focus on state action which links women's interests to those of the powerful, a lack of class or race analysis, and

a lack of analysis of ways in which women are different from men. Critics often accuse liberal feminism of judging women and their success by male standards.

"White feminism" is a kind of liberal feminism which assumes that the issues facing white women are the issues all women face, and unity around liberal feminist goals is more important than racial equality and other such goals. Intersectionality was a theory developed in criticism of liberal feminism's common blindspot on race.

In more recent years, liberal feminism has sometimes been conflated with a kind of libertarian feminism, sometimes called equity feminism or individual feminism. Individual feminism often opposes legislative or state action, preferring to emphasize developing the skills and abilities of women to compete better in the world as it is. This feminism opposes laws that give either men or women advantages and privileges.

## **Socialist Feminism**

The phrase "socialist feminism" was increasingly used during the 1970s to describe a mixed theoretical and practical approach to achieving women's equality. Socialist feminist theory analyzed the connection between the oppression of women and other oppressions in society, such as racism and economic injustice.

## **The Socialist Basis**

Socialists had fought for decades to create a more equal society that did not exploit the poor and the powerless in the same ways that capitalism did. Like Marxism, socialist feminism recognized the oppressive structure of a capitalist society. Like radical feminism, socialist feminism recognized the fundamental oppression of women, particularly in a patriarchal society. However, socialist feminists did not recognize gender and only gender as the exclusive basis of all oppression. Rather, they held and continue to hold that class and gender are symbiotic, at least to some degree, and one cannot be addressed without taking the other into consideration. Socialist feminists wanted to integrate the recognition of sex discrimination within their work to achieve justice and equality for women, for working classes, for the poor and all humanity.

## **A Little History**

The term "socialist feminism" might make it sound as though the two concepts— socialism and feminism—are cemented together and intertwined, but this has not always been the case. Socialist Party leader Eugene V. Debs and Susan B. Anthony were at odds back in 1905, each of them supporting a different end of the spectrum. Decades later, Gloria Steinem suggested that women, and particularly younger women, were eager to throw their support behind socialist Bernie Sanders rather than Hillary Clinton, a concept that became evident in the 2016 national election when Sanders won 53 percent of the female vote in the New Hampshire primary in contrast to Clinton's 46 percent.

## **How Is Socialist Feminism Different?**

Socialist feminism has often been compared to cultural feminism, but they are quite different although there are some similarities. Cultural feminism focuses almost exclusively on the unique traits and accomplishments of the female gender in opposition to those of men. Separatism is a key theme, but socialist feminism opposes this. The goal of socialist feminism is to work with men to achieve a level playing field for both genders. Socialist feminists have referred to cultural feminism as "pretentious." Socialist feminism is also distinctly different from liberal feminism, although

the concept of liberalism has changed over the early decades of the 21st century.

Although liberal feminists seek equality of the sexes, socialist feminists do not believe that is entirely possible within the constraints of current society. The focus of radical feminists is more on the root causes of inequalities that exist. They tend to take the position that sexual discrimination is the sole source of the oppression of women. However, radical feminism may be more closely related than some other forms of feminism are to socialist feminism. Of course, all these types of feminism share similar and often identical concerns, but their remedies and solutions vary.

## **Radical Feminism**

Radical feminism is a philosophy emphasizing the patriarchal roots of inequality between men and women, or, more specifically, the social domination of women by men. Radical feminism views patriarchy as dividing societal rights, privileges, and power primarily along the lines of sex, and as a result, oppressing women and privileging men. Radical feminism opposes existing political and social organization in general because it is inherently tied to patriarchy. Thus, radical feminists tend to be skeptical of political action within the current system and instead tend to focus on culture change that undermines patriarchy and associated hierarchical structures.

### **What Makes It 'Radical'?**

Radical feminists tend to be more militant in their approach (radical as "getting to the root") than other feminists. A radical feminist aims to dismantle patriarchy rather than making adjustments to the system through legal changes. Radical feminists also resist reducing oppression to an economic or class issue, as socialist or Marxist feminism sometimes did or does. Radical feminism opposes patriarchy, not men. To equate radical feminism to man-hating is to assume that patriarchy and men are inseparable, philosophically and politically. (Although, Robin Morgan has defended "man-hating" as the right of the oppressed class to hate the class that is oppressing them.)

### **Roots of Radical Feminism**

Radical feminism was rooted in the wider radical contemporary movement. Women who participated in the anti-war and New Left political movements of the 1960s found themselves excluded from equal power by the men within the movement, despite the movements' supposed underlying values of empowerment. Many of these women split off into specifically feminist groups, while still retaining much of their original political radical ideals and methods. "Radical feminism" became the term used for the more radical edge of feminism.

Radical feminism is credited with the use of consciousness-raising groups to raise awareness of women's oppression. Later radical feminists sometimes added a focus on sexuality, including some moving to radical political lesbianism.

Some key radical feminists were Ti-Grace Atkinson, Susan Brownmiller, Phyllis Chester, Corrine Grad Coleman, Mary Daly, Andrea Dworkin, Shulamith Firestone, Germaine Greer, Carol Hanisch, Jill Johnston, Catherine MacKinnon, Kate Millett, Robin Morgan, Ellen Willis, and Monique Wittig. Groups that were part of the radical feminist wing of feminism include Redstockings, New York Radical Women (NYRW), the Chicago Women's Liberation Union (CWLU), Ann Arbor Feminist House, The Feminists, WITCH, Seattle Radical Women, and Cell 16. Radical feminists organized demonstrations against the Miss America pageant in 1968.

### **Key Issues and Tactics**

## Central issues engaged by radical feminists include:

- Reproductive rights for women, including the freedom to make choices to give birth, have an abortion, use birth control, or get sterilized
- Evaluating and then breaking down traditional gender roles in private relationships as well as in public policies
- Understanding pornography as an industry and practice leading to harm to women, although some radical feminists disagreed with this position
- Understanding rape as an expression of patriarchal power, not a seeking of sex
- Understanding prostitution under patriarchy as the oppression of women, sexually and economically
- A critique of motherhood, marriage, the nuclear family, and sexuality, questioning how much of our culture is based on patriarchal assumptions
- A critique of other institutions, including government and religion, as centered historically in patriarchal power.

Tools used by radical women's groups included consciousness-raising groups, actively providing services, organizing public protests, and putting on art and culture events. Women's studies programs at universities are often supported by radical feminists as well as more liberal and socialist feminists.

Some radical feminists promoted a political form of lesbianism or celibacy as alternatives to heterosexual sex within an overall patriarchal culture. There remains disagreement within the radical feminist community about transgender identity. Some radical feminists have supported the rights of transgender people, seeing it as another gender liberation struggle; some have opposed the transgender movement, seeing it as embodying and promoting patriarchal gender norms.

## Quotes From Radical Feminists

"I didn't fight to get women out from behind vacuum cleaners to get them onto the board of Hoover." – Germaine Greer

"All men hate some women some of the time and some men hate all women all of the time." – Germaine Greer

"The fact is that we live in a profoundly anti-female society, a misogynistic 'civilization' in which men collectively victimize women, attacking us as personifications of their own paranoid fears, as The Enemy. Within this society it is men who rape, who sap women's energy, who deny women economic and political power." – Mary Daly

"I feel that 'man-hating' is an honorable and viable political act, that the oppressed have a right to class-hatred against the class that is oppressing them. – Robin Morgan

"In the long run, Women's Liberation will of course free men—but in the short run it's going to COST men a lot of privilege, which no one gives up willingly or easily."

– Robin Morgan

"Feminists are often asked whether pornography causes rape. The fact is that rape and prostitution caused and continue to cause pornography. Politically, culturally, socially, sexually, and economically, rape and prostitution generated pornography; and pornography depends for its continued existence on the rape and prostitution of women." – Andrea Dworkin

## Ecofeminism

**Ecofeminism**, also called **ecological feminism**, branch of feminism that examines the connections

between women and nature. Its name was coined by French feminist Françoise d'Eaubonne in 1974. Ecofeminism uses the basic feminist tenets of equality between genders, a revaluing of non-patriarchal or nonlinear structures, and a view of the world that respects organic processes, holistic connections, and the merits of intuition and collaboration. To these notions ecofeminism adds both a commitment to the environment and an awareness of the associations made between women and nature. Specifically, this philosophy emphasizes the ways both nature and women are treated by patriarchal (or male-centred) society. Ecofeminists examine the effect of gender categories in order to demonstrate the ways in which social norms exert unjust dominance over women and nature. The philosophy also contends that those norms lead to an incomplete view of the world, and its practitioners advocate an alternative worldview that values the earth as sacred, recognizes humanity's dependency on the natural world, and embraces all life as valuable.

### **Origins Of Ecofeminism**

The modern ecofeminist movement was born out of a series of conferences and workshops held in the United States by a coalition of academic and professional women during the late 1970s and early 1980s. They met to discuss the ways in which feminism and environmentalism might be combined to promote respect for women and the natural world and were motivated by the notion that a long historical precedent of associating women with nature had led to the oppression of both. They noted that women and nature were often depicted as chaotic, irrational, and in need of control, while men were frequently characterized as rational, ordered, and thus capable of directing the use and development of women and nature. Ecofeminists contend that this arrangement results in a hierarchical structure that grants power to men and allows for the exploitation of women and nature, particularly insofar as the two are associated with one another. Thus, early ecofeminists determined that solving the predicament of either constituency would require undoing the social status of both.

Early work on ecofeminism consisted largely of first documenting historical connections between women and the environment and then looking for ways to sever those connections. One founder of ecofeminism, theologian Rosemary Ruether, insisted that all women must acknowledge and work to end the domination of nature if they were to work toward their own liberation. She urged women and environmentalists to work together to end patriarchal systems that privilege hierarchies, control, and unequal socioeconomic relations. Ruether's challenge was taken up by feminist scholars and activists, who began critiquing not only ecological theories that overlooked the effect of patriarchal systems but also feminist theories that did not interrogate the relationship between women and nature as well.

By the late 1980s, ecofeminism had grown out of its largely academic environment and become a popular movement. Many scholars cite the feminist theorist Ynestra King as the cause of that popularization. In 1987 King wrote an article titled "What Is Ecofeminism?" that appeared in *The Nation*. There she challenged all Americans to consider the ways in which their belief systems allow for the exploitative use of the earth and the further oppression of women. With the help of King's article, the concept of ecofeminism grew both in support and philosophical scope.

### **Radical Ecofeminism And Cultural Ecofeminism**

As ecofeminism continued to develop, it witnessed the first of several splinterings. By the late 1980s ecofeminism had begun to branch out into two distinct schools of thought: radical ecofeminism and cultural ecofeminism. Radical ecofeminists contend that the dominant patriarchal society equates nature and women in order to degrade both. To that end, radical ecofeminism builds on

the assertion of early ecofeminists that one must study patriarchal domination with an eye toward ending the associations between women and nature. Of particular interest to those theorists is the ways in which both women and nature have been associated with negative or commodifiable attributes while men have been seen as capable of establishing order. That division of characteristics encourages the exploitation of women and nature for cheap labour and resources.

Cultural ecofeminists, on the other hand, encourage an association between women and the environment. They contend that women have a more intimate relationship with nature because of their gender roles (e.g., family nurturer and provider of food) and their biology (e.g., menstruation, pregnancy, and lactation). As a result, cultural ecofeminists believe that such associations allow women to be more sensitive to the sanctity and degradation of the environment. They suggest that this sensitivity ought to be prized by society insofar as it establishes a more direct connection to the natural world with which humans must coexist. Cultural ecofeminism also has roots in nature-based religions and goddess and nature worship as a way of redeeming both the spirituality of nature and women's instrumental role in that spirituality.

Not all feminists favoured the bifurcation of ecofeminism. Some women, for instance, worried that cultural ecofeminism merely enforces gender stereotypes and could lead to further exploitation. Others wanted a greater emphasis on nature-based religion, while still others insisted that a celebration of Western organized religions could accommodate nature-based worship. Those same groups also differed with regard to the romanticization of nature and the roles that various practices (such as vegetarianism or organic farming) ought to play in the application of ecofeminist principles. As a result, the movement continued to grow and expand in order to accommodate those variations, and most self-identified ecofeminists celebrate the myriad definitions and applications available under the general rubric of ecofeminism.

## **Ecofeminism's Future**

Many women remained unsatisfied with the limits of the movement. Of particular concern was the failure of women in developed countries to acknowledge the ways in which their own lifestyles were leading to further degradation of their counterparts in less-developed countries and of the Earth as a whole. Women from developing countries pointed to the effects of commercial food production, sweatshop labour, and poverty on their families and their landscapes. They accused white ecofeminists of promoting that exploitation by purchasing goods created as a result of inequity. They also took issue with the appropriation of indigenous cultures and religions for the purpose of advancing a philosophical position. Thus, contemporary ecofeminism must be developed to acknowledge the very real effects of race, class, ethnicity, and sexuality on a woman's social position. Women involved in environmental justice issues and women representing minority cultures have worked to establish their own sense of ecofeminism to include local cultures and spirituality, a celebration of their roles as mothers and caretakers, and a recognition of the ways in which Western colonization compromised those beliefs.

Many ecofeminists were also concerned with what they saw as a heterosexual bias in the movement insofar as ecofeminism appeared to privilege the experience of heterosexual women over homosexual women. To correct that problem, an emerging school of ecofeminism emphasized the need to incorporate the tenets of queer theory into the precepts of ecofeminism. They contended that if ecofeminism is indeed committed to fighting against systems of oppression and domination, then the movement must also acknowledge the ways in which sexuality—and, more specifically, responses to that sexuality—also figure as oppressive mechanisms. Thus, the re-

demption of women's roles and opportunities must also include a valuing of sexual differences as well as differences in race, class, and gender.

Ecofeminist scholars often contend that the great plurality of beliefs within ecofeminism is one of the movement's greatest strengths. They note that the myriad definitions and applications, which sometimes complement and sometimes conflict with one another, demonstrate the liberating and inclusive aspects of the movement. They also point to the important commonalities shared within the various schools of ecofeminism. All ecofeminists, they say, work toward the development of theory and action that acknowledge the problems inherent in patriarchal and hierarchical systems. They advocate the revaluing of science to acknowledge the role of subjectivity and intuition. They also support the creation of a new worldview that celebrates all biological systems as inherently valuable. Finally, they insist on solving those problems through affirming and nonviolent means.

# MCQs

1. Who is the author of the book The Republic –
  - a. Plato
  - b. Aristotle
  - c. Kant
  - d. GandhijiAnswer: a
  
2. The idea of Philosopher King introduced by –
  - a. Rousseau,
  - b. Hobbes,
  - c. Locke ,
  - d. PlatoAnswer: d
  
3. Platos ideal state is known as –
  - a. The Republic,
  - b. Polity,
  - c. Oligarchy ,
  - d. AutocracyAnswer: a
  
4. To Aristotle the best form of government is –
  - a. Polity,
  - b. Aristocracy,
  - c. Plutocracy,
  - d. democracyAnswer: a
  
5. “For the people, by the people, of the people” is a statement of –
  - a. Democracy,
  - b. Aristocracy,
  - c. Autocracy,
  - d. None of theseAnswer: a
  
6. “General will” is the concept of –
  - a. Rousseau,
  - b. Webber,
  - c. Gandhiji,
  - d. d) NehruAnswer: a
  
7. “General will” is equal to , a)
  - a. peoples will,
  - b. rulers will,
  - c. workers will,
  - d. none of theseAnswer: a

8. "The web of relations" is a definition of –  
a. state,  
b. society,  
c. government,  
d. group Answer:b
9. Who wrote the book "Justice asFairness"-  
a. John Rawls,  
b. Aruna roy,  
c. Pareto,  
d. LevinasAnswer:a
10. Which is the largest democratic countryin the world-  
a. China,  
b. USA,  
c. India,  
d. Brazil Answer:c
11. When did the United NationsOrganisation establish-  
a. 1945,  
b. 1935,  
c. 1955,  
d. 1947 Answer:a
12. Who among the following is acontratualist  
a. Rousseau,  
b. Locke,  
c. Hobbes,  
d. all of these Answer: d
13. Who among the following is a liberalpolitical philosopher-  
a. John Rawls,  
b. Aristotle,  
c. Plato  
d. all of theseAnswer: a
14. In which country plural executivefunctions –  
a. Switzerland,  
b. India,  
c. USA ,  
d. Britain Answer: a
15. The head of the state is known as Chancellor in which of the following country  
a. Holland,  
b. China,  
c. Russia,  
d. GermanyAnswer: d

16. "Right to vote" is a-
- political right,
  - civil right,
  - fundamental right,
  - legal right
- Answer: a
17. Who supported slavery-
- Plato,
  - Aristotle,
  - Locke
  - , Rousseau
- Answer: b
18. "Free citizenship in a free state" pertains to-
- Athens,
  - Sparta,
  - both A&b,
  - none of these
- Answer: a
19. "Virtue is knowledge" said by whom-
- Socrates,
  - Heraclitus,
  - J.S.Mill ,
  - all the above
- Answer: a
20. "Division of labour" is the concept of –
- Plato,
  - Socrates,
  - Ambrose,
  - Seneca
- Answer: a
21. The International Criminal Court is located at-
- Washington,
  - Hague,
  - Geneva
  - London
- Answer: b
22. Whose work is "Human Nature in Politics"
- Dacey;
  - Wallas;
  - Laski;
  - Merriam
- Answer: b
23. Who wrote "New Aspects of Politics"
- Wallas;
  - Laski;
  - Merriam;
  - Bentley
- Answer: c

24. Find out the work of Lasswell and Kaplan
- Systematic Politics
  - The Politics of System
  - Power and Society
  - Introduction to Politics
- Answer: c
25. Who wrote "The Political System"
- Almond;
  - Apter;
  - Lasswell;
  - Easton
- Answer: d
26. The term 'Historicism' was made popular by
- Sabine;
  - Oakeshott;
  - Popper;
  - Foster
- Answer: c
27. 'It is better to be vague than irrelevant'. This statement explains the following
- Post-behaviouralism;
  - Behaviouralism;
  - Positivism;
  - Empiricism
- Answer: a
28. The Iron Law of Oligarchy is associated with
- Millett;
  - Michels;
  - McConnell;
  - Mazzini
- Answer: b
29. Who regarded revolution as a means of achieving freedom?
- Hegel;
  - Dahl;
  - John Milton;
  - Karl Marx
- Answer: c
30. Human consciousness postulates liberty, liberty involves rights, rights demand the state, who has made this statement?
- Hegel;
  - Green;
  - Laski;
  - Barker
- Answer: b
31. Which factor is necessary for the development of democratic institutions?
- strong military forces
  - respect for individual rights
  - a one-party system
  - an agricultural economy
- Answer: b

32. Who said "Power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." ?
- Lord Acton
  - David Apter
  - A.V. Dicey
  - Montesquieu
- Answer: a
33. The book 'Ain't a Woman' is related with
- Black Feminism
  - White Feminism
  - Eurocentric Feminism
  - Third world Feminism
- Answer: a
34. The book 'Ain't I a Woman' give emphasis on condition of -----
- Black Women's condition in America
  - Black Women's condition in Europe
  - Third World women's sufferings
  - Dowry problem
- Answer: a
35. Who wrote the book 'Ain't a Women'?
- Bell Hook
  - Carol Gilligan
  - Robbin Morgan
  - Firestone
- Answer: a
36. 'Racism is not just a general evil in society but the race hatred they might harbor in their own psyche'. Who state these arguments
- Bell Hook
  - Carol Gilligan
  - Robbin Morgan
  - Firestone
- Answer: a
37. 'Sisterhood is Powerful' is written by
- Robin Morgan
  - Simon De Beauvoir
  - Kate Millett
  - Lawrence Kohlberg
- Answer: a
38. Black feminism mainly focus the issue -----
- Sexism
  - Racism
  - Both A & B
  - None of the above
- Answer: c
39. who rejects the idea that feminism is a western ideology
- Kumari Jayawardena
  - Valerie Smith
  - Elizabeth Spelman
  - V. Geetha
- Answer: a

40. Who argues that there is a relation between colonizers and colonized that involves a particular form of gender relations and gender domination?
- Cynthia Enloe
  - Bell Hook
  - Uma Narayan
  - Kumari Jaya Wardena
- Answer: a
41. Biologically determined sexual difference in morality is proposed by -----
- Sigmund Freud
  - Jacques Lacan
  - Carol Gilligan
  - Simon de Beauvoir
- Answer: d
42. Who wrote the book "In a different Voice"?
- Robbin de Morgan
  - Carol Gilligan
  - Karl Jung
  - Karl Marx
- Answer: b
43. 'In a different voice' is published in the year
- 1986
  - 1982
  - 1995
  - 1979
- Answer: d
44. According to Gilligan morality of women is based on principle
- Abstract
  - Relational
  - Justice
  - less developed morality
- Answer: b
45. According to Gilligan men's morality is depend on -----
- Relational
  - Justice
  - personality
  - None of these
- Answer: b
46. Who argued that women's morality is not a less developed morality?
- Karl marx
  - Judith Butler
  - Karl Jung
  - Carl Gilligan
- Answer: d
47. Women's morality based on the principle of -----
- dependence
  - ethic of care
  - Love and hate

- d. None of these Answer: b
48. There is difference between men's morality and women's morality. These difference is based on -----
- conception of self
  - difference in personality
  - Both A & B
  - None of these Answer: a
49. Who rejects the idea that mother is an innate natural instinct?
- Shulamith Firestone
  - Nancy Chodorow
  - Carol Gilligan
  - Sigmund Freud Answer: b
50. Who argues that desire to mother is part of the desire to feminine?
- Anne Snitow
  - Nancy Chodorow
  - Scott
  - d) Simone de Beauvoir Answer: b
51. The dual parenting propose the idea that
- Both men and women mothered equally
  - Women get more care
  - De valuing the concept of mothering
  - None of these Answer: a
52. What is the 'feminine principle' behind the relationship between nature and women?
- Productive and Reproductive work
  - Patience
  - Vice
  - All of the above Answer: a
53. What is the root cause of the damage to nature according to eco feminism?
- Western Colonialism
  - scarcity of resources
  - Technological advancement
  - None of these Answer: a
54. 'Return to nature' is the principle of -----
- Eco Feminism
  - Deep Ecology
  - Land Ethic
  - All of the above Answer: a
55. The existence of purusha is supported by the following arguments like
- Teleological
  - ontological

- c. Ethical
  - d. All of the above Answer: d
56. Parliamentary form of government first evolved in
- a. Greece
  - b. The United Kingdom
  - c. The United States
  - d. Rome Answer: b
57. India has adopted Rule of Law on the pattern of-
- a. USA,
  - b. UK,
  - c. Russia ,
  - d. China Answer: c
58. Who said that Bureaucracy is "a regulated administrative system organized as a series of Inter related offices ?
- a. Max Weber;
  - b. Gladden;
  - c. F.M. Marx;
  - d. John A. Vieg Answer: b
59. The power to decide an election petition is vested in the
- a. Parliament;
  - b. Supreme Court;
  - c. High Courts;
  - d. Election Commission Answer: c
60. Who said, "Revolution is a sweeping fundamental change in the predominant myth of a social order"?
- a. G.S. Peter;
  - b. H. Arendt;
  - c. Huntington;
  - d. Neumann Answer: d
61. Participation is an important element of every
- a. Monarchical System
  - b. Oligarchical System
  - c. Democratic System
  - d. Aristocratic System Answer: c
62. 'If sovereignty is not absolute, no state will exist'. Who said this ?
- a. Laski;
  - b. Locke;
  - c. Austin;
  - d. None of the above Answer: d
63. According to Marx 'the Dictatorship of the proletariat' signifies ?

- a. A transitional state
  - b. An ideal state
  - c. An autocratic state
  - d. A liberal states
- Answer: a

64. Who said 'Neutrality is' one of the strongest bulwarks of democracy ?

- a. F. M. Marx;
  - b. Peter Self;
  - c. Ajay Baseli;
  - d. O. P. Dwivedi
- Answer: c

65. "All administration means domination" who said this ?

- a. Weber;
  - b. Martin Albrow;
  - c. R. K. Merton;
  - d. Talcot Parsons
- Answer: a

66. Who among the following first developed the concept of general system theory

- a. Colin Cherry
  - b. Ludwig Von Bertalanffy
  - c. Robert K Merton
  - d. Talcott Parsons
- Answer: b

67. Democracy is meaningless without

- a. President and Congress
  - b. Supreme Court and President
  - c. A federal form of government
  - d. Freedom of speech
- Answer: d

68. Structural functionalism as a method was developed to study the politics of

- a. Modern totalitarianism
  - b. Politics of developing countries
  - c. Developed socialism
  - d. Advanced Capitalism
- Answer: a

69. According to radical feminism a free society is possible only through -----

- a. End of Patriarchy
  - b. Rise of consciousness group
  - c. Elect a liberal government
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: a

70. Gandhi describe himself as a

- a. Social democrat
  - b. Philosophical anarchist
  - c. Socialist
  - d. Liberal
- Answer: b

71. David Easton stated in his work, The Political System, 1953, that two kinds of political inputs

are:

- a. Voting and impeachment
  - b. Political action committees and political parties
  - c. Demand and support
  - d. Pressure and bribery
- Answer: c

72. According to Aristotle, democracy is

- a. A genuine form of government
  - b. The same as oligarchy
  - c. A perverted form of government
  - d. The same as polity
- Answer: b

73. Power is the capacity to

- a. Persuade
  - b. Hold sovereignty
  - c. Produce intended effects
  - d. Exercise authority
- Answer: b

74. Authority is the right to

- a. Invoke tradition
  - b. Nationhood
  - c. Rule
  - d. Delegate
- Answer: a

75. Sovereignty refers to

- a. Ruling monarchs
  - b. Ceremonial leaders
  - c. Supreme courts
  - d. The ultimate source of authority in society
- Answer: a

76. Which of the following is the function of political parties?

- a. Supervising interest groups
  - b. Administering elections
  - c. Aggregating (combining) interest
  - d. Negotiating with foreign governments
- Answer: c

77. The assignment of law-making, law-enforcing, and law-interpreting functions to independent branches of the government is called

- a. separation of powers
  - b. checks and balances.
  - c. enumerated powers.
  - d. implied powers.
- Answer: a

78. According to Almond and Verba, the civil culture

- a. Contributes to the stability of liberal democracies
  - b. Is incompatible with the stability of liberal democracies
  - c. both A&B,
  - d. none of the above
- Answer: a

79. Social capital is based on
- Start up funding for voluntary organisations
  - Widespread acceptance of the market economy
  - Eastern Europe's 'third way'
  - A culture of trust and cooperation
- Answer: d
80. Who introduced hegemony in the concept of civil society?
- Lenin
  - Gramsci
  - Hegel
  - Marx
- Answer: b
81. Who said 'civilisation is not a burden, but it is an opportunity'?
- Marx
  - Gandhi
  - Nehru
  - Lenin
- Answer: b
82. The Iron Law of Oligarchy is associated with
- Michels
  - Millet
  - Bentham
  - Kant
- Answer: a
83. Who wrote the work 'a preface to democratic theory'?
- Dahl
  - Marx
  - Lenin
  - Maclver
- Answer: a
84. The most essential principle of liberalism is
- Equality
  - Social justice
  - Democracy
  - Freedom
- Answer: d
85. Who is guild socialist?
- Green
  - Mill
  - Cole
  - Dicey
- Answer: c
86. Socialism is:
- An economic system that is based on private ownership
  - An economic system for communism
  - An economic system that allows competition in business
  - A government system that communist countries use
- Answer: b

87. An institution is a form of
- Organisation
  - Legal system
  - Culture
  - State
- Answer: a
88. Who said Politics is about 'who gets what, when and how'?
- Lasswell
  - Almond
  - Easton
  - Verba
- Answer: a
89. Social justice is primarily concerned with
- Who governs society
  - How society is governed
  - How society is defined
  - Who should get what in society
- Answer: d
90. Equality of opportunity means
- Everybody as equal right to complain
  - Everybody finishes the same start in life
  - Everybody finishes the same regardless of effort,
  - all are equal
- Answer: b
91. Which one of the following country follows unitary form of government?
- Australia.
  - USA
  - India
  - UK
- Answer: d
92. Who among the following argued that universal suffrage does injustice to property owners?
- J.S. Mill
  - W.F. Willoughby
  - H.J. Laski
  - Henry Maine
- Answer: a
93. Who among the following described democracy as the 'tyranny of the majority'?
- James Madison
  - John Dunning
  - J Rousseau
  - De Tocqueville
- Answer: d
94. Who among the following is not an exponent of 'Elitist Theory of Democracy'?
- Mosca
  - Pareto
  - Michel
  - C Macpherson
- Answer: d

95. Who among the following advocated partyless democracy in India?
- Acharya Vinoba Bhave
  - Jayprakash Narayan
  - Mahatma Gandhi
  - M.N. Roy
- Answer: b
96. Who among the following theorists advocated participatory democracy?
- C.B. Macpherson
  - Michael Oakeshott
  - F. A. Hayek
  - Gaetano Mosca
- Answer: a
97. Who among the following has described the world wide triumph of liberal democracy as the 'end of history'?
- Samuel P. Huntington
  - Francis Fukuyama
  - Robert Dahl
  - C. Wright Mills
- Answer: a
98. Who among the following favoured qualification as the basis for right to vote?
- E. Barker
  - T.H. Green
  - J.S. Mill
  - J. Bentham
- Answer: c
99. Participatory democracy calls for:
- increasing the voter turnout in elections
  - greater and active engagement of citizens in government
  - greater involvement of the legislature in the business of legislature
  - active engagement of the representatives in the affairs of their constituencies
- Answer: b
100. Which is Canada's political system?
- a confederal state
  - a direct democracy
  - a unitary state.
  - parliamentary democracy
- Answer: d
101. Rational-legal authority also known as
- Confederal
  - Universal
  - Democratic
  - Bureaucratic
- Answer: d
102. "A partyless regime is a conservative regime an anti-party regime is a reactionary regime." Who made this statement?
- Samuel Huntington
  - Sartori
  - Carl J. Friedrich
  - K.C. Wheare
- Answer: b

103. The advocates of deliberative democracy emphasize
- executive supremacy
  - parliamentary sovereignty
  - judicial autonomy
  - popular sovereignty
- Answer: d
104. the concept of 'circulation of elites' has been used by
- Mosca
  - Michels
  - Weber
  - Pareto
- Answer: a
105. The theory of sovereignty is historically associated with the rise of
- Democracy
  - Absolute monarchy
  - Feudalism
  - Decolonization
- Answer: b
106. Who among the following, characterized bureaucracy as ration-legal authority ?
- Max Weber
  - Herbert A. Simon
  - Vilfredo Pareto
  - F.M. Marx
- Answer: a
107. The Communist manifesto was first published in
- Russian
  - English
  - German
  - French
- Answer: c
108. The International Criminal Court is located at
- Washington
  - Hague
  - Geneva
  - London
- Answer: b
109. Who among the following has described the world wide triumph of liberal democracy as the end of history ?
- Francis Fukuyama
  - Samuel P. Huntington
  - David Held
  - Samir Amin
- Answer: a
110. The National Parliamentary body of China is known as
- National People's Congress
  - Supreme Soviet
  - People's Assembly

d. State Council Answer: a

111. Which aspect of imperialism does the dependency theory emphasize ?

- a. Strategic
- b. Political
- c. Cultural
- d. Economic Answer: d

112. According to David Easton, the main function of government is to:

- a. provide social order, national security, and public goods.
- b. guarantee constitutional rights
- c. levy tax on people to run the political system.
- d. allocate authoritatively values for a whole society. Answer: d

113. Who was acknowledging politics is a universal activity?

- a. Maclver
- b. Robert Dahl
- c. Hobbes
- d. Plato Answer: b

114. The term 'politics' was derived from two words 'polis' and 'polity' in which language

- a. Greek;
- b. Latin;
- c. English;
- d. French Answer: b

115. Who defined politics as "the authoritative allocation of values that are binding on the society"

- a. John Lock
- b. B. J.S. Mill
- c. David Easton
- d. Almond Answer: c

116. Political science is the scientific designation of the subject of study was accepted in which year

- a. 1948
- b. 1950
- c. 1945
- d. 1970 Answer: a

117. Who contributed the work 'the Politics'?

- a. Aristotle
- b. Plato
- c. Socrates
- d. Machiavelli Answer: a

118. The scope of Political Science is determined by the enquiries that arise in connection with the state. Who said so?

- a. A. Gilchrist

- b. Almond
  - c. T.H. Green
  - d. August Comte
- Answer: a

119. The development of Political Science as a discipline can be traced back to
- a. 4th century B.C .
  - b. 3rd century B.C
  - c. 5th century B.C
  - d. 6th century B.C.
- Answer: a

120. In the Classical or Normative period, the study of politics reflected
- a. a normative concern and deductive method explanation
  - b. behavioural study of politics
  - c. values oriented study of politics
  - d. none of these
- Answer: a

121. Who was the first proponent of scientific study of politics?
- a. Charles Merriam
  - b. Harold D Lasswell
  - c. George Catlin
  - d. Arthur Bentley
- Answer: a

122. Behavioural approach in Political Science is an attempt to make the empirical content of Political Science more scientific who said this?
- a. Charles Merriam
  - b. Robert A Dahl
  - c. George Catlin
  - d. Arthur Bentley
- Answer: a

123. Eighth principles of the behavioural approach of political science generally known as
- a. Verifications
  - b. Pure science
  - c. Intellectual foundations
  - d. Observational study
- Answer: c

124. Politics is "the study of shaping and sharing of power"
- a. Charles Merriam
  - b. Robert A Dahl
  - c. Harold D Lasswell
  - d. Arthur Bentley
- Answer: c

125. Politics became "narrow focus, the trivial detail and abstract fact"
- a. C Wright Mills
  - b. Robert A Dahl
  - c. Harold D Lasswell
  - d. Arthur Bentley
- Answer: a

126. Who was the most ardent advocate of Post Behaviouralism?

- a. David Easton
  - b. C Wright Mills
  - c. Robert Dahl
  - d. Harold D Lasswell
- Answer: a
127. The strong demands of Postbehaviouralists are
- a. Pure science
  - b. Relevance and action
  - c. Value
  - d. None of these
- Answer: b
128. Historical materialism is one of the tools in
- a. Behaviouralism
  - b. Utilitarianism
  - c. Marxism
  - d. Post behaviouralism
- Answer: d
129. It is not a matter of problems to be solved but a state of domination and subjugation to be ended by a total transformation of the conditions which give rise to it . who said this?
- a. David Easton
  - b. C Wright Mills
  - c. Robert A Dahl
  - d. Ralph Miliband
- Answer: d
130. Who said the state is the politically organised people of a definite territory?
- a. J.K. Bluntschli
  - b. C Wright Mills
  - c. Robert Dahl
  - d. Ralph Miliband
- Answer: a
131. Who defines state as “people organised for law within a definite territory?”
- a. J.K. Bluntschli
  - b. C Wright Mills
  - c. Woodrow Wilson
  - d. Ralph Miliband
- Answer: b
132. “Territorial society divided into government and subjects whose relationships are determined by the exercise of this supreme coercive power” who said this?
- a. Harold J Laski
  - b. C Wright Mills
  - c. Woodrow Wilson
  - d. Ralph Miliband
- Answer: a
133. Who emphasised the importance of the ‘subjective desire of the people’ for organisation and maintenance of the state?
- a. Harold J Laski
  - b. C Wright Mills
  - c. Woodrow Wilson
  - d. Willoughby
- Answer: d

134. Who said, an association as “a group organised for the pursuit of an interest or a group of interests in common”?
- Harold J Laski
  - Maclver
  - Woodrow Wilson
  - Willoughby
- Answer: b
135. Who defined sovereignty as the ‘absolute and perpetual power of commanding in a state’?
- Garner;
  - Jean Bodin;
  - Green;
  - Hobbes
- Answer: b
136. Who is regarded as the greatest exponent of the Monistic theory of sovereignty?
- Jean Bodin
  - Anthony Giddens
  - John Austin
  - Michel Waltzer
- Answer: c
137. Who defines sovereignty it as ‘the sumtotal of the influences in a state which lie behind the law’
- Gilchrist
  - A.V. Dicey
  - John Austin
  - Michel Waltzer
- Answer: a
138. Who propounded sovereignty in his famous concept of the ‘general will’
- Anthony Giddens
  - Rousseau
  - John Locke
  - Hobbes
- Answer: b
139. Who defined sovereignty as “the supreme power of the state over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law”?
- John Austin
  - Rousseau
  - John Locke
  - Jean Bodin
- Answer: d
140. Whose work is “the Law of War and Peace”
- John Austin
  - Jean Bodin
  - Hugo Grotius
  - John Locke
- Answer: c
141. Whose work is “Lectures on Jurisprudence”?
- Gilchrist

- b. John Austin
  - c. A.V. Dicey
  - d. Garner Answer: b
142. Who developed the concept of law as a command given by a superior to an inferior?
- a. Jean Bodin
  - b. John Locke
  - c. Hobbs,
  - d. Lenin Answer: d
143. Who is the main proponent of the pluralist concept of sovereignty?
- a. Hugo Grotius
  - b. John Austin
  - c. Henry Maine
  - d. Jean Bodin Answer: c
144. Whose work is "Grammar of Politics"?
- a. John Austin
  - b. Jean Bodin
  - c. Laski
  - d. Locke Answer: c
145. Whose work is "The Spirit of Laws"?
- a. Jean Bodin
  - b. Henry Maine
  - c. Laski
  - d. Montesquieu Answer: d
146. Who wrote the work 'Modern State'?
- a. Montesquieu
  - b. Mac Iver
  - c. Laski
  - d. Garner Answer: c
147. Whose work is "Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution"?
- a. Jean Bodin
  - b. Gilchrist
  - c. Hugo Grotius
  - d. A.V. Dicey Answer: c
148. Who wrote the work "Representative Government"?
- a. Lowell
  - b. T.H. Green
  - c. J.S. Mill
  - d. Laski Answer: c
149. Politics science is a discipline
- a. That cannot ignore values
  - b. Which provides value free analysis

- c. Which does not subscribe to any values
- d. Meant to study values Answer: c

150. Which of the following is not a traditional approach to the study of Political Science?

- a. Simulation
- b. Legal institutionalism
- c. Historiography
- d. Comparison Answer: c

151. Whose work is "the Nerves of Government"?

- a. Catlin
- b. Duverger
- c. Deutsch
- d. George Sabine Answer: c

152. The ancient Greeks used the following word for the term 'state'

- a. Republica
- b. Polis
- c. Republic
- d. Commonweal Answer: b

153. Who described politics as "acting in concert"?

- a. Aristotle
- b. Plato
- c. Marx
- d. Hannah Arendt Answer: d

154. Who wrote the work 'The Great Issues Politics'?

- a. Maclver
- b. Laski
- c. Lipson
- d. Catlin Answer: c

155. Who wrote the work "The Web of Government"?

- a. Lasswell
- b. Laski
- c. Lipson
- d. Catlin Answer: d

156. Whose work is "Marxism and Politics"?

- a. Macpherson
- b. Willoughby
- c. Charles Merriam
- d. Miliband Answer: d

157. One of the following is an advocate of historical approach

- a. Coleman
- b. Lipset

- c. Henry Maine
  - d. Robert Dahl
- Answer: c

158. Who among the following was an advocate of behaviouralism and post behaviouralism?

- a. Leo Strauss
  - b. David Easton
  - c. George Catlin
  - d. Charles Merriam
- Answer: b

159. 'It is better to be vague than irrelevant' This statement explains the following

- a. Positivism
  - b. Empiricism
  - c. Behaviouralism
  - d. Post behaviouralism
- Answer: d

160. Who used to say "I am the state"

- a. Louis IX
  - b. Machiavelli
  - c. John Austin
  - d. Maclver
- Answer: a

161. Who described man in the state of nature as a 'noble savage'?

- a. Hobbes
  - b. Rousseau
  - c. Locke
  - d. Laski
- Answer: b

162. Whose work is "the Process of Government"?

- a. Arthur Bentley
  - b. Robert Dahl
  - c. Charles Merriam
  - d. Karl Popper
- Answer: a

163. Which view is observed 'the state is a necessary evil'

- a. Idealistic view
  - b. Individualistic view
  - c. Fascist view
  - d. Pluralistic view
- Answer: b

164. Who observed 'the state is the march of God on Earth'

- a. Plato
  - b. Aristotle
  - c. Hegel
  - d. Louis XIV
- Answer: c

165. Who wrote the work "The Prince"?

- a. Maclver
- b. Locke

- c. Austin  
d. Machiavelli Answer: d
166. Theorists who believe that “state is an association of associations” are best described as  
a. Pluralists  
b. Federalists  
c. Socialists  
d. Anarchists Answer: a
167. Plato is called the father of idealist theory of the state because  
a. He postulated a dualism between reality and value  
b. He prescribed the ideals of city state  
c. His theory was based not on what human nature is but on what it ought to be  
d. He based his theory on the idea of the good Answer: c
168. The main functions of the state. According to the Pluralists is to  
a. Regulate production and distribution of essential goods  
b. Harmonise the rights and activities of various groups and association  
c. Promote general welfare of its citizens  
d. Provide social security Answer: b
169. Who observed “the state should promote greatest good of the greatest number”?  
a. T.H. Green  
b. Jeremy Bentham  
c. J.S. Mill  
d. Laski Answer: b
170. The chief advocate of the Patriarchal theory of the Origin of the state is  
a. Henry Maine  
b. Morgan  
c. Locke  
d. Green Answer: a
171. Locke has used the social contract theory to justify  
a. Liberal democratic state  
b. Supremacy of the judicial organ  
c. Political obligation  
d. Absolute loyalty of citizens of the state Answer: a
172. Who contributed “Leviathan”?  
a. Pateman  
b. Hobbes  
c. Locke  
d. Rawls Answer: b
173. The pluralist theory views power as  
a. Repressive  
b. Relational  
c. Control over resources

- d. A fixed quantity Answer: b
174. The theory of sovereignty is historically associated with the rise of
- Democracy
  - Feudalism
  - Absolute monarchy
  - Decolonisation Answer: b
175. The Austrian theory attributes to the sovereign
- Political supremacy
  - The power of political legitimation
  - Moral omni-competence
  - Absolute judicial authority Answer:
176. Which one of the following is an apt description of Bodin's theory of sovereignty?
- Political sovereignty
  - Limited sovereignty
  - Absolute sovereignty
  - Popular sovereignty Answer: c
177. Who believed that irrespective of the forms of government, authority tends to be oligarchic ?
- Laski
  - Weber
  - Robert Michaels
  - Aristotle Answer: c
178. Who said "knowledge is Power"
- Morgenthau
  - Foucault
  - Lasswell
  - Easton Answer: b
179. Who said 'power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely'?
- Almond
  - Aristotle
  - Acton
  - Apter Answer: a
180. Who wrote politics is 'who gets, what, when and how'?
- Lasswell
  - Kaplan
  - Almond
  - Powel Answer: a
181. Who among the following was the chief exponent of the legal theory of sovereignty?
- Rousseau
  - Locke
  - Austin
  - Bodin Answer: c

182. Which among the following is not a feature of sovereignty?

- a. Absoluteness
- b. Indivisibility
- c. Delegation
- d. Permanence Answer:c

183. One of the following is not the feature of sovereignty

- a. Originality
- b. All-comprehensiveness
- c. Divisibility
- d. Inalienability Answer:c

184. Austin was an English

- a. Jurist
- b. Sociologist
- c. Economist
- d. Scientist Answer:a

185. Who wrote the work 'anarchy, state and utopia'?

- a. Taylor
- b. Merriam
- c. Robert Nozick
- d. Catlin Answer:c

186. Rousseau is the advocate of

- a. Political sovereignty
- b. Legal sovereignty
- c. Popular sovereignty
- d. Personal sovereignty Answer: d

187. who observed state is known by the rights it maintains?

- a. Hegel
- b. Green
- c. Barker
- d. Laski Answer: d

188. Who among the following is associated with the Rule of law?

- a. A.D. Lindsay
- b. Harold Laski
- c. A.V. Dicey
- d. Ivor Jennings Answer: c

189. Who described the 'rule of law' as nonsense stilts?

- a. Bentham
- b. Laski
- c. Montesquieu
- d. Rawls Answer: a

190. Secret ballot is also known as
- Australian ballot
  - Austrian ballot
  - Canadian ballot
  - Greek Answer: b
191. Constitutional government implies
- Limited government
  - Representative government
  - Government according to the constitution
  - Government by the consent of the people Answer: a
192. An essential pre-requisite for constitutionalism?
- A written constitution
  - Parliamentary democracy
  - Guarantee of fundamental rights
  - Limited government Answer: d
193. The theory of separation of powers was initiated by
- Montesquieu
  - Locke
  - Madison
  - Dicey Answer: a
194. According to Aristotle, the perverted form of government with regard to polity was
- Oligarchy
  - Aristocracy
  - Democracy
  - Monarchy e. Answer: c
195. The first systematic classification of government was given by
- Plato
  - Aristotle
  - Socrates
  - Montesquieu Answer: c
196. Zero hour begins
- At mid-day
  - At the end of the day
  - At the time when the prime minister suggests
  - At the beginning of the day Answer: a
197. The term 'sovereignty' is derived from the word 'superanus' of which language
- French
  - Latin
  - Greek
  - English Answer: d

198. Who is called the keystone of the cabinet arch in a parliamentary system?
- Chief Justice
  - President
  - Prime Minister
  - Speaker of the lower house
- Answer:c
199. All the ministers sail and sink together. This is true of the following form of government
- Unitary
  - Presidential
  - Federal
  - Parliamentary
- Answer:a
200. The idea of sovereignty owes its existence to
- Bodin
  - Austin
  - Hobbes
  - None of these
- Answer:c
201. The cardinal point of the book "Vindication of Right" is.....
- Women as a rational being
  - Women as an emotional being
  - Women should serve for men
  - Women is subordinate to men
- Answer: a
202. Who wrote the book subjection of women?
- J.S. Mill
  - Nancy Chodorow
  - Mary Wollstonecraft
  - James Mill
- Answer: a
203. The Female Eunuch is written by-----
- Germaine Greer
  - Shulamith Firestone
  - Kate Millett
  - Nancy Chodorow
- Answer: a
204. Who wrote the book "Vaginal Politics"?
- Ellen Frankfort
  - Mary Wollstonecraft
  - Shulamith Firestone
  - Germaine Greer
- Answer: a
205. What is the reason for the oppression of women in the society according to Social Feminism.
- Capitalism
  - Proletarianism
  - Communism
  - Socialism
- Answer: a
206. According to the Marxist Feminist the inferior status of women emerged through-----

- a. Private property
  - b. Class divided society
  - c. Both A&B
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: a

207. Who is considered the founder of Feminism

- a. J.S. Mill
  - b. James Mill
  - c. Mary Wollstonecraft
  - d. Nancy Chodorow
- Answer: c

208. Eurocentric feminism belongs to the category of-----

- a. Black Feminism
  - b. libertarian feminism
  - c. Waves of feminism
  - d. Kinds of Feminism
- Answer: d

209. The black feminist's major argument against white feminism is-----

- a. White feminist universalize their issues
  - b. White feminism ignore the racism over sexism
  - c. White Feminist focused on abortion rights and economic independency
  - d. All of the above
- Answer: d

210. Eurocentric feminism is classified under--

- a. waves of feminism
  - b. Kinds of feminism
  - c. Black feminism
  - d. Liberal feminism
- Answer: b

211. Suffrage movement is associated with-----

- a. First wave feminism
  - b. second wave feminism
  - c. Third wave feminism
  - d. kinds of feminism
- Answer: a

212. Right to vote and property right are the result of-----

- a. First wave feminism
  - b. Second wave feminism
  - c. Third wave feminism
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: a

213. Who wrote the book "Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, and the New Racism?"

- a. Patricia Collins
  - b. Ellen Willis
  - c. Carol J. Adams
  - d. Robin Morgan
- Answer: a

214. "Sisterhood is forever" is written by

- a. Robin Morgan
- b. Carol Gilligan
- c. Patricia Collins
- d. Carol J.Adams Answer: a

215. Against sexual apartheid is written by

- a. Maryam Namazie
- b. Robin Morgan
- c. Carol J. Adams
- d. Carol Gilligan Answer: a

216. Obedience to authority is a principle of-----

- a. Pre conventional stage of morality
- b. Conventional stage of morality
- c. Post conventional stages of morality
- d. All of the above Answer: a

217. Live up to the others expectations is a principle of

- a. Pre conventional stage of morality
- b. Conventional stage of morality
- c. Post conventional stages of morality
- d. All of the above Answer: b

218. Post conventional stages of morality gives importance -----

- a. Abstract ideas
- b. concrete ideas
- c. Social contract
- d. Both A&C Answer: c

219. Ethic of care comes under the category of..

- a. Waves of feminism
- b. care focused feminism
- c. Black feminism
- d. White feminism Answer: b

220. The notion of justice is discussed in the context of.....-

- a. Ethic of care
- b. Dual parenting
- c. mothering
- d. stages of moral development Answer: a

221. According to Engel's women lose their significance in the society due to -----

- a. Acceleration of wealth
- b. Invention of private property
- c. Accumulation of wealth
- d. All of the above Answer: d

222. Division of class according to Engels is-----

- a. Master and slave
  - b. Men and women
  - c. High caste and low caste
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: a

223. According to Engels after the invention of private property mode of society changes from -----

- a. Matriarchy to patriarchy
  - b. patriarchy to matriarchy
  - c. communalistic to communist
  - d. Anarchy to communism
- Answer: a

224. What is the world- historical defeat of the female sex?

- a. Disappearance of mother right
  - b. Disappearance of father right
  - c. Disappearance of child right
  - d. Inheritance through mother
- Answer: a

225. According to Engels ancient society was.....

- a. monogamy
  - b. polygamy
  - c. both monogamy and polygamy
  - d. Nothing called polygamy and monogamy
- Answer: b

226. Carl Jung called inner life as

- a. Psyche
  - b. Mind
  - c. Anima
  - d. Animus
- Answer: a

227. Who propose the idea that human consciousness compressing opposing characteristics?

- a. Carl Jung
  - b. Sigmund Freud
  - c. Karl Marx
  - d. Jacques Lacan
- Answer: a

228. who state that inner life as structured like language?

- a. Jacques Lacan
  - b. Carl Jung
  - c. Freud
  - d. Marx
- Answer: a

229. Eternal feminine concept is associated with.....-

- a. Simon De Beauvoir
  - b. Okaley
  - c. Kate Millett
  - d. Shulamith Firestone
- Answer: a

230. Simone de Beauvoir comes under the philosophical tradition
- Phenomenological feminism
  - Existential feminism
  - Liberal feminism
  - Radical feminism
- Answer: b
231. Who re write the Engels definition of historical materialism?
- Shulamith firestone
  - Okaley
  - Kate Millett
  - Carl Jung
- Answer: a
232. Abortion rights argued in -----Feminism
- Black feminism
  - Eurocentric Feminism
  - Liberal Feminism
  - Third wave feminism
- Answer: b
233. Laissez faire theory advocate by
- J.S.Mill
  - James Mill
  - John Locke
  - Thomas Hobbes
- Answer: a
234. Laissez faire theory establish the view that
- Maximum freedom for individual
  - Maximum freedom for state
  - Less freedom to individual
  - States superemacy over individual
- Answer: a
235. Who wrote the book feminism?
- Jane Freed man
  - Auguste compte
  - V.Geetha
  - Kate Millett
- Answer: a
236. Major issues in black feminism
- Sexism and racism
  - Economic issues
  - Reproduction
  - production
- Answer: a
237. Who wrote the book "The creation of Feminist consciousness"
- Gerde Lerner
  - Sandra Harding
  - Levi strauss
  - Kate Millett
- Answer: a

238. who wrote the book "Three essays on the theory of sexuality"?
- Freud
  - Marx
  - Engels
  - Robert Connel
- Answer: a
239. Marxian philosophy comes under the category of ..
- Materialism
  - Spiritualism
  - Idealism
  - rationalism
- Answer: a
240. The cardinal point of Marxian philosophy is -----
- Dialectical Materialism
  - dialectical Spiritualism
  - spiritual idealism
  - Rationalism
- Answer: a
241. What are the two interlinked material processes of the society proposed by Marx?
- Production and distribution
  - Production and re-production
  - Production and consumption
  - Re Production and re distribution
- Answer: b
242. According to Marx the mode of production is -----
- static
  - Dynamic
  - Both static and dynamic
  - None of the above
- Answer: b
243. What is the main reason for women's powerlessness in society, according to Marx?
- Emergence of private property
  - Changes in modes of production
  - Physical strength of men
  - Patience of women
- Answer: a
244. Invention of Private property as a major cause of powerlessness women in society. This conception is related with
- Marxist feminism
  - Communalism
  - communism
  - Socialism
- Answer: a
245. According to Marxist feminist theory primitive society is in character
- Communalistic
  - Communitistic
  - Anarchist
  - None of the above
- Answer: b

246. According to Marxist the change of mode of production makes women's status as-----
- Private property
  - Independent
  - Dominant
  - None of the above
- Answer: a
247. Children's inheritance through mother is known as .....
- Mother right
  - Father right
  - Parental right
  - Social right
- Answer: a
248. According to Marxist feminism, primitive society was-----
- Patriarchal
  - Matriarchal
  - Non communistic
  - Communalistic
- Answer: b
249. 'The Interpretation of Dream' is written by ...
- Hitler
  - Engels
  - Kohlberg
  - Freud
- Answer: d
250. 'The Ego and the Id' is written by-----
- Karl Jung
  - Jacques Lacan
  - Judith Butler
  - Freud
- Answer: d
251. 'The Psycho Pathology of Everyday Life' is written by'-----
- Freud
  - Engels
  - Lacan
  - Butler
- Answer: a
252. 'Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious' is written by-----
- Freud
  - Butler
  - Kohlberg
  - Hitler
- Answer: a
253. who wrote the book 'The Future of an Illusion'?
- Freud
  - Butler
  - Judith Butler
  - Robin Morgan
- Answer: a

254. 'Moses and Monotheism' is written by-----

- a. Freud
  - b. Engels
  - c. Butler
  - d. Kohlberg
- Answer: a

255. 'Beyond the pleasure principle' is written by -----

- a. Freud
  - b. Butler
  - c. Kohlberg
  - d. Lacan
- Answer: a

256. Who wrote the book 'Dialectics of Nature'?

- a. Marx
  - b. Butler
  - c. Kohlberg
  - d. Engels
- Answer: d

257. 'Principle of communism' is written by-----

- a. Marx
  - b. Engels
  - c. Robin Morgan
  - d. Hitler
- Answer: b

258. 'Socialism: Utopian and scientific' is written by-----

- a. Lacan
  - b. Butler
  - c. Engels
  - d. Robin Morgan
- Answer: c

259. 'Undoing Gender' is written by -----

- a. Judith Butler
  - b. Kohl Berg
  - c. Lacan
  - d. Nancy Chodorow
- Answer: a

260. 'The Bodies that matters' is written by -----

- a. Judith Butler
  - b. Kohlberg
  - c. Gilligan
  - d. Lacan
- Answer: a

261. 'Black Feminist Thought' is written by-- -----

- a. Patricia Hill Collins
  - b. Lacan
  - c. Firestone
  - d. Engels
- Answer: a

262. 'Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity' is written by-----
- Kohlberg
  - Gilligan
  - Lacan
  - Butler Answer: d
263. 'The Psychic Power of: Theories in Subjection' is written by-----
- Butler
  - Kohlberg
  - Engels
  - Lacan Answer: a
264. 'The Four Fundamental concepts of Psychoanalysis' is written by-----
- Jacques Lacan
  - Marx
  - Gilligan
  - Nancy Chodorow Answer: a
265. 'Psychological Type' is written by -----
- Carl Jung
  - Engels
  - Butler
  - Lacan Answer: a
266. 'The Power of Feelings: Personal Meaning in Psychoanalysis, Gender, and Culture' is written by -----
- Nancy Chodorow
  - Shulamith Firestone
  - Butler
  - Engels Answer: a
267. Psychoanalytical theory is associated with.....
- Sigmund Freud
  - Karl Marx
  - Judith Butler
  - Gabriel Marcel Answer: a
268. Who introduced concept of anima in psychoanalytical theory?
- Sigmund Freud
  - Carl Jung
  - Judith Butler
  - Jacques Lacan Answer: b
269. Who introduced concept of Animus in psychoanalytical theory?
- Karl Marx
  - Jacques Lacan
  - Carl Jung
  - Judith Butler Answer: c

270. Archetype of unconscious is introduced by-----
- Karl Jaspers
  - Karl Marx
  - Carl Jung
  - Gabriel Marcel
- Answer: c
271. Anima is the archetype of unconscious mind of-----
- Men
  - Women
  - Both men and women
  - Abnormal human beings
- Answer: a
272. Animus is the unconscious mind of.....
- Men
  - women
  - Both men and women
  - None of the above
- Answer: b
273. At the time of birth all of us are bi -sexual. Who introduced this view ?
- Judith Butler
  - Gabriel Marcel
  - Carl Jung
  - Karl Jaspers
- Answer: c
274. Communist manifesto was written by-----
- Frederich Engels and Karl Marx
  - Karl Marx and Karl Jung
  - Marx and Frederich Nietzsche
  - Vladmir Lenin and Karl Marx
- Answer: a
275. According to Engels----- determines the condition of women in the society.
- Freedom
  - Responsibility
  - society
  - Economy
- Answer: d
276. Two determine factors of development of society, according to Engels
- Production and distribution
  - production and Transportation
  - Production and Reproduction
  - production and consumption
- Answer: c
277. According to Engels production means-----
- Production of food, shelter and cloth
  - production of fund
  - Production of agricultural products
  - Industrial products
- Answer: a

278. According to Engels Reproduction means-----

- a. Procreation
- b. increasing wealth
- c. increasing means of production
- d. None of the above

Answer: a

279. Origin of the term gender

- a. Greek
- b. Latin
- c. German
- d. Hebrew

Answer: a

280. The word 'Genus' means

- a. Class
- b. sex
- c. Male
- d. Female

Answer: a

281. "Gender is the result of socially constructed ideas about the behavior, actions and roles of a particular sex performs". This definition given by

- a. WHO
- b. UNESCO
- c. ICC
- d. ILO

Answer: a

282. Gender means

- a. Sociological Difference between men and women
- b. Biological difference between men and women
- c. Both A and B
- d. None of the above

Answer: a

283. Gender is determined by

- a. Sociologically
- b. biologically
- c. Both A and B
- d. None of the above

Answer: a

284. " Levelling the playing field of girls and boys (men and women) by ensuring that , all children have equal opportunity to develop their talents". Definition given by

- a. WHO
- b. UNESCO
- c. UNICEF
- d. ILU)

Answer: c

285. The 'Reproduction of Mothering 'is written by

- a. Nancy Chodorow
- b. Robin Morgan

- c. Hilary Kornblith
- d. Firestone Answer: a

286. Ethic of care gives emphasis to
- a. Importance of relationship
  - b. Women empowerment
  - c. Male domination
  - d. female domination Answer: a

287. Theory of stages of Moral development is introduced by
- a. Carol Gilligan
  - b. Nancy Chodorow
  - c. Lawrence Kohlberg
  - d. Simon de Beauvoir Answer: a

288. 'The relation between Men and Women: both perceptual and material'.  
Definition given by
- a. WHO
  - b. UNESCO
  - c. FAO
  - d. UNICEF Answer: b

289. Waves of feminism represents
- a. Historical development of feminism
  - b. kinds of Feminism
  - c. Meaning of Feminism
  - d. None of the above Answer: a

290. The time period of first wave Feminism
- a. Late 18th century to early part of 20th century
  - b. Early 18th century to 19th century
  - c. 19th century
  - d. 20th century Answer: a

291. The first wave feminism focused on
- a. Legal issues
  - b. cultural issues
  - c. Social issues
  - d. None of the above Answer: b

292. Major figure in the first wave feminism
- a. Simone de Beauvoir
  - b. Mary Wollstoncraft
  - c. Rachel Carson
  - d. Robin Morgan Answer: b

293. The most influenced theory in the first wave feminism
- a. De ontological

- b. Epicureanism
  - c. Justice
  - d. Utilitarianism
- Answer: d

294. The greatest happiness of the greatest number is associated with-----
- a. Deontology
  - b. Theory of Justice
  - c. Utilitarianism
  - d. stoicism
- Answer: c

295. Jermmy Bandham is the chief exponent of -----
- a. Utilitarianism
  - b. De ontology
  - c. Social contract
  - d. Theory of Justice
- Answer: a

296. Harriot Taylor is associated with
- a. Utilitarianism
  - b. De ontology
  - c. Ethical cognitivism
  - d. non naturalism
- Answer: a

297. First wave Feminism achieve
- a. Woman's property Right
  - b. Right to Votec
  - c. Both A and B
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: c

298. The non physiological difference between men and women were constructed by -----
- a. Nature
  - b. society
  - c. Men
  - d. Women
- Answer: b

299. The book Second Sex was written by-----
- a. Simone de Beauvoir
  - b. Robin Morgan
  - c. Lawrence Kohlberg
  - d. Carol Gilligan
- Answer: a

300. The mythical story 'Oedipus' is related with -----
- a. Sigmund Freud's Psycho analytical theory
  - b. Eangel's theory of gender
  - c. Carl jung's Psycho analytical theory
  - d. Lacan's psycho analytical theory
- Answer: a

301. The 'Logic of unconscious' in Freud's psycho analytical theory is -----
- a. Internal dynamism

- b. External dynamism
  - c. External stimuli
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: a

302. What are the aspects of unconscious?

- a. Id
  - b. Ego
  - c. Super ego
  - d. All of the above
- Answer: d

303. When we can make ensure that a child's ego is stabilized according to Freud's psychology?

- a. He/She differentiate his or her own body from the nursing mother
  - b. Identify that body and bodily functions are different
  - c. Both A&B
  - d. None of these
- Answer: c

304. The concept of 'Penis Envy' is associated with

- a. Psycho analytical theory of Sigmund Freud
  - b. Psycho analytical theory of Jacques Lacan
  - c. Psycho analytical theory of Jung
  - d. Marxist Feminist theory
- Answer: a

305. 'Castration fear' is associated with

- a. Psycho analytical theory of Sigmund Freud
  - b. Psycho analytical theory of Jacques Lacan
  - c. Psycho analytical theory of Jung
  - d. Marxist Feminist theory
- Answer: a

306. Who wrote the book 'Civilization and its discontents'?

- a. Marx
  - b. Freud
  - c. Jung
  - d. Gilligan
- Answer: b

307. According to Lacan Phallus represents

- a. Law of the father
  - b. Law of mother
  - c. Law of nature
  - d. None of these
- Answer: b

308. According to Lacan both men and women are functions like -----

- a. Signifier in the language
  - b. signified in the Language
  - c. Both signifier and signified
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: a

309. Liberal Feminism belongs to the category of -----

- a. waves of Feminism

- b. Kinds of Feminism
  - c. Third world feminism
  - d. None of these
- Answer: a

310. Liberal feminism gives important to-----
- a. maximum freedom for women
  - b. Protect men's Right
  - c. Protect white women's right
  - d. Protect black women's right
- Answer: b

311. The cardinal principles of Liberal feminism is.....
- a. Freedom of choice
  - b. Equality of opportunity
  - c. Equal citizenship with men
  - d. All of the above
- Answer: a

312. Classical liberalism gives emphasis to -- -----
- a. Freedom from coercive interference
  - b. Autonomy of will
  - c. Political Autonomy
  - d. None of the above
- Answer: d

313. Egalitarian Liberal feminism comes under the category of -----
- a. Liberal Feminism
  - b. Classical liberal feminism
  - c. white feminism
  - d. black feminism
- Answer: a


314. Egalitarian liberal feminism gives emphasis on the principle of-----
- a. Autonomy of will
  - b. political autonomy
  - c. Both a & b
  - d. Racism
- Answer: a

315. The main aim of Radical feminism is----
- a. over throw patriarchy
  - b. Abolish the gender roles assigned by society
  - c. Political changes through voting
  - d. Both a & b
- Answer: c

316. "A vindication of Rights of women" is the book written by-----
- a. Mary woll-stone craft
  - b. J.S Mill
  - c. James Mill
  - d. Kumari Jayawardena
- Answer: a

317. "A Vindication of Rights" published in the year.....-
- a. 1792
  - b. 1798

- c. 1777
- d. 1778 Answer: a



# **UNIT - 9**

Logic

## Logic

Though literature is commonly thought to tell some kind of truth, it is surely not one comparable to logic. A time-honoured example: Socrates is a man All men are mortal Therefore Socrates is mortal. Given the premises, we intuitively grasp the conclusion as true. How could it be otherwise? It offends some sense of rightness to deny it, just as we cannot assert that something is at once the case and not the case,  $p$  and not- $p$ . But what is this intuitive sense?

Broadly, there are four views. The first is that the laws of logic are generalized, empirical truths about how things in the world behave, like the laws of science, but more abstract. Few believe this. That "ravens are black" is not an inevitable truth in the way "all bachelors are unmarried" necessarily must be. We accept that ravens are indeed black, but could conceive of some being not so. But a married bachelor is a contradiction in terms, something we can't seriously entertain.

A second theory, is that the laws of logic are not given to us by experience, but are true in ways more fundamental than our sense impressions: they are true because that is how the world is. The mind's power of reason gives us insight into the inherent nature of things: truth is a property of the world rather than our reasoning processes. But what is this property? We don't derive our laws of logic through insight, and there are sufficient conundrums in the physical world (e.g. quantum mechanics where an electron is sometimes a particle and sometimes wave occupying a position with some percentage of probability) for us to doubt if logic can be safely grounded in the outside world.

A third view is that logic is isomorphous with mind functioning, that humans by their constitutions are unable to entertain contradictions once they become apparent. Our brains are simply constructed ("hardwired") so as to reject logical inconsistencies. But logic is not a branch of psychology or physiology; and we have as yet only a rudimentary understanding of brain functioning. A theory so dependent on unknowns is not one securely based.

The fourth view is simpler: the laws of logic are verbal conventions. We learn through social usage the meanings of and, and not, true and false. In one, trivial sense this is undeniably true. But if the terminology is arbitrary, we still cannot rationalize away our sense of truth and correctness in this manner. The sentence " $p$  and not- $p$ " remains a contradiction, whatever term we give it.

## Sentential Logic

Move on, difficulties notwithstanding. Logics that aim to represent situations in simple, context-free sentences are called sentential (also propositional, or propositional calculus), after Gottlob Frege who founded modern mathematical logic. Sentential logic is built with propositions (simple assertions that employ logical constants like not and or, and and and if - then. Such logics cannot deal with expressions like he believed her (which appeal to the common understanding of the human heart) but are very powerful in their own field.

## Symbolic Logic

Indeed, once connectives are used ( $\&$ ,  $\sim$ ,  $\exists$ ,  $\supset$ ,  $\forall$  and, not, some, supposing, all) very complex sentences can be built up where the truth value of the whole sentence is dependent only on the truth values of its components. We arrive not only at secure judgements, but see clearly how the individual propositions systematically play their part in the overall truth or falsity of the sentence.

Symbols are commonly used. Take a sentence like: John exists. We recast that as: There is something that is John, and that something is identical to John. Expressed symbolically that becomes:  $(\exists x) (x = \text{John})$ . Everything is green becomes:  $(\forall x) (\text{Green}(x))$ . Using the negative  $\sim$  we can ex-

press: everything is green as: it is not the case that everything is not green:  $\sim (\exists x) (\sim \text{green}(x))$ .

Is this helpful? Immensely so. Numbers can be defined in this way. Perplexing sentences like: The King of France is bald can be re-expressed as a conjunction of three propositions:

1. There is a King of France,
2. There is not more than one King of France, and
3. Everything that is a King of France is bald. Put another way, this becomes: there is an  $x$ , such that  $x$  is a King of France,  $x$  is bald, and for every  $y$ ,  $y$  is a King of France only if  $y$  is identical with  $x$ . In symbols:  $(\exists x) (K(x) \& b(x) \& (y)(K(y) \supset (y = x)))$ .

## Metalinguages

But how do we handle logical paradoxes like the following: { What is written between these brackets is false.} If what is written between the brackets is false, it is also false that What is written between these brackets is false – i.e. the sentence must be true. But we have accepted it as false. How can we stop sentences referring to themselves? Alfred Tarski's solution was to consider the primary sentence as written in an object language, and that commenting on the primary sentence is in another language altogether, a metalanguage. Both languages had to be logically formulated to avoid the tangles and vagueness of everyday speech, but only the metalanguage could refer to the object language, not the other way about.

## Many-Valued Logics

Are these the only categories of logic? Not at all. There are three-valued systems that operate with true, false and possible/indeterminate. There are systems that use more than three values. And there is a large branch of logic (modal logic) that deals not with simple propositional assertions, but with concepts like possible, impossible, contingent, necessary and absurd. And since what is true today may not have been so yesterday, some have argued that time should come into logic, {7} either by changing our understanding of logical operators, or by extending standard logic. Why have these alternatives been developed, and how do they modify a search for an ideal, logically transparent language?

A two-value system of logic is unsatisfactory in some areas of mathematics on two counts. Certain propositions cannot be declared true or false because that truth or falsity hasn't been demonstrated. Secondly, the adoption of either true and false values for a proposition may lead to contradictions in the mathematical treatment of quantum mechanics and relativity. As an alternative to standard logic, Jan Lukasiewicz developed a three-valued system of logic: true, false and possible, usually denoted as 1, 0 and 1/2 – where the possible was defined by his pupil Tarski in 1921. Once the possible was denoted as 1/2 the way was open to many-valued logics, and such logics are indeed used to solve problems associated with independence, non-contradiction and completeness of axioms.

Much richer than these is the practical or deontic (normative) logic developed by G.H. von Wright, {9} who recognized two aspects of knowledge: theoretical and practical. The last he divided into logics of values, names and imperatives. Four modal categories applied to each of these three logics – truth (necessary, possible or contingent), knowledge (verified, falsified or undecided), obligation (compulsory, permitted, forbidden) and existence (relation of modal logic to quantification). The matter is technical, of course, and contested, but has been applied to legal issues.

If nonstandard logics like modal and the many-valued escape the restrictions of standard logic, are they more widely applicable? Surprisingly, the answer is no. They apply more cogently in certain specific areas (in quantum mechanics, in computer circuitry, or the problems of relay and switching circuits in electrical theory) but lose their universality because the two-valued tautologies no longer apply. Many workers regard them as degraded systems, no more than interesting novelties.

### **Role of Logic and Its Limitations**

So where does logic fit into philosophy? Mostly as a means to an end, i.e. to thinking clearly, and expressing that thought succinctly. The psychologist Jean Piaget certainly regarded thinking as secondary to the actions of the intelligence. For him (as it was for Cassirer) logic was a science of pure forms, structures simply representing the processes of thought. Logic was too narrow, arid and mechanical to properly represent human thought processes. René Poirier argued for an organic logic where modalities operated on various levels: symbolism, experience and mental certitude. Symbolic logic was only the syntactical manipulation of signs empty of content. Logic should start further down, thought Petre Botezatu, by studying the structures of thoughts themselves. Above all, thought Anton Dumitru, we must know directly the fundamental ideas and principles of logic.

### **Reference and Naming**

How could we know these principles? Moreover, to take something more straightforward, how do we even make reference to objects that form the subjects of simple two-value propositions? There is more to it than pointing and uttering a name. Many words denote things abstract, or never seen, or possibly not even existing. And the matter is crucial. However logically transparent the sentences, they will not make sense unless they hook up to the world beyond.

How is this done? What is the answer to literary critics like Derrida who claim that words point not to objects, but to other words, and these to yet more, and so on endlessly? At their simplest, prior to their use in propositions and sentences, words refer to things. But do they need to have meanings, or can they simply denote things – i.e. do they describe or simply point? Russell opted for both: his theory of descriptions combined sense and reference:  $F$  denotes  $x$  iff  $F$  applies to  $x$ . (Additionally, there was a special category of logically proper names that denoted simple objects, these simple objects being the results of direct acquaintance, i.e. of sense impressions.) But in general Russell's ordinary proper names were identified with description, even though different speakers might carry around different descriptions in their heads. And where the simple object denoted did not exist (the King of France) then matters could be arranged so that one at least of the propositions was false.

We can therefore speak meaningfully of things that do not exist. The sentences are simply false, as would be those employing a fiction like Sherlock Holmes. But since there is a distinction between Sherlock Holmes was a detective, and Sherlock Holmes was a woman, subsequent philosophers have often preferred to use a formal language in a domain of fictional entities: the so-called free logics. Many things are not determinable in fiction, moreover (did Sherlock Holmes have an aunt in Leamington Spa?) so that these logics are often multi-valued.

Since a name might not be acceptable to everyone, or might conjure up very different descriptions in different minds, Strawson and Searle suggested that name and reference should be established by a cluster of descriptions, most though not all operating at any one time. But what do we understand by: The man who murdered Sadat was insane? – insane because he murdered Sadat, or in-

sane anyway? To distinguish, Donnellan used the terms attributive and referential respectively.

Saul Kripke is critical of description. Descriptions may fix a reference, but do not give it sense. Some may even turn out later to be false. To preserve a reference from these mishaps what we should employ are rigid designators, entities which have the same reference in all possible worlds. Remember, says Kripke, that references are often borrowed without being understood, and that we may have only the haziest notion of Cicero and the Cataline plot but still wish to refer to them. Let us therefore adopt a causal theory of reference. A name is introduced by dubbing: ostension. People not present at the dubbing can pick up the name later, and in turn pass it on to others: the reference chains are called designating or d-chains. The name thus becomes independent of its first use or user, allows substitution by other words, and needs no elaborate descriptions. No doubt this mimics what actually happens in the world. But each speaker is now responsible for the reference: his meanings, and associations in using the name can all be referred back and checked. Words other than names are more difficult: they require reference fixing and theories for reference borrowing, which is where a good deal of contemporary work continues.

## **Truth**

**Truth**, in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, the property of sentences, assertions, beliefs, thoughts, or propositions that are said, in ordinary discourse, to agree with the facts or to state what is the case.

## **The Correspondence Theory**

The classic suggestion comes from Aristotle: "To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true." In other words, the world provides "what is" or "what is not," and the true saying or thought corresponds to the fact so provided. This idea appeals to common sense and is the germ of what is called the correspondence theory of truth. As it stands, however, it is little more than a platitude and far less than a theory. Indeed, it may amount to merely a wordy paraphrase, whereby, instead of saying "that's true" of some assertion, one says "that corresponds with the facts." Only if the notions of fact and correspondence can be further developed will it be possible to understand truth in these terms.

Unfortunately, many philosophers doubt whether an acceptable explanation of facts and correspondence can be given. Facts, as they point out, are strange entities. It is tempting to think of them as structures or arrangements of things in the world. However, as the Austrian-born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, structures have spatial locations, but facts do not. The Eiffel Tower can be moved from Paris to Rome, but the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris cannot be moved anywhere. Furthermore, critics urge, the very idea of what the facts are in a given case is nothing apart from people's sincere beliefs about the case, which means those beliefs that people take to be true.

Thus, there is no enterprise of first forming a belief or theory about some matter and then in some new process stepping outside the belief or theory to assess whether it corresponds with the facts. There are, indeed, processes of checking and verifying beliefs, but they work by bringing up further beliefs and perceptions and assessing the original in light of those. In actual investigations, what tells people what to believe is not the world or the facts but how they interpret the world or select and conceptualize the facts.

## Coherence And Pragmatist Theories

Starting in the mid-19th century, this line of criticism led some philosophers to think that they should concentrate on larger theories, rather than sentences or assertions taken one at a time. Truth, on this view, must be a feature of the overall body of belief considered as a system of logically interrelated components—what is called the “web of belief.” It might be, for example, an entire physical theory that earns its keep by making predictions or enabling people to control things or by simplifying and unifying otherwise disconnected phenomena. An individual belief in such a system is true if it sufficiently coheres with, or makes rational sense within, enough other beliefs; alternatively, a belief system is true if it is sufficiently internally coherent. Such were the views of the British idealists, including F.H. Bradley and H.H. Joachim, who, like all idealists, rejected the existence of mind-independent facts against which the truth of beliefs could be determined.

Yet coherentism too seems inadequate, since it suggests that human beings are trapped in the sealed compartment of their own beliefs, unable to know anything of the world beyond. Moreover, as the English philosopher and logician Bertrand Russell pointed out, nothing seems to prevent there being many equally coherent but incompatible belief systems. Yet at best only one of them can be true.

Some theorists have suggested that belief systems can be compared in pragmatic or utilitarian terms. According to this idea, even if many different systems can be internally coherent, it is likely that some will be much more useful than others. Thus, one can expect that, in a process akin to Darwinian natural selection, the more useful systems will survive while the others gradually go extinct. The replacement of Newtonian mechanics by relativity theory is an example of this process. It was in this spirit that the 19th-century American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce said:

The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. In effect, Peirce’s view places primary importance on scientific curiosity, experimentation, and theorizing and identifies truth as the imagined ideal limit of their ongoing progress. Although this approach may seem appealingly hard-headed, it has prompted worries about how a society, or humanity as a whole, could know at a given moment whether it is following the path toward such an ideal. In practice it has opened the door to varying degrees of skepticism about the notion of truth. In the late 20th century philosophers such as Richard.

Rorty advocated retiring the notion of truth in favour of a more open-minded and open-ended process of indefinite adjustment of beliefs. Such a process, it was felt, would have its own utility, even though it lacked any final or absolute endpoint.

## Tarski And Truth Conditions

The rise of formal logic (the abstract study of assertions and deductive arguments) and the growth of interest in formal systems (formal or mathematical languages) among many Anglo-American philosophers in the early 20th century led to new attempts to define truth in logically or scientifically acceptable terms. It also led to a renewed respect for the ancient liar paradox (attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epimenides), in which a sentence says of itself that it is false, thereby apparently being true if it is false and false if it is true. Logicians set themselves the task of developing systems of mathematical reasoning that would be free of the kinds of self-

reference that give rise to paradoxes such as that of the liar. However, this proved difficult to do without at the same time making some legitimate proof procedures impossible. There is good self-reference (“All sentences, including this, are of finite length”) and bad self-reference (“This sentence is false”) but no generally agreed-upon principle for distinguishing them.

These efforts culminated in the work of the Polish-born logician Alfred Tarski, who in the 1930s showed how to construct a definition of truth for a formal or mathematical language by means of a theory that would assign truth conditions (the conditions in which a given sentence is true) to each sentence in the language without making use of any semantic terms, notably including truth, in that language. Truth conditions were identified by means of “T-sentences.” For example, the English-language T-sentence for the German sentence *Schnee ist weiss* is: “Schnee ist weiss” is true if and only if snow is white. A T-sentence says of some sentence (S) in the object language (the language for which truth is being defined) that S is true if and only if..., where the ellipsis is replaced by a translation of S into the language used to construct the theory (the metalanguage). Since no metalanguage translation of any S (in this case, snow is white) will contain the term true, Tarski could claim that each T-sentence provides a “partial definition” of truth for the object language and that their sum total provides the complete definition.

While the technical aspects of Tarski’s work were much admired and have been much discussed, its philosophical significance remained unclear, in part because T-sentences struck many theorists as less than illuminating. But the weight of philosophical opinion gradually shifted, and eventually this platitudinous appearance was regarded as a virtue and indeed as indicative of the whole truth about truth. The idea was that, instead of staring at the abstract question “What is truth?,” philosophers should content themselves with the particular question “What does the truth of S amount to?”; and for any well-specified sentence, a humble T-sentence will provide the answer.

## Deflationism

Philosophers before Tarski, including Gottlob Frege and Frank Ramsey, had suspected that the key to understanding truth lay in the odd fact that putting “It is true that...” in front of an assertion changes almost nothing. It is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white. At most there might be an added emphasis, but no change of topic. The theory that built on this insight is known as “deflationism” or “minimalism” (an older term is “the redundancy theory”).

Yet, if truth is essentially redundant, why should talk of truth be so common? What purpose does the truth predicate serve? The answer, according to most deflationists, is that true is a highly useful device for making generalizations over large numbers of sayings or assertions. For example, suppose that Winston.

Churchill said many things ( $S_1, S_2, S_3, \dots, S_n$ ). One could express total agreement with him by asserting, for each of these sayings in turn, “Churchill said S, and S,” and then asserting, “And that is all he said.” But even if one could do this—which would involve knowing and repeating every single saying Churchill made—it would be much more economical just to say, “Everything Churchill said was true.” Similarly, “Every indicative sentence is either true or false” is a way of insisting, for each such sentence (S), S or not S.

Despite their contention that the truth predicate is essentially redundant, deflationists can allow that truth is important and that it should be the aim of rational inquiry. Indeed, the paraphrases into which the deflationary view renders such claims help to explain why this is so. Thus, “It is important

to believe that someone is ill only if it is true that he is" becomes "It is important to believe that someone is ill only if he is." Other broad claims that appeal to the notion of truth can likewise be paraphrased in illuminating ways, according to deflationists. "Science is useful because what it says is true" is a way of simultaneously asserting an indefinitely large number of sentences such as "Science is useful because it says that cholera is caused by a bacterium, and it is" and "Science is useful because it says that smoking causes cancer, and it does" and so on.

While deflationism has been an influential view since the 1970s, it has not escaped criticism. One objection is that it takes the meanings of sentences too much for granted. According to many theorists, including the American philosopher Donald Davidson, the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to its truth conditions. If deflationism is correct, however, then this approach to sentence meaning might have to be abandoned (because no statement of the truth conditions of a sentence could be any more informative than the sentence itself). But this in turn is contestable, since deflationists can reply that the best model of what it is to "give the truth conditions" of a sentence is simply that of Tarski, and Tarski uses nothing beyond the deflationists' own notion of truth. If this is right, then saying what a sentence means by giving its truth conditions comes to nothing more than saying what a sentence means.

As indicated above, the realm of truth bearers has been populated in different ways in different theories. In some it consists of sentences, in others sayings, assertions, beliefs, or propositions. Although assertions and related speech acts are featured in many theories, much work remains to be done on the nature of assertion in different areas of discourse. The danger, according to Wittgenstein and many others, is that the smooth notion of an assertion conceals many different functions of language underneath its bland surface. For example, some theorists hold that some assertions are not truth bearers but are rather put forward as useful fictions, as instruments, or as expressions of attitudes of approval or disapproval or of dispositions to act in certain ways. A familiar example of such a view is expressivism in ethics, which holds that ethical assertions (e.g., "Vanity is bad") function as expressions of attitude ("Tsk tsk") or as prescriptions ("Do not be vain!"). Another example is the constructive empiricism of the Dutch-born philosopher Bas van Fraassen, according to which some scientific assertions are not expressions of belief so much as expressions of a lesser state of mind, "acceptance." Accordingly, assertions such as "Quarks exist" are put forward not as true but merely as "empirically adequate." If some such views are correct, however, then an adequate theory of truth will require some means of distinguishing the kinds of assertion to which it should apply—some account, in other words, of what "asserting as true" consists of and how it contrasts, if it does, with other kinds of commitment.

Even if there is this much diversity in the human linguistic repertoire, however, it does not necessarily follow that deflationism—according to which the truth predicate applies redundantly to all assertions—is wrong. The diversity might be identifiable without holding the truth predicate responsible. "Vanity is bad" or "Quarks exist" might contrast with "Snow is white" in important respects without the difference entailing that the first two sentences are without truth value (neither true nor false) or at best true in other senses.

## **Validity**

### **Definition of validity**

One desirable feature of arguments is that the conclusion should follow from the premises. But what does it mean? Consider these two arguments :

- Argument #1 : Barbie is over 90 years old. So Barbie is over 20 years old.
- Argument #2 : Barbie is over 20 years old. So Barbie is over 90 years old.

Intuitively, the conclusion of the first argument follows from the premise, whereas the conclusion of the second argument does not follow from its premise. But how should we explain the difference between the two arguments more precisely? Here is a thought : In the first argument, if the premise is indeed true, then the conclusion cannot be false. On the other hand, even if the premise in the second argument is true, there is no guarantee that the conclusion must also be true. For example, Barbie could be 30 years old.

So we shall make use of this idea to define the notion of a deductively valid argument, or valid argument, as follows: An argument is valid if and only if there is no logically possible situation where all the premises are true and the conclusion is false at the same time.

The idea of validity provides a more precise explication of what it is for a conclusion to follow from the premises. Applying this definition, we can see that the first argument above is valid, since there is no possible situation where Barbie can be over 90 but not over 20. The second argument is not valid because there are plenty of possible situations where the premise is true but the conclusion is false. Consider a situation where Barbie is 25, or one where she is 85. The fact that these situations are possible is enough to show that the argument is not valid, or invalid.

## Validity and truth

What if we have an argument with more than one premise? Here is an example : All pigs can fly. Anything that can fly can swim. So all pigs can swim. Although the two premises of this argument are false, this is actually a valid argument. To evaluate its validity, ask yourself whether it is possible to come up with a situation where all the premises are true and the conclusion is false. (We are not asking whether there is a situation where the premises and the conclusion are all true.) Of course, the answer is 'no'. If pigs can indeed fly, and if anything that can fly can also swim, then it must be the case that all pigs can swim.

## So this example tells us something :

The premises and the conclusion of a valid argument can all be false. Hopefully you will now realize that validity is not about the actual truth or falsity of the premises or the conclusion. Validity is about the **logical connection** between the premises and the conclusion. A valid argument is one where the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion, but validity does not guarantee that the premises are in fact true. All that validity tells us is that **if the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.**

## Showing that an argument is invalid

Now consider this argument :

Adam loves Beth. Beth loves Cathy. So Adam loves Cathy. This argument is not valid, for it is possible that the premises are true and yet the conclusion is false. Perhaps Adam loves Beth but does not want Beth to love anyone else. So Adam actually hates Cathy. The mere possibility of such a situation is enough to show that the argument is not valid. Let us call these situations invalidating counterexamples to the argument. Basically, we are defining a valid argument as an argument with

no possible invalidating counterexamples. To sharpen your skills in evaluating arguments, it is therefore important that you are able to discover and construct such examples.

Notice that a counterexample need not be real in the sense of being an actual situation. It might turn out that in fact that Adam, Beth and Cathy are members of the same family and they love each other. But the above argument is still invalid since the counterexample constructed is a possible situation, even if it is not actually real. All that is required of a counterexample is that the situation is a coherent one in which all the premises of the argument are true and the conclusion is false. So we should remember this :

An argument can be invalid even if the conclusion and the premises are all actually true. To give you another example, here is another invalid argument with a true premise and a true conclusion : "Paris is the capital of France. So Rome is the capital of Italy." . It is not valid because it is possible for Italy to change its capital (say to Milan), while Paris remains the capital of France.

Another point to remember is that **it is possible for a valid argument to have a true conclusion even when all its premises are false**. Here is an example :

All pigs are purple in colour. Anything that is purple is an animal. So all pigs are animals. Before proceeding any further, please make sure you understand why these claims are true and can give examples of such cases.

1. The premises and the conclusion of an invalid argument can all be true.
2. A valid argument should not be defined as an argument with true premises and a true conclusion.
3. The premises and the conclusion of a valid argument can all be false.
4. A valid argument with false premises can still have a true conclusion.

## A reminder

The concept of validity provides a more precise explication of what it is for a conclusion to follow from the premises. Since this is one of the most important concepts in this course, you should make sure you fully understand the definition. In giving our definition we are making a distinction between truth and validity. In ordinary usage "valid" is often used interchangeably with "true" (similarly with "false" and "not valid"). But here validity is restricted to only arguments and not statements, and truth is a property of statements but not arguments. So never say things like "this statement is valid" or "that argument is true"!

## Truth and Validity

The term **validity** (also called **logical truth**, **analytic truth**, or **necessary truth**) as it occurs in logic refers generally to a property of particular statements and deductive arguments. Although **validity** and **logical truth** are synonymous concepts, the terms are used variously in different contexts. Whether or not **logical truth** is **analytic truth** is a matter of clarification.

## Validity of Arguments

When an argument is set forth to prove that its conclusion is true (as opposed to probably true), then the argument is intended to be deductive. An argument set forth to show that its conclusion is probably true may be regarded as inductive. To say that an argument is valid is to say that the conclusion really does follow from the premises. That is, an argument is valid precisely when it cannot possibly lead from true premises to a false conclusion. The following definition is fairly typical: An argument is **deductively valid** if, whenever all premises are true, the conclusion is also necessarily true. An argument that is not valid is said to be "invalid". An example of a valid argument is given

by the following well-known syllogism: All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. What makes this a valid argument is not the mere fact that it has true premises and a true conclusion, but the fact of the logical necessity of the conclusion, given the two premises. No matter how the universe might be constructed, it could never be the case that this argument should turn out to have simultaneously true premises but a false conclusion. The above argument may be contrasted with the following invalid one: All men are mortal. Socrates is mortal. Therefore, Socrates is a man.

In this case, the conclusion does not follow inescapably from the premise: a universe is easily imagined in which 'Socrates' is not a man but a woman, so that in fact the above premises would be true but the conclusion false. This possibility makes the argument invalid. (Although whether or not an argument is valid does not depend on what anyone could actually imagine to be the case, this approach helps us evaluate some arguments.)

A standard view is that whether an argument is valid is a matter of the argument's logical form. Many techniques are employed by logicians to represent an argument's logical form. A simple example, applied to the above two illustrations, is the following: Let the letters 'P', 'Q', and 's' stand, respectively, for the set of men, the set of mortals, and Socrates. Using these symbols, the first argument may be abbreviated as:

All P are Q. s is a P.  
Therefore, s is a Q.

Similarly, the second argument becomes:

All P are Q. s is a Q.  
Therefore, s is a P.

These abbreviations make plain the logical form of each respective argument. At this level, notice that we can talk about any arguments that may take on one or the other of the above two configurations, by replacing the letters P, Q and s by appropriate expressions. Of particular interest is the fact that we may exploit an argument's form to help discover whether or not the argument from which it has been obtained is or is not valid. To do this, we define an "interpretation" of the argument as an assignment of sets of objects to the upper-case letters in the argument form, and the assignment of a single individual member of a set to the lower-case letters of the argument form. Thus, letting P stand for the set of men, Q stand for the set of mortals, and s stand for Socrates is an interpretation of each of the above arguments. Using this terminology, we may give a formal analogue of the definition of deductive validity:

An argument is **formally valid** if its form is one such that for each interpretation under which the premises are all true also the conclusion is true. As already seen, the interpretation given above does cause the second argument form to have true premises and false conclusion, hence demonstrating its invalidity.

## **Denotation and connotation**

The terms, **denotation** and **connotation**, are used to convey and distinguish between two different kinds of meanings or extensions of a word. A denotation is the strict, literal, definition of a word, devoid of any emotion, attitude, or color. The connotation of a word or term adds elements of emo-

tion, attitude, or color. The meaning or use of denotation and connotation depends partly on the field of study.

## The meaning of denotation and connotation

- In media-studies terminology, **denotation** is the first level of analysis: What the audience can visually see on a page. Denotation often refers to something literal, and avoids being a metaphor. Here it is usually coupled with connotation, which is the second level of analysis, being what the denotation represents.
- In logic, linguistics, and semiotics, a **denotation** of a word or phrase is a part of its meaning; however, several parts of meaning may take this name, depending on the contrast being drawn:
- Denotation and connotation are either
- in basic semantics and literary theory, the literal and figurative meanings of a word, or,
- in philosophy, logic and parts of linguistics, the extension and intension of a word
- Denotation can be synonymous with **reference**, and connotation with **sense**, in the sense and reference distinction in philosophy of language.
- In Computer science, denotational semantics is contrasted with operational semantics.
- In Semiotics, denotation also has its own meaning.

In logic and semantics, denotation always attracts the extension, meaning "in the pair," but the other element genuinely varies. The distinction between connotation and denotation corresponds roughly to Gottlob Frege's ground-breaking and much-studied distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference). Bertrand Russell, in 1905, published a seminal article on the topic of denotation, entitled "On Denoting." Denotation often links with symbolism, as the denotation of a particular media text often represents something further; a hidden meaning (or an enigma code) is often hidden in a media text.

## Examples

In order to understand fully the difference between denotation and connotation in media studies and semiotics, it is helpful to examine some examples: The denotation of this example is a red rose with a green stem. The connotation is that it is a **symbol** of passion and love—this is what the rose represents. The denotation is a brown cross. The connotation is a **symbol** of religion, according to the media connotation. To be more specific, this is a **symbol** of Christianity. The denotation is a representation of a cartoon heart. The connotation is a **symbol** of love and affection, not in the way of a rose, but a symbol of true love.

## Definition of Connotation

A connotation is a subjective cultural and/or emotional coloration in addition to the explicit or denotative meaning of any specific word or phrase in a language.

## Usage

Within contemporary society, **connotation** branches into a culmination of different meanings. These could include the contrast of a word or phrase with its primary, literal meaning (known as a denotation), with what that word or phrase specifically denotes. The connotation essentially relates to how anything may be associated with a word or phrase, for example, an implied value judgment or feelings.

- A stubborn person may be described as being either "strong-willed" or "pig-headed." Although

these have the same literal meaning (that is, stubborn), strong-willed connotes admiration for someone's convictions, while pig-headed connotes frustration in dealing with someone. Likewise, "used car" and "previously owned car" have the same literal meaning, but many dealerships prefer the latter, since it is thought to have fewer negative connotations.

- It is often useful to avoid words with strong connotations (especially disparaging ones) when striving to achieve a neutral point of view. A desire for more positive connotations, or fewer negative ones, is one of the main reasons for using euphemisms. (Although, not all theories of linguistic meaning honor the distinction between literal meaning and connotation).

## Logic

In logic and in some branches of semantics, **connotation** is more or less synonymous with intension. Connotation is often contrasted with **denotation**, which is more or less synonymous with extension. A word's extension is the collection of things it refers to; its intension is what it implies about the things it is used to refer to. So, the **denotation** or **extension** of "dog" is just the collection of all the dogs that exist.

The **connotation** or **intension** of "dog" is (something like) "four-legged canine carnivore." Alternatively, the connotation of the word may be thought of as the set of all its possible referents (as opposed to merely the actual ones). So saying, "You are a dog," would imply that the subject was ugly or aggressive rather than a literal canine.

## Difference Between Denotation and Connotation

Understanding the difference between denotation and connotation is important to understanding definitions and how concepts are used. Unfortunately, that is complicated by the fact that these terms can be used in two different ways: grammatical and logical. Even worse, both uses are worth keeping in mind, and both uses are relevant to the project of logical, critical thinking.

## Meanings

In grammar, a word's denotation is whatever the word directly refers to, roughly equivalent to its lexical definition. Thus, the word "atheist" denotes a person who disbelieves in or denies the existence of gods. A word's connotation refers to any subtle nuances that might or might not be intended by its use. For example, one possible connotation for the word "atheist" might be someone who is immoral and wicked, depending upon who is doing the speaking or listening.

Separating grammatical denotation from connotation is important because while one might assume that a word's denotation is fully intended, whether a word's connotations are intended is much more difficult to determine. Connotations are often emotional in nature, and thus if they are intended, it may be for the purpose of swaying a person's emotional reactions rather than the logical evaluation of an argument.

If there are misunderstandings about how a person is using a word in a particular debate, a primary source of that misunderstanding might lie in the word's connotations: people might be seeing something not intended, or the speaker may be intending something people don't see. In constructing your arguments, it's a good idea not merely to look at what your words denote, but also what they connote.

In logic, the uses of denotation and connotation are very different. The denotation, or extension, of a term, is the list of a class of objects referred to by the word (think of it as "how far does this word

extend?"). Thus the word "planet" denotes specific objects such as Venus, Earth, Jupiter, and Neptune. Whether it also denotes an object like "Pluto" is a matter of some debate among astronomers for reasons I will explain shortly. The connotation, or intention, of a word, is the list of attributes shared by all members of the class named by the word (think of it as "by using this word, what do I intend?"). Thus the word "planet" connotes certain characteristics which astronomers have decided to differentiate certain objects from other objects like comets, stars, and asteroids. The debate over whether the word "planet" denotes "Pluto" is because astronomers disagree on what sorts of attributes are connoted by the word "planet," and hence whether "Pluto" has the right attributes to qualify as a planet.

### **Which Comes First?**

The debate over the status of Pluto indicates that whereas the extension of a word is determined by its intention, the reverse is not also true. Put more simply, the list of objects covered by a word is determined by the list of characteristics that word is thought to describe; on the other hand, the list of characteristics described by a word is not determined by the list of things covered by that word. The objects covered by the word "planet" are determined by what characteristics the word "planet" is supposed to describe, but not the other way around.

At least, that's what some philosophers argue. Others disagree and argue the contrary: that a word is used first to describe a list of objects thought to be similar in some important ways and then, once this denotation of the word is established, the connotation is developed by teasing out a set of reasonable characteristics from the list of objects. Thus, the connotation is determined by the denotation.

Who is right? Perhaps they both are. An example of how difficult it is to determine this might be the word "tree." Did people first create a list of tree-like qualities and then later decide which objects go on the list of "trees," or did people first start calling certain objects "trees" and only later decide what "tree-like" qualities justified inclusion in the list of trees? In logic, science, and philosophy – basically, in any field where very careful thought is required – intention should determine extension. In casual usage, however, it may well be that as a practical matter extension can determine intention.

### **Meanings Change**

The meaning of words can change over time because people will simply use them in different ways, but any change in meaning might represent an extensional change (in what the word denotes), an intentional change (in what the word connotes), or both. For example, the word "marriage" doesn't currently denote (for most people) any unions between two members of the same sex. If we started to denote such unions by "marriage," would that require a change in connotation (what characteristics the word intends) or not?

This is, in fact, a key element in the debate over gay marriage. When people disagree over whether gays should be allowed to marry, they disagree in part over the proper intention of the term "marriage." Unless they come to some agreement over the term's intention, they will never see eye-to-eye over its extension.

An intentional definition, however, lists the attributes or characteristics of the concept – for example, listing the qualities that an object must have to qualify as a planet instead of an asteroid. For obvious reasons, this is often easier than an extensional definition because there is no need to list

a long series of examples – a list of attributes is always shorter and quicker.

## Propositions

The term 'proposition' has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.<sup>[1]</sup>), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

One might wonder whether a single class of entities can play all these roles. If David Lewis (1986, p. 54) is right in saying that "the conception we associate with the word 'proposition' may be something of a jumble of conflicting desiderata," then it will be impossible to capture our conception in a consistent definition.

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like 'proposition', may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat.

Propositions, we shall say, are the sharable objects of the attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens, which presumably are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which presumably cannot be false.

These consequences fit well with contemporary usage. Our definition leaves open many of the questions dividing propositionalists: which additional roles are propositions fit to play? would propositions have to be mind-independent or abstract? what individuation conditions would they have? how would they relate to facts? We examine these issues below, as well as the fundamental issue of whether there are propositions at all.

## The Nature and Status of Propositions

Easy Arguments: Mind-Independence and Abstractness Reflection on the proposition role leads many propositionalists to rather dramatic answers to questions about the nature and status of propositions. Below is one standard line of argument, versions of which can be found in Bealer (1998) and Schiffer (2003).

The proposition that there are rocks, which we denote  $\langle \text{there are rocks} \rangle$ , does not entail the existence of any beings that have or are capable of having mental states. It entails this neither in a strictly or broadly logical sense. That is, it is possible in the broadest sense for  $\langle \text{there are rocks} \rangle$  to be true in the absence of all mental states. But now, if this proposition is possibly true in the absence of mental states, then it possibly exists in the absence of all mental states, and so is mind-independent. This is an easy argument for the mind-independence of at least some propositions.

A parallel "easy argument" can be given for the abstractness of at least some propositions.  $\langle 2+2=4 \rangle$  does not entail the existence of concrete entities. So it is possible for it to be true (and so to exist) in the absence of concrete entities. Thus, it is possibly abstract. Assuming, contra Linksy and Zalta (1996), that abstractness is, necessarily, an essential feature of abstract entities, then it follows that  $\langle 2+2=4 \rangle$  is in fact abstract. One might want to extend such arguments to contingent propositions. Consider  $\langle \text{there are trees} \rangle$ . This proposition is false in a world without concrete entities. But if it is false in such a world, it must exist in that world, and so is possibly, and so actually

abstract.

Similar arguments can be constructed for properties. If properties are what we assert of objects and what is true/false of objects, then there are simple arguments for the conclusion that at many properties are mind-independent and abstract. It is dangerous to generalize these sorts of "Easy Arguments" to all propositions (particularly singular propositions). But even if they cannot be fully generalized, they threaten to show that propositions would be mind-independent abstract entities. Now, given that propositions de jure are sharable objects of attitudes, it is antecedently unlikely that they should turn out to be, say, token utterances. But one might have thought that propositions could be identified with natural language sentence types (as in Quine 1960), or with sentence types in the language of thought. But if the Easy Arguments succeed, it seems that to accept propositions, we must accept Platonism. Conceptualism about propositions seems ruled out.

Many philosophers deny that there are propositions precisely because they accept the validity of these Easy Arguments (and the truth of certain attitude ascriptions). There are familiar problems besetting the believer in abstract entities. The two "Benacerraf problems," in particular have received much attention in the literature: the epistemological problem and identification problem. The epistemological problem for abstract propositions, roughly, is this: how can we know about abstract propositions, given that we cannot causally interact with them? The identification problem requires a bit more explanation. If propositions are abstract, then there will be many distinct candidates for propositions which seem to play the proposition role equally well. If certain entities, the Fs, are candidates for being propositions, why won't the entities consisting of an F paired with the number 1 count as adequate candidates as well, so long as we reconstrue predicates for propositions in such a way as to make the number 1 irrelevant? But propositions cannot be both Fs and these new entities, because these new entities are not Fs. Is it simply indeterminate what propositions are? See the entry on platonism: in metaphysics.

The Easy Arguments can appear suspicious. How can the seemingly obvious acknowledgement that there are propositions — i.e., that beliefs have sharable objects which bear truth-values — commit us to there being mind-independent abstract entities? We will discuss two sorts of reply found in the literature. Both are objections to the inference from there being propositions to the claim that propositions have the surprising features. We are putting aside objections to the claim that there are propositions.

### **Reply #1: Truth in a World vs. Truth at a World.**

The Easy Arguments rely on an assumption about entailment and truth, namely:

(Assumption A) If a proposition  $\langle p \rangle$  fails to entail a proposition  $\langle q \rangle$ , then it is possible for  $\langle p \rangle$  to be true while not- $q$ . This assumption is needed to reason from premises about propositions failing to entail other propositions about there being mental states or being concrete entities to the possible truth of those propositions in the absence of mental states and concrete entities.

But how could (A) fail? If a proposition fails to entail that  $q$ , doesn't it follow that there is a possible world in which the former is true and not- $q$ ? Some philosophers (Pollock 1985, King 2007) have argued that principles like (A) have two readings, one clearly acceptable but useless to the Easy Arguments and the other useful to those arguments but false. The two readings correspond to two ways of understanding talk of truth with respect to possible worlds. One way for something to be true with respect to a world requires the truth-bearer to exist in the world and be true there. Another way is for the truth-bearer to "correctly describe" the world, where this does not require existing in

the world. Pollock gives the example of a picture depicting the non-existence of all pictures. The picture could correctly depict a situation even though the situation it depicts is one in which the picture itself does not exist. Similarly, the Medieval philosopher Jean Buridan discusses the example of an utterance of 'there are no negative utterances'. This utterance correctly describes a certain possible situation even though that situation is one in which the utterance would not exist. Following Adams (1981), we may call the former way of being true with respect to a world truth in a world and the latter truth at a world. The conceptualist may claim that propositions can be true at worlds without being true in them, by analogy with the examples from Pollock and Buridan. A proposition like <there are no propositions> is true at certain possible worlds but true in none. Since we do not want to say that such propositions are necessary, we must understand necessity as truth at every possible world. Correspondingly, to preserve the connections between entailment and necessity, we must understand entailment in terms of the entailed proposition being true at every world at which the entailing proposition is true. Given all this, we can distinguish two readings for Assumption A:

(Reading 1) If a proposition <p> fails to entail a proposition <q>, then there is a possible world W such that <p> is true in W and not-q at W. (Reading 2) If a proposition <p> fails to entail a proposition <q>, then there is a possible world W such that <p> is true at W and not-q at W. Given the understanding of entailment in terms of truth at a world, the conceptualist will claim that Reading 1 is false, while Reading 2 is true but useless to the Easy Arguments. Thus, the conclusions of those arguments are blocked.

The plausibility of this response depends on having a good account of what truth at a world amounts to. But this, in turn, depends on issues in the metaphysics of modality. If worlds are concrete particulars ("I and all my surroundings"), as they are for David Lewis (1986), then we could say that a proposition is true at a world if the proposition is about the entities that are parts of that world and is true, and true in a world if true at a world and also part of that world. There may well be difficulties of explaining how a proposition could be part of more than one concrete world (and why it would only be part of some concrete worlds but not all), but this framework seems to make conceptual room for the possibility propositions being true at worlds without being true in them.

Suppose, however, that worlds were conceived as world stories, i.e., as maximal consistent sets of propositions (see Section 2). How, then, might truth at a world be understood? One approach, favored by Adams (1981), is to explain truth at a world in terms of truth in a world, understanding the latter to amount to truth were the world actual (were all its members true). On this approach, we would understand what is true at a world in terms of what is true in it, together with certain facts about the actual world. However, the conceptualist cannot abide this approach. For, on this approach, the members of any world are true in that world. But since the members of any and every world are propositions, it would follow that, contrary to conceptualism, that it is necessary that there are propositions.

A more conceptualist-friendly approach is to reverse the order of explanation, to explain truth in a world in terms of truth at a world + existence in that world. How could truth at a world be understood? A natural proposal is to understand it as membership in a world story. Difficulties emerge with this proposal when we face the question of how to understand consistency of world stories. There are maximal sets of propositions that are not possible worlds because they are not consistent in the relevant sense. But the relevant sense is not easily defined. Following Adams (1981), we might wish to use the concept of possibility to gloss the notion of consistency: a set of propo-

sitions is consistent if and only if those propositions could all be true together. This returns us to the problem noted in the previous paragraph: it again would turn out that necessarily there are propositions (even in mindless worlds). The conceptualist might hope to take the relevant notion of consistency as primitive and reject the gloss in terms of joint possible truth. Still, we should ask about the broader implications of denying the joint possible truth of consistent world stories. Consider, for instance the notion of actuality. Only one of the many possible worlds is actual, although each is actual relative to itself. The actual one, on the world story view, is the one all of whose members are true. But if this is what actuality for worlds amounts to, then assuming possible worlds are possibly actual, it would follow that for each possible world all its members could be true together. Ought we to deny that possible worlds are possibly actual?

The conceptualist might hope to avoid these problems, without falling back on Lewis's concrete realism about possible worlds, by understanding worlds in terms of properties or states of affairs, rather than propositions. Following Stalnaker (1976), one might think of worlds as properties which are ways things could have been. Following Plantinga (1974) and others, one might think of worlds as maximal consistent states of affairs, where these are thought of as distinct from propositions.

However, this retrenchment may end up only shifting the Platonist worries elsewhere. To distinguish the ways that are possible worlds (or possible world-states) from those which are not, it is difficult to avoid appealing to a gloss in terms of being possibly instantiated: the possible worlds are not only maximal but they could be instantiated. Taking this line would require conceding that in every world there are properties. Something similar holds for the conception of possible worlds as maximal consistent states of affairs.

One might think, however, that Platonism about properties is less problematic than Platonism about propositions. The former do not represent the world, whereas the latter, as truth-bearers, do (Jubien 2001, King 2007). However, properties can apply or fail to apply to objects, and can be said to be true or false of objects, and so it is not clear that worries about representation clearly gain more traction for propositions than for properties. Similar considerations apply to states of affairs.

Despite these worries, the conceptualist might be encouraged by the example of singular propositions. Hasn't the truth in vs. truth at distinction been useful in dealing with the modality of singular propositions? For example, consider any singular proposition about Socrates, e.g., the proposition that Socrates was a philosopher. Such propositions, plausibly, depend for their existence on the object they are directly about. One might therefore think that no singular proposition about Socrates could exist unless Socrates existed. Consider, then, the proposition that Socrates does not exist. It is clearly contingent that Socrates exists; things could have been otherwise. But then the proposition that Socrates does not exist would appear to be possible without being possibly true. Unlike the examples from Pollock and Buridan, however, we cannot understand such possibility without possible truth in terms of expressing a possibly true proposition while not being possibly true itself. Propositions do not express propositions, of course, and so we cannot understand their possibility without possible truth in this way (Plantinga 1981).

What is it, then, for such a singular proposition to be possible but not possibly true? Answering this question was one of the key motivations in the development of the distinction between truth in and truth at a world. But while Adams and others attempted to do this by thinking of truth at a world as determined by what is true in that world together with a certain set of facts about the actual world, the conceptualist hopes to kick aside the ladder of truth in a world altogether. Whether

this hope is reasonable or not is an important issue in contemporary work on propositions. (Key recent discussions include King 2007, Soames 2010, and Merricks 2015).

## **Reply #2: Deflationism to the Rescue?**

Another response to the Easy Arguments is, so to speak, to deflate their significance by deflating propositions. The Easy Arguments succeed, but their success marks no great philosophical discovery and raises no hard questions of the sort that have traditionally bothered metaphysicians of a nominalist bent. We will here discuss only Stephen Schiffer's (2003) theory of "pleonastic propositions." Propositions exist, for Schiffer, but unlike rocks or cats, there is nothing more to them than what our concept of a proposition guarantees. One may call them "abstract entities," if one likes, but this label should not encourage the thought that our minds can reach beyond the physical world to make contact with denizens of a Platonic universe. We know about propositions, not by interacting with them, as we do with rocks and cats, but by being participants in certain sorts of linguistic or conceptual practice. It's because we speak or think in certain ways that we are able to know about propositions.

Schiffer argues, in effect, that given our proposition-talk and thought, propositions are, in D. M. Armstrong's phrase, a kind of "ontological free lunch." That is, the key "axioms" of our proposition-talk and thought are guaranteed to be true. These include the instances of the equivalence schema (E) for propositions: The proposition that  $p$  is true iff  $p$ . Given the truth of such axioms, it follows that propositions exist and have the features attributed to them by our axioms. Moreover, because these axioms are constitutive of the concept of a proposition, it follows that, by possessing that concept, we can know the truth of these axioms.

One might concede to Schiffer that the axioms are constitutive of our concept of a proposition. But why think those axioms are true? Schiffer stresses that we do not make the axioms true by saying, thinking, or "stipulating" that they are true. The mind-independence of propositions, after all, is implicit in those axioms. Schiffer's argument for pleonastic propositions is of a piece with his argument for pleonastic entities generally, including fictional entities, events, and properties. A pleonastic entity, for him, is an entity that falls under a pleonastic concept. The latter is the key notion and is defined as follows.

**Definition:** A concept  $F$  is pleonastic iff it implies true something-from-nothing transformations.

A SFN (something-from-nothing) transformation (about  $F$ s) is a statement that allows us to deduce a statement about a kind of entity  $F$ , from a statement that involves no reference to  $F$ s. (61) SFN transformations assert a kind of supervenience condition on  $F$ s: if the relevant non- $F$  conditions obtain,  $F$ s exist and have the relevant features. (E.g., if snow is white, then the proposition that snow is white exists and is true.)

If the concept  $F$  is pleonastic, then there are  $F$ s. We need to know how to tell if a concept is pleonastic. Here is Schiffer's test: Test: A concept  $F$  is pleonastic (and so implies true something-from-nothing transformations) iff adding it to any theory yields a conservative extension of that theory. (57)

## **Schiffer's final formulation of the conservativeness test is:**

For any theory  $T$  and sentence  $S$  expressible in  $T$ , if the theory obtained by adding to  $T_{/\sim F}$  <the theory resulting from restricting quantifiers in  $T$  to  $\sim F$ s> the concept of an  $F$ , together with its something-from-nothing  $F$ -entailment claims, logically entails  $S_{\sim F}$  <the sentence resulting from restricting quantifiers in  $S$  to  $\sim F$ s>, then  $T_{/\sim F}$  logically entails  $S_{\sim F}$ . (p. 57).

One might think the conservativeness test is overly complicated, and that all that matters is that the new entities not interfere with the empirical world. If so, then the test would mention only empirical theories not all theories. But, as Matti Eklund (2007) points out, two kinds of entity that are individually non-interfering with respect to the empirical world might interfere with one another. Schiffer is aware of this problem (see his discussion of anti-fictional entities, pp. 55–6), and this is why he turns to the more complicated account.

Schiffer's picture is this. If a concept satisfies the conservativeness test, then its instantiation would be unproblematic because it would interfere with nothing else. Its instantiation comes for free. If a concept doesn't meet this test, it doesn't come for free. Although Schiffer's view of propositions can be described as deflationary in one sense (because it attempts to deflate questions about the existence and nature of propositions), the meta-ontology underlying Schiffer's approach is, if anything, inflationary: all "non-interfering" kinds of entity are instantiated.

Schiffer's, and other deflationist theories, must, at a minimum, answer the following two questions, in addition to the questions facing all propositionalists:

(1) Why would the non-interference of Fs be evidence for their existence?

Even if Fs would be non-interfering in Schiffer's sense, the postulation of Fs logically conflicts with some consistent theories, e.g., 'There are no Fs'. Schiffer places severer constraints on the denial of entities than on the acceptance of them. Suppose Fs would be non-interfering. Then adding them would not add information about non-Fs. But suppose also that denying Fs would not add information about non-Fs. Why isn't this a reason to deny Fs? So, in this sense, the theory denying Fs passes a corresponding conservativeness test.

(2) How can the deflationist explain how these propositions have truth-conditions?

If the proposition that snow is white is a simple, necessary and eternal object, why does its having a property (truth) have anything to do with concrete snow's having a property (whiteness)? Do instances of the T-schema simply state brute necessary connections between abstract objects and concrete ones? Or do these necessary connections somehow derive from our practices, and if so, how?

### **Reply #3: Propositions as Types**

Another reaction one might have to the Easy Arguments is to accept their conclusions but to give an account of the nature of propositions which will make these conclusions palatable. One promising line of thinking, in this regard, is to think of propositions as types, the tokens of which are mental or linguistic acts or events, and in particular the acts that would be thought to express the proposition. Such views have been developed in recent years by Dummett (1996), Hanks (2011, 2015), and Soames (2010, 2014a, 2015). We focus here on the recent proposals put forth by Hanks and Soames.

The type view is motivated by its answers to otherwise puzzling features of traditional Platonist views of propositions (e.g. Frege (1984)). On this view, belief and other attitudes are understood as relations to already-existing propositions which represent things as being a certain way. The truth or falsity of an individual's belief or other cognitive state is explained by the truth or falsity of the proposition which is the object of that state. If truth consists in a representation's being accurate,

then a proposition is true just in case it accurately represents things as being a certain way. Thus, on the traditional view, thinking subjects represent things as being a certain way (either in thought or language) by standing in appropriate relations to propositions which fundamentally represent things as being a certain way. Two problems arise for the Platonist's position. First, how do cognizers come to be acquainted with such propositions? Second, what explains how propositions represent things as being a certain way? Platonists appear to have no answer to the epistemic question, and presumably accept representation as a primitive feature of propositions. Type theorists, however, explain the relation between a cognizer and a proposition simply as an instance of the general relation between type and token. Consider, as Dummett (1996, p. 259) does, one's humming of a tune. The tune is a species or type of musical performance capable of having multiple performances at differing times or locations, while the humming of it is an act belonging to that type. One might then see the relation of a proposition to a mental or linguistic act as one between the type of act performed and the performance of the act.

What type of acts should one identify with propositions? For both Hanks and Soames, propositions are types of predicative acts. The notion of predication here is simply, for atomic propositions, one of an agent's representing an object *o* as having property *F*. (Hanks (2015, p. 64) characterizes predication as categorization, or the sorting of things into groups according to a rule. Since representation is primarily something done by cognitive agents, according to Hanks and Soames, one might wonder whether the proposition itself is representational, and so possesses truth-conditions, on the type view. Both theorists respond to this concern by claiming that propositions are representational in a secondary, derivative sense. There are many examples of types that inherit features of their tokens (a sonata (type) can be discordant in virtue of performances of it being discordant; a movie can be frightening in virtue of its tokens being so, etc.

Just as an act can be described as intelligent in order to communicate that the agent acted intelligently in performing the act, type theorists will claim that a proposition represents *o* as *F* in a similarly derivative sense wherein any agent who performs the act of predicating *F* of *o* will thereby represent *o* as *F*. One question that arises for such a view is whether propositions are genuinely representational entities with truth-conditions, or whether the claim that a proposition represents things as being a certain way is simply a convenient manner of speaking indirectly about the actual and possible representational acts of thinkers.

As we have seen, the type view reverses the traditional order of explanation concerning the nature of predication, representation, and truth-conditions. On the traditional, Fregean picture, propositions exist as objective, mind-independent entities "waiting" to be entertained, judged or asserted, so to speak. On this view, for a subject *S* to predicate *F* of *o* is for *S* to entertain the proposition that *o* is *F*; for *S* to represent *o* as *F* in thought or language is to have a thought or utterance with the primarily representational proposition that *o* is *F* as its content, etc. On the type view, a proposition's representational and predicative properties are derived from the fundamentally representational and predicative acts of agents.

A concern for the type view is whether there will be "missing propositions" – truths or falsehoods which have never been entertained. One drawn to the type view may allow for the existence of uninstantiated types to account for the existence of these propositions. However, given that propositions are claimed to derive their representational features from their tokens, such uninstantiated types would lack representational features, and so lack truth-conditions. Hanks suggests dealing with such propositions counterfactually. Even if no one had ever predicated eloquence of Clinton,

the proposition that Clinton is eloquent is true iff Clinton is eloquent because if someone were to predicate eloquence of Clinton, the token would be true iff Clinton is eloquent. Predicative types, then, inherit their representation features from both their actual and possible tokens. This response, however, leaves us with the question of truths for which there are not even any merely possible tokens – for example, mathematical truths that are too complicated for any finite mind to grasp. What, if anything, provides the truth-conditions of these propositions?

Hanks (2015, p. 27) allows that propositions are mind-independent and objective entities which do not depend for their existence on having any tokens, just as one might think about a difficult type of dive that has never been performed. Thus, while Hanks' view appears to be a rejection of a traditional Platonism about propositions, it seems nevertheless to accept a Platonism about types by untethering their existence from their tokens. (Compare to Dodd's (2007) defense of Platonism about types.) Soames (2014a,b) also allows for untokened types, but only those whose constituents have been referred to or predicated in other propositions.

For Soames, a proposition  $p$  may exist in  $w$  even if no token of  $p$  has been performed in  $w$ . For Soames, if in  $w$  a predicative event has occurred in which an agent predicates  $n$ -place property  $R$  of  $n$  objects, and in  $w$  events of referring to or thinking of objects  $o_1 \dots o_n$  have occurred, then the proposition that is the type of act of predicating  $R$  of  $o_1 \dots o_n$  exists (even if  $R$  has never been predicated of  $o_1 \dots o_n$  in  $w$ ). Still, it would seem that there can be truths in a world about objects that have never been thought of or referred to in that world. In response to this, Soames claims that a proposition need not exist in a world  $w$  in order to be true in  $w$ . In support of this, Soames appeals to other, albeit controversial, cases in which an object can have a property despite not existing. For instance, Socrates can have the properties of being referred to or being admired despite no longer existing. Thus, Soames' accommodation of our intuitions concerning propositions that have never been thought appears to involve a rejection of Actualism.

The type view has been argued to provide solutions to several traditional problems for propositional thought, including Frege's puzzle, first-person belief, Kripke's puzzle about belief, and the problem of empty names. In responding to these problems, Soames invokes "Millian modes of presentation," or ways of cognizing an object in thought which do not affect the representational content of the act, to preserve a non-Fregean, Millian view of semantic content for names and natural kind terms while individuating propositions finely enough to solve traditional problems in the philosophy of language. Hanks, by contrast, invokes distinct types of referential and expressive acts as the constituents of propositions. On this view, each use of a name falls under several different reference types which differ in their fineness of grain, each associated with a different proposition.

As we have seen, the type view is motivated in large part by the perceived need to explain how propositions represent things as being a certain way on the grounds that a view which accepts primitively representational propositions is objectionably mysterious. Some question, however, whether the representational properties of propositions can (or need to) be explained at all (McGlone 2012, Caplan, et al. 2013, Merricks 2015). Merricks, for example, argues that we should accept that there are fundamentally representational entities, but that we have no reason to favor mental states (such as beliefs) over propositions as being the fundamental bearers of representational properties. For if, e.g., beliefs are fundamentally representational, then it is either a primitive fact about them that they represent what they do, or it is a feature capable of explanation. If it is a primitive fact about them, then the view appears just as mysterious as one which accepts that

propositions are primitively representational. If it is a fact capable of explanation, as the type theorists contend, then it is presumably explained in terms of an agent's ability to predicate properties of objects. But unless there is some explanation of how an agent can engage in predication, predication must itself be a primitive representational ability, and the theory has not made any genuine progress on what was to be explained. A final question worth considering at this stage is whether propositions are representational entities at all. Richard (2013) and Speaks (2014), for instance, each develop views of propositions which deny that they are. Consider the view defended by Richard. Sentences, beliefs, and the like represent things as being a certain way – snow as being white, for example. Put another way, the sentence 'Snow is white' represents snow's being white, where this is simply a way for things to be – a state of affairs or property that is either instantiated or not (but does not represent things as being any way, just as properties are not in general representational). On this approach, the proposition expressed by the sentence is identified with the way that things are represented as being, not as something which has representational properties either primitively or in need of explanation by more fundamental acts of predication. If an approach along these lines is correct, the type view appears to lose one of its central motivations.

## Categorical Syllogism

**He is a true fugitive who flies from reason. "**

– Marcus Aurelius One needs the necessary knowledge in order to make the correct decisions. Likewise, one needs the necessary logic skills, in order to make a correct reasoning. Aristotle is one of the forefathers of modern Logic and Philosophy. Aristotelian Logic, also known as Categorical Syllogism or Term Logic, may well be the earliest works of Formal Logic. A **Categorical Syllogism** is modernly defined as a particular kind of argument containing three categorical propositions, two of them premises, one a conclusion.

A categorical proposition is of the type "This S is P" and "This man is a man", no 'if', no 'but' and no 'either or'. There are other forms of syllogisms in use. Other examples include Disjunctive Syllogism, Hypothetical Syllogism and Polysyllogism. We will only be discussing on Categorical Syllogism in this article (unless otherwise mentioned). The following is an example of a syllogism: Socrates is a man. All men are mortal. Socrates is mortal.

A syllogism will be made up of 3 propositions. Each of the three propositions will have a truth value that is either true or false. No other values are allowed. Human awareness is NOT needed to make a proposition true or false. Truth value is the absolute value whether you know about it or not. That is, you might not know whether a proposition is true or false right now, but may find out later on its value.

Socrates is a man. → PROPOSITION 1  
All men are mortal. → PROPOSITION 2  
Socrates is mortal. → PROPOSITION 3

The first two of the three propositions are **premises** and the last one is a **conclusion**.

Socrates is a man. → PREMISE  
All men are mortal. → PREMISE  
Socrates is mortal. → CONCLUSION

## Structure of a Categorical Proposition

A categorical proposition is an IDEA or concept expressed by a declarative sentence. Propositions are NOT sentences. We express ideas in our minds by sentences. In English grammar a declarative sentence is a type of sentence that can affirm or deny something about reality. Declarative sentences indicate something can be either true or false in reality. If two different sentences express the same idea there is only one proposition expressed. So if we can express the idea that dogs are mammals in English, we can ALSO use the same idea in other languages using different words and different sentences. Even in the English language we can express the same idea with different sentences: you are fired and you are terminated express the same idea and therefore are the same proposition. We don't count every sentence as a proposition if the same idea is expressed. You would be wrong to think propositions are literal sentences because now you would have to count each sentence as a different proposition each time a sentence uses different words - even though you express the same idea to another person. Would you have a new proposition to say a dog is a mammal in Spanish, French, German, etc.? No, in that case the SAME PROPOSITION is expressed regardless of the words or word order of a sentence. A declarative sentence, which is used to usually express a proposition, can be split up into 4 main grammatical parts: the Quantifier, Subject Term, the Copula and the Predicate Term.

### The Subject term

The Subject is the "main noun" in a proposition. It is the main argument of the whole proposition, the actor in the sentence. The Subject can be thought of as the "What we are talking about". Examples include the following: "Socrates" in "**Socrates** is mortal" "Throwers" in "All **throwers** throw something" "Sparrows" in "Virtually all **sparrows** can fly"

### The Predicate term

The Predicate tells us something about the Subject. The Predicate can be thought as the "What we are talking about of the Subject". Examples include the following: "Mortal" in "Socrates is **mortal**" "Something" in "All throwers throw **something**" "Fly" in "Virtually all sparrows can **fly**"

### The Copula

Word or set of words that connect the Subject and Predicate Examples include the following: "Is" in "Socrates **is** mortal" "Throw" in "All throwers **throw** something" "Can" in "Virtually all sparrows **can** fly"

### The Quantifier

The extent or number of the subject. (E.g. All, some, none) Examples include the following: "All" in "**All** throwers throw something" "No" in "**No** fish can fly" "Virtually all" in "**Virtually all** sparrows can fly" And here is how it looks like when we put them together:

Quantifier	Subject	Copula	Predicate
All	S	is	P
All	throwers	throw	something

And that will be the structure of a simple Categorical Proposition.

### Minor/Major Premise and Term

As explained above, a syllogism is made up of 3 propositions, with 2 being premises and 1 as the

conclusion. Of the two premises, one will be the minor premise, whereas the other will be a major premise. In order to differentiate a minor premise from a major premise, we shall first take a look at the conclusion. It has been defined in the last section that a conclusion, being a proposition, will have a subject and a predicate. Although we have already defined a Subject and Predicate, we must also be aware that the Subject and Predicate are also known as **terms**. We can think of a term as a boundary. In *Deductive Logic*, written by St. George, he defined a term as the same thing as a name or noun. A name is a word, or collection of words, which serves as a mark to recall or transmit the idea of a thing, either in itself or through some of its attributes.

As we have seen, there will always be 2 terms in a Categorical Proposition (Subject and Predicate). Therefore, the conclusion of a syllogism will have a Subject and a Predicate as well. Here are two rules to take note of:

1. The **Subject** of a conclusion will be the **Minor Term** of the syllogism.
2. The **Predicate** of a conclusion will be the **Major Term** of the syllogism.

A syllogism is made up of 2 premises and 1 conclusion. So how do we differentiate between one premise from the other? Simple, take a look at the following two rules:

3. The Premise in which the **Minor Term** appears will be called the **Minor Premise**.
4. The Premise in which the **Major Term** appears will be called the **Major Premise**.

But that's not all. A syllogism is actually made up of 3 terms. The third term, or the **Middle Term**, can be thought of as a term used to link the two premises together in forming the conclusion. Here is how Britannica Online Encyclopedia define the 3 terms. The subject and predicate of the conclusion each occur in one of the premises, together with a third term (the middle) that is found in both premises but not in the conclusion. This brings us to a fifth and final rule.

5. The **Middle Term** will appear in both premises but not in the conclusion.

**The following table attempts to summarize the above.**

	<b>Minor Term</b>	<b>Middle Term</b>	<b>Major Term</b>
Minor Premise	0	0	
Major Premise		0	0
Conclusion	0		0

The following syllogism as an example: Socrates is a man. All men are mortal. Socrates is mortal. The conclusion of this syllogism is "Socrates is mortal". The subject here is "Socrates", which is also the minor term. "Socrates" appeared within the premise "Socrates is a man" making it the minor premise in this syllogism. **Socrates** is a man. ← Minor premise All men are mortal. **Socrates** is mortal. The predicate of the conclusion will be "mortal", thus the second proposition, "All men are mortal", will be the major premise. Socrates is a man. All men are **mortal**. ← Major premise Socrates is **mortal**. The middle term will appear in both the minor and major premises, but not in the conclusion. Therefore, the middle term in this syllogism will be "man/men". Socrates is a **man**. All **men** are mortal. Socrates is mortal.

## To summarize:

		Minor Term	Middle Term	Major Term
Minor Premise	"Socrates is a man"	Socrates	Man	-
Major Premise	"All men are mortal"	-	Man	Mortal
Conclusion	"Socrates is mortal"	Socrates	-	Mortal

One must take note that the middle term will not always come after the minor term and before the major term (as in the example above). Rather that the placement of the middle term in the example is only one of the many figures. Figure refers to placement of the middle term in the premises. There are four distinct figures (1-4). Mood is a concept that describes the premise --this is discussed later down below in detail. For now we need to know there are four distinct MOODS (A, E, I and O). Every standard form categorical syllogism has a MOOD and Figure. Argument validity can be determined by MOOD and FIGURE also because this is a FORMAL aspect regardless what the argument is about. This is how the name FORMAL LOGIC came about. Please note an argument may be valid in one mood and figure and that same argument is INVALID in a different mood and figure. Mood and Figure of a syllogism can make a difference between a syllogism being valid or invalid.

## Term Distribution

Quick reference: The standard form to represent an A type of proposition is to use the letters S (for the subject term), P (for the predicate term) and M (for the middle term). So we can shorten this to types of propositions: A type propositions are shortened to "All S are P." E type propositions are shortened to "No S are P."

I- type propositions are shortened to "Some S are P."

O type propositions are shortened to "Some S are not P".

Obviously you will need to substitute S, P and M for real words to make grammatical sentences out of this. The form does not change even-though the subject matter of the sentences can change. With that said, the distribution of a term refers to if an entire class or set is being referred to or not. In each case of a proposition we either have distributed terms or we don't. Here is a run-down of what is distributed among the four types of propositions:

### **A type propositions can distribute only the subject term. A type propositions distribute their subject term whatever that happens to be.**

For example, All Women are human beings indicates the entire classification of the subject is a member of the classification human being. It would be wrong to say all human beings are women. The order in which the terms are in may matter. Another example, all dogs are mammals. This says all dogs fall into the classification of the predicate mammals. Nothing is said of the entire class of the predicate. The predicate may have other members besides what is listed in a premise in front of us. Be warned not to jump to conclusions here.

### **An E type of proposition distributes both the subject term and the predicate terms.**

For example, No cats are dogs. Here we are referring to two classes and we are told both classes are not compatible. That is, the proposition expresses one class is not inside the other class. There are no parts of the class that intersect if we were to diagram this with a picture. No S is P eliminates two classes from joining together and here the order of the subject and predicate do not make a difference. I can swap the predicate and subject term positions and still have the same truth value: No dogs are cats is still a true proposition; No P are S is just as true as No S are P.

### **An I type of proposition does not distribute any terms.**

For example, Some men are married. no entire class is referred to exclude or include an entire set of subjects or predicate. All we know in this context is that Some means AT LEAST one S exists and that S is also in the predicate class whatever that might be. The middle term can't be distributed in this type of proposition. Therefore, a syllogism with two I type propositions and a conclusion is automatically invalid.

### **An O type proposition only distributes the predicate term.**

For example, Some animals are not reptiles. This proposition excludes the possibility of certain types of subjects. The proposition does not exclude All [of a certain subject] animals from being reptiles but at least one. Some here means ATLEAST ONE as it does in an I-type proposition. So an O type proposition excludes the subject term from an entire set of attributes described by the predicate. So we have distribution of the predicate, but not of the subject term. We don't have enough details to also make inferences about the subject. We only go by what we have available in the premise.

## **Rules of Categorical Syllogisms**

The following guidelines can determine validity without using a diagram for a Categorical Syllogism:


- 1) There must exactly three terms in a syllogism where all terms are used in the same respect & context. That is, no using one word in two different contexts in the same argument. For instance using the term man to represent all humans in one premise and man to represent a single individual later on in a different premise. This would be the fallacy of four terms.
- 2) The subject term and the predicate term ought to be a noun or a noun clause. The predicate should not be an adjective or an adverb. That means the sentence should be detailed as possible. No withholding information being purposely vague or ambiguous to cause a person to draw the wrong conclusion on purpose. No ending premises with adverbs or adjectives. When that occurs you must make those words into a noun or noun clause by adding details. This is usually done when arguments are not in standard categorical form. To place a non-formal argument in standard categorical form, you need to add details; you should turn adjective or adverb into concrete nouns or noun clauses. This eliminates ambiguity, vagueness and a person from backing out of a claim. This is called technically adding PARAMETERS. This helps expose deceptive tactics in the argument. This step is ignored when you get to Mathematical logic (symbolic logic).
- 3) The middle term must be distributed at least once in the premises or the argument is invalid. The fallacy of Undistributed Middle. For example, no conclusion follows from two affirmative particular premises because the middle term is not distributed. This means the link between the premises we have used cannot guarantee our conclusion.

- 4) If a term is distributed in the conclusion that same term must be distributed in a premise or the argument is invalid. This would be the fallacy of Illicit major or Illicit minor depending on the premise where the term in the conclusion is distributed but not in the premise. So if the term is not distributed in the major premise but the same term is distributed in the conclusion this would be the fallacy of illicit Major.
- 5) If the conclusion is negative then there must also be a negative premise.
- 6) No conclusion follows two negative premises. This would be the fallacy of exclusive premises.
- 7) No negative conclusions follows from two affirmative premises.

## Types of Proposition

All forms of Propositions can exist in one of 4 different types. These 4 types are denoted by the code letters A,E,I,O. These code letters are derived from the 2 Latin vowels affirmo and nego.

Code Type	Name	English	Example
Type A	Universal Affirmative	All S is P	All birds have wings
Type E	Universal Negative	No S is P	No birds have gills
Type I	Particular Affirmative	Some S is P	Some birds can fly
Type O	Particular Negative	Some S is not P	Some birds cannot fly



Type A proposition

### Type A - Universal Affirmative proposition

All of the subject will be distributed in the class defined by the predicate. Example:

All birds have wings




Type E proposition

### Type E - Universal Negative proposition

None of the subject will be distributed in the class defined by the predicate. Example:

No birds have gills



Type I and O proposition

### **Type I - Particular Affirmative proposition**

Some of the subject will be distributed in the class defined by the predicate. Example:  
Some birds can fly.

### **Type O - Particular Negative proposition**

Some of the subject will not be distributed in the class defined by the predicate. Example:  
Some birds cannot fly.

### **Definitions**

A **proposition** in this case will be a literally meaningful statement/sentence that affirms or deny something.

### **Laws of Thought**

**INTRODUCTION:** Some early philosophers defined logic as the science of the laws of thought, and that there are exactly three basic laws of thought which are so fundamental that it is necessary, in order to make correct thinking, that the laws must be obeyed. The formulation and clarification of such rules have a long tradition in the history of philosophy and logic. Any good reasoning is expected to conform to the set of three logical principles that are called "laws of thought".

The laws of thought are a sufficient foundation for logic. All other principles of logic are mere elaborations of the laws of thought. Philosophy is the pursuit of basic understanding through reason. Reasoning mean "thinking using language". That was why Aristotle said that human beings are 'reasoning animals'. Reason is an enquiry into relationships between ideas, and reason is the human being's best hope for discovering hidden truths. Using reason yields the best way of aiming at meaningful thought. So, three articles describe the limits of reason by showing different laws of thought.

**MEANING OF LAWS OF THOUGHT:** The laws of thought are the fundamental principles for human rational thinking. The laws of thought are fundamental axiomatic rules upon which rational discourse itself is often considered to be based. Generally, the laws are taken as the rules that guide and underlie everyone's thinking, thought, expressions, decisions, etc. The laws of thought are laws by which or in accordance with which valid thought proceeds, or that justify valid inference, or to which all valid deduction are reducible. Many logicians believe that intelligible, logically rational thinking is impossible outside the boundaries of three laws:

1. The Law of Identity
2. The Law of Excluded Middle; and
3. The Law of Non-Contradiction

**LAW OF IDENTITY:** The law of identity is also referred to as the Principle of Identity. The Law of Identity asserts that a thing is identical with itself, i.e. everything is the same as itself. In other words, this law states that something is itself and not something else. This is to say that a true statement is not a false statement, but a true one; or that if a statement is true, then it is true. Using philosophical notation, we may rephrase it by saying that the law asserts that for every statement of the form of 'p', implication 'p' must be true; that every such statement is tautology. Symbolically, the Law of Identity states:

- a.  $P \& P$  meaning P and P
- b.  $P \wedge P$  meaning P and P
- c.  $P.P$  meaning P and P
- d.  $P \rightarrow P$  meaning If P is true, then it is true
- e.  $P = P$  meaning P is equal to P
- f.  $P \rightarrow \sim(P \& \sim P)$  meaning If P is true, then it is true; and not P and something else

Basically, what all these formulations of the law of identity is 'every statement is identical with itself. Keys to Symbol:

$\&$ ,  $\wedge$ ,  $.$  = and

$\rightarrow$  = if ... then....  
 $=$  = is equal to  
 $\sim$  = not

In other words, the law asserts that if any statement is true, then it is true; a statement cannot remain the same and change its truth value. 'A' is 'A'. A boy is boy; a girl is a girl. Every proposition implies itself. What ever it, is.

## **LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE**

This is also referred to as the Principle of Exclude Middle. The law of Excluded Middle states that a statement is either true or false, i.e. a logically useful sentence cannot be 'neither true nor false' and cannot simultaneously be 'both true and false'. There is no middle value between truth and falsity. Logical space has only two sides; true and false; yes and no; right and left – like two sides of a coin, a statement stays on one side only at a time; never in the middle. Symbolically the law of Excluded Middle says that:

$P \vee \sim P$  (i.e. 'P or not P', where P represent any statement at all)

In other words, P is either true or P is false. In this context, 'or' is used to mean either one or the other of two things but not both and not none. 'Or' use in this sense, is called "AUT" (Latin) as distinguished from the other sense of it, in which it is called "VEL". In the sense of 'aut', or is said to be used in the exclusive sense, whereas as 'vel' or is used in the inclusive sense in which 'or' means both of them and not neither. Thus, the law of Excluded Middle indicates that either 'P' or ' $\sim P$ ' must be true, there is no third or middle proposition between them, i.e, something either exist or does not exist. Every proposition is either true or false. Everything must either be or not be. For every proposition, either its positive or its negative form is true.

## **LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION**

This is also referred to as the Principle of Non contradiction or the principle of contradiction. The Law of Non contradiction states that a statement cannot be its own negation, i.e., a statement that purports to be true and false at the same time in the same context is, for that same reason, neither true nor false, and so it is not a statement in logics. In other words, no statement in logic is both true and false. Symbolically, the law of non-contradiction states:  $\sim (P \ \& \ \sim P)$  meaning: P is not 'P and not P', i.e. if it is not P, it is not P; P and 'not P' cannot be the same; it is not possible for both 'P' and 'not P' to be true.

Simply, the law of non contradiction asserts that no statement can be both true and false. Using the philosophical symbol/notation, we may rephrase it by saying that the law of non-contradiction asserts that every statement of the form 'P', and 'not P' must be false, that such statement is self-contradictory. The law asserts that nothing can both 'exist' and 'not exist' at the same time and in the same respect. A person cannot be a boy or a girl at the same time. Nothing, having a given quality, also has the negative of that quality (e.g. every number is either 'even' or 'non-even'). No proposition is both true and false. Nothing can both be and not be. Two or more contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time. One cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect and at the same time.

## **OPINION OF PHILOSOPHERS ON THE LAWS OF THOUGHT**

Aristotle was the first person to investigate the patterns and processing of reason. He discovered logic. He wrote several extensive works on logic. He did not merely point out ways that people should think; he described the fundamental principles by which thought can occur at all. At the foundation, he marked the three laws of thought, which, till today, are basic in logic. Aristotle regarded the laws of contradiction and the law of excluded middle as examples of axioms. He stated that future contingents, or statements about unsure future events were not part of the law of excluded middle. In other words, it is either true or false that there will be a world war tomorrow, but the complex proposition that either there will be a world war tomorrow or that there will not is true.

In the Western philosophy, the evolution of the laws of thought can be traced to Aristotle. Aristotle described the laws of thought as the basic laws by which human thinking and reasoning can occur. He described the three laws as foundation laws. He identified the laws as the necessary condition of human thought: without them, thought cannot occur. George Boole<sup>1</sup> fully supported the Aristotelian concepts of the laws of thought.

Whitehead and Bertrand Russell considered the law of excluded middle as a theorem in Mathematics, rather than as an axiom. However, L. E. J. Brouwer and his school rejected the law of excluded middle; and they did not accept the use of the law in mathematical proofs involving all members of an infinite class. Jan Lukasiewicz formulated a propositional calculus in which the laws of Non-Contradiction and the law of excluded middle class failed. The calculus had a third truth-value, neither truth nor falsity, for Aristotle's future contingents.

Gottfried Leibniz formulated the additional law of sufficient reason asserting that nothing takes place without sufficient reasons to determine why it is as it is and not otherwise. For example, when a woman gives birth to a baby girl not a boy: and not a piglet, etc. he held that criteria of truth are clarity and absence of contradiction. Thus, in order to test the truths of reason, it was enough to apply the logic of Aristotle (i.e. the laws of identity, of contradiction; and of excluded middle) while the law of sufficient reason was needed to test 'truths of fact'.

The laws of thought gained more prominence through their usage by Boole. Boole used the concept to donate theories of his algebra of logic. His second book was An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities (1854). People sometimes try to state counter examples to the laws by pointing out how statement can become true or false depending on the conditions e.g.

1. 'It is raining' may be true now, but was false yesterday
2. It is half-way between 'raining' and 'not raining'

However, these counter statements always involve changing the reference of the statement. If the reference of the statement is clear and explicit, it does not seem possible for a statement to make sense and violate these laws. For an example, Bill Clinton, former President of the United States of America tried to fight against the laws of thought when he denied that he had lied to the Congress about whether "there is a relationship with my intern" by saying later "it all depends on what it is". He thought that he could make the truth of this statement change because the relationship had ended. Rather, he was twisting words beyond sense and into deception.

## CONCLUSION

The laws of thought are sometimes misunderstood. The first law does not imply that nothing ever changes. The second law does not mean that a thing can have only one property. The third law does not assert that everything is black and white: it merely indicate that either everything is black or something is not black. The laws of thought are given not just as nice rules of thumb to follow or ways that one should think: they are necessary conditions for thought.

We can see this because logic involves conditions that are common to us all. Even President cannot veto the Laws of Thought.

## PROPOSITIONS INTRODUCTION

Classical logic concerns itself with forms and classifications of propositions. We shall begin with the standard definition of proposition. A proposition is a declarative sentence which is either true or false but not both. Also a proposition cannot be neither true nor false. A proposition is always expressed with the help of a sentence. For example - the same proposition "It is raining" can be expressed in English, Hindi, and Sanskrit and so on. It means that two or more than two sentences may express the same proposition. This is possible only when proposition is taken as the meaning of the sentence which expresses it. Therefore sentence is only the vehicle of or the means of expressing a proposition. It is the unit of thought and logic whereas sentence is the unit of grammar. A sentence may be correct or incorrect; the grammatical rules determine this. A proposition may be true or false, the empirical facts determine the status. The primary thing about a sentence is its grammatical form, but the primary thing about a proposition is its meaning and implication.

The different types of sentences are not different types of propositions. Some types of sentences are not propositions at all. Sentences may be assertive, interrogative, and imperative. Only assertive types of sentences are propositions and rest of them are not. A set of proposition make up an argument. Let us see what role propositions play and how logicians will be concerned in logic by taking a simple example of an argument:

All men are mortal.	proposition1
All kings are men.	proposition2
Therefore all kings are mortal.	proposition3

Given these propositions as true or false, the logician will only find out whether the argument is valid or not by using certain rules that we shall learn later. Before we proceed further, it is of importance that we situate the discussion on "Proposition" in the whole context of the history of Logic itself.

## **HISTORY OF LOGIC AND PROPOSITION**

Aristotle, the classical logician defines proposition as that which contains subject, predicate and a copula. "Rose is red" is a proposition. Here 'Rose' is the subject, 'red' is the predicate and 'is' is the copula. A subject is that about which something is said, a predicate is what is said about the subject and the copula is the link. Further, according to classical logicians copula should be expressed in the form of present tense only. That is why classical logicians talk of reduction of sentences into propositions. According to them all propositions are sentences but all sentences are not propositions. Subject-predicate logic ultimately gave rise to substance-attribute metaphysics in philosophy.

### **Aristotle classifies proposition into four types. They are as follows:**

- Universal affirmative (A);
- Universal negative (E);
- Particular affirmative (I) and
- Particular negative (O).

These propositions are called categorical or unconditional propositions because no condition is stated anywhere in the propositions. Letters within parentheses are standard symbols of respective propositions which are extensively used throughout our study of logic. "All men are mortal" is an example of 'A' proposition. "No men are immortal" is an instance of 'E' proposition. "Some men are intelligent" is an 'I' proposition and "Some men are honest" is an instance of 'O' proposition. Aristotle was the first thinker to devise a logical system. He holds that a proposition is a complex involving two terms, a subject and a predicate. The logical form of a proposition is determined by its quantity (universal or particular) and quality (affirmative or negative). The analysis of logical form, types of inference, etc. constitute the subject matter of logic.

Aristotle may also be credited with the formulation of several metalogical propositions, most notably the Law of Noncontradiction, the Principle of the Excluded Middle, and the Law of Bivalence. These are important in his discussion of modal logic and tense logic. Aristotle referred to certain principles of propositional logic and to reasoning involving hypothetical propositions. He also formulated nonformal logical theories, techniques and strategies for devising arguments (in the Topics), and a theory of fallacies (in the Sophistical Refutations). Aristotle's pupils Eudemus and Theophrastus modified and developed Aristotelian logic in several ways.

The next major innovations in logic are due to the Stoic school. They developed an alternative account of the syllogism, and, in the course of so doing, elaborated a full propositional logic which complements Aristotelian logic. They also investigated various logical antinomies, including the Liar Paradox. The leading logician of this school was Chrysippus, credited with over a hundred works in logic. There were few developments in logic in the succeeding periods, other than a number of handbooks, summaries, translations, and commentaries, usually in a simplified and combined form. The more influential authors include Cicero, Porphyry, and Boethius in the later Roman Empire; the Byzantine scholiast Philoponus; and alFarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes in the Arab

world. The next major logician of proposition is Peter Abelard, who worked in the early twelfth century. He composed an independent treatise on logic, the *Dialectica*, and wrote extensive commentaries. There are discussions of conversion, opposition, quantity, quality, tense logic, a reduction of *de dicto* to *de re* modality, and much else. Abelard also clearly formulates several semantic principles. Abelard is responsible for the clear formulation of a pair of relevant criteria for logical consequences. The failure of his criteria led later logicians to reject relevance implication and to endorse material implication.

Spurred by Abelard's teachings and problems he proposed, and by further translations, other logicians began to grasp the details of Aristotle's texts. The result, coming to fruition in the middle of the thirteenth century, was the first phase of supposition theory, an elaborate doctrine about the reference of terms in various propositional contexts. Its development is preserved in handbooks by Peter of Spain, Lambert of Auxerre, and William of Sherwood. The theory of obligations, a part of non-formal logic, was also invented at this time. Other topics, such as the relation between time and modality, the conventionality of semantics, and the theory of truth, were investigated.

The fourteenth century is the apex of mediæval logical theory, containing an explosion of creative work. Supposition theory is developed extensively in its second phase by logicians such as William of Ockham, Jean Buridan, Gregory of Rimini, and Albert of Saxony. Buridan also elaborates a full theory of consequences, a cross between entailments and inference rules. From explicit semantic principles, Buridan constructs a detailed and extensive investigation of syllogistic, and offers completeness proofs.

## **PROPOSITIONS AND SENTENCES**

Propositions are stated using sentences. However, all sentences are not propositions. Look at a few examples of sentences:

1. Snakes are poisonous.
2. Some students are intelligent.
3. How old are you?
4. May God bless you!
5. What a car!
6. Vote for me.

The first two statements are assertions and we can say of these statements that they may either be true or false. Therefore they are propositions. However, we cannot say whether or not the question, 'How old are you?' is true or false. The answer to the question, 'I am 16 years old' may be true or false. The question is not a proposition, while the answer is a proposition. 'May God bless you' is a ceremonial statement and it is neither true nor false. Therefore, such statements are not propositions.

'What a car!' is exclamatory and has nothing to do with being true or false. Exclamatory statements are not propositions. 'Vote for me' is an appeal or command. We cannot attribute truth or falsity to it. Therefore, evocative statements are not propositions. We therefore need to distinguish between sentences and propositions. The differences are:

1. Propositions must be meaningful (meaningful in logical sense) sentences.
2. Propositions must have a subject, a predicate and a word joining the two, a sentence need not.
3. All propositions are either true or false, but sentences may or may not be.
4. Propositions are units of Logic, sentences are units of Grammar.

## PROPOSITIONS AND JUDGMENTS

Till the nineteenth century, idealistic philosophers used the word, 'Judgment' instead of 'propositions'. Nowadays, a distinction is made between the two words. "Judgment" means 'pronouncing a formal decision'. "Proposition" means 'the result of judging'. Judgment is basically the attitude we take whereas proposition is that which we affirm or deny, accept or reject as true or false. Judgment is a mental act, a process, and an event in time. Proposition is timeinvariant.

When we say 'All kings are mortal', it is a proposition. When we assert 'We believe that all kings are mortal', we are in fact taking an attitude, making a judgment. Sometimes, a statement may appear by itself to be a proposition. However, if one knows the context in which the statement is made, it may turnout that the proposition is really a judgment made. Consider the statement: 'All foreigners are unacceptable'. By itself, it looks like a proposition, but what, if a speech is made and at the end the speaker concludes logically why 'all foreigners are unacceptable'. In such a case the speaker is actually passing a judgment. Sometimes, therefore, we need the context to distinguish a proposition from a judgment. It is only in the beginning of twentieth century that A.N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell recognize varieties of propositions. According to them subject-predicate logic is only one form of propositions.

## TYPES OF PROPOSITION

Propositions can be viewed from different standpoints and classified into different types:

<b>STANDPOINT</b>	<b>TYPES OF PROPOSITIONS</b>
Composition	Simple, Complex or Compound
Generality	Singular, General
Relation	Categorical, Conditional
Quantity	Universal, Particular
Quality	Affirmative, Negative
Modality	Necessary, Assertoric, Problematic
Significance	Verbal, Real

### Composition - Simple Propositions

**Examples:** Love is happiness. Tiger is ferocious. All white men were dreaded by the red Indians. A simple proposition has only one subject and one predicate. Note that the subject 'All white men' is one subject though it has many words. Similarly 'Red Indians' is one predicate.

### Composition – Complex or Composite Propositions

**Examples:** Violence does not pay and leads to unhappiness.

She is graceful but cannot act. Either he is honest or dishonest. If John comes home, then you must cook chicken. 'She is graceful' is a simple proposition. 'Cannot act' can be written as 'She cannot act', which is a simple proposition again. These simple propositions are connected by a con-

junction 'but'. When two or more simple propositions are combined into a single statement we get a complex or composite proposition.

### **Generality: Singular proposition**

**Examples:** The dog wags its tail. George is my friend.

Kapil Dev is a good cricketer.

When in a proposition the subject refers to a definite, single object, the proposition is said to be singular proposition. A proper noun or a common noun preceded by a definite article 'the' forms the subject of such a proposition.

### **Generality - General Propositions**

**Examples:** Children like chocolate.

All hill stations are health resorts. Some people are funny. Few bikes come with fancy fittings. When in a proposition the subject refers to many objects, the proposition is said to be a general proposition. A common noun forms the subject of such propositions. When it is singular, the indefinite article 'a' is used. 'A dog' means any dog. It generalizes across all dogs. Words like 'some', 'few' refer to more than one object.

### **Relation - Categorical Propositions**

**Examples:** The pillows are soft  
Junk food is not good for health  
Music is the food of love.

A proposition that affirms or denies something without any condition is called a categorical proposition. Recall that a proposition has a subject, a predicate and a joining word. The joining word relates the two together. In the first example the subject, "the pillows" is joined to the predicate "soft" by the joining word "are". In this proposition the softness of the pillow is asserted or affirmed. In the second example it is denied that junk food is good for health.

Simple and general propositions are categorical in nature. In the above examples there are no conditions relating the subject and the predicate. Therefore they are called categorical propositions.

### **Relation: Conditional Propositions**

**Examples:** If you study hard, then you will do well.

Robert is either an athlete or a carpenter.

A conditional proposition consists of two categorical propositions that are so related to each other that one imposes a condition that must be fulfilled if what the other asserts is to be acceptable.

### **There are three types of conditional propositions:**

1. Hypothetical proposition
2. Alternative proposition
3. Disjunctive proposition

#### **1. Hypothetical Proposition**

**Examples:** If (you are hungry), then (you can eat chocolates.) If (it doesn't rain),

then (the harvest will be poor.)

A hypothetical proposition consists of two categorical propositions. They are put within parentheses. The first part is called antecedent and the second part is called consequent. These two propositions are related in such a way that if the first is true then the second must be true if the second is false, then the first also is false. However, if the first part is false, the second part may be true or may be false.

**Example:** If the sun shines then there is light antecedent consequent

## 2. Alternative Proposition

**Examples:** John is either a professor or a musician Either we play football or we play cricket

John is either a doctor or the author of this book.

An alternative proposition consists of two simple categorical propositions connected by 'either – or' and thus suggesting that any one of these two propositions may be true or both may be true. John may be a professor or may be a musician. It is also likely that John is both a professor and a musician. The two parts of an alternative proposition are known as alternants. Either alternant may be true or both may be true. The alternative proposition will be false only when both the alternants are false.

Either (Alternant)	Or (Alternant)	Proposition
John is a professor	John is a musician	
TRUE	TRUE	TRUE
TRUE	FALSE	TRUE
FALSE	TRUE	TRUE
FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

## 3. Disjunctive Proposition

**Examples:** It is not the case that both he is honest and he is dishonest.

It is not the case that both the meat is boiled and roasted

A disjunctive proposition consists of two simple categorical propositions (alternants) which are so related that both cannot be simultaneously true.

**Note:** The fact that both cannot be true at the same time is the only difference between an alternative and disjunctive proposition. Thus there may be examples which are common to both. In symbolic logic we use disjunctive for alternative and the third variety is called negation.

Examples: Either he is in the class or he is in the playground.

Either (Alternant)	Or (Alternant)	Proposition
	John is in class	John is in playground
FALSE	TRUE	TRUE
TRUE	FALSE	TRUE

## Modality: Assertoric Proposition:

**Examples:** The earth moves round the sun.

Objects far away appear small to the eyes.

At zero degree centigrade water turns into ice. Eleven players form a cricket team. The earth is not perfectly round. When the claim or assertion made in a proposition is verifiable it is called an assertoric proposition. The assertion that the earth moves round the sun can be verified by scientific methods. If the result of such verification is true then the proposition is true.

### **Modality: Necessary Proposition:**

**Examples:** Bachelors are unmarried male.

The result of any number multiplied by zero is zero. A point has no dimension.

Propositions which are always true by definition are called necessary propositions.

### **Modality: Problematic Proposition:**

**Examples:** Perhaps he is a rich man.

She may be happier off with him. There may be famine this year.

In a problematic proposition we only guess the truth or falsity and make no definite assertion.

### **Quantity - Universal Proposition:**

**Examples:** All boys in the team are educated.

No politicians are honest. Shillong is a hill station.

When the predicate tells something about the entire class referred to by the subject term, it is called a universal proposition. The predicate term 'educated' refers to the entire class referred to by the subject term 'all boys in the team'.

### **Quantity - Particular Proposition:**

**Examples:** Some girls are beautiful. Some songs are classical. Some men are religious.

When the predicate term tells something about an indefinite part of the class referred to by the subject term, it is called particular proposition.

### **Quality:**

The early discussion on proposition from the standpoint of quantity was based on the subject class being quantified by the word all, some, no etc. When we discuss proposition from the standpoint of quality our focus will be on the 'copula' between the terms. A copula relates the two terms and is of some form of the verb 'to be' - 'is', 'are', 'is not', 'are not'

The copula either affirms or denies the relation between two terms

### **Quality: Affirmative Proposition**

**Examples:** Some fruits are sweet. All computers are fast. Mr. John is bald.

If the relation between the subject term and the predicate term is positive (or affirmative), the proposition is said to be affirmative. In this case the copula is of the form 'is' or 'are'.


### **Quality: Negative Proposition:**

**Examples:** Some fruits are not sweet.

All computers are not fast. Mr. John is not bald.

If the relation between the subject term and the predicate term is negative (or denied), the proposition is said to be negative. In this case the copula is of the form 'is not' or 'are not'





The four corners of this chart represent the four basic forms of propositions recognized in classical logic:

**A** propositions, or universal affirmatives take the form: All S are P.

**E** propositions, or universal negations take the form: No S are P.

**I** propositions, or particular affirmatives take the form: Some S are P.

**O** propositions, or particular negations take the form: Some S are not P.

Given the assumption made within classical (Aristotelian) categorical logic, that every category contains at least one member, the following relationships, depicted on the square, hold:

Firstly, A and O propositions are **contradictory**, as are E and I propositions. Propositions are contradictory when the truth of one implies the falsity of the other, and conversely. Here we see that the truth of a proposition of the form All S are P implies the falsity of the corresponding proposition of the form Some S are not P. For example, if the proposition "all industrialists are capitalists" (A) is true, then the proposition "some industrialists are not capitalists" (O) must be false. Similarly, if "no mammals are aquatic" (E) is false, then the proposition "some mammals are aquatic" must be true.

Secondly, A and E propositions are **contrary**. Propositions are contrary when they cannot both be true. An A proposition, e.g., "all giraffes have long necks" cannot be true at the same time as the corresponding E proposition: "no giraffes have long necks." Note, however, that corresponding A and E propositions, while contrary, are not contradictory. While they cannot both be true, they can both be false, as with the examples of "all planets are gas giants" and "no planets are gas giants." Next, I and O propositions are **subcontrary**. Propositions are subcontrary when it is impossible for both to be false. Because "some lunches are free" is false, "some lunches are not free" must be true. Note, however, that it is possible for corresponding I and O propositions both to be true, as with "some nations are democracies," and "some nations are not democracies." Again, I and O propositions are subcontrary, but not contrary or contradictory.

Lastly, two propositions are said to stand in the relation of **subalternation** when the truth of the first ("the superaltern") implies the truth of the second ("the subaltern"), but not conversely. A propositions stand in the subalternation relation with the corresponding I propositions. The truth of the A proposition "all plastics are synthetic," implies the truth of the proposition "some plastics are synthetic." However, the truth of the O proposition "some cars are not American-made products" does not imply the truth of the E proposition "no cars are American-made products." In traditional logic, the truth of an A or E proposition implies the truth of the corresponding I or O proposition, respec-

tively. Consequently, the falsity of an I or O proposition implies the falsity of the corresponding A or E proposition, respectively. However, the truth of a particular proposition does not imply the truth of the corresponding universal proposition, nor does the falsity of an universal proposition carry downwards to the respective particular propositions.

The presupposition, mentioned above, that all categories contain at least one thing, has been abandoned by most later logicians. Modern logic deals with uninstantiated terms such as "unicorn" and "ether flow" the same as it does other terms such as "apple" and "orangutan". When dealing with "empty categories", the relations of being contrary, being subcontrary and of subalternation no longer hold. Consider, e.g., "all unicorns have horns" and "no unicorns have horns." Within contemporary logic, these are both regarded as true, so strictly speaking, they cannot be contrary, despite the former's status as an A proposition and the latter's status as an E proposition. Similarly, "some unicorns have horns" (I) and "some unicorns do not have horns" (O) are both regarded as false, and so they are not subcontrary. Obviously then, the truth of "all unicorns have horns" does not imply the truth of "some unicorns have horns," and the subalternation relation fails to hold as well. Without the traditional presuppositions of "existential import", i.e., the supposition that all categories have at least one member, then only the contradictory relation holds. On what is sometimes called the "modern square of opposition" (as opposed to the traditional square of opposition sketched above) the lines for contraries, subcontraries and subalternation are erased, leaving only the diagonal lines for the contradictory relation.

## Truth function

In logic, a **truth function** is a function which accepts truth values as input and produces a unique truth value as output. In other words: The input and output of a truth function are all truth values; a truth function will always output exactly one truth value; and inputting the same truth value(s) will always output the same truth value. The typical example is in propositional logic, wherein a compound statement is constructed using individual statements connected by logical connectives; if the truth value of the compound statement is entirely determined by the truth value(s) of the constituent statement(s), the compound statement is called a **truth function**, and any logical connectives used are said to be **truth functional**.

Classical propositional logic is a truth-functional logic, in that every statement has exactly one truth value which is either true or false, and every logical connective is truth functional (with a correspondent truth table), thus every compound statement is a truth function. On the other hand, modal logic is non-truth-functional.

## Overview

A logical connective is truth-functional if the truth-value of a compound sentence is a function of the truth-value of its sub-sentences. A class of connectives is truth-functional if each of its members is. For example, the connective "and" is truth-functional since a sentence like "Apples are fruits and carrots are vegetables" is true if, and only if each of its sub-sentences "apples are fruits" and "carrots are vegetables" is true, and it is false otherwise. Some connectives of a natural language, such as English, are not truth-functional. Connectives of the form "x believes that ..." are typical examples of connectives that are not truth-functional. If e.g. Mary mistakenly believes that Al Gore was President of the USA on April 20, 2000, but she does not believe that the moon is made of green cheese, then the sentence "Mary believes that Al Gore was President of the USA on April 20, 2000" is true while "Mary believes that the moon is made of green cheese"

is false. In both cases, each component sentence (i.e. "Al Gore was president of the USA on April 20, 2000" and "the moon is made of green cheese") is false, but each compound sentence formed by prefixing the phrase "Mary believes that" differs in truth-value. That is, the truth-value of a sentence of the form "Mary believes that..." is not determined solely by the truth-value of its component sentence, and hence the (unary) connective (or simply operator since it is unary) is non-truth-functional.


The class of classical logic connectives (e.g.  $\&$ ,  $\rightarrow$ ) used in the construction of formulas is truth-functional. Their values for various truth-values as argument are usually given by truth tables. Truth-functional propositional calculus is a formal system whose formulae may be interpreted as either true or false.

### Table of binary truth functions

In two-valued logic, there are sixteen possible truth functions, also called Boolean functions, of two inputs P and Q. Any of these functions corresponds to a truth table of a certain logical connective in classical logic, including


several degenerate cases such as a function not depending on one or both of its arguments. Truth and falsehood is denoted as 1 and 0 in the following truth tables, respectively, for sake of brevity.

#### Contradiction/False


Notation	Equivalent formulas	Truth table	Venn diagram													
"bottom"	$P \wedge \neg P$ $\neg(P \vee Q)$	<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2"><b>Q</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="2"><b>P</b></td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </table>		<b>Q</b>			0	1	<b>P</b>	0	0	0	1	0	0	
	<b>Q</b>															
	0	1														
<b>P</b>	0	0	0													
	1	0	0													

## Tautology/True

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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"top"	$P \vee \neg P$ $\forall pq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2" rowspan="2"></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Q		0	1	P	0	1	1	1	1	1	
		Q														
		0	1													
P	0	1	1													
	1	1	1													

## Proposition P

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram													
P	$p$ $\exists pq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2" rowspan="2"></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Q		0	1	P	0	0	0	1	1	1	
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		0	1													
P	0	0	0													
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## Negation of Q


Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram												
$\neg Q$ $\sim Q$	$Nq$ $Gpq$	<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2">Q</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>P</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	1	1	1	0	
	Q														
	0	1													
P	0	1													
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### Conjunction


Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram												
$P \wedge Q$ $P \& Q$ $P \cdot Q$ $P \text{ AND } Q$	$P \leftrightarrow \neg \neg Q$ $\neg P \leftrightarrow Q$ $\neg P \downarrow \neg$ $QKpq$	<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2">Q</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>P</td> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	0	1	0	1	
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	0	1													
P	0	0													
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## Alternative denial

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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
$P \uparrow Q$   $P \mid Q$ $P \text{ NAND } Q$	$P \rightarrow \neg Q$ $\neg P \leftarrow Q$ $\neg P \vee \neg Q$   $Dpq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	1	1	1	1	0	
	Q															
	0	1														
P	0	1	1													
	1	1	0													

## Disjunction


Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram													
$P \vee Q$ $P \text{ OR } Q$	$P \leftarrow \neg Q$ $\neg P \rightarrow Q$ $\neg(P \uparrow \neg Q)$ $\neg(\neg P \wedge \neg Q)$ $Apq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	0	1	1	1	1	
	Q															
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P	0	0	1													
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## Joint denial

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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
$P \downarrow Q$ $P \text{ NOR } Q$	$P \leftrightarrow \neg Q$ $\neg P \rightarrow Q$ $\neg P \wedge \neg Q$ $Xpq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>P</th> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Q			0	1	P	1	0	1	0	0	
	Q														
	0	1													
P	1	0													
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## Material nonimplication


Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram												
$P \rightarrow Q$ $P \quad Q$ $P \quad Q$	$P \wedge \neg Q$ $\neg P \downarrow Q$ $\neg P \leftrightarrow \neg Q$ $Lpq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th>P</th> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	0	1	1	0	
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## Material implication

Notation	Equivalent formulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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
$P \rightarrow Q$ $P \supset Q$ $P \rightarrow Q$	$P \uparrow \neg Q$ $\neg P \vee Q$ $\neg P \leftarrow \neg Q$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	1	1	1	0	1	
	Q															
	0	1														
P	0	1	1													
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## Converse nonimplication

Notation	Equivalent formulas	Truth table	Venn diagram													
$P \nleftrightarrow Q$ $P \nrightarrow Q$ $P \nrightarrow Q$	$P \downarrow \neg Q$ $\neg P \wedge Q$ $\neg P \leftrightarrow \neg Q$ $Mpq$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>0</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Q			0	1	P	0	0	1	1	0	0	
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
## Converse implication

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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$P \leftarrow Q$ $P \subset Q$ $P \supset Q$	$P \vee \neg Q$ $\neg P \uparrow Q$ $\neg P \rightarrow \neg Q$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Q				0	1	P	0	1	0	1	1	1	
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P	0	1	0															
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## Exclusive disjunction

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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$P \nleftrightarrow Q$ $P \not\equiv Q$ $P \oplus Q$ $P \text{ XOR } Q$	$P \oplus Q$ $\neg(P \leftrightarrow Q)$ $\neg(P \leftrightarrow \neg Q)$	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="2">Q</th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th>0</th> <th>1</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <th rowspan="2">P</th> <th>0</th> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <th>1</th> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Q				0	1	P	0	0	1	1	1	0	
		Q																
		0	1															
P	0	0	1															
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## Biconditional

Notation	Equivalentformulas	Truth table	Venn diagram
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$P \leftrightarrow \neg Q$ $\neg P \leftrightarrow Q$ $P \equiv Q$ $P \text{ XNOR } Q \text{ IFF } Q$	$\neg P$	<table border="1"> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2">Q</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td> </tr> </table>		Q			0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	
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## Functional completeness

Because a function may be expressed as a composition, a truth-functional logical calculus does not need to have dedicated symbols for all of the above-mentioned functions to be functionally complete. This is expressed in a propositional calculus as logical equivalence of certain compound statements. For example, classical logic has  $\neg P \vee Q$  equivalent to  $P \rightarrow Q$ . The conditional operator " $\rightarrow$ " is therefore not necessary for a classical-based logical system if " $\neg$ " (not) and " $\vee$ " (or) are already in use.

A minimal set of operators that can express every statement expressible in the propositional calculus is called a minimal functionally complete set. A minimally complete set of operators is achieved by NAND alone  $\{\uparrow\}$  and NOR alone  $\{\downarrow\}$ . The following are the minimal functionally complete sets of operators whose arities do not exceed 2:

### One element

$\{\uparrow\}, \{\downarrow\}$ .

#### Two elements

$\{\vee, \neg\}, \{\wedge, \neg\}, \{\rightarrow, \neg\}, \{\leftarrow, \neg\}, \{\rightarrow, \perp\},$   
 $\{\leftarrow, \perp\}, \{\rightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}, \{\leftarrow, \leftrightarrow\}, \{\rightarrow, \nrightarrow\},$   
 $\{\rightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}, \{\leftarrow, \nrightarrow\}, \{\leftarrow, \leftrightarrow\}, \{\nrightarrow, \neg\},$   
 $\{\leftrightarrow, \neg\}, \{\nrightarrow, \top\}, \{\leftrightarrow, \top\}, \{\nrightarrow, \leftrightarrow\},$   
 $\{\leftrightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}.$

#### Three elements

$\{\vee, \leftrightarrow, \perp\}, \{\vee, \leftrightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}, \{\vee, \leftrightarrow, \top\},$   
 $\{\wedge, \leftrightarrow, \perp\}, \{\wedge, \leftrightarrow, \leftrightarrow\}, \{\wedge, \leftrightarrow, \top\}.$

## Propositional Logic

Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic and statement logic, is the branch of logic that studies ways of joining and/or modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more complicated propositions, statements or sentences, as well as the logical relationships and properties that are derived from these methods of combining or altering statements. In propositional logic, the simplest statements are considered as indivisible units, and hence, propositional logic does not study those logical properties and relations that depend upon parts of statements that are not themselves statements on their own, such as the subject and predicate of a statement. The most thoroughly researched branch of propositional logic is classical truth-functional propositional logic, which studies logical operators and connectives that are used to produce complex statements whose truth-value depends entirely on the truth-values of the simpler statements making them up, and in which it is assumed that every statement is either true or false and not both. However, there are other forms of propositional logic in which other truth-values are considered, or in which there is consideration of connectives that are used to produce statements whose truth-values depend not simply on the truth-values of the parts, but additional things such as their necessity, possibility or relatedness to one another.

## Introduction

A statement can be defined as a declarative sentence, or part of a sentence, that is capable of having a truth-value, such as being true or false. So, for example, the following are statements:

- George W. Bush is the 43rd President of the United States.
- Paris is the capital of France.
- Everyone born on Monday has purple hair.

Sometimes, a statement can contain one or more other statements as parts. Consider for example, the following statement:

- Either Ganymede is a moon of Jupiter or Ganymede is a moon of Saturn.

While the above compound sentence is itself a statement, because it is true, the two parts, "Ganymede is a moon of Jupiter" and "Ganymede is a moon of Saturn", are themselves statements, because the first is true and the second is false. The term proposition is sometimes used synonymously with statement. However, it is sometimes used to name something abstract that two different statements with the same meaning are both said to "express". In this usage, the English sentence, "It is raining", and the French sentence "Il pleut", would be considered to express the same proposition; similarly, the two English sentences, "Callisto orbits Jupiter" and "Jupiter is orbited by Callisto" would also be considered to express the same proposition. However, the nature or existence of propositions as abstract meanings is still a matter of philosophical controversy, and for the purposes of this article, the phrases "statement" and "proposition" are used interchangeably.

Propositional logic, also known as sentential logic, is that branch of logic that studies ways of combining or altering statements or propositions to form more complicated statements or propositions. Joining two simpler propositions with the word "and" is one common way of combining statements. When two statements are joined together with "and", the complex statement formed by them is true if and only if both the component statements are true. Because of this, an argument of the following form is logically valid:

Paris is the capital of France and Paris has a population of over two million. Therefore, Paris has a population of over two million. Propositional logic largely involves studying logical connectives such as the words “and” and “or” and the rules determining the truth-values of the propositions they are used to join, as well as what these rules mean for the validity of arguments, and such logical relationships between statements as being consistent or inconsistent with one another, as well as logical properties of propositions, such as being tautologically true, being contingent, and being self-contradictory. (These notions are defined below.)

Propositional logic also studies way of modifying statements, such as the addition of the word “not” that is used to change an affirmative statement into a negative statement. Here, the fundamental logical principle involved is that if a given affirmative statement is true, the negation of that statement is false, and if a given affirmative statement is false, the negation of that statement is true.

What is distinctive about propositional logic as opposed to other (typically more complicated) branches of logic is that propositional logic does not deal with logical relationships and properties that involve the parts of a statement smaller than the simple statements making it up. Therefore, propositional logic does not study those logical characteristics of the propositions below in virtue of which they constitute a valid argument:

1. George W. Bush is a president of the United States.
2. George W. Bush is a son of a president of the United States.
3. Therefore, there is someone who is both a president of the United States and a son of a president of the United States.

The recognition that the above argument is valid requires one to recognize that the subject in the first premise is the same as the subject in the second premise. However, in propositional logic, simple statements are considered as indivisible wholes, and those logical relationships and properties that involve parts of statements such as their subjects and predicates are not taken into consideration.

Propositional logic can be thought of as primarily the study of logical operators. A logical operator is any word or phrase used either to modify one statement to make a different statement, or join multiple statements together to form a more complicated statement. In English, words such as “and”, “or”, “not”, “if ... then...”, “because”, and “necessarily”, are all operators. A logical operator is said to be truth-functional if the truth-values (the truth or falsity, etc.) of the statements it is used to construct always depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the statements from which they are constructed. The English words “and”, “or” and “not” are (at least arguably) truth-functional, because a compound statement joined together with the word “and” is true if both the statements so joined are true, and false if either or both are false, a compound statement joined together with the word “or” is true if at least one of the joined statements is true, and false if both joined statements are false, and the negation of a statement is true if and only if the statement negated is false.

Some logical operators are not truth-functional. One example of an operator in English that is not truth-functional is the word “necessarily”. Whether a statement formed using this operator is true or false does not depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the statement to which the operator is applied. For example, both of the following statements are true:

- $2 + 2 = 4$ .
- Someone is reading an article in a philosophy.

However, Now consider the corresponding statements modified with the operator “necessarily”:

- Necessarily,  $2 + 2 = 4$ .
- Necessarily, someone is reading an article in a philosophy.

Here, the first example is true but the second example is false. Hence, the truth or falsity of a statement using the operator “necessarily” does not depend entirely on the truth or falsity of the statement modified. Truth-functional propositional logic is that branch of propositional logic that limits itself to the study of truth-functional operators. Classical (or “bivalent”) truth-functional propositional logic is that branch of truth-functional propositional logic that assumes that there are only two possible truth-values a statement (whether simple or complex) can have: (1) truth, and (2) falsity, and that every statement is either true or false but not both.

Classical truth-functional propositional logic is by far the most widely studied branch of propositional logic, and for this reason, most of the remainder of this article focuses exclusively on this area of logic. In addition to classical truth-functional propositional logic, there are other branches of propositional logic that study logical operators, such as “necessarily”, that are not truth-functional. There are also “non-classical” propositional logics in which such possibilities as (i) a proposition’s having a truth-value other than truth or falsity, (ii) a proposition’s having an indeterminate truth-value or lacking a truth-value altogether, and sometimes even (iii) a proposition’s being both true and false, are considered.

## History

The serious study of logic as an independent discipline began with the work of Aristotle (384-322 BCE). Generally, however, Aristotle’s sophisticated writings on logic dealt with the logic of categories and quantifiers such as “all”, and “some”, which are not treated in propositional logic. However, in his metaphysical writings, Aristotle espoused two principles of great importance in propositional logic, which have since come to be called the Law of Excluded Middle and the Law of Contradiction. Interpreted in propositional logic, the first is the principle that every statement is either true or false, the second is the principle that no statement is both true and false. These are, of course, cornerstones of classical propositional logic. There is some evidence that Aristotle, or at least his successor at the Lyceum, Theophrastus (d. 287 BCE), did recognize a need for the development of a doctrine of “complex” or “hypothetical” propositions, that is, those involving conjunctions (statements joined by “and”), disjunctions (statements joined by “or”) and conditionals (statements joined by “if... then...”), but their investigations into this branch of logic seem to have been very minor.

More serious attempts to study statement operators such as “and”, “or” and “if... then...” were conducted by the Stoic philosophers in the late 3rd century BCE. Since most of their original works—if indeed, these writings were even produced—are lost, we cannot make many definite claims about exactly who first made investigations into what areas of propositional logic, but we do know from the writings of Sextus Empiricus that Diodorus Cronus and his pupil Philo had engaged in a protracted debate about whether the truth of a conditional statement depends entirely on it not being the case that its antecedent (if-clause) is true while its consequent (then-clause) is false, or whether

it requires some sort of stronger connection between the antecedent and consequent—a debate that continues to have relevance for modern discussion of conditionals. The Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (roughly 280-205 BCE) perhaps did the most in advancing Stoic propositional logic, by marking out a number of different ways of forming complex premises for arguments, and for each, listing valid inference schemata.

Chrysippus suggested that the following inference schemata are to be considered the most basic:

1. If the first, then the second; but the first; therefore the second.
2. If the first, then the second; but not the second; therefore, not the first.
3. Not both the first and the second; but the first; therefore, not the second.
4. Either the first or the second [and not both]; but the first; therefore, not the second.
5. Either the first or the second; but not the second; therefore the first.

Inference rules such as the above correspond very closely to the basic principles in a contemporary system of natural deduction for propositional logic. For example, the first two rules correspond to the rules of modus ponens and modus tollens, respectively. These basic inference schemata were expanded upon by less basic inference schemata by Chrysippus himself and other Stoics, and are preserved in the work of Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus and later, in the work of Cicero.

Advances on the work of the Stoics were undertaken in small steps in the centuries that followed. This work was done by, for example, the second century logician Galen (roughly 129-210 CE), the sixth century philosopher Boethius (roughly 480-525 CE) and later by medieval thinkers such as Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and William of Ockham (1288-1347), and others. Much of their work involved producing better formalizations of the principles of Aristotle or Chrysippus, introducing improved terminology and furthering the discussion of the relationships between operators. Abelard, for example, seems to have been the first to clearly differentiate exclusive disjunction from inclusive disjunction, and to suggest that inclusive disjunction is the more important notion for the development of a relatively simple logic of disjunctions.

The next major step forward in the development of propositional logic came only much later with the advent of symbolic logic in the work of logicians such as Augustus DeMorgan (1806-1871) and, especially, George Boole (1815-1864) in the mid-19th century. Boole was primarily interested in developing a mathematical-style “algebra” to replace Aristotelian syllogistic logic, primarily by employing the numeral “1” for the universal class, the numeral “0” for the empty class, the multiplication notation “ $xy$ ” for the intersection of classes  $x$  and  $y$ , the addition notation “ $x + y$ ” for the union of classes  $x$  and  $y$ , etc., so that statements of syllogistic logic could be treated in quasi-mathematical fashion as equations; for example, “No  $x$  is  $y$ ” could be written as “ $xy = 0$ ”. However, Boole noticed that if an equation such as “ $x = 1$ ” is read as “ $x$  is true”, and “ $x = 0$ ” is read as “ $x$  is false”, the rules given for his logic of classes can be transformed into a logic for propositions, with “ $x + y = 1$ ” reinterpreted as saying that either  $x$  or  $y$  is true, and “ $xy = 1$ ” reinterpreted as meaning that  $x$  and  $y$  are both true. Boole’s work sparked rapid interest in logic among mathematicians. Later, “Boolean algebras” were used to form the basis of the truth-functional propositional logics utilized in computer design and programming.

In the late 19th century, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) presented logic as a branch of systematic in-

quiry more fundamental than mathematics or algebra, and presented the first modern axiomatic calculus for logic in his 1879 work *Begriffsschrift*. While it covered more than propositional logic, from Frege's axiomatization it is possible to distill the first complete axiomatization of classical truth-functional propositional logic. Frege was also the first to systematically argue that all truth-functional connectives could be defined in terms of negation and the material conditional. In the early 20th century, Bertrand Russell gave a different complete axiomatization of propositional logic, considered on its own, in his 1906 paper "The Theory of Implication", and later, along with A. N. Whitehead, produced another axiomatization using disjunction and negation as primitives in the 1910 work *Principia Mathematica*. Proof of the possibility of defining all truth functional operators in virtue of a single binary operator was first published by American logician H. M. Sheffer in 1913, though American logician C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) seems to have discovered this decades earlier. In 1917, French logician Jean Nicod discovered that it was possible to axiomatize propositional logic using the Sheffer stroke and only a single axiom schema and single inference rule.

The notion of a "truth table" is often utilized in the discussion of truth-functional connectives (discussed below). It seems to have been at least implicit in the work of Peirce, W. S. Jevons (1835-1882), Lewis Carroll (1832-1898), John Venn (1834-1923), and Allan Marquand (1853-1924). Truth tables appear explicitly in writings by Eugen Müller as early as 1909. Their use gained rapid popularity in the early 1920s, perhaps due to the combined influence of the work of Emil Post, whose 1921 work makes liberal use of them, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's 1921 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, in which truth tables and truth-functionality are prominently featured.

Systematic inquiry into axiomatic systems for propositional logic and related metatheory was conducted in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s by David Hilbert, Paul Bernays, Alfred Tarski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Kurt Gödel, Alonzo Church, and others. It is during this period, that most of the important metatheoretic results such as those discussed in Section VII were discovered. Complete natural deduction systems for classical truth-functional propositional logic were developed and popularized in the work of Gerhard Gentzen in the mid-1930s, and subsequently introduced into influential textbooks such as that of F. B. Fitch (1952) and Irving Copi (1953).

Modal propositional logics are the most widely studied form of non-truth-functional propositional logic. While interest in modal logic dates back to Aristotle, by contemporary standards the first systematic inquiry into this modal propositional logic can be found in the work of C. I. Lewis in 1912 and 1913. Among other well-known forms of non-truth-functional propositional logic, deontic logic began with the work of Ernst Mally in 1926, and epistemic logic was first treated systematically by Jaakko Hintikka in the early 1960s. The modern study of three-valued propositional logic began in the work of Jan Łukasiewicz in 1917, and other forms of non-classical propositional logic soon followed suit.

Relevance propositional logic is relatively more recent; dating from the mid-1970s in the work of A. R. Anderson and N. D. Belnap. Paraconsistent logic, while having its roots in the work of Łukasiewicz and others, has blossomed into an independent area of research only recently, mainly due to work undertaken by N. C. A. da Costa, Graham Priest and others in the 1970s and 1980s.

## **Propositional Logic and the Four Basic Truth Functional Connectives**

**Propositional logic** (also called "sentential logic") is the area of formal logic that deals with the logical relationships between propositions. A **proposition** is simply what I called in section 1.1 a statement. Some examples of propositions are: Snow is white Snow is cold Tom is an astronaut

The floor has been mopped The dishes have been washed We can also connect propositions together using certain English words, such as “and” like this: The floor has been mopped and the dishes have been washed.

This proposition is called a **complex proposition** because it contains the connective “and” which connects two separate propositions. In contrast, “the floor has been mopped” and “the dishes have been washed” are what are called atomic propositions. **Atomic propositions** are those that do not contain any truth-functional connectives. The word “and” in this complex proposition is a truth-functional connective. A **truth-functional connective** is a way of connecting propositions such that the **truth value** of the resulting complex proposition can be determined by the truth value of the propositions that compose it. Suppose that the floor has not been mopped but the dishes have been washed. In that case, if I assert the conjunction, “the floor has been mopped and the dishes have been washed,” then I have asserted something that is false. The reason is that a conjunction, like the one above, is only true when each **conjunct** (i.e., each statement that is conjoined by the “and”) is true. If either one of the conjuncts is false, then the whole conjunction is false. This should be pretty obvious. If Bob and Sally split chores and Bob’s chore was to both vacuum and dust whereas Sally’s chore was to both mop and do the dishes, then if Sally said she mopped the floor and did the dishes when in reality she only did the dishes (but did not mop the floor), then Bob could rightly complain that it isn’t true that Sally both mopped the floor and did the dishes!

What this shows is that conjunctions are true only if both conjuncts are true. This is true of all conjunctions. The conjunction above has a certain form—the same form as any conjunction. We can represent that form using placeholders— lowercase letters like p and q to stand for any statement whatsoever. Thus, we represent the form of a **conjunction** like this:

### **p and q**

Any conjunction has this same form. For example, the complex proposition, “it is sunny and hot today,” has this same form which we can see by writing the conjunction this way:

### **It is sunny today and it is hot today.**

Although we could write the conjunction that way, it is more natural in English to conjoin the adjectives “sunny” and “hot” to get “it is sunny and hot today.” Nevertheless, these two sentences mean the same thing (it’s just that one sounds more natural in English than the other). In any case, we can see that “it is sunny today” is the proposition in the “p” place of the form of the conjunction, whereas “it is hot today” is the proposition in the “q” place of the form of the conjunction. As before, this conjunction is true only if both conjuncts are true. For example, suppose that it is a sunny but bitterly cold winter’s day. In that case, while it is true that it is sunny today, it is false that it is hot today—in which case the conjunction is false. If someone were to assert that it is sunny and hot today in those circumstances, you would tell them that isn’t true. Conversely, if it were a cloudy but hot and humid summer’s day, the conjunction would still be false. The only way the statement would be true is if both conjuncts were true.

In the formal language that we are developing in this chapter, we will represent conjunctions using a symbol called the “dot,” which looks like this: “ $\cdot$ ” Using this symbol, here is how we will represent a conjunction in symbolic notation:

### **p $\cdot$ q**

In the following sections we will introduce four basic truth-functional connectives, each of which

have their own symbol and meaning. The four basic truth-functional connectives are: conjunction, disjunction, negation, and conditional. In the remainder of this section, we will discuss only conjunction. As we've seen, a conjunction conjoins two separate propositions to form a complex proposition.

The conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true. We can represent this information using what is called a **truth table**. Truth tables represent how the truth value of a complex proposition depends on the truth values of the propositions that compose it. Here is the truth table for conjunction:

p	q	$p \cdot q$
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

Here is how to understand this truth table. The header row lists the atomic propositions, p and q, that the conjunction is composed of, as well as the conjunction itself,  $p \cdot q$ . Each of the following four rows represents a possible scenario regarding the truth of each conjunct, and there are only four possible scenarios: either p and q could both be true (as in row 1), p and q could both be false (as in row 4), p could be true while q is false (row 2), or p could be false while q is true (row 3). The final column (the truth values under the conjunction,  $p \cdot q$ ) represents how the truth value of the conjunction depends on the truth value of each conjunct (p and q). As we have seen, a conjunction is true if and only if both conjuncts are true. This is what the truth table represents. Since there is only one row (one possible scenario) in which both p and q are true (i.e., row 1), that is the only circumstance in which the conjunction is true. Since in every other row at least one of the conjuncts is false, the conjunction is false in the remaining three scenarios.

At this point, some students will start to lose a handle on what we are doing with truth tables. Often, this is because one thinks the concept is much more complicated than it actually is. (For some, this may stem, in part, from a math phobia that is triggered by the use of symbolic notation.) But a truth table is actually a very simple idea: it is simply a representation of the meaning of a truth-functional operator. When I say that a conjunction is true only if both conjuncts are true, that is just what the table is representing. There is nothing more to it than that. (Later on in this chapter we will use truth tables to prove whether an argument is valid or invalid. Understanding that will require more subtlety, but what I have so far introduced is not complicated at all.)

There is more than one way to represent conjunctions in English besides the English word "and." Below are some common English words and phrases that commonly function as truth-functional conjunctions.

but	yet	also	although
however	moreover	nevertheless	still

It is important to point out that many times English conjunctions carry more information than simply that the two propositions are true (which is the only information carried by our symbolic connective, the dot). We can see this with English conjunctions like "but" and "however" which have a contrastive sense. If I were to say, "Bob voted, but Caroline didn't," then I am contrasting what Bob and Caroline did. Nevertheless, I am still asserting two independent propositions.

Another kind of information that English conjunctions represent but the dot connective doesn't is temporal information. For example, in the conjunction:

### **Bob brushed his teeth and got into bed**

There is clearly a temporal implication that Bob brushed his teeth first and then got into bed. It might sound strange to say:

### **Bob got into bed and brushed his teeth**

since this would seem to imply that Bob brushed his teeth while in bed. But each of these conjunctions would be represented in the same way by our dot connective, since the dot connective does not care about the temporal aspects of things. If we were to represent "Bob got into bed" with the capital letter A and "Bob brushed his teeth" with the capital letter B, then both of these propositions would be represented exactly the same, namely, like this:

### **A · B**

Sometimes a conjunction can be represented in English with just a comma or semicolon, like this: While Bob vacuumed the floor, Sally washed the dishes. Bob vacuumed the floor; Sally washed the dishes. Both of these are conjunctions that are represented in the same way. You should see that both of them have the form,  $p \cdot q$ .

Not every conjunction is a truth-function conjunction. We can see this by considering a proposition like the following:

Maya and Alice are married. If this were a truth-functional proposition, then we should be able to identify the two, independent propositions involved. But we cannot. What would those propositions be? You might think two propositions would be these:

Maya is married Alice is married But that cannot be right since the fact that Maya is married and that Alice is married is not the same as saying that Maya and Alice are married to each other, which is clearly the implication of the original sentence. Furthermore, if you tried to add "to each other" to each proposition, it would no longer make sense:

Maya is married to each other Alice is married to each other Perhaps we could say that the two conjuncts are "Maya is married to Alice" and "Alice is married to Maya," but the truth values of those two conjuncts are not independent of each other since if Maya is married to Alice it must also be true that Alice is married to Maya. In contrast, the following is an example of a truth-functional conjunction:

Maya and Alice are women. Unlike the previous example, in this case we can clearly identify two propositions whose truth values are independent of each other:

### **Maya is a woman Alice is a woman**

Whether or not Maya is a woman is an issue that is totally independent of whether Alice is a woman (and vice versa). That is, the fact that Maya is a woman tells us nothing about whether Alice is a woman. In contrast, the fact that Maya is married to Alice implies that Alice is married to Maya. So the way to determine whether or not a conjunction is truth-functional is to ask whether it is formed from two propositions whose truth is independent of each other. If there are two propositions whose truth is independent of each other, then the conjunction is truth-functional; if there are not

two propositions whose truth is independent of each other, the conjunction is not truth-functional.

## Quantification Theory

In this final lesson on symbolic logic, we'll take a very brief look at modern methods of representing the internal structure of propositions in first-order predicate calculus (or quantification theory). Incorporating all of the propositional calculus along with a few new symbols and rules of inference, the predicate calculus provides another way of handling the same logical forms we examined in our study of categorical logic.

## Individuals, Predicates, and Quantifiers

In addition to the familiar symbols of the propositional calculus, quantification theory also employs special symbols of four special sorts:

- individual constants ( a, b, c, etc. ) represent particular individual things—Allison, Bill, or this car, for example.
- predicate constants ( F, G, H, etc. ) represent specific predicates—free, greedy, or heavy, for example.

Writing an individual symbol directly after a predicate symbol signifies that this thing has that property. Thus, using the above examples, Fa, Gb, and Hc would signify "Allison is free," "Bill is greedy," and "This car is heavy" respectively. Since these are complete statements, they can be combined using the statement connectives to form such compound statements as  $Fa \cdot Gb$ ,  $Hg \supset Gb$ , and  $Hc \vee \sim Hc$ .

- individual variables ( x, y, z, etc. ) are employed to refer to any predicate generally.
- quantifiers are logical operators that signify the range of individuals to which individual variables apply, either all (  $\forall x$  ) or some (  $\exists x$  ).

	statement	individual	predicate
constants	A, B, C...	a, b, c...	F, G, H...
variables	p, q, r...	...x, y, z	
operators	$\sim$ , $\&$ , $\vee$ , $\supset$ , $\equiv$	(x) ( $\exists x$ )	

Put together, these symbols can be used to represent each of the four major forms of categorical proposition:

- $(x)(Sx \supset Px)$  corresponds to the **A** proposition, "All S are P."
- $(x)(Sx \supset \sim Px)$  corresponds to the **E** proposition, "No S are P."
- $(\exists x)(Sx \cdot Px)$  corresponds to the **I** proposition, "Some S are P."
- $(\exists x)(Sx \cdot \sim Px)$  corresponds to the **O** proposition, "Some S are not P."

Any of the rules of replacement from the propositional calculus may be applied to these statements of quantification theory. Thus, for example, we can easily demonstrate the converse of an E proposition:

- |  |          |
|--|----------|
| 1. $(x)(Sx \supset \sim Px)$           | premise  |
| 2. $(x)(\sim \sim Px \supset \sim Sx)$ | 1 Trans. |
| 3. $(x)(Px \supset \sim Sx)$           | 2 D.N.   |

### Quantification Rules

In order to prove the validity of syllogisms, however, we first need to strip the quantifiers from each statement, apply the appropriate rules of inference, and then restore quantifiers to each statement. The four quantification rules dictate the conditions under which it is permissible to delete or add a quantifier:

- Using  $\emptyset x$  to represent any expression in which the individual variable "x" appears, Universal Instantiation (UI) can be stated as an argument of the form:

$$\begin{array}{l} (x)(\emptyset x) \\ \emptyset u \end{array}$$

The "u" in this case can be any arbitrarily chosen individual constant or variable. In the context of a proof, for example, the truth of  $(x)[Fx \supset (Gx \vee Hx)]$  could be used to justify that of  $Fb \supset (Gb \vee Hb)$ . If the statement holds for all x, then it certainly must hold for b.

In similar fashion, Universal Generalization (UG) has the form:

$$\begin{array}{l} \emptyset y \\ (x)(\emptyset x) \end{array}$$

In this case, however, it is crucial that the "y" is an arbitrarily chosen individual—that is, an individual that was introduced into the proof by an application of UI.

Only then can we be sure that what holds of it is not some special feature but something that would hold equally well of all "x."

- Removing an existential quantifier requires application of Existential Instantiation (EI), and argument of the form:

$$\begin{array}{l} (\exists x)(\emptyset x) \\ \emptyset u \end{array}$$

In this case, the individual constant "u" must be one which has never been used in any earlier line of the proof; otherwise, we might mistakenly associate two things which have nothing in common. Thus, it is usually best to employ EI as soon as possible (certainly, before any application of UI) in a proof.

- Finally, Existential Generalization (EG) is an argument of the form:

$$\emptyset u (\exists x)(\emptyset x)$$

Here, as in UI, "u" may be any individual constant or variable.

Using these quantification rules together with the inference and replacement rules of the propositional calculus, it is possible to prove the validity of any of the valid categorical syllogisms. For **EIO-1**, for example:

1.  $(x)(Mx \supset \sim Px)$  premise
2.  $(\exists x)(Sx \cdot Mx)$  premise
3.  $Sd \cdot Md$  2 EI
4.  $Md \supset \sim Pd$  1 UI
5.  $Sd$  3 Simp.
6.  $Md \cdot Sd$  3 Comm.
7.  $Md$  6 Simp.
8.  $\sim Pd$  4, 7 M.P.
9.  $Sd \cdot \sim Pd$  5, 8 Conj.
10.  $(\exists x)(Sx \cdot \sim Px)$  9 EG

### Asyllogistic Inferences

Quantification theory makes it possible to prove the validity of many arguments that could not easily be expressed in categorical logic at all. In fact, Russell and Whitehead showed less than a hundred years ago that a higher-order predicate calculus (one that fills in the chart above by including variables and quantifiers for predicates as well as for individuals) is sufficient to provide logical demonstrations of simple arithmetical truths. A few decades later, however, Gödel showed that any such powerful system must contain at least one proposition whose truth or falsity cannot be proven.

### Symbolic Logic

Symbolic logic is the method of representing logical expressions through the use of symbols and variables, rather than in ordinary language. This has the benefit of removing the ambiguity that normally accompanies ordinary languages, such as English, and allows easier operation. There are many systems of symbolic logic, such as classical propositional logic, first-order logic and modal logic. Each may have separate symbols, or exclude the use of certain symbols.

### Logical Symbols

The following table presents several logical symbols, their name and meaning, and any relevant notes. The name of the symbol (under "meaning" links to a page explaining the symbol or term and its use). Note that different symbols have been used by different logicians and systems of logic. For the sake of clarity, this site consistently uses the symbols in the left column, while the "Notes" column may indicate other commonly-used symbols.

Symbol	Meaning	Notes

Operators (Connectives)		
$\neg$	Negation (NOT)	The tilde ( $\sim$ ) is also often used.
$\wedge$	conjunction (AND)	The ampersand ( $\&$ ) or dot ( $\cdot$ ) are also often used.
$\vee$	disjunction (OR)	This is the inclusive disjunction, equivalent to and/or in English.
$\oplus$	exclusive disjunction (XOR)	$\oplus$ means that only one of the connected propositions is true, equivalent to either...or. Sometimes $\underline{\vee}$ is used.
$\downarrow$	alternative denial (NAND)	Means "not both". Sometimes written as $\uparrow$
$\downarrow$	joint denial (NOR)	Means "neither/nor".
$\rightarrow$	conditional (if/then)	Many logicians use the symbol $\supset$ instead. This is also known as material implication.
$\leftrightarrow$	biconditional (iff)	Means "if and only if" $\equiv$ is sometimes used, but this site reserves that symbol for equivalence.
Quantifiers		
$\forall$	universal quantifier	Means "for all", so $\forall xPx$ means that $Px$ is true for every $x$ .
$\exists$	existential quantifier	Means "there exists", so $\exists xPx$ means that $Px$ is true for at least one $x$ .

Relations		
$\supset$	implication	$\alpha \supset \beta$ means that $\beta$ follows from $\alpha$
$\equiv$	equivalence	Also $\Leftrightarrow$ . Equivalence is two-way implication, so $\alpha \equiv \beta$ means $\alpha \supset \beta$ and $\beta \supset \alpha$ .
$\vdash$	provability	Shows provable inference. $\alpha \vdash \beta$ means that from $\alpha$ we can prove that $\beta$ .
$\therefore$	therefore	Used to signify the conclusion of an argument. Usually taken to mean implication, but often used to present arguments in which the premises do not deductively imply the conclusion.
$\Box$	forces	A relationship between possible worlds and sentences in modal logic.
Truth-Values		
$\top$	tautology	May be used to replace any tautologous (always true) formula.
$\perp$	contradiction	May be used to replace any contradictory (always false) formula. Sometimes "F" is used.
Parentheses		

( )	parentheses	Used to group expressions to show precedence of operations. Square brackets [ ] are sometimes used to clarify groupings.
<b>Set Theory</b>		
$\in$	membership	Denotes membership in a set. If $a \in \Gamma$ , then $a$ is a member (or an element) of set $\Gamma$ .
$\cup$	union	Used to join sets. If $S$ and $T$ are sets of formula, $S \cup T$ is a set containing all members of both.
$\cap$	intersection	The overlap between sets. If $S$ and $T$ are sets of formula, $S \cap T$ is a set containing those elements that are members of both.
$\subseteq$	subset	A subset is a set containing some or all elements of another set.
$\subset$	proper subset	A proper subset contains some, but not all,
		elements of another set.
$=$	set equality	Two sets are equal if they contain exactly the same elements.
$\complement$	absolute complement	$\complement(S)$ is the set of all things that are not in the set $S$ . Sometimes written as $\complement(S)$ , $S^c$ or $S^c$ .

-	relative complement	$T - S$ is the set of all elements in $T$ that are not also in $S$ . Sometimes written as $T \setminus S$ .
$\emptyset$	empty set	The set containing no elements.
<b>Modalities</b>		
$\square$	necessarily	Used only in modal logic systems. Sometimes expressed as $\Box$ where the symbol is unavailable.
$\diamond$	possibly	Used only in modal logic systems. Sometimes expressed as $\langle \rangle$ where the symbol is unavailable.

## Propositions, Variables and Non-Logical Symbols

The use of variables in logic varies depending on the system and the author of the logic being presented. However, some common uses have emerged. For the sake of clarity, this site will use the system defined below.

Symbol	Meaning	Notes
<b>A, B, C</b> ... <b>Z</b>	propositions	Uppercase Roman letters signify individual propositions. For example, $P$ may symbolize the proposition "Pat is ridiculous". $P$ and $Q$ are traditionally used in most examples.
<b><math>\alpha, \beta, \gamma</math></b> ... <b><math>\omega</math></b>	formulae	Lowercase Greek letters signify formulae, which may be themselves a proposition ( $P$ ), a formula ( $P \wedge Q$ ) or several connected formulae ( $\phi \wedge \rho$ ).
<b>x, y, z</b>	variables	Lowercase Roman letters towards the end of the alphabet are used to signify variables. In logical systems, these are usually coupled with a quantifier, $\forall$ or $\exists$ , in order to signify some or all of some unspecified subject or object. By convention, these begin with $x$ , but any other letter may be used if needed, so long as they are defined as a variable by a quantifier.
<b>a, b, c,</b> ... <b>z</b>	constants	Lowercase Roman letters, when not assigned by a quantifier, signify a constant, usually a proper noun. For instance, the letter "j" may be used to signify "Jerry". Constants are given a meaning before they are used in logical expressions.
<b>Ax, Bx</b>	predicate symbols	Uppercase Roman letters appear again to indicate predicate relationships between variables and/or constants, coupled with one or more variable places which may be filled by variables or constants. For instance, we may define the relation "x is green" as $Gx$ , and "x

... $Zx$		likes $y$ " as $Lxy$ . To differentiate them from propositions, they are often presented in italics,
		so while $P$ may be a proposition, $Px$ is a predicate relation for $x$ . Predicate symbols are non-logical – they describe relations but have neither operational function nor truth value in themselves.
$\Gamma, \Delta, \dots, \Omega$	sets of formulae	Uppercase Greek letters are used, by convention, to refer to sets of formulae. $\Gamma$ is usually used to represent the first site, since it is the first that does not look like Roman letters. (For instance, the uppercase Alpha ( $A$ ) looks identical to the Roman letter "A")
$\Gamma, \Delta, \dots, \Omega$	possible worlds	In modal logic, uppercase greek letters are also used to represent possible worlds. Alternatively, an uppercase $W$ with a subscript numeral is sometimes used, representing worlds as $W_0, W_1$ , and so on.
$\{ \}$	sets	Curly brackets are generally used when detailing the contents of a set, such as a set of formulae, or a set of possible worlds in modal logic. For instance, $\Gamma = \{ \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \}$

## DECISION PROCEDURES

As the name suggests, symbolic logic is a system of logic, not very different from traditional logic, but concerned with the use of symbols. Therefore, we can say that symbolic logic has two aims– (i) to symbolise the arguments and expressions, and (ii) to evaluate them. We are concerned with the latter objective. In symbolic logic, and more precisely in the logic of propositions, there are many methods to test the validity of arguments and argument forms and also there are ways to test or examine whether statement forms are tautologies or not. Such ways or

methods that examine whether a given argument or statement forms is valid or invalid, whether it is tautologies or not, is called a decision procedure. It is such a procedure, by which we come to a "decision" i.e. we decide if the argument is valid or invalid, a tautology or not.

There are some standard decision procedures in the logic of propositions. These are–

- 1) Truth-Table Method
- 2) Shorter Truth-Table Method
- 3) Method of Reduction to Conjunctive Normal Form (Cnf.)

## DECIDABILITY

The concept of decision procedure is basically concerned with the concept of decidability, whether a well-formed formula (wff) is valid or not, an inference is sound or not. In other words, we decide the validity or invalidity of 'wff' through a procedure. This is what we roughly mean by decidability. So, decidability requires a decision procedure. Decision procedures are effective since they are believed to be stable, reliable and finite "which can be described in advance for providing in a finite number of steps a 'yes' or 'no' answer to any class of questions". Decision procedure is regarded as mechanical. It works like a computer. If a formula, is valid applied correctly, it would at some point give a positive answer. If the formula under consideration is in fact not valid, it would give a negative answer.

## IS PROOF A DECISION PROCEDURE?

Often, we think that proof and decision procedures are synonymous terms. We need to understand that with regard to 'proof', there remains nothing to be proved as false. In case of proving a formula, we know prior to its proving that it is logically true. We need to distinguish between 'proving something' and 'testing something'. To prove something, we have no option to make it false. But in the case of testing something, the 'given' may be either true or false and it is the task of the doer to decide effectively whether the 'given' is true or false. So, this shows that proof establishes logical truth, but cannot establish logical falsity. However, Quine is of the opinion that just because a 'proof' fails to establish logical falsity, this does not prevent us from formulating a procedure to prove validity. But he distinctly shows the difference between a proof and a decision procedure, when he says that 'a decision procedure assures an affirmative and negative answer every time, while a proof procedure assures at best an eventual affirmative answer where an affirmative answer is in order'. Further, according to Quine a complete proof procedure can be distinguished from a decision procedure because a 'complete decision procedure' enables us to give both affirmative and negative answers, while a complete proof procedure give a positive or affirmative answer; it cannot give us negative answers.

Following the argument given above about a 'proof' not being a decision procedure, we can say that both Conditional Proof (CP) and Indirect Proof (IP) are not decision procedures since, the rule of CP is used is dealing with valid arguments. But, at this juncture, we face a confusing situation. Indirect Proof is equated with Reductio Ad Absurdum (RAA). But RAA is considered as a decision procedure. If this be the case, then why IP is not considered as a decision procedure? Why do we say Indirect Proof is similar to Reductio Ad Absurdum?

The similarity between the two is that in either we attempt to draw contradiction of that which is "given" or we make attempts to reduce an absurdity of the "given". Their difference lies in their procedures. In Reductio Ad Absurdum, the absurdity is derived in terms of truth-values; but in case of Indirect Proof, the absurdity is derived in terms of propositions or propositional variables. In both Reductio Ad Absurdum and Indirect Proof, if the given statement is valid, then its negation is a contradiction. Therefore, the "given" has to be a tautology. But what happens when the given statement is not valid? In this case, when the given statement is not valid then its negation does not lead into a contradiction nor it is proved as a tautology. So in such cases, the given statement is either contingent or inconsistent. With regard to the truth-values, RAA helps to productively decide contingent and inconsistent statements. In Indirect Proof, the inferential rules fail to decide if the given statement is contingent or inconsistent. Since, IP as a proof procedure, gives only a positive answer to any statement, but fails to give a negative answer. Indirect Proof (IP) cannot be regarded as a decision procedure.

## **TRUTH-TABLE METHOD**

The Truth-Table method is an ideal example of a decision procedure. This method helps us to show that one function is equivalent to another function by analyzing the components of the truth-tables. The validity of arguments involving the truth-functional compound statements can be tested by this, truth-table method. The phrase 'truth-function is an important concept in the truth-table method. We can define truth-function as a compound expression which contains variable, where the truth-values are determined solely by the truth-values of its component variables. Through the truth-table method logicians decide whether a given compound expression is a tautology or contradictory or contingency. A detail account of these three types of logical expressions will be given in the Chapter on Truth-table. Now let us find out the validity of an argument with the help of the

Truth-table method. We have already stated that the Truth-table method help us to test the validity or invalidity of arguments. Let us consider the following argument.

Premise– If the student works hard, he will be successful.  
 Premise– The student works hard.  
 Conclusion– Therefore, the student will be successful.

The logical form of this argument is:  $p \supset q$   
 $p$   
 $\therefore q$

We can test the validity of the above argument by arranging the premises and conclusion in the following as:  $[(p \supset q) \cdot p] \supset q$

Now Construct a truth-table for the above symbolic expression. In this expression,  $p, q$  are known as variables, and the symbols “ $\cdot$ ”, “ $\supset$ ” are known as constants.

1	2	3	4	5
$P$	$q$	$P \supset q$	$[(p \supset q) \cdot P]$	$[(p \supset q) \cdot P] \supset q$
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	F	T
F	T	T	F	T
F	F	T	F	T

The above Truth-table shows that the given symbolic expression is valid, since in the last column (5) of the truth-table, all the Truth-values are Ts (meaning true). This expression is a tautology. Similarly, an expression will be contradictory if the last column in the truth-table shows all the values as Fs (meaning false). A symbolic expression will be contingent, if the last column of the truth-table shows truth-values as having Ts and Fs.

Thus, we can say that the truth-table method is an effective mechanism, a decision procedure to decide if a given expression is valid or invalid. But this procedure may sometimes be inconvenient if we have more than three variables in a well formed formula (wff). But in spite of a symbolic expression being cumbersome, the truth-table method is regarded as an effective decision procedure.

## THE METHOD OF REDUCTION AD ABSURDUM OR THE INDIRECT TRUTH TABLE METHOD

Another convenient method to test the validity of arguments containing large number of statements is the method of Reduction Ad Absurdum, also known as the Indirect Truth-table method. This method is shorter than the ordinary or direct Truth-table method. This method is mechanical and is used to test the validity of expression containing more number of variables and constants. In Indirect Truth-table method we count backwards. In the direct Truth-table method, we reach the main column at the end, but in the Indirect Truth table method, we start with the main column.

In this method of RAA, we begin with the hypothesis or assumption that the given argument is invalid. To do this, we place an 'F' (meaning false) below the main connective conjoining the premises and the conclusion. With the help of the principles governing the construction of the truth-tables, we assign values to the components of the argument. In the course of doing this activity of assigning values, if we find any discrepancies, then our original hypothesis about the given argument as wrong must be invalid. If such be the case, then the argument itself must be valid. But if the case be that there are no discrepancies when we assign values on the basis of our original hypothesis, then argument must be invalid. Now, Apply the technique of RAA to test the validity or invalidity of an argument.

	$(p \supset q) \supset (q \supset p)$					
Step 1						F
	$(p \supset q) \supset (q \supset p)$					
Step 2	T	F				F
	$(p \supset q) \supset (q \supset p)$					
Step 3	T	F	T	F		F
	$(p \supset q) \supset (q \supset p)$					
Step 4	F	T	T	F	T	F

In the above example, we begin with the assumption or hypothesis that the argument is invalid. To do this, we put F under the constant  $\supset$  joining  $p \supset q$  and  $q \supset p$  as shown in Step 1. The Step 2 shows that main column can be F when the antecedent  $(p \supset q)$  is true (T) and the consequent  $(q \supset p)$  is false (F). In Steps 3 and 4 we show that the consequent  $q \supset p$  can be false (F) only if q is true (T) and p is false (F). Here we have the truth-values of p and q as false (F) and true (T) respectively. These values are assigned to p and q in the antecedent  $(p \supset q)$ . After doing so, we find that there is no inconsistency in the expression  $(p \supset q) \supset (q \supset p)$ . So, our original assumption of putting F under main column is justified. But if this assumption is justified and no inconsistency arises thereby, it means that the argument is invalid.

Thus, we have seen that Reductio Ad Absurdum or the Indirect Truth-table method, when applied to argument or argument forms, is a complete decision procedure. It is a simpler method for testing arguments. Therefore, it is a convenient method to test the validity of complex logical expressions. It gives us a concrete answer to a complex logical statement, either as valid or invalid.

## REDUCTION TO CONJUNCTIVE NORMAL FORM (CNF)

Apart from Direct and Indirect truth-table methods, we have another method to test the truth-value of complex logical expressions. This method is the Method of Reduction to Conjunctive Normal Form or what is known in brief as CNF. This method helps us to decide whether a given truth functional expression is a tautology or not. Like the other methods discussed above, this method of CNF is also a decision procedure and be conveniently applied to complex logical expressions having a large number of variables. Here, we need to introduce quite a few reference formulae for purpose of reduction to conjunctive normal form. By reference formulae, we mean equivalent logical expressions which are logically true expressions. The reference formulae are required for CNF in order to reduce a given truth functional expression to its equivalent expression. The reference formulae are:

### 1) Principle of Commutation (Comm.)

$$\text{i) } (p \cdot q) \equiv (q \cdot p)$$

$$\text{ii) } (p \vee q) \equiv (q \vee p)$$

### 2) Principle of Association (Assoc.)

$$\text{i) } (p \cdot (q \cdot r)) \equiv ((p \cdot q) \cdot r)$$

$$\text{ii) } (p \vee (q \vee r)) \equiv ((p \vee q) \vee r)$$

### 3) Principle of Distribution (Dist.)

$$\text{i) } (p \cdot (q \vee r)) \equiv (p \cdot q) \vee (p \cdot r)$$

$$\text{ii) } (p \vee (q \cdot r)) \equiv (p \vee q) \cdot (p \vee r)$$

### 4) Principle of Double Negation (D.N.)

$$\sim\sim p \equiv p$$

### 5) De Morgan's Laws (De.M.)

$$\text{i) } \sim(p \cdot q) \equiv \sim p \vee \sim q$$

$$\text{ii) } \sim(p \vee q) \equiv \sim p \cdot \sim q$$

### 6) Definition of Material Implication (Impl.)

$$p \cdot q \equiv (\sim p \vee q)$$

Understand CNF as a decision procedure by using the Reference Formulae to test the validity of a logical expression.

$$(p \vee q) \cdot \sim p \supset q$$

$$\sim((p \vee q) \cdot \sim p) \vee q \quad \text{—by Impl.}$$

$$(\sim(p \vee q) \vee \sim\sim p) \vee q \quad \text{—by De.M.}$$

$$((\sim p \cdot \sim q) \vee p) \vee q \quad \text{—by De.M., D.N.}$$

$$((p \vee \sim p) \cdot (p \vee \sim q)) \vee q \quad \text{—by Dist}$$

$$((p \vee \sim p) \vee q) \cdot (p \vee (q \vee \sim q)) \quad \text{—by Dist.}$$

In the illustration of the given example through reduction to conjunctive Normal form, we conclude that the given truth – functional expression is a Tautology. Because, the last equivalent expression is a conjunction of two tautological disjunctions –  $((p \vee \sim p) \vee q)$  and  $((p \vee (q \vee \sim q))$ . In CNF, an argu-

ment is considered to be valid if its equivalent expression is a tautological Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). But the argument will be invalid, if it cannot be reduced to a conjunction of tautologies.

## Testing the Validity of Sentential Logic

The test will involve applying skills that we've already learned: setting up truth tables and computing the truth-values of compounds. First, we must define logical form in SL.

### Logical Form in SL

This will seem trivial, but it is necessary. We're learning how to evaluate arguments expressed in SL. Like any evaluation of deductive arguments, the outcome hinges on the argument's form. So what is the form of an SL argument? Consider an example; here is an argument in SL:

$A \supset B$

$\sim B$  Therefore,  $\sim A$

'A' and 'B' stand for simple sentences in English; we don't care which ones. We're working within SL: given an argument in this language, how do we determine its form? Quite simply, by systematically replacing capital letters with variables (lower-case letters like 'p', 'q', and 'r'). The form of that particular SL argument is this:

$p \supset q$

$\sim q$  Therefore,  $\sim p$

The replacement of capital letters with lower-case variables was **systematic** in this sense: each occurrence of the same capital letter (e.g., 'A') was replaced with the same variable (e.g., 'p').

To generate the logical form of an SL argument, what we do is systematically replace SL sentences with what we'll call **sentence-forms**. An SL sentence is just a well-formed combination of SL symbols—capital letters, operators, and parentheses. A sentence-form is a combination of symbols that would be well-formed in SL, except that it has lower-case variables instead of capital letters.

Again, this may seem like a trivial change, but it is necessary. Remember, when we're testing an argument for validity, we're checking to see whether its form is such that it's possible for its premises to turn out true and its conclusion false.

This means checking various ways of filling in the form with particular sentences. Variables—as the name suggests—can vary in the way we need: they are generic and can be replaced with any old particular sentence. Actual SL constructions feature capital letters, which are actual sentences having specific truth-values. It is conceptually incoherent to speak of checking different possibilities for actual sentences. So we must switch to sentence-forms.

### The Truth Table Test for Validity

To test an SL argument for validity, we identify its logical form, then create a truth table with columns for each of the variables and sentence-forms in the argument's form. Filling in columns of Ts and Fs under each of the operators in those sentence-forms will allow us to check for what we're looking for: an instance of the argument's form for which the premises turn out true and the conclusion turns out false. Finding such an instance demonstrates the argument's invalidity, while failing to find one demonstrates its validity.

To see how this works, it will be useful to work through an example. Consider the following argu-

ment in English: If Democrats take back Congress, lots of new laws will be passed. Democrats won't take back Congress. Therefore, lots of new laws won't be passed.

We'll evaluate it by first translating it into SL. Let 'D' stand for 'Democrats takeback Congress' and 'L' stand for 'Lots of new laws will be passed'. This is the argument in SL:

$D \supset L$   
 $\sim D$  Therefore,  $\sim L$

First, the logical form. Replacing 'D' with 'p' and 'L' with 'q', we get:

$p \supset q$   
 $\sim p$  Therefore,  $\sim q$

Now we set up a truth table, with columns for each of the variables and columns for each of the sentence-forms. To determine how many rows our table needs, we note the number of different variables that occur in the argument-form (call that number 'n'); the table will need  $2^n$  rows. In this case, we have two variables—'p' and 'q'—and so we need  $2^2 = 4$  rows. (If there were three variables, we would need  $2^3 = 8$  rows; if there were four,  $2^4 = 16$ ; and so on.) Here is the table we need to fill in for this example:

p	q	$p \supset q$	$\sim p$	$\sim q$

First, we fill in the "base columns". These are the columns for the variables. We do this systematically. Start with the right-most column (under 'q' in this case), and fill in Ts and Fs alternately: T, F, T, F, T, F, ... as many times as you need—until you've got a truth-value in every row. That gives us this:

p	q	$p \supset q$	$\sim p$	$\sim q$
	T			
	F			
	T			
	F			

Next, we move to the base column to the left of the one we just filled in (under 'p' now), and fill in Ts and Fs by alternating in twos: T, T, F, F, T, T, F, F, ... as many times as we need. The result is this:

<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b><math>p \supset q</math></b>	<b><math>\sim p</math></b>	<b><math>\sim q</math></b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>			
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>			
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>			
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>			

If there were a third base column, we would fill in the Ts and Fs by alternating in fours: T, T, T, T, F, F, F, F. For a fourth base column, we would alternate every other eight. And so on. Next, we need to fill in columns of Ts and Fs under each of the operators in the statement-forms' columns. To do this, we apply our knowledge of how to compute the truth-values of compounds in terms of the values of their components, consulting the operators' truth table definitions. We know how to compute the values of  $p \supset q$ : it's false when p is true and q false; true otherwise. We know how to compute the values of  $\sim p$  and  $\sim q$ : those are just the opposites of the values of p and q in each of the rows. Making these computations, we fill the table in thus:

<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b><math>p \supset q</math></b>	<b><math>\sim p</math></b>	<b><math>\sim q</math></b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>

Once the table is filled in, we check to see if we have a valid or invalid form. The mark of an invalid form is that it's possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Here, the rows of the table are the possibilities—the four possible outcomes of plugging in particular SL sentences for the variables: both true; the first is true, but the second false; the first false but the second true; both false. The reason we systematically fill in the base columns as described above is that the method ensures that our rows will collectively exhaust all these possible combinations.

So, to see if it's possible for the premises to come out true and the conclusion to come out false, we check each of the rows, looking for one in which this happens—one in which there's a T under ' $p \supset q$ ', a T under ' $\sim p$ ', and an F under ' $\sim q$ '. And we have one: in row 3, the premises come out true and the conclusion comes out false. This is enough to show that the argument is invalid:

p	q	$p \supset q$	$\sim p$	$\sim q$
T	T	T	F	F
T	F	F	F	T
F	T	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>
F	F	T	T	T

## INVALID

When we're checking for validity, we're looking for one thing, and one thing only: a row (or rows) in which the premises come out true and the conclusion comes out false. If we find one, we have shown that the argument is invalid. If we don't find one, that indicates that it's impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false—and so the argument is valid. Either way, the only thing we look for is a row with true premises and a false conclusion. Every other kind of row is irrelevant. It's common for beginners to mistakenly think they are. The fourth row in the table above, for example, looks significant. Everything comes out true in that row. Doesn't that mean something—something good, like that the argument's valid? No. Remember, each row represents a **possibility**; what row 4 shows is that it's possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion true. But that's not enough for validity. For an argument to be valid, the premises must **guarantee** the conclusion; whenever they're true, the conclusion **must** be true. That it's merely possible that they all come out true is not enough.

Look at a more involved example, to see how the computation of the truth-values of the statement-forms must sometimes proceed in stages. The skill required here is nothing new—it's just identifying main operators and computing the values of the simplest components first—but it takes careful attention to keep everything straight. Consider this SL argument (never mind what its English counterpart is):

$(\sim A \cdot B) \vee \sim XB \rightarrow A$  Therefore,  $\sim X$

To get its form, we replace 'A' with 'p', 'B' with 'q', and 'X' with 'r':

$(\sim p \cdot q) \vee \sim rq \rightarrow p$  Therefore,  $\sim r$

So our truth-table will look like this (eight rows because we have three variables;  $2^3 = 8$ ):

p	q	r	$(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$

Filling in the base columns as prescribed above—alternating every other one for the column under ‘r’, every two under ‘q’, and every four under ‘p’—we get:

p	q	r	$(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T			
T	T	F			
T	F	T			
T	F	F			
F	T	T			
F	T	F			
F	F	T			
F	F	F			

Now we turn our attention to the three sentence-forms. We’ll start with the first premise, the compound  $(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$ . We need to compute the truth-value of this formula. We know how to do this, provided we have the truth-values of the simplest parts; we’ve solved problems like that already. The only difference in the case of truth tables is that there are multiple different assignments of truth-values to the simplest parts. In this case, there are eight different ways of assigning truth-values to ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘r’; those are represented by the eight different rows of the table. So we’re solving a problem we know how to solve; we’re just doing it eight times.

We start by identifying the main operator of the compound formula. In this case, it’s the wedge: we

have a disjunction; the left-hand disjunct is  $(\sim p \bullet q)$ , and the right-hand disjunct is  $\sim r$ . To figure out what happens under the wedge in our table, we must first figure out the values of these components. Both disjuncts are themselves compound:  $(\sim p \bullet q)$  is a conjunction, and  $\sim r$  is a negation. Let's tackle the conjunction first. To figure out what happens under the dot, we need to know the values of  $\sim p$  and  $q$ . We know the values of  $q$ ; that's one of the base columns. We must compute the value of  $\sim p$ . That's easy: in each row, the value of  $\sim p$  will just be the opposite of the value of  $p$ . We note the values under the tilde, the operator that generates them:

p	q	r	$(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T	F		
T	T	F	F		
T	F	T	F		
T	F	F	F		
F	T	T	T		
F	T	F	T		
F	F	T	T		
F	F	F	T		

To compute the value of the conjunction, we consider the result, in each row, of the truth-function for dot, where the inputs are the value under the tilde in  $\sim p$  and the value under  $q$  in the base column. In rows 1 and 2, it's  $F \bullet T$ ; in rows 3 and 4,  $F \bullet F$ ; and so on. The results:

p	q	r	$(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T	F F		
T	T	F	F F		
T	F	T	F F		
T	F	F	F F		
F	T	T	T T		
F	T	F	T T		
F	F	T	T F		
F	F	F	T F		

The column we just produced, under the dot, gives us the range of truth-values for the left-hand disjunct in the first premise. We need the values of the right-hand disjunct. That's just  $\sim r$ , which is easy to compute: it's just the opposite value of  $r$  in every row:

p	q	r	( $\sim p \bullet q$ )	$\sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T	F	F	F	
T	T	F	F	F	T	
T	F	T	F	F	F	
T	F	F	F	F	T	
F	T	T	T	T	F	
F	T	F	T	T	T	
F	F	T	T	F	F	
F	F	F	T	F	T	

Now we can finally determine the truth-values for the whole disjunction. We compute the value of the wedge's truth-function, where the inputs are the columns under the dot, on the one hand, and the tilde from ' $\sim r$ ' on the other.  $F \vee F$ ,  $F \vee T$ ,  $F \vee F$ , and so on:

p	q	r	( $\sim p \bullet q$ )	$\sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T	F	F	<b>F</b>	F
T	T	F	F	F	<b>T</b>	T
T	F	T	F	F	<b>F</b>	F
T	F	F	F	F	<b>T</b>	T
F	T	T	T	T	<b>T</b>	F
F	T	F	T	T	<b>T</b>	T
F	F	T	T	F	<b>F</b>	F
F	F	F	T	F	<b>T</b>	T

Since that column represents the range of possible values for the entire sentence-form, we highlight it. When we test for validity, we're looking for rows where the premises as a whole come out true; we'll be looking for the value under their main operators. To make that easier, just so we don't lose track of things visually because of all those columns, we highlight the one under the main operator.

Next, the second premise, which is thankfully much less complex. It is, however, slightly tricky. We need to compute the value of a conditional here. But notice that things are a bit different than usual: the antecedent, 'q', has its base column to the **right** of the column for the consequent, 'p'. That's a bit awkward. We're used to computing conditionals from left-to-right; we'll have to mentally adjust to the fact that ' $q \supset p$ ' goes from right-to-left. (Alternatively, if it helps, you can simply repro-

duce the base columns underneath the variables in the 'q  $\rightarrow$  p' column.) So in the first two rows, we compute T  $\rightarrow$  T; but in rows 3 and 4, it's F  $\rightarrow$  T; in rows 5 and 6, it's T  $\rightarrow$  F (the only circumstance in which conditionals turn out false); and in rows 7 and 8, it's F  $\rightarrow$  F. Here is the result:

p	q	r	$(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T	F F <b>F</b> F	T	
T	T	F	F F <b>T</b> T	T	
T	F	T	F F <b>F</b> F	T	
T	F	F	F F <b>T</b> T	T	
F	T	T	T T <b>T</b> F	F	
F	T	F	T T <b>T</b> T	F	
F	F	T	T F <b>F</b> F	T	
F	F	F	T F <b>T</b> T	T	

No need to highlight that column, as it's the only one we produced for that premise, so there can be no confusion.

We finish the table by computing the values for the conclusion, which is easy:

p	q	r	$(\sim p \bullet q) \vee \sim r$	$q \supset p$	$\sim r$
T	T	T	F F <b>F</b> F	T	F
T	T	F	F F <b>T</b> T	T	T
T	F	T	F F <b>F</b> F	T	F
T	F	F	F F <b>T</b> T	T	T
F	T	T	T T <b>T</b> F	F	F
F	T	F	T T <b>T</b> T	F	T
F	F	T	T F <b>F</b> F	T	F
F	F	F	T F <b>T</b> T	T	T

Is the argument valid? We look for a row with true premises and a false conclusion. There are none. The only two rows in which both premises come out true are the second and the eighth, and in both we also have a true conclusion. It is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, so the argument is valid. So that is how we test arguments for validity in SL. It's a straightforward procedure; the main source of error is simple carelessness. Go step by step, keep careful track of what you're doing, and it should be easy. It's worth noting that the truth table test is what logicians call a "decision procedure": it's a rule-governed process (an algorithm) that is guar-


anted to answer your question (in this case: valid or invalid?) in a finite number of steps. It is possible to program a computer to run the truth table test on arbitrarily long SL arguments. This is comforting, since once one gets more than four variables or so, the process becomes unwieldy.

## **Venn diagram**


**Venn diagram**, graphical method of representing categorical propositions and testing the validity of categorical syllogisms, devised by the English logician and philosopher John Venn (1834–1923). Long recognized for their pedagogical value, Venn diagrams have been a standard part of the curriculum of introductory logic since the mid-20th century.

Venn introduced the diagrams that bear his name as a means of representing relations of inclusion and exclusion between classes, or sets. Venn diagrams consist of two or three intersecting circles, each representing a class and each labeled with an uppercase letter. Lowercase x's and shading are used to indicate the existence and nonexistence, respectively, of some (at least one) member of a given class.


Two-circle Venn diagrams are used to represent categorical propositions, whose logical relations were first studied systematically by Aristotle. Such propositions consist of two terms, or class nouns, called the subject (S) and the predicate (P); the quantifier all, no, or some; and the copula are or are not. The proposition "All S are P," called the universal affirmative, is represented by shading the part of the circle labeled S that does not intersect the circle labeled P, indicating that there is nothing that is an S that is not also a P. "No S are P," the universal negative, is represented by shading the intersection of S and P; "Some S are P," the particular affirmative, is represented by placing an x in the intersection of S and P; and "Some S are not P," the particular negative, is represented by placing an x in the part of S that does not intersect P.




Venn diagram of the categorical proposition "All S are P."



Venn diagram of the categorical proposition "No S are P."




Venn diagram of the categorical proposition "Some S are P."



Venn diagram of the categorical proposition "Some S are not P."


Three-circle diagrams, in which each circle intersects the other two, are used to represent categorical syllogisms, a form of deductive argument consisting of two categorical premises and a categorical conclusion. A common practice is to label the circles with capital (and, if necessary, also lowercase) letters corresponding to the subject term of the conclusion, the predicate term of the conclusion, and the middle term, which appears once in each premise. If, after both premises are diagrammed (the universal premise first, if both are not universal), the conclusion is also represented, the syllogism is valid; i.e., its conclusion follows necessarily from its premises. If not, it is invalid.

Three examples of categorical syllogisms are the following. All Greeks are human. No humans are immortal. Therefore, no Greeks are immortal. Some mammals are carnivores. All mammals are animals. Therefore, some animals are carnivores. Some sages are not seers. No seers are soothsayers. Therefore, some sages are not soothsayers. To diagram the premises of the first syllogism, one shades the part of G ("Greeks") that does not intersect H ("humans") and the part of H that intersects I ("immortal"). Because the conclusion is represented by the shading in the intersection of G and I, the syllogism is valid.



Venn diagram of the syllogism “All Greeks are human;  
no humans are immortal; therefore, no Greeks are immortal.”


To diagram the second premise of the second example—which, because it is universal, must be diagrammed first—one shades the part of M (“mammals”) that does not intersect A (“animals”). To diagram the first premise, one places an x in the intersection of M and C. Importantly, the part of M that intersects C but does not intersect A is unavailable, because it was shaded in the diagramming of the first premise; thus, the x must be placed in the part of M that intersects both A and C. In the resulting diagram the conclusion is represented by the appearance of an x in the intersection of A and C, so the syllogism is valid.



Venn diagram of the syllogism “Some mammals are carnivores;  
all mammals are animals; therefore, some animals are carnivores.”

To diagram the universal premise in the third syllogism, one shades the part of Se (“seers”) that intersects So (“soothsayers”). To diagram the particular premise, one places an x in Sa (“sages”) on


that part of the boundary of So that does not adjoin a shaded area, which by definition is empty. In this way one indicates that the Sa that is not an Se may or may not be an So (the sage that is not a seer may or may not be a soothsayer). Because there is no x that appears in Sa and not in So, the conclusion is not represented, and the syllogism is invalid.



Venn diagram of the syllogism "Some sages are not seers; no seers are soothsayers; therefore, some sages are not soothsayers."

Venn's Symbolic Logic (1866) contains his fullest development of the method of Venn diagrams. The bulk of that work, however, was devoted to defending the algebraic interpretation of propositional logic introduced by the English mathematician George Boole.

### TESTING VALIDITY USING VENN'S DIAGRAMS



To test the validity of a categorical syllogism, one can use the method of Venn diagrams. Since a categorical syllogism has three terms, we need a Venn diagram using three intersecting circles, one representing each of the three terms in a categorical syllogism. A three term diagram has eight regions (the number of regions being  $2^n$  where n is the number of terms).


The following chart gives the extension of the predicates in the various regions of the diagram.

Region	S (Minor Term)	P (Major Term)	M (Middle Term)
1	yes	no	no
2	yes	yes	no
3	no	yes	no
4	yes	no	yes
5	yes	yes	yes
6	no	yes	yes
7	no	no	yes
8	no	no	no

In order to use a Venn diagram to test a syllogism, the diagram must be filled in to reflect the contents of the premises. Remember, shading an area means that that area is empty, the term represented has no extension in that area. What one is looking for in a Venn diagram test for validity is an accurate diagram of the **conclusion** of the argument that **logically follows** from a diagram of the premises. Since each of the premises of a categorical syllogism is a categorical proposition, diagram the premise sentences independently and then see whether the conclusion has already been diagrammed. If so, the argument is valid. If not, then it is not.


Remember, one definition of validity is that the propositional (informational) content of the conclusion is already expressed in the premises. Venn diagram validity tests provide a graphic tool for using this approach to testing for validity.

A categorical syllogism is valid if, but only if, a diagram of its premises produces a diagram that expresses the propositional content of its conclusion. Begin the process by preparing a three term Venn diagram. As a convention, organize the diagram as above, 2 circles at the top of the diagram, one centered at the bottom. The upper left hand circle should represent the minor term (designated S as this term is the subject of the conclusion). The upper right hand circle should represent the major term (designated P as this term is the predicate of the conclusion). The lower circle should represent the middle term (designated M).




**Consider the following argument:**


All Greeks are mortal. (All M are P) All Athenians are Greek. (All S are M) So, all Athenians are mortal. (All S are P) Next, diagram each of the premises. When doing this, act as if there are only 2 relevant circles. Begin with the first premise (frequently the premise involving the major term, sometimes called the major premise). In our example you need to diagram the proposition "All M are P". Ignoring for a moment the circle representing the minor term, your diagram should look like this:




Following the standard conventions we get:



Next, diagram the second premise--"All S are M"-- to get:




Now, if we overlap the diagrams of the premises we get a diagram of the argument, and we are ready to determine whether the argument is valid or not:




Does this diagram express the informational content of the conclusion of the argument? Yes, all of the S's that remain are in region 5, and everything in region 5 is an S, an M, and a P. Since all the S's are in region 5, all the S's are P's and the argument is VALID.

**Consider another argument:**

All mathematicians are rational. (All P are M) All philosophers are rational. (All S are M)



SO, all philosophers are mathematicians. (All S are P) Beginning with the first premise we get:




**Adding the second premise we get:**

Does this diagram express the informational content of the conclusion "All S are P"? NO. Region 4 of the diagram is not shaded (not empty) so it is possible that there is an S that is not a P. Accordingly, the argument is NOT VALID.


**NOTE:** Whenever a diagram of the premises of an argument produces exactly three shaded regions, the argument is not valid. Exactly three shaded regions indicates that there is a fallacy of distribution. Similarly, if a diagram of the premises indicates 2 or more populated regions, then the argument is not valid.

### Consider the argument:

All philosophers are logical. Some physicists are logical. So, some philosophers are physicists. In the following diagram, the bar that crosses from region 5 into region 6 indicates that the argument is NOT VALID. All that we can be certain of is that there is either an SPM (region 5) or a PM non-S (region 6), but we don't know which. Since we don't know which, the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises.




If we modify the previous argument just a little, we see an important distinction. Consider the argument: Some physicists are logical. (Some S are M) No philosophers are logical. (No P are M)



So, some physicists are not philosophers. (Some S are not P) In our new argument, a diagram of the first premise produces:

The second premise, however, rules out the possibility that the S that is M is also a P, because the second premise guarantees that no P's are M's. Our diagram looks like this:



Does this diagram express the informational content of the conclusion "Some S are not P"? Yes, the S that is an M in region 4 is a non-P. So the argument is valid. As useful as Venn's methods are, there are some severe limitations to their usefulness. First, while it is possible to construct a 16 region Venn-type diagram for a 4 term argument, and even a 32 region diagram for a 5 term argument, those diagrams are almost impossible to read or use. What is more, it is impossible to construct a 64 region diagram for a 6 term argument--there is no way to get exactly the right 64 regions in a 2 dimensional diagram, More significantly, though, is that Venn's diagrams cannot capture the logic of quantified sentences that are more complex than simple categorical propositions. Fortunately, we have at our disposal an even more powerful analytical tool--modern predicate logic.

## Fallacies

A fallacy is a kind of error in reasoning. Fallacious arguments should not be persuasive, but they too often are. Fallacies may be created unintentionally, or they may be created intentionally in order to deceive other people.

The vast majority of the commonly identified fallacies involve arguments, although some involve only explanations, or definitions, or other products of reasoning. Sometimes the term "fallacy" is used even more broadly to indicate any false belief or cause of a false belief. The list below includes some fallacies of these sorts, but most are fallacies that involve kinds of errors made while arguing informally in natural language.

A charge of fallacious reasoning always needs to be justified. The burden of proof is on your shoulders when you claim that someone's reasoning is fallacious. Even if you do not explicitly give your reasons, it is your responsibility to be able to give them if challenged. An informal fallacy is fallacious because of both its form and its content. The formal fallacies are fallacious only because of

their logical form. For example, the Slippery Slope Fallacy has the following form: Step 1 often leads to step 2. Step 2 often leads to step 3. Step 3 often leads to ... until we reach an obviously unacceptable step, so step 1 is not acceptable. That form occurs in both good arguments and fallacious arguments. The quality of an argument of this form depends crucially on the probabilities of going from one step to another. The probabilities involve the argument's content, not merely its form. The discussion below that precedes the long alphabetical list of fallacies begins with an account of the ways in which the term "fallacy" is imprecise. Attention then turns to the number of competing and overlapping ways to classify fallacies of argumentation. For pedagogical purposes, researchers in the field of fallacies disagree about the following topics: which name of a fallacy is more helpful to students' understanding; whether some fallacies should be de-emphasized in favor of others; and which is the best taxonomy of the fallacies. Researchers in the field are also deeply divided about how to define the term "fallacy" itself, how to define certain fallacies, and whether any theory of fallacies at all should be pursued if that theory's goal is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing between fallacious and non-fallacious reasoning generally.

Analogously, there is doubt in the field of ethics regarding whether researchers should pursue the goal of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing moral actions from immoral ones.

## Introduction

The first known systematic study of fallacies was due to Aristotle in his *De Sophisticis Elenchis* (*Sophistical Refutations*), an appendix to the *Topics*. He listed thirteen types. After the Dark Ages, fallacies were again studied systematically in Medieval Europe. This is why so many fallacies have Latin names. The third major period of study of the fallacies began in the later twentieth century due to renewed interest from the disciplines of philosophy, logic, communication studies, rhetoric, psychology, and artificial intelligence.

The more frequent the error within public discussion and debate the more likely it is to have a name. That is one reason why there is no specific name for the fallacy of subtracting five from thirteen and concluding that the answer is seven, though the error is common. The term "fallacy" is not a precise term. One reason is that it is ambiguous. It can refer either to (a) a kind of error in an argument, (b) a kind of error in reasoning (including arguments, definitions, explanations, and so forth), (c) a false belief, or (d) the cause of any of the previous errors including what are normally referred to as "rhetorical techniques." Philosophers who are researchers in fallacy theory prefer to emphasize (a), but their lead is often not followed in textbooks and public discussion.

Regarding (d), ill health, being a bigot, being hungry, being stupid, and being hypercritical of our enemies are all sources of error in reasoning, so they could qualify as fallacies of kind (d), but they are not included in the list below. On the other hand, wishful thinking, stereotyping, being superstitious, rationalizing, and having a poor sense of proportion are sources of error and are included in the list below, though they wouldn't be included in a list devoted only to faulty arguments. Thus there is a certain arbitrariness to what appears in lists such as this. What have been left off the list below are the following persuasive techniques commonly used to influence others and to cause errors in reasoning:

apple polishing, using propaganda techniques, ridiculing, being sarcastic, selecting terms with strong negative or positive associations, using innuendo, and weasling. All of the techniques are worth knowing about if one wants to reason well. In describing the fallacies below, the custom is

followed of not distinguishing between a reasoner using a fallacy and the reasoning itself containing the fallacy. Real arguments are often embedded within a very long discussion. Richard Whately, one of the greatest of the 19th century researchers into informal logic, wisely said, "A very long discussion is one of the most effective veils of Fallacy; ...a Fallacy, which when stated barely...would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if diluted in a quarto volume."

## **Taxonomy of Fallacies**

The importance of understanding the common fallacy labels is that they provide an efficient way to communicate criticisms of someone's reasoning. However, there are a variety of ways to label fallacies, and there are a number of competing and overlapping ways to classify fallacies. For example, the fallacies of argumentation can be classified as either formal or informal. A formal fallacy can be detected by examining the logical form of the reasoning, whereas an informal fallacy depends upon the content of the reasoning and possibly the purpose of the reasoning. That is, informal fallacies are errors of reasoning that cannot easily be expressed in our system of formal logic (such as symbolic, deductive, predicate logic). The list below contains very few formal fallacies. Fallacious arguments also can be classified as deductive or inductive, depending upon whether the fallacious argument is most properly assessed by deductive standards or instead by inductive standards. Deductive standards demand deductive validity, but inductive standards require inductive strength such as making the conclusion more likely. Fallacies can be divided into categories according to the psychological factors that lead people to use them, and they can also be divided into categories according to the epistemological or logical factors that cause the error. In the latter division there are three categories: (1) the reasoning is invalid but is presented as if it were a valid argument, or else it is inductively much weaker than it is presented as being, (2) the argument has an unjustified premise, or (3) some relevant evidence has been ignored or suppressed. Regarding (2), a premise can be justified or warranted at a time even if we later learn that the premise was false, and it can be justified if we are reasoning about what would have happened even when we know it didn't happen.

Similar fallacies are often grouped together under a common name intended to bring out how the fallacies are similar. Here are three examples. Fallacies of relevance include fallacies that occur due to reliance on an irrelevant reason. Ad Hominem, Appeal to Pity, and Affirming the Consequent are also fallacies of relevance. Accent, Amphiboly and Equivocation are examples of fallacies of ambiguity. The fallacies of illegitimate presumption include Begging the Question, False Dilemma, No True Scotsman, Complex Question and Suppressed Evidence.

## **Pedagogy**

It is commonly claimed that giving a fallacy a name and studying it will help the student identify the fallacy in the future and will steer them away from using the fallacy in their own reasoning. As Steven Pinker says in *The Stuff of Thought* (p. 129), If a language provides a label for a complex concept, that could make it easier to think about the concept, because the mind can handle it as a single package when juggling a set of ideas, rather than having to keep each of its components in the air separately. It can also give a concept an additional label in long-term memory, making it more easily retrievable than ineffable concepts or those with more roundabout verbal descriptions.

For pedagogical purposes, researchers in the field of fallacies disagree about the following topics: which name of a fallacy is more helpful to students' understanding; whether some fallacies should be de-emphasized in favor of others; and which is the best taxonomy of the fallacies. Fallacy theory is criticized by some teachers of informal reasoning for its over-emphasis on poor reasoning ra-

ther than good reasoning. Do colleges teach the Calculus by emphasizing all the ways one can make mathematical mistakes? The critics want more emphasis on the forms of good arguments and on the implicit rules that govern proper discussion designed to resolve a difference of opinion. But there has been little systematic study of which emphasis is more successful.

## **What is a fallacy?**

Researchers disagree about how to define the very term “fallacy.” Focusing just on fallacies in sense (a) above, namely fallacies of argumentation, some researchers define a fallacy as an argument that is deductively invalid or that has very little inductive strength. Because examples of false dilemma, inconsistent premises, and begging the question are valid arguments in this sense, this definition misses some standard fallacies. Other researchers say a fallacy is a mistake in an argument that arises from something other than merely false premises. But the false dilemma fallacy is due to false premises. Still other researchers define a fallacy as an argument that is not good. Good arguments are then defined as those that are deductively valid or inductively strong, and that contain only true, well-established premises, but are not question-begging. A complaint with this definition is that its requirement of truth would improperly lead to calling too much scientific reasoning fallacious; every time a new scientific discovery caused scientists to label a previously well-established claim as false, all the scientists who used that claim as a premise would become fallacious reasoners. This consequence of the definition is acceptable to some researchers but not to others. Because informal reasoning regularly deals with hypothetical reasoning and with premises for which there is great disagreement about whether they are true or false, many researchers would relax the requirement that every premise must be true. One widely accepted definition defines a fallacious argument as one that either is deductively invalid or is inductively very weak or contains an unjustified premise or that ignores relevant evidence that is available and that should be known by the arguer. Finally, yet another theory of fallacy says a fallacy is a failure to provide adequate proof for a belief, the failure being disguised to make the proof look adequate.

Other researchers recommend characterizing a fallacy as a violation of the norms of good reasoning, the rules of critical discussion, dispute resolution, and adequate communication. The difficulty with this approach is that there is so much disagreement about how to characterize these norms. In addition, all the above definitions are often augmented with some remark to the effect that the fallacies are likely to persuade many reasoners. It is notoriously difficult to be very precise about this vague and subjective notion of being likely to persuade, and some researchers in fallacy theory have therefore recommended dropping the notion in favor of “can be used to persuade.”

Some researchers complain that all the above definitions of fallacy are too broad and do not distinguish between mere blunders and actual fallacies, the more serious errors. Researchers in the field are deeply divided, not only about how to define the term “fallacy” and how to define some of the individual fallacies, but also about whether any general theory of fallacies at all should be pursued if that theory’s goal is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing between fallacious and non-fallacious reasoning generally. Analogously, there is doubt in the field of ethics whether researchers should pursue the goal of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing moral actions from immoral ones.

## **Formal Fallacy**

A formal fallacy is an error in logic that can be seen in the argument's form. All formal fallacies are specific types of non sequitur.

- Appeal to probability – a statement that takes something for granted because it would probably be the case (or might be the case).
- Argument from fallacy (also known as the fallacy fallacy) – the assumption that if an argument for some conclusion is fallacious, then the conclusion is false.
- Base rate fallacy – making a probability judgment based on conditional probabilities, without taking into account the effect of prior probabilities.
- Conjunction fallacy – the assumption that an outcome simultaneously satisfying multiple conditions is more probable than an outcome satisfying a single one of them.
- Masked-man fallacy (illicit substitution of identicals) – the substitution of identical designators in a true statement can lead to a false one.<sup>[10]</sup>

## Informal fallacies

Informal fallacies – arguments that are logically unsound for lack of well-grounded premises.

- Argument to moderation (false compromise, middle ground, fallacy of the mean, argumentum ad temperantiam) – assuming that the compromise between two positions is always correct.
- Continuum fallacy (fallacy of the beard, line-drawing fallacy, sorites fallacy, fallacy of the heap, bald man fallacy) – improperly rejecting a claim for being imprecise.
- Correlative-based fallacies
- Suppressed correlative – a correlative is redefined so that one alternative is made impossible (e.g., "I'm not fat because I'm thinner than him").
- Definist fallacy – defining a term used in an argument in a biased manner. The person making the argument expects the listener will accept the provided definition, making the argument difficult to refute.
- Divine fallacy (argument from incredulity) – arguing that, because something is so incredible or amazing, it must be the result of superior, divine, alien or paranormal agency.
- Double counting – counting events or occurrences more than once in probabilistic reasoning, which leads to the sum of the probabilities of all cases exceeding unity.
- Equivocation – using a term with more than one meaning in a statement without specifying which meaning is intended.
- Ambiguous middle term – using a middle term with multiple meanings.
- Definitional retreat – changing the meaning of a word when an objection is raised.
- Motte-and-bailey fallacy – conflating two positions with similar properties, one modest and easy to defend (the "motte") and one more controversial (the "bailey"). The arguer first states the controversial position, but when challenged, states that they are advancing the modest position.
- Fallacy of accent – changing the meaning of a statement by not specifying on which word emphasis falls.
- Persuasive definition – purporting to use the "true" or "commonly accepted" meaning of a term while, in reality, using an uncommon or altered definition.
- (cf. the if-by-whiskey fallacy)
- Ecological fallacy – inferences about the nature of specific individuals are based solely upon aggregate statistics collected for the group to which those individuals belong.
- Etymological fallacy – reasoning that the original or historical meaning of a word or phrase is necessarily similar to its actual present-day usage.
- Fallacy of composition – assuming that something true of part of a whole must also be true of

the whole.

- Fallacy of division – assuming that something true of a thing must also be true of all or some of its parts.
- False attribution – an advocate appeals to an irrelevant, unqualified, unidentified, biased or fabricated source in support of an argument.
- Fallacy of quoting out of context (contextomy, contextomy; quotation mining) – refers to the selective excerpting of words from their original context in a way that distorts the source's intended meaning.
- False authority (single authority) – using an expert of dubious credentials or using only one opinion to sell a product or idea. Related to the appeal to authority.
- False dilemma (false dichotomy, fallacy of bifurcation, black-or-white fallacy) – two alternative statements are held to be the only possible options when in reality there are more.
- False equivalence – describing two or more statements as virtually equal when they are not.
- Feedback fallacy – believing in the objectivity of an evaluation to be used as the basis for improvement without verifying that the source of the evaluation is a disinterested party.
- Historian's fallacy – assuming that decision makers of the past had identical information as those subsequently analyzing the decision. This should not be confused with presentism, in which present-day ideas and perspectives are anachronistically projected into the past.
- Historical fallacy – a set of considerations is thought to hold good only because a completed process is read into the content of the process which conditions this completed result.
- Baconian fallacy – using pieces of historical evidence without the aid of specific methods, hypotheses, or theories in an attempt to make a general truth about the past. Commits historians "to the pursuit of an impossible object by an impracticable method".
- Homunculus fallacy – using a "middle-man" for explanation; this sometimes leads to regressive middle-men. It explains a concept in terms of the concept itself without explaining its real nature (e.g.: explaining thought as something produced by a little thinker – a homunculus – inside the head simply identifies an intermediary actor and does not explain the product or process of thinking).
- Inflation of conflict – arguing that, if experts in a field of knowledge disagree on a certain point within that field, no conclusion can be reached or that the legitimacy of that field of knowledge is questionable.
- If-by-whiskey – an argument that supports both sides of an issue by using terms that are selectively emotionally sensitive.
- Incomplete comparison – insufficient information is provided to make a complete comparison.
- Inconsistent comparison – different methods of comparison are used, leaving a false impression of the whole comparison.
- Intentionality fallacy – the insistence that the ultimate meaning of an expression must be consistent with the intention of the person from whom the communication originated (e.g. a work of fiction that is widely received as a blatant allegory must necessarily not be regarded as such if the author intended it not to be so).
- Lump of labour fallacy – the misconception that there is a fixed amount of work to be done within an economy, which can be distributed to create more or fewer jobs.
- Kettle logic – using multiple, jointly inconsistent arguments to defend a position.
- Ludic fallacy – the belief that the outcomes of non-regulated random occurrences can be encapsulated by a statistic; a failure to take into account that unknown unknowns have a role in determining the probability of events taking place.
- McNamara fallacy (quantitative fallacy) – making a decision based only on quantitative obser-

uations, discounting all other considerations.

- Mind projection fallacy – subjective judgments are "projected" to be inherent properties of an object, rather than being related to personal perceptions of that object.
- Moralistic fallacy – inferring factual conclusions from purely evaluative premises in violation of fact–value distinction. For instance,
  - inferring is from ought is an instance of moralistic fallacy. Moralistic fallacy is the inverse of naturalistic fallacy defined below.
- Moving the goalposts (raising the bar) – argument in which evidence presented in response to a specific claim is dismissed and some other (often greater) evidence is demanded.
- Nirvana fallacy (perfect-solution fallacy) – solutions to problems are rejected because they are not perfect.
- Proof by assertion – a proposition is repeatedly restated regardless of contradiction; sometimes confused with argument from
  - repetition (argumentum ad infinitum, argumentum ad nauseam)
- Prosecutor's fallacy – a low probability of false matches does not mean a low probability of some false match being found.
- Proving too much – an argument that results in an overly-generalized conclusion (e.g.: arguing that drinking alcohol is bad because in some instances it has led to spousal or child abuse).
- Psychologist's fallacy – an observer presupposes the objectivity of their own perspective when analyzing a behavioral event.
- Referential fallacy – assuming all words refer to existing things and that the meaning of words reside within the things they refer to, as opposed to words possibly referring to no real object or that the meaning of words often comes from how they are used.
- Reification (concretism, hypostatization, or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness) – treating an abstract belief or hypothetical construct as if it were a concrete, real event or physical entity (e.g.: saying that evolution selects which traits are passed on to future generations; evolution is not a conscious entity with agency).
- Retrospective determinism – the argument that because an event has occurred under some circumstance, the circumstance must have made its occurrence inevitable.
- Slippery slope (thin edge of the wedge, camel's nose) – asserting that a proposed, relatively small, first action will inevitably lead to a chain of related events resulting in a significant and negative event and, therefore, should not be permitted.
- Special pleading – the arguer attempts to cite something as an exemption to a generally accepted rule or principle without justifying the exemption (e.g.: a defendant who murdered his parents asks for leniency because he is now an orphan).

## **Improper premise**

- Begging the question (petitio principii) – using the conclusion of the argument in support of itself in a premise (e.g.: saying that smoking cigarettes is deadly because cigarettes can kill you; something that kills is deadly).
- Loaded label – while not inherently fallacious, use of evocative terms to support a conclusion is a type of begging the question fallacy. When fallaciously used, the term's connotations are relied on to sway the argument towards a particular conclusion. For example, an organic foods advertisement that says "Organic foods are safe and healthy foods grown without any pesticides, herbicides, or other unhealthy additives." Use of the term "unhealthy additives" is used as support for the idea that the product is safe.

- Circular reasoning (circulus in demonstrando) – the reasoner begins with what he or she is trying to end up with (e.g.: all bachelors are unmarried males).
- Fallacy of many questions (complex question, fallacy of presuppositions, loaded question, plurium interrogationum) – someone asks a question that presupposes something that has not been proven or accepted by all the people involved. This fallacy is often used rhetorically so that the question limits direct replies to those that serve the questioner's agenda.

### Argument Forms Substitution-Instances

Since the statements of the propositional calculus are propositions, they can be combined to form logical arguments, complete with one or more premises and a single conclusion that may follow validly from them. Thus, for example, each of the following is an argument expressed in the language of symbolic logic:

$A \supset B$	$(D \cdot B) \supset \sim E$	$(A \vee E) \supset (D \equiv B)$
A	$D \cdot B$	$A \vee E$
B	$\sim E$	$D \equiv B$

What is more, notice that all three of these arguments share a common structure: the first premise of each is a  $\supset$  statement; the second premise is the antecedent of that statement; and the conclusion is its consequent. We can exhibit this common structure more clearly by using statement variables to express the argument form involved:

$$p \supset q$$

$$p$$

Each of the three arguments above is a substitution instance of this argument form, since each of them results from the substitution of an appropriate (simple or compound) statement for each of the statement variables in the argument form. Notice that these substitutions must be consistent in each application; once we've put  $D \cdot B$  in the place of  $p$  in the first premise of the second argument, for example, we must also put it in the place of  $p$  in the second premise. In the same way, the first and third arguments above—along with indefinitely many others—can be shown to be substitution-instances of the same argument form. Most arguments are substitution-instances of several distinct argument forms, each of which can be no more complex in structure than the argument itself.

### Testing for Validity

Recognizing individual arguments as substitution-instances of more general argument forms is an important skill because, as we've already seen, the validity of any argument depends solely upon its logical form. An argument in the propositional calculus is valid whenever it is a substitution-instance of an argument form in which it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Since the argument form reliably leads from premises of a certain general structure to a conclusion of a different structure, every substitution-instance of that argument form must express a valid argument.

Thus, the same truth-tables we used to define the statement connectives provide an effective decision procedure for determining the validity of arguments in the propositional calculus. We simply chart the truth-values of each premise and the conclusion of an argument form for every possible

combination of truth-values for the statement variables involved, and look to see what happens on those lines of the truth-table in which all of the premises are true. If the conclusion is also true on each of these lines, then the inference captured by the argument form is a valid one, and arguments of this form must all be valid. If, however, there is even a single line on which all of the premises are true but the conclusion is false, then the inference is invalid, and we cannot be sure whether arguments of this form are valid or invalid. (They certainly are not valid because of this form, but of course some of them may happen to be substitution-instances of other argument forms whose inferences are valid.)

## Modus Ponens

Consider, for example, what happens when we construct a truth-table that lists each of the four combinations of truth-values that the component statements could exhibit in the simple argument form that we identified at the top of this page.

$p \supset q$   
 $p$   
 $q$

		1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
$p$	$q$	$p \supset q$	$p$	$q$
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	F
F	T	T	F	T
F	F	T	F	F

This truth-table shows that (no matter what statements we substitute for  $p$  and  $q$ ) both of the premises of the argument will be true only on the first line (when both component statements are true). But on that line, the conclusion is also true, so the inference is valid. Whenever we come across an argument that shares this basic structure, we can be perfectly certain of its logical validity. In fact, arguments of this form are so common that the form itself has a name, Modus Ponens, which we will usually abbreviate as M.P.

On the other hand, consider what happens when we construct a truth-table for testing the validity of a distinct, though superficially similar, argument form:

$p \supset q$   
 $q$   
 $p$

		1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
$p$	$q$	$p \supset q$	$q$	$p$
T	T	T	T	T
T	F	F	F	T
F	T	T	T	F
F	F	T	F	F

In arguments of this form, both premises are true on the first and on the third lines of the truth-table. While the conclusion is true on the first line, on the third line it is false. Since it is therefore possible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false, the inference is invalid. This unreliable argument form is called the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Although it might be mistaken for M.P. at a casual glance, the fallacy—unlike its valid cousin—does not guarantee the truth of its conclusion.

## Modus Tollens

Another common argument form with a valid inference is Modus Tollens (abbreviated as M.T.), which has the form:

$p \supset q$   
 $\sim q$   
 $\sim p$

		1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b><math>p \supset q</math></b>	<b><math>\sim q</math></b>	<b><math>\sim p</math></b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>

As the truth-table shows, the premises are true only when both of the component statements are false, in which case the conclusion is also true. There is no line on which both premises are true and the conclusion false, so the inference is valid, as are all substitution-instances of this argument form.

As with M.P., there is an argument form superficially similar to M.T. that yields entirely different results.

$p \supset q$   
 $\sim p$   
 $\sim q$

		1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b><math>p \supset q</math></b>	<b><math>\sim p</math></b>	<b><math>\sim q</math></b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>

This is the fallacy of denying the antecedent. As the truth-table to the right clearly shows, it is an unreliable inference, since it is possible (on the third line) for both of its premises to be true while its conclusion is false. Substitution-instances of this argument form may not be valid.

## Hypothetical Syllogism

			1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b>r</b>	<b><math>p \supset q</math></b>	<b><math>q \supset r</math></b>	<b><math>p \supset r</math></b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>

A larger truth-table is required to demonstrate the validity of the argument form called Hypothetical Syllogism (H.S.), since it involves three statement variables instead of two, and we must consider all eight of the possible combinations of their truth-values:

**$p \supset q$**

**$q \supset r$**

**$p \supset r$**

Despite its greater size, this truth-table establishes validity in exactly the same way as its more compact predecessors: both premises are true only on the first, fifth, seventh, and eighth lines, and the conclusion is also true on each of these lines. It follows that all arguments sharing in this general form must be valid.

## Disjunctive Syllogism

Finally, consider the argument form known as Disjunctive Syllogism or D.S.

$p \vee q$

$\sim p$

Q

		1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b><math>p \vee q</math></b>	<b><math>\sim p</math></b>	<b>q</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>

The truth-table demonstration of its validity should look familiar by now. Whenever the premises are true (on the third line of the truth table), so is the conclusion.

Once again, however, there is a similar form that embodies an invalid inference, the fallacy of affirming the alternative:

$p \vee q$

p

$\sim q$

		1st Premise	2nd Premise	Conclusion
<b>p</b>	<b>q</b>	<b><math>p \vee q</math></b>	<b>p</b>	<b><math>\sim q</math></b>
<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>
<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>T</b>

In this case, the first line of the truth-table shows that (with our inclusive sense of the  $\vee$ ) it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.

## Axiomatic systems

In mathematics and set theory, an **axiomatic system** is any set of specified axioms from which some or all of those axioms can be used, in conjunction along with derivation rules or procedures, to logically derive theorems. A mathematical theory or set theory consists of an axiomatic system and all its derived theorems. An axiomatic system that is completely described is a special kind of formal system; usually, however, the effort towards complete formalization brings diminishing returns in certainty and a lack of readability for humans. Therefore discussion of axiomatic systems is normally only semi-formal. A **formal theory** typically means an axiomatic system, for example formulated within model theory. A **formal proof** is a complete rendition of a mathematical or set-

theoretical proof within a formal system.

## Properties

An axiomatic system is said to be consistent if it lacks contradiction (i.e. it is not possible to derive both a statement and its negation from the system's axioms).

In an axiomatic system, an axiom is called independent if it is not a theorem that can be derived from other axioms in the system. A system will be called independent if each of its underlying axioms is independent.

The most important criterion for assessment of an axiomatic system is that particular system's consistency. Inconsistency in an axiomatic system is universally regarded as being a fatal flaw for that system. Independence is also a desirable property, but its lack is not a fatal flaw. Lack of independence means that the system has redundancy in its axioms, meaning that one or more of its axioms is not needed. This is usually considered to be a flaw because reducing the number of axioms of a system to the minimum necessary for deriving all the needed or desired theorems of that system is considered to be a virtue, because axioms are unproved and unprovable; having as little of that as possible means that as few unproved assumptions as possible are being made in that system.

An axiomatic system will be called complete if for every statement, either itself or its negation, is derivable in that system. This is very difficult to achieve, however, and as shown by the combined works of Gödel and Coen, impossible for axiomatic systems involving infinite sets. So, along with consistency, relative consistency is also the mark of a worthwhile axiom system. This occurs when the undefined terms of a first axiom system are given definitions from a second, such that the axioms of the first are theorems of the second.

A good example is the relative consistency of neutral geometry, or absolute geometry, with respect to the theory of the real number system. Lines and points are undefined terms in absolute geometry, but assigned meanings in the theory of real numbers in a way that is consistent with both axiom systems.

## Models

A model for an axiomatic system is a well-defined set, which assigns meaning for the undefined terms presented in the system, in a manner that is correct with the relations defined in the system. The existence of a concrete model proves the consistency of a system.

A model is called concrete if the meanings assigned are objects and relations from the real world, as opposed to an abstract model which is based on other axiomatic systems. The first axiomatic system was Euclidean geometry.

Models can also be used to show the independence of an axiom in the system. By constructing a valid model for a subsystem without a specific axiom, we show that the omitted axiom is independent if its correctness does not necessarily follow from the subsystem.

Two models are said to be isomorphic if a one-to-one correspondence can be found between their elements, in a manner that preserves their relationship. An axiomatic system for which every model is isomorphic to another is called categorial (sometimes categorical), and the property of categori-

ality (categoricity) ensures the completeness of a system.

## **Axiomatic method**

The **axiomatic method** is often discussed as if it were a unitary approach, or uniform procedure. With the example of Euclid to appeal to, it was indeed treated that way for many centuries. Up until the beginning of the nineteenth century it was generally assumed in European mathematics and philosophy (for example in Spinoza's work) that the heritage of Greek mathematics represented the highest standard of intellectual finish (development more geometrico, in the style of the geometers). That approach, in which axioms were supposed to be self-evident and thus indisputable, was swept away during the course of the nineteenth century. One important episode in this was the development of Non-Euclidean geometry, based on denial of Euclid's parallel postulate (or axiom). It was found that consistent geometries can be constructed by denying that postulate, taking as an axiom that more than one parallel to a given line can be drawn through a point outside that line, or a different axiom that no parallel can be drawn—both of those result in different and consistent geometric systems that may or may not be applicable to an experienced world.

Other challenges to the supposed self-evidence of axioms came from the foundations of real analysis, from Georg Cantor's set theory, and from the failure of Frege's work on foundations. Russell was able to derive a paradox—a kind of contradiction—from Frege's axioms for set theory, thus showing that Frege's axiomatic system was not consistent, and this showed that the supposed self-evidence of Frege's axioms was mistaken.

Another challenge came from David Hilbert's 'new' use of axiomatic method as a research tool. For example, group theory was first put on an axiomatic basis towards the end of that century. Once the axioms were clarified (that inverse elements should be required, for example), the subject could proceed autonomously without reference to the transformation group's origins of those studies.

Therefore, there are at least three 'modes' of axiomatic method current in mathematics, and in the fields it influences. In caricature, possible attitudes are:

1. Accept my axioms and you must accept their consequences;
2. I reject one of your axioms and accept extra models;
3. My set of axioms defines a research program.

The first case is the classic deductive method. The second goes by the slogan be wise, generalise; it may go along with the assumption that concepts can or should be expressed at some intrinsic 'natural level of generality'. The third was very prominent in the mathematics of the twentieth century, in particular in subjects based around homological algebra.

It is easy to see that the axiomatic method has limitations outside mathematics and set theory. For example, in political philosophy axioms that lead to unacceptable conclusions are likely to be rejected wholesale; so that no one really assents to version 1 above.

## **Axiomatic systems in science**

Historically, the most important purpose of an axiom system was to reach an overview of some science or part of science. Euclid succeeded in doing that for geometry. Beyond its successful use

in set theory and mathematics, there have been attempts to use the axiomatic method in physics (by Ludwig Boltzmann, Heinrich Hertz, and some members of the Vienna Circle), biology (by J. H. Woodger), quantum mechanics (by Günther Ludwig), and possibly other sciences.

Those attempts have been at best only partly successful. If such efforts at axiomatization for sciences were to be successful, this would make it possible to study these sciences simply by drawing logical inferences from the axioms, without needing any new empirical input. When conclusions are drawn from general scientific laws or principles that method is in fact employed, empirical testing of such theoretical derivations is still always needed. Thus, the axiomatization and formalization of the system is incomplete and does not solve the problem of whether the system yields actual scientific knowledge.

## Consistency

A set of statements is logically consistent if they can all be true at the same time. A set of statements is logically inconsistent if they cannot all be true at the same time. It may also be helpful to think of logical consistency as a set of beliefs that do not contradict each other (regardless of whether they are true). When evaluating logical consistency, assume the statements are true and think about whether they fit together like the pieces of a puzzle. That is, consistency is about understanding the relationships between your beliefs, not proving a belief true.

Logic is concerned with the consistency of sets of sentences (used to represent beliefs) and with consistent outcomes to processing logical formulae containing operands and operatives. A set of sentences is said to be **consistent** if and only if **there is at least one possible situation in which they are all true**. So, the following set of sentences is consistent:

1. Grass is green.
2. It is not the case that the moon is green.
3. Most humans have ten fingers.
4. Grasshoppers have six legs and dogs have four.
5. Earth is a cube.

Note that not all of the sentences are true (sentence 5). However, if the Earth were a cube, it need not be that any of the other sentences are false. There is a possible situation in which they are all true. In this way, logicians are not interested as such in the actual **truth value** of a sentence (whether it is in fact true or false), but more in a sentence's possible truth values.

## Consider the following English sentences:

1. The moon is entirely constituted from cheese.
2. The moon is only partly constituted from cheese.

There is no possible situation in which 1 and 2 are both true, that is to say, it is impossible for them both to be true at the same moment. Such a pair of sentences are said to be inconsistent. A set of sentences is said to be **inconsistent** if there is **no possible situation in which they are all true**.

A set of sentences may consist of only one sentence. In which case, if there is a possible situation in which that sentence is true, the sentence is said to be consistent. If there is no such situation, the sentence is said to be inconsistent.

For example, "grass is green" and "snow is blue" are examples of consistent sentences (and the set containing them and only them is consistent). The sentences "grass is green" and "grass is blue" (when taken individually) are consistent sentences, but any set containing them both is inconsistent. The sentence "2+2=5" is inconsistent. There is no situation in which it is true. If two sentences cannot be both true and cannot be both false, they are said to be **contradictory**. For example, "Socrates was a philosopher" and "Socrates was not a philosopher" are contradictory statements. If two sentences cannot be both true at the same time (form an inconsistent set), they are said to be contrary. For example, "I have exactly 10 fingers" and "I have exactly 9 fingers" are contrary (both statements cannot be true, but both could be false). All contradictory statements are contrary.

## Completeness

The term **complete** with respect to meta-logic is used to describe a system of logic for which every logical implication in that system is provable. In other words, if something true can be expressed in that system, it is provable in that system.

Formally, a logic is complete when for every  $\Gamma \subset \varphi$ , it is also true that  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ . A complete logical system leaves no logical truth that can be formulated within it unprovable, or undecidable. For instance, a system of number theory for the natural numbers, which contains the language elements needed to express  $2 + 2 = 4$ , but cannot be used to express  $2 + 2 = 4$  is incomplete.


Completeness is an important property of a logical system, but unlike soundness, it is not necessary for a logical system to be complete to be useful. For example, second-order logic is sound but not complete. Kurt Gödel famously provided incompleteness theorems for systems of mathematical logic.

## Difference between Inductive and Deductive reasoning

Reasoning in artificial intelligence has two important forms, Inductive reasoning, and Deductive reasoning. Both reasoning forms have premises and conclusions, but both reasoning are contradictory to each other. Following is a list for comparison between inductive and deductive reasoning:

- Deductive reasoning uses available facts, information, or knowledge to deduce a valid conclusion, whereas inductive reasoning involves making a generalization from specific facts, and observations.
- Deductive reasoning uses a top-down approach, whereas inductive reasoning uses a bottom-up approach.
- Deductive reasoning moves from generalized statement to a valid conclusion, whereas Inductive reasoning moves from specific observation to a generalization.
- In deductive reasoning, the conclusions are certain, whereas, in Inductive reasoning, the conclusions are probabilistic.
- Deductive arguments can be valid or invalid, which means if premises are true, the conclusion must be true, whereas inductive argument can be strong or weak, which means conclusion may be false even if premises are true.

The differences between inductive and deductive can be explained using the below diagram on the basis of arguments:



## Comparison Chart:

Basis for Comparison	Deductive Reasoning	Inductive Reasoning
<b>Definition</b>	Deductive reasoning is the form of valid reasoning, to deduce new information or conclusion from known related facts and information.	Inductive reasoning arrives at a conclusion by the process of generalization using specific facts or data.
<b>Approach</b>	Deductive reasoning follows a top-down approach.	Inductive reasoning follows a bottom-up approach.
<b>Starts from</b>	Deductive reasoning starts from Premises.	Inductive reasoning starts from the Conclusion.
<b>Validity</b>	In deductive reasoning conclusion must be true if the premises are true.	In inductive reasoning, the truth of premises does not guarantee the truth of conclusions.
<b>Usage</b>	Use of deductive reasoning is difficult, as we need facts which must be true.	Use of inductive reasoning is fast and easy, as we need evidence instead of true facts. We often use it in our daily life.
<b>Process</b>	Theory → hypothesis → patterns → confirmation.	Observations → patterns → hypothesis → Theory.
<b>Argument</b>	In deductive reasoning, arguments may be valid or invalid.	In inductive reasoning, arguments may be weak or strong.
<b>Structure</b>	Deductive reasoning reaches from general facts to specific facts.	Inductive reasoning reaches from specific facts to general facts.

# MCQs

1. Logic is a----- science
  - a) Positive science
  - b) Normative science
  - c) Descriptive science
  - d) None of these
  
2. Logic is the Science of -----
  - a) Plants
  - b) Thought
  - c) Wealth
  - d) Society
  
3. In Symbolic logic,\_\_\_\_\_do not change their value.
  - a) Constants
  - b) Negation
  - c) Variables
  - d) Inference
  
4. In\_\_\_\_\_proposition, two simplepropositions are combined by 'either-- or'.
  - a) Disjunctive c
  - b) Negative
  - c) Conjunctive
  - d) Implication
  
5. 'Socrates is a Philosopher' is a ----- proposition
  - a) Compound
  - b) Simple
  - c) General
  - d) None of these
  
6. 'If it is raining then the ground will be wet' is an example of \_\_\_\_\_.
  - a) Negation
  - b) Conjunction
  - c) Disjunction
  - d) Implication
  
7. A curl is also called\_\_\_\_\_.
  - a) Tilde

- b) Dot
- c) Wedge
- d) Horseshoe

8. 'If p, then q and r' is symbolized as-.

- a)  $p \cdot (q \cdot r)$
- b)  $(p \cdot q) \cdot r$
- c)  $(\sim p \cdot q) \cdot r$
- d)  $p \supset (q \cdot r)$

9. 'Ram is tall and Das is short' is an example of proposition

- a) Compound
- b) Simple
- c) General
- d) None of these

10. Symbolic expression of 'p implies q' is

- a)  $p \cdot q$
- b)  $p \vee q$
- c)  $p \supset q$
- d)  $p \equiv q$  Answers: 1-10

1 b 2 b 3 a 4 a 5 b 6 d 7 a 8 d 9 a 10c

11 changes its value from argument to argument.

- a) Variable
- b) Constant
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) None of these

12. Wedge symbol denotes \_\_\_\_\_ function.

- a) Negation
- b) Conjunction
- c) Disjunction
- d) Implication

13 symbol stands for 'if --then' relationship.

- a)  $\cdot$
- b)  $\supset$
- c)  $\vee$
- d)  $\sim$

14. In the compound statement ' $p \supset q$ ', 'p' and 'q' are.

- a) Constants
- b) Bi conditionals

- c) Variables
  - d) None of these
15. 'Raju is not honest' is an example of a \_\_\_\_ proposition.
- a) Bi conditional
  - b) Conjunctive
  - c) Disjunctive
  - d) Negative
16. The known propositions in an inference is called
- a) Conclusion
  - b) Predicate
  - c) Premises
  - d) None of these
17. The composite proposition formed by the combination of two or more simple propositions using 'If Then' is called.
- a) Disjunction
  - b) Implication
  - c) Conjunction
  - d) None of these
18. '~' is \_\_\_\_\_ symbol
- a) Disjunction
  - b) Implication
  - c) Negation
  - d) None of these
19. In conjunctive propositions, two simple propositions are joined by the word \_\_\_\_.
- a) Either – or
  - b) And
  - c) If -- then
  - d) Either – or
20. The language used with the purpose of giving information is called --- function of language
- a) Expressive
  - b) Informative
  - c) Directive
  - d) None of these

Answers: 11-20  
 11 a 12 c 13 b 14 c 15 d 16 b 17 b 18 c  
 19 b 20 b

21. 'Logic is the study of correct reasoning' is an example for ----function of language
- a) Informative

- b) Expressive
  - c) Directive
  - d) None of these
22. By using \_\_\_\_\_, the logical form of an argument becomes explicit.
- a) Truth tables
  - b) Truth values
  - c) Symbols
  - d) None of these
23. The constant symbol ' ' stands for \_\_. v
- a) Disjunction
  - b) Implication
  - c) Negation
  - d) None of these
24. The use of language for expressing one's feelings and emotions and thoughts are called ----
- a) Informative
  - b) Expressive
  - c) Directive
  - d) None of these
25. 'That is really great' is an example of use of language
- a) Informative
  - b) Expressive
  - c) Directive
  - d) None of these
26. The use of language that seeks for guide or to command is function of language
- a) Expressive
  - b) Informative
  - c) Directive
  - d) None of these
27. 'Shut the door' is an example of ----- function of language
- a) Informative
  - b) Expressive
  - c) Directive
  - d) None of these
28. By using \_\_\_\_\_, the validity of an argument can be determined more accurately.
- a) Numbers
  - b) linguistic expressions
  - c) Symbols

d) all these

29. The new proposition derived from premises in an Inference is called

- a) Premises
- b) Conclusion
- c) Copula
- d) Predicate

30. A compound proposition in which simple propositions are combined using 'and' is called

- a) Bi conditionals
- b) Disjunction
- c) Conjunction
- d) None of these

Answers: 21-30

21 a 22 c 23 a 24 b 25 b 26 c 27 c 28 c

29 b 30 c

31. 'p q' is a \_\_\_\_\_ proposition. v

- a) Disjunction
- b) Implication
- c) Negation
- d) None of these

32. \_\_\_\_\_ is an important work of Russell in collaboration with Whitehead that introduced symbolic logic.

- a) Principia Mathematica
- b) Language, Truth and Logic,
- c) Philosophical Investigations
- d) none of these

33. 'The Mathematical Analysis of Logic' is the work of ----

- a) Whitehead
- b) A J Ayer
- c) Russell
- d) George Boole

34. 'An Investigation of the Laws of Thought' is the work of ----

- a) George Boole
- b) A J Ayer
- c) Russell
- d) Whitehead

35. In collaboration with A.N. Whitehead, published Principia Mathematica

- a) Whitehead
- b) A J Ayer

- c) Russell
- d) George Boole

36. \_\_\_\_\_ is a truth-functional connective.

- a) Dot
- b) Wedge
- c) Horseshoe
- d) All these

37. The symbol for conjunction is -----

- a) Dot
- b) Wedge
- c) Horseshoe
- d) All these

38. The 'If' part in a Hypothetical proposition is called

- a) Alternative
- b) Consequence
- c) Antecedent
- d) None of these

39. The Dot symbol stands for -----

- a) Bi conditionals
- b) Disjunction
- c) Conjunction
- d) None of these

40. The 'Then' part in a Hypothetical proposition is called

- a) Alternative
- b) Consequence
- c) Antecedent
- d) None of these

Answers: 31-40  
 31 a 32 a 33 d 34 a 35 c 36 d 37 a 38 c  
 39 c 40 b

41. \_\_\_\_\_ symbol stands for 'either - or' relationship.

- a)  $\cdot$
- b)  $\supset$
- c)  $\vee$
- d)  $\sim$

42. ' $\equiv$ ' is the symbol for \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Negation

- b) Conjunction
- c) Implication
- d) None of these

43. 'If a and b, then c' is symbolized as \_\_\_.

- a)  $[(a \cdot b) \supset c]$
- b)  $[a \supset (b \cdot c)]$
- c)  $[(\sim a \supset b) \cdot c]$
- d)  $[(a \supset b) \vee c]$

44. 'You will pass the exam only if you work hard' is symbolized as \_.

- a)  $P \supset W$
- b)  $P \cdot W$
- c)  $P \vee W$
- d) None of these

45. \_\_\_\_\_ symbol stands for 'if and only if' relationship.

- a)  $\cdot$
- b)  $\supset$
- c)  $\vee$
- d)  $\equiv$

46.  $p \cdot q$  is the symbolic expression of

- a) Either p or q
- b) p implies q
- c) p and q
- d) p if and only if q

47. The horseshoe symbol indicates ----- function

- a) Negation
- b) Conjunction
- c) Implication
- d) Material equivalence

48. 'Ram and Dinesh will not both be elected' is symbolized as

- a).  $(R \cdot D)$
- b).  $(\sim R \cdot D)$
- c).  $\sim (R \cdot D)$
- d).  $(\sim R \cdot \sim D)$

49. 'Either Alice or Betty will be elected' is symbolized as

- a)  $A \cdot B$
- b)  $A \vee B$
- c)  $A \equiv B$

d)  $A \supset B$

50. 'Neither Alice nor Betty will be elected' is symbolized as

a)  $\sim (A \cdot B)$

b)  $\sim (A \vee B)$

c)  $(A \equiv B)$

d)  $\sim (A \supset B)$  Answers: 41-50

41 c 42 d 43 a 44 a 45 d 46 c 47 c 48 c

49 b 50 b

51. 'Ram is not honest' is symbolized as ---

a)  $\sim R$

b)  $R$

c)  $R \cdot H$

d)  $R \supset H$

52. 'Anu is short and Balu is tall' is symbolized as ---

a)  $A \vee B$

b)  $A \cdot B$

c)  $A \equiv B$

d)  $A \supset B$

53. ' $\sim \sim$ ' is the symbol for \_\_\_\_\_.

a) Bi conditionals

b) Disjunction

c) Double Negation

d) None of these

54. 'Anu is not short and Balu is not tall' is symbolized as ---

a)  $A \vee B$

b)  $A \cdot B$

c)  $\sim A \cdot \sim B$

d) None of these

55. 'p and negation q' is symbolized as

a)  $p \vee \sim q$

b)  $p \cdot q$

c)  $p \supset \sim q$

d)  $p \cdot \sim q$

56. In Conjunction the word ----- is used to conjoin statements

a) Either or

b) And

- c) If ---Then
- d) None of these

57. Conjunction is a \_\_\_\_\_ statement

- a) Simple
- b) Compound
- c) General
- d) None of these

58. \_\_\_\_\_ symbol is used to form an implicative statement.

- a) Horseshoe
- b) Wedge
- c) Dot
- d) None of these

59. 'Ram and Dinesh will both not be elected' is symbolized as

- a)  $R \cdot D$
- b)  $(\sim R \cdot D)$
- c)  $\sim(R \cdot D)$
- d)  $(\sim R) \cdot (\sim D)$

60. Disjunction is a compound proposition in which the word is used to connect statements.

- a) Either or
- b) And
- c) If -- Then
- d) None of these

Answers: 51-60

51 a 52 b 53 c 54 c 55 d 56 b 57 c 58 a

59 d 60 a

61. 'If Raju attend the class, then Damu will not attend the class' can be symbolized as ----

- a)  $\sim (R \cdot D)$
- b)  $\sim (R \vee D)$
- c)  $(\sim R \supset D)$
- d)  $R \supset \sim D$

62. The word 'And' is used in -----

- a) Negation
- b) Conjunction
- c) Implication
- d) Material equivalence

63. In Conjunction, if p is false and q is true  $p \cdot q$  is -----

- a) True

- b) False
  - c) Cannot be determined
  - d) None of these
64. The statement form  $p \vee \sim p$  is a
- a) Tautology
  - b) Contingent
  - c) Contradictory
  - d) None of these
65. In implication, if p is true and q is false  $p \supset q$  is -----
- a) True
  - b) False
  - c) Cannot be determined
  - d) None of these
66. The statement form  $p \cdot \sim p$  is a ---
- a) Tautology
  - b) Contingent
  - c) Contradictory
  - d) None of these
67. In Disjunction, if p is false and q is false  $p \vee q$  is -----
- a) False
  - b) True
  - c) Cannot be determined
  - d) None of these
68. The statement form  $p \cdot q$  is a ---
- a) Tautology
  - b) Contingent
  - c) Contradictory
  - d) None of these
69. In Conjunction, if p is true and q is true  $p \cdot q$  is -----
- a) True
  - b) False
  - c) Cannot be determined
  - d) None of these
70. The truth value of a false statement is -----
- a) True
  - b) False
  - c) Cannot be determined

d) None of these Answers: 61-70

61 d 62 b 63 b 64 a 65 b 66 c 67 a 68  
b 69 a 70 b

71. In implication, if p is false and q is false,  $p \supset q$  is -----

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

72. The truth value of a true statement is -----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

73. In Disjunction, if p is true and q is false,  $p \vee q$  is -----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

74. The specific form of the statement  $B \vee \sim B$  is ----

- a) p
- b)  $p \vee \sim p$
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

75. In Conjunction if p is true and q is false,  $p \cdot q$  is -----

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

76. The specific form of the statement  $A \supset (B \vee C)$  is ----

- a) p
- b)  $p \supset q$
- c)  $p \supset (q \vee r)$
- d) None of these

77. In implication, if p is false and q is true,  $p \supset q$  is -----

- a) True
- b) False

- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

78. Which of the following is the substitution instance of the statement form  $p \cdot \sim p$

- a)  $C \vee \sim C$
- b)  $C \cdot \sim C$
- c)  $C \supset \sim C$
- d) None of these

79. In Disjunction, if p is false and q is true,  $p \vee q$  is -----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

80. A statement or statement form of the pattern  $p \equiv q$  is called ----

- a) Biconditional
- b) Disjunction
- c) Double Negation
- d) None of these

Answers: 71-80  
 71 a 72 b 73 b 74 b 75 b 76 c 77 a 78  
 b 79 b 80 a

81. In Conjunction if p is false and q is false,  $p \cdot q$  is -----

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

82. The statement form  $p \supset \sim p$  is a ----

- a) Tautology
- b) Contingent
- c) Contradictory
- d) None of these

83. In implication if p is true and q is true,  $p \supset q$  is -----

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

84. 'If Anil wins his first game, then both Cohen and Das win their first games' is symbolized as ----

- a)  $(A \supset C) \supset D$
- b)  $(A \vee C) \supset D$
- c)  $A \supset (C \cdot D)$
- d) None of these

85. In Disjunction if p is true and q is true,  $p \vee q$  is -----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

86. If A and B are true statements and X and Y are false statements, the truth value of  $(A \vee B) \cdot (X \vee Y)$  is

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

87. 'Ramesh is honest and Dinesh is intelligent' is a proposition.

- a) General
- b) Simple
- c) Compound
- d) None of these

88. Which word is used to form the disjunction of two statements?

- a) Either or
- b) And
- c) If -- Then
- d) None of these

89. What is the truth value of a conjunction, if both of its conjuncts are true ?

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

90.  $p \cdot q \therefore p$  This rule of inference is known as -----

- a) Modus Ponens
- b) Modus Tollens
- c) Simplification
- d) None of these

Answers: 81-90  
 81 b 82b 83 a 84 c 85 b 86 a 87 c 88 a  
 89 b 90 c

91. The negation of a true statement is ..
- False
  - True
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
92. A valid argument with all true premises is termed as      argument
- Cogent
  - Sound
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
93. The falsehood of conclusion in an argument does not guarantee the ----- of an argument
- Validity
  - Invalidity
  - Both a and b
  - None of these
94. 'Roses are red and Violets are blue' is a      statement
- Negation
  - Conjunctive
  - Implication
  - Material equivalence
95.      A conjunction is true if both of its conjuncts are -----
- False
  - True
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
96. If A and B are true and X and Y are false , then the truth value of the compound statement (A.B) . (X.Y) is -----
- False
  - True
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
97. 'Shiv is tall and Ramu is short' is a----- statement
- Simple
  - Compound
  - General
  - None of these

98. 'Roses are red and Violets are not blue' is symbolized as -----

- a)  $R \cdot V$
- b)  $R \cdot \sim V$
- c)  $R \vee V$
- d) None of these

99. If A and B are true and X and Y are false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $A \vee [X \cdot (B \vee Y)]$

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

100. If B is true, Y is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $\sim (B \cdot \sim Y)$  is -----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

Answers: 91-100  
91 a 92 b 93 b 94 b 95 b 96 a 97 a 98  
b 99 b 100 a

101. 'Either P or Q will be selected' is symbolized as

- a)  $P \cdot Q$
- b)  $P \vee Q$
- c)  $P \supset Q$
- d) None of these

102. If A is true, X is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $\sim (A \vee X)$  is -----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

103. Bi-conditional proposition is a ----- proposition

- a) Implication
- b) Disjunction
- c) Simple
- d) Compound

104. \_\_\_\_\_ symbol is used to connect statements conjunctively.

- a) Horseshoe
- b) Wedge
- c) Tilde

d) None of these

105. Two statements are logically equivalent when their material equivalence is a ----

- a) Contradiction
- b) Contingent
- c) Conjunction
- d) Tautology

106. 'I will go to the cinema if and only if my friend comes with me' is a --- proposition

- a) Implication
- b) Disjunction
- c) Negation
- d) Biconditional

107. The statement form with only false substitution instances is called \_\_\_\_.

- a) Contradiction
- b) Contingent
- c) Conjunction
- d) Tautology

108. Find out the rule used in the following inference.  $p \supset q$  /  $P$  /  $\therefore q$

- a) Modus ponens
- b) Modus Tollens
- c) Disjunctive syllogism
- d) Hypothetical syllogism

109. The statement form with only true substitution instances is called \_\_\_\_.

- a) Contradiction
- b) Contingent
- c) Conjunction
- d) Tautology

110. 'p v q' is false if \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) only p is false
  - b) both p and q are true
  - c) both p and q are false
  - d) None of these
- Answers: 101-110

101 b 102 a 103 d 104 d 105 d 106 d

107 a 108 a 109 d 110 c

111. 'Arjun is honest but Ganesh is sincere' is symbolized as----

- a)  $A \vee G$
- b)  $A \cdot G$

- c)  $A \supset \sim G$
- d) None of these

112. '  $\supset$  ' is the symbol for \_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Negation
- b) Conjunction
- c) Implication
- d) None of these

113. 'If antecedent, then consequent' is a general form of \_\_\_\_.

- a) Implication
- b) Disjunction
- c) Negation
- d) Argument

114. '  $\vee$  ' is the symbol for -----  $\vee$

- a) Implication
- b) Conjunction
- c) Disjunction
- d) None of these

115. The components of a disjunction are called -----

- a) Terms
- b) Disjuncts
- c) Conjuncts
- d) None of these

116. Find the odd one out.

- a) Implication
- b) Disjunction
- c) Negation
- d) Argument

117. The components of conjunction are called\_.

- a) Terms
- b) Disjuncts
- c) Conjuncts
- d) None of these

118. Find out the rule used in the following inference.  $P \therefore p \vee q$

- a) Modus ponens
- b) Addition
- c) Disjunctive syllogism
- d) None of these

119. 'It is not the case that Raju is honest' is a proposition

- a) Atomic
- b) Compound
- c) General
- d) None of these

120. The statement form with both true and false substitution instances is called\_.

- a) Contradiction
- b) Contingent
- c) Conjunction
- d) Tautology

111 b 112 c 113 a 114 c 115 b 116 d

117 c 118 b 119 b 120 b

121. Find out the rule used in the following inference.  $p \vee q, \sim p \therefore q$

- a) Modus ponens
- b) Modus Tollens
- c) Disjunctive syllogism
- d) Hypothetical syllogism

122. Modus Tollens means denying the\_\_.

- a) Antecedent
- b) Consequent
- c) both (a) and (b)
- d) None of these

123. Find out the rule used in the following inference.  $p \supset q, \sim q \therefore \sim p$

- a) Modus ponens
- b) Modus Tollens
- c) Disjunctive syllogism
- d) Hypothetical syllogism

124. 'It is not the case that Ramesh is honest' is symbolised as ----

- a) R
- b)  $\sim R$
- c) R . H
- d) None of these

125. If we can construct a formal proof, the argument is\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Invalid
- b) False
- c) True
- d) Valid

126. Find out the rule used in the following inference.  $P \supset q \therefore p \supset q$

- a) Modus ponens
- b) Addition
- c) Disjunctive syllogism
- d) Conjunction

127. Modus Ponens means \_\_\_\_\_ the antecedent and the consequent.

- a) Affirming
- b) Constructing
- c) Denying
- d) None of these

128. Name the following valid argument form.  $p \supset q \quad q \supset r \therefore p \supset r$

- a) Modus ponens
- b) Modus Tollens
- c) Disjunctive syllogism
- d) Hypothetical syllogism

129. Compound propositions are also known as.

- a) Negative
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) None of these

130. We can construct the formal proof of validity through\_\_\_\_.

- a) Truth tables
  - b) Rules of inference
  - c) Rules of replacement
  - d) both (b) and (c)
- Answers: 121-130

121 c 122 c 123 b 124 b 125 d 126 d

127 a 128 d 129 d 130 d

131. Simple propositions are also known as \_\_\_\_\_ propositions

- a) Affirmative
- b) Universal
- c) General
- d) None of these

132. An argument is valid if and only if it is not possible for all of its premises to be true and its conclusion\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Contradictory

d) Tautology

133. Compound propositions are also known as.

- a) Molecular
- b) Atomic
- c) General
- d) None of these

134. In disjunction, two simple propositions are combined by -----

- a) If -- then
- b) And
- c) 'either -- or'.
- d) If and only if

135. Find the odd one out.

- a) Logic
- b) Ethics
- c) Aesthetics
- d) Economics

136 is generally regarded as the science of thought

- a) Logic
- b) Ethics
- c) Aesthetics
- d) None of these

137 is an example for normative science

- a) Economics
- b) Psychology
- c) Physics
- d) Logic

138. \_\_\_\_\_ is the symbolic expression for 'p or q'.

- a)  $p \cdot q$
- b)  $p \vee q$
- c)  $p \supset q$
- d)  $p \cdot \sim q$

139. Disjunction is a----- proposition

- a) Simple
- b) General
- c) Compound
- d) None of these

140. Simple propositions are also known as \_\_\_\_\_ propositions

- a) Molecular
- b) Atomic
- c) General
- d) None of these

131 d 132 a 133 a 134 c 135 d 136 a  
137 d 138 b 139 c 140 b

141. 'v' symbol connects\_\_.

- a) Disjuncts
- b) Conjuncts
- c) Biconditionals
- d) None of these

142 symbol indicates Implication function

- a)  $\cdot$
- b)  $\supset$
- c)  $\vee$
- d)  $\sim$

143. Implication is a----- proposition

- a) Simple
- b) General
- c) Compound
- d) None of these

144. '≡' is the symbol for\_\_\_\_\_.

- a) Material equivalence
- b) affirmation
- c) Implication
- d) None of these

145. \_\_\_\_\_ is a truth-functionalconnective.

- a) Dot
- b) Wedge
- c) Horseshoe
- d) All these

146. Find the odd one out.

- a) Dot
- b) Wedge
- c) Horseshoe
- d) Term

147. \_\_\_\_\_ is the symbolic expression for 'p and negation q'.

- a)  $p \cdot q$
- b)  $p \cdot q$
- c)  $p \vee \sim q$
- d)  $p \sim q \vee \supset$

148. \_\_\_\_\_ is not a truth-functional connective.

- a) Dot
- b) Horseshoe
- c) Wedge
- d) None of these

149. Negation is indicated by \_\_\_\_ symbol.

- a) Tilde
- b) Dot
- c) Horseshoe
- d) Wedge

150. The symbol \_\_\_\_\_ indicates material equivalence.

- a) Tilde
  - b) Three bar
  - c) Horseshoe
  - d) Wedge
- Answers: 141-150

141 a 142 b 143 c 144 a 145 d 146 d

147 c 148 d 149 a 150 b

151. If C is true, Z is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(C \supset (Z \sim \supset$

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

152. 'John will win the superbowl unless Andrews wins his Championship' is symbolised as ---

- a)  $J \vee A$
- b)  $J \cdot \sim A$
- c)  $J \supset \sim A$
- d) None of these

153. Which one of the following is logically equivalent to 'p'

- a)  $\sim p$
- b)  $\sim \sim p$
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

154. If A is true, X is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(A \cdot \sim X)$

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

155. Who introduced into logic the important notion of variable.

- a) Plato
- b) Socrates
- c) Aristotle
- d) None of these

156. 'You will fail in the exam unless you study well' is symbolized as ---

- a)  $F \cdot S$
- b)  $F \vee S$
- c)  $F \cdot \sim S$
- d) None of these

157. If A is true, X is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(A \vee \sim X)$

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

158. The foundations of logic were laid by \_\_\_\_\_ in the fourth century B.C.

- a) Plato
- b) Socrates
- c) Aristotle
- d) None of these

159. A truth functional argument form is valid, if and only if, the conditional statement of it is a -----

- a) Contradictory
- b) Tautology
- c) Contingent
- d) None of these

160. \_\_\_\_\_ is valid if and only if it has no substitution instances with true premises and false Conclusion

- a) Argument
  - b) Argument form
  - c) Statement
  - d) None of these
- Answers: 151-160

151 b 152 a 153 b 154 b 155 c 156 b  
157 b 158 c 159 b 160 b

161. If A and B are true, X and Y are false , then the truth value of the compound Statement  $[(A \supset B) \cdot (Y \cdot X)]$
- False
  - True
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
162. is invalid if and only if it has at least one substitution instance with true premises and False Conclusion
- Argument
  - Argument form
  - Statement
  - None of these
163. A and B are true, X and Y are false , then the truth value of the compound Statement  $[(A \cdot X) \cdot (B \cdot Y)]$
- True
  - False
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
164. The truth value of the negation of any true statement is ----
- True
  - False
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
165. An argument is valid if and only if the of that argument is a valid argument Form
- Specific form
  - Argument form
  - Statement
  - None of these
166. The truth value of the negation of any false statement is ----
- True
  - False
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
167. 'p v q' is false if p is ----- and q is
- True – false
  - False - false
  - false - true

d) None of these

168. 'p  $\supset$  q' is false if p is ----- and q is false

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

169. 'p . q' is false if p is ---- q is ----

- a) True - false
- b) False - false
- c) false - true
- d) All of these

170. 'p  $\vee$  q' is true if p is----- and q is --

- a) True - False
  - b) False - True
  - c) True - True
  - d) All of these
- Answers: 161-170

161 a 162 b 163 b 134 b 165 a 166 a  
167 b 168 a 169 d 170 d

171. 'Railways will win the footballcup unless Mohan Bagan wins the football championship'

- a) R . B
- b) R  $\vee$  B
- c) B. R
- d) None of these

172. If B is true, Y is false , then the truth value of the compound statement ( $\sim Y \vee \sim B$ )

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

173. A and B are true, X and Y are false , then the truth value of the compound Statement [ ( $\sim A$ .  $\sim X$ ) . (B $\vee$ Y)]

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

174. ' p is a sufficient condition for q' is symbolised as ----

- a) p . q

- b)  $p \supset q$
- c)  $q \cdot p$
- d) None of these

175. If A is true, X is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(\sim A \vee \sim X)$

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

176. The words Truth / Falsity refer to

- a) Arguments
- b) Terms
- c) Copula
- d) None of these

177. 'p only if q' is symbolised as ----

- a)  $p \cdot q$
- b)  $p \supset q$
- c)  $q \cdot p$
- d) None of these

178. If B is true, Y is false, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(\sim B \cdot \sim Y)$

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

179. The terms Validity/ Invalidity refers to

- a) Propositions
- b) Terms
- c) Copula
- d) Arguments

180. A and B are true, X and Y are false, then the truth value of the compound Statement  $[(A \vee B) \cdot (X \vee Y)]$

- a) True
  - b) False
  - c) Cannot be determined
  - d) None of these
- Answers: 171-180

171 b 172 a 173 b 174 b 175 a 176 d  
177 b 178 b 179 d 180 b

181. 'Either Railways or Navy will win the Football championship' is symbolised as ---
- $R \cdot N$
  - $R \supset N$
  - $R \vee N$
  - None of these
182. A and B are true, X and Y are false, then the truth value of the compound Statement  $[(A \cdot B) \vee (X \cdot Y)]$
- True
  - False
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
183. 'If Tata wins its first game, then Birla or Reliance wins its first game' is symbolised as ---
- $T \cdot (B \supset R)$
  - $T \vee (B \cdot R)$
  - $T \supset (B \vee R)$
  - None of these
184. If A is true, X is false, and P is unknown, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(A \vee \sim X) \vee P$  is
- True
  - False
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these
185. 'If p then q' is symbolised as ----
- $p \cdot q$
  - $p \supset q$
  - $q \cdot p$
  - None of these
186. Truth / Falsity refers to
- Propositions
  - Terms
  - Copula
  - None of these
187. If A and B are true, X and Y are false, then the truth value of the compound Statement  $[(A \cdot Y) \vee (B \cdot X)]$
- True
  - False
  - Cannot be determined
  - None of these

188 of a statement is defined as that statement form from which the statement results by the substitution of a different simple statement for each different statement variable.

- a) Validity
- b) Inference
- c) Specific form
- d) None of these

189. Validity/ Invalidity refers to

- a) Propositions
- b) Terms
- c) Copula
- d) None of these

190.  $(p \supset q)$  is an example for ---statement forms

- a) Contradictory
  - b) Tautology
  - c) Contingent
  - d) None of these
- Answers: 181-190

181 c 182 a 183 c 184 a 185 b 186 a  
187 b 188 c 189 d 190 c

191. A and B are true, X and Y are false, then the truth value of the compound Statement  $[(A \cdot X) \vee (B \cdot Y)]$

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

192. The specific form of the given statement  $W \cdot \sim W$  is ----

- a)  $p \cdot \sim q$
- b)  $p \cdot \sim p$
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

193. If A is true, X is false, and P is unknown, then the truth value of the compound statement  $(\sim A \cdot X) \cdot P$  is

- a) True
- b) False
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

194. Find out the odd one

- a) Modus ponens

- b) Argument
- c) Simplification
- d) Addition

195. The specific form of the given statement  $L \supset W$  is ----

- a)  $p \vee q$
- b)  $q \cdot p$
- c)  $p \supset q$
- d) None of these

196. If A is true, X is false, and P is unknown, then the truth value of the compound statement  $P \supset (A \vee X)$  is

- a) False
- b) True
- c) Cannot be determined
- d) None of these

197. An argument is proved invalid by displaying at least one row of its truth tables in which all its premises are true, but its conclusion is ----

- a) False
- b) True
- c) True/false
- d) None of these

198.  $(p \cdot q)$  is an example for ---statement forms

- a) Contradictory
- b) Tautology
- c) Contingent
- d) None of these

199. Find out the rule  $p \supset q \therefore p \supset (p \cdot q)$

- a) Commutation
- b) Absorption
- c) Exportation
- d) De Morgan's Theorems

200. 'Raju is intelligent' is symbolized as

- a) I. R
  - b) R. I
  - c) R
  - d) None of these
- Answers: 191-200

191b 192 b 193 b 194 b 195 c 196 b

197 c 198 c 199 b 200 c

201. The meaning of the term 'LOGIC' is

- a) Ethos
- b) mythos
- c) Logos
- d) Logicos

202. Logic deals with

- a) Will
- b) Feel
- c) Archeological survey
- d) Thought

203. Verbal expression of Concept is called

- a) Word
- b) Sentence
- c) Action
- d) Judgement

204. Logic is the Science of

- a) Living beings
- b) Thought
- c) Women
- d) Plants

205. Inference expressed through language is called

- a) Proposition
- b) Sentence
- c) Word
- d) Argument

206. Who among the following is regarded as Father of Logic

- a) Kanada
- b) Aristotle
- c) Spinoza
- d) Kant

207. Logic is a----- Science

- a) Natural
- b) Biological
- c) Theological
- d) Normative

208. Deductive Logic is

- a) Formal Logic
- b) Material Logic
- c) Narrative Logic
- d) Fiction

209. Word which acts as Subject or Predicate of a Proposition is called

- a) Argument
- b) Judgement
- c) Term
- d) Inference

210. \_\_\_\_\_ sentences are used as Propositions

- a) Declarative
- b) Exclamatory
- c) Imperative
- d) Interrogative

211. The word which used to connect subject and predicate in a proposition is called

- a) Argument
- b) Premise
- c) Conclusion
- d) Copula

212. The known proposition in an Inference is called

- a) Subject
- b) Predicate
- c) Premises
- d) Copula

213. The new proposition derived from premises in an Inference is called

- a) Copula
- b) Conclusion
- c) Subject
- d) Predicate

214. The term which refer to an object within the limits of sense organs is called

- a) Composite term
- b) Simple term
- c) Abstract term
- d) Concrete term

215. . The term which refer to an object which is beyond the limits of sense organs is called

- a) Composite term

- b) Simple term
- c) Abstract term
- d) Concrete term

216. The term which refers to the attributes of the subject is called

- a) Simple
- b) Connotative
- c) Denotative
- d) Composite

217. The term which does not refer to the attributes of the subject is called

- a) a. Non-Composite
- b) b. Connotative
- c) c. Non-Connotative
- d) d. Composite

218. A term is said to be ----- if its meaning is complete in itself

- a) Abstract
- b) Absolute
- c) Concrete
- d) Relative

219. A term is said to be ----- if it depends on some other term for the completion of its meaning

- a) Abstract
- b) Absolute
- c) Concrete
- d) Relative

220. A term which refers to a class of objects in the same sense is called

- a) a. General
- b) Collective
- c) Singular
- d) Concrete

221. A term which consists of one word is called

- a) Concrete
- b) Abstract
- c) Simple
- d) Composite

222. A term which consists of a group of words is called

- a) Concrete
- b) Abstract
- c) Simple

d) Composite

223. Which term among the following implies presence of a quality

- a) Positive term
- b) Negative term
- c) Privative term
- d) None of these

224. Which term among the following implies absence of a quality

- a) Positive term
- b) Negative term
- c) Privative term
- d) None of these

225. Which term among the following implies absence of a quality which that object is expected to possess

- a) Positive term
- b) Negative term
- c) Privative term
- d) None of these

226. The statement which affirms or denies the relation between two terms is called

- a) Proposition
- b) Argument
- c) Syllogism
- d) None of the above

227. Two or more simple propositions joined together forms

- a) Complex Proposition
- b) Compound Proposition
- c) C. Complicate Proposition
- d) d. Subjectless Proposition

228. A compound proposition in which simple propositions are combined using 'And' is called

- a) Implication
- b) Disjunction
- c) Conjunction
- d) Equivalence

229. The composite proposition formed by the combination of two or more simple propositions using 'Either...Or' is called

- a) Conjunction
- b) Disjunction
- c) Implication

d) None of these

230. The composite proposition formed by the combination of two or more simple propositions using 'If....Then' is called

- a) Conjunction
- b) Disjunction
- c) Implication
- d) None of these

Answers:

231. The 'IF' part in a Hypothetical proposition is called

- a) Alternative
- b) Consequence
- c) Antecedent
- d) None of these

232. The 'THEN' part in a Hypothetical proposition is called

- a) Alternative
- b) Consequence
- c) Antecedent
- d) None of these

233. A proposition which states the relation between two terms without any condition is called

- a) Hypothetical proposition
- b) Disjunctive proposition
- c) Conditional proposition
- d) Categorical proposition

234. A proposition which states the relation between two terms based on some condition is called

- a) Simple proposition
- b) Complex proposition
- c) Conditional proposition
- d) Categorical proposition

235. Which one among the following is not a Conditional proposition

- a) Hypothetical
- b) Disjunction
- c) Conjunction
- d) Implication

236. The proposition which does not contain any other component or part is called

- a) Simple Proposition
- b) Complex Proposition
- c) Complicate Proposition

d) Compound Proposition

237. The object about which the proposition mentioning is called

- a) Subject term
- b) Predicate term
- c) Copula
- d) None of these

238. The term which refers to the attributes of the subject in a proposition is called

- a) Subject term
- b) Predicate term
- c) Copula
- d) None of these

239. Traditional classification of propositions is based on

- a) Relation between subject & predicate
- b) Position of Subject
- c) Position of Predicate
- d) None of these

240. Verbal expression of Judgement is called

- a) Word
- b) Judgement
- c) Inference
- d) proposition

241. Which among the following is not a Normative Science

- a) Logic
- b) Ethics
- c) Astrology
- d) Aesthetics

242. A Normative Science deals with

- a) 'What ought to be'
- b) 'What is'
- c) 'What will be'
- d) None of these

243. A Positive Science is ----- in nature

- a) Axiological
- b) Factual
- c) Imperative
- d) None of these

244. The knowledge derived through sense experience is called

- a) Conception
- b) Inference
- c) Perception
- d) Judgement

245. Mental image of the perceived object is called

- a) Percept
- b) Concept
- c) Judgement
- d) Inference

246. The process of deriving a new truth from one or more known truths is called

- a) Percept
- b) Concept
- c) Judgement
- d) Inference

247. The fundamental aim of Logic is

- a) Search of Truth
- b) Search of Beauty
- c) Search of Morality
- d) None of these

248. The Proposition formed by the combination of two or more simple proposition is called

- a) Simple Proposition
- b) Complex Proposition
- c) Complicate Proposition
- d) Compound Proposition

249. Which among the following is not a compound Proposition

- a) Subjectless Proposition
- b) Hypothetical Proposition
- c) Disjunctive Proposition
- d) Conjunctive Proposition

250. The portion of Logic which deals with Form of Thought is called

- a) Induction
  - b) Injection
  - c) Direction
  - d) Deduction
- Answers:

251. The portion of Logic which deals with Matter of Thought is called

- a) Induction

- b) Injection
- c) Direction
- d) Deduction

252. The Argument in which an Universal conclusion is derived from Particular Premises is

- a) Universal argument
- b) Particular argument
- c) Deductive argument
- d) Inductive argument

253. The Argument in which a Particular conclusion is derived from Universal Premises is

- a) Universal argument
- b) Particular argument
- c) Deductive argument
- d) Inductive argument

254. Logically correct argument is called

- a) True argument
- b) False argument
- c) Valid argument
- d) Invalid argument

255. Logically incorrect argument is called

- a) True argument
- b) False argument
- c) Valid argument
- d) Invalid argument

256. The argument which contains only true propositions is called

- a) Sound argument
- b) Unsound argument
- a) Barren argument
- b) None of these

257. Argument containing true premises and false conclusion is called

- a) Sound argument
- b) Valid argument
- c) Invalid argument
- d) True argument

258. Which among the following is not considered as a Law of Thought

- a) Law of Identity
- b) Law of Excluded Middle

- c) Law of Uniformity of Nature
- d) Law of Non-Contradiction

259. Which Law of thought states 'AIS A'

- a) Law of Identity
- b) Law of Excluded Middle
- c) Law of Sufficient Cause
- d) Law of Non-Contradiction

260. Which Law of thought states 'A cannot be both B and 'Not B' at the Same time''

- a. Law of Identity
  - b. Law of Excluded Middle
  - c. Law of Sufficient Cause
  - d. Law of Non-Contradiction
- Answers:

261. Which Law of thought states 'A can be Either B Or 'Not B'

- a. Law of Identity
- b. Law of Excluded Middle
- c. Law of Sufficient Cause
- d. Law of Non-Contradiction

262. Which Law of thought states 'Whatever happens in this world should have a Sufficient Cause'

- a) Law of Identity
- b) Law of Excluded Middle
- c) Law of Sufficient Cause
- d) Law of Non-Contradiction

263. Classification means 'Division based on

- a) Principle
- b) Position
- c) Place
- d) Objects

264. The 'Subject term' in a Proposition is symbolically represented as

- a) 'S'
- b) 'P'
- c) 'A'
- d) 'O'

265. The 'Predicate term' in a Proposition is symbolically represented as

- a) 'S'
- b) 'P'
- c) 'A'
- d) 'O'

266. Unconditional Propositions are also known as

- a) Imperative
- b) Authoritative
- c) Categorical
- d) Hypothetical

267. Based on Quality, Categorical propositions are classified into

- a) 2
- b) 3
- c) 4
- d) 5

268. Based on Quantity, Categorical propositions are classified into

- a) 2
- b) 3
- c) 4
- d) 5

269. Based on Quality, Categorical propositions are classified into

- a) Affirmative & Negative
- b) Affirmative and Universal
- c) Negative & Particular
- d) Universal & Particular

270. Based on Quantity, Categorical propositions are classified into

- a) Affirmative & Negative
  - b) Affirmative and Universal
  - c) Negative & Particular
  - d) Universal & Particular
- Answers:

271. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate affirms the Subject class is called

- a) Affirmative proposition
- b) Negative proposition
- c) Universal proposition
- d) Particular proposition

272. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate denies the Subject class is called

- a) Affirmative proposition
- b) Negative proposition
- c) Universal proposition
- d) Particular proposition

273. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate affirms or denies the whole class of Subject is called
- a) Affirmative proposition
  - b) Negative proposition
  - c) Universal proposition
  - d) Particular proposition
274. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate affirms or denies a part class of Subject is called
- a) Affirmative proposition
  - b) Negative proposition
  - c) Universal proposition
  - d) Particular proposition
275. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate affirms the whole class of Subject is called
- a) Universal Affirmative
  - b) Universal Negative
  - c) Particular Affirmative
  - d) Particular Negative
276. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate denies the whole class of Subject is called
- a) Universal Affirmative
  - b) Universal Negative
  - c) Particular Affirmative
  - d) Particular Negative
277. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate affirms a part of the class of Subject is called
- a) Universal Affirmative
  - b) Universal Negative
  - c) Particular Affirmative
  - d) Particular Negative
278. The categorical proposition in which the Predicate denies a part of the class of Subject is called
- a) Universal Affirmative
  - b) Universal Negative
  - c) Particular Affirmative
  - d) Particular Negative
279. 'Universal Affirmative Proposition' is symbolically represented as
- a) 'A' Proposition
  - b) 'E' Proposition
  - c) 'I' Proposition

d) 'O' Proposition

280. 'Universal Negative' Proposition is symbolically represented as

- a) 'A' Proposition
- b) 'E' Proposition
- c) 'I' Proposition
- d) 'O' Proposition

Answers:

281. 'Particular Affirmative' Proposition is symbolically represented as

- a) 'A' Proposition
- b) 'E' Proposition
- c) 'I' Proposition
- d) 'O' Proposition

282. 'Particular Negative' Proposition is symbolically represented as

- a) 'A' Proposition
- b) 'E' Proposition
- c) 'I' Proposition
- d) 'O' Proposition

283. The proposition which states about the inclusion of the whole class of Subject is called

- a) Universal Affirmative
- b) Universal Negative
- c) Particular Affirmative
- d) Particular Negative

284. The proposition which states about the exclusion of the whole class of Subject is called

- a) Universal Affirmative
- b) Universal Negative
- c) Particular Affirmative
- d) Particular Negative

285. The proposition which states about the inclusion of a part of the class of Subject is called

- a) Universal Affirmative
- b) Universal Negative
- c) Particular Affirmative
- d) Particular Negative

286. The proposition which states about the exclusion of a part of the class of Subject is called

- a) Universal Affirmative
- b) Universal Negative
- c) Particular Affirmative
- d) Particular Negative

287. The extension of a term is called its

- a) Connotation
- b) Denotation
- c) Both of these
- d) None of these

288. The intension of a term is called its

- a) Connotation
- b) Denotation
- c) Both of these
- d) None of these

289. Distribution of terms is based on

- a) Connotation
- b) Denotation
- c) Both of these
- d) None of these

290. When a term is used in its entire extension referring to all objects denoted by that term, it is said to be

- a) Distributed
  - b) Undistributed
  - c) Both of these
  - d) None of these
- Answers:

291. 'A' proposition distributes

- a) Subject only
- b) Predicate only
- c) Both Subject & Predicate
- d) Both Subject & Predicate are undistributed

292. 'E' proposition distributes

- a) Subject only
- b) Predicate only
- c) Both Subject & Predicate
- d) Both Subject & Predicate are undistributed

293. 'I' proposition distributes

- a) Subject only
- b) Predicate only
- c) Both Subject & Predicate
- d) Both Subject & Predicate are undistributed

294. 'O' proposition distributes

- a) Subject only
- b) Predicate only
- c) Both Subject & Predicate
- d) Both Subject & Predicate are undistributed

295. Name the Logician who illustrated distribution of terms in A,E,I & O propositions through Venn Diagram

- a) Socrates
- b) Frege
- c) Euler
- d) Leibniz

296. Proposition affirms or denies the relation between

- a) Subject & Predicate
- b) Two Subjects
- c) Two Predicates.
- d) Subject & Copula

297. The Inference in which a conclusion is derived from one premise

- a) Immediate
- b) Mediate
- c) Judgement
- d) Proposition

298. The Inference in which a conclusion is derived from two premises

- a) Immediate
- b) Mediate
- c) Judgement
- d) Proposition

299. Syllogism is a

- a) Immediate Inference
- b) Mediate Inference
- c) Opposition
- d) Eduction

300. In Immediate Proposition, there are propositions

- a) 2
- b) 3
- c) 4
- d) 5

301. Which one among the following is not an immediate Inference

- a) Contrary
- b) Obversion
- c) Conversion
- d) Syllogism

302. Which one of the following is not an Opposition

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Subaltern
- d) Conversion

303. Which Opposition states the relation between A & E

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Sub-contrary
- d) Subaltern

304. Which Opposition states the relation between I & O

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Sub-contrary
- d) Subaltern

305. Which Opposition states the relation between A & I and E & O

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Sub-contrary
- d) Subaltern

306. Which Opposition states the relation between A & O and E & I

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Sub-contrary
- d) Subaltern

307. A syllogism consists of -----terms

- a) 2
- b) 3
- c) 4
- d) 5

308. A syllogism consists of -----propositions

- a) 2
- b) b.3
- c) c.4
- d) 5

309. The Predicate of the conclusion in a Syllogism is called

- a) Major term
- b) Minor term
- c) Middle term
- d) First term

310. The Subject of the conclusion in a Syllogism is called

- a) Major term
- b) Minor term
- c) Middle term
- d) First term

311. The term which present only in the premises and not in the conclusion of a Syllogism is called

- a) Major term
- b) Minor term
- c) Middle term
- d) First term

312. Which among the following is not a proposition of a Syllogism

- a) Major premise
- b) Minor premise
- c) Conclusion
- d) Middle premise

313. Logical error is called

- a) Syllogism
- b) Opposition
- c) Fallacy
- d) Eduction

314. Which among the following is not a fallacy of Ambiguity

- a) Fallacy of ambiguous First term
- b) Fallacy of ambiguous Major
- c) Fallacy of ambiguous Minor
- d) Fallacy of ambiguous Middle

315. State the fallacy in the following Syllogism All Monkeys are Mammals All Donkeys are Mammals All Donkeys are Monkeys.

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguity
- b) Fallacy of Undistributed Middle
- c) Fallacy of Illicit
- d) Fallacy of two Negative Premises

316. Which among the following is a Fallacy of Illicit

- a) Fallacy of Illicit Middle
- b) Fallacy of Illicit Premises
- c) Fallacy of Illicit Major
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Conclusion

317. A Syllogism which contains both categorical and Conditional propositions is called

- a) Universal Syllogism
- b) General Syllogism
- c) Major Syllogism
- d) Mixed Syllogism

318. Which among the following is not a mixed Syllogism

- a) Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism
- b) Mixed Disjunctive Syllogism
- c) Dilemma
- d) Mixed Categorical Syllogism

319. Modus ponens is a

- a) Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism
- b) Mixed Disjunctive Syllogism
- c) Dilemma
- d) Mixed Categorical Syllogism

320. Modus tollens is a

- a) Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism
- b) Mixed Disjunctive Syllogism
- c) Dilemma
- d) Mixed Categorical Syllogism

321. Modus ponens tollens is a

- a) Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism
- b) Mixed Disjunctive Syllogism
- c) Dilemma
- d) Mixed Categorical Syllogism

322. Modus tollens ponens is a

- a) Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism

- b) Mixed Disjunctive Syllogism
- c) Dilemma
- d) Mixed Categorical Syllogism

323. If the conclusion of a Dilemma is Categorical proposition I, it is called

- a) Simple Dilemma
- b) Complex Dilemma
- c) Compound Dilemma
- d) Complicated Dilemma

324. If the conclusion of a Dilemma is Disjunctive proposition, it is called

- a) Simple Dilemma
- b) Complex Dilemma
- c) Compound Dilemma
- d) Complicated Dilemma

325. Which among the following is not a Dilemma

- a) Simple Constructive Dilemma
- b) Compound Constructive dilemma
- c) Complex Constructive Dilemma
- d) Complex Destructive Dilemma

326. Dilemma only can be Rebutted

- a) Simple Constructive Dilemma
- b) Simple Destructive Dilemma
- c) Complex Constructive Dilemma
- d) Complex Destructive Dilemma

327. Inductive Logic is also known as

- a) Formal Logic
- b) Material Logic
- c) Symbolic Logic
- d) None of these

328. Conclusion drawn from the premises by counting particular instances is in

- a) Analogy
- b) Scientific Induction
- c) Enumerative Induction
- d) None of these

329. Conclusion drawn from the premises based on the similarities among the particular facts is in

- a) Analogy
- b) Scientific Induction

- c) Enumerative Induction
- d) None of these

330. Scientific Induction has ----- stages

- a) 3
- b) 4
- c) 5
- d) 6

331. Scientific Induction starts with

- a) Theory
- b) Law
- c) Observation
- d) Formulation of Hypothesis

332. Experiment is

- a) Natural Observation
- b) Controlled Observation
- c) Both
- d) None of these

333. The guess about the cause of an event is called

- a) Observation
- b) Analysis
- c) Study
- d) Hypothesis

334. Induction is ----- process

- a) Ascending
- b) Descending
- c) Parallel.
- d) Cycle

335. In a Syllogism, if one premise is negative, then the conclusion will be

- a) Negative
- b) Affirmative
- c) No conclusion
- d) None of these

336. We cannot derive any conclusion from

- a) Two Affirmative premises
- b) Two Universal premises
- c) Two particular premises

d) One universal and one particular

337. In a Syllogism, if one of the premises is Particular, then the conclusion will be

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

338. In a Syllogism, if one of the premises is Negative, then the conclusion will be

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

339. Which among the following is a method for collection of facts in Scientific Induction

- a) Formulation of Hypothesis
- b) Verification of Hypothesis
- c) Observation
- d) Proving the Hypothesis

340. Conclusion drawn from the premises by counting all particular instances is in

- a) Direct enumeration
- b) Perfect enumeration
- c) Indirect enumeration
- d) Imperfect enumeration

341. Conclusion drawn from the premises by counting some particular instances is in

- a) Direct enumeration
- b) Perfect enumeration
- c) Indirect enumeration
- d) Imperfect enumeration

342. The process of jumping from 'Some to All' is called

- a) Deductive leap
- b) Logical Jump
- c) Circle leap
- d) Inductive leap

343. Verification of Hypothesis is possible through

- a) Perfect or imperfect method
- b) Direct or Indirect method
- c) Positive or Negative method
- d) Analytical or Synthetic method

344. Observation under man made condition is called

- a) Natural
- b) Synthetic
- c) Experiment
- d) Examination

345. Verified Hypothesis is called

- a) Fact
- b) Theory
- c) Law
- d) Rule

346. Proved Hypothesis is called

- a) Fact
- b) Theory
- c) Law
- d) Rule

347. The Hypothesis which cannot be verified is called

- a) Hidden hypothesis
- b) Evolved Hypothesis
- c) Barren Hypothesis
- d) Vague Hypothesis

348. Which among the following is not a Postulate of Induction

- a) Law of Universal Causation
- b) Law of Excluded Middle
- c) Law of Uniformity of Nature
- d) Law of Unity of Nature

349. Postulates of Induction is also known as

- a) Laws of Thought
- b) Laws of Aristotle
- c) Laws of Nature
- d) Laws of Leibniz

350. The Law of Universal Causation states that

- a) Some events have no cause
- b) Every event has a cause
- c) All events occur without cause
- d) Cause is not necessary for events to occur

351. Which Law states that 'Same cause will produce same effect under same condition'

- a) Law of Universal Causation
- b) Law of Uniformity of Nature
- c) Law of Identity
- d) Law of Non-Contradiction

352. The Hypothesis which is accepted temporarily is called

- a) Barren Hypothesis
- b) Ad hoc Hypothesis
- c) Add on Hypothesis
- d) Selective Hypothesis

353. Logic is a ----- Science

- a) Positive
- b) Normative
- c) Descriptive
- d) Natural

354. The proposition, 'Either the umbrella is black or the umbrella is blue' is called

- a) Hypothetical
- b) Categorical
- c) Disjunctive
- d) None of these

355. The Problem of Induction is

- a) How Induction is possible
- b) How Inductive Leap is possible
- c) How Analogy is possible
- d) How Observation is possible

356. Opposition is a ----- Inference

- a) Indirect
- b) Direct
- c) Concrete
- d) Immediate

357. Education is a ----- Inference

- a) Abstract
- b) Absurd
- c) Immediate
- d) Mediate

358. Which among the following is an Education

- a) Contrary
- b) Obversion
- c) Contradictory
- d) Subaltern

359. How many propositions are there in an Opposition

- a) 6
- b) 5
- c) 2
- d) 3

360. Deduction and Induction are two main forms of

- a) Beliefs
- b) Concepts
- c) Reasoning
- d) Assumptions

361. Which among the following are two kinds of propositions

- a) Concrete- Abstract
- b) Deductive- Inductive
- c) Connotative- Denotative
- d) Categorical- Conditional

362. The Proposition 'If you work hard then you will succeed' is

- a) Categorical
- b) Hypothetical
- c) Disjunctive
- d) None of these

363. The proposition 'Some Indians are not jealous' is a

- a) Universal Affirmative
- b) Universal Negative
- c) Particular Affirmative
- d) Particular Negative

364. When a term refers only to a part of the class of things denoted by that term said to be

- a) Distributed
- b) Undistributed
- c) Abstract
- d) Absurd

365. When a term refers only to the whole class of things denoted by that term said to be

- a) Distributed

- b) Undistributed
- c) Abstract
- d) Absurd

366. The following argument is Gold melts when heated Silver melts when heated Iron melts when heated Copper melts when heated Brass melts when heated. ∴ All metals melts when heated.

- a) Deductive
- b) Inductive.
- c) Both
- d) None of these

367. The relation between two Universal propositions having same subject, same predicate but differ only in quality is

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Subalternation
- d) Sub-contrary

368. The relation between two Particular propositions having same subject, same predicate but differ only in quality is

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Subalternation
- d) Sub-contrary

369. The relation between two propositions having same subject, same predicate but differ only in quantity is

- a) Contrary
- b) b. Contradictory
- c) Subalternation
- d) Sub-contrary

370. The relation between two propositions having same subject, same predicate but differ both in quantity and in quality is

- a) Contrary
- b) Contradictory
- c) Subalternation
- d) Sub-contrary

371. The relation between two propositions having same subject, same predicate but differ in quality or in quantity or both in quality and quantity is called

- a) eduction
- b) Opposition
- c) Syllogism

d) Conversion

372. Euler's Circles are diagrams representing of terms

- a) Distribution
- b) Meaning
- c) Quality
- d) Quantity

373. The quantity of 'A' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

374. The quantity of 'E' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

375. The quantity of 'I' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

376. The quantity of 'O' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

377. The quality of 'A' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

378. The quality of 'E' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

379. The quality of 'I' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

380. The quality of 'O' proposition is

- a) Universal
- b) Particular
- c) Affirmative
- d) Negative

381. The contrary opposition of 'A' proposition is

- a) A
- b) E
- c) I
- d) O

382. The Sub-contrary opposition of 'I' proposition is

- a) A
- b) E
- c) I
- d) O

383. The Subaltern opposition of 'A' proposition is

- a) A
- b) E
- c) I
- d) O

384. The Subaltern opposition of 'E' proposition is

- a) A
- b) E
- c) I
- d) O

385. The Contradictory opposition of 'A' proposition is

- a) A
- b) E
- c) I
- d) O

386. The Contradictory opposition of 'E' proposition is

- a) A

- b) E
- c) I
- d) d. O

387. The proposition 'No men are perfect' is

- a) Universal affirmative
- b) Universal Negative
- c) Particular Affirmative
- d) Particular Negative

388. The fallacy occurs when the syllogism uses its Major term in one sense in the Major premise and in another sense in the conclusion

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Major

389. The fallacy occurs when the syllogism uses its Minor term in one sense in the Minor premise and in another sense in the conclusion

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) Fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Major

390. The fallacy occurs when the syllogism uses its Middle term in one sense in the Major premise and in another sense in the Minor premise

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) Fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Ambiguous Middle
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Major

391. The fallacy occurs when the Major term in a syllogism remains 'Undistributed' in the Major premise while it is 'Distributed' in the conclusion.

- a) a. Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) Fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Illicit Major
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Minor

392. The fallacy occurs when the Minor term in a syllogism remains 'Undistributed' in the Minor premise while it is 'Distributed' in the conclusion.

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) Fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Illicit Major

d) Fallacy of Illicit Minor

393. All men are Politicians All men are Indians  $\therefore$  All Indians are Politicians The fallacy committed the above syllogism is

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) Fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Illicit Major
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Minor

394. All men are Selfish No Apes are men  $\therefore$  No Apes are Selfish The fallacy committed the above syllogism is

- a) Fallacy of Ambiguous Major
- b) Fallacy of Ambiguous Minor
- c) Fallacy of Illicit Major
- d) Fallacy of Illicit Minor

395. Modus ponens is also known as

- a) Constructive Hypothetical syllogism
- b) Simple Dilemma
- c) Destructive hypothetical Syllogism
- d) Complex Dilemma

396. Modus Tollens is also known as

- a) Constructive Hypothetical syllogism
- b) c Simple Dilemma
- c) b Destructive hypothetical Syllogism
- d) Complex Dilemma

397. Which among the following is not a Dilemma

- a) Simple Constructive Dilemma
- b) Complex Constructive Dilemma
- c) Simple Destructive Dilemma
- d) Simple complex Dilemma

398. Scientific Induction establishes

- a) A Particular Fact
- b) A Concrete Fact
- c) An Abstract fact
- d) A General Law

399. All men are mortal All kings are men  $\therefore$  All kings are mortal State the Major Term in the above Syllogism

- a) Men

- b) King
- c) Mortal
- d) Are

400. Ad hoc hypothesis is also known as

- a) Everlasting hypothesis
- b) Working hypothesis
- c) Artificial hypothesis
- d) analogical hypothesis

Answers: 201-400

- 1. Ans: c. Logos
- 2. Ans: d. Thought
- 3. Ans: a. Word
- 4. Ans : b. Thought
- 5. Ans: d. Argument
- 6. Ans: Aristotle
- 7. Ans: d. Normative
- 8. Ans: a. Formal Logic
- 9. Ans: c. Term
- 10. Ans: a. Declarative
  
- 11. Ans: d. Copula.
- 12. Ans: c. Premise
- 13. Ans: b. Conclusion.
- 14. Ans: d. Concrete term
- 15. Ans: c. Abstract term
- 16. Ans: b. Connotative

17. Ans: a.Non-Connotative
18. Ans: b. Absolute
19. Ans: d.Relative
20. Ans: a. General
21. Ans: c. Simple
22. Ans: d. Composite
23. Ans: a. Positive term
24. Ans: b. Negative term
25. Ans: c. Privative term
26. Ans: a. Proposition
27. Ans: d. Subjectless Proposition
28. Ans: c. Conjunction
29. Ans: b. Disjunction
30. Ans: b. Implication
31. Ans: c. Antecedent
32. Ans: b. Consequence
33. Ans: d. Categorical proposition
34. Ans:c. Conditional proposition
35. Ans: c. Conjunction
36. Ans : a. Simple Proposition
37. Ans: Subject term
38. Ans: b Predicate term

39. Ans: a. Relation between

subject & predicate

40. Ans: d. proposition

41. Ans : c. Astrolog

42. Ans: a. 'What ought to be'

43. Ans: b. Factual

44. Ans: c. Perception

45. Ans: b. Concept

46. Ans: d. Inference

47. Ans: a. Search of Truth

48. Ans : d. Compound Proposition

49. Ans : a. Subjectless Proposition

50. Ans : d. Deduction

51. Ans : a. Induction

52. Ans: d. Inductive argument

53. Ans: c. Deductive argument

54. Ans : c. Valid argument

55. Ans : d. Invalid argument

56. Ans : a. Sound argument

57. Ans : c. Invalid argument

58. Ans : c. Law of Nature

59. Ans: a. Law of Identity

60. Ans: d. Law of Non-

#### Contradiction

61. Ans: b. Law of Excluded Middle

62. Ans: c. Law of Sufficient Cause

63. Ans : a. Principle

64. Ans: a. 'S'

65. Ans: b. 'P'

66. Ans: c. Categorical

67. Ans: 2

68. Ans: 2

69. Ans: a. Affirmative & Negative

70. Ans: d. Universal & Particular

71. Ans: .a. Affirmative proposition

72. Ans: b. Negative proposition

73. Ans: c. Universal proposition

74. Ans: d. Particular proposition.

75. Ans: a. Universal Affirmative

76. Ans: b. Universal Negative

77. Ans: c. Particular Affirmative

78. Ans: d. Particular Negative

79. Ans: a. 'A' Proposition

80. Ans: b. 'E' Proposition

81. Ans: c. 'I' Proposition
82. Ans: d. 'O' Proposition
83. Ans: a. Universal Affirmative
84. Ans: b. Universal Negative
85. Ans: c. Particular Affirmative
86. Ans : d. Particular Negative
- 
87. Ans: b. Denotation
88. Ans: a. Connotation
89. Ans: b. Denotation
90. Ans: a. Distributed
91. Ans : a. Subject only
92. Ans : c. Both Subject & Predicate
93. Ans : d. Both Subject & Predicate are undistributed
94. Ans : b. Predicate only
95. Ans: c. Euler
- 
96. Ans: a. Subject & Predicate
97. Ans: a. Immediate
98. Ans: b. Mediate
99. Ans : b. Mediate Inference

100. Ans: a. 2
101. Ans: d. Syllogism
102. Ans: d. Conversion
103. Ans: a. Contrary
104. Ans: c. Sub-contrary
105. Ans: d. Subaltern
106. Ans: b. Contradictory
107. Ans: b. 3
108. Ans: b. 3
109. Ans: a. Major term
110. Ans: b. Minor term
111. Ans: b. Middle term
112. Ans: d. Middle premise
113. Ans : c. Fallacy
- 114 Ans : a.Fallacy of ambiguousFirst term
- 115 Ans : b. Fallacy ofUndistributed Middle
116. Ans : c. Fallacy of Illicit Major
117. Ans : d. Mixed Syllogism
118. Ans : d. Mixed Categorical

### Syllogism

119. Ans : a. Mixed HypotheticalSyllogism
120. Ans : a. Mixed HypotheticalSyllogism

121. Ans : Mixed DisjunctiveSyllogism
122. Ans : Mixed DisjunctiveSyllogism
123. Ans : a. Simple Dilemma
124. Ans : b. Complex Dilemma
125. Ans : b. CompoundConstructive dilemma
126. Ans : c. Complex ConstructiveDilemma
127. Ans: a. Formal Logic
128. Ans : c. Enumerative Induction
129. Ans : a. Analogy
130. Ans: b. 4
131. Ans: c. Observation
132. Ans : b. Controlled Observation
133. Ans : d. Hypothesis
134. Ans : a. Ascending
135. Ans : a. Negative
- 136 Ans : c. Two particular premises
137. Ans : b. Particular
138. Ans : d. negative
139. Ans : c. Observation
140. Ans : b. Perfect enumeration
141. Ans : d. Imperfect enumeration
142. Ans: d. Inductive leap
143. Ans : b. Direct or Indirectmethod

144. Ans : c. Experiment  
145. Ans : b. Theory  
146. Ans : c. Law  
147. Ans : c. Barren Hypothesis  
148. Ans: b. Law of Excluded Middle  
149. Ans : c. Laws of Nature  
150. Ans : b. Every event has a cause  
151. Ans : b. Law of Uniformity of Nature

#### Possible


152. Ans : b. Ad hoc Hypothesis  
153. Ans : b Normative  
154. Ans : c. Disjunctive  
155. Ans: b. How Inductive Leap is
156. Ans : d. Immediate  
157. Ans : c. Immediate  
158. Ans : b. Obversion  
159. Ans : c. 2  
160. Ans : c. Reasoning  
161. Ans : d. Categorical-Conditional  
162. Ans : b. Hypothetical  
163. Ans : d. Particular Negative  
164. Ans: .b. Undistributed

165. Ans: a. Distributed
166. Ans : b. Inductive.
167. Ans : a. Contrary
168. Ans : d. Sub-contrary
169. Ans : c. Subalternation
170. Ans : b. Contradictory
171. Ans: b. Opposition
172. Ans : a. Distribution
173. Ans: a. Universal
- 
174. Ans : a. Universal
175. Ans : b. Particular
176. Ans : b. Particular
177. Ans : c. Affirmative
178. Ans : d. Negative
179. Ans : c. Affirmative
180. Ans : d. Negative
181. Ans : b. E
182. Ans : d. O
183. Ans : c. I
184. Ans : d. O
- 
185. Ans : d. O
186. Ans : c. I
187. Ans: b. Universal Negative
188. Ans: a. Ambiguous Major

189. Ans: b. Ambiguous Minor
190. Ans : c. Ambiguous Middle
191. Ans: c. Fallacy of Illicit Major
192. Ans: d. Fallacy of Illicit Minor
193. Ans: d. Fallacy of Illicit Minor
194. Ans: c. Fallacy of Illicit Major
195. Ans : a. Constructive

#### Hypothetical syllogism

196. Ans : b Destructivehypothetical Syllogism
197. Ans: d. Simple complexDilemma
198. Ans: d. A General Law
199. Ans: c. Mortal
200. Ans: b. Working hypothesis



**UNIT – 10**

*Applied Philosophy*

## **Applied Philosophy**

Applied philosophy is marked out from philosophy in general by its focus on matters of practical concern. It is often identified with applied ethics, but although this forms a large part of the area of applied philosophy, the broader term includes discussion of philosophical problems, some metaphysical, some epistemological, in fields such as law, education or art, that are not strictly or uniquely ethical. Applied ethics also includes the area of professional ethics; it examines the ethical dilemmas and challenges met with by workers in health-care, business and other areas where specific ethical issues such as confidentiality and truth-telling may arise.

## **The Proper Preoccupations of Philosophy**

Philosophy is often regarded as the most abstract of studies, so the term 'applied philosophy' needs some explanation. It represents the claim that it is possible to build bridges between theory and practice and, in particular, that philosophy is not only an internal movement in philosophy but that it can and should play a role in public debate. This should not be seen, though, as a bid to claim expertise on the part of philosophers but rather as a reassertion of the traditional conception of the philosopher, not as an expert, but as an honest and open seeker after truth. This search involves accepting the possibility of rational argument about normative directions. It does not mean, though, maintaining a posture of uninvolved neutrality. As philosophy, indeed, it involves a prior commitment to the values of rationality, impartiality and equality of respect for individuals, and these provide the foundation for the moral values and range of rights that are fundamental to applied ethics. Applied philosophy, then, is part of a whole view of the human condition and takes a broad view of ethical decision-making. It can therefore accept as part of its task the identification and discussion of values capable of securing widespread acceptance in the contemporary world. For philosophy has traditionally been concerned, not only with abstract reflection but also with questions about how we should live and how we should conduct our social life and political affairs.

Today's applied philosophy, then, marks a return to what have always been proper preoccupations of philosophers. Some of these preoccupations are old and could be said to have a perennial interest - intimate relationships and family life, for example, or global issues of peace and war. Others are the product of new technologies, revolutions in communication, new weapons of indiscriminate destruction, and an unprecedented increase in the impact of humans on their environment and support systems. Applied philosophy and especially applied ethics yields scope and space for discussion of these issues of public policy. To all these debates, it can bring clarity, openness, critical analysis, and respect for careful evaluation of arguments. At the same time, it represents a shift from the view that philosophy can only analyse and clarify problems but is not able to take on the task of seeking answers to them.

Applied philosophy differs in style and approach from some mainstream philosophy in other ways, too. It gives greater attention to context and to the detailed texture of complex situations and it is also more holistic in approach - that is to say, it is much more ready to include the insights of psychology, sociology and other relevant areas of knowledge in its deliberations, and to allow the facts it finds there to influence its conclusions. Its method of reasoning could be compared to that of a designer who starts with a blueprint, but has to adapt it to the materials to hand and to the situations in which it is required. The origins and background of applied philosophy can be traced back to the first of the early Greek philosophers, Thales (c.585 BCE), who could well qualify as the first applied philosopher. Having been scorned for his speculative and impractical interests - he was so preoccupied with studying the stars that he fell down a well! - he decided, very successfully, to go into business and use those observations to make a fortune, thus demonstrating that phil-

osophical abstraction had its uses, and even a potential cash-value.

Later schools of philosophy in ancient times - Pythagoreans, Epicureans, Stoics - offered their followers principles for living and guidance on life-style. Socrates (469-399 BCE.), too, while he avoided preaching any dogma, did offer in his own approach to life and also to death an example of a way of living appropriate to the pursuit of philosophy.

Plato (c.430-347 BCE), the chronicler of Socrates' discussions, described his own blueprint for the good society in his dialogue the Republic, which covered not only political arrangements, but also the way social life should be organised. He set out there his ideals for education, for sexual relations and reproduction, for art, literature and censorship.

In the modern period, too, many philosophers have applied their philosophical insights to practical issues. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) treated such topics as marriage and the family in his *Summa Theologiae*. John Locke (1632-1704) wrote on toleration, and also on education; his political theory also provided the philosophical underpinning of the American Declaration of Independence. The principle of human dignity formulated by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is central to most modern conventions of human rights, and Kant also treated the subject of suicide, and the question of whether it is ever right to tell a lie from benevolent motives - questions which continue to be important for medical ethics. Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73) have a continued if not always acknowledged influence on public policy, while Karl Marx's (1818-83) political philosophy has played a dramatic role in the shaping of the modern world. Applied philosophy, then, is not a new subject. Nevertheless, it suffered a period of neglect as the pendulum in philosophy swung from the speculative metaphysics of the nineteenth century to the materialistic scientism of the twentieth.

A number of factors contributed to the return to applied ethics, dating from approximately the mid-twentieth century. Perhaps the most important of these was the development of new kinds of medical technology, particularly those involving new methods of reproduction, and those affecting the end of life; another has been controversy about war and international relations. The publication of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975) prompted increased academic debate about the relationship between humans and the animal world, and at the same time, there was a dawning public awareness of environmental threats on a global scale. Finally, interest in business and corporate ethics has grown, in reaction to scandals of public and business life. For all these reasons, then, and many others, applied philosophy has today entered a new, more self-conscious and better-defined phase of development.

## **PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY**

The philosophy of technology brings logical, metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political philosophical questions to bear on the making and using of artifacts. The particular balance among these questions will differ within related regionalizations of philosophy, such as the philosophy of science or the philosophy of art. In the philosophy of technology, for instance, epistemology typically plays a lesser role than in the philosophy of science but a greater role than in the philosophy of art. Any philosophical assessment of technology is thus partially defined by its own inner balance in relation to philosophy as a whole.

## **Historical Emergence**

Although limited discussions of *techne* and associated or derivative phenomena can be found in ancient, medieval, and early modern philosophy, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twen-

tieth centuries that technology, as something distinct from technics or technique, became a subject for theoretical examination. Among the earliest contributing texts, the mechanical engineer Franz Reuleaux's *Theoretische Kinematik* (1875) developed an extended conceptual analysis of different types of tools and machines. More generally, Ernst Kapp's *Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik* (1877), in the first book to use "philosophy of technology" in its title, outlined a theory of culture grounded in technics understood as the extension and differentiation of human anatomy and physiology. The hammer, for instance, functions as an extension of the fist, the camera as an extension of the eye, and the railroad as an extension of the circulatory system; and vice versa, the fist can be said to be like a hammer, the eye like a camera, and rail lines like blood vessels. Elaborations of this view of technology as organ projection are representative of a school of what Carl Mitcham (1994) calls engineering philosophy of technology, an approach that was further developed in the work of thinkers as diverse as the Russian Peter Englemeier, the German Friedrich Dessauer, the Frenchman Gilbert Simondon, and the Spaniard Juan David García Bacca (all of whom have been largely ignored in Anglo American philosophy).

The research engineer Dessauer, for instance, developed a neo-Kantian critique of the transcendental possibility of technological invention that sees technology as bringing noumenal power into the world. Dessauer was also instrumental in promoting philosophical discussion within the *Verein Deutscher Ingenieure* (VDI; Society of German Engineers). The psychologist Simondon explored relations among parts, artifacts, and technical systems and the evolutionary manifestation of what he called technicity. The engineer Englemeier and the philosopher García Bacca both saw technological change engendering world-historical transformations that were at once humanizing and transcending of the merely organically human. Additional contributions to this school can be found in theoretical discussions about cybernetics and artificial intelligence. Also illustrative of achievements in engineering-oriented philosophy of technology are the scientific philosopher Mario Bunge's (1985) systematic metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of technology and the engineer Billy Vaughn Koen's (2003) brief for engineering as the one right method for problem solving.

In its emergence, however, philosophy of technology was more commonly associated with what might be called a counterphilosophy that interprets technology not as extending but as encroaching on or narrowing the dimensions of human experience. Following Immanuel Kant's attempt "to deny [scientific] knowledge, in order to make room for faith," this humanities philosophy of technology has sought to limit technological thought and practice to make room for human culture in all its rich diversity. A case in point is the public intellectual Lewis Mumford's (1967) criticism of what he calls monotecnics, the technics of power, in contrast to poly- or biotechnics. The problem with monotecnics is that it promotes the pursuit of physical power and control at the expense of other aspects of human flourishing such as friendship and art. For Mumford the "myth of the machine" is to think that power is the source of all human benefit. In fact, it constitutes an unrealistic narrowing of human activity. Some version of this argument has been promoted especially by the continental European philosophical tradition in the works of José Ortega y Gasset (1939), Martin Heidegger (1954), and Jacques Ellul (1954). Indeed, even more broadly, the relation between technology and life—whether in the sense of *zoe* (organic existence) or *bios* (human flourishing)—has become one of the most crucial issues in both the metaphysics and ethics of technology. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the argument for delimitation had the unintended side effect of relegating technology to marginal status in professional philosophy. Only as technology became more than an engineering interest or a social problem has it begun to be a mainstream topic in philosophy. One of the challenges in the twenty-first century will be to pursue the professional development of philosophical reflection on technology in ways that bridge the oppositions inherent in its bimodal historical origins without compromising their basic if divergent

concerns.

## **Ethical and Political Issues**

Because of their prominence in public affairs, the philosophy of technology properly highlights ethical and political issues. Indeed, contemporary work in practical or applied ethics—as in nuclear, environmental, biomedical, and computer ethics—emphasizes the moral challenges of technology, although in ways that sometimes reduce the field to an aggregate of different ethics for different technologies. Such subspecialization can deprive ethics of possible synergistic strengths. Access equity issues, for instance, occur in both biomedicine and computers, and the concepts and principles for dealing with one might well inform or enhance the other. Speaking generally, then, one can identify at least six competing and overlapping interpretations of technology as an ethical or political problem. Three of these arose initially before World War II, although they have continued to cast a shadow of concern, often in new and distinctive forms.

First, there is a problem of the just distribution of technological products and powers—that is, technology as a political issue. Since the Industrial Revolution the social-justice question has found numerous expressions in authoritarian and democratic regimes, in developing and developed countries. Authoritarian regimes have often justified themselves as acting to promote access to technological benefits against entrenched special scientific, technical, or corporate interests or against those whose commitment to equality undermines the invention and production of goods and services. Democratic regimes have placed more emphasis on promoting equality by means of due process and regulatory agencies. One aspect of due process that has been given special philosophical attention concerns the legal protocols to promote free and informed consent, extending the concept from human experimentation to engineering at large (Martin and Schinzinger 2005). With the engineered design of new products and processes social justice issues have often taken special form in association with some otherwise morally neutral concepts. The advent of electronic computer and Internet communications, for instance, has helped impart ethical significance to questions of privacy and the so-called "digital divide." Additionally, according to Ulrich Beck (1992), concerns for the fair distribution of goods and services were, during the late twentieth century, superseded by those dealing with the fair distribution of dangers and risks, thus giving social justice debates a special twist. One of the strongest criticisms of some of the resulting twists and turns has been Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette's (1991) careful dissecting of the antidemocratic assumptions of much risk-cost-benefit analysis.

Second is the problem of the alienation of workers from their labor in the industrial means of production, which has been presented especially by Marxists as an economic and by some non-Marxist social scientists as a psychological issue. Langdon Winner's (1977) analysis of the theory of autonomous technology or the idea that technology as resistant to human control is a more general statement of the issue. Critical theory work by Herbert Marcuse (1964) and Andrew Feenberg (1991, 1999) extended the classic Marxist discussion into situations reconfigured by consumerist culture and globalization. Opposing Marcuse's pessimism about transformation, Feenberg (especially 1995) has been more optimistic about alternative possibilities. Environmentalists, however, have further argued that technology in general alienates human beings from nature.

Don Ihde's (1990) phenomenology of the techno-lifeworld offers another take on this issue through an analysis of human—technology—world relations. Two fundamental types of such engagements are instrumental relations, in which the technology is integrated into the human sensorium as its extension (the blind man's cane), and hermeneutic relations, in which the technology becomes part of the world to be interpreted (a thermometer). Both engagements manifest an invariant structure

that amplifies some aspect of the world (exact metric of temperature) while simultaneously reducing others (general sense of climate). The former tends to bring humans closer to the world, the latter to distance (or alienate) them from it.

Third is the problem of the destruction or transformation of culture by modern science and technology—either directly through new weapons and forms of military conflict or indirectly through the impact of new means of transportation, communication, and media. The destruction of World War I, the most violent in human history, was a manifestation of technology that only became worse during World War II with the development of nuclear weapons. The long cold war practice of nuclear deterrence and the early twenty-first-century challenges of terrorism present special problems for learning to manage the destructive potential in technology.

Between the two world wars concern for the more indirect technological transformation of culture took on special salience, as variously illustrated by the cultural lag theory of the American sociologist William Fielding Ogburn, the elegiac ruminations of the Catholic theologian Romano Guardini, or the active nihilistic enthusiasms of Ernst Jünger. In the latter half of the twentieth century the issue found small-scale manifestation in personal efforts to come to terms with new choices (e.g., in diet, drugs, and consumer lifestyle options) and large-scale manifestation in debates about the dynamics of sociotechnical change (e.g., the role of technology in economic development and technological determinism versus social constructionism). Questions can also arise about the transformed character of cultural life under the influence of information and image technologies, from television to the Internet and virtual reality machines.

Since World War II three more issues have emerged to ethical and political prominence. One is that of democratic participation. An anticipatory version of this issue emerged in interwar proposals for technocracy. For some theorists (such as Thorstein Veblen) rule by technical elites offered a better alternative than rule by economic or political elites. However, in the postwar revival of democratic theory, and with recognition that technology (like law) is a creation that also influences the creators, it was argued that the principle of "no taxation without representation" should be extended to "no innovation without representation" (Goldman 1992). Winner, for instance, describes "technologies as forms of life" and calls for the abandonment of "technological somnambulism" (1986, p. 10) in favor of public debate about the design of technological projects as diverse as highway bridges, tomato harvesters, and nuclear power plants. Efforts to determine how such democratic participation should be structured both within communities of technical expertise and in the negotiations between technical experts and the nontechnical public have been the subject of ongoing debates.

Fifth is the industrial pollution of the natural environment, which has contributed to attempts to develop an appropriate environmental or ecological ethics. What is the difference between artifice and nature—and the moral status of wilderness or the nonhuman environment? As nature is humanly transformed, to what extent should contemporary technological action take into account the welfare of future generations, whether human or nonhuman? What is the relation between values that are divided between the anthropocentric and ecocentric, extrinsic or instrumental and intrinsic? Another morally relevant concept, closely related to issues of both participation and environmentalism, is that of unintended consequences. To what extent are scientists and engineers responsible for the unexpected and perhaps even unforeseeable results of their technological actions? Two attempts to deal with the plethora of environmental issues, especially in relation to the challenge of unintended consequences, are those associated with sustainable development and the precautionary principle—with competing interpretations of both becoming major themes of

moral and political deliberations.

Finally, there is the issue of responsibility: How are humans to respond ethically to the power placed in their hands by modern technology? Such a question has personal, professional, and policy dimensions. At the personal level, quantitatively and qualitatively enhanced choices, with expanding knowledge production relevant to such choices (scientific research and consumer reports), place existential pressures on individuals to increase conscious reflection. The principle of free and informed consent appears to require not only that medical professionals inform the subjects of human experimentation about the risks and benefits of their participation but also that medical patients of all sorts become reflective participants in their own treatment—and that consumers of any technological goods or services weigh multiple costs and benefits as if they were engineers designing their lives. Are such demands both reasonable and possible?

At the professional level, scientists and engineers, falling under similar existential pressures to expand the conscious exercise of responsibility, have formulated codes of conduct for technical practices related to both research and design. In engineering ethics, for instance, the primacy of protecting public safety, health, and welfare is now a well-established general principle. In what sense, however, are engineers qualified to make such judgments? Does technical expertise provide any basis for determining appropriate levels of public safety, health, or welfare?

Finally, at the level of public policy, responsibility takes two closely related forms. Policy for science and technology seeks out the best ways to fund or regulate developments in science and technology. Science and technology for policy searches for the best ways to bring scientific knowledge to bear on political decision making while making technological power most effectively available for political action. Responding to and exemplifying these dual drives scientific and technological research agencies such as the U.S. National Science Foundation, the Human Genome Project, and the National Nanotechnology Initiative have created specific programs to promote ethical reflection on the creation and use of new scientific knowledge and technological products, processes, and systems.

Again speaking broadly, it is possible to identify two fundamental attitudes toward this spectrum of ethical and political issues. One attempts to explain modern technology as rooted in human nature and culture (engineering philosophy of technology), the other interprets modern technical methods and effects as deformations of human action, however preferable in particular instances to those of nature (humanities philosophy of technology). The engineering approach in its expansive confidence calls in one way or another for more and better technology, the humanities approach in its restrictive questioning for some relinquishment or delimitation of technology. The tensions between such alternative attitudes repeatedly come to the fore in analysis of such key concepts as privacy, risk, participation, and the environment, and in assessments of new opportunities in virtual reality construction, biotechnological design, and nanotechnological research and development.

There is also a tendency for the engineering school to make alliances with the Anglo American analytic tradition in philosophy, and for the humanities school to find a convenient partner in the European phenomenological tradition. The former, viewing technology as a complex amalgam of artifacts, knowledge, activities, and volitions, each with diverse structural features scattered across historical epochs and societal contexts, prefers to deal on a case-by-case basis with one technology after another. The latter strives for bolder generalizations about technology as a whole, at least across each historical or societal context. From the phenomenological perspective, too great an emphasis on individual technological rocks can obscure the extent to which such geological spec-

imens are constituents of mountains extended in both space and time.

## Metaphysical Issues

The attempt to speak of technology rather than technologies rests on an attempt to identify some inner or essential feature of diverse technologies. This hypothetical essential feature may be termed technicity. One can then immediately note that, before the modern period, technicity was at a minimum scattered throughout and heavily embedded within a diversity of human engagements, and indeed that philosophy took a stand against any separating of technicity from its embedding context. Plato's argument in the *Gorgias* is precisely an argument against disembedding *techne* from social or cultural contexts and traditions, not to mention ideas of the good. For Aristotle, *techne* is an intellectual virtue, and thus properly subordinate to the flourishing of human nature. What is distinctive about modern philosophy, by contrast, is the attempt, beginning with Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and René Descartes to disembed technics from particular human activities, to study them in systematic ways, and thus to create technology.

John Stuart Mill in his *Logic* (1843) already assumes the success of this disembedding project when he explains the practical value of science. For Mill the rationality of any art is grounded in a corresponding science. The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and, having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations or circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. (*logic*, book 6, ch. 12, section 2)

Remarkably, Mill's analysis does not recognize art (or traditional technics) as including any knowledge of means. Art is concerned solely with determining an end, to achieve which it deploys appropriate means as determined by science. It is the scientific study of means that constitutes what even during Mill's lifetime was coming to be called technology. Modern technicity may thus be defined as a systematic or scientific study of means that suspends examination of ends. Does such an approach have distinctive social and cultural implications, independent of any particular technologies and contexts?

Among the first philosophers to analyze such a disembedding of means from ends was Ortega. In the English translation of his *La rebelión de las masas* (1929), Ortega writes that "[t]hree principles have made possible [the] new world: liberal democracy, scientific experiment, and industrialism. The two latter may be summed up in one word: technicism" (1939, p. 56). Ortega himself actually uses the word *técnica*, but the term technicism is significant, and this in fact constitutes one of its first English occurrences with this sense. (Before the 1930s, technicism simply meant excessive reliance on technical terminology. The previous decade Max Scheler used the cognate *Technizismus* to name the industrial ethos.)

As part of a further "Meditación de la técnica" (1939), Ortega outlined a historical movement from the chance inventions that characterize archaic societies, through the trial-and-error techniques of the artisan, to the scientific technologies of the engineer. According to Ortega, the difference between these three forms of making lies in the way they create the means to realize a human project—that is, in the kind of technicity involved. In the first epoch, technical discoveries are accidental; in the second, techniques emerge from intuitive skill. In both instances they are preserved and elaborated within the confines of myth and craft traditions. In the third, however, the engineer

undertakes scientific studies of technics and, as a result, "prior to the possession of any [particular] technics, already possesses technics [itself]" (Obras, 5:369). It is this third type of technicity that constitutes modern technicism (and here Ortega himself uses the term *tecnicismo*).

But technicism, understood here as the science of how to generate all possible technical means, disembedded from any lived making and using, creates a unique challenge. Before the modern period human beings were commonly limited by circumstances, within which they inherited a way of life and the technical means to achieve it. Now, however, they are given in advance many possible ways to live and a plethora of technical means but little in the way of a substantive vision of human flourishing. "To be an engineer and only an engineer is to be everything possibly and nothing actually," all form and no content (Obras, 5:366). There is in the midst of modern technicism what Ortega describes as a hidden ethical challenge to imagination and choice. Insofar as people can be anything they want, why should they take the trouble to be any one thing at all? Will not some extranatural motivation (not to say fanaticism) not be needed to help Buridan's cyborgs select among (rejecting some) the equally liberal options that surround them?

According to Heidegger modern technology is a challenge not just to ethics but to ontology. For Heidegger (1954) scientific technics constitutes a new kind of truth: truth not as correspondence, not as coherence, and not as functional knowledge, but as disclosure or revelation. Technology discloses Being in a historically unique way: as *Bestand* or resource. A castle constructed with traditional technics on a cliff overlooking the Rhine makes more fully present than before the stone that invests the landscape with its particular contours, while it sets off the curve of the river against the backdrop of its walls and towers. It invites people to settle near and experience the particularities of this place. By contrast, a poured concrete, hydroelectric power station compels the river to become an energy resource and converts the landscape into, not a place of human habitation, but a machine for the generation of electricity. It encourages people to draw on its energy for multitasking business in production and travel. The distinctly modern technicity that manifests itself in the disclosure of nature as resource Heidegger names *Gestell* (enframing).

*Gestell* at first sight appears to be a human work, something human beings in the course of history have chosen to practice for their own benefit. It gives them power over nature. However, as it digitalizes nature physically (dimensioned vectors), geographically (longitude and latitude), chemically (molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles), and biologically (genetic mapping), it also transforms language (computer signal processing) and art (pixel imaging) so that impact outstrips original intentions. Hidden in the midst of *Gestell* is Being as event, that which lets this dominating transformation come to pass. *Gestell* is at once destiny and, precisely because it appears so clearly to be the result of a human activity, an obscuring of the transhuman imparting of a destiny that is its ground.

In the same year that Heidegger's *Die Frage nach der Technik* appeared, Jacques Ellul published *La Technique*, later translated into English as *The Technological Society* (1954). For Ellul, too, what is happening is something transhuman, or at least transindividual, the emergence of a new social order in which people give themselves up to the systematic analysis of actions into constituent means that are then evaluated in terms of output/input metrics. The scientific analysis of techniques extends technoscientific methods into economics, politics, education, leisure, and elsewhere creating what he calls the technical milieu. After the milicux of nature and of society, technology is the third great epoch of human history. Ellul's characterology of this new reality—describing its rationality, artificiality, self-directedness, self-augmentation, indivisibility, universality, and autonomy—reveals the technical milieu as something more than simply human. Although more

hospitable to human biological existence, it nevertheless also manifests certain inexorable laws of artifice (such as those of economics). Just as the natural milieu once provided a framework for human life, a differentiated but overriding order to which human beings adapted in a variety of ways, so now a much more homogeneous technical milieu presents itself, not simply as a realm of freedom that human beings have constructed, but as that which also constructs and constrains them even when they fail to recognize it.

### **From Metaphysics to Ethics**

Efforts to make phenomenological metaphysics fruitful for ethics can be found in the work of two German American philosophers, Hans Jonas and Albert Borgmann. Jonas's (1966) work begins with a fundamental inquiry into the phenomenon of life, arguing that in the organic world there emerges a new kind of being. For Jonas the key features of human inner life (introspection and subjectivity) are present in embryo in the most primitive organisms, and in metabolism there emerges the primordial form of freedom. In metabolism a detachment enters the world insofar as being becomes distinguished from physical identity. However, in the materialism of modern science this uniqueness is easily overlooked. Adopting a teleological approach to ontology, Jonas argues that only from the perspective of the more fully realized freedom manifest in humans can the reality of the organic as a whole be recognized for what it is. On this ontological basis Jonas (1984) undertakes an extended philosophical scrutiny of the technological projects of nuclear weapons and biomedical health care. In the presence of technical powers to end or alter human life Jonas reformulates the Kantian categorical imperative as: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life" (p. 11). Such a reformulation of the fundamental deontological principle constitutes an attempt at the re-embedding of technology in moral philosophy.

More broadly and in sustained dialogue with a range of discussions about the place of technology in human affairs, Borgmann's (1984) work draws a fundamental distinction between two kinds of artifice and action. On the one side are technological devices that obscure their inner functions to deliver without engagement commodities for easy and effortless consumption. This constitutes what Borgmann calls the device paradigm, an ideal type at which the products and processes of modern technology aim. On the other are focal things and practices whose workings are more transparent and that demand of their users some reordering of interests if they are to be used. The model for the first is the central heating system that only needs its thermostat set, for the second the wood-fired hearth.

In a series of studies arguing the nondeterminist importance of material culture to ethics and politics, Borgmann (1992, 1999) calls on citizens in the high-tech world to reconsider their ways of life to develop a deeper sense for the possibilities of human flourishing in the midst of liberal options for self-determined self-fulfillment. For Borgmann the ideal is not a forced return to the past but a voluntary recovery of the commanding presence of things in the technological present. As he concludes in a volume devoted to the critical assessment of his thought:

Science makes reality ever more transparent, and technology makes it more and more controllable. But at the end of our inquiries and manipulations there is always something that reflects rather than yields to our searchlight and presents itself as given to us rather than constructed by us. It is intelligible not because we have seen through it or designed it but because it speaks to us [in the form of] an unforthinkable and uncontrollable reality. (Higgs, Lights, and Strong 2000, pp. 368–

369).

It is such a reality to which human flourishing is ultimately in thrall even in the midst of its highest exercises of insight and mastery.

### **Epistemological Issues**

Epistemology has often been treated as a stepchild in the philosophy of technology family of philosophical interests. Technological forms of knowledge are commonly thought to be derivative of scientific knowledge, so that any attempt to bring the theory of knowledge to bear in the examination of technology has regularly been part of a discussion of the relation between technology and science. At the same time this common privileging of science has been philosophically criticized, although the criticism has taken different forms in the European phenomenological and in the Anglo American analytic philosophical traditions.

From a phenomenological perspective the argument has been that technology is not so much applied science as science is theoretical technology. In his historico-philosophical studies of the scientific and technological revolutions of the seventeenth century and after, for instance, Jonas (1974) argues that from its origins modern science was animated by a technological interest that gives it an inherently applicable or technological character. Related studies of the dependency of science on technological instrumentation, from Galileo's telescopes to particle accelerators and PCR (polymerase chain reaction) machines suggest that science might even be described as applied technology. This approach to the epistemology of technology has parallels with the pragmatic tradition of conceiving scientific knowledge in fundamentally instrumentalist terms. The Venezuelan phenomenologist Ernesto Mayz Vallenilla (2004) likewise offers a more Husserlian-based but complementary effort to describe the unique epistemological features of what he calls meta-technical instruments.

From the analytic perspective there has been more of an effort to identify distinctive types of knowledge operative in technology. Summarizing the results from such an approach, Mitcham (1994) draws attention to at least four types of distinctly technological knowledge: sensorimotor skills, technical maxims (including rules of thumb and recipes), descriptive laws or technological rules (which take an "if A then B" form), and technological theories (either grounded in scientific theory or bringing scientific method to bear on human-technology interactions). German philosophers of technology such as Hans Lenk, Gunter Ropohl, and Bernhard Irrgang, all associated with the VDI promotion of philosophical reflection on technology, are pursuing efforts to develop epistemological analyses of the engineering sciences. And Joseph C. Pitt (2000) makes a determined effort to identify the distinctive forms of technological and engineering knowledge, drawing especially on the careful analyses of aeronautical engineering history by Walter G. Vincenti (1990) to argue that engineering design possesses its own cognitive features.

Important issues for any theory of technological knowledge remain the characterization of whatever basic epistemic criteria might be analogous to those operative in science such as truth, simplicity, coherence, and explanation. There may be distinctive technological forms of such criteria. But two major candidates for uniquely technological criteria are effectiveness and efficiency. Certainly, many propositions of engineering knowledge are assessed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency more than truth or explanation. A further epistemological challenge is to explicate the distinctive character of models and modeling in the technological and engineering contexts. The relevance of such epistemological analyses nevertheless remains of problematic relevance to ethics and politics.

## **Empirical, Anthropological, and Policy Turns**

Concern for the adequacy of metaphysical definitions of technology—and perhaps exhaustion with endless ethical and political difficulties (with hopes that new approaches might prove more fruitful)—has given rise to what has been called an empirical turn in the philosophy of technology. As advocated by the Dutch philosophers Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, this program argues that "philosophical reflection should be based on empirically adequate descriptions reflecting the richness and complexity of modern technology" (2000, p. xix) and promotes a greater analysis of what technologists and engineers actually do over any extended exegesis of texts, whether those of other philosophers of technology or even engineers and technicians. As such, a natural alliance has developed with social constructivist approaches to science, technology, and society studies in the pursuit of richer metaphysical or ontological understandings of artifacts, epistemological analyses of technical practice, and even ethical decision making among professional engineers. From the perspective of Jozef Keulartz et al. (2002), this also provides a solid opportunity for advancing a pragmatist ethics for technological culture.

Two topics of prominence in the empirical turn from the interpretation of texts to the interpretation of technical artifacts have been those of design and function. Design is often identified as the essence of engineering, and there have been numerous technical studies of design methodology. At the same time engineering design must be distinguished from aesthetic design as well as design by means of evolutionary processes in nature. Even within the realm of engineering design, studies such as those by Vincenti (1990), Louis Bucciarelli (1994), and Richard Buchanan and Victor Margolin (1995) have very different implications for assessing proposals for consumer, green, sustainable, or participatory design. With regard to technical functions, analyses have focused on the relation between functions in organisms, social institutions, and artifacts; on the relation between functional and physical descriptions of artifacts; and on the extent to which functions are determined by design or use.

A different sense for new beginnings has emerged in relation to prospects in the development of the new fields of bioengineering and biotechnology—especially when applied to humans. The leader in this case is the medical scientist and philosopher Leon Kass, the chair of the Bush administration's President's Council on Bioethics. In his turn Kass has tried to go outside the boundaries of standard bioethics in at least four ways: to promote thinking that enrolls more than professional bioethicists, that does more than piecemeal or specialized analyses, that references human nature as a norm, and that builds toward policy results. As in *Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness* (2003), Kass et al. at the council seek to raise broad issues about what it means to be human in the presence of possibilities for the reengineering not just of the external world but of the inner world of human birth, growth, and experience. He has been especially concerned about the possibilities for the deformation of humanity not from above by totalitarian governmental use of technology but from below by positive consumer endorsement of behaviors that would from a traditional perspective be assessed as temptations.

Beyond the policy-oriented work of Kass and colleagues, policy questions have become increasingly central not just as aspects of ethical responsibility but as issues in their own right. What precisely is technological policy, as opposed to technological politics? Does policy decision making take different forms in relation to science and to engineering? How are policies to be formulated and assessed?

The extent to which these turns in the philosophy of technology will define its future are questions that the professional community must examine. Any such examination will also need to include a

self-criticism that considers the special responsibilities of a regionalization in philosophy that, more than the philosophy of science or of art, has as part of its heritage public responsibilities and a large measure of ethical concerns.

### **(The Nature of) Technology?**

The question, What is technology? or What is the nature of technology?, is both a central question that philosophers of technology aim to answer and a question the answer to which determines the subject matter of philosophy of technology. One can think of philosophy of technology as the philosophical examination of technology, in the same way as the philosophy of science is the philosophical examination of science and the philosophy of biology the philosophical study of a particular subdomain of science. However, in this respect the philosophy of technology is in a similar situation as the philosophy of science finds itself in.

Central questions in the philosophy of science have long been what science is, what characterizes science and what distinguishes science from non-science (the demarcation problem). These questions have recently somewhat moved out of focus, however, due to the lack of acceptable answers. Philosophers of science have not been able to satisfactorily explicate the nature of science or to specify any clear-cut criterion by which science could be demarcated from non-science or pseudo-science. As philosopher of science Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2008: 168) wrote: "fact is that at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there is no consensus among philosophers or historians or scientists about the nature of science."

The nature of technology, however, is even less clear than the nature of science. As philosopher of science Marx Wartofsky put it, "'Technology' is unfortunately too vague a term to define a domain; or else, so broad in its scope that what it does define includes too much. For example, one may talk about technology as including all artifacts, that is, all things made by human beings. Since we 'make' language, literature, art, social organizations, beliefs, laws and theories as well as tools and machines, and their products, such an approach covers too much" (Wartofsky, 1979: 176). More clarity on this issue can be achieved by looking at the history of the term (for example, Nye, 2006: Chapter 1; Misa, 2009; Mitcham & Schatzberg, 2009) as well as at recent suggestions to define it.

Jacob Bigelow, an early author on technology, conceived of it as a specific domain of knowledge: technology was "an account [...] of the principles, processes, and nomenclatures of the more conspicuous arts" (Bigelow, 1829, quoted in Misa, 2009: 9; Mitcham & Schatzberg, 2009: 37). In a similar manner, Günter Ropohl (1990: 112; 2009: 31) defined "technology" as the 'science of technics' ("Wissenschaft von der Technik", where "Technik" denotes the domain of crafts and other areas of manufacturing, making, etc.). The important aspect of Bigelow's and Ropohl's definitions is that "technology" does not denote a domain of human activity (such as making or designing) or a domain of objects (technological innovations, such as solar panels), but a domain of knowledge. In this respect, their usage of the term is continuous with the meaning of the Greek "techne" (Section 1.a).

A review of a number of definitions of "technology" (Li-Hua, 2009) shows that there is not much overlap between the various definitions that can be found in the literature. Many definitions conceive of technology in Bigelow's and Ropohl's sense as a particular body of knowledge (thus making the philosophy of technology a branch of epistemology), but do not agree on what kind of knowledge it is supposed to be. On some definitions it is seen as firm-specific knowledge about design and production processes, while others conceive of it as knowledge about natural phenom-

ena and laws of nature that can be used to satisfy human needs and solve human problems (a view which closely resembles Francis Bacon's).

Philosopher of science Mario Bunge presented a view of the nature of technology along the latter lines (Bunge, 1966). According to Bunge, technology should be understood as constituting a particular subdomain of the sciences, namely "applied science", as he called it. Note that Bunge's thesis is not that technology is applied science in the sense of the application of scientific theories, models, etc. for practical purposes. Although a view of technology as being "just the totality of means for applying science" (Scharff, 2009: 160) remains present among the general public, most engineers and philosophers of technology agree that technology cannot be conceived of as the application of science in this sense. Bunge's view is that technology is the subdomain of science characterized by a particular aim, namely application. According to Bunge, natural science and applied science stand side by side as two distinct modes of doing science: while natural science is scientific investigation aimed at the production of reliable knowledge about the world, technology is scientific investigation aimed at application. Both are full-blown domains of science, in which investigations are carried out and knowledge is produced (knowledge about the world and how it can be applied to concrete problems, respectively). The difference between the two domains lies in the nature of the knowledge that is produced and the aims that are in focus. Bunge's statement that "technology is applied science" should thus be read as "technology is science for the purpose of application" and not as "technology is the application of science."

Other definitions reflect still different conceptions of technology. In the definition accepted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), technology not only includes specific knowledge, but also machinery, production systems and skilled human labor force. Li-Hua (2009) follows the UNCTAD definition by proposing a four-element definition of "technology" as encompassing technique (that is, a specific technique for making a particular product), specific knowledge (required for making that product; he calls this technology in the strict sense), the organization of production and the end product itself. Friedrich Rapp, in contrast, defined "technology" even more broadly as a domain of human activity: "in simplest terms, technology is the reshaping of the physical world for human purposes" (Rapp, 1989: xxiii).

Thus, attempts to define "technology" in such a way that this definition would express the nature of technology, or only some of the principal characteristics of technology, have not led to any generally accepted view of what technology is. In this context, historian of science and technology Thomas J. Misa observed that historians of technology have so far resisted defining "technology" in the same way as "no scholarly historian of art would feel the least temptation to define "art", as if that complex expression of human creativity could be pinned down by a few well-chosen words" (Misa, 2009: 8). The suggestion clearly is that technology is far too complex and too diverse a domain to define or to be able to talk about the nature of technology. Nordmann (2008: 14) went even further by arguing that not only can the term "technology" not be defined, but also it should not be defined. According to Nordmann, we should accept that technology is too diverse a domain to be caught in a compact definition. Accordingly, instead of conceiving of "technology" as the name of a particular fixed collection of phenomena that can be investigated, Nordmann held that "technology" is best understood as what Grunwald & Julliard (2005) called a "reflective concept". According to the latter authors, "technology" should simply be taken to mean whatever we mean when we use the term. While this clearly cannot be an adequate definition of the term, it still can serve as a basis for reflections on technology in that it gives us at least some sense of what it is that we are reflection on. Using "technology" in this extremely loose manner allows us to connect reflections on very different issues and phenomena as being about – in the broadest sense –

the same thing. In this way, “technology” can serve as the core concept of the field of philosophy of technology.

Philosophy of technology faces the challenge of clarifying the nature of a particular domain of phenomena without being able to determine the boundaries of that domain. Perhaps the best way out of this situation is to approach the question on a case-by-case basis, where the various cases are connected by the fact that they all involve technology in the broadest possible sense of the term. Rather than asking what technology is, and how the nature of technology is to be characterized, it might be better to examine the natures of particular instances of technology and in so doing achieve more clarity about a number of local phenomena. In the end, the results from various case studies might to some extent converge – or they might not.

## **Dominance**

**Theory of Technology Dominance** Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s) TTD has two dependent factors:

1. Reliance - The extent to which an individual applies the intelligent decision aid and integrates the recommendations of that aid into his or her judgment.
2. Dominance - The state of decision making where the intelligent decision aid, as opposed to its user, takes primary control of a decision making process.

## **Main independent construct(s)/factor(s)**

TTD has four independent factors:

1. Task Experience - The level of experience a decision maker has regarding the completion of a task as well as the extent to which the decision maker has developed strategies for completing that particular task.
2. Task Complexity - The extent to which the cognitive abilities of the decision maker are challenged with completing a certain task. (In psychology this is often termed Task Difficulty.)
3. Decision Aid Familiarity - The extent to which the decision maker is comfortable with the intelligent decision aid based on prior experience and/or significant training with the aid (or similar aids).
4. Cognitive Fit – The extent to which the cognitive processes used with the decision aid to complete a task match the cognitive processes normally applied by the decision maker using the aid.

## **Concise description of theory**

The Theory of Technology Dominance (TTD) posits that a decision maker may become reliant on an intelligent decision aid under two conditions:

1. The decision maker is low in task experience.
2. The decision maker is high in all factors (task experience, task complexity, decision aid familiarity, and cognitive fit).

According to TDD, reliance on an intelligent decision aid can create a long-term, de-skilling effect in the user as well as hinder that user’s growth of knowledge and advancement in his or her domain. Furthermore, TDD states that a negative relationship exists between the user’s expertise level and the risk of poor decision making when the expertise of the user and intelligent decision aid are

mismatched. When the expertise of the user and the aid are matched, however, a positive relationship exists between reliance on the aid and improved decisions making.

Conceptually, TTD can be divided into three sections which are built on a total of eight testable propositions. The three sections are:

- Section 1: Addresses the factors that determine the likelihood that a decision maker will rely on an intelligent decision aid.
- Section 2: Addresses the conditions under which a decision maker is vulnerable to being dominated by the intelligent decision aid.
- Section 3: Addresses the long-term impact of intelligent decision aid use on de-skilling domain experts and impeding epistemological evolution.
- The eight testable propositions are (Arnold & Sutton, 1998):

### **Section 1 - Factors influencing reliance**

- Proposition 1: "When users have a low to moderate level of experience, there is a negative relationship between task experience and reliance on a decision aid."
- Proposition 2: "There is a positive relationship between task complexity and reliance on a decision aid."
- Proposition 3: "When task experience and perceived task complexity are high, there is a positive relationship between decision aid familiarity and reliance on the decision aid."
- Proposition 4: "When task experience and perceived task complexity are high, there is a positive relationship between cognitive fit and reliance on the decision aid."


### **Section 2 – Conditions favorable for dominance**

- Proposition 5: "When the expertise of the user and intelligent decision aid are mismatched, there is a negative relationship between the user's expertise level and the risk of poor decision making."
- Proposition 6: "When the expertise level of the user and intelligent decision aid are matched, there is a positive relationship between reliance on the aid and improved decisions making."

### **Section 3 – Long-term effects**

- Proposition 7: "There is a positive relationship between continued use of an intelligent decision aid and the de-skilling of auditors' abilities for the domain in which the aid is used."
- Proposition 8: "There is negative relationship between the broad-based, long-term use of an intelligent decision aid in a given problem domain and the growth in knowledge and advancement of the domain."

### **Diagram/schematic of theory**



Recreated from Arnold and Sutton (1998)

## Power and Social inequalities

Power and inequality determine the socioeconomic conditions of different classes.

## Key Points

- Social stratification is a concept involving the classification of persons into groups based on shared socioeconomic conditions.
- Conflict theories, such as Marxism, focus on the inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies.
- Social stratification has been shown to cause many social problems, including homicide, infant mortality, obesity, teenage pregnancies, emotional depression, teen suicide, and a high prison population.
- In modern Western societies, stratification is broadly organized into three main layers: upper class, middle class, and lower class.
- Conflict theories, such as Marxism, point to the inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies.
- In Marxist theory, the capitalist mode of production consists of two main economic parts: the

- substructure and the Superstructure. Marx
- Social stratification has been shown to cause many social problems.

## Key Terms

- **Marxist Theory:** An economic and sociopolitical worldview and method of socioeconomic inquiry centered upon a materialist interpretation of history, a dialectical view of social change, and an analysis–critique of the development of capitalism.
- **Conflict Theories:** Perspectives in social science that emphasize the social, political, or material inequality of a social group, critique the broad socio-political system, or otherwise detract from structural functionalism and ideological conservatism.
- **Weberian:** Of or relating to Max Weber (1864–1920), influential German sociologist and political economist.

## Power and Inequality

In social science and politics, power is the ability to influence the behavior of people. The term authority is often used for power perceived as legitimate by the social structure. Power can be seen as evil or unjust, but the exercise of power is accepted as endemic to (or regularly found in) humans as social beings. French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984) saw power as “a complex strategic situation in a given society social setting”. Power may be held through authority, social class (material wealth), personal charisma, expertise or knowledge, persuasion, force (such as law or violence), and a myriad of other dynamics.

Because power operates both relationally and reciprocally, sociologists speak of the balance of power between people in a relationship. All parties to all relationships have some power; the sociological examination of power concerns itself with discovering and describing the relative strengths – equal or unequal, stable or subject to periodic change. Given that power is not innate and can be granted to others, to acquire power you must possess or control a form of power currency (such as wealth, social status, authority, etc.).

## Social inequality and stratification

Social inequality refers to relational processes in society that have the effect of limiting or harming a group’s social status, social class, and social circle. Areas of social inequality include access to voting rights, freedom of speech and assembly, the extent of property rights and access to education, health care, quality housing, traveling, transportation, vacationing and other social goods and services.

The reasons for social inequality can vary, but are often broad and far reaching. Social inequality can emerge through a society’s understanding of appropriate gender roles, or through the prevalence of social stereotyping. They can also be established through discriminatory legislation. Social inequalities exist between ethnic or religious groups, classes and countries, making the concept a global phenomenon. In sociology, social stratification is a concept involving the classification of persons into groups based on shared socioeconomic conditions; it is a relational set of inequalities with economic, social, political and ideological dimensions. Theories of social stratification are based on four basic principles:

- Social stratification is a trait of society, not simply a reflection of individual differences.

- Social stratification carries over from generation to generation.
- Social stratification is universal but variable.
- Social stratification involves not just inequality but beliefs as well.

## **Classifications of stratification**

In modern Western societies, stratification is broadly organized into three main layers: upper class, middle class, and lower class. The upper class in modern societies is the social class composed of the wealthiest members of society, who also wield the greatest political power. The upper class is generally contained within the wealthiest 1–2 percent of the population, with wealth passed from generation to generation. In Weberian socioeconomic terms, the middle class is the broad group of people in contemporary society who fall socioeconomically between the working class and upper class. The common measures of what constitutes middle class vary significantly between cultures. The working class describes the group of people employed in lower tier jobs, often including those in unemployment or otherwise possessing below-average incomes. Working classes are mainly found in industrialized economies and in urban areas of non-industrialized economies.

## **Social Stratification and Marxism**

Conflict theories, such as Marxism, focus on the inaccessibility of resources and lack of social mobility found in stratified societies. Many sociological theorists have criticized the extent to which the working classes are unlikely to advance socioeconomically; the wealthy tend to hold political power which they use to exploit the proletariat inter-generationally.

In Marxist theory, the capitalist mode of production consists of two main economic parts: the substructure and the superstructure. Marx saw classes as defined by people's relationship to the means of production in two basic ways: either they own productive property or they labor for others. The base comprehends the forces and relations of production: employer-employee work conditions, the technical division of labor, and property relations—into which people enter to produce the necessities and amenities of life. These relations determine society's other relationships and ideas, which are described as its superstructure. The superstructure of a society includes its culture, institutions, political power structures, roles, rituals, and state.

Social stratification has been shown to cause many social problems. A comprehensive study of major world economies revealed that homicide, infant mortality, obesity, teenage pregnancies, emotional depression, teen suicide, and prison population all correlate with higher social inequality.

## **There are three common characteristics of stratified systems:**

1. Rankings apply to social categories of people who share a common characteristic without necessarily interacting or identifying with each other. The process of being ranked can be changed by the person being ranked, and it can differ based on race, gender, and social class.
2. People's life experiences and opportunities depend on their social category. This characteristic can be changed by the amount of work a person can put into their interests. The use of resources can influence others.
3. The ranks of different social categories change slowly over time. This has occurred frequently in the United States ever since the American revolution—the U.S. Constitution has been altered several times to specify rights for everyone.

## **Democratization of technology**

**Democratization of technology** refers to the process by which access to technology rapidly continues to become more accessible to more people. New technologies and improved user experiences have empowered those outside of the technical industry to access and use technological products and services. At an increasing scale, consumers have greater access to use and purchase technologically sophisticated products, as well as to participate meaningfully in the development of these products. Industry innovation and user demand have been associated with more affordable, user-friendly products. This is an ongoing process, beginning with the development of mass production and increasing dramatically as digitization became commonplace.

Thomas Friedman argued that the era of globalization has been characterized by the democratization of technology, democratization of finance, and democratization of information. Technology has been critical in the latter two processes, facilitating the rapid expansion of access to specialized knowledge and tools, as well as changing the way that people view and demand such access.

## **History**

Scholars and social critics often cite the invention of the printing press as a major invention that changed the course of history. The force of the printing press rested not in its impact on the printing industry or inventors, but on its ability to transmit information to a broader public by way of mass production. This event is so widely recognized because of its social impact – as a democratizing force. The printing press is often seen as the historical counterpart to the Internet.

After the development of the Internet in 1969, its use remained limited to communications between scientists and within government, although use of email and boards gained popularity among those with access. It did not become a popular means of communication until the 1990s. In 1993 the US federal government opened the Internet to commerce and the creation of HTML formed the basis for universal accessibility.

## **Major innovations**

The Internet has played a critical role in modern life as a typical feature of most Western households, and has been key in the democratization of knowledge. It not only constitutes arguably the most critical innovation in this trend thus far; it has also allowed users to gain knowledge of and access to other technologies. Users can learn of new developments more quickly, and purchase high-tech products otherwise only actively marketed to recognized experts. Some have argued that cloud computing is having a major effect by allowing users greater access through mobility and pay-as-you-use capacity.

Social media has also empowered and emboldened users to become contributors and critics of technological developments. The open-source model allows users to participate directly in development of software, rather than indirect participation, through contributing opinions. By being shaped by the user, development is directly responsive to user demand and can be obtained for free or at a low cost. In a comparable trend, arduino and littleBits have made electronics more accessible to users of all backgrounds and ages. The development of 3D printers has the potential to increasingly democratize production.

## **Cultural impact**

This trend is linked to the spread of knowledge of and ability to perform high-tech tasks, challeng-

ing previous conceptions of expertise. Widespread access to technology, including lower costs, was critical to the transition to the new economy. Similarly, democratization of technology was also fuelled by this economic transition, which produced demands for technological innovation and optimism in technology-driven progress.

Since the 1980s, a spreading constructivist conception of technology has emphasized that the social and technical domains are critically intertwined. Scholars have argued that technology is non-neutral, defined contextually and locally by a certain relationship with society.

Andrew Feenberg, a central thinker in the philosophy of technology, argued that democratizing technology means expanding technological design to include alternative interests and values. When successful in doing so, this can be a tool for increasing inclusiveness. This also suggests an important participatory role for consumers if technology is to be truly democratic. Feenberg asserts that this must be achieved by consumer intervention in a liberated design process. Improved access to specialized knowledge and tools has been associated with an increase in the "do it yourself" (DIY) trend. This has also been associated with consumerization, whereby personal or privately owned devices and software are also used for business purposes. Some have argued that this is linked to reduced dependence on traditional information technology departments.

Astra Taylor, the author of the book *The People's Platform: Taking Back Power and Culture in the Digital Age*, argues, "The promotion of Internet-enabled amateurism is a lazy substitute for real equality of opportunity."

### **Industry impact**

In some ways, democratization of technology has strengthened this industry. Markets have broadened and diversified. Consumer feedback and input is available at a very low or no cost. However, related industries are experiencing decreased demand for qualified professionals as consumers are able to fill more of their demands themselves. Users of a range of types and status have access to increasingly similar technology. Because of the decreased costs and expertise necessary to use products and software, professionals (e.g. in the audio industry) may experience loss of work.

In some cases, technology is accessible but sufficiently complex that most users without specialized training are able to operate it without necessarily understanding how it works. Additionally, the process of consumerization has led to an influx in the number of devices in businesses and accessing private networks that IT departments cannot control or access. While this can lead to lowered operating costs and increased innovation, it is also associated with security concerns that most businesses are unable to address at the pace of the spread of technology.

### **Political impact**

At a demonstration at BMVIT, banners read, "Democracy needs anonymity – stop data retention" (left) and "Liberty dies with security" (right). Some scholars have argued that technological change will bring about a third wave of democracy. The Internet has been recognized for its role in promoting increased citizen advocacy and government transparency. Jesse Chen, a leading thinker in democratic engagement technologies, distinguishes the democratizing effects of technology from democracy itself. Chen has argued that, while the Internet may have democratizing effects, the Internet alone cannot deliver democracy at all levels of society unless technologies are purposely designed for the nuances of democracy, specifically the engagement of large groups of people in

between elections in and beyond government.

The spread of the Internet and other forms of technology has led to increased global connectivity. Many scholars believe that it has been associated in the developing world not only with increased Western influence, but also with the spread of democracy through increased communication, efficiency, and access to information. Scholars have drawn associations between the level of technological connectedness and democracy in many nations.

Technology can enhance democracy in the developed world as well. In addition to increased communication and transparency, some electorates have implemented online voting to accommodate an increased number of citizens.

### **Public evaluation of science and technology**

Although there was much technological progress in the Roman empire and during the Middle Ages, philosophical reflection on technology did not grow at a corresponding rate. Comprehensive works such as Vitruvius' *De architectura* (first century BC) and Agricola's *De re metallica* (1556) paid much attention to practical aspects of technology but little to philosophy.

In the realm of scholastic philosophy, there was an emergent appreciation for the mechanical arts. They were generally considered to be born of—and limited to—the mimicry of nature. This view was challenged when alchemy was introduced in the Latin West around the mid-twelfth century. Some alchemical writers such as Roger Bacon were willing to argue that human art, even if learned by imitating natural processes, could successfully reproduce natural products or even surpass them (Newman 2004). The result was a philosophy of technology in which human art was raised to a level of appreciation not found in other writings until the Renaissance. However, the last three decades of the thirteenth century witnessed an increasingly hostile attitude by religious authorities toward alchemy that culminated eventually in the denunciation *Contra alchymistas*, written by the inquisitor Nicholas Eymeric in 1396 (Newman 2004).

The Renaissance led to a greater appreciation of human beings and their creative efforts, including technology. As a result, philosophical reflection on technology and its impact on society increased. Francis Bacon is generally regarded as the first modern author to put forward such reflection. His view, expressed in his fantasy *New Atlantis* (1627), was overwhelmingly positive. This positive attitude lasted well into the nineteenth century, incorporating the first half-century of the industrial revolution.

For example, Karl Marx did not condemn the steam engine or the spinning mill for the vices of the bourgeois mode of production; he believed that ongoing technological innovation were necessary steps toward the more blissful stages of socialism and communism of the future.

A turning point in the appreciation of technology as a socio-cultural phenomenon is marked by Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872), written under the influence of the Industrial Revolution, and Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859). Butler's book gave an account of a fictional country where all machines are banned and the possession of a machine or the attempt to build one is a capital crime. The people of this country had become convinced by an argument that ongoing technical improvements are likely to lead to a 'race' of machines that will replace mankind as the dominant species on earth.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century a critical attitude predominated in philosophical reflection on technology. The representatives of this attitude were, overwhelmingly, schooled in the humanities or the social sciences and had virtually no first-hand knowledge of engineering practice. Whereas Bacon wrote extensively on the method of science and conducted physical experiments himself, Butler, being a clergyman, lacked such first-hand knowledge. Ernst Kapp, who was the first to use the term 'philosophy of technology' in his book *Eine Philosophie der Technik* (1877 [2018]), was a philologist and historian. Most of the authors who wrote critically about technology and its socio-cultural role during the twentieth century were philosophers of a general outlook, such as Martin Heidegger (1954 [1977]), Hans Jonas (1979 [1984]), Arnold Gehlen (1957 [1980]), Günther Anders (1956), and Andrew Feenberg (1999). Others had a background in one of the other humanities or in social science, such as literary criticism and social research in the case of Lewis Mumford (1934), law in the case of Jacques Ellul (1954 [1964]), political science in the case of Langdon Winner (1977, 1980, 1983) and literary studies in the case of Albert Borgmann (1984). The form of philosophy of technology constituted by the writings of these and others has been called by Carl Mitcham (1994) "humanities philosophy of technology", because it takes its point of departure from the social sciences and the humanities rather than from the practice of technology, and it approaches technology accepting "the primacy of the humanities over technologies" (1994: 39), since technology originates from the goals and values of humans.

Humanities philosophers of technology tend to take the phenomenon of technology itself largely for granted; they treat it as a 'black box', a given, a unitary, monolithic, inescapable phenomenon. Their interest is not so much to analyze and understand this phenomenon itself but to grasp its relations to morality (Jonas, Gehlen), politics (Winner), the structure of society (Mumford), human culture (Ellul), the human condition (Hannah Arendt), or metaphysics (Heidegger). In this, these philosophers are almost all openly critical of technology: all things considered, they tend to have a negative judgment of the way technology has affected human society and culture, or at least they single out for consideration the negative effects of technology on human society and culture. This does not necessarily mean that technology itself is pointed out as the principal cause of these negative developments. In the case of Heidegger, in particular, the paramount position of technology in modern society is rather a symptom of something more fundamental, namely a wrongheaded attitude towards Being which has been on the rise for almost 25 centuries. It is therefore questionable whether Heidegger should be considered as a philosopher of technology, although within the traditional view he is considered to be among the most important ones. Much the same could be said about Arendt, in particular her discussion of technology in *The Human Condition* (1958), although her position in the canon of humanities philosophy of technology is not as prominent. To be sure, the work of these founding figures of humanities philosophy of technology has been taken further by a second and third generation of scholars— in particular the work of Heidegger remains an important source of inspiration— but who in doing so have adopted a more neutral rather than overall negative view of technology and its meaning for human life and culture. Notable examples are Ihde (1979, 1993) and Verbeek (2000 [2005]).

In its development, humanities philosophy of technology continues to be influenced not so much by developments in philosophy (e.g., philosophy of science, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind) but by developments in the social sciences and humanities. Although, for example, Ihde and those who take their point of departure with him, position their work as phenomenologist or postphenomenologist, there does not seem to be much interest in either the past or the present of this diffuse notion in philosophy, and in particular not much interest in the far from easy question

to what extent Heidegger can be considered a phenomenologist. Of particular significance has been the emergence of 'Science and Technology Studies' (STS) in the 1980s, which studies from a broad social- scientific perspective how social, political, and cultural values affect scientific research and technological innovation, and how these in turn affect society, politics, and culture. For a detailed treatment Mitcham's 1994 book provides an excellent overview. Olsen, Selinger and Riis (2008) offer a collection of more recent contributions; Scharff and Dusek (2003 [2014]) and Kaplan (2004 [2009]) present comprehensive anthologies of texts from this tradition.

### **A Basic Ambiguity in the Meaning of Technology**

Mitcham contrasts 'humanities philosophy of technology' to 'engineering philosophy of technology', where the latter refers to philosophical views developed by engineers or technologists as "attempts ... to elaborate a technological philosophy" (1994: 17). Mitcham discusses only a handful of people as engineering philosophers of technology, however: Ernst Kapp, Peter Engelmeier, Friedrich Dessauer, and much more briefly Jacques Lafitte, Gilbert Simondon, Hendrik van Riessen, Juan David García Bacca, R. Buckminster Fuller and Mario Bunge. The label raises serious questions, however: several of them hardly classify as 'engineers or technologists' and it is also not very clear how the notion of 'a technological philosophy' should be understood. As philosophers these authors seem all to be rather isolated figures, whose work shows little overlap and who seem to be sharing mainly the absence of a 'working relation' with established philosophical disciplines. It is not so clear what sort of questions and concerns underlie the notion of 'engineering philosophy of technology'. A larger role for systematic philosophy could bring it quite close to some examples of humanities philosophy of technology, for instance the work of Jacques Ellul, where the analyses would be rather similar and the remaining differences would be ones of attitude or appreciation.

In the next section we discuss in more detail a form of philosophy of technology that we consider to occupy, currently, the position of alternative to the humanities philosophy of technology. It emerged in the 1960s and gained momentum in the past fifteen to twenty years. This form of the philosophy of technology, which may be called 'analytic', is not primarily concerned with the relations between technology and society but with technology itself. It expressly does not look upon technology as a 'black box' but as a phenomenon that should be studied in detail. It regards technology perhaps not in its entirety as a practice but as something grounded in a practice, basically the practice of engineering. It analyses this practice, its goals, its concepts and its methods, and it relates its findings to various themes from philosophy.

In focusing on technology as a practice sustained by engineers, similar to the way philosophy of science focuses on the practice of science as sustained by scientists, analytic philosophy of technology could be thought to amount to the philosophy of engineering. Indeed many of the issues related to design, could be singled out as forming the subject matter of the philosophy of engineering. The very title of *Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences* (Meijers 2009), an extensive up-to-date overview, which contains contributions to all of the topics treated in the next section, expresses the view that technology and engineering do not coincide. Which is not to say, however, that the book offers a clear conception of what makes technology different from engineering, or more than engineering. In fact, the existence of humanities philosophy of technology and analytic philosophy of technology next to each other reflects a basic ambiguity in the notion of technology that the philosophical work that has been going on has not succeeded in clarifying. Technology can be said to have two 'cores' or 'dimensions', which can be referred to as instrumentality and productivity. Instrumentality covers the totality of human endeavours to control their lives and their environments by interfering with the world in an instrumental way, by using things in

a purposeful and clever way. Productivity covers the totality of human endeavours to bring new things into existence that can do certain things in a controlled and clever way. For the study of instrumentality, however, it is in principle irrelevant whether or not the things that are made use of in controlling our lives and environments have been made by us first; if we somehow could rely on natural objects to always be available to serve our purposes, the analysis of instrumentality and its consequences for how we live our lives would not necessarily be affected. Likewise, for the analysis of what is involved in the making of artifacts, and how the notion of artifact and of something new being brought into existence are to be understood, it is to a large extent irrelevant how human life, culture and society are changed as a result of the artifacts that are in fact produced. Clearly, humanities philosophy of technology has until now been more attracted by the instrumentality core whereas analytic philosophy of technology has mainly gone for the productivity core. But technology as one of the basic phenomena of modern society, if not the most basic one, clearly is constituted by the processes centering on and involving both cores. It has proved difficult, however, to come to an overarching approach in which the interaction between these two dimensions of technology are adequately dealt with—no doubt partly due to the great differences in philosophical orientation and methodology associated with the two traditions and their separate foci. To improve this situation is arguably the most urgent challenge that the field of philosophy of technology as a whole is facing, since the continuation of the two orientations leading their separate lives threatens its unity and coherence as a discipline in the first place. Notwithstanding its centrality and urgency, the ambiguity noted here seems hardly to be confronted directly in the literature. It is addressed by Lawson (2008, 2017) and by Franssen and Koller (2016).

After presenting the major issues of philosophical relevance in technology and engineering that are studied by analytic philosophers of technology in the next section, we discuss the problems and challenges that technology poses for the society in which it is practiced in the third and final section.

## **Analytic Philosophy of Technology**

**Introduction:** Philosophy of Technology and Philosophy of Science as Philosophies of Practices It may come as a surprise to those new to the topic that the fields of philosophy of science and philosophy of technology show such great differences, given that few practices in our society are as closely related as science and technology. Experimental science is nowadays crucially dependent on technology for the realization of its research set-ups and for gathering and analyzing data. The phenomena that modern science seeks to study could never be discovered without producing them through technology.

Theoretical research within technology has come to be often indistinguishable from theoretical research in science, making engineering science largely continuous with 'ordinary' or 'pure' science. This is a relatively recent development, which started around the middle of the nineteenth century, and is responsible for great differences between modern technology and traditional, craft-like techniques. The educational training that aspiring scientists and engineers receive starts off being largely identical and only gradually diverges into a science or an engineering curriculum. Ever since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, characterized by its two major innovations, the experimental method and the mathematical articulation of scientific theories, philosophical reflection on science has focused on the method by which scientific knowledge is generated, on the reasons for thinking scientific theories to be true, or approximately true, and on the nature of evidence and the reasons for accepting one theory and rejecting another. Hardly ever have philosophers of science posed questions that did not have the community of scientists, their concerns, their aims,

their intuitions, their arguments and choices, as a major target. In contrast it is only recently that the philosophy of technology has discovered the community of engineers.

It might be claimed that it is up to the philosophy of technology, and not the philosophy of science, to target first of all the impact of technology—and with it science—on society and culture, because science affects society only through technology. This, however, will not do. Right from the start of the scientific revolution, science affected human culture and thought fundamentally and directly, not with a detour through technology, and the same is true for later developments such as relativity, atomic physics and quantum mechanics, the theory of evolution, genetics, biochemistry, and the increasingly dominating scientific world view overall. Philosophers of science overwhelmingly give the impression that they leave questions addressing the normative, social and cultural aspects of science gladly to other philosophical disciplines, or to historical studies. There are exceptions, however, and things may be changing; Philip Kitcher, to name but one prominent philosopher of science, has since 2000 written books on the relation of science to politics, ethics and religion (Kitcher 2001, 2011).

There is a major difference between the historical development of modern technology as compared to modern science which may at least partly explain this situation, which is that science emerged in the seventeenth century from philosophy itself. The answers that Galileo, Huygens, Newton, and others gave, by which they initiated the alliance of empiricism and mathematical description that is so characteristic of modern science, were answers to questions that had belonged to the core business of philosophy since antiquity. Science, therefore, kept the attention of philosophers. Philosophy of science is a transformation of epistemology in the light of the emergence of science. The foundational issues—the reality of atoms, the status of causality and probability, questions of space and time, the nature of the quantum world—that were so lively discussed during the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century are an illustration of this close relationship between scientists and philosophers. No such intimacy has ever existed between those same philosophers and technologists; their worlds still barely touch. To be sure, a case can be made that, compared to the continuity existing between natural philosophy and science, a similar continuity exists between central questions in philosophy having to do with human action and practical rationality and the way technology approaches and systematizes the solution of practical problems. To investigate this connection may indeed be considered a major theme for philosophy of technology. This continuity appears only by hindsight, however, and dimly, as the historical development is at most a slow convening of various strands of philosophical thinking on action and rationality, not a development into variety from a single origin. Significantly it is only the academic outsider Ellul who has, in his idiosyncratic way, recognized in technology the emergent single dominant way of answering all questions concerning human action, comparable to science as the single dominant way of answering all questions concerning human knowledge (Ellul 1954 [1964]). But Ellul was not so much interested in investigating this relationship as in emphasizing and denouncing the social and cultural consequences as he saw them. It is all the more important to point out that humanities philosophy of technology cannot be differentiated from analytic philosophy of technology by claiming that only the former is interested in the social environment of technology. There are studies which are rooted in analytic philosophy of science but address specifically the relation of technology to society and culture, and equally the relevance of social relations to practices of technology, without taking an evaluative stand with respect to technology; an example is B. Preston 2012.

## **The Relationship Between Technology and Science**

The close relationship between the practices of science and technology may easily keep the important differences between the two from view. The predominant position of science in the philosophical field of vision made it difficult for philosophers to recognize that technology merits special attention for involving issues that do not emerge in science. This view resulting from this lack of recognition is often presented, perhaps somewhat dramatically, as coming down to a claim that technology is 'merely' applied science.

A questioning of the relation between science and technology was the central issue in one of the earliest discussions among analytic philosophers of technology. In 1966, in a special issue of the journal *Technology and Culture*, Henryk Skolimowski argued that technology is something quite different from science (Skolimowski 1966). As he phrased it, science concerns itself with what is, whereas technology concerns itself with what is to be. A few years later, in his well-known book *The Sciences of the Artificial* (1969), Herbert Simon emphasized this important distinction in almost the same words, stating that the scientist is concerned with how things are but the engineer with how things ought to be. Although it is difficult to imagine that earlier philosophers were blind to this difference in orientation, their inclination, in particular in the tradition of logical empiricism, to view knowledge as a system of statements may have led to a conviction that in technology no knowledge claims play a role that cannot also be found in science. The study of technology, therefore, was not expected to pose new challenges nor hold surprises regarding the interests of analytic philosophy.

In contrast, Mario Bunge (1966) defended the view that technology is applied science, but in a subtle way that does justice to the differences between science and technology. Bunge acknowledges that technology is about action, but an action heavily underpinned by theory—that is what distinguishes technology from the arts and crafts and puts it on a par with science. According to Bunge, theories in technology come in two types: substantive theories, which provide knowledge about the object of action, and operative theories, which are concerned with action itself. The substantive theories of technology are indeed largely applications of scientific theories. The operative theories, in contrast, are not preceded by scientific theories but are born in applied research itself. Still, as Bunge claims, operative theories show a dependence on science in that in such theories the method of science is employed. This includes such features as modeling and idealization, the use of theoretical concepts and abstractions, and the modification of theories by the absorption of empirical data through prediction and retrodiction.

In response to this discussion, Ian Jarvie (1966) proposed as important questions for a philosophy of technology what the epistemological status of technological statements is and how technological statements are to be demarcated from scientific statements. This suggests a thorough investigation of the various forms of knowledge occurring in either practice, in particular, since scientific knowledge has already been so extensively studied, of the forms of knowledge that are characteristic of technology and are lacking, or of much less prominence, in science. A distinction between 'knowing that'—traditional propositional knowledge—and 'knowing how'—non-articulated and even impossible-to-articulate knowledge—had been introduced by Gilbert Ryle (1949) in a different context. The notion of 'knowing how' was taken up by Michael Polanyi under the name of tacit knowledge and made a central characteristic of technology (Polanyi 1958). However, emphasizing too much the role of unarticulated knowledge, of 'rules of thumb' as they are often called, easily underplays the importance of rational methods in technology. An emphasis on tacit knowledge may also be ill-fit for distinguishing the practices of science and technology because the role of tacit knowledge in science may well be more important than current philosophy of science

acknowledges, for example in concluding causal relationships on the basis of empirical evidence. This was also an important theme in the writings of Thomas Kuhn on theory change in science (Kuhn 1962).

## **The Centrality of Design to Technology**

To claim, with Skolimowski and Simon, that technology is about what is to be or what ought to be rather than what is may serve to distinguish it from science but will hardly make it understandable why so much philosophical reflection on technology has taken the form of socio-cultural critique. Technology is an ongoing attempt to bring the world closer to the way one wishes it to be. Whereas science aims to understand the world as it is, technology aims to change the world. These are abstractions, of course. For one, whose wishes concerning what the world should be like are realized in technology? Unlike scientists, who are often personally motivated in their attempts at describing and understanding the world, engineers are seen, not in the least by engineers themselves, as undertaking their attempts to change the world as a service to the public.

The ideas on what is to be or what ought to be are seen as originating outside of technology itself; engineers then take it upon themselves to realize these ideas. This view is a major source for the widely spread picture of technology as being instrumental, as delivering instruments ordered from 'elsewhere', as means to ends specified outside of engineering, a picture that has served further to support the claim that technology is neutral with respect to values. This view involves a considerable distortion of reality, however. Many engineers are intrinsically motivated to change the world; in delivering ideas for improvement they are, so to speak, their own best customers. The same is true for most industrial companies, particularly in a market economy, where the prospect of great profits is another powerful motivator. As a result, much technological development is 'technology-driven'.

To understand where technology 'comes from', what drives the innovation process, is of importance not only to those who are curious to understand the phenomenon of technology itself but also to those who are concerned about its role in society. Technology or engineering as a practice is concerned with the creation of artifacts and, of increasing importance, artifact-based services. The design process, the structured process leading toward that goal, forms the core of the practice of technology. In the engineering literature, the design process is commonly represented as consisting of a series of translational steps; At the start are the customer's needs or wishes. In the first step these are translated into a list of functional requirements, which then define the design task an engineer, or a team of engineers, has to accomplish.

The functional requirements specify as precisely as possible what the device to be designed must be able to do. This step is required because customers usually focus on just one or two features and are unable to articulate the requirements that are necessary to support the functionality they desire. In the second step, the functional requirements are translated into design specifications, which the exact physical parameters of crucial components by which the functional requirements are going to be met. The design parameters chosen to satisfy these requirements are combined and made more precise such that a blueprint of the device results. The blueprint contains all the details that must be known such that the final step to the process of manufacturing the device can take place. It is tempting to consider the blueprint as the end result of a design process, instead of a finished copy being this result. However, actual copies of a device are crucial for the purpose of prototyping and testing. Prototyping and testing presuppose that the sequence of steps making up the design process can and will often contain iterations, leading to revisions of the design parame-

ters and/or the functional requirements. Even though, certainly for mass-produced items, the manufacture of a product for delivery to its customers or to the market comes after the closure of the design phase, the manufacturing process is often reflected in the functional requirements of a device, for example in putting restrictions on the number of different components of which the device consists. The complexity of a device will affect how difficult it will be to maintain or repair it, and ease of maintenance or low repair costs are often functional requirements. An important modern development is that the complete life cycle of an artifact is now considered to be the designing engineer's concern, up till the final stages of the recycling and disposal of its components and materials, and the functional requirements of any device should reflect this.

From this point of view, neither a blueprint nor a prototype can be considered the end product of engineering design. The biggest idealization that this scheme of the design process contains is arguably located at the start. Only in a minority of cases does a design task originate in a customer need or wish for a particular artifact. First of all, as already suggested, many design tasks are defined by engineers themselves, for instance, by noticing something to be improved in existing products. But more often than not design starts with a problem pointed out by some societal agent, which engineers are then invited to solve. Many such problems, however, are ill-defined or wicked problems, meaning that it is not at all clear what the problem is exactly and what a solution to the problem would consist in. The 'problem' is a situation that people—not necessarily the people 'in' the situation—find unsatisfactory, but typically without being able to specify a situation that they find more satisfactory in other terms than as one in which the problem has been solved. In particular it is not obvious that a solution to the problem would consist in some artifact, or some artifactual system or process, being made available or installed. Engineering departments all over the world advertise that engineering is problem solving, and engineers easily seem confident that they are best qualified to solve a problem when they are asked to, whatever the nature of the problem. This has led to the phenomenon of a technological fix, the solution of a problem by a technical solution, that is, the delivery of an artifact or artifactual process, where it is questionable, to say the least, whether this solves the problem or whether it was the best way of handling the problem.

A candidate example of a technological fix for the problem of global warming would be the currently much debated option of injecting sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere to offset the warming effect of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and methane. Such schemes of geoengineering would allow us to avoid facing the—in all likelihood painful—choices that will lead to a reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, but will at the same time allow the depletion of the Earth's reservoir of fossil fuels to continue. See for a discussion of technological fixing, e.g., Volti 2009: 26–32. Given this situation, and its hazards, the notion of a problem and a taxonomy of problems deserve to receive more philosophical attention than they have hitherto received.

These wicked problems are often broadly social problems, which would best be met by some form of 'social action', which would result in people changing their behavior or acting differently in such a way that the problem would be mitigated or even disappear completely. In defense of the engineering view, it could perhaps be said that the repertoire of 'proven' forms of social action is meager. The temptation of technical fixes could be overcome—at least that is how an engineer might see it—by the inclusion of the social sciences in the systematic development and application of knowledge to the solution of human problems. This however, is a controversial view. Social engineering is to many a specter to be kept at as large a distance as possible instead of an ideal to be

pursued. Karl Popper referred to acceptable forms of implementing social change as 'piecemeal social engineering' and contrasted it to the revolutionary but completely unfounded schemes advocated by, e.g., Marxism. In the entry on Karl Popper, however, his choice of words is called 'rather unfortunate'. The notion of social engineering, and its cogency, deserves more attention than it is currently receiving.

An important input for the design process is scientific knowledge: knowledge about the behavior of components and the materials they are composed of in specific circumstances. This is the point where science is applied. However, much of this knowledge is not directly available from the sciences, since it often concerns extremely detailed behavior in very specific circumstances. This scientific knowledge is therefore often generated within technology, by the engineering sciences. But apart from this very specific scientific knowledge, engineering design involves various other sorts of knowledge. In his book *What Engineers Know and How They Know It* (Vincenti 1990), the aeronautical engineer Walter Vincenti gave a six-fold categorization of engineering design knowledge (leaving aside production and operation as the other two basic constituents of engineering practice). Vincenti distinguishes.

1. Fundamental design concepts, including primarily the operational principle and the normal configuration of a particular device;
2. Criteria and specifications;
3. Theoretical tools;
4. Quantitative data;
5. Practical considerations;
6. Design instrumentalities.

The fourth category concerns the quantitative knowledge just referred to, and the third the theoretical tools used to acquire it. These two categories can be assumed to match Bunge's notion of substantive technological theories. The status of the remaining four categories is much less clear, however, partly because they are less familiar, or not at all, from the well-explored context of science. Of these categories, Vincenti claims that they represent prescriptive forms of knowledge rather than descriptive ones. Here, the activity of design introduces an element of normativity, which is absent from scientific knowledge. Take such a basic notion as 'operational principle', which refers to the way in which the function of a device is realized, or, in short, how it works. This is still a purely descriptive notion. Subsequently, however, it plays a role in arguments that seek to prescribe a course of action to someone who has a goal that could be realized by the operation of such a device. At this stage, the issue changes from a descriptive to a prescriptive or normative one. An extensive discussion of the various kinds of knowledge relevant to technology is offered by Houkes (2009).

Although the notion of an operational principle—a term that seems to originate with Polanyi (1958)—is central to engineering design, no single clear-cut definition of it seems to exist. The issue of disentangling descriptive from prescriptive aspects in an analysis of the technical action and its constituents is therefore a task that has hardly begun. This task requires a clear view on the extent and scope of technology. If one follows Joseph Pitt in his book *Thinking About Technology* (1999) and defines technology broadly as 'humanity at work', then to distinguish between technological action and action in general becomes difficult, and the study of technological action must absorb all descriptive and normative theories of action, including the theory of practical rationality, and much of theoretical economics in its wake. There have indeed been attempts at such

an encompassing account of human action, for example Tadeusz Kotarbinski's Praxiology (1965), but a perspective of such generality makes it difficult to arrive at results of sufficient depth. It would be a challenge for philosophy to specify the differences among action forms and the reasoning grounding them in, to single out three prominent fields of study, technology, organization and management, and economics.

A more restricted attempt at such an approach is Ilkka Niiniluoto's (1993). According to Niiniluoto, the theoretical framework of technology as the practice that is concerned with what the world should be like rather than is, the framework that forms the counterpoint to the descriptive framework of science, is design science. The content of design science, the counterpoint to the theories and explanations that form the content of descriptive science, would then be formed by technical norms, statements of the form 'If one wants to achieve X, one should do Y'. The notion of a technical norm derives from Georg Henrik von Wright's Norm and Action (1963). Technical norms need to be distinguished from anankastic statements expressing natural necessity, of the form 'If X is to be achieved, Y needs to be done'; the latter have a truth value but the former have not. Von Wright himself, however, wrote that he did not understand the mutual relations between these statements. Ideas on what design science is and can and should be are evidently related to the broad problem area of practical rationality—see this entries on practical reason and instrumental rationality—and also to means-ends reasoning, discussed.

### **Methodological Issues: Design as Decision Making**

Design is an activity that is subject to rational scrutiny but in which creativity is considered to play an important role as well. Since design is a form of action, a structured series of decisions to proceed in one way rather than another, the form of rationality that is relevant to it is practical rationality, the rationality incorporating the criteria on how to act, given particular circumstances. This suggests a clear division of labor between the part to be played by rational scrutiny and the part to be played by creativity. Theories of rational action generally conceive their problem situation as one involving a choice among various course of action open to the agent.

Rationality then concerns the question how to decide among given options, whereas creativity concerns the generation of these options. This distinction is similar to the distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery in science. The suggestion that is associated with this distinction, however, that rational scrutiny only applies in the context of justification, is difficult to uphold for technological design. If the initial creative phase of option generation is conducted sloppily, the result of the design task can hardly be satisfactory. Unlike the case of science, where the practical consequences of entertaining a particular theory are not taken into consideration, the context of discovery in technology is governed by severe constraints of time and money, and an analysis of the problem how best to proceed certainly seems in order. There has been little philosophical work done in this direction; an overview of the issues is given in Kroes, Franssen, and Bucciarelli (2009).

The ideas of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality (see, e.g., Simon 1982) are relevant here, since decisions on when to stop generating options and when to stop gathering information about these options and the consequences when they are adopted are crucial in decision making if informational overload and calculative intractability are to be avoided. However, it has proved difficult to further develop Simon's ideas on bounded rationality since their conception in the 1950s. Another notion that is relevant here is means-ends reasoning. In order to be of any help here, theories of means-ends reasoning should then concern not just the evaluation of given means with respect to

their ability to achieve given ends, but also the generation or construction of means for given ends. A comprehensive theory of means-ends reasoning, however, is not yet available; for a proposal on how to develop means-ends reasoning in the context of technical artifacts. In the practice of technology, alternative proposals for the realization of particular functions are usually taken from 'catalogs' of existing and proven realizations. These catalogs are extended by ongoing research in technology rather than under the urge of particular design tasks.

When engineering design is conceived as a process of decision making, governed by considerations of practical rationality, the next step is to specify these considerations. Almost all theories of practical rationality conceive of it as a reasoning process where a match between beliefs and desires or goals is sought. The desires or goals are represented by their value or utility for the decision maker, and the decision maker's problem is to choose an action that realizes a situation that, ideally, has maximal value or utility among all the situations that could be realized. If there is uncertainty concerning the situations that will be realized by a particular action, then the problem is conceived as aiming for maximal expected value or utility. Now the instrumental perspective on technology implies that the value that is at issue in the design process viewed as a process of rational decision making is not the value of the artifacts that are created. Those values are the domain of the users of the technology so created. They are supposed to be represented in the functional requirements defining the design task. Instead the value to be maximized is the extent to which a particular design meets the functional requirements defining the design task. It is in this sense that engineers share an overall perspective on engineering design as an exercise in optimization. But although optimization is a value-orientated notion, it is not itself perceived as a value driving engineering design.

The functional requirements that define most design problems do not prescribe explicitly what should be optimized; usually they set levels to be attained minimally. It is then up to the engineer to choose how far to go beyond meeting the requirements in this minimal sense. Efficiency, in energy consumption and use of materials first of all, is then often a prime value. Under the pressure of society, other values have come to be incorporated, in particular safety and, more recently, sustainability. Sometimes it is claimed that what engineers aim to maximize is just one factor, namely market success. Market success, however, can only be assessed after the fact. The engineer's maximization effort will instead be directed at what are considered the predictors of market success. Meeting the functional requirements and being relatively efficient and safe are plausible candidates as such predictors, but additional methods, informed by market research, may introduce additional factors or may lead to a hierarchy among the factors.

Choosing the design option that maximally meets all the functional requirements (which may but need not originate with the prospective user) and all other considerations and criteria that are taken to be relevant, then becomes the practical decision-making problem to be solved in a particular engineering-design task. This creates several methodological problems. Most important of these is that the engineer is facing a multi-criteria decision problem. The various requirements come with their own operationalizations in terms of design parameters and measurement procedures for assessing their performance. This results in a number of rank orders or quantitative scales which represent the various options out of which a choice is to be made. The task is to come up with a final score in which all these results are 'adequately' represented, such that the option that scores best can be considered the optimal solution to the design problem. Engineers describe this situation as one where trade-offs have to be made: in judging the merit of one option relative to other options, a relative bad performance on one criterion can be balanced by a relatively good perfor-

mance on another criterion. An important problem is whether a rational method for doing this can be formulated. It has been argued by Franssen (2005) that this problem is structurally similar to the well-known problem of social choice, for which Kenneth Arrow proved his notorious impossibility theorem in 1950, implying that no general rational solution method exists for this problem. This poses serious problems for the claim of engineers that their designs are optimal solutions, since Arrow's theorem implies that in most multi-criteria problems the notion of 'optimal' cannot be rigorously defined.

This result seems to except a crucial aspect of engineering activity from philosophical scrutiny, and it could be used to defend the opinion that engineering is at least partly an art, not a science. Instead of surrendering to the result, however, which has a significance that extends much beyond engineering and even beyond decision making in general, we should perhaps conclude instead that there is still a lot of work to be done on what might be termed, provisionally, 'approximative' forms of reasoning. One form of reasoning to be included here is Herbert Simon's bounded rationality, plus the related notion of 'satisficing'. Since their introduction in the 1950s (Simon 1957) these two terms have found wide usage, but we are still lacking a general theory of bounded rationality. It may be in the nature of forms of approximative reasoning such as bounded rationality that a general theory cannot be had, but even a systematic treatment from which such an insight could emerge seems to be lacking.

Another problem for the decision-making view of engineering design is that in modern technology almost all design is done by teams. Such teams are composed of experts from many different disciplines. Each discipline has its own theories, its own models of interdependencies, its own assessment criteria, and so forth, and the professionals belonging to these disciplines must be considered as inhabitants of different object worlds, as Louis Bucciarelli (1994) phrases it. The different team members are, therefore, likely to disagree on the relative rankings and evaluations of the various design options under discussion. Agreement on one option as the overall best one can here be even less arrived at by an algorithmic method exemplifying engineering rationality. Instead, models of social interaction, such as bargaining and strategic thinking, are relevant here. An example of such an approach to an (abstract) design problem is presented by Franssen and Bucciarelli (2004).

To look in this way at technological design as a decision-making process is to view it normatively from the point of view of practical or instrumental rationality. At the same time it is descriptive in that it is a description of how engineering methodology generally presents the issue how to solve design problems. From that somewhat higher perspective there is room for all kinds of normative questions that are not addressed here, such as whether the functional requirements defining a design problem can be seen as an adequate representation of the values of the prospective users of an artifact or a technology, or by which methods values such as safety and sustainability can best be elicited and represented in the design process.

### **Metaphysical Issues: The Status and Characteristics of Artifacts**

Understanding the process of designing artifacts is the theme in philosophy of technology that most directly touches on the interests of engineering practice. This is hardly true for another issue of central concern to analytic philosophy of technology, which is the status and the character of artifacts. This is perhaps not unlike the situation in the philosophy of science, where working scientists seem also to be much less interested in investigating the status and character of models and theories than philosophers are.

Artifacts are man-made objects: they have an author. The artifacts that are of relevance to technology are, in particular, made to serve a purpose. This excludes, within the set of all man-made objects, on the one hand byproducts and waste products and on the other hand works of art. Byproducts and waste products result from an intentional act to make something but just not precisely, although the author at work may be well aware of their creation. Works of art result from an intention directed at their creation (although in exceptional cases of conceptual art, this directedness may involve many intermediate steps) but it is contested whether artists include in their intentions concerning their work an intention that the work serves some purpose. A further discussion of this aspect belongs to the philosophy of art. An interesting general account has been presented by Diptert (1993).

Technical artifacts, then, are made to serve some purpose, generally to be used for something or to act as a component in a larger artifact, which in its turn is either something to be used or again a component. Whether end product or component, an artifact is 'for something', and what it is for is called the artifact's function. Several researchers have emphasized that an adequate description of artifacts must refer both to their status as tangible physical objects and to the intentions of the people engaged with them. Kroes and Meijers (2006) have dubbed this view "the dual nature of technical artifacts"; its most mature formulation is Kroes 2012. They suggest that the two aspects are 'tied up', so to speak, in the notion of artifact function. This gives rise to several problems. One, which will be passed over quickly because little philosophical work seems to have been done concerning it, is that structure and function mutually constrain each other, but the constraining is only partial. It is unclear whether a general account of this relation is possible and what problems need to be solved to arrive there. There may be interesting connections with the issue of multiple realizability in the philosophy of mind and with accounts of reduction in science; an example where this is explored is Mahner and Bunge 2001.

It is equally problematic whether a unified account of the notion of function as such is possible, but this issue has received considerably more philosophical attention. The notion of function is of paramount importance for characterizing artifacts, but the notion is used much more widely. The notion of an artifact's function seems to refer necessarily to human intentions. Function is also a key concept in biology, however, where no intentionality plays a role, and it is a key concept in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind, where it is crucial in grounding intentionality in non-intentional, structural and physical properties. Up till now there is no accepted general account of function that covers both the intentionality-based notion of artifact function and the non-intentional notion of biological function—not to speak of other areas where the concept plays a role, such as the social sciences. The most comprehensive theory, that has the ambition to account for the biological notion, cognitive notion and the intentional notion, is Ruth Millikan's 1984. The collection of essays edited by Ariew, Cummins and Perlman (2002) presents a recent introduction to the general topic of defining the notion of function in general, although the emphasis is, as is generally the case in the literature on function, on biological functions.

Against the view that, at least in the case of artifacts, the notion of function refers necessarily to intentionality, it could be argued that in discussing the functions of the components of a larger device, and the interrelations between these functions, the intentional 'side' of these functions is of secondary importance only. This, however, would be to ignore the possibility of the malfunctioning of such components. This notion seems to be definable only in terms of a mismatch between actual behavior and intended behavior. The notion of malfunction also sharpens an ambiguity in the general reference to intentions when characterizing technical artifacts. These artifacts usually

engage many people, and the intentions of these people may not all pull in the same direction. A major distinction can be drawn between the intentions of the actual user of an artifact for a particular purpose and the intentions of the artifact's designer. Since an artifact may be used for a purpose different from the one for which its designer intended it to be used, and since people may also use natural objects for some purpose or other, one is invited to allow that artifacts can have multiple functions, or to enforce a hierarchy among all relevant intentions in determining the function of an artifact, or to introduce a classification of functions in terms of the sorts of determining intentions. In the latter case, which is a sort of middle way between the two other options, one commonly distinguishes between the proper function of an artifact as the one intended by its designer and the accidental function of the artifact as the one given to it by some user on private considerations. Accidental use can become so common, however, that the original function drops out of memory.

Closely related to this issue to what extent use and design determine the function of an artifact is the problem of characterizing artifact kinds. It may seem that we use functions to classify artifacts: an object is a knife because it has the function of cutting, or more precisely, of enabling us to cut. On closer inspection, however, the link between function and kind-membership seems much less straightforward. The basic kinds in technology are, for example, 'knife', 'aircraft' and 'piston'. The members of these kinds have been designed in order to be used to cut something with, to transport something through the air and to generate mechanical movement through thermodynamic expansion. However, one cannot create a particular kind of artifact just by designing something with the intention that it be used for some particular purpose: a member of the kind so created must actually be useful for that purpose. Despite innumerable design attempts and claims, the perpetual motion machine is not a kind of artifact. A kind like 'knife' is defined, therefore, not only by the intentions of the designers of its members that they each be useful for cutting but also by a shared operational principle known to these designers, and on which they based their design. This is, in a different setting, also defended by Thomasson, who in her characterization of what she in general calls an artifactual kind says that such a kind is defined by the designer's intention to make something of that kind, by a substantive idea that the designer has of how this can be achieved, and by his or her largely successful achievement of it (Thomasson 2003, 2007). Quasi-sorts of kinds in which artifacts can be grouped, a distinction must therefore be made between a kind like 'knife' and a corresponding but different kind 'cutter'. A 'knife' indicates a particular way a 'cutter' can be made. One can also cut, however, with a thread or line, a welding torch, a water jet, and undoubtedly by other sorts of means that have not yet been thought of. A 'cutter' would then refer to a truly functional kind. As such, it is subject to the conflict between use and design: one could mean by 'cutter' anything that can be used for cutting or anything that has been designed to be used for cutting, by the application of whatever operational principle, presently known or unknown.

This distinction between artifact kinds and functional kinds is relevant for the status of such kinds in comparison to other notions of kinds. Philosophy of science has emphasized that the concept of natural kind, such as exemplified by 'water' or 'atom', lies at the basis of science. On the other hand it is generally taken for granted that there are no regularities that all knives or airplanes or pistons answer to. This, however, is loosely based on considerations of multiple realizability that fully apply only to functional kinds, not to artifact kinds. Artifact kinds share an operational principle that gives them some commonality in physical features, and this commonality becomes stronger once a particular artifact kind is subdivided into narrower kinds. Since these kinds are specified in terms of physical and geometrical parameters, they are much closer to the natural

kinds of science, in that they support law-like regularities;. A recent collection of essays that discuss the metaphysics of artifacts and artifact kinds is Franssen, Kroes, Reydon and Vermaas 2014.

## **Ethics of Technology**

It was not until the twentieth century that the development of the ethics of technology as a systematic and more or less independent subdiscipline of philosophy started. This late development may seem surprising given the large impact that technology has had on society, especially since the industrial revolution. A plausible reason for this late development of ethics of technology is the instrumental perspective on technology. This perspective implies, basically, a positive ethical assessment of technology: technology increases the possibilities and capabilities of humans, which seems in general desirable. Of course, since antiquity, it has been recognized that the new capabilities may be put to bad use or lead to human hubris. Often, however, these undesirable consequences are attributed to the users of technology, rather than the technology itself, or its developers. This vision is known as the instrumental vision of technology resulting in the so-called neutrality thesis. The neutrality thesis holds that technology is a neutral instrument that can be put to good or bad use by its users. During the twentieth century, this neutrality thesis met with severe critique, most prominently by Heidegger and Ellul, but also by philosophers from the Frankfurt School, such as Horkheimer and Adorno (1947 [2002]), Marcuse (1964), and Habermas (1968 [1970]).

The scope and the agenda for ethics of technology to a large extent depend on how technology is conceptualized. The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed a richer variety of conceptualizations of technology that move beyond the conceptualization of technology as a neutral tool, as a world view or as a historical necessity. This includes conceptualizations of technology as a political phenomenon (Winner, Feenberg, Sclove), as a social activity (Latour, Callon, Bijker and others in the area of science and technology studies), as a cultural phenomenon (Ihde, Borgmann), as a professional activity (engineering ethics, e.g., Davis), and as a cognitive activity (Bunge, Vincenti). Despite this diversity, the development in the second half of the twentieth century is characterized by two general trends. One is a move away from technological determinism and the assumption that technology is a given self-contained phenomenon which develops autonomously to an emphasis on technological development being the result of choices (although not necessarily the intended result). The other is a move away from ethical reflection on technology as such to ethical reflection of specific technologies and to specific phases in the development of technology. Both trends together have resulted in an enormous increase in the number and scope of ethical questions that are asked about technology. The developments also imply that ethics of technology is to be adequately empirically informed, not only about the exact consequences of specific technologies but also about the actions of engineers and the process of technological development. This has also opened the way to the involvement of other disciplines in ethical reflections on technology, such as Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Technology Assessment (TA).

## **Approaches in the Ethics of Technology**

Not only is the ethics of technology characterized by a diversity of approaches, it might even be doubted whether something like a subdiscipline of ethics of technology, in the sense of a community of scholars working on a common set of problems, exists. The scholars studying ethical issues in technology have diverse backgrounds (e.g., philosophy, STS, TA, law, political science) and they do not always consider themselves (primarily) ethicists of technology. To give the reader an overview of the field, three basic approaches or strands that might be distinguished in the ethics of technology will be discussed.

## **Cultural and political approaches**

Both cultural and political approaches build on the traditional philosophy and ethics of technology of the first half of the twentieth century. Whereas cultural approaches conceive of technology as a cultural phenomenon that influences our perception of the world, political approaches conceive of technology as a political phenomenon, i.e., as a phenomenon that is ruled by and embodies institutional power relations between people.

Cultural approaches are often phenomenological in nature or at least position themselves in relation to phenomenology as post-phenomenology. Examples of philosophers in this tradition are Don Ihde, Albert Borgmann, Peter-Paul Verbeek and Evan Selinger (e.g., Borgmann 1984; Ihde 1990; Verbeek 2000 [2005], 2011). The approaches are usually influenced by developments in STS, especially the idea that technologies contain a script that influences not only people's perception of the world but also human behavior, and the idea of the absence of a fundamental distinction between humans and non-humans, including technological artifacts (Akrich 1992; Latour 1992, 1993; Ihde & Selinger 2003). The combination of both ideas has led some to claim that technology has (moral) agency.

Political approaches to technology mostly go back to Marx, who assumed that the material structure of production in society, in which technology is obviously a major factor, determined the economic and social structure of that society. Similarly, Langdon Winner has argued that technologies can embody specific forms of power and authority (Winner 1980). According to him, some technologies are inherently normative in the sense that they require or are strongly compatible with certain social and political relations. Railroads, for example, seem to require a certain authoritative management structure. In other cases, technologies may be political due to the particular way they have been designed. Some political approaches to technology are inspired by (American) pragmatism and, to a lesser extent, discourse ethics. A number of philosophers, for example, have pleaded for a democratization of technological development and the inclusion of ordinary people in the shaping of technology (Winner 1983; Sclove 1995; Feenberg 1999).

Although political approaches have obviously ethical ramifications, many philosophers who have adopted such approaches do not engage in explicit ethical reflection on technology. An interesting recent exception, and an attempt to consolidate a number of recent developments and to articulate them into a more general account of what an ethics of technology should look like, is the volume *Pragmatist Ethics for a Technological Culture* (Keulartz et al. 2002). In this volume, the authors plead for a revival of the pragmatist tradition in moral philosophy because it is better fit to deal with a number of moral issues in technology. Instead of focusing on how to reach and justify normative judgments about technology, a pragmatist ethics focuses on how to recognize and trace moral problems in the first place. Moreover, the process of dealing with these problems is considered more important than the outcome.

## **Engineering ethics**

Engineering ethics is a relatively new field of education and research. It started off in the 1980s in the United States, merely as an educational effort. Engineering ethics is concerned with "the actions and decisions made by persons, individually or collectively, who belong to the profession of engineering" (Baum 1980: 1). According to this approach, engineering is a profession, in the same way as medicine is a profession.

Although there is no agreement on how a profession exactly should be defined, the following characteristics are often mentioned:

- A profession relies on specialized knowledge and skills that require a long period of study;
- The occupational group has a monopoly on the carrying out of the occupation;
- The assessment of whether the professional work is carried out in a competent way is done by, and it is accepted that this can only be done by, professional peers;
- A profession provides society with products, services or values that are useful or worthwhile for society, and is characterized by an ideal of serving society;
- The daily practice of professional work is regulated by ethical standards, which are derived from or relate to the society-serving ideal of the profession.

Typical ethical issues that are discussed in engineering ethics are professional obligations of engineers as exemplified in, for example, codes of ethics of engineers, the role of engineers versus managers, competence, honesty, whistle-blowing, concern for safety and conflicts of interest (Davis 1998, 2005; Martin & Schinzinger 2005; Harris, Pritchard, & Rabins 2008).

Recently, a number of authors have pleaded for broadening the traditional scope of engineering ethics (e.g., Herkert 2001; van de Poel & Royakkers 2011). This call for a broader approach derives from two concerns. One concern is that the traditional micro-ethical approach in engineering ethics tends to take the context in which engineers have to work for given, while major ethical issues pertain to how this context is 'organized'. Another concern is that the traditional micro-ethical focus tends to neglect issues relating to the impact of technology on society or issues relating to decisions about technology. Broadening the scope of engineering ethics would then, among others, imply more attention for such issues as sustainability and social justice.

## **Ethics of specific technologies**

The last decades have witnessed an increase in ethical inquiries into specific technologies. This may now be the largest of the three strands discussed, especially given the rapid growth in technology-specific ethical inquiries in the last two decades. One of the most visible new fields is probably computer ethics (e.g., Moor 1985; Floridi 2010; Johnson 2009; Weckert 2007; van den Hoven & Weckert 2008), with more recently a focus on robotics, artificial intelligence, machine ethics, and the ethics of algorithms (Lin, Abney, & Jenkins 2017; Nucci & Santoni de Sio 2016; Mittelstadt et al. 2016; Bostrom & Yudkowsky 2014; Wallach & Allen 2009). But biotechnology has spurred dedicated ethical investigations as well (e.g., Sherlock & Morrey 2002; P. Thompson 2007). More traditional fields like architecture and urban planning have also attracted specific ethical attention (Fox 2000). More recently, nanotechnology and so-called converging technologies have led to the establishment of what is called nanoethics (Allhoff et al. 2007). Other examples are the ethics of nuclear deterrence (Finnis et al. 1988), nuclear energy (Taebi & Roeser 2015) and geoengineering (C. Preston 2016).

Obviously the establishment of such new fields of ethical reflection is a response to social and technological developments. Still, the question can be asked whether the social demand is best met by establishing new fields of applied ethics. This issue is in fact regularly discussed as new fields emerge. Several authors have for example argued that there is no need for nanoethics because nanotechnology does not raise any really new ethical issues (e.g., McGinn 2010). The alleged absence of newness here is supported by the claim that the ethical issues raised by nanotechnology are a variation on, and sometimes an intensification of, existing ethical issues, but hardly really new, and by the claim that these issues can be dealt with the existing theories and

concepts from moral philosophy. For an earlier, similar discussion concerning the supposed new character of ethical issues in computer engineering.

The new fields of ethical reflection are often characterized as applied ethics, that is, as applications of theories, normative standards, concepts and methods developed in moral philosophy. For each of these elements, however, application is usually not straightforward but requires a further specification or revision. This is the case because general moral standards, concepts and methods are often not specific enough to be applicable in any direct sense to specific moral problems. 'Application' therefore often leads to new insights which might well result in the reformulation or at least refinement of existing normative standards, concepts and methods. In some cases, ethical issues in a specific field might require new standards, concepts or methods. Beauchamp and Childress for example have proposed a number of general ethical principles for biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress 2001). These principles are more specific than general normative standards, but still so general and abstract that they apply to different issues in biomedical ethics. In computer ethics, existing moral concepts relating to for example privacy and ownership has been redefined and adapted to deal with issues which are typical for the computer age (Johnson 2003). New fields of ethical application might also require new methods for, for example, discerning ethical issues that take into account relevant empirical facts about these fields, like the fact that technological research and development usually takes place in networks of people rather than by individuals (Zwart et al. 2006). Another more general issue that applies to many new technologies is how to deal with the uncertainties about (potential) social and ethical impacts that typically surround new emerging technologies. Brey's (2012) proposal for an anticipatory ethics may be seen as a reply to this challenge. The issue of anticipation is also one of the central concerns in the more recent interdisciplinary field of responsible innovation (e.g., Owen et al. 2013).

Although different fields of ethical reflection on specific technologies might well raise their own philosophical and ethical issues, it can be questioned whether this justifies the development of separate subfields or even subdisciplines. One obvious argument might be that in order to say something ethically meaningful about new technologies, one needs specialized and detailed knowledge of a specific technology. Moreover such subfields allow interaction with relevant non-philosophical experts in for example law, psychology, economy, science and technology studies (STS) or technology assessment (TA). On the other side, it could also be argued that a lot can be learned from interaction and discussion between ethicists specializing in different technologies, and a fruitful interaction with the two other strands discussed above (cultural and political approaches and engineering ethics). Currently, such interaction in many cases seems absent, although there are of course exceptions.

## **Some Recurrent Themes in the Ethics of Technology**

We now turn to the description of some themes in the ethics of technology. We focus on a number of general themes that provide an illustration of general issues in the ethics of technology and the way these are treated.

### **Neutrality versus moral agency**

One important general theme in the ethics of technology is the question whether technology is value-laden. Some authors have maintained that technology is value-neutral, in the sense that technology is just a neutral means to an end, and accordingly can be put to good or bad use (e.g., Pitt 2000). This view might have some plausibility in as far as technology is considered to be just a bare physical structure. Most philosophers of technology, however, agree that technological

development is a goal-oriented process and that technological artifacts by definition have certain functions, so that they can be used for certain goals but not, or far more difficulty or less effectively, for other goals. This conceptual connection between technological artifacts, functions and goals makes it hard to maintain that technology is value-neutral. Even if this point is granted, the value-ladenness of technology can be construed in a host of different ways. Some authors have maintained that technology can have moral agency. This claim suggests that technologies can autonomously and freely 'act' in a moral sense and can be held morally responsible for their actions.

The debate whether technologies can have moral agency started off in computer ethics (Bechtel 1985; Snapper 1985; Dennett 1997; Floridi & Sanders 2004) but has since broadened. Typically, the authors who claim that technologies (can) have moral agency often redefine the notion of agency or its connection to human will and freedom (e.g., Latour 1993; Floridi & Sanders 2004, Verbeek 2011). A disadvantage of this strategy is that it tends to blur the morally relevant distinctions between people and technological artifacts. More generally, the claim that technologies have moral agency sometimes seems to have become shorthand for claiming that technology is morally relevant. This, however, overlooks the fact technologies can be value-laden in other ways than by having moral agency (see, e.g., Johnson 2006; Radder 2009; Illies & Meijers 2009; Peterson & Spahn 2011). One might, for example, claim that technology enables (or even invites) and constrains (or even inhibits) certain human actions and the attainment of certain human goals and therefore is to some extent value-laden, without claiming moral agency for technological artifacts. A good overview of the debate can be found in Kroes and Verbeek 2014.

The debate about moral agency and technology is now particularly salient with respect to the design of intelligent artificial agents. James Moor (2006) has distinguished between four ways in which artificial agents may be or become moral agents:

1. Ethical impact agents are robots and computer systems that ethically impact their environment; this is probably true of all artificial agents.
2. Implicit ethical agents are artificial agents that have been programmed to act according to certain values.
3. Explicit ethical agents are machines that can represent ethical categories and that can 'reason' (in machine language) about these.
4. Full ethical agents in addition also possess some characteristics we often consider crucial for human agency, like consciousness, free will and intentionality.

It might perhaps never be possible to technologically design full ethical agents, and if it were to become possible it might be questionable whether it is morally desirable to do so (Bostrom & Yudkowsky 2014). As Wallach and Allen (2009) have pointed out, the main problem might not be to design artificial agents that can function autonomously and that can adapt themselves in interaction with the environment, but rather to build enough, and the right kind of, ethical sensitivity into such machines.

## **Responsibility**

Responsibility has always been a central theme in the ethics of technology. The traditional philosophy and ethics of technology, however, tended to discuss responsibility in rather general terms and were rather pessimistic about the possibility of engineers to assume responsibility for the technologies they developed. Ellul, for example, has characterized engineers as the high priests of technology, who cherish technology but cannot steer it. Hans Jonas (1979 [1984]) has argued that

technology requires an ethics in which responsibility is the central imperative because for the first time in history we are able to destroy the earth and humanity.

In engineering ethics, the responsibility of engineers is often discussed in relation to code of ethics that articulate specific responsibilities of engineers. Such codes of ethics stress three types of responsibilities of engineers: (1) conducting the profession with integrity and honesty and in a competent way, (2) responsibilities towards employers and clients and (3) responsibility towards the public and society. With respect to the latter, most US codes of ethics maintain that engineers 'should hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public'.

As has been pointed out by several authors (Nissenbaum 1996; Johnson & Powers 2005; Swierstra & Jelsma 2006), it may be hard to pinpoint individual responsibility in engineering. The reason is that the conditions for the proper attribution of individual responsibility that have been discussed in the philosophical literature (like freedom to act, knowledge, and causality) are often not met by individual engineers. For example, engineers may feel compelled to act in a certain way due to hierarchical or market constraints, and negative consequences may be very hard or impossible to predict beforehand. The causality condition is often difficult to meet as well due to the long chain from research and development of a technology till its use and the many people involved in this chain. Davis (2012) nevertheless maintains that despite such difficulties individual engineers can and do take responsibility.

One issue that is at stake in this debate is the notion of responsibility. Davis (2012), and also for example Ladd (1991), argue for a notion of responsibility that focuses less on blame and stresses the forward-looking or virtuous character of assuming responsibility. But many others focus on backward-looking notions of responsibility that stress accountability, blameworthiness or liability. Zandvoort (2000), for example has pleaded for a notion of responsibility in engineering that is more like the legal notion of strict liability, in which the knowledge condition for responsibility is seriously weakened. Doorn (2012) compares three perspectives on responsibility ascription in engineering—a merit-based, a right-based and a consequentialist perspective—and argues that the consequentialist perspective, which applies a forward-looking notion of responsibility, is most powerful in influencing engineering practice.

The difficulty of attributing individual responsibility may lead to the Problem of Many Hands (PMH). The term was first coined by Dennis Thompson (1980) in an article about the responsibility of public officials. The term is used to describe problems with the ascription of individual responsibility in collective settings. Doorn (2010) has proposed a procedural approach, based on Rawls' reflective equilibrium model, to deal with the PMH; other ways of dealing with the PMH include the design of institutions that help to avoid it or an emphasis on virtuous behavior in organizations (van de Poel, Royakers, & Zwart 2015).

## **Design**

In the last decades, increasingly attention is paid not only to ethical issues that arise during the use of a technology, but also during the design phase. An important consideration behind this development is the thought that during the design phase technologies, and their social consequences, are still malleable whereas during the use phase technologies are more or less given and negative social consequences may be harder to avoid or positive effects harder to achieve.

In computer ethics, an approach known as Value Sensitive Design (VSD) has been developed to

explicitly address the ethical nature of design. VSD aims at integrating values of ethical importance in engineering design in a systematic way (Friedman & Kahn 2003). The approach combines conceptual, empirical and technical investigations. There is also a range of other approaches aimed at including values in design. 'Design for X' approaches in engineering aim at including instrumental values (like maintainability, reliability and costs) but they also include design for sustainability, inclusive design, and affective design (Holt & Barnes 2010). Inclusive design aims at making designs accessible to the whole population including, for example, handicapped people and the elderly (Erlandson 2008). Affective design aims at designs that evoke positive emotions with the users and so contributes to human well-being. Van de Hoven, Vermaas, and van de Poel 2015 gives a good overview of the state-of-the art of value sensitive design for various values and application domains.

If one tries to integrate values into design one may run into the problem of a conflict of values. The safest car is, due to its weight, not likely to be the most sustainability. Here safety and sustainability conflict in the design of cars. Traditional methods in which engineers deal with such conflicts and make trade-off between different requirements for design include cost-benefit analysis and multiple criteria analysis. Such methods are, however, beset with methodological problems like those discussed (Franssen 2005; Hansson 2007). Van de Poel (2009) discusses various alternatives for dealing with value conflicts in design including the setting of thresholds (satisficing), reasoning about values, innovation and diversity.

## **Technological risks**

The risks of technology are one of the traditional ethical concerns in the ethics of technology. Risks raise not only ethical issues but other philosophical issues, such as epistemological and decision-theoretical issues as well (Roeser et al. 2012). Risk is usually defined as the product of the probability of an undesirable event and the effect of that event, although there are also other definitions around (Hansson 2004b). In general it seems desirable to keep technological risks as small as possible. The larger the risk, the larger either the likeliness or the impact of an undesirable event is. Risk reduction therefore is an important goal in technological development and engineering codes of ethics often attribute a responsibility to engineers in reducing risks and designing safe products. Still, risk reduction is not always feasible or desirable.

It is sometimes not feasible, because there are no absolutely safe products and technologies. But even if risk reduction is feasible it may not be acceptable from a moral point of view. Reducing risk often comes at a cost. Safer products may be more difficult to use, more expensive or less sustainable. So sooner or later, one is confronted with the question: what is safe enough? What makes a risk (un)acceptable?

The process of dealing with risks is often divided into three stages: risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk management. Of these, the second is most obviously ethically relevant. However, risk assessment already involves value judgments, for example about which risks should be assessed in the first place (Shrader-Frechette 1991). An important, and morally relevant, issue is also the degree of evidence that is needed to establish a risk. In establishing a risk on the basis of a body of empirical data one might make two kinds of mistakes. One can establish a risk when there is actually none (type I error) or one can mistakenly conclude that there is no risk while there actually is a risk (type II error). Science traditionally aims at avoiding type I errors. Several authors have argued that in the specific context of risk assessment it is often more important to avoid type II errors (Cranor 1990; Shrader-Frechette 1991). The reason for this is that risk assessment not just

aims at establishing scientific truth but has a practical aim, i.e., to provide the knowledge on basis of which decisions can be made about whether it is desirable to reduce or avoid certain technological risks in order to protect users or the public.

Risk evaluation is carried out in a number of ways (see, e.g., Shrader-Frechette 1985). One possible approach is to judge the acceptability of risks by comparing them to other risks or to certain standards. One could, for example, compare technological risks with naturally occurring risks. This approach, however, runs the danger of committing a naturalistic fallacy: naturally occurring risks may (sometimes) be unavoidable but that does not necessarily make them morally acceptable. More generally, it is often dubious to judge the acceptability of the risk of technology A by comparing it to the risk of technology B if A and B are not alternatives in a decision.

A second approach to risk evaluation is risk-cost benefit analysis, which is based on weighing the risks against the benefits of an activity. Different decision criteria can be applied if a (risk) cost benefit analysis is carried out (Kneese, Ben-David, and Schulze 1983). According to Hansson (2003: 306), usually the following criterion is applied:

... a risk is acceptable if and only if the total benefits that the exposure gives rise to outweigh the total risks, measured as the probability-weighted disutility of outcomes.

A third approach is to base risk acceptance on the consent of people who suffer the risks after they have been informed about these risks (informed consent). A problem of this approach is that technological risks usually affect a large number of people at once. Informed consent may therefore lead to a "society of stalemates" (Hansson 2003: 300).

Several authors have proposed alternatives to the traditional approaches of risk evaluation on the basis of philosophical and ethical arguments. Shrader-Frechette (1991) has proposed a number of reforms in risk assessment and evaluation procedures on the basis of a philosophical critique of current practices. Roeser (2012) argues for a role of emotions in judging the acceptability of risks. Hansson has proposed the following alternative principle for risk evaluation:

Exposure of a person to a risk is acceptable if and only if this exposure is part of an equitable social system of risk-taking that works to her advantage. (Hansson 2003: 305).

Hansson's proposal introduces a number of moral considerations in risk evaluation that are traditionally not addressed or only marginally addressed. These are the consideration whether individuals profit from a risky activity and the consideration whether the distribution of risks and benefits is fair.

Some authors have criticized the focus on risks in the ethics of technology. One strand of criticism argues that we often lack the knowledge to reliably assess the risks of a new technology before it has come into use. We often do not know the probability that something might go wrong, and sometimes we even do not know, or at least not fully, what might go wrong and what possible negative consequences may be. To deal with this, some authors have proposed to conceive of the introduction of new technology in society as a social experiment and have urged to think about the conditions under which such experiments are morally acceptable (Martin & Schinzingler 2005; van de Poel 2016). Another strand of criticism states that the focus on risks has led to a reduction of the impacts of technology that are considered (Swierstra & te Molder 2012). Only impacts related to safety and health, which can be calculated as risks, are considered, whereas 'soft' impacts, for

example of a social or psychological nature, are neglected, thereby impoverishing the moral evaluation of new technologies.

## **Computer and Information Ethics**

This section surveys the field of computer and information ethics. The first section will define the field and will consider its aims and scope, its history, and major approaches and orientations. In the section thereafter, major topics in computer ethics will be surveyed, including privacy, security, free expression and content control, equity issues, intellectual property, and issues of moral responsibility. The final section will focus on the approaches of values in design and valuesensitive design, which aim to analyze embedded values in computer software and systems, and to devise methodologies for incorporating values into the design process.

**Approaches in Computer and Information ethics** Computer ethics is a field of applied ethics that addresses ethical issues in the use, design and management of information technology and in the formulation of ethical policies for its regulation in society. Computer ethics, which has also been called cyberethics, took off as a field in the 1980s, together with the rise of the personal computer. Early work in the field had already started in the 1940s, soon after the invention of the computer. MIT Professor Norbert Wiener was a precursor of the field, already identifying many issues of computer ethics in his book *The Human Use of Human Beings* [Wiener, 1950]. The term “computer ethics” was first introduced in the mid-1970s by Walter Maner, who also promoted the idea of teaching computer ethics in computer science curricula [Maner, 1980]. The watershed year of 1985 saw the appearance of seminal publications by Jim Moor [1985] and Deborah Johnson [1985] that helped define the field. Since then, it has become a recognized field of applied ethics, with its own journals and conference series. In recent years, the field is sometimes also related to a more general field of information ethics, which includes computer ethics, media ethics, library ethics, and bioinformation ethics.

Why would there be a need for computer ethics, while there is no need for a separate field of ethics for many other technologies, like automobiles and appliances? Jim Moor [1985] has argued that the computer has had an impact like no other recent technology. The computer seems to impact every sector of society, and seems to require us to rethink many of our policies, laws and behaviors. According to Moor, this great impact is due to the fact that computers have logical malleability, meaning that their structure allows them to perform any activity that can be specified as a logical relation between inputs and outputs. Many activities can be specified in this way, and the computer therefore turns out to be an extremely powerful and versatile machine that can perform an incredible amount of functions, from word processor to communication device to gaming platform to financial manager.

The versatility of computers is an important reason for the occurrence of a computer revolution, or information revolution, which is now transforming many human activities and social institutions. Many important things that humans do, including many that raise moral questions like stealing from someone, defaming someone, or invading someone’s privacy now also exist in electronic form. In addition, the computer also makes substantially new types of activities possible that are morally controversial, such as the creation of virtual child pornography for which no real children were abused. Because many of the actions made possible by computers are different and new, we often lack policies and laws to guide them. They generate what Moor has called policy vacuums, being the lack of clear policies or rules of conduct. The task of computer ethics, then, is to propose and develop new ethical policies, ranging from explicit laws to informal guidelines, to guide new types of actions that involve computers. Computer ethics has taken off since its birth in the mid-

80s, and has established itself as a mature field with its own scientific journals, conferences and organizations.

The field initially attracted most of its interests from computer scientists and philosophers, with many computer science curricula nowadays requiring a course or module on computer ethics. However, given the wide implications for human action sketched by Moor, computer ethics is also of interest to other fields that focus on human behavior and social institutions, such as law, communication studies, education, political science and management. Moreover, computer ethics is also an important topic of debate in the public arena, and computer ethicists regularly contribute to public discussions regarding the use and regulating of computer technology. Computer ethics is sometimes defined as a branch of professional ethics similar to other branches like engineering ethics and journalism ethics. On this view, the aim of computer ethics is to define and analyze the moral and professional responsibilities of computer professionals. Computer professionals are individuals employed in the information technology branch, for example as hardware or software engineer, web designer, network or database administrator, computer science instructor or computer-repair technician.

Computer ethics, on this view, should focus on the various moral issues that computer professionals encounter in their work, for instance in the design, development and maintenance of computer hardware and software. Within this approach to computer ethics, most attention goes to the discussion of ethical dilemmas that various sorts of computer professionals may face in their work and possible ways of approaching them. Such dilemmas may include, for example, the question how one should act as a web designer when one's employer asks one to install spyware into a site built for a client, or the question to what extent software engineers should be held accountable for harm incurred by software malfunction. Next to the discussion of specific ethical dilemmas, there is also general discussion of the responsibilities of computer professionals towards various other parties, such as clients, employers, colleagues, and the general public, and of the nature and importance of ethical codes in the profession.

A recent topic of interest has been the development of methods for value-sensitive design, which is the design of software and systems in such a way that they conform to a desired set of (moral) values [Friedman, Kahn and Borning, 2006]. While the professional ethics view of computer ethics is important, many in the field employ a broader conception that places the focus on general ethical issues in the use and regulation of information technology. This approach may be called the philosophical ethics approach to computer ethics. This conception holds, following Moor [1985], that computer ethics studies moral issues that are of broad societal importance, and develops ethical policies to address them. Such policies may regulate the conduct of organizations, groups and individuals and the workings of institutions.

The philosophical approach focuses on larger social issues like information privacy and security, computer crime, issues of access and equity, and the regulation of commerce and speech on the Internet. It asks what ethical principles should guide our thinking about these issues, and what specific policies (laws, social and corporate policies, social norms) should regulate conduct with respect to them. Within this approach, some researchers focus on the development of ethical guidelines for users of computer technology. Others place more emphasis on policy issues, and try to formulate ethical policies for organizations, government agencies or lawmakers. Still others focus on computer technologies themselves, and try to identify and evaluate morally relevant features in their design. Some also focus on theoretical and metaethical issues.

## **Topics in Computer and Information Ethics**

Introductions to computer ethics show considerable agreement on what the central issues for computer ethics are. They include ethical issues of privacy, security, computer crime, intellectual property, free expression, and equity and access, and issues of responsibility and professional ethics.

### **Privacy**

Privacy is a topic that has received much attention in computer ethics from early on. Information technology is often used to record, store and transmit personal information, and it may happen that this information is accessed or used by third parties without the consent of the corresponding persons, thus violating their privacy. Privacy is the right of persons to control access to their personal affairs, such as their body, thoughts, private places, private conduct, and personal information about themselves. The most attention in computer ethics has gone to information privacy, which is the right to control the disclosure of personal data. Information technology can easily be used to violate this right.

Privacy issues come into play on the Internet, where cookies, spyware, browser tracking and access to the records of internet providers may be used to study the Internet behavior of individuals or to get access to their PCs. They also come into play in the construction of databases with personal information by corporations and government organizations, and the merging of such databases to create complex records about persons or to find matches across databases. Other topics of major concern include the privacy implications of video surveillance and biometric technologies, and the ethics of medical privacy and privacy in the workplace. It has also been studied whether people have a legitimate expectation to privacy in public areas, whether they can be freely recorded, screened and tracked whenever they appear in public and how the notion of "public" itself has changed in light of information technology.

### **Security and crime**

Security has become a major issue in computer ethics, because of rampant computer crime and fraud, the spread of computer viruses, malware and spam, and national security concerns about the status of computer networks as breeding grounds for terrorist activity and as vulnerable targets for terrorist attacks. Computer security is the protection of computer systems against the unauthorized disclosure, manipulation, or deletion of information and against denial of service attacks. Breaches of computer security may cause harms and rights violations, including economic losses, personal injury and death, which may occur in so-called safety-critical systems, and violations of privacy and intellectual property rights.

Much attention goes to the moral and social evaluation of computer crime and other forms of disruptive behavior, including hacking (non-malicious break-ins into systems and networks), cracking (malicious break-ins), cybervandalism (disrupting the operations of computer networks or corrupting data), software piracy (the illegal reproduction or dissemination of proprietary software), and computer fraud (the deception for personal gain in online business transactions by assuming a false online identity or by altering or misrepresenting data). Another recently important security-related issue is how state interests in monitoring and controlling information infrastructures to better protect against terrorist attacks should be balanced against the right to privacy and other civil rights [Nissenbaum, 2005].

## **Free expression and content control**

The Internet has become a very important medium for the expression of information and ideas. This has raised questions about whether there should be content control or censorship of Internet information, for example by governments or service providers. Censorship could thwart the right to free expression, which is held to be a basic right in many nations. Free expression includes both freedom of speech (the freedom to express oneself through publication and dissemination) and freedom of access to information.

Several types of speech have been proposed as candidates for censorship. These include pornography and other obscene forms of speech, hate speech such as websites of fascist and racist organizations, speech that can cause harm or undermine the state, such as information as to how to build bombs, speech that violates privacy or confidentiality, and libelous and defamatory speech. Studies in computer ethics focus on the permissibility of these types of speech, and on the ethical aspects of different censorship methods, such as legal prohibitions and software filters.

**Equity and access** The information revolution has been claimed to exacerbate inequalities in society, such as racial, class and gender inequalities, and to create a new, digital divide, in which those that have the skills and opportunities to use information technology effectively reap the benefits while others are left behind. In computer ethics, it is studied how both the design of information technologies and their embedding in society could increase inequalities, and how ethical policies may be developed that result in a fairer and more just distribution of their benefits and disadvantages. This research includes ethical analyses of the accessibility of computer systems and services for various social groups, studies of social biases in software and systems design, normative studies of education in the use of computers, and ethical studies of the digital gap between industrialized and developing countries.

**Intellectual property** Intellectual property is the name for information, ideas, works of art and other creations of the mind for which the creator has an established proprietary right of use. Intellectual property laws exist to protect creative works by ensuring that only the creators benefit from marketing them or making them available, be they individuals or corporations. Intellectual property rights for software and digital information have generated much controversy. There are those who want to ensure strict control of creators over their digital products, whereas others emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong public domain in cyberspace, and argue for unrestricted access to electronic information and for the permissibility of copying proprietary software. In computer ethics, the ethical and philosophical aspects of these disputes are analyzed, and policy proposals are made for the regulation of digital intellectual property in its different forms. Patentability of software is also a topic of major concern, which is problematic due to the non-tangible nature of software as well as the difficulty in specifying what counts as the identity of a piece of software (cf. Turner and Eden, forthcoming b).

## **Moral Responsibility**

Society strongly relies on computers. It relies on them for correct information, for collaboration and social interaction, for aid in decision-making, and for the monitoring and execution of tasks. When computer systems malfunction or make mistakes, harm can be done, in terms of loss of time, money, property, opportunities, or even life and limb. Who is responsible for such harms? Computer professionals, end-users, employers, policy makers and others could all be held responsible for particular harms.

It has even been argued that intelligent computer systems can bear moral responsibility themselves [Dodig-Crnkovic and Persson, 2008]. In computer ethics, it is studied how the moral responsibility of different actors can be defined, and what kinds of decisions should be delegated to computers to begin with. It is studied how a proper assignment of responsibility can minimize harm and allows for attributions of accountability and liability.

## **Foundational Issues in Computer Ethics**

Foundational, metaethical and methodological issues have received considerable attention in computer ethics. Many of these issues have been discussed in the context of the so-called foundationalist debate in computer ethics [Floridi and Sanders, 2002; Himma, 2007a]. This is an ongoing metatheoretical debate on the nature and justification of computer ethics and its relation to metaethical theories. Three questions central to the foundationalist debate are: "Is computer ethics a legitimate field of applied ethics?", "Does computer ethics raise any ethical issues that are new or unique?" and "Does computer ethics require substantially new ethical theories, concepts or methodologies different from those used elsewhere in applied ethics?"

The first question, whether computer ethics is a legitimate field of applied ethics, has often been discussed in the context of the other two questions, with discussants arguing that the legitimacy of computer ethics depends on the existence of unique ethical issues or questions in relation to computer technology. The debate on whether such issues exist has been called the uniqueness debate [Tavani, 2002].

In defense of uniqueness, Maner [1996] has argued that unique features of computer systems, like logical malleability, superhuman complexity and the ability to make exact copies, raise unique ethical issues to which no non-computer analogues exist. Others remain unconvinced that any computer ethics issue is genuinely unique. Johnson [2003] has proposed that issues in computer ethics are new species of traditional moral issues. They are familiar in that they involve traditional ethical concepts and principles like privacy, responsibility, harm and ownership, but the application of these concepts and principles is not straightforward because of special properties of computer technology, which require a rethinking and retooling of ethical notions and new ways of applying them. Floridi and Sanders [2002; Floridi, 2003] do not propose the existence of unique ethical issues but rather argue for the need of new ethical theory. They argue that computer ethics needs a metaethical and macrotheoretical foundation, which they argue be different from the standard macroethical theories like utilitarianism and Kantianism. Instead, they propose a macroethical theory they call Information Ethics, which assigns intrinsic value to information. The theory covers not just digital or analogue information, but in fact analyzes all of reality as having an informational ontology, being built out of informational objects.

Since informational objects are postulated to have intrinsic value, moral consideration should be given to them, including the informational objects produced by computers. In contrast to these various authors, Himma [2007a] has argued that computer technology does not need to raise new ethical issues or require new ethical theories to be a legitimate field of applied ethics. He argues that issues in computer ethics may not be unique and may be approached with traditional ethical theories, and that it nevertheless is a legitimate field because computer technology has given rise to an identifiable cluster of moral issues in much the same way like medical ethics and other fields of applied ethics.

Largely separately from the foundationalist debate, several authors have discussed the issue of proper methodology in computer ethics, discussing standard methods of applied ethics and their limitations for computer ethics [Van den Hoven, 2008; Brey, 2000]. An important recent development that has methodological and perhaps also metaethical ramifications is the increased focus on cultural issues. In intercultural information ethics [Ess and Hongladarom, 2007; Brey, 2007], ethicists attempt to compare and come to grips with the vastly different moral attitudes and behaviors that exist towards information and information technology in different cultures. In line with this development, Gorniak-Kocycowska [1995] and others have argued that the global character of cyberspace requires a global ethics which transcends cultural differences in value systems.

## **Other Topics**

There are many other social and ethical issues that are studied in computer ethics next to these central ones. Some of these include the implications of IT for community, identity, the quality of work, and the quality of life, the relation between information technology and democracy, the ethics of Internet governance and electronic commerce, and the ethics of trust online. Many new ethical issues come up together with the development of new technologies or applications. Recently, much attention has been devoted to ethical aspects of social networking sites like Facebook, MySpace and Youtube, to ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence, and to robotics and artificial agents. The constant addition of new products and services in information technology and the emergence of new uses and correlated social and cultural consequences ensures that the field keeps meeting new challenges.

## **Values and Computer Systems Design**

Although most ethical commentary in the philosophical approach is directed at the use of computers by individuals and organizations, attention has also started to be paid to systems and software themselves. It has come to be recognized that the systems themselves are not morally neutral but contain values and biases in their design that must also be analyzed. Approaches of this sort have been called values in design approaches [Nissenbaum, 1998; Flanagan, Howe and Nissenbaum, 2007]. Values in design approaches hold that computer software and systems can be morally evaluated partially or wholly independently of actual uses of them. They can be said to embody values in the sense that they have a tendency to promote or sustain particular values when used. This may sound like technological determinism, but proponents usually do not subscribe to the strong determinist thesis that embodied values necessitate certain effects in whatever way the system is used.

Yet, they do hold a weak determinism according to which systems may embody values that systematically engender certain effects across a wide range of uses, at least including typical or "normal" ways of using the system. For a system to embody a value, then, means that there is a tendency for that value to be promoted or realized when the system is used. This observation has led proponents to argue that more attention should be paid to ethical aspects in the design of computer systems rather than just their use.

Friedman and Nissenbaum [1996] have studied how values may enter into computer systems, with a focus on justice and bias. They argue that bias can enter into computer systems in three ways. Preexisting bias emerges from the practices and attitudes of designers and the social institutions in which they function. Technical bias arises from technical constraints. Emergent bias arises after the design of the system, when a context of use emerges that is different from the one anticipated. These three origins of bias may be generalized to apply to other values as well. Brey [2000] has

proposed a particular values in design approach termed disclosive computer ethics. He claims that a significant part of the effort of computer ethics should be directed at deciphering and subsequently evaluating embedded moral values in computer software and systems. The focus should be on widely held public and moral values, such as privacy, autonomy, justice, and democracy. Research, Brey argues, should take place at three levels: the disclosure level, at which morally charged features of computer systems are detected and disclosed, the theoretical level, at which relevant moral theory is developed, and the application level, at which ethical theory is used in the evaluation of the disclosed morally charged features. He claims that such research should be interdisciplinary, involving ethicists, computer scientists and social scientists.

The approach of value-sensitive design [Friedman, Kahn and Borning, 2006; Friedman & Kahn, 2003] is not so much concerned with the identification and evaluation of values in computer systems, but rather with the development of methods for incorporating values into the design process. It is an approach to software engineering and systems development that builds on values in design approaches and studies how accepted moral values can be operationalized and incorporated into software and systems. Its proposed methodology integrates conceptual investigations into values, empirical investigations into the practices, beliefs and intentions of users and designers, and technical investigations into the way in which technological properties and mechanisms support or hinder the realization of values. It also seeks procedures to incorporate and balance the values of different stakeholders in the design process.

## **Biotechnology**

The term “techno science” is increasingly being used to refer to such contemporary disciplines as information and communication technology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and to biotechnology. The popularity of the term is illustrated by the fact that even a group of social scientists reporting on the changing attitudes of European public towards biotechnology invokes the term to mark the departure of this particular field from the norms and values once held to be essential to the ethos of science. The evident commercialization and industrialization of biotechnology, with the pursuit of private knowledge, patents and profits, hardly meets Merton's criteria of universalism, communism, disinterestedness and skepticism, or the public's expectations about the values, accountability and social responsibility of science. Biotechnology has become a techno science, a commercial enterprise accountable to financial markets and to shareholders. It is interesting to note that the public, according to these social scientists, have not yet fully accommodated to the new commercial realities of “techno science” and still entertain expectations about science that modern biotechnology is unlikely going to meet.

In the seventeenth century the philosophers Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and René Descartes (1596–1650) advocated a new way of doing science that would have the power to conquer nature for human benefit. (The old science had seemed to be more concerned with contemplating nature than controlling it.) In the contemporary world biotechnology is providing the technology for controlling and changing living nature, including human nature. However, because biotechnological power over the living world offers not only the promise for doing good but also an opportunity for doing evil, this has provoked an ethical debate over the modern scientific project for the mastery of nature through technology.

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## **Biotechnology in History**

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The history of biotechnology can be divided into three periods: ancient, modern, and contemporary. Ancient biotechnology began more than 10,000 years ago with the emergence of agriculture in ancient Mesopotamia. Modern biotechnology began in the nineteenth century with the development of industrial microbiology. Contemporary biotechnology began in the 1970s with new techniques for genetic engineering. In each period one can see the power humans have acquired to manipulate nature. But one also can see the natural limits of this power, which is constrained by the natural potentialities available in wild plants and animals and the natural complexities of behavioral traits in the living world.

Ancient biotechnology began when human beings started to domesticate plants and animals for human use. Throughout most of the history of the human species, spanning approximately six million years, human beings fed themselves by gathering wild plants and hunting wild animals. Then some people in a few parts of the world began to produce food by cultivating domesticated plants and herding domesticated animals. As a consequence those farmers and herders bred for and selected genetic modifications in domesticated organisms that were more suitable to human desires. Even in the early twenty-first century all of human civilization depends on this project in agricultural biotechnology.

The human power of domestication is limited, however, by the natural potentiality of wild plants and animals. Most plant and animal species in the wild are not suitable for domestication. For example, most wild plants are not good as a source of food because they are woody or do not produce fruit, leaves, or roots that are edible. Most wild animals are not susceptible to successful domestication because they cannot be bred and herded in a manner that makes them useful for human beings. Although advances in biological knowledge have increased human biotechnological power over living nature, that power will always be limited by the potentialities found in nature.

Modern biotechnology arose in the nineteenth century as growing knowledge in the biological sciences was applied to the technological manipulation of the living world for human purposes. For example, the chemist Louis Pasteur's (1822–1895) microbiological explanation of fermentation as resulting from the activity of microscopic organisms allowed improvements in the brewing of beer and other industries that depend on using fermentation by yeast to produce food and beverages. Pasteur also showed that infectious diseases are caused by disease-producing microorganisms and perfected techniques for vaccination that would create immunity to some of those diseases. Later, in the twentieth century, the discovery of the ways in which some fungi produce antibiotics such as penicillin revolutionized the medical treatment of bacterial infections. In the early 2000s there are hundreds of pharmaceutical agents derived from fungal fermentation.

However, even modern biotechnology shows the technical limits set by nature. Bacteria vulnerable to fungal toxins can evolve to become resistant to those toxins. Indeed, bacteria have been so successful in evolving tolerance to antibiotics that there is a growing fear in the medical profession that the age of antibiotic protection against infectious diseases is reaching its end. The power of this aspect of biotechnology for controlling living nature is great but limited.

The contemporary biotechnology that began in the last half of the twentieth century arose from a deeper knowledge of genetics and molecular biology and has provided humans with greater power over the living world. Even so, contemporary biotechnology is limited in its technical means by the physical and chemical limits of nature. Contemporary biotechnology began in 1973 when Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen developed the technology for recombinant DNA, which allows scientists to alter DNA molecules and thus artificially create new forms of life. They did this by combining a number of discoveries. Bacteria protect themselves against certain viruses through the use of restriction enzymes that cut up viral DNA at specific sequences of nucleotide bases; this allows a scientist with the right restriction enzyme to cut out a specific genetic sequence. Bacteria contain plasmids, which are small loops of DNA that can pass from one bacterium to another. This allows bacteria to develop antibiotic resistance quickly if the genes for resistance are passed by plasmids. Boyer and Cohen showed how one could use a restriction enzyme to cut out a specific genetic sequence and then glue that sequence into a bacterial plasmid. That plasmid, with its new combination of genetic sequences, could be introduced into a bacterial cell. As the bacterial cell divided, it would produce copies of the recombinant plasmid, which then could be extracted from the bacteria.

An illustration of the value of this recombinant DNA technique is provided by the production of human insulin. People with diabetes do not have enough of the protein insulin to regulate blood-sugar levels. After the 1920s diabetic patients were treated with injections of insulin extracted from pigs and cattle. This is an example of modern biotechnology. Although pig and cow insulin is very similar to human insulin, there are enough differences that some people with diabetes have had allergic reactions. Contemporary biotechnology provided a solution to the problem by using recombinant DNA techniques. The human gene for insulin was identified and then could be inserted into a bacterial cell through a plasmid so that the bacterium would produce human insulin that could be harvested for use by human patients. In 1982 human insulin produced in genetically modified bacteria became the first drug of contemporary biotechnology to be approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Contemporary biotechnology has developed hundreds of products with agricultural, environmental, and medical benefits. Agricultural biotechnology uses reliable techniques for genetic manipulation to produce new kinds of plants and animals to provide food that is cheaper and more nutritious. Environmental biotechnology is used to design genetically modified organisms that can clean up environmental pollution by consuming toxic materials. Medical biotechnology is used to devise new drugs and vaccines and therapeutic techniques that relieve or prevent suffering, cure disease, and enhance physical and mental well-being.

## **Ethical Issues**

Despite its many benefits, biotechnology has provoked ethical controversy in six areas of moral concern: safety, liberty, justice, environmental nature, humannature, and religious beliefs. SAFETY. Safety is a moral concern for opponents of biotechnology who worry that its power disrupts the complex balance in living nature in ways that are likely to be harmful. Individuals such as Jeremy Rifkin (1977) and groups such as Greenpeace have warned that genetically modified crops and foods could endanger human health as well as the health of the environment. Critics of medical biotechnology fear that biotechnology medicine alters the human body and mind in radical ways that could produce harmful consequences—perhaps far into the future—in ways that are hard to foresee.

Proponents of biotechnology such as James Watson (2003) and Michael Fumento (2003) argue that its techniques are so precise and controlled that it tends to be far safer than older forms of technology. Breeders of plants and animals have genetically modified organisms for thousands of years without understanding exactly what they were doing. But biotechnology in the early 2000s provides a better understanding of and greater power over genetic mechanisms so that it is possible to minimize the risks. In fact, there is no clear evidence that any human being among the hundreds of millions who have been exposed has become sick from eating genetically modified foods. Similarly, the risks to human health from medical biotechnology can be reduced by means of careful testing and new techniques for designing drugs and therapies that are designed specifically for individual patients with unique genetic traits. Nevertheless, the history of unforeseen harm from all technologies justifies a cautious approach.

**LIBERTY.** Liberty is a moral concern for those who fear that biotechnology will give some people tyrannical power over others. The history of eugenics, in which governments used coercion to eliminate those judged to be biologically "unfit," illustrates the danger of encroachments on liberty. Libertarian proponents of biotechnology such as Fumento and Virginia Postrel (1998) insist that there should be no threat to liberty as long as biotechnology is chosen freely by individuals in a free market economy. But conservatives such as Leon Kass (2002) worry that people could be coerced informally by social pressure, employers, and insurance companies so that they will feel compelled to adopt biotechnology products and procedures. Moreover, Kass and others suggest that biotech can give parents the power to control the nature and behavior of their children in ways that threaten the liberty of the children.

**JUSTICE.** Justice is a moral concern for people who anticipate that biotechnology will be so expensive that only the richest individuals will benefit from it so that the rich will have an unjust advantage over the poor. Even proponents of biotechnology such as Lee Silver (1998) worry that reproductive biotechnology eventually could divide humanity into two separate species based on the wealth or poverty of their ancestors: the "genrich" who would be genetically designed to be superior and the "genpoor" who would be left behind as biologically inferior beings. Of course in some ways this problem is not unique to biotechnology because rich people always have unfair advantages over the poor, but the libertarian defenders of biotechnology foresee that in a free-market society prices for biotechnology products and services eventually will decline as a result of competition, and this will lessen the advantages of the rich over the poor. Similarly, critics of biotechnology argue that the rich nations of the world will benefit more from this new technology than will the poor nations, yet libertarians predict that international free trade will spread the advantages of biotechnology around the world.

**ENVIRONMENTAL NATURE.** Environmental nature is a moral concern for environmentalists such as Rifkin and Bill McKibben (2003). Those environmentalists predict that biotechnology will promote the replacement of the natural environment with a purely artificial world and that this will deprive human beings of healthy contact with wild nature. They also fear that introducing genetically modified organisms into the environment will produce monstrous forms of life that will threaten human beings and the natural world.

Proponents of biotechnology respond by noting that beginning with agriculture, human beings have been creating genetically modified organisms that transform the environment for thousands of years. All organisms modify their environments, sometimes with global effects. For example, the

oxygen in the earth's atmosphere has been produced over billions of years by photosynthetic organisms. Biologists such as F. John Odling-Smee (2003) have called this "niche construction." So human beings are not unique in their capacity for changing their environments. Although this sometimes has produced disasters such as the extinction of plants and animals and the emergence of new disease-causing agents, people have learned to adjust to these dangers, and contemporary biotechnology provides more precise knowledge and techniques to recognize and avoid such dangers. Moreover, environmental biotechnology is developing new organisms, such as bacteria genetically engineered to metabolize toxic wastes, to restore dangerous natural environments to a condition that is safe for human beings.

## **HUMAN NATURE.**

Human nature is a moral concern for anyone who fears that biotechnology could change or even abolish human nature. Both environmentalists such as Rifkin and McKibben and conservatives such as Kass and Francis Fukuyama (2002) worry that the biotechnological transformation of human nature will produce a "posthuman" world with no place for human dignity rooted in human nature. On the other side of this debate Nick Bolstrom (2003) and others in the World Transhumanist Association welcome the prospect of using biotechnology to move toward a "transhuman" condition. More moderate proponents of biotechnology dismiss both positions for being based on exaggerated views of the power of biotechnology.

In a report by the President's Council on Bioethics (2003) Kass and other members of the council contend that biotechnology expresses a willful lack of humility in pursuing a scientific mastery of nature that carries out the modern scientific project first described by Francis Bacon. When a physician uses medical therapy to restore the health of a patient, the physician cultivates the body's natural capacity for healing to serve the natural goal of health. Such medical treatment is guided in both its means and its ends by nature. But when biotechnologists use genetic engineering or psychotropic drugs to extend human bodily or mental powers beyond their normal range, they act not as nature's servant but as nature's master because they are forcing nature to serve their own willful desires.

As an example Kass and other members of the council point to the use of psychotropic drugs such as Prozac that alter the biochemistry of the brain to elevate mood. Using such drugs to cure severely depressed patients can be justified as therapy directed toward restoring normal mental health, but their use to change human personality radically—perhaps by inducing feelings of contentment that never yield to sadness—would violate the normal range of human mental experience set by nature. The ultimate aim of such a psychopharmacological science would be a drug-dependent fantasy of happiness that would be dehumanizing. Furthermore, scientists such as David Healy (2004) have warned that any drug powerful enough to change human personality is likely to have severely harmful side effects.

The President's Council (2003) warns against the excessive pride inherent in Bacon's project for mastering nature, which assumes that nature is mere material for humans to shape to their desires. Rather, it urges people to adopt an attitude of humility and respect and treat the natural world as a "gift." To respect the "giftedness" of the natural world is to recognize that the world is given to humans as something not fully under their control and that even human powers for changing the world belong to human nature as the unchanging ground of all change (Kass 2003).

Proponents of biotechnology could respond by defending Bacon's project as combining respect

for nature with power over nature. At the beginning of the *Novum Organon* Bacon observed that "nature to be commanded must be obeyed" because "all that man can do is to put together or put asunder natural bodies," and then "the rest is done by nature working within" (Bacon 1955, p. 462). Kass has used the same words in explaining how the power of biotechnology is limited by the potentialities inherent in nature (Kass 1985).

Throughout the history of biotechnology—from the ancient Mesopotamian breeders of plants and animals, to Pasteur's use of microorganisms for fermentation and vaccination, to Boyer and Cohen's techniques for gene splicing—people have employed nature's properties for the satisfaction of human desires. Boyer and Cohen did not create restriction enzymes and bacterial plasmids but discovered them as parts of living nature. They then used those natural processes to bring about outcomes, such as the production of human insulin for persons with diabetes, that would benefit human beings. Biotechnology has the ability to change nature only insofar as it conforms to the laws of nature. To command nature people must obey it.

Baconian biotechnology is thus naturally limited in its technical means because it is constrained by the potentialities of nature. It is also naturally limited in its moral ends because it is directed toward the goals set by natural human desires. Kass and the President's Council (2003) acknowledge this by showing how biotechnology is employed to satisfy natural desires such as the desire of parents for happy children and the desire of all human beings for life and health. As they indicate, it is not enough to respect the "giftedness" of nature because some of the "gifts" of nature, such as diabetes and cancer, are undesirable. People accept some of nature's gifts and reject others on the basis of the desires inherent in human nature.

**RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.** To appreciate life as a gift that should elicit a feeling of humility rather than mastery is a religious emotion. Some of the moral concerns about biotechnology express the religious attitude that life is sacred and therefore the biotechnological manipulation of life shows a lack of reverence for the divinely ordained cosmic order. The biblical story of the Tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1–9) suggests that the human lust for technical power over the world provokes divine punishment.

In 1977 the environmentalist Jeremy Rifkin wrote a book attacking biotechnology with the title *Who Should Play God?: The Artificial Creation of Life and What It Means for the Future of the Human Race*. The title conveys the direction of his argument. The "creation of life" is proper only for God. For human beings to create life "artificially" is a blasphemous transgression of God's law that will bring punishment upon the human race. Rifkin often uses the imagery of the Frankenstein story. Like Doctor Frankenstein, biotech scientists are trying to take God's place in creating life, and the result can only be the creation of monsters. When people such as Rifkin use the phrase "playing God," they evoke a religious sense that nature is a sacred expression of God's will and therefore should not be changed by human intervention. Rifkin has said that "the resacralization of nature stands before us as the great mission of the coming age" (Rifkin 1983, p. 252).

In contrast to Rifkin, Bacon thought that regarding nature as sacred was a pagan idea contrary to biblical religion. In pagan antiquity the natural world was the sacred image of God, but the Bible teaches that God is the transcendent Creator of nature; therefore, God's mysterious will is beyond nature. Although nature declares God's power and wisdom, it does not declare the will and true worship of God. Bacon believed that true religion as based on faith in biblical revelation must be separated from true philosophy based on the rational study of nature's laws (Bacon 1955).

Some biblical theologians, such as Philip Hefner (2003) and Ted Peters (2003), have restated this Baconian claim that the biblical conception of God as the supernatural creator of nature separates the sacred and the natural and thus denies pagan pantheism. They argue that because human beings have been created in God's image and God is the Creator, human beings must share somehow in God's creativity. The Bible declares that when God made humanity in his image, this was to include "dominion" or "mastery" over all the earth, including all the animals (Genesis 1:26–28). Hefner reads the Bible as teaching that human beings are "created cocreators." As "created," humans are creatures and cannot create in the same way as God, who can create *ex nihilo*, "from nothing." However, as "cocreators" people can contribute to changes in creation. Of course, Hefner warns, people must do this as cautious and respectful stewards of God's creation, but it is not appropriate to worship nature as sacred and thus inviolable.

The theological idea of human beings as cocreators was affirmed by Pope John Paul II in his 1981 encyclical *Laborem Exercens* and criticized as a "remarkably bad idea" by the Protestant theologian Stanley Hauerwas (Houck and Williams 1983). In his 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus* the Pope stressed the importance of human technological knowledge in improving the conditions of life (Novak 1993).

That God transcends nature, that nature is thus not sacred, that human beings as created in God's image share in God's creative activity, that human beings have the power and the duty to master nature by artful manipulation, and that they have the moral duty to do this as an activity of charity for the improvement of human life—all the precepts Bacon drew from the Bible to support his view of the new science—have been accepted by some biblical believers. But many of those believers worry that modern science promotes an atheistic materialism that denies the dignity of human beings and of the natural world generally as God's Creation. In particular they worry about whether biotechnology expresses an unduly willful attitude toward the world as merely raw material for human manipulation and survival.

## **Environmental ethics Introduction**

Environmental ethics is a sub-discipline of philosophy that deals with the ethical problems surrounding environmental protection. It aims to provide ethical justification and moral motivation for the cause of global environmental protection.

Body

- Environmental ethics focuses on questions concerning how we ought to inhabit the world; what constitutes a good life or a good society; and who, where, or what merits moral standing. The field emerged most significantly in the 1960s from an increasing awareness of the global environmental condition.
- It is concerned with the issue of responsible personal conduct with respect to natural landscapes, resources, species, and non-human organisms. It is a cluster of beliefs, values and norms regarding how humans should interact with the environment.

## **Issues involved in environmental ethics**

- a) **Consumption of natural resources:** Since humans are part of nature, sustainable use of resources can be achieved through cooperation with nature.
- b) **Destruction of forests:** Big industries and multinational companies form the major section which exploits forests unsustainably. However, the brunt of the destruction is faced by the poor

and tribals who are the inhabitants of the forests. It leads to the loss of biodiversity, habitats and extinction of plants and animals.

- c) **Environmental pollution:** Consequences of environmental pollution do not respect national boundaries. Moreover, the poor and weaker sections of society are disproportionately affected by negative effects of climate change.
- d) **Anthropocentrism:** It refers to an ethical framework that grants “moral standing” solely to human beings. Thus, an anthropocentric ethic claims that only human beings are morally considerable in their own right, meaning that all the direct moral obligations we possess, including those we have with regard to the environment, are owed to our fellow human beings.
- e) **Equity:** People living in the economically-advanced sections/ parts use greater amount of resources and energy per individual and also waste more resources. This is at the cost of poor people who are resource-deprived.
- f) **Animal rights:** The plants and animals that share the Earth with us too have a right to live and share the Earth’s resources and living space. Animal welfare is relevant to environmental ethics because animals exist within the natural environment and thus form part of environmentalists’ concerns.

## Measures to maintain environmental ethics

- The “**land ethic**” of Aldo Leopold: It demands that we stop treating the land as a mere object or resource. Land is not merely soil, instead, it is a fountain of energy, flowing through a circuit of soils, plants and animals.
- In order to preserve the relations within the land, Leopold claims that we must move towards a “land ethic”, thereby granting moral standing to the land community itself, not just its individual members.

## Deep ecology: There are eight principles or statements that are basic to deep ecology:

- The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
- Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
- Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
- The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
- Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
- Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
- The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living.
- Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

**The conservation ethics and traditional value systems:** Since olden days, people have always valued mountains, rivers, forests, trees and several animals. Thus, much of nature was venerated and

protected. Traditions held plants and animals as an important aspect of nature and were considered the basis of life-support systems and integral to bring about a harmonious life.

**Virtue ethics:** Virtue ethics is a way of thinking about how to behave well, which focuses on the character of moral agents and the nature of the good life. Virtue ethics is based on a positive view of human nature, one that takes into account that humans are strongly predisposed to recognize excellence in others (including non-human) whom they can take as role models and gain fulfillment from a life lived virtuously.

## Conclusion

To cope with the issues of environmental ethics, human beings must reach some value consensus and cooperate with each other at the personal, national, regional, multinational and global levels. Global environmental protection depends on global governance. An environmental ethic is, therefore, typically a global ethic with a global perspective.

## Nature as means or end

From the Latin *natura* (Gr. φύσις), a term with many related meanings in philosophy and with extensive applications in theology. Among philosophers it is commonly taken to mean the essence of a thing as this is the source of its properties or operations; more strictly, however, it is a primary and per se principle of motion and rest that is found in natural things as opposed to artifacts. It is sometimes used in the more restricted sense of human nature, for which meaning see man. Theologians use the term in opposition to grace or to supernature, particularly when discussing human nature, and in opposition to person, particularly in Trinitarian theology and Christology.

Since nature is the proper subject of the philosophy of nature, the major emphasis in this article is on nature as studied in natural philosophy. Topics treated include the primary meanings of the concept, its development among the Greeks, modifications in it occasioned by the rise of modern science, an Aristotelian analysis of its meaning in natural philosophy, and various secondary meanings.

**Primary Meanings.** On Nature (Περὶ φύσεως) is the title under which the writings of the pre-Socratics have been handed down to posterity. Some doubt exists as to what precisely was the first meaning, but it is generally admitted that at least an early and important use of the term φύσις was to designate the primordial stuff or underlying substratum persisting through all change. It is likely that the early Ionian philosophers imagined the world as developing in an orderly fashion from within, somewhat as a living being, and hence the primary substance would have been viewed, though indistinctly, as a source of activity. Thus φύσις was an intrinsic principle that accounted for the ceaseless change or becoming of things. Moreover, the very process of becoming, it seems, was itself called φύσις, a term that is etymologically related to φύω, to grow (cf. Lat. *natura* and *nascor*). Finally, at some later date the term was applied to the changing things themselves taken in their totality. This is possibly the most common sense of nature in modern usage and was probably the meaning of φύσις intended in the title Περὶ φύσεως.

**Greek Development.** The attempt of the Ionians of the 6th century b.c. to explain all becoming in terms of one material principle (e.g., water or air or fire) reached its logical conclusion in Parmenides with the very denial of nature as process. For Parmenides all being must be one and exclude all nonbeing; as such it is perfectly immutable, and only as such is it knowable; all change is but sensory illusion. After Parmenides, there was an attempt to reconcile being, stable object of intel-

lect, with the becoming of sensory experience. Fundamental reality remained immutable; it was, however, multiple: the four elements of Empedocles; the "seeds," infinite in number, of Anaxagoras; the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus. These particles, in motion, combined and separated, and as such were principles of change and of a multiplicity of changing compounds. The atomists, with their homogeneous particles differing only in size and shape, interpreted all change in terms of movement in space ("void") and all sensible qualities, such as color, in terms of quantitative differences. They have been considered as forerunners to modern science. So too have the Pythagoreans, who, from the 6th century B.C., had been seeking to explain the world in the light of numbers. The claim to find the ultimate explanation of reality in the random motions of corporeal elements, i.e., in nature and chance, was strongly opposed by Plato. If nature means the primary source of becoming, what is truly nature, for him, could only be what is really first, and that is intelligence and art. Thus, with Plato, nature in the commonly accepted sense gave way to divine soul, and chance to divine direction (Laws 888E–899D). Finality, introduced as conscious design, was lodged in a principle (soul) distinct from the purely corporeal. Likewise, the intelligibility of sensible bodies was to be sought beyond them, in the changeless, purely intelligible Ideas, of which they are imperfect imitations. The order of the sensible world could be seen, too, in terms of the a priori principles of pure number. As for the changing imitations considered in themselves, of these there could be no science, but only a likely account.

Nature was reinstated as a true principle and a real source of explanation within the material universe by Aristotle, who thus restored the philosophy of nature to the rank of a science (*scientia*). Aristotle continued the naturalist tradition of the pre-Socratics, his science being qualitative rather than mathematical, empirical rather than rationalist. It was far from being a mere return, however. After Plato there was form to be reckoned with. In Aristotle the natural world becomes intelligible in itself only because nature is identified with form in matter—with form now seen as the actuality of matter—even more properly than with matter itself. This form becomes the origin of activity, and matter, considered in itself, is reduced to a principle of mere passivity and receptivity. The realization of form in matter is the goal of natural activity, and although there are various combinations and separations of elements, it is always for the sake of a form; hence, the teleological view, as opposed to the mechanistic, remains dominant. But purpose is now found in the unconscious workings of form as well as in the conscious activities of rational soul. Although Aristotle conceived the natural universe as impregnated with and illuminated by form, for the ultimate explanation he too reached beyond nature. It is the desire to imitate the fully actual reality of Pure Form that, in the final analysis, explains all the ceaseless processes of nature.

**Later Modifications.** Both the Platonist and the Aristotelian view of nature extended into the Middle Ages. The early period was largely Neoplatonist, but in the 13th century the commentaries of St. Albert the Great and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas brought the Aristotelian doctrine of nature into the foreground.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the rapid development of the new empirico-mathematical science was accompanied by an emphatic rejection of teleology: the conception of nature tending to ends. At first, change was Platonistically explained by an inherent, creative principle (*natura naturans*) animating and directing the world of nature (*natura naturata*)—terms that go back to the Latin translation of Averroës. Before long, however, under the influence of F. Bacon, J. Kepler, G. Galilei, R. Descartes, I. Newton, and others, the account became thoroughly mechanistic. With the rejection of the geocentric astronomy and the adoption of the universal law of gravitation, the qualitatively differentiated world of Aristotle gave place to a totally homogeneous universe. Purely qual-

itative differences, such as color, were considered to be functions of quantitative structure, and were soon dismissed as mere appearances to a sentient mind. Matter as potency was replaced by matter as mass and extension. All change was reduced to the motion of smallest parts in space; all causality, to prior events, i.e., to prior motions, identical causes being followed by identical effects. The spontaneous activity of bodies gave way to the idea of force (impact, attraction) and the impulse toward ends was displaced by inertia, the disposition to remain always the same. Nature thus became, for the scientist and the philosopher of nature alike, a mechanical system of inert, homogeneous mass-bodies, situated in space and time, moved by external forces, and utterly devoid of all but quantitative properties.

In the 20th century, the adequacy of purely mechanistic principles of explanation has been seriously questioned for the biological and psychological sciences. Further, the scientific theories of evolution along with the physicist's conception of matter as energy have made more generally acceptable a view that was already to some degree in evidence in the philosophies of G. W. Leibniz and G. W. F. Hegel, viz, the idea of nature as internally active and engaged in process. This conception, to which in some instances has been added the idea of aim, has found philosophical expression in the works of such thinkers as H. Bergson, S. Alexander, and A.N. Whitehead.

**Aristotelian Analysis.** A fuller presentation of the Aristotelian concept of nature, which has been generally adopted by scholastic thinkers, entails considering his definition of nature, nature as passive, nature as active, end as nature, and related concepts.

**Definition of Nature.** Aristotle (Phys. 192b 8–32) reached his definition of nature by way of a comparison of the things that exist by nature (viz, animals and their parts, plants and simple bodies) with those that exist by other causes, in particular by art. The former are seen to have within them a tendency to move, i.e., to change. The artifact as such has no such tendency. It has an inclination to change only accidentally insofar as it is made of a natural substance. Nature, then, concluded Aristotle, is the principle or cause of being moved and being at rest in that in which it is primarily, by reason of itself and not accidentally.

"Being moved" implies passivity. Strictly speaking, the principle that constitutes a thing as a mover is a nature only when the mover by its activity is itself moved. Also, motion here includes any kind of corporeal change, accidental or substantial; it excludes, however, spiritual operations, such as intellection. "Rest" implies the attainment of the end to which the movement was directed. The phrase "by reason of itself and not accidentally" excludes such cases as the doctor who cures himself. The art of medicine is, in this case, intrinsic but accidental to the one who is being cured, considered as such.

**Nature as Passive.** Nature, thus defined, was identified by Aristotle first (Phys. 193a 10–30) with matter taken as the substratum of change, i.e., as the passive, potential principle of being moved. In opposition to the pre-Socratics, Aristotle conceived of the ultimate material principle (primary matter) as being of itself bereft of all form, purely passive, pure potentiality. The matter, however, from which becoming proceeds, taken in its concrete existence, is always determined matter. The substantial form currently possessed, determining the matter in a particular way, always limits and defines matter's immediate potentialities. This is true both for the potency of primary matter for new substantial forms and more obviously for the accidental receptivities characteristic of any given being. Furthermore, since the form already possessed by the matter can be the source of certain activities as well, the matter on which a natural agent operates, just as it is

never pure potency, need not be entirely passive. Its activity, in fact, may run contrary to the aim of the agent.

Nature as Active. It is especially with form, however, that Aristotle is concerned to identify nature (Phys. 193a 30-b 19). The ancients, not distinguishing the two principles of matter and form, had conceived of their primordial stuff as already determined and capable of activity. Once substantial form is disassociated from matter and recognized as principle of essential determination, source of activity, and end of generation, it becomes obvious that form more than matter deserves to be called nature. Nature, then, as active principle of movement, is substantial form. (Note that, although one says "Nature acts," strictly speaking it is the composite substance that acts in virtue of its nature.)

Form is the source of two different types of activity in nature. First and more obviously, form is the intrinsic source of the vital activities of the living body. As such, it is known as soul. And as such it is a nature, since, by these activities, the living being is itself moved. The soul, in fact, is the primary source of activity whereby one part of the heterogeneous composite moves another part. Moreover, all the vital activities are either movements themselves (e.g., growth) or essentially connected with movements (e.g., sensation) or they pre-suppose movements (e.g., intellection). The soul, however, is also the principle of generation, an activity that is essentially directed to another substance. But even as such, it is a nature, insofar as the movement takes place within the same species, if not within the same individual.

Second, form is the intrinsic source of the spontaneous activities characteristic of a given body, e.g., a chemical element. Inanimate bodies, not having differentiated parts, do not move themselves. Their activities, on the contrary, are directed to other bodies that in turn may affect them. The forms, in this case, satisfy the requirement of interiority in the definition of nature insofar as they are parts within a system of interrelated active and passive potencies.

In Aristotle's cosmology, however, there are certain movements of bodies that do arise from an intrinsic source (Phys. 254b 33–255b 31), as in his example of a body falling to the ground—a movement that does not appear to require an external agent. In this case, however, nature functions as a principle of activity without constituting the thing as a mover. The body, in fact, does not move itself, part moving part, as does the living thing. For Aristotle, rather, the movement arises spontaneously from the impulse of the form toward what is appropriate to it, which, in this instance, is a suitable environment.

### **End as Nature.**

Whether a movement is natural or not cannot always be determined by sole reference to the active and passive principles. The determining factor is ultimately the end of becoming, and this too is nature.

Nature, in one sense, has been identified with the receptive and determinable principle. There are, however, in the world of nature, potencies that are not natural: the capacity of a natural body to take on an artificial form, or the capacity to be altered by some violent action. The natural potency differs from these in that it is a positive inclination to an act that perfects or fulfills the being so inclined, or else contributes to the good of the species or even to the good of the universe as a whole. The passive principle in nature, moreover, is normally related to a natural agent, through the activity of which it is brought to act. The activity of natural agents is accounted for by the tendency of the form in nature to actualize and bring to completion what is potential either within the same

individual or beyond. The natural agent, then, actively tends to that good or perfection to which the potential principle is passively inclined. Furthermore, the natural agent, fixed in its species by its form, is also determined by this same principle with respect to specific goals, which it attains for the most part. Thus the acts to which it naturally directs matter by its activity are determinate acts. It is in this sense that a nature is said to act for an end. (Obviously, the end as a good is more easily recognized in the activity of living beings than it is in the workings of the inanimate world.) Consequently, it is the act or form, considered as the end to which a natural being tends either actively or passively, that determines whether a process is or is not in accordance with nature. And in those cases where the good of the whole is in opposition to the good of the individual (as in the case of corruption), it is the former that takes precedence as a determining principle.

The form considered as end, furthermore, is itself properly called nature. It is a principle of becoming, and one that, in the essential order of things, is prior even to the passive and active principles as such. It is also intrinsic, insofar as natural movements are for the sake of the form (*finis cui*) from which they spring. In fact, the natural form seeks its own preservation and development within the individual; it tends by generation to its own continuance, as a specific form, in other individuals; and ultimately, by realizing its specific ends, it contributes to the order and preservation of the universe, i.e., to the good of the whole of which it is a part.

Related Concepts. Art, violence, and chance are all active principles that presuppose nature but operate outside the order of natural finality.

**Secondary Meanings.** From nature meaning the form or essence that is the end of generation, the word has been extended to signify any essence whatsoever without reference at all to becoming. This sense, as applicable to any being, material or immaterial, is frequently conveyed by the terms definition and quiddity. A meaning somewhat closer to the original is that of essence as the source of any activity, whether of physical movement or of spiritual operation (*De ente* 1). This sense, too, is sometimes conveyed by the term substance.

### **Aldo-Leopold; land-ethics**

When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in Troy, he hanged all on one rope a dozen slave-girls of his household whom he suspected of misbehavior during his absence. This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls were property. The disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and wrong. Concepts of right and wrong were not lacking from Odysseus'. Greece: witness the fidelity of his wife through the long years before at last his black galleys clove the wine-dark seas for home. The ethical structure of that day covered wives, but had not yet been extended to human chattels. During the three thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages - in those judged by expediency only.

### **The Ethical Sequence**

This extension of ethics, so far studied only by philosophers, is actually a process in ecological evolution. Its sequences may be described in ecological as well as in philosophical terms. An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence. An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist calls these symbioses. Politics and economics are advanced symbioses in which the original free-for-all competition has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mech-

organisms with an ethical content. The complexity of co-operative mechanisms has increased with population density, and with the efficiency of tools. It was simpler, for example, to define the anti-social uses of sticks and stones in the days of the mastodons than of bullets and billboards in the age of motors. The first ethics dealt with the relation between individuals; the Mosaic Decalogue is an example. Later accretions dealt with the relation between the individual and society. The Golden Rule tries to integrate the individual to society; democracy to integrate social organization to the individual. There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus' slave-girls, is still property. The land-relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations.

The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is, if I read the evidence correctly, an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity. It is the third step in a sequence. The first two have already been taken. Individual thinkers since the days of Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the despoliation of land is not only inexpedient but wrong. Society, however, has not yet affirmed their belief. I regard the present conservation movement as the embryo of such an affirmation. An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for meeting ecological situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions, that the path of social expediency is not discernible to the average individual. Animal instincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting such situations. Ethics are possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making.

### **The Community Concept**

All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete for his place in the community, but his ethics prompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be a place to compete for). The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.

This sounds simple: do we not already sing our love for and obligation to the land of the free and the home of the brave? Yes, but just what and whom do we love? Certainly not the soil, which we are sending helter-skelter downriver. Certainly not the waters, which we assume have no function except to turn turbines, float barges, and carry off sewage. Certainly not the plants, of which we exterminate whole communities without batting an eye. Certainly not the animals, of which we have already extirpated many of the largest and most beautiful species. A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, - management, and use of these 'resources,' but it does affirm their right to continued existence, and, at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural state.

In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such. In human history, we have learned (I hope) that the conqueror role is eventually self-defeating. Why? Because it is implicit in such a role that the conqueror knows, ex cathedra, just what makes the community clock tick; and just what and who is valuable, and what and who is worthless, in community life. It always turns out that he knows neither, and this is why his conquests eventually defeat themselves.

In the biotic community, a parallel situation exists. Abraham knew exactly what the land was for: it was to drip milk and honey into Abraham's mouth. At the present moment, the assurance with which we regard this assumption is inverse to the degree of our education: The ordinary citizen today assumes that science knows what makes the community clock tick; the scientist is equally

sure that he does not. He knows that the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings may never be fully understood: That man is, in fact, only a member 'of a biotic team is shown by an ecological interpretation of history. Many historical events, hitherto explained solely in terms of human enterprise, were actually biotic interactions between people and land. The characteristics of the land determined the facts quite as potently as the characteristics of the men who lived on it.

Consider, for example, the settlement of the Mississippi valley. In the years following the Revolution, three groups were contending for its control: the native Indian, the French and English traders, and the American settlers. Historians wonder what would have happened if the English at Detroit had thrown a little more weight into the Indian side of those tipsy scales which decided the outcome of the colonial migration into the cane-lands of Kentucky. It is time now to ponder the fact that the cane-lands, when subjected to the particular mixture of forces represented by the cow, plow, fire, and axe of the pioneer, became bluegrass.

What if the plant succession inherent in this dark and bloody ground had, under the impact of these forces, given us some worthless sedge, shrub, or weed? Would Boone and Kenton have held out? Would there have been any overflow into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri? Any Louisiana Purchase? Any transcontinental union of new states? Any Civil War?

Kentucky was one sentence in the drama of history. We are commonly told what the human actors in this drama tried to do, but we are seldom told that their success, or the lack of it, hung in large degree on the reaction of particular soils to the impact of the particular forces exerted by their occupancy. In the case of Kentucky, we do not even know where the bluegrass came from whether it is a native species, or a stowaway from Europe.

Contrast the cane-lands with what hindsight tells us about the Southwest, where the pioneers were equally brave, resourceful, and persevering. The impact of occupancy here brought no bluegrass, or other plant fitted to withstand the bumps and buffetings of hard use. This region, when grazed by livestock, reverted through a series of more and more worthless grasses, shrubs, and weeds to a condition of unstable equilibrium. Each recession of plant types bred erosion; each increment to erosion bred a further recession of plants. The result today is a progressive and mutual deterioration, not only of plants and soils, but of the animal community subsisting thereon. The early settlers did not expect this: on the cienegas of New Mexico some even cut ditches to hasten it. So subtle has been its progress that few residents of the region are aware of it. It is quite invisible to the tourist who finds this wrecked landscape colorful and charming (as indeed it is, but it bears scant resemblance to what it was in 1848).

This same landscape was 'developed' once before, but with quite different results. The Pueblo Indians settled the Southwest in pre-Colombian times, but they happened not to be equipped with range live stock. Their civilization expired, but not because their land expired. In India, regions devoid of any sod-forming grass have been settled, apparently without wrecking the land, by the simple expedient of carrying the grass to the cow, rather than vice versa. (Was this the result of some deep wisdom, or was it just good luck? I do not know.) In short, the plant succession staved the course of history; the pioneer simply demonstrated, for good or ill, what successions inhered in the land. Is history taught in this spirit? It will be, once the concept of land as a community really penetrates our intellectual life.

## The Ecological Conscience

Conservation is a state of harmony between men and land. Despite nearly a century of propaganda, conservation still proceeds at a snail's pace; progress still consists largely of letterhead pieties and convention oratory. On the back forty we still slip two steps backward for each forward stride. The usual answer to this dilemma is 'more conservation education.' No one will debate this, but is it certain that only the volume of education needs stepping up? Is something lacking in the content as well? It is difficult to give a fair summary of its content in brief form, but, as I understand it, the content is substantially this: obey the law, vote right, join some organizations, and practice what conservation is profitable on your own land; the government will do the rest. Is not this formula too easy to accomplish anything worth while? It defines no right-or-wrong, assigns no obligation, calls for no sacrifice, implies no change in the current philosophy of values. In respect of land use, it urges only enlightened self-interest. Just how far will such education take us? An example will perhaps yield a partial answer.

By 1930 it had become clear to all except the ecologically blind that southwestern Wisconsin's topsoil was slipping seaward. In 1933 the farmers were told that if they would adopt certain remedial practices for five years, the public would donate CCC labor to install them, plus the necessary machinery and materials. The offer was widely accepted, but the practices were widely forgotten when the five-year contract period was up. The farmers continued only those practices that yielded an immediate and visible economic gain, for themselves.

This led to the idea that maybe farmers would learn more quickly if they themselves wrote the rules. Accordingly the Wisconsin Legislature in 1937 passed the Soil Conservation District Law. This said to farmers, in effect: We, the public, will furnish you free technical service and loan you specialized machinery, if you will unite your own rules for land-use. Each county may write its own rules, and these will have the force of law. Nearly all the counties promptly organized to accept the proffered help, but after a decade of operation, no county has yet written a single rule. There has been visible progress in such practices as strip-cropping, pasture renovation, and soil liming, but none in fencing woodlots against grazing, and none in excluding plow and cow from steep slopes. The farmers, in short, have selected those remedial practices which were profitable anyhow, and ignored those which were profitable to the community, but not clearly profitable to themselves.

When one asks why no rules have been written, one is told that the community is not yet ready to support them; education must precede rules. But the education actually in progress makes no mention of obligations to land over and above those dictated by self-interest. The net result is that we have more education but less soil, fewer healthy woods, and as many floods as in 1937.

The puzzling aspect of such situations is that the existence of obligations over and above self-interest is taken for granted in such total community enterprises as the betterment of roads, schools, churches, and baseball teams. Their existence is not taken for granted, nor as yet seriously discussed, in bettering the behavior of the water that falls on the land, or in the preserving of the beauty or diversity of the farm landscape. Land use ethics are still governed wholly by economic self-interest, just as social ethics were a century ago.

To sum up: we asked the farmer to do what he conveniently could to save his soil, and he has done just that, and only that. The farmer who clears the woods off a 75 percent slope, turns his cows

into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society. If he puts lime on his fields and plants his crops on contour, he is still entitled to all the privileges and emoluments of his Soil Conservation District. The District is a beautiful piece of social machinery, but it is coughing along on two cylinders because we have been too timid, and too anxious for quick success, to tell the farmer the true magnitude of his obligations. Obligations have no meaning without conscience, and -the problem we face is the extension of the social conscience from people to land.

No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual emphasis loyalties, affections, and convictions. The proof that- conservation has not yet touched these foundations of conduct lies in the fact that philosophy and religion have not yet heard of it. In our attempt to make conservation easy, we have made it trivial.

### **Substitutes for a Land Ethic**

When the logic of history hungers for bread and we hand out a stone, we are at pains to explain how much the stone resembles bread. I now describe some of the stones which serve in lieu of a land ethic. One basic weakness in a conservation system based wholly on economic motives is that most members of the land community, have no economic value. Wildflowers and songbirds are examples. Of the 22,000 higher plants and animals native to Wisconsin, it is doubtful whether more than 5 per cent can be sold, fed, eaten, or otherwise put to economic use. Yet members of the biotic community; and if (as I believe) its stability depends on its integrity, they are entitled to continuance. When one of these non-economic categories is threatened; and if we happen to love it, we invent subterfuges to give it economic importance. At the beginning of the century songbirds were supposed to be disappearing. Ornithologists jumped to the rescue with some distinctly shaky evidence to the effect that insects would eat us up if birds failed to control them. The evidence had to be economic in order to be valid. It is painful to read these -circumlocutions today. We have no land ethic yet, but we have at least drawn nearer the point of admitting that birds should continue as a matter of biotic right, regardless of the presence or absence of economic advantage to us.

A parallel situation exists in respect of predatory mammals, raptorial birds, and fish-eating birds. Time was when biologists somewhat overworked the evidence that these creatures preserve the health of game by killing weaklings, or that they control rodents for the farmer, or that they prey only on 'worthless' species. Here again, the evidence had to be economic in order to be valid. It is only in recent years that we hear the more honest argument that predators are members of the community, and that no special interest has the right to exterminate them for the sake of a benefit, real or fancied, to itself. Unfortunately this enlightened view is still in the talk stage. In the field the extermination of predators goes merrily on: witness the impending erasure of the timber wolf by fiat of Congress, the Conservation Bureaus, and many state legislatures.

Some species of trees have been 'read out of the party' by economics-minded foresters because they grow too slowly, or have too low a sale value to pay as - timber crops: white cedar, tamarack, cypress, beech, and hemlock are examples. In Europe, where forestry is ecologically - more advanced, the non-commercial tree species are recognized as members of the native forest community, to be preserved as such, within reason. Moreover some (like beech) have been found to have a valuable function in building up soil fertility. The interdependence of the forest and its constituent tree species, ground flora, and fauna is taken for granted.

Lack of economic value is sometimes a character not only of species or groups, but of entire biotic communities: marshes, bogs, dunes, and 'deserts' are examples. Our formula in such cases is to relegate their conservation to government as refuges, monuments, or parks. The difficulty is that these communities are usually interspersed with more valuable private lands; the government cannot possibly own or control such scattered parcels. The net effect is that we have relegated some of them to ultimate extinction over large areas. If the private owner were ecologically minded, he would be proud to be the custodian of a reasonable proportion of such areas, which add diversity and beauty to his farm and to his community. In some instances, the assumed lack of profit in these 'waste' areas has proved to be wrong, but only after most of them had been done away with. The present scramble to reflood muskrat marshes is a case in point.

There is a clear tendency in American conservation to relegate to government all necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform. Government ownership, operation, -subsidy, or regulation is now widely prevalent in forestry, range management, soil and watershed management, park and wilderness conservation, fisheries management, and migratory bird management, with more to come. Most of this growth in governmental conservation is proper and logical, some of it is inevitable. That I imply no disapproval of it is implicit in the fact that I have spent most of my life working for it. Nevertheless the question arises: What is the ultimate magnitude of the enterprise? Will the tax base carry its eventual ramifications? At what point will governmental conservation, like the mastodon, become handicapped by its own dimensions? The answer, if there is any, seems to be in a land ethic, or some other force which assigns more obligation to the private landowner.

Industrial landowners and users, especially lumbermen and stockmen, are inclined to wail long and loudly about the extension of government ownership and regulation to land, but (with notable exceptions) they show little disposition to develop the only visible alternative: the voluntary practice of conservation on their own lands. When the private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act for the good of the community, he today assents only without stretched palm. If the act costs him cash this is fair and proper, but when it costs only fore-thought, open-mindedness, or time, the issue is at least debatable. The overwhelming growth of land-use subsidies in recent years must be ascribed, in large part, to the government's own agencies for conservation education: the land bureaus, the agricultural colleges, - and the extension services. As far as I can detect, no ethical obligation toward land is taught in these institutions.

To sum up: a system of conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value, but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning. It assumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of the biotic cluck will function without the uneconomic parts. It tends to relegate to government many functions eventually too large, too complex, or too widely dispersed to be performed by government. An ethical obligation on the part of the private owner is the only visible remedy for these situations.

## **The Land Pyramid**

An ethic to supplement and guide the economic relation to land presupposes the existence of some mental image of land as a biotic mechanism. We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in. The image commonly employed in conservation education is 'the balance of nature.' For reasons too lengthy to detail here, this figure of speech \* fails to describe accurately what little we know about the land mechanism.- A much

truer image is the one employed in ecology: the biotic pyramid. I shall first sketch the pyramid as a symbol of develop some of its implications in terms of land-use.

Plants absorb energy from the sun. This energy flows through a circuit called the biota, which may be represented by a pyramid consisting of layers. The bottom layer is the soil. A plant layer rests on the soil, an insect layer on the plants, a bird and rodent layer on the insects, and so on up through various animal groups to the apex layer, which consists of the larger carnivores. The species of a layer are alike not in where they came from, or in what they look like, but rather in what they eat. Each successive layer depends on those below it for food and often for other services, and each in turn furnishes food and services to those above. Proceeding upward, each successive layer decreases in numerical abundance. Thus, for every carnivore there are hundreds of his prey, thousands of their prey, millions of insects, uncountable plants. The pyramidal form of the system reflects this numerical progression from apex to base. Man shares an intermediate layer with the bears, raccoons, and squirrels which eat both meat and vegetables.

The lines of dependency for food and other services are called food chains. Thus soil-oak-deer-Indian is a chain that has now been largely converted to soil-corn-cow-farmer. Each species, including ourselves, is a link in many chains. The deer eats a hundred plants other than oak, and the cow a hundred plants other than corn. Both; then, are links in a hundred chains. The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the cooperation and competition of its diverse parts.

In the beginning; the pyramid of life was low and squat; the food chains short and simple. Evolution has added layer after layer, link after link. Man is one of thousands of accretions to the height and complexity of the pyramid. Science has given us many doubts, .but it has given us at least one certainty: the trend ; of evolution .is to elaborate and diversify the biota. Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals. Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upward; death and decay return it to the soil. The circuit is not closed; some energy is dissipated in decay, some is added by absorption from the air, some is stored in soils, peats and longlived forests; but it is a sustained circuit, like a slowly augmented revolving fund of life. There is always a net loss by downhill wash, but this is normally small and offset by the decay of rocks. It is deposited in the ocean and, in the course of geological time, raised to form new lands and new pyramids.

The velocity and character of the upward flow of energy depend on the complex structure of the plant and animal community, much as the upward flow of sap in a tree depends on its complex cellular organization. Without this complexity, normal circulation would presumably not occur. Structure means the characteristic numbers, as well as the characteristic kinds and functions, of the component species. This interdependence between the .complex structure of the land and its smooth functioning as -an, energy unit is one of its basic attributes.

When a change occurs in one part: of the circuit, may other parts must adjust themselves to it. Change does not . necessarily obstruct or divert the flow of energy; evolution is a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which has been to elaborate the flow, mechanism, and to lengthen. the circuit. Evolutionary changes; however, are usually slow and local. Man's invention of tools has enabled him to make changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity, and scope.

One change is in the composition of floras and faunas. The larger predators are lopped off the apex of the pyramid; food chains, for the first time in history, become shorter rather than longer. Domesticated species from other lands are substituted for wild ones, and wild ones are moved to new habitats. In this world-wide pooling of faunas and floras, some species get out of bounds as pests and diseases, others are, extinguished. Such effects are seldom intended or foreseen; they represent unperfected and often untraceable readjustments in the structure. Agricultural science is largely a race between the emergence of new pests and the emergence of new techniques for their control.

Another change touches the flow of energy through plants and animals and its return to the soil. Fertility is the ability of soil to receive, store, and release energy. Agriculture, by overdrafts on the soil, or by too radical a substitution of domestic for native species in the superstructure; may derange the channels of flow or deplete storage. Soils depleted of their storage, or of the organic matter which anchors it, wash away faster than they form. This is erosion. Waters, like soil; are part of the energy circuit. Industry, by polluting waters or obstructing them with dams, may exclude the plants and animals necessary to keep energy incirculation.

Transportation brings about another basic change: the plants or animals grown in one region are now consumed and returned to the soil in another. Transportation taps the energy stored in rocks, and in the air, and uses it elsewhere; thus we fertilize the garden with nitrogen gleaned by the guano birds from the fishes of seas on the other side of the Equator. Thus the formerly localized and self-contained circuits are pooled on a world-wide scale.

The process of altering the pyramid for human occupation releases stored energy, and this often gives rise, during the pioneering period; to a deceptive exuberance of plant and animal life, both wild and tame. These releases of biotic capital tend to becloud or postpone the penalties of violence.

This thumbnail sketch of land as an energy circuit conveys three basic ideas:

1. That land is not merely soil.
2. That the native plants and animals kept the energy circuit open; others may or may not.
3. That man-made changes are of a different order than evolutionary changes, and have effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen.

These ideas, collectively; raise two basic issues: Can the land adjust itself to the new order? Can the desired alterations be accomplished with less violence? Biotas seem to differ in their capacity to sustain violent conversion. Western Europe, for example, carries a far different pyramid than Caesar found there. Some large animals are lost; swampy forests have become meadows or plowland; many new plants and animals are introduced, some of which escape as pests; the remaining natives are greatly changed in distribution and abundance. Yet the soil is still there and, with the help of imported nutrients, still fertile; the waters flow normally; the new structure seems to function and to persist. There is no visible stoppage or derangement of the circuit.

Western Europe, then, has a resistant biota. Its inner processes are tough, elastic, resistant to strain. No matter how violent the alterations, the pyramid, so far, has developed some new *modus vivendi* which preserves its habitability for man, and for most of the other natives. Japan seems to

present another instance of radical conversion without disorganization. Most other civilized regions, and some as yet barely touched by civilization, display various stages of disorganization, varying from initial symptoms to advanced wastage: In Asia Minor and North Africa diagnosis is confused by climatic changes, which may have been either the cause or the effect of advanced wastage. In the United States the degree of disorganization varies locally; it is worst in the Southwest, the Ozarks, and parts of the South, and least in New England and the Northwest. Better land-uses may still arrest it in the less advanced regions. In parts of Mexico, South America, South Africa, and Australia a violent and accelerating wastage is in progress, but I cannot assess the prospects.

This almost world-wide display of disorganization in the land seems to be similar to disease in an animal, except that it never culminates in complete disorganization or death. The land recovers, but at some reduced level of complexity, and with a reduced carrying capacity for people, plants, and animals: Many biotas currently regarded as lands of opportunity' are in fact already subsisting on exploitative agriculture, i.e. they have already exceeded their sustained carrying capacity. Most of South America is overpopulated in this sense.

In arid regions we attempt to offset the process of wastage by reclamation, but it is only too evident that the prospective longevity of reclamation projects is often short. In our own West, the best of them may not last a century.

The combined evidence of history and ecology seems to support one general deduction: the less violent the man-made changes, the greater the probability of successful readjustment in the pyramid. Violence, in turn, varies with human population density; a dense population requires a more violent conversion. In this respect, North America has a better chance for permanence than Europe, if she can contrive to limit her density.

This deduction runs counter to our current philosophy, which assumes that because a small increase in density enriched human life, that an indefinite increase will enrich it indefinitely. Ecology knows of no density relationship that holds for indefinitely wide limits. All gains from density are subject to a law of diminishing returns.

Whatever may be the equation for men and land, it is improbable that we as yet know all its terms. Recent discoveries in mineral and vitamin nutrition reveal unsuspected dependencies in the up-circuit: incredibly minute quantities of certain substances determine the value of soils to plants, of plants to animals. What of the down-circuit? What of the vanishing species, the preservation of which we now regard as an esthetic luxury? They helped build the soil; in what unsuspected ways may they be essential to its maintenance? Professor Weaver proposes that we use prairie flowers to reflocculate the wasting soils of the dust bowl; who knows for what purpose cranes and condors, otters and grizzlies may some day be used?

### **Land Health and the A-B Cleavage**

A land, ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for self-renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity. Conservationists are notorious for their dissensions. Superficially these seem to add up to mere confusion, but a more careful scrutiny reveals a single plane of cleavage common to many specialized fields. In each field one group (A) regards the land as soil, and its function as commodity-production; another

er group (B) regards the land as a biota, and its function as something broader. How much broader is admittedly in a state of doubt and confusion. In my own field, forestry, group A is quite content to grow trees like cabbages, with cellulose as the sic forest commodity. It feels no inhibition against violence; its ideology is agronomic. Group B, on the other hand, sees forestry as fundamentally different from agronomy because it, employs natural species, and manages a natural environment rather than creating an artificial one. Group B prefers natural reproduction on principle. It worries on biotic as well as economic grounds about the loss of species like chestnut, and the threatened lugs of the white pines. It worries about a whole series of secondary forest Functions: wildlife, recreation, watersheds, wilderness areas. To my mind, Group B feels the stirrings of an ecological conscience.

In the wildlife field, a parallel cleavage exists. For Group A the basic commodities are sport and meat; the yardsticks of production are ciphers of take in pheasants and trout. Artificial propagation is acceptable as a permanent as well as a temporary recourse if its unit costs permit. Group B, on the other hand, worries about a whole series of biotic side-issues. What is the cast in predators of producing a game crop? Should we have further recourse to exotics? How can management restore the shrinking species, like prairie grouse, already hopeless as shootable game? How can management restore the threatened ratites, like trumpeter-swan and whooping crane? Can management principles be extended to wildflowers? Here again it is dear to me that we have the same A-B cleavage as in forestry.

In the larger field of agriculture I am less competent to speak, but there seem to be somewhat parallel cleavages. Scientific agriculture was actively developing before ecology was born, hence a slower penetration of ecological concepts might be expected. Moreover the farmer, by the very nature of his techniques, must modify the biota more radically than the forester or the wildlife manager. Nevertheless, there are many discontents in agriculture which seem to add up to a new vision of biotic farming.'

Perhaps the most important of these is the new evidence that poundage or tonnage is no measure of the food-value of farm crops; the products of fertile soil may be qualitatively as well as quantitatively superior. We can bolster poundage from depleted soils by pouring on imported fertility, but we are riot necessarily bolstering food-value. The possible ultimate ramifications of this idea are so immense that I must leave their exposition to abler pens.

The discontent that labels itself 'organic farming,' while bearing some of the earmarks of a cult, is nevertheless biotic in its direction, particularly in its insistence on the importance of soil flora and fauna.

The ecological fundamentals of agriculture are just as poorly known to the public as in other fields of land-use. For example, few educated people realize that the marvelous advances in technique made during recent decades are improvements in the pump, rather than the well. Acre for acre, they have barely sufficed to offset the sinking level of fertility.

In all of these cleavages, we see repeated the same basic paradoxes: man the conqueror versus man the biotic citizen; science the sharpener of his sword versus science the searchlight on his universe; land the slave and servant versus land the collective organism. Robinson's injunction to Tristram may well be applied, at this juncture, to Homo Sapiens as a species in geological time. Whether you will or not You are a King, Tristram, for you are one Of the time- tested few that leave

the world, When they are gone, not the same place it was. Mark what you leave.

## The Outlook

It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense. Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our education headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land. Your true modern is separated from the land by many middlemen, and by innumerable physical gadgets. He has no vital relation to it; to him it is the space between cities on which crops grow. Turn him loose for a day on the land, and if the spot does not happen to be a golf links or a 'scenic' area, he is bored stiff. If crops could be raised by hydroponics instead of farming, it would suit him very well. Synthetic substitutes for wood, leather, wool, and other natural land products suit him better than the originals. In short, land is something he has 'outgrown.'

Almost equally serious as an obstacle to a land ethic is the attitude of the farmer for whom the land is still an adversary, or a taskmaster that keeps him in slavery. Theoretically, the mechanization of farming ought to cut the farmer's chains, but whether it really does is debatable. One of the requisites for an ecological comprehension of land is an understanding of ecology, and this is by no means co-extensive with 'education'; in fact, much higher education seems deliberately to avoid ecological concepts. An understanding of ecology does not necessarily originate in courses bearing ecological labels; it is quite as likely to be labeled geography, botany, agronomy, history, or economics. This is as it should be, but whatever the label, ecological training is scarce.

The case for a land ethic would appear hopeless but for the minority which is in obvious revolt against these 'modern' trends.

The 'key-log' which must be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.

It of course goes without saying that economic feasibility limits the tether of what can or cannot be done for land. It always has and it always will. The fallacy the economic determinists have tied around our collective neck, and which we now need to cast off, is the belief that economics determines all land use. This is simply not true. An innumerable host of actions and attitudes, comprising perhaps the bulk of all land relations, is determined by the land-users' tastes and predilections, rather than by his purse. The bulk of all land relations hinges on investments of time, forethought, skill, and faith rather than on investments of cash. As a land-user thinketh, so is he.

I have purposely presented the land ethic as a product of social evolution because nothing so important as an ethic is ever 'written.' Only the most superficial student of history supposes that Moses 'wrote' the Decalogue; it evolved in the minds of a thinking community, and Moses wrote a tentative summary of it for a 'seminar.' We say tentative because evolution never stops.

The evolution of a land ethic is an intellectual as well as emotional process. Conservation is paved with good intentions which prove to be futile, or even dangerous, because they are devoid of criti-

cal understanding either of the land, or of economic land-use. We think it is a truism that as the ethical frontier advances from the individual to the community, its intellectual content increases. The mechanism of operation is the same for any ethic: social approbation for right actions: social disapproval for wrong actions. By and large, our present problem is one of attitudes and implements. We are remodeling the AI with a steam-shovel, and we are proud of our yardage. We shall hardly relinquish the shovel, which after-all has many good points, but we are in need of gentler and more objective criteria for its successful use.

## **Deep Ecology**

“Deep ecology” was born in Scandinavia, the result of discussions between Næss and his colleagues Sigmund Kvaløy and Nils Faarlund; for a historical survey and commentary on the development of deep ecology). All three shared a passion for the great mountains. On a visit to the Himalayas, they became impressed with aspects of “Sherpa culture” particularly when they found that their Sherpa guides regarded certain mountains as sacred and accordingly would not venture onto them. Subsequently, Næss formulated a position which extended the reverence the three Norwegians and the Sherpas felt for mountains to other natural things in general.

The “shallow ecology movement”, as Næss (1973) calls it, is the “fight against pollution and resource depletion”, the central objective of which is “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.” The “deep ecology movement”, in contrast, endorses “biospheric egalitarianism”, the view that all living things are alike in having value in their own right, independent of their usefulness to others. The deep ecologist respects this intrinsic value, taking care, for example, when walking on the mountainside not to cause unnecessary damage to the plants.

Inspired by Spinoza’s metaphysics, another key feature of Næss’s deep ecology is the rejection of atomistic individualism. The idea that a human being is such an individual possessing a separate essence, Næss argues, radically separates the human self from the rest of the world. To make such a separation not only leads to selfishness towards other people, but also induces human selfishness towards nature. As a counter to egoism at both the individual and species level, Næss proposes the adoption of an alternative relational “total-field image” of the world. According to this relationalism, organisms (human or otherwise) are best understood as “knots” in the biospherical net. The identity of a living thing is essentially constituted by its relations to other things in the world, especially its ecological relations to other living things. If people conceptualise themselves and the world in relational terms, the deep ecologists argue, then people will take better care of nature and the world in general.

As developed by Næss and others, the position also came to focus on the possibility of the identification of the human ego with nature. The idea is, briefly, that by identifying with nature we can enlarge the boundaries of the self beyond my skin. My larger—ecological—Self (the capital “S” emphasizes that we are something larger than our body and consciousness), deserves respect as well. To respect and to care for my Self is also to respect and to care for the natural environment, which is actually part of me and with which I should identify. “Self-realization”, in other words, is the reconnection of the shriveled human individual with the wider natural environment. Næss maintains that the deep satisfaction that we receive from identification with nature and close partnership with other forms of life in nature contributes significantly to our life quality. (One clear historical antecedent to this kind of nature spiritualism is the romanticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau as expressed in his last work, the *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*).

When Næss's view crossed the Atlantic, it was sometimes merged with ideas emerging from Leopold's land ethic. But Næss—wary of the apparent totalitarian political implications of Leopold's position that individual interests and well-being should be subordinated to the holistic good of the earth's biotic community—has always taken care to distance himself from advocating any sort of "land ethic". Some critics have argued that Næss's deep ecology is no more than an extended social-democratic version of utilitarianism, which counts human interests in the same calculation alongside the interests of all natural things (e.g., trees, wolves, bears, rivers, forests and mountains) in the natural environment. However, Næss failed to explain in any detail how to make sense of the idea that oysters or barnacles, termites or bacteria could have interests of any morally relevant sort at all. Without an account of this, Næss's early "biospheric egalitarianism"—that all living things whatsoever had a similar right to live and flourish—was an indeterminate principle in practical terms. It also remains unclear in what sense rivers, mountains and forests can be regarded as possessors of any kind of interests. This is an issue on which Næss always remained elusive.

Biospheric egalitarianism was modified in the 1980s to the weaker claim that the flourishing of both human and non-human life have value in themselves. At the same time, Næss declared that his own favoured ecological philosophy— "Ecosophy T", as he called it after his Tvergastein mountain cabin—was only one of several possible foundations for an environmental ethic. Deep ecology ceased to be a specific doctrine, but instead became a "platform", of eight simple points, on which Næss hoped all deep green thinkers could agree. The platform was conceived as establishing a middle ground, between underlying philosophical orientations, whether Christian, Buddhist, Daoist, process philosophy, or whatever, and the practical principles for action in specific situations, principles generated from the underlying philosophies. Thus the deep ecological movement became explicitly pluralist.

While Næss's Ecosophy T sees human Self-realization as a solution to the environmental crises resulting from human selfishness and exploitation of nature, some of the followers of the deep ecology platform in the United States and Australia further argue that the expansion of the human self to include non-human nature is supported by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which is said to have dissolved the boundaries between the observer and the observed. These "relationalist" developments of deep ecology are, however, criticized by some feminist theorists. The idea of nature as part of oneself, one might argue, could justify the continued exploitation of nature instead. For one is presumably more entitled to treat oneself in whatever ways one likes than to treat another independent agent in whatever ways one likes. According to some feminist critics, the deep ecological theory of the "expanded self" is in effect a disguised form of human colonialism, unable to give nature its due as a genuine "other" independent of human interest and purposes.

Meanwhile, some third-world critics accused deep ecology of being elitist in its attempts to preserve wilderness experiences for only a select group of economically and socio-politically well-off people. The Indian writer Ramachandra.

Guha (1989, 1999) for instance, depicts the activities of many western-based conservation groups as a new form of cultural imperialism, aimed at securing converts to conservationism (cf. Bookchin 1987 and Brennan 1998a). "Green missionaries", as Guha calls them, represent a movement aimed at further dispossessing the world's poor and indigenous people. "Putting deep ecology in its place," he writes, "is to recognize that the trends it derides as "shallow" ecology might in fact be varieties of environmentalism that are more apposite, more representative and more popular in the

countries of the South.” Although Næss himself repudiates suggestions that deep ecology is committed to any imperialism. Guha’s criticism raises important questions about the application of deep ecological principles in different social, economic and cultural contexts. Finally, in other critiques, deep ecology is portrayed as having an inconsistent utopian vision.

## **Peter Singer; Animal Rights**

Moral philosopher and Princeton professor Peter Singer described what he called a “momentous revolution in thinking” regarding animal welfare during a talk in the Ames Courtroom at the Harvard Law School on Friday.

During the event, entitled “Ethics and Animals: Where are We Now,” Singer described the economically-driven processes of factory farming and mass-fishing and the laws that the European Union and United Kingdom have implemented in the past decade to strictly regulate the treatment of animals during those practices.

But, Singer cautioned, while the world has come a long way, outlooks surrounding the ethics and the treatment of animals have not been pushed as far as he thinks they could.

“Animals have interests,” Singer said. “When these are similar to ours, or their pain is on a similar level, why give them less consideration?”

Singer cited the Bible, in which God grants the humans dominion over the animals, as the first documentation of humanity’s obligation to animals. He said that he thinks “dominion” has come to be interpreted as the right “to do as we will,” rather than as responsible stewardship.

“The question is not ‘Can they reason?’ nor ‘Can they talk?’ but ‘Can they suffer?’” said Singer, quoting the logic used by nineteenth-century philosopher Jeremy Bentham, Bentham’s ideology has also been applied to discussions about slaves, infants, and those with cognitive disabilities.

The case for animal consciousness and the need to acknowledge their interests, Singer said, is evidenced by the similarities between animals and humans— anatomically, physiologically, and behaviorally. He also pointed to the shared evolutionary history between the two. “We are animals,” Singer said, citing Darwin’s theory of evolution.

Singer, a professor of bioethics at Princeton and the University of Melbourne, is the author of the controversial book *Animal Liberation*, which asserts that animals’ interests should be given equal weight to those of humans. The book drew criticism upon its release in 1975.

Friday’s talk was part of a series sponsored by the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at the Law School. Singer also spoke later in the day in the Science Center about effective altruism—a utilitarian stance on how best to affect change in the world.

“If God were a utilitarian, Singer would be his patron saint,” Law School professor and Petrie-Flom Center co-director Glenn Cohen said in his introduction.

## **Medical-Ethics: Surrogacy**

“Surrogacy is often thought to be a ‘treatment’ option for the infertile or an alternative to adoption, and so to be celebrated in fulfilling people’s desires to be parents. However, surrogacy also brings a wealth of more complex ethical issues around gender, labour, payment, exploitation and inequali-

ty.”

## **Payment**

Take the issue of payment: surrogacy involves literal labour (physical and often emotional effort in both gestating and birthing). However, many see it as distinct from labour (working in a factory or teaching a class). This raises an ethical question around whether surrogacy is different from other kinds of paid work and, if it isn't, shouldn't we remunerate surrogates?

Some philosophers argue that surrogacy is unique when compared to other work. For instance, they claim that women are intimately connected to their reproductive capacities and bodies (so pregnancy and birth are special and shouldn't be bought), or that being pregnant requires an unusual time commitment (unlike other kinds of work, the woman works for 24 hours a day, seven days a week, for nine months).

Others argue that there is equivalence to traditional work. Various occupations demand control over the body (ballerinas and astronauts are heavily controlled in what they can eat and how much they exercise, just as surrogates are) and longevity of work (writing a book can take longer than gestating and delivering a baby). All this work should be paid, so the argument goes.

## **Gender**

Ethics also come into play when thinking about the gendered nature of surrogacy and intended parenting. Biologically, the surrogate has to be someone with the capacity to gestate and give birth – usually a woman. As gendered labour, surrogacy triggers important feminist concerns, such as about bodily autonomy, vulnerability, inequality and rights.

For example, whether women who are surrogates maintain autonomy over their body when they are carrying a foetus for another individual or couple, or when decisions are being made about what happens to that foetus when there is disagreement. I think about the complexity of these sorts of questions and defend the importance of protecting and promoting women's autonomy in my broader work on feminist conceptions of autonomy.

Intended parenthood raises feminist concerns too, such as on gendered roles and expectations. This includes whether women in particular feel that being mothers is critical to being 'proper' women (and hence why they might pursue surrogacy if they cannot carry their own children). Likewise, women might feel breastfeeding is what 'real' mothers (and women) do (and why intended mothers – ie, women who are not pregnant – might want to induce lactation).

Interestingly, at SUK's annual conference in September, it was noted that lactation can be induced in men using a similar process as for non-pregnant women. (It has been used for a transgender woman who wanted to breastfeed recently too). For feminists worried about unequal gender roles in parenting in general, this could be further ammunition for dispelling myths about women as 'natural' carers because of their biological capacities.

## **Exploitation**

A final ethical issue to mention is exploitation. The UK, Ukraine, US, Australia and India have different regulations about surrogacy. Some countries see the surrogate, while others the intended mother, as the legitimate mother. Some favour altruistic forms of surrogacy, while others allow commercial forms. Some countries give parental rights to intended parents before or at the birth of

the child, while others only after six weeks.

There are good reasons to worry about a country-specific approach to surrogacy, as outlined in the recent. In particular, the country-specific approach opens up the potential to exploit legal loopholes, intended parents, and, ultimately those doing the majority of the labour – surrogates.

Despite the inevitable difficulties of securing global agreement, concerns about exploitation – of all parties, but especially the most vulnerable – provides a significant reason to push for a global approach to surrogacy arrangements.

These are just three ethical puzzles of surrogacy. All of the themes, and more beyond, require careful consideration since what we think about each is not just philosophically intriguing but is likely to have implications for how we believe our practice, laws and policy should be shaped. As the UK is currently reviewing its legislation on surrogacy, giving attentive thought to these issues is a particularly timely demand on all of us.

## **Social, ethical, medical & legal aspects of surrogacy:**

### **An Indian Scenario**

On examining the thousands of years old records of Indian Vedic literature and based on the discoveries of today's science dealing with molecules, genes and DNA it appears that the motherhood is an instinct driven physiological phenomena. Instinct of motherhood is the most powerful desire that exists in all the living creatures that include all animals and humans. According to ancient Indian philosophy the biological purpose of life is to propagate once own traits (genes) and all living creatures are here on a transition phase to pass their own traits (genes) to the next generation. Propagation is the ultimate purpose of any species, therefore, birth of an offspring is always dependent on the factors that lead to high chances of survival of the offspring. For example, birds migrate thousands of kilometers to find out suitable place where environment can support the high chances of survival of their offsprings. In the Canadian Inuit Community which is 300 miles north of Arctic Circle, the seasonality was reported till 1970. But due to modernization and decline of traditional life-style the seasonality in this community has not been reported in the later years.

Infertility is generally known as a social stigma in India. It is hypothesized that the agony and trauma of infertility is best felt and described by the infertile couples themselves. Though, infertility does not claim the life of an individual but it inflicts devastating influence on life of an individual for not fulfilling the biological role of parenthood for no fault of his or her own. It is also known that in general, Indian society has got a very stable family structure, strong desire for children and particularly for son to carry forth the lineage or Vansh. With the enormous advances in the field of medicine, the infertility can now be treated using the new medical technologies collectively called as Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) such as in vitro fertilization (IVF) or intracytoplasmic sperm injection.

(ICSI), etc. The birth of the world's first child, Louise Brown on July 25, 1978, through the technique of in vitro fertilization was a path-breaking step in control of infertility; and is considered as one of the most important medical advances of the last century. In October 1978, Dr Subhash Mukherjee, Kolkata (India) announced the birth of country's first test tube baby. Dr Mukherjee and his team used the cryopreserved embryo.

There are different types of infertility and in some cases it would be physically or medically impos-

sible/ undesirable to carry a baby to term and hence, to fulfill the desire of such infertile couple to have a child, the surrogacy comes as an important option.

## **Surrogacy**

In Latin "Surrogatus" means a substitute i.e. a person appointed to act in the place of another. As per the Black's Law Dictionary surrogacy means the process of carrying and delivering a child for another person. The New Encyclopedia Britannica defines surrogacy as a practice in which a woman bears a child for a couple unable to produce children in the usual way. According to Warnock Report (1984) HF&E, surrogacy is the practice whereby one woman carries a child for another with the intention that the child should be handed over after birth.

There are two types of surrogacy practices prevailing in India: (i) Traditional/Natural/Partial surrogacy; and (ii) Gestational surrogacy.

Like in other countries, in India also, the following two types of surrogacy arrangements are being practiced:

**Altruistic surrogacy:** Where the surrogate mother receives no financial rewards for her pregnancy or the relinquishment of the child to the genetic parents except necessary medical expenses.

**Commercial surrogacy:** Where the surrogate mother is paid over and above the necessary medical expenses.

Surrogacy is the union of science, society, services and person that make it a reality. Surrogacy leads to a win-win situation for both the infertile couple and the surrogate mother. The infertile couple is able to fulfill their most important desire and the surrogate mother receives the suitable reward.

To give a womb for rent means to nurture the fertilized egg of another couple in your womb and give birth to the child with a specific intention, the intention here being either money, or service, or because of altruistic reasons.

Bhadaraka has described the following misconceptions regarding a surrogate mother:

1. She is not the genetic mother of the child whom she nurtures and gives birth to.
2. She is not the wife of the father of the child to whom she gives birth.
3. This is a scientific idea, a scientific process. There is no need for any physical contact.
4. She is not an asocial woman.
5. This is not an illegal practice.
6. She is not forced into this. She herself decides whether she wants to become a surrogate mother or not.
7. She has no claim or rights over the child that is born.
8. "This is my child", "this child is my inheritance" - she cannot articulate such thoughts, because of social, scientific and legal restrictions.
9. She is not a woman who sells children.
10. She is not responsible for the child (once the child is born).
11. Surrogacy is a mutually beneficial concept of providing services.

It is necessary to mention here that the couple's insistence does not agree with what science be-

lieves. It does not matter as to which religion the surrogate belongs, as the child is genetically of the couple. Religion is interpreted according to the conditions, education, time and the circumstances.

Surrogacy is a social act of highest level of service which is scientific and brims with goodwill. A person's opinion based on a lack of information should not harm others. Like medicine is prescribed for treatment of a disorder, in the same way surrogacy is also a method of treatment.

Bhadaraka reported that the majority of the Indian society considered surrogate mother as an amalgam of religion, culture and science with following noble services: (i) She shows a strong inclination to society by doing something novel, (ii) She abolishes the stigma of infertility from the society, (iii) She fulfils her duty by doing something worthwhile for the society, and (iv) She is an example of a model woman in society.

As per the proposed draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill the surrogacy and related terms are defined in the following ways: (i) Surrogacy means an arrangement in which a woman agrees to a pregnancy, achieved through assisted reproductive technology, in which neither of the gametes belong to her or her husband, with the intention to carry it to term and hand over the child to the person or persons for whom she is acting as a surrogate; (ii) Surrogate mother means a woman who agrees to have an embryo generated from the sperm of a man who is not her husband and the oocyte of another woman, implanted in her to carry the pregnancy to full term and deliver the child to its biological parents; and (iii) Surrogacy agreement means a contract between the persons availing of assisted reproductive technology and the surrogate mother.

### **Issues related with surrogacy**

Surrogacy, by ART, should be considered only for those infertile women for whom it would be physically or medically impossible/ undesirable to carry a baby to the term. Surrogate mother should sign an agreement with the commissioning couple which shall have legal bindings on both the parties. Before signing the agreement, the written consent of her spouse shall be required. A woman seeking or agreeing to act as a surrogate shall be medically tested for diseases such as sexually transmitted diseases or otherwise, as may be necessary, and all other communicable diseases which may endanger the health of the child or children, and must declare in writing that she has not received a blood transfusion or a blood product in the last six months. The commissioning parent(s) shall ensure that the surrogate and the child or children she delivers are appropriately insured until the time the child is handed over to the commissioning parent(s) or any other person as per the agreement and till the surrogate is free of all health complications arising out of surrogacy. Surrogate mother must register as a patient in her own name in the hospital after signing the appropriate agreement. While registering, the surrogate mother must mention that she is a surrogate mother and should provide all the necessary information about the commissioning parents. Surrogate mother should not use or register in the name of the commissioning couple for whom she is acting as surrogate as this would pose legal issues, particularly in the untoward event of maternal death.

The birth certificate shall be in the name of the commissioning parents. The ART clinic should also provide a certificate to the commissioning parents giving the name and address of the surrogate mother. All the expenses of surrogate mother during the period of pregnancy and postnatal care relating to pregnancy should be borne by the commissioning couple. The surrogate mother would also be entitled a monetary compensation from the commissioning couple for agreeing to act as a surrogate. The exact value of the compensation should be decided by discussion between the commissioning couple. and the prospective surrogate mother or an appropriate formula may be

developed by the Government to calculate the minimum compensation to be paid to the surrogate mother. A surrogate mother should never donate her own oocyte to the commissioning couple. Surrogate mother as well as the donor shall relinquish all parental rights related with the offsprings in writing.

### **Background of proposed draft ART (Regulation) Bill**

After the birth of the first scientifically well documented test tube baby in 1986 in India, there was mushrooming of IVF clinics in the country. The services offered by some of these IVF clinics were questionable. The reason for this was a lack of ART guidelines as well as legislation on ART in the country, no accreditation, supervisory and regulatory body and no control of Government. Therefore, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) developed draft National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision & Regulation of ART Clinics in India in 2002. The draft document was then subjected to extensive public debate throughout the country (in seven cities; New Delhi, Jodhpur, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad & Kolkata) where more than four thousand people participated. To obtain the opinion of the people on the various issues where the consensus of all the members of the Committee could not be established, a prescribed proforma was designed and given to the participants (85% general public, 13% Indian doctors and 2% international doctors).

Based on the opinion of this survey (Table), comments and suggestions received from the various stakeholders including National Commission for Women and National Human Right Commission, the National Guidelines were finalized and after the approval of the Drafting Committee the revised document was submitted to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India. The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare examined these guidelines and after slight modifications published the National Guidelines for Accreditation, Supervision & Regulation of ART Clinics in India as National Guidelines of Government of India in 2005.

Table

Opinion of the people on various issues obtained during the public debates

Sl. no.	Issues	Opinion of the people (%)					
		Doctor			General public		
		Yes	No	No opinion	Yes	No	No opinion
1	Whether surrogacy should be allowed in the Country?	96	2	2	92	3	5
2	Whether commercial surrogacy should be allowed in the Country?	80	15	5	72	24	4
3	Whether relatives/friends should be allowed to act as a surrogate mother?	45	52	3	14	83	3
4	Whether the identity of the donor should be known to the infertile couple?	37	58	5	7	89	4
5	Whether relatives/friends should be allowed for gamete donation?	44	54	2	8	91	1
6	Whether you are satisfied or agreed with the points mentioned under the heading "How may sperm and oocytes donors be sourced?"	54	42	4	81	15	4

On obtaining the feedback from different States of the country it was noticed that these National Guidelines were not being followed properly in the country. Therefore, the Indian Council of Medical Research developed draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill in 2008 with the help of a Drafting Committee of ICMR. The draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill-2008 was again subjected to extensive public debate not only throughout the country but globally by placing the draft Bill on the websites of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India and of the ICMR. Based on the comments received from various stakeholders including the comments from other countries and as per the recommendations of the Drafting Committee, the draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill was revised and finalized. The finalized version of draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill- 2010 was sent to the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, and has now been revised by the Ministry of Law & Justice as Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill - 2013. The Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill- 2014 has now become a part of the Cabinet Note.

## Conclusion

The draft Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill proposes to establish National Board, State Boards and National Registry of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) in India for accreditation and supervision of ART clinics and ART Banks, ensuring that services provided by these are ethical and that the medical, social and legal rights of all those concerned including surrogate mother are protected with maximum benefit to all the stakeholders within a recognized framework of ethics and good medical practices.

## The doctor-patient relationship Introduction

The doctor-patient relationship plays an essential role in ordering the health care system and medical ethics, and since it is a form of communication, it necessitates ethical, philosophical, psychological, and sociological considerations. The present paper aims to evaluate the essence of the doctor-patient relationship in order to re-examine its conceptual framework. In the first part, the

philosophical, psychological and sociological significance of this relationship is explored, and in the final section, the theoretical implications will be discussed. It seems that despite the imbalance in the relationship between doctors and patients resulting from the greater significance of the physicians' ethics, organization of this relationship is not possible without enhancing patient ethics.

Simultaneous consideration of sociological, psychological and philosophical dimensions of the doctor-patient relationship can contribute to developing theoretical foundations and multidisciplinary bases for establishing practical ethical codes. The result will eventually be a more effective interaction between the two.

## **A) The Philosophical Essence of the Doctor-Patient Relationship**

In investigating the philosophical essence of the doctor-patient relationship, three points should be taken into consideration. First, ethical demands in doctor-patient interactions must have distinct definitions and terms; second, the phenomenological ethical debates on this issue need to be explored; and third, modern topics in the philosophy of the relationship should be considered, and relationships with the others should be analyzed from different perspectives.

### **Ethical Demands**

Various organizations and professions differ in their attitudes towards ethical demands, recommendations, norms, values and judgments. The three components of inclusion, priority and severity are presented below as the criteria for judgment in ethical issues.

- 1. Inclusion:** The main questions to answer in regard to this component are: "What are the ethical limits?" and "Should all of our actions be judged ethically or only some of them are included in the scope of ethical judgment?" In other words, is it enough to avoid doing the wrong thing, or is doing right among our moral duties too? It seems that the doctors' moral duties include doing the right thing as well. This important matter is embedded within the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence.
- 2. Priority:** The component of priority relies on the answers to the following questions: "If what morality is demanding is in conflict with our personal interests (for example it concerns our self, family, friends and so on), which side should we take? Should we always take the ethical side and forget about our personal interests? Or personal interests could have priority over moral obligations?" Nigel and Stalker explain that autonomy and our personal integrity have priority over what morality is demanding from us, or as Kagan and Singer say, demandingness of morality can even affect autonomy and our personal integrity. It seems that on the one hand the altruism of a practitioner as a professional should be based on the priority of patients' interests, and on the other hand it should safeguard the practitioner's own autonomy.
- 3. Severity:** The main questions here are: Can ethics press extreme and costly demands from us? Or are the obligations of morality lighter and easier in the way that most people could overcome? Apparently if ethics are founded on costly demands, we will be more likely to fail to fulfill our ethical duties.

Based on the above-mentioned considerations and classifications, three macro-positions emerge in the ethical relationship, including: maximal ethics, ordinary ethics, and minimal ethics.

**Maximal Ethics:** Maximal ethics include all the three components discussed above. In this type of

ethics, ethical inclusion does not have any limits and covers all human actions. Extremist moralities consider ethical inclusion to be an absolute matter that covers all life styles and signify that no human action should be outside of this infinite circle.

**Ordinary Ethics:** This is the sort of ethics that most people believe in, and because of its affinity to the contemporary human life, it is also referred to as “common ethics”. Here what ethics demands from us are boundaries. In other words, moderate ethics often state that after performing our obligations and moral duties, in a relatively wide range of personal interests we can start selecting. Thus, our actions are not always subject to moral judgment.

**Minimal Ethics :** This type of ethics is contradicted with maximal ethics. According to minimalists, the only forbidden action is intentional harassment. Followers of minimal ethics believe in a wide range of choices and selection areas; they recognize only a limited range of constraints and are in favor of acting upon personal interests.

It is a growing concern in medical ethics that the doctor-patient relationship is not approached in a sufficiently broad way and that this overly narrow medical perspective leaves doctors, nurses and other health care professionals badly equipped to deal with ethical dilemmas. Phenomenology could broaden this perspective and serve as a strong basis to understand moral sensitivity. Two notions in phenomenology have a central role in understanding the concept of the doctor-patient relationship: intentionality and first-person point of view.

### **Intentionality and first-person point of view**

One of the basic concepts of phenomenology is attainment of phenomenal intentionality, which occurs when a person recognizes earlier assumptions and adopts a perspective. Some thinkers like Franz Brentano believe that intentionality and the phenomenological approach can be applied to the first-person point of view. For instance the first sighting of a beautiful landscape elevates us in a way that may not happen in later encounters. The reason is that later encounters are accompanied by presuppositions of the observer, who will be more used to the landscape. It seems that the phenomenological approach can be applied to the doctor-patient relationship. Doctors must reexamine and restrict assumptions toward patients, and at the same time value intentionality in order not to fall into habits.

### **Moral Sensitivity**

Moral sensitivity may be enhanced in two ways. First, through reinforcing the phenomenological approach by renewing the first sight experience, that is, in each re-identification (of the patient for instance), priorities should be observed. Second, since any situation could come to a fork and ethical conflicts may rise, the adverse impacts should be considered and every situation must be regarded from an ethical perspective. Although at commencement moral sensitivity appears to overlap with maximal ethics, it is of particular importance especially in heterogeneous communications such as the doctor-patient relationship. It may be added that enhancing moral sensitivity even seems to be the target of the phenomenology of ethics in the doctor-patient relationship.

### **Communication with Others**

The term “communication” can be defined through the philosophical approaches of great thinkers such as Levinas, Marcel and Buber who set their philosophical arguments in the relationship between “me” and “the other”. Levinas insists on the maximum responsibility of any other; Marcel insists on turning the me-that relationship to the me-you relationship and replacing absence with

presence; Buber finds God in "Thou".

## **B) The Psychological Essence of The Doctor-Patient Relationship**

In terms of psychology, the doctor-patient relationship is imbalanced as the doctor has superiority over the patient. Such imbalanced relationships may give rise to various patterns of communication behavior. Psychologists have distinguished the following four communication behavior patterns based on components such as honesty, perspicuity, respect and inhibition:

### **1) Submissiveness**

Submissive persons are shy, and although they speak honestly, they are usually taciturn and cannot express themselves perspicuously. They are also afraid of being judged or offending others, so they are incapable of making eye contact while speaking. Their voices are weak and unsteady, and they speak hesitantly. Submissive people avoid conflict rather than try to resolve it. They speak indirectly and in general terms because they cannot express themselves openly and may quickly feel depressed and vulnerable. People with this behavioral pattern admittedly let others abuse them and treat them disrespectfully. These patterns work both for doctors and patients. Patients who evade their responsibilities and encourage physicians to patriarchy in the process of therapy, or doctors who are not able to say "no" to patients easily consent to inappropriate and ineffective treatments.

### **2) Dominance**

Domineering people feel insecure and believe that they do not possess good qualities. Accordingly, they try to deceive others and take advantage. Domineering persons do not have the perspicuity and honesty necessary for earning their wishes. They express themselves in general terms and sometimes their voices shake. These people use others to achieve their goals and make light of this inhibition and deception, so they take away another person's autonomy and freedom. This behavioral pattern is often seen in doctors and sometimes among patients as well. Doctors who prefer patient satisfaction to authority thus create a false autonomy for the patients and will eventually be dominated by them, and patients with this behavioral pattern impair the healing process by inhibition and deception.

### **3) Aggressiveness**

The target of aggressive and domineering people is very similar and that is exploitation and domination of others. Their difference is that a domineering person achieves this aim by secrecy and cheating, while an aggressive person follows it frankly and openly. Unlike the domineering type, aggressive people are honest and straightforward; they are horrible listeners, always accuse others, get angry soon, get confused by criticism, and are usually grim in appearance. They have loud voices and look hostile, and in conflicts, they tend to destroy their opponents. This pattern is seen among both physicians and patients. Impatient physicians that do not listen, shout all the time and sometimes make irreparable mistakes during the healing process, or patients with lower anger thresholds who create tension in medical environments belong in the category of aggressive people.

### **4) Assertiveness**

Assertiveness is the most creative behavioral pattern of communication. Assertive people respect themselves and others, and observe the authority of all sides. They are both honest and frank, and do not accuse themselves or others. Their approach to matters is problem-oriented, that is, when dealing with a problem, instead of accusing themselves and others, they think of a solution. They listen effectively and speak appropriately and understandably. During conflict they emphasize con-

versation. Their arguments are clear, specified, objective, fair and respectful, and eventually they are the most successful communicators. Issues such as breaking bad news, wasted treatments and medical mistakes are easy and solvable with this type of behavioral pattern. While submissiveness, dominance and aggression lead to lose-lose situations in long term, assertiveness, is a helpful behavioral pattern and finally results in win-win solutions.

Based on the above-mentioned notions, the following practical hints should be outlined:

- 1. Psychic Distance:** An important topic in aesthetics and artistic criticism that is also related to ethics is psychic distance. In aesthetics, this refers to the distance that should exist between a work of art and the viewer, so that aesthetic entente is created and art is not confused with reality. Omitting the psychic distance and forming deep sympathy and psychological identification with the work of art obstructs artistic judgment and aesthetic approach. In medical ethics, the concept seems to be important while encountering patients. Reduction of psychic distance and excessive sympathy with patients prevent an effective doctor-patient relationship as a fundamental element of treatment.
- 2. Body Language:** Nonverbal communication skills are referred to as body language. This type of communication is very important in the doctor-patient relationship due to factors such as the limited visiting time, and linguistic and discourse differences.
- 3. Truth-Telling versus Pain Relief:** One of the oldest ethical challenges is the pain and suffering that can be caused by telling the truth. On the other hand, we can bring comfort and relief to patients by lying to them. Physicians can employ various methods at their discretion, but it seems that health care systems are more inclined toward telling the truth, and doctors must try to maintain a balance between the two.
- 4. Emotional Quotient (EQ):** Unlike intelligence quotient that does not improve after the second decade of life, emotional quotient can continue to improve till the end. Emotional quotient refers to the ability to control emotions, sentiments and unwanted desires. People with high intelligence quotient dealing with people with lower intelligence quotient are susceptible to reckless, impulsive behavior and may gradually lose their EQ. In order to improve the doctor-patient relationship, health providers must be instructed in techniques to promote their emotional quotient.

### **C) The Sociological Essence of the Doctor-Patient Relationship**

Unlike the psychological approach, the sociological approach to the doctor-patient relationship examines the essence of this (individualistic) relationship in a social context. In other words, the sociological approach regards the doctor-patient relationship beyond a merely mutual connection and therefore external elements are considered particularly important.

In order to investigate this relationship from the sociological perspective, communicative actions serve as a valid basis. They have been included among the most important sociological criteria in the last few decades as a set of social actions oriented towards reaching entente. The target of communication action theory is to subvert a single prophetic and patriarchal individualism in human interactions. Jürgen Habermas has developed this notion in his famous book *The Theory of Communicative Action*, and his ideas are quite often presented in ethical manuscripts and medical ethics books. In this book Habermas distinguishes and characterizes his theory by drawing a distinction between instrumental action and communicative action.

## **Instrumental Action**

Jürgen Habermas states, "We call an action oriented to success instrumental when we consider it in the light of following the rules of rational choice and assess the efficiency of influencing the decisions of a rational opponent. By contrast, I shall speak of communicative action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts aiming at reaching an understanding. In communicative action the participants are not primarily oriented to their own individual successes; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, negotiating the definitions of the situation is an essential element of the interpretive accomplishments required for communicative action".

Reducing an individual to only one of the functions of his or her integrity is called instrumentalism. The function of a ticket seller in a bus station is just like that of a machine and therefore his human dimension could easily be overlooked. In the doctor-patient relationship both sides (especially the doctor) are susceptible to perceive others as mere instruments. The power that is practiced over patients by "medical gazing" makes them abject by reducing them to bodies that are examined simply to locate illness. Three fundamental concepts in sociology and philosophy have been purposed to deal with instrumentalism:

### **1) Teleological view of others by emphasizing the task:**

In his works on the Golden Rule, Kant argues that instrumental action is inconsistent with socialization and human dignity, and proposes to regard others as an end, not an instrument. The universal version of this rule is that you should like for others whatever you like for yourself and vice versa. One concrete technique for applying this rule is that human beings constantly put themselves in other people's positions and see the world from their perspectives.

### **2) The distinction between mysterious looks and issue makers:**

Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel emphasize the difference between the I-Thou and I-It relationship. In the former, a human is a mystery that unfolds and in the latter, an issue that resolves.

### **3) Maximum responsibility toward others:**

Emmanuel Levinas states, "We are responsible for each other, and me more so...". This approach considers responsibility toward others as an unconditional matter, but does not require others to be equally responsible in return.

## **Communicative Action**

Communicative action is allegedly an action focused on entente. Whoever wants to be successful in reaching entente should be prepared to bring up claims. Habermas states that the communication between a speaker and a listener is constituted by the existence of three universally valid claims: the claims for truth, rightness and truthfulness. The terms of these claims in the doctor-patient relationship accurately reveal the sociological essence of this relationship. Doctors should speak understandably and beware of ambiguity and opacity in their speech. On the other hand, they should make true statements and propositions, scientific and other. They should be honest and have faith in what they say, and ultimately they can use their discretion to determine the content of their relationship with patients.

## **Analysis**

To clarify the concept of relationship and connectedness, we used a hybrid concept analysis including: identifying essential attributes, critiquing the existing definitions, examining boundaries

and identifying antecedents. On the basis of the comparative concept analysis, the doctor-patient relationship is an interdisciplinary notion and a mono-disciplinary approach will reduce this relationship to communicative skills.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

The doctor-patient relationship has greater impact on the health system than it may seem at first. In this paper, three novel dimensions of the doctor-patient relationship were deeply explored. The philosophical approach emphasizes the importance of promoting moral sensitivity. Communicating with others entails considerations rooted in the human soul that provoke great philosophical concerns. The psychological approach emphasizes learning about behavioral patterns, enhancing the intelligence quotient, and creating a balance between truth-telling and pain relief. Finally, the sociological approach demonstrates that the doctor-patient relationship is part of a macro social relationship in a community and discovers various aspects beyond the two-person relationship.

## **Abortion**

An overview of the moral and legal aspects of abortion and evaluates the most important arguments. The central moral aspect concerns whether there is any morally relevant point during the biological process of the development of the fetus from its beginning as a unicellular zygote to birth itself that may justify not having an abortion after that point. Leading candidates for the morally relevant point are: the onset of movement, consciousness, the ability to feel pain, and viability. The central legal aspect of the abortion conflict is whether fetuses have a basic legal right to live, or, at least, a claim to live. The most important argument with regard to this conflict is the potentiality argument, which turns on whether the fetus is potentially a human person and thus should be protected. The question of personhood depends on both empirical findings and moral claims.

## **Preliminary Distinctions**

One of the most important issues in biomedical ethics is the controversy surrounding abortion. This controversy has a long history and is still heavily discussed among researchers and the public—both in terms of morality and in terms of legality. The following basic questions may characterize the subject in more detail: Is abortion morally justifiable? Does the fetus (embryo, conceptus, and zygote) have any moral and/or legal rights? Is the fetus a human person and, thus, should be protected? What are the criteria for being a person? Is there any morally relevant break along the biological process of development from the unicellular zygote to birth? This list of questions is not meant to be exhaustive, but it describes the issues of the following analysis.

### **1) Three Views on Abortion**

There are three main views: first, the extreme conservative view (held by the Catholic Church); second, the extreme liberal view (held by Singer); and third, moderate views which lie between both extremes. Some opponents (anti-abortionists, pro-life activists) holding the extreme view, argue that human personhood begins from the unicellular zygote and thus – according to the religious stance – one should not have an abortion by virtue of the imago dei of the human being (for example, Schwarz 1990). To have an abortion would be, by definition, homicide. The extreme liberal view is held by proponents (abortionists). They claim that human personhood begins immediately after birth or a bit later (Singer). Thus, they consider the relevant date is at birth or a short time later (say, one month). The proponents of the moderate views argue that there is a morally relevant break in the biological process of development – from the unicellular zygote to birth – which determines the justifiability and non-justifiability of having an abortion. According to them, there is a gradual process from being a fetus to being an infant where the fetus is not a human being but a

human offspring with a different moral status.

The advantage of the extreme conservative view is the fact that it defines human personhood from the beginning of life (the unicellular zygote); there is no slippery slope. However, it seems implausible to say that the zygote is a human person. The advantage of the extreme liberal view is that its main claim is supported by a common philosophical usage of the notion "personhood" and thus seems more sound than the extreme conservative view because the offspring is far more developed; as the unicellular zygote. This view also faces severe problems; for example, it is not at all clear where the morally relevant difference is between the fetus five minutes before birth and a just born offspring. Some moderate views have commonsense plausibility especially when it is argued that there are significant differences between the developmental stages. The fact that they also claim for a break in the biological process, which is morally relevant, seems to be a relapse into old and unjustified habits. As Gillespie stresses in his article "Abortion and Human Rights" (1984, 94-102) there is no morally relevant break in the biological process of development. But, in fact, there are differences, which make a comparative basis possible without having to solve the problem of drawing a line. How should one decide?

## **2) The Standard Argument**

The standard argument is the following practical syllogism:

- The killing of human beings is prohibited.
- A fetus is a human being.
- The killing of fetuses is prohibited.

Hence, abortion is not allowed since homicide is prohibited. It seems obvious to question the result of the practical syllogism since one is able to argue against both premises. First, there are possible situations where the first premise could be questioned by noting, for example that killing in self-defense is not prohibited. Second, the second premise could also be questioned since it is not at all clear whether fetuses are human beings in the sense of being persons, although they

are of course human beings in the sense of being members of the species of homo sapiens. Consecutively, one would deny that fetuses are persons but admit that a young two year old child may be a person. Although, in the end, it may be difficult to claim that every human being is a person. For example, people with severe mental handicaps or disorder seem not to have personhood. That is, if personhood is defined with regard to specific criteria like the capacity to reason, or to have consciousness, self-consciousness, or rationality, some people might be excluded. But, in fact, this does not mean that people with severe mental handicaps who lack personhood can be killed. Even when rights are tied to the notion of personhood, it is clearly prohibited to kill disabled people. Norbert Hoerster, a well-known German philosopher, claims that fetuses with severe handicaps can be – like all other fetuses – aborted, as born human beings with severe handicaps they have to be protected and respected like all other human beings, too (1995, 159).

## **3) The Modified Standard Argument**

However, it seems appropriate to modify the standard argument and to use a more sophisticated version. Replace the notion "human being" with "human life form." The new practical syllogism is:

- The killing of human life forms is prohibited.
- A fetus is a human life form.

- The killing of fetuses is prohibited.

The objection against the first premise of the standard argument still holds for the new more sophisticated version. But, the second modified premise is much stronger than the previous one because one has to determine what a human life form really is. Is a fetus a human life form? But, even if the fetus is a human life form, it does not necessarily follow that it should be protected by that fact, simpliciter. The fetus may be a human life form but it hardly seems to be a person (in the ordinary sense of the notion) and thus has no corresponding basic right to live. However, as already stated, this kind of talk seems to go astray because the criteria for personhood may be suitable for just-borns but not appropriate for fetuses, embryos, or unicellular zygotes, like some biological (human being), psychological (self-consciousness), rational (ability to reasoning), social (sympathy/love), or legal (being a human life form with rights) criteria may indicate (for example, Jane English 1984). Jane English persuasively argues in "Abortion and the Concept of a Person" that even if the fetus is a person, abortion may be justifiable in many cases, and if the fetus is no person, the killing of fetuses may be wrong in many cases.

## Personhood

What does it mean to claim that a human life form is a person? This is an important issue since the ascription of rights is at stake. I previously stated that it is unsound to say that a fetus is a person or has personhood since it lacks, at least, rationality and self-consciousness. It follows that not every human being is also a person according to the legal sense, and, thus, also lacks moral rights (extreme case). The fetus is by virtue of his genetic code a human life form but this does not mean that this would be sufficient to grant it legal and moral rights. Nothing follows from being a human life form by virtue of one's genes, especially not that one is able to derive legal or moral rights from this very fact (for example, speciesism). Is a human person exclusively defined by her membership of the species *Homo sapiens sapiens* and thus should be protected? To accept this line of argumentation would entail the commitment of the existence of normative empirical features. It seems premature to derive the prohibition to kill a life form from the bare fact of its genetic feature – including the human life form – unless one argues that human beings do have the basic interest of protecting their offspring. Is a human life form a moral entity? This seems to be a good approach. The argument runs as follows: It seems plausible to claim that human beings create values and, if they have the basic interest of protecting their offspring, human beings may establish a certain morality by which they can argue, for example, for the prohibition of abortions. The moral judgment can be enforced through legal norms.

To be more precise about the assumption of the existence or non-existence of normative, empirical features: Critics of the view to tie the right to live and the biological category of being a human being claim that the protagonists effect the is-ought fallacy. Why is it unsound to take the bare fact of being a member of the biological species *Homo sapiens* as a solid basis for granting the right to live? The linkage seems only justified when there are sound factual reasons. If there are none, the whole line of reasoning would "hang in the air" so that one could also easily argue for the right to live for cats and dogs. Only factual relevant features may be important for the linkage. What could these relevant features look like?

Jane English presents in her article "Abortion and the Concept of a Person" several features of personhood which characterize the human person. Her notion of personhood can be grouped into five sectors (English 1984, pp. 152):

- (i) the biological sector (being a human being, having extremities, eating and sleeping);

- (ii) the psychological sector (perception, emotions, wishes and interests, ability to communicate, ability to make use of tools, self-consciousness);
- (iii) the rational sector (reasoning, ability to make generalizations, to make plans, learning from experience);
- (iv) the social sector (to belong to different groups, other people, sympathy and love); and
- (v) the legal sector (to be a legal addressee, ability to make contracts, to be a citizen). According to English, it is not necessary for a human life form to comply with all five sectors and different aspects to count as a person. A fetus lies right in the penumbra where the concept of personhood is hard to apply. There is no core of necessary and sufficient features that could be ascribed to a human life form in order to be sure that these features constitute a person (English 1984, 153).

Mary Anne Warren claims that a human life form should qualify as a person when, at least, some of the following aspects (especially i-iii) are at stake: (i) consciousness and the ability to feel pain; (ii) reasoning; (iii) a self-motivated activity; (iv) ability to communicate; and (v) the existence of a self-concept (for example, individual, racial) and self-consciousness (Warren 1984, 110-113). Warren argues that the fetus is no person since it lacks the criteria of personhood and, thus, an abortion is justified.

The aim is not to give an airtight definition of the concept of personhood. The main question is whether a fetus could qualify as a person. The following can be stated: The fetus is a human offspring but is not a legal, social, and rational person in the ordinary sense of the notions. Some aspects of the psychological sector for example, the ability to feel and perceive can be ascribed to the fetus but not to the embryo, conceptus, or the (unicellular) zygote. It seems implausible to say that a fetus (or embryo, conceptus, zygote) is a person, unless one additionally claims that the genetic code of the fetus is a sufficient condition. However, this does not mean, in the end, that one could always justify an abortion. It only shows that the fetus could hardly be seen as a human person.

It is hard to keep the legal and moral aspects of the conflict of abortion apart. There are overlaps which are due to the nature of things since legal considerations are based on the ethical realm. This can also be seen according to the notion person. What a person is is not a legal question but a question which is to be decided within a specific ethics. If one characterizes the notion of a person along some criteria, then the question of which criteria are suitable or not will be discussed with regard to a specific moral approach (for example, Kantianism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics). The relevant criteria, in turn, may come from different areas like the psychological, rational, or social sphere. If the criteria are settled, this influences the legal sector because the ascription of legal rights – especially the right to live in the abortion debate – is tied to persons and respectively to the concept of personhood.

### **Moral Aspects of the Abortion Conflict**

The main question with regard to the moral sphere concerns identification of the right developmental point of the fetus (or the embryo, conceptus, zygote) to decide which break may morally justify an abortion or not (proponents of the moderate view and the extreme liberal view claim that there is such a break). The main arguments in the debate will be evaluated in the following. Before we analyze the arguments, it is necessary to say something about moral rights.

## **a) Moral Rights**

Some authors claim that the talk of moral rights and moral obligations is an old never-ending tale. There are no “moral rights” or “moral obligations” per se; at least, in the sense that there are also moral rights and moral obligations apart from legal rights and legal obligations. There is no higher ethical authority which may enforce a specific moral demand. Rights and obligations rest on law. According to ethics, one should better say “moral agreements” (for example, Gauthier). The proponents claim that moral agreements do have a similar status to legal rights and legal obligations but stress that no person has an enforceable demand to have her moral rights prevail over others. The suitability is the essential aspect of the metaphysics of rights and obligations. Only the formal constraint establishes rights and obligations within a given society (for example, Hobbes); the informal constraint within a given society – though it may be stronger – is not able to do so. Without a court of first instance there are no rights and obligations. Only by using the legal system is one able to establish specific moral rights and specific moral obligations. Those authors claim that there are no absolute moral rights and moral obligations which are universally valid; moral agreements are always subjective and relative. Hence, there are also no (absolute) moral rights which the fetus (embryo, conceptus, or zygote) may call for. The only solution may be that the survival of the fetus rests on the will of the human beings in a given moral society. According to their view, it is only plausible to argue that an abortion is morally reprehensible if the people in a given society do have a common interest not to abort and make a moral agreement which is enforced by law.

## **b) At Birth**

Proponents of the liberal view contend that the morally significant break in the biological development of the fetus is at birth. This means that it is morally permitted to have an abortion before birth and morally prohibited to kill the offspring after birth. The objection against this view is simple because there seems to be no morally relevant difference between a short time (say five minutes) before birth and after it. Factually, the only biological difference is the physical separation of the fetus from the mother. However it seems unsound to interpret this as the morally significant difference; the bare evidence with regard to the visibility of the offspring and the physical separation (that is, the offspring is no longer dependent on the woman’s body) seems insufficient.

## **c) Viability**

Proponents of the moderate view often claim that the viability criterion is a hot candidate for a morally significant break because the dependence of the nonviable fetus on the pregnant woman gives her the right to make a decision about having an abortion. The aspect of dependence is insufficient in order to determine the viability as a possible break. Take the following counter-example: A son and his aged mother who is nonviable without the intensive care of her son; the son has no right to let his mother die by virtue of her given dependence. However, one may object that there is a difference between “needing someone to care for you” and “needing to live off a particular person’s body.” Furthermore, one may stress that the nonviable and the viable fetus both are potential human adults. But as below the argument of potentiality is flawed since it is unclear how actual rights could be derived from the bare potentiality of having such rights at a later time. Hence, both types of fetuses cannot make claim for a right. There is also another objection that cannot be rebutted: the viability of the fetus regarding the particular level of medical technology. On the one hand, there is a temporal relativity according to medical technology. The understanding of what constitutes the viability of the fetus has developed over time according to the technical level of embryology in the last centuries and decades. Today, artificial viability allows physicians to rescue many premature infants who would have previously died. On the other hand, there exists a local relativity according to the availability of medical supplies in and within countries which de-

termines whether the life of a premature infant will be saved. The medical supply may vary greatly. Consequently, it seems inappropriate to claim that viability as such should be regarded as a significant break by being a general moral justification against abortions.

#### **d) First Movement**

The first movement of the fetus is sometimes regarded as a significant break because proponents stress its deeper meaning which usually rests on religious or non-religious considerations. Formerly the Catholic Church maintained that the first movement of the fetus shows that it is the breathing of life into the human body (animation) which separates the human fetus from animals. This line of thinking is out-of-date and the Catholic Church no longer uses it. Another point is that the first movement of the fetus that women experience is irrelevant since the real first movement of the fetus is much earlier. Ultrasonic testing shows that the real first movement of the fetus is somewhere between the 6th and 9th week. But even if one considers the real first movement problems may arise. The physical ability to move is morally irrelevant. One counter-example: What about an adult human being who is quadriplegic and is unable to move? It seems out of the question to kill such people and to justify the killing by claiming that people who are disabled and simply lack the ability to move are, therewith, at other people's disposal.

#### **e) Consciousness and the Ability to Feel Pain**

In general, proponents of moderate views believe that consciousness and the ability to feel pain will develop after about six months. However the first brain activities are discernable after the seventh week so that it is possible to conclude that the fetus may feel pain after this date. In this respect, the ability to suffer is decisive for acknowledging a morally significant break. One may object to this claim, that the proponents of this view redefine the empirical feature of "the ability to suffer" as a normative feature (is-ought fallacy). It is logically unsound to conclude from the bare fact that the fetus feels pain that it is morally reprehensible or morally prohibited per se to abort the fetus.

#### **f) Unicellular Zygote**

Proponents of the extreme conservative view claim that the morally significant break in the biological development of the fetus is given with the unicellular human zygote. They argue that the unicellular zygote is a human person, and thus, it is prohibited to have an abortion because one kills a human being (for example, Schwarz).

The extreme conservative proponents argue that biological development from the fetus to a human being is an incremental process which leaves no room for a morally significant break (liberals deny this line of thinking). If there is no morally significant break, then the fetus has the same high status of a newborn, or the newborn has the same low status of the fetus.

To many opponents of the "extreme" conservative position, it seems questionable to claim that a unicellular zygote is a person. At best, one may maintain that the zygote will potentially develop into a human being. Except the potentiality argument is flawed since it is impossible to derive current rights from the potential ability of having rights at a later time. Opponents (for example, Gert) also object to any attempt to base conclusions on religious considerations that they believe cannot stand up to rational criticism. For these reasons, they argue that the conservative view should be rejected.

#### **g) Thomson and the Argument of The Sickly Violinist**

Judith Jarvis Thomson presents an interesting case in her landmark article "A Defense of Abor-

tion" (1971) in order to show that, even if the fetus has a right to live, one is still able to justify an abortion for reasons of a woman's right to live/integrity/privacy. Thomson's famous example is that of the sickly violinist: You awake one morning to find that you have been kidnapped by a society of music lovers in order to help a violinist who is unable to live on his own by virtue of his ill-health. He has been attached to your kidneys because you alone have the only blood type to keep him alive. You are faced with a moral dilemma because the violinist has a right to live by being a member of the human race; there seems to be no possibility to unplug him without violating this right and thus killing him. However, if you leave him attached to you, you are unable to move for months, although you did not give him the right to use your body in such a way (Thomson 1984, 174-175).

First, Thomson claims that the right to live does not include the right to be given the means necessary for survival. If the right to live entails the right to those means, one is not justified in preventing the violinist from the on-going use of one's kidneys. The right to the on-going use of the kidneys necessarily implies that the violinist's right to his means for survival always trumps the right to another person's body. Thomson refuses this and claims that "the fact that for continued life that violinist needs the continued use of your kidneys does not establish that he has a right to be given the continued use of your kidneys" (Thomson 1984, 179). She argues that everybody has a right of how his own body is used. That is, the violinist has no right to use another person's body without her permission. Therefore, one is morally justified in not giving the violinist the use of one's own kidneys.

Second, Thomson contends that the right to live does not include the right not to be killed. If the violinist has the right not to be killed, then another person is not justified in removing the plug from her kidneys although the violinist has no right to their use. According to Thomson, the violinist has no right to another person's body and hence one cannot be unjust in unplugging him: "You surely are not being unjust to him, for you gave him no right to use your kidneys, and no one else can have given him any such right" (Thomson 1984, 180). If one is not unjust in unplugging oneself from him, and he has no right to the use of another person's body, then it cannot be wrong, although the result of the action is that the violinist will be killed.

### **Legal Aspects of the Abortion Conflict**

What is the legal status of the fetus (embryo, conceptus, and zygote)? Before the question is answered, one should pay some attention to the issue of the genesis of a legal system. Which ontological status do legal rights have? Where do they come from? Usually we accept the idea that legal rights do not "fall from the blue sky" but are made by human beings. Other conceptions which had been provided in the history of human kind are:

1. rights rest on God's will;
2. rights rest on the strongest person; or
3. rights rest on a specific human feature like a person's wisdom or age.

However, let us take the following description for granted: There is a legal community in which the members are legal entities with (legal) claims and legal addressees with (legal) obligations. If someone refuses the addressee's legal obligation within such a system, the legal entity has the right to call the legal instance in order to let his right be enforced. The main question is whether the fetus (or the embryo, conceptus, zygote) is a legal person with a basic right to live or not and, furthermore, whether there will be a conflict of legal norms, that is a conflict between the fetus' right

to live and the right of self-determination of the pregnant woman (principle of autonomy). Is the fetus a legal entity or not?

### **The Account of Quasi-Rights**

It was previously stated that the fetus as such is no person and that it seems unsound to claim that fetuses are persons in the ordinary sense of the notion. If rights are tied to the notion of personhood, then it seems appropriate to say that fetuses do not have any legal rights. One can object that animals of higher consciousness have some “rights” or quasi-rights because it is prohibited to kill them without good reason (killing great apes and dolphins for fun is prohibited in most countries). Their “right” not to be killed is based on the people’s will and their basic interest not to kill higher developed animals for fun. But, it would be wrong to assume that those animals are legal entities with “full” rights, or that they have only “half” rights. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that animals have “quasi-rights.” There is a parallel between the so-called right of the fetus and the quasi-rights of some animals: both are not persons in the normal sense of the notion but it would cause us great discomfort to offer them no protection and to deliver them to the vagaries of the people. According to this line of argument, it seems sound to claim that fetuses also have quasi-rights. It does not follow that the quasi-rights of the fetuses and the quasi-rights of the animals are identical; people would normally stress that the quasi-rights of fetuses are of more importance than that of animals.

However, there are some basic rights of the pregnant woman, for example, the right of self-determination, the right of privacy, the right of physical integrity, and the right to live. On the other hand, there is the existential quasi-right of the fetus, that is, the quasi-right to live. If the presumption is right that legal rights are tied to the notion of personhood and that there is a difference between rights and quasi-rights, then it seems right that the fetus has no legal right but “just” a quasi-right to live. If this is the case, what about the relation between the existential quasi-right of the fetus and the basic legal rights of the pregnant woman? The answer seems obvious: quasi-rights cannot trump full legal rights. The fetus has a different legal status that is based on a different moral status (see above). On this view there is no legal conflict of rights.

### **The Argument of Potentiality**

Another important point in the debate about the ascription of legal rights to the fetus is the topic of potential rights. Joel Feinberg discusses this point in his famous article “Potentiality, Development, and Rights” (1984, 145-151) and claims that the thesis that actual rights can be derived from the potential ability of having such rights is logically flawed because one is only able to derive potential rights from a potential ability of having rights. Feinberg maintains that there may be cases where it is illegal or wrong to have an abortion even when the fetus does not have any rights or is not yet a moral person. To illustrate his main argument – that rights do not rest on the potential ability of having them – Feinberg considers Stanley Benn’s argument which I slightly modified:

If person X is President of the USA and thus is Commander in Chief of the army, then person X had the potential ability to become the President of the USA and Commander in Chief of the army in the years before his rule.

### **But, it does not follow that:**

The person X has the authority to command the army as potential President of the USA.

Thus, it seems incorrect to derive actual rights from the bare potential ability to have legal rights at a later time. It should be added that Benn – despite his criticism on the argument of potential

rights – also claims that there are valid considerations which do not refer to the talk of rights and may provide plausible reasons against infanticide and late abortions even when fetuses and newborns are lawless beings with no personhood.

## **A Pragmatic Account**

There is always a chance that women get pregnant when they have sex with their (heterosexual) partners. There is not a 100% certainty of not getting pregnant under “normal circumstances”; there is always a very small chance even by using contraception to get pregnant. However, what does the sphere of decisions look like? A pregnancy is either deliberate or not. If the woman gets deliberately pregnant, then both partners (respectively the pregnant woman) may decide to have a baby or to have an abortion. In the case of having an abortion there may be good reasons for having an abortion with regard to serious health problems, for example, a (seriously) disabled fetus or the endangerment of the woman’s life. Less good reasons seem to be: vacation, career prospects, or financial and social grievances. If the pregnancy is not deliberate, it is either self-caused in the sense that the partners knew about the consequences of sexual intercourse and the contraception malfunctioned or it is not self-caused in the sense of being forced to have sex (rape). In both cases the fetus may be aborted or not. The interesting question concerns the reasons given for the justification of having an abortion.

There are at least two different kinds of reasons or justifications: The first group will be called “first order reasons”; the second “second order reasons.” First order reasons are reasons of justifications which may plausibly justify an abortion, for example, (i) rape, (ii) endangerment of the woman’s life, and (iii) a serious mentally or physically disabled fetus. Second order reasons are reasons of justifications which are, in comparison to first order reasons, less suitable in providing a strong justification for abortion, for example, (i) a journey, (ii) career prospects, (iii) by virtue of financial or social grievances.

### **a) First Order Reasons**

#### **i. Rape**

It would be cruel and callous to force the pregnant woman who had been raped to give birth to a child. Judith Jarvis Thomson maintains in her article “A Defense of Abortion” that the right to live does not include the right to make use of a foreign body even if this means having the fetus aborted (Thomson 1984, pp. 174 and pp. 177). Both the fetus and the raped woman are “innocent,” but this does not change “the fact” that the fetus has any rights. It seems obvious in this case that the raped woman has a right to abort. Forcing her not to abort is to remind her of the rape day-by-day which would be a serious mental strain and should not be enforced by law or morally condemned.

However, this assumption would be premature from John Noonan’s viewpoint according to his article “An Almost Absolute Value in History” (Noonan 1970, 51- 59). He claims that

the fetus as human [is] a neighbor; his life [has] parity with one’s own [...] [which] could be put in humanistic as well as theological terms: do not injure your fellow man without reasons. In these terms, once the humanity of the fetus is perceived, abortion is never right except in self-defense. When life must be taken to save life, reason alone cannot say that a mother must prefer a child’s

life to her own. With this exception, now of great rarity, abortion violates the rational humanist tenet of the equality of human lives.

Hence, the woman has no right to abort the fetus even if she had been raped and got pregnant against her will. This is the consequence of Noonan's claim since he only permits having an abortion in self-defense while Thomson argues that women, in general, have a right to abort the fetus when the fetus is conceived as an intruder (for example, due to rape). But, it remains unclear what Noonan means by "self-defense." At the end of his article he states that "self-sacrifice carried to the point of death seemed in extreme situations not without meaning. In the less extreme cases, preference for one's own interests to the life of another seemed to express cruelty or selfishness irreconcilable with the demands of love"

(Noonan 1970). On this view, even in the standard case of self-defense – for example, either the woman's life or the life of the fetus – the pregnant woman's death would not be inappropriate and in less extreme cases the raped woman would express cruelty or selfishness when she aborts the fetus – a judgment not all people would agree with.

## **ii. Endangerment of the Woman's Life**

Furthermore, there is no good reason to proceed with a pregnancy when the woman's life is in serious danger. Potential life should not be more valued than actual life. Of course, it is desirable to do everything possible to rescue both but it should be clear that the woman's life "counts more" in this situation. To force her at the risk of her life means to force her to give up her right of self-defense and her right to live. There seems to be no good reason to suspend her basic right of self-defense.

## **iii. Serious Mentally or Physically Disabled Fetuses**

It is hard to say when exactly a fetus is seriously mentally or physically disabled because this hot issue raises the vital question of whether the future life of the disabled fetus is regarded as worth living (problem of relativity). Hence, there are simple cases and, of course, borderline cases which lie in the penumbra and are hard to evaluate. Among the simple cases take the following example: Imagine a human torso lacking arms and legs that will never develop mental abilities like self-consciousness, the ability to communicate, or the ability to reason. It seems quite obvious to some people that such a life is not worth living. But what about the high number of borderline cases? Either parents are not entitled to have a healthy and strong offspring, nor are the offspring entitled to become healthy and strong. Society should not force people to give birth to seriously disabled fetuses or morally worse to force mothers who are willing to give birth to a disabled fetus to have an abortion (for example, Nazi Germany). It seems clear that a rather small handicap of the fetus is not a good reason to abort it.

Often radical groups of disabled persons claim that, if other people hold the view that it is all right to abort fetuses with (serious) genetic handicaps, the same people therewith deny the basic right to live of disabled adults with serious handicaps. This objection is unreasonable since fetuses in contrast to adult human beings have no basic interest in continuing to live their lives. Disabled fetuses maybe aborted like other fetuses, disabled (adult) human persons have to be respected like other people.

## **b) Second Order Reasons**

### **i. A Journey to Europe**

With regard to the reasons of justification according to the second group, there is a specific view

which is based on the argument that it is the decision of the woman to have an abortion or not.

There is a related view that rests on the assumption of the pregnant woman who claims that the fetus is a part of her body like a limb so that she has the right to do what ever she wants to do with the fetus. The argument is wrong. The fetus is certainly not a simple part of the pregnant woman but, rather, a dependent organism that relies on the woman.

The following example, the journey to Europe from North America, is based on the feminist argument but it is somewhat different in stressing another point in the line of argumentation: A young woman is pregnant in the seventh month and decides to make a journey to Europe for a sight-seeing tour. Her pregnancy is an obstacle to this and she decides to have an abortion. She justifies her decision by claiming that it will be possible for her to get pregnant whenever she wants but she is only able to make the journey now by virtue of her present career prospects. What can be said of her decision? Most authors may feel a deep discomfort not to morally condemn the action of the woman or not to reproach her for her decision for different reasons. But, there seems only two possible answers which may count as a valid basis for morally blaming the woman for her decision: First, if the young woman lives in a moral community where all members hold the view that it is immoral to have an abortion with regard to the reason given, then her action may be morally reprehensible. Furthermore, if the (moral) agreement is enforced by law, the woman also violated the particular law for which she has to take charge of. Second, one could also blame her for not showing compassion for her potential child. People may think that she is a callous person since she prefers to make the journey to Europe instead of giving birth to her almost born child (seventh month). If the appeal to her mercy fails, one will certainly be touched by her "strange" and "inappropriate" action. However, the community would likely put some informal pressure on the pregnant woman to influence her decision not to have an abortion. But some people may still contend that this social pressure will not change anything about the fact that the fetus has no basic right to live while claiming that the woman's decision is elusive.

## **ii. Financial and Social Reasons**

A woman got pregnant (not deliberately) and wants to have an abortion by virtue of her bad financial and social background because she fears that she will be unable to offer the child an appropriate life perspective. In this case, the community should do everything possible to assist the woman if she wants to givebirth to her child. Or, some may argue, that society should offer to take care of her child in special homes with other children or to look for other families who are willing to house another child. According to this line of thinking, people may claim that the financial or social background should not be decisive for having an abortion if there is a true chance for help.

## **c) First Order Reasons vs. Second Order Reasons**

There is a difference between the first order reasons and the second order reasons. We already saw that the first order reasons are able to justify an abortion while the second order reasons are less able to do so. That is because people think that the second order reasons are weaker than the reasons of the first group. It seems that the human ability to show compassion for the fetus is responsible for our willingness to limit the woman's basic right of autonomy where her reasons are too elusive. However, one may state that there are no strong compulsive reasons which could morally condemn the whole practice of abortion. Some people may not unconvincingly argue that moral agreements and legal rights are due to human beings so that reasons for or against abortion are always subjective and relative. According to this view, one is only able to contend the "trueness" or "wrongness" of a particular action in a limited way. Of course, there are other people who argue for the opposite (for example, Kantians, Catholic Church). One reason why people have

strong feelings about the conflict of abortion is that human beings do have strong intuitive feelings, for example, to feel compassion for fetuses as helpless and most vulnerable human entities. But moral intuitionism falls short by being a valid and objective basis for moral rights.

In the end, it is a question of a particular moral approach whether one regards an abortion as morally justifiable or not. But not every approach is justified. There is no anything goes.

## **Public Policy and Abortion**

One of the most difficult issues is how to make a sound policy that meets the needs of most people in a given society without focusing on the extreme conservative view, or the extreme liberal view, or the many moderate views on the conflict of abortion. The point is simple, one cannot wait until the philosophical debate is settled, for maybe there is no one solution available. But, in fact, people in a society must know what the policy is; that is, they have to know when and under what circumstances abortion is permitted or altogether prohibited. What are the reasons for a given policy? Do they rest on religious beliefs or do they depend on cultural claims? Whose religious beliefs and whose cultural claims? Those beliefs and claims of most people or of the dominant group in a given society? What about the problem of minority rights? Should they be respected or be refused? These are hard questions; no one is able to yet give a definite response.

But, of course, the problem of abortion has to be “solved,” at least, with regard to practical matters. This means that a good policy does not rest on extreme views but tries to cover as many points of views, although being aware of the fact that one is not able to please every person in society. This would be an impossible task. It seems that one should adopt a moderate view rather than the proposed extreme views. This is not because the moderate view is “correct” but because one needs a broad consensus for a sound policy. The hardliners in the public debate on the conflict of abortion, be they proponents or opponents, may not be aware of the fact that neither view is sustainable for most people.

A sound way for governments with regard to a reasonable policy could be the acceptance of a more or less neutral stance that may function as a proper guide for law. But, in fact, the decisive claim of a “neutral stance” is, in turn, questionable. All ethical theories try to present a proper account of a so-called neutral stance but there is hardly any theory that could claim to be sustainable with regard to other approaches. However, the key seems to be, again, to accept a middle way to cover most points of views. In the end, a formation of a policy seeks a sound compromise people could live with. But this is not the end of the story. One should always try to find better ways to cope with hard ethical problems. The conflict of abortion is of that kind and there is no evidence to assume otherwise.

## **Clinical Ethics Consultation and Abortion**

The vital issue of how one chooses whether or not to have an abortion is of utmost importance since people, in particular women, want to have a proper “guideline” that can support them in their process of ethical decision-making. According to pregnant women, the most crucial point seems not to be whether abortion is morally legitimate or not but, rather, how one should deliberate in the particular case. In fact, observations regularly show that women will nearly have the same number of abortions in contexts in which it is legal or not.

Gert is right in claiming that “the law can allow behavior that some people regard as morally unacceptable, such as early abortion, and it can prohibit behavior that some people regard as morally acceptable, such as late abortion. No one thinks that what the law decides about abortion settles the moral issue” (Gert 2004, 138). But what follows from that? What aspects should one consider

and how should one decide in a particular case?

It would be best to consult a neutral person who has special knowledge and experiences in medicine and medical ethics (for example, clinical ethics consultation). Most people are usually not faced with hard conflicts of abortion in their daily lives and get simply swamped by it; they are unable to determine and evaluate all moral aspects of the given case and to foresee the relevant consequences of the possible actions (for example, especially with regard to very young women who get pregnant by mistake). They need professional help without being dominated by the person in order to clarify their own (ethical) stance.

However, the conflict of abortion as such may not be solvable, in the end, but the experienced professional is able to provide persons with feasible solutions for the particular case.

## **Euthanasia**

Euthanasia, also called 'Mercy Killing' and 'Physician Assisted Suicide'; is a term in medical ethics for the practice of interfering or intervening in a natural process towards death. In other words it is accelerating the natural course of death in terminally ill patients, when all treatments become ineffective or much too painful for the patient to bear. In short Euthanasia is ending a human life with the intention of relieving the person from an unbearable pain. Haris (2001) precisely defines Euthanasia as 'a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending a life to relieve intractable suffering'.

The issue of Euthanasia has always remained controversial and still has failed to carry legal and constitutional support in most parts of the world. Suicide in any form and by any means is either punished or at least disapproved in human history. There is no permissibility of such a killing/suicide in Islam so Euthanasia can never be the part of Muslim law in Islamic world. Therefore the origin and development of this concept can be historically located in the non Muslim countries especially of the west.

Back in 400 BC when the father of medicine Hippocrates formulated the oath still taken by the fresh medical graduates dictates 'I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any such counsel'., speaks against physician assisted suicide. Even in the 19th century, the US legislation proclaimed that if a suicide is committed on the advice of another person, the adviser would be guilty of a murder. In the early 20th century, the Supreme Court reevaluated its judgments concerning 'living will' and focusing how best to ensure the dignity and the independence for the 'end of life' with considerable changes in the health laws. In 1920 the book "Permitting the Destruction of Life not Worthy of Life" was published, in which the author Hoche advocated the death assistance be given under very controlled conditions. In 1935 Euthanasia society was formed in England to support mercy killing. 1939's Nazi's Euthanasia became very popular when Hitler ordered mercy killing of the sick and disabled. From 1995 to 2008, Euthanasia has been legalized in countries like parts of Australia, Netherland, Belgium and few states of the United States of America. [2]

There are several forms or kinds of Euthanasia; each form has its own ethical issues. Active Euthanasia: is the one which causes immediate death of the patient, by the direct and deliberate action of the physician. For example when a lethal injection is given to the patient or an overdose of a pain killer when the physician knows the after effects of such a dose.

Passive Euthanasia involves an indirect action by the physician for the death of the patient. This may include withdrawing or withholding the required treatment. For example switching off the life supporting machine like ventilator or not doing the required surgical procedures that can keep the

person alive though for a shorttime. Voluntary Euthanasia:- takes place with the will of the patient, usually on his request to the physician.

Non-Voluntary Euthanasia occurs when the patient is unconscious or in comma for a long time, or unable to make decision for example a very young child, or a mentally retarded person. Therefore someone else related to the patient makes the decision of ending the patient's life.

Involuntary Euthanasia:- is oftentimes equated to murder because in this case the patient does not opt for death but he is killed as the doctor thinks it to be in his benefit.

Indirect Euthanasia: – does not involve the intentional killing by the physician, but the side effects of the treatment, usually given to reduce the pain accelerate the death of the patient.

Assisted Suicide:- includes cases when the patient seeks help from his physician to die. This can include making the lethal drugs available for the patients.

The most common argument given by the proponents of Euthanasia is its effective way of relieving excruciating pain. To this one argument there can be two counter arguments. Firstly the advancements made today in the field of medicine, especially in pain management weakens the justification for Euthanasia. Secondly research shows that terminally ill patients choose suicide not because of the physical pain but because of depression. A study of terminally ill patients published in The American Journal of Psychiatry in 1986 concluded:

'The striking feature of [our] results is that all of the patients who had either desired premature death or contemplated suicide were judged to be suffering from clinical depressive illness; that is, none of those patients who did not have clinical depression had thoughts of suicide or wished that death would come early'.

Researchers believe that a person diagnosed with terminal illness should be given time and support to pass through the five stages of the process – denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance, and killing them before they come to terms with the situation is nothing less than a murder.

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Boston Globe survey of 1991 shows that patients with incurable illnesses who see suicide as an option are mostly those who are neither tired of pain or of restricted life style, nor the fear of machine dependency but rather the feeling of being a burden on their family. Sometimes it's the family who advocate Euthanasia for the terminally ill patient, considering his life unworthy, and therefore a burden; which in turn throws the patient in the abbeys of depression. One should be afraid of the day when legalization of the right to die will become duty to die, pressurizing the already tormented patients to select Euthanasia as an only option. [3]

If we look at Euthanasia from another angle it is not a right to die but gives someone a right to kill. A right given to doctors and the relatives of a person to intentionally end his life. There is a need to differentiate between suicide and killing. Suicide is an individual act, whereas Euthanasia is not a private act. It involves the will of the person or the relatives and action of the physician, and known

by everyone around. It is therefore more close to public killing than suicide. Such a power to kill can be abused for the most vulnerable people in the population.

There should be a public realization that if all forms of treatments fail or become ineffective or continuation of any medical or surgical procedure would increase the pain rather than alleviating it, the suffering soul should be given support in all possible ways and all efforts should be directed toward minimizing his agony and making whatever little time he has, comfortable.

As followers of Islam such an option as Euthanasia can never cross our minds for ourselves or for our dear ones. I have a personal experience of accompanying a close kin of mine to the dialysis sessions, where patients were not only dependent on machines for their lives but were not even allowed to drink water during the warmest summers, but never did I once heard a patient or any of his relative praying for a quick demise. They would seek Allah's blessings during the hardest of times and a kind of hope would get them going. I saw doctors trying to look for options to improve the quality of life of such patients but any thought of eliminating the patient's pain through killing them was out of question and option.

As Muslims it is our firm belief that every life is sacred and Allah never creates and sustains anyone without purpose. In the holy Quran He says 'And if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he has saved the life of whole people'. (Quran 5:32). Allah further commands 'take not the life which Allah made sacred otherwise in the course of justice'.

If we equate voluntary Euthanasia with suicide, then again none of us has a right to take his own life. How can we have this right when we have not created ourselves, in fact how can we destroy something of which we are not the owners. Our bodies and souls belong to the Almighty and have been entrusted to us to be taken care of in the best ways possible. Suicide is a crime which is not only punishable in this world but also unforgivable sin in the hereafter. Prophet Mohammad warned the people against suicide by saying "Whoever kills himself with an iron instrument will be carrying it forever in hell. Whoever takes poison and kills himself will forever keep sipping that poison in hell. Whoever jumps off a mountain and kills himself will forever keep falling down in the depths of hell". [4]

Our religion Islam not only emphasize on seeking all possible medical help during illness but further consoles the patients in pain by giving him the happy tidings for reward if he endures the pain with patience. In one of the hadith it is mentioned that when a true believer is afflicted with pain, even a prick of a thorn and he bears it with patience, then his sins will be forgiven and his wrongdoings will be discarded as the tree sheds off its leaves. Such words by the Holy Prophet can be a huge support for a sufferer of a terminal illness or of incurable and painful disease. Euthanasia cannot therefore be a part of the dictionary of a true believer.

The weak value system of the west has come up with the idea of deserting the old, weak and the sick by leaving them in the old houses and hospitals. These so called facilities also sometimes cost them huge amounts, which make them claim that people who become unproductive for the society and a burden on the productive fellows should die for the good of the people around and for their own ease. But the east has still kept its value system strong. Our religious and social values dictate us to take care with respect and dignity of the old, weak, sick and the helpless. Allah has specially stressed upon respecting and serving the parents specially when they become old. "and that you be kind to your parents. Whether one or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a word of contempt but address them in terms of honor. And lower to them

the wing of humility out of compassion, and say: my Lord, bestow on them your mercy even as they cherished me in childhood" (Qur'an 17:25- 25). As far as the issue of heavy cost is concerned to keep a terminally ill patient alive, Islam makes it a responsibility of the state and the society as a whole to cover the health care needed.

Euthanasia might be categorized into several kinds but Islam emphasizes the intentions involved in the act. If for example physician intends to alleviate the pain of the patients but the dose somehow kill him, the doctor cannot be accused of murder, or cannot be said to have practiced Euthanasia. The doctor is expected to help the patient in the process of life and not in process of death.

Important enough is to consider the relative nature of the terms like pain, suffering and agony. It really depends on the patience and tolerance level of each individual, which of course varies. What is suffering for one person might not be the same for the other, similarly excruciating pain for one can be bearable for someone else.

Conclusion: – Humans might be the wisest form of God's creation but still not wise enough to be given a right to decide for their own death or for the death of another of their own kind. All lives are precious and sacred and only such value system can be the basis of a human society, where the sanctity of life is maintained. Euthanasia in any of its forms, involves the intention of killing or finishing a still living human weakens the fabric of the society and gives an altogether a different lens to the members to see death as the only solution for all pains and torments, which blurs the vision to see other possibilities to fight the situation. Euthanasia should therefore be discouraged in all its forms and in all parts of the world.

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### **Female-infanticide What is infanticide?**

Infanticide is the unlawful killing of very young children. It is found in both indigenous and sophisticated cultures around the world.

### **Female infanticide**

Female infanticide is the deliberate killing of girl babies. It is also described as gender-selective killing or "gendercide". (Similar words like 'gynocide' and 'femicide' are used to describe the killing of females of any age.) Female infanticide is more common than male infanticide, and in some countries, particularly India and China, is likely to have serious consequences on the balance of the sexes in the population. The reasons behind it are almost always cultural, rather than directly religious. The causes:

### **Anti-female bias**

Societies that practise female infanticide always show many other signs of bias against females. Women are perceived as subservient because of their role as carers and homemakers, whilst men predominantly ensure the family's social and economic stability.

## Family economics

Girl babies are often killed for financial reasons.

- **Earning power:** Men are usually the main income-earners, either because they are more employable or earn higher wages for the same work, or because they are able to do more agricultural work in subsistence economies. Since male babies have a greater income potential, they are less likely to be killed.
- **Potential pensions:** In many societies, parents depend on their children to look after them in old age. But in many of these cultures a girl leaves her parental family and joins her husband's family when she marries. The result is that parents with sons gain extra resources for their old age, when their sons marry, while parents with daughters lose their 'potential pensions' when they marry and move away. This gives parents a strong reason to prefer male children. Some parents (particularly poor ones) who can't afford to support a large family, will kill female babies. Girls are considered a drain on family resources during their childhood without bringing economic benefits later on.
- **Dowry:** Some girl babies are killed so that the family doesn't have to pay a dowry when they get married. In Indian society it is tradition for the parents of the bride to give a dowry to the groom and his family. The dowry consists of large amounts of money and valuable goods. For families with several daughters this can be a serious financial burden.

## Government policy

Governmental policies have also increased female infanticide as an unpredicted side-effect. For example, when the Chinese Government introduced a One Child per Family Policy there was a surge in female infanticide. Families needed to have a son because of their higher earning potential, so a girl baby was an economic disaster for them, and there was a strong motive to ensure that girl babies did not survive.

## Caste

Some female infants are killed because they are regarded as being lower in the **caste** hierarchy than males.

## Where does female infanticide occur?

Female infanticide is a significant problem in parts of Asia - infanticide does occur in the West, but usually as isolated family tragedies with no underlying pattern or gender bias.

## India

Female infanticide and **female foeticide** (the selective abortion of girls in the womb) are significant issues in India.

Female infanticide has been a problem for centuries, partly as a result of the patriarchal nature of Indian society.

## Tackling the issue

Modern India has tried several ways to tackle the issue. One initiative in the state of Tamil Nadu was taken to attack the underlying economic problems.

Where parents had one or two daughters but no son, and either of the parents was willing to be sterilised, the government offered the parents money to help look after the children. This money

was to be paid annually throughout the daughter's education, followed by a lump sum on her twentieth birthday, either for use as a dowry or to fund further education.

## **China**

Female infanticide has existed in China for a long time, and although the One Child per Family policy has added to the problem, it didn't cause it.

The One Child Policy was introduced by the Chinese Government in 1979 with the intention of keeping the population within sustainable limits even in the face of natural disasters and poor harvests, and improving the quality of life for the Chinese population as a whole.

Under the policy, parents who have more than one child may have their wages reduced and be denied some social services.

Despite the egalitarian nature of Chinese society, many parents believe that having a son is a vital element of providing for their old age. Therefore in extreme cases, a baby is killed if it is not of the preferred sex, because of the pressure not to have more than one child.

## **Tackling the issue**

The Chinese Government have acknowledged the problem and introduced laws to deal with it:

- Marriage law prohibits female infanticide.
- Women's Protection Law prohibits infanticide and bans discrimination against women who choose to keep female babies.
- Maternal Health Care Law forbids the use of technological advances, such as ultra-sound machines, to establish the sex of foetuses, so as not to pre-determine the fate of female infants or encourage selective abortion.

## **Origins of infanticide**

Infanticide occurs in most cases as a way of restricting poverty and population. Throughout history infanticide has been regarded as a productive and efficient way to control starvation and poor standards of living caused by over population.

## **Confucianism**

The male bias in China is deeply rooted in Chinese traditions which leads parents to want their first child to be a boy. Confucianism regards male children as more desirable since they provide security for the elderly, work and are important for the performance of ancestral rites.

## **Hinduism**

Hindu authorities condemn infanticide. Son-preference in Hindu cultures is largely based on the fact that men are better providers, and that sons are required for the proper performance of funeral rites. Some writers argue that Hindu culture has long had a patriarchal bias against women.

## **Sikhism**

Sikh authorities condemn infanticide. The Sikh religion is one of the most gender-neutral, and explicitly proclaims the equality of men and women. This makes it more surprising that censuses in India show there are far more male children than female children in the Sikh community.

In practice there does appear to be a strong preference for boys in the Sikh heartland. The community appears to give greater respect to the parents of boys, and boys themselves.

In response the Sikh religious organisation Akal Takht has re-emphasised that women are equal to men. It has banned neo-natal sex identification, selective abortion and the killing of female babies.

## **Islam**

Islam has always condemned infanticide. Female infanticide was common in pre-Islamic Arabia. However, by the time of Muhammad, and the revelation of the Qur'an female infanticide was strictly forbidden, and regarded as seriously as adult murder.

### **The Qur'an on female infanticide:**

When the infant girl, is buried alive, is questioned, for what crime she was killed.

#### **Surah 81 v 8 - 9**

You shall not kill your children for fear of want. We will provide for them and for you. To kill them is a grievous sin.

#### **Surah 17 v 31**

## **Christianity**

Christianity has always condemned infanticide.

## **Judaism**

Judaism has always condemned infanticide. **Professional Ethics: Corporate Governance The ends and means of corporate governance**

There is significant debate about the ends and means of corporate governance, i.e., about who firms should be managed for, and who should (ultimately) manage them. Much of this debate is carried on with the large publicly-traded corporation in view.

### **Ends: shareholder primacy or stakeholder balance?**

There are two main views about the proper ends of corporate governance. According to one view, firms should be managed in the best interests of shareholders. It is typically assumed that managing firms in shareholders' best interests requires maximizing their wealth. This view is often called "shareholder primacy" (Stout 2002) or—in order to contrast it more directly with its main rival (to be discussed below) "shareholder theory". (Confusingly, the label 'shareholder primacy' is sometimes used—e.g., by Bainbridge [2008]—to refer to the view that shareholders should have ultimate control over the firm.) Shareholder primacy is the dominant view about the ends of corporate governance among financial professionals and in business schools.

A few writers argue for shareholder primacy on deontological grounds. On this argument, shareholders own the firm, and hire managers to run it for them on the condition that the firm is managed in their interests. Shareholder primacy is thus based on a promise that managers make to shareholders (Friedman 1970; Hasnas 1998). In response, some argue that shareholders do not own the firm. They own stock, a type of corporate security (Bainbridge 2008; Stout 2002); the firm itself may be unowned (Strudler 2017). Others argue that managers do not make, explicitly or implicitly, any promises to shareholders to manage the firm in a certain way (Boatright 1994). More writers argue for shareholder primacy on consequentialist grounds. On this argument, managing firms in the interests of shareholders is more efficient than managing them in any other way (Hansmann & Kraakman 2001; Jensen 2002). In support of this, some argue that, if managers are not given a single objective that is clear and measurable—viz., maximizing shareholder value—then they will have an enhanced opportunity for self-dealing (Stout 2002). Consequentialist arguments

for shareholder primacy run into problems that afflict many versions of consequentialism: in requiring all firms to be managed in a certain way, it does not allow sufficient scope for personal choice (Hussain 2012). Most think that people should be able to pursue projects, including economic projects, that matter to them, even if those projects do not maximize welfare.

The second main view about the proper ends of corporate governance is given by stakeholder theory. This theory was first put forward by Freeman in the 1980s (Freeman 1984; Freeman & Reed 1983), and then refined by Freeman and various collaborators over the next 30 years (see, e.g., Freeman et al. 2010; Jones, Wicks, & Freeman 2002). According to stakeholder theory—or at least, early formulations of the theory—instead of managing the firm in the best interests of shareholders only, managers should seek to “balance” the interests of all stakeholders, where a stakeholder is anyone who has a “stake”, or interest (including a financial interest), in the firm.

To its critics, stakeholder theory has seemed both insufficiently articulated and weakly defended. With respect to articulation, one question that has been pressed is: Who are the stakeholders (Orts & Strudler 2002, 2009)? The groups most commonly identified are shareholders, employees, the community, suppliers, and customers. But other groups have stakes in the firm, including creditors, the government, and competitors. It makes a great deal of difference where the line is drawn, but stakeholder theorists have not provided a clear rationale for drawing a line in one place rather than another. Another question is: What does it mean to “balance” the interests of all stakeholders—other than not always giving precedence to shareholders’ interests (Orts & Strudler 2009)? With respect to defense, critics have wondered what the rationale for managing firms in the interests of all stakeholders is. In one place, Freeman (1984) offers an instrumental argument for his view, claiming that balancing stakeholders’ interests is better for the firm strategically than maximizing shareholder wealth. (This is precisely what defenders of shareholder primacy say about that view.) In another, he gives an argument that appeals to Rawls’s justice as fairness.

In recent years, questions have been raised about whether stakeholder theory is appropriately seen as a genuine competitor to shareholder primacy, or is even appropriately called a “theory”. In one article, Freeman and collaborators say that stakeholder theory is simply “the body of research ... in which the idea of ‘stakeholders’ plays a crucial role” (Jones et al. 2002). In another, Freeman describes stakeholder theory as “a genre of stories about how we could live”

(1994: 413). It may be, as Norman (2013) says, that stakeholder is now best regarded as “mind-set”, i.e., a way of looking at the firm that emphasizes its embeddedness in a network of relationships.

It is important to realize that a resolution of the debate between shareholder and stakeholder theorists (however we conceive of the latter) will not resolve all or even most of the ethical questions in business. This is because this is a debate about the ends of corporate governance; it cannot answer all of the questions about the moral constraints that must be observed in pursuit of those ends (Goodpaster 1991; Norman 2013). Neither shareholder primacy nor stakeholder theory is plausibly interpreted as the view that corporate managers should do whatever is possible to maximize shareholder wealth and balance all stakeholders’ interests, respectively. Rather, these views should be interpreted as views that managers should do whatever is morally permissible to achieve these ends. A large part of business ethics is trying to determine what morality permits in this domain.

## **Means: control by shareholders or others too?**

Answers to questions about the means of corporate governance often mirror answers to question about the ends of corporate governance. Often the best way to ensure that a firm is managed in the interests of a certain party P is to give P control over it. Conversely, justifications for why the firm should be managed in the interests of P sometimes appeal P's rights to control it.

Thus Friedman (1970) thinks that shareholders' ownership of the firm gives them a right to control the firm (which they can use to ensure that the firm is run in their interests). We might see control rights for shareholders as following analytically from the concept of ownership. To own a thing is to have a bundle of rights with respect to that thing. One of the standard "incidents" of ownership is control.

As noted, in recent years the idea that the firm is something that can be owned has been challenged (Bainbridge 2008; Strudler 2017). But contractarian arguments for shareholder control of firms have been constructed which do not rely on the assumption of firm ownership. All that is assumed in these arguments is that some people own capital, and others own labor. Capital can "hire" labor (and other inputs of production), on terms that it draws up, or labor can "hire" capital, on terms that it draws up, with society setting limits on what the terms may be. It just so happens that, in most cases, capital hires labor. These points are emphasized especially by those who regard the firm as a "nexus of contracts" among various parties.

Many writers find this result troubling. Even if the governance structure in most firms is in some sense agreed to, they say that it is unjust in other ways. Anderson (2015) characterizes standard corporate governance regimes as oppressive and unaccountable private dictatorships. To address this injustice, these writers call for various forms of worker participation in managerial decision-making, including the ability by workers to reject arbitrary directives by managers (Hsieh 2005), worker co-determination of firms' policies and practices, and exclusive control of productive enterprises by workers.

Arguments for these governance structures take various forms. One type of argument appeals to the value of protecting workers' interests (Brenkert 1992a; Hsieh 2005). A second type of argument appeals to the value of autonomy, or a right to freely determine one's actions, including one's actions at work (McCall 2001). A third type of argument for worker participation in managerial decision-making is the "parallel case" argument. According to it, if states should be governed democratically, then so should firms, because firms are like states in the relevant respects (Dahl 1985; Walzer 1983). A fourth argument for worker participation in firm decision-making sees it as valuable or even necessary training for participation in political processes in the broader society (Cohen 1989).

Space considerations prevent a detailed examination of these arguments. But criticisms generally fall into two categories. The first insists on the normative priority of agreements, of the sort described above. There are few legal restrictions on the types of governance structures that firms can have. And some firms are in fact controlled by workers (Dow 2003; Hansmann 1996). To insist that other firms should be governed this way is to say, according to this argument, that people should not be allowed to arrange their economic lives as they see fit. Another criticism of worker participation appeals to efficiency. Allowing workers to participate in managerial decision-making may decrease the pace of decision-making, since it requires giving many workers a chance to make their voices heard (Hansmann 1996). It may also raise the cost of capital for firms, as investors may demand more favorable terms if they are not given control of the enterprise in return

(McMahon 1994). Both sources of inefficiency may put the firm at a significant disadvantage in a competitive market. And it may not be just a matter of competitive disadvantage. If it were, the problem could be solved by making all firms worker-controlled. The problem may be one of diminished productivity more generally.

### **Corporate social responsibility**

Corporate social responsibility is based on the premise that a business can only thrive if it operates within a thriving society. In that way, the business depends on the community it operates within, and as such, has an ethical and moral responsibility towards that community. A business is perceived as legitimate when its activities are congruent with the goals and values of the society in which the business operates.

Consumers and other companies are likely to shun firms that develop unethical reputations. And arguably, companies that don't pay attention to their social and ethical responsibilities are more likely to stumble into legal troubles, such as mass corruption or accounting fraud scandals – threatening the sustainability of the business itself.

By promoting respect for the company in the marketplace, CSR can result in higher sales, enhance employee loyalty and attract better personnel to the firm. It is also a way to connect to the personal well-being of customers. In this way, the CSR can contribute towards higher profits for the company.

Therefore, by ensuring brand loyalty and consumer patronage, CSR can ensure that the business remains sustainable in the long-term and it stays profitable.

### **Ethical Responsibility**

Responsibility is an ethical concept that refers to the fact that individuals and groups have morally based obligations and duties to others and to larger ethical and moral codes, standards and traditions.

### **Ethical Principles of Responsibility and Accountability**

Responsibility in a business context refers to “a sphere of duty or obligation assigned to a person by the nature of that person's position, function or work.”

The roles taken on by decision-makers imply a responsibility to perform certain functions associated with those roles. To be more specific, responsibility refers to more than just the primary function of a role; it refers to the multiple facets of that function, which includes both processes and outcomes, and the consequences of the acts performed as part of that set of obligations. A responsible actor may be seen as one whose job involves a predetermined set of obligations that need to be met in order for the job to be accomplished.

According to Aristotle, moral responsibility was viewed as originating with the moral agent as decision-maker, and grew out of an ability to reason, an awareness of action and consequences, and a willingness to act free from external compulsion.

Accountability is the readiness or preparedness to give an explanation or justification to stakeholders for one's judgments, intentions and actions.

“It is a readiness to have one's actions judged by others and, where appropriate, accept responsibility for errors, misjudgments and negligence and recognition for competence, conscientiousness,

excellence and wisdom.” While responsibility is defined as a bundle of obligations associated with a role, accountability could be defined as “blaming or crediting someone for an action”—normally associated with a recognized responsibility. The accountable actor is “held to external oversight, regulation, and mechanisms of punishment aimed to externally motivate responsive adjustment in order to maintain adherence with appropriate moral standards of action.”

In the professional context, accountability is about answering to clients, colleagues and other relevant professionals. The demand to give an account of one’s judgments, acts and omissions arises from the nature of the professional-client and the professional-professional relationships. For communication professionals, accountability has more specific implications. Recent years have seen more practical and concrete interpretation of the concept of accountability by communication specialists. It is associated with responsiveness to the views of all stakeholders, which includes a willingness to explain, defend, and justify actions.

While tracing the lines of responsibility and accountability can be difficult, in the end, if one is responsible in any way for an action, then one must accept some degree of accountability. On the other hand, if responsibility and accountability are not equitably shared and if the process by which they are assigned is not transparent, then problems will arise. In the corporate world, not every actor is blame-worthy, especially if the actor’s autonomy is limited by structure, process, or circumstance. However, lack of autonomy is not an excuse for avoiding accountability entirely.

### **Media Ethics: ethical issues in Privacy Introduction**

The use of social media is growing at a rapid pace and the twenty-first century could be described as the “boom” period for social networking. According to reports provided by Smart Insights, as at February 2019 there were over 3.484 billion social media users. The Smart Insight report indicates that the number of social media users is growing by 9% annually and this trend is estimated to continue. Presently the number of social media users represents 45% of the global population. The heaviest users of social media are “digital natives”; the group of persons who were born or who have grown up in the digital era and are intimate with the various technologies and systems, and the “Millennial Generation”; those who became adults at the turn of the twenty-first century. These groups of users utilize social media platforms for just about anything ranging from marketing, news acquisition, teaching, health care, civic engagement, and politicking to social engagement.

The unethical use of social media has resulted in the breach of individual privacy and impacts both physical and information security. Reports in 2019, reveal that persons between the ages 8 and 11 years spend an average 13.5 hours weekly online and 18% of this age group are actively engaged on social media. Those between ages 12 and 15 spend on average 20.5 hours online and 69% of this group are active social media users. While children and teenagers represent the largest Internet user groups, for the most part they do not know how to protect their personal information on the Web and are the most vulnerable to cyber-crimes related to breaches of information privacy.

In today’s IT-configured society data is one of, if not the most, valuable asset for most businesses/organizations. Organizations and governments collect information via several means including invisible data gathering, marketing platforms and search engines such as Google. Information can be attained from several sources, which can be fused using technology to develop complete profiles of individuals. The information on social media is very accessible and can be of great value to individuals and organizations for reasons such as marketing, etc.; hence, data is retained by most companies for future use.

## Privacy

Privacy or the right to enjoy freedom from unauthorized intrusion is the negative right of all human beings. Privacy is defined as the right to be left alone, to be free from secret surveillance, or unwanted disclosure of personal data or information by government, corporation, or individual (dictionary.com). In this chapter we will define privacy loosely, as the right to control access to personal information. Supporters of privacy posit that it is a necessity for human dignity and individuality and a key element in the quest for happiness. According to Baase [5] in the book titled “A Gift of Fire: Social, Legal and Ethical Issues for Computing and the Internet,” privacy is the ability to control information about one’s self as well as the freedom from surveillance from being followed, tracked, watched, and being eavesdropped on. In this regard, ignoring privacy rights often leads to encroachment on natural rights.

Privacy, or even the thought that one has this right, leads to peace of mind and can provide an environment of solitude. This solitude can allow people to breathe freely in a space that is free from interference and intrusion. According to Richards and Solove, Legal scholar William Prosser argued that privacy cases can be classified into four related “torts,” namely:

1. Intrusion—this can be viewed as encroachment (physical or otherwise) on one’s liberties/solitude in a highly offensive way.
2. Privacy facts—making public, private information about someone that is of no “legitimate concern” to anyone.
3. False light—making public false and “highly offensive” information about others.
4. Appropriation—stealing someone’s identity (name, likeness) to gain advantage without the permission of the individual.

Technology, the digital age, the Internet and social media have redefined privacy however as surveillance is no longer limited to a certain pre-defined space and location. An understanding of the problems and dangers of privacy in the digital space is therefore the first step to privacy control. While there can be clear distinctions between informational privacy and physical privacy, as pointed out earlier, intrusion can be both physical and otherwise.

This chapter will focus on informational privacy which is the ability to control access to personal information. We examine privacy issues in the social media context focusing primarily on personal information and the ability to control external influences. We suggest that breach of informational privacy can impact: solitude (the right to be left alone), intimacy (the right not to be monitored), and anonymity (the right to have no public personal identity and by extension physical

privacy impacted). The right to control access to facts or personal information in our view is a natural, inalienable right and everyone should have control over who see their personal information and how it is disseminated.

In May 2019 the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) clearly outlined that it is unlawful to process personal data without the consent of the individual (subject). It is a legal requirement under the GDPR that privacy notices be given to individuals that outline how their personal data will be processed and the conditions that must be met that make the consent valid. These are:

- “Freely given—an individual must be given a genuine choice when providing consent and it

should generally be unbundled from other terms and conditions (e.g., access to a service should not be conditional upon consent being given).”

- “Specific and informed—this means that data subjects should be provided with information as to the identity of the controller(s), the specific purposes, types of processing, as well as being informed of their right to withdraw consent at any time.”
- “Explicit and unambiguous—the data subject must clearly express their consent (e.g., by actively ticking a box which confirms they are giving consent—pre-ticked boxes are insufficient).”
- “Under 13s—children under the age of 13 cannot provide consent and it is therefore necessary to obtain consent from their parents.”

Arguments can be made that privacy is a cultural, universal necessity for harmonious relationships among human beings and creates the boundaries for engagement and disengagement. Privacy can also be viewed as instrumental good because it is a requirement for the development of certain kinds of human relationships, intimacy and trust. However, achieving privacy is much more difficult in light of constant surveillance and the inability to determine the levels of interaction with various publics. Some critics argue that privacy provides protection against anti-social behaviors such as trickery, disinformation and fraud, and is thought to be a universal right. However, privacy can also be viewed as relative as privacy rules may differ based on several factors such as “climate, religion, technological advancement and political arrangements”. The need for privacy is an objective reality though it can be viewed as “culturally rational” where the need for personal privacy is viewed as relative based on culture. One example is the push by the government, businesses and Singaporeans to make Singapore a smart nation. According to GovTech 2018 reports there is a push by the government in Singapore to harness the data “new gold” to develop systems that can make life easier for its people. The report points out that Singapore is using sensors robots Smart Water Assessment Network (SWAN) to monitor water quality in its reservoirs, seeking to build smart health system and to build a smart transportation system to name a few. In this example privacy can be describe as “culturally rational” and the rules in general could differ based on technological advancement and political arrangements.

In today’s networked society it is naïve and ill-conceived to think that privacy is over-rated and there is no need to be concerned about privacy if you have done nothing wrong. The effects of information flow can be complex and may not be simply about protection for people who have something to hide. Inaccurate information flow can have adverse long-term implications for individuals and companies. Consider a scenario where someone’s computer or tablet is stolen. The perpetrator uses identification information stored on the device to access their social media page which could lead to access to their contacts, friends and friends of their “friends” then participate in illegal activities and engage in anti- social activities such as hacking, spreading viruses, fraud and identity theft. The victim is now in danger of being accused of criminal intentions, or worse. These kinds of situations are possible because of technology and networked systems. Users of social media need to be aware of the risks that are associated with participation.

## **Social media**

The concept of social networking pre-dates the Internet and mass communication as people are said to be social creatures who when working in groups can achieve results in a value greater than the sum of its parts. The explosive growth in the use of social media over the past decade has made it one of the most popular Internet services in the world, providing new avenues to “see and be seen”. The use of social media has changed the communication landscape resulting in changes in ethical norms and behavior. The unprecedented level of growth in usage has resulted in the reduction in the use of other media and changes in areas including civic and political engagement, pri-

vacy and safety. Alexa, a company that keeps track of traffic on the Web, indicates that as of August, 2019 YouTube, Facebook and Twitter are among the top four (4) most visited sites with only Google, being the most popular search engine, surpassing these social media sites.

Social media sites can be described as online services that allow users to create profiles which are “public, semi-public” or both. Users may create individual profiles and/or become a part of a group of people with whom they may be acquainted offline. They also provide avenues to create virtual friendships. Through these virtual friendships, people may access details about their contacts ranging from personal background information and interests to location. Social networking sites provide various tools to facilitate communication. These include chat rooms, blogs, private messages, public comments, ways of uploading content external to the site and sharing videos and photographs. Social media is therefore drastically changing the way people communicate and form relationships.

Today social media has proven to be one of the most, if not the most effective medium for the dissemination of information to various audiences. The power of this medium is phenomenal and ranges from its ability to overturn governments (e.g., Moldova), to mobilize protests, assist with getting support for humanitarian aid, organize political campaigns, organize groups to delay the passing of legislation (as in the case with the copyright bill in Canada) to making social media billionaires and millionaires. The enabling nature and the structure of the media that social networking offers provide a wide range of opportunities that were nonexistent before technology. Facebook and YouTube marketers and trainers provide two examples. Today people can interact with and learn from people millions of miles away. The global reach of this medium has removed all former pre-defined boundaries including geographical, social and any other that existed previously. Technological advancements such as Web 2.0 and Web 4.0 which provide the framework for collaboration, have given new meaning to life from various perspectives: political, institutional and social.

### **Privacy and social media**

Social media and the information/digital era have “redefined” privacy. In today’s Information Technology—configured societies, where there is continuous monitoring, privacy has taken on a new meaning. Technologies such as closed-circuit cameras (CCTV) are prevalent in public spaces or in some private spaces including our work and home. Personal computers and devices such as our smart phones enabled with Global Positioning System (GPS), Geo locations and Geo maps connected to these devices make privacy as we know it, a thing of the past. Recent reports indicate that some of the largest companies such as Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook as well as various government agencies are collecting information without consent and storing it in databases for future use. It is almost impossible to say privacy exists in this digital world (@nowthisnews).

The open nature of the social networking sites and the avenues they provide for sharing information in a “public or semi-public” space create privacy concerns by their very construct. Information that is inappropriate for some audiences are many times inadvertently made visible to groups other than those intended and can sometimes result in future negative outcomes. One such example is a well-known case recorded in an article entitled “The Web Means the End of Forgetting” that involved a young woman who was denied her college license because of backlash from photographs posted on social media in her private engagement.

Technology has reduced the gap between professional and personal spaces and often results in information exposure to the wrong audience. The reduction in the separation of professional and

personal spaces can affect image management especially in a professional setting resulting in the erosion of traditional professional image and impression management. Determining the secondary use of personal information and those who have access to this information should be the prerogative of the individual or group to whom the information belongs. However, engaging in social media activities has removed this control.

Privacy on social networking sites (SNSs) is heavily dependent on the users of these networks because sharing information is the primary way of participating in social communities. Privacy in SNSs is "multifaceted." Users of these platforms are responsible for protecting their information from third-party data collection and managing their personal profiles. However, participants are usually more willing to give personal and more private information in SNSs than anywhere else on the Internet. This can be attributed to the feeling of community, comfort and family that these media provide for the most part. Privacy controls are not the priority of social networking site designers and only a small number of the young adolescent users change the default privacy settings of their accounts. This opens the door for breaches especially among the most vulnerable user groups, namely young children, teenagers and the elderly. The nature of social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter and other social media platforms cause users to re-evaluate and often change their personal privacy standards in order to participate in these social networked communities.

While there are tremendous benefits that can be derived from the effective use of social media there are some unavoidable risks that are involved in its use. Much attention should therefore be given to what is shared in these forums. Social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are said to be the most effective media to communicate to Generation Y's (Gen Y's), as teens and young adults are the largest user groups on these platforms. However, according to Bolton et al. Gen Y's use of social media, if left unabated and unmonitored will have long-term implications for privacy and engagement in civic activities as this continuous use is resulting in changes in behavior and social norms as well as increased levels of cyber-crime.

Today social networks are becoming the platform of choice for hackers and other perpetrators of antisocial behavior. These media offer large volumes of data/information ranging from an individual's date of birth, place of residence, place of work/business, to information about family and other personal activities.

In many cases users unintentionally disclose information that can be both dangerous and inappropriate. Information regarding activities on social media can have far reaching negative implications for one's future. A few examples of situations which can, and have been affected are employment, visa acquisition, and college acceptance. Indiscriminate participation has also resulted in situations such as identity theft and bank fraud just to list a few. Protecting privacy in today's networked society can be a great challenge. The digital revolution has indeed distorted our views of privacy, however, there should be clear distinctions between what should be seen by the general public and what should be limited to a selected group. One school of thought is that the only way to have privacy today is not to share information in these networked communities. However, achieving privacy and control over information flows and disclosure in networked communities is an ongoing process in an environment where contexts change quickly and are sometimes blurred. This requires intentional construction of systems that are designed to mitigate privacy issues.

## **Ethics and social media**

Ethics can be loosely defined as "the right thing to do" or it can be described as the moral philoso-

phy of an individual or group and usually reflects what the individual or group views as good or bad. It is how they classify particular situations by categorizing them as right or wrong. Ethics can also be used to refer to any classification or philosophy of moral values or principles that guides the actions of an individual or group. Ethical values are intended to be guiding principles that if followed, could yield harmonious results and relationships. They seek to give answers to questions such as “How should I be living? How do I achieve the things that are deemed important such as knowledge and happiness or the acquisition of attractive things?” If one chooses happiness, the next question that needs to be answered is “Whose happiness should it be; my own happiness or the happiness of others?” In the domain of social media, some of the ethical questions that must be contemplated and ultimately answered are:

- Can this post be regarded as oversharing?
- Has the information in this post been distorted in anyway?
- What impact will this post have on others?

As previously mentioned, users within the ages 8–15 represent one of the largest social media user groups. These young persons within the 8–15 age range are still learning how to interact with the people around them and are deciding on the moral values that they will embrace. These moral values will help to dictate how they will interact with the world around them. The ethical values that guide our interactions are usually formulated from some moral principle taught to us by someone or a group of individuals including parents, guardians, religious groups, and teachers just to name a few. Many of the Gen Y’s/“Digital Babies” are “newbies” yet are required to determine for themselves the level of responsibility they will display when using the varying social media platforms. This includes considering the impact a post will have on their lives and/or the lives of other persons. They must also understand that when they join a social media network, they are joining a community in which certain behavior must be exhibited. Such responsibility requires a much greater level of maturity than can be expected from them at that age.

It is not uncommon for individuals to post even the smallest details of their lives from the moment they wake up to when they go to bed. They will openly share their location, what they eat at every meal or details about activities typically considered private and personal. They will also share likes and dislikes, thoughts and emotional states and for the most part this has become an accepted norm. Often times however, these shares do not only contain information about the person sharing but information about others as well. Many times, these details are shared on several social media platforms as individuals attempt to ensure that all persons within their social circle are kept updated on their activities. With this openness of sharing risks and challenges arise that are often not considered but can have serious impacts. The speed and scale with which social media creates information and makes it available—almost instantaneously—on a global scale, added to the fact that once something is posted there is really no way of truly removing it, should prompt individuals to think of the possible impact a post can have. Unfortunately, more often than not, posts are made without any thought of the far-reaching impact they can have on the lives of the person posting or others that may be implicated by the post.

### **Why do people share?**

According to Berger and Milkman there are five (5) main reasons why users are compelled to share content online, whether it is every detail or what they deem as highlights of their lives. These are:

- cause related

- personal connection to content
- to feel more involved in the world
- to define who they are
- to inform and entertain

People generally share because they believe that what they are sharing is important. It is hoped that the shared content will be deemed important to others which will ultimately result in more shares, likes and followers.

Figure below sums up the findings of Berger and Milkman which shows that the main reason people feel the need to share content on the varying social media platform is that the content relates to what is deemed as worthy cause. 84% of respondents highlighted this as the primary motivation for sharing. Seventy-eight percent said that they share because they feel a personal connection to the content while 69 and 68%, respectively said the content either made them feel more involved with the world or helped them to define who they were. Forty-nine percent share because of the entertainment or information value of the content. A more in depth look at each reason for sharing follows.



**Figure**

Why people share source: Global Social Media Research.

**Content related to a cause**

Social media has provided a platform for people to share their thoughts and express concerns with others for what they regard as a worthy cause. Cause related posts are dependent on the interest of the individual. Some persons might share posts related to causes and issues happening in society. In one example, the parents of a baby with an aggressive form of leukemia, who having been told that their child had only 3 months to live unless a suitable donor for a blood stem cell transplant could be found, made an appeal on social media. The appeal was quickly shared and a suitable donor was soon found. While that was for a good cause, many view social media merely as platforms for freedom of speech because anyone can post any content one creates. People think the expression of their thoughts on social media regarding any topic is permissible. The problem with this is that the content may not be accepted by law or it could violate the rights of someone thus giving rise to ethical questions.

## **Content with a personal connection**

When social media users feel a personal connection to their content, they are more inclined to share the content within their social circles. This is true of information regarding family and personal activities. Content created by users also invokes a deep feeling of connection as it allows the users to tell their stories and it is natural to want the world or at least friends to know of the achievement. This natural need to share content is not new as humans have been doing this in some form or the other, starting with oral history to the media of the day; social media. Sharing the self-created content gives the user the opportunity of satisfying some fundamental needs of humans to be heard, to matter, to be understood and emancipated. The problem with this however is that in an effort to gratify the fundamental needs, borders are crossed because the content may not be sharable (can this content be shared within the share network?), it may not be share-worthy (who is the audience that would appreciate this content?) or it may be out of context (does the content fit the situation?).

## **Content that makes them feel more involved in the world**

One of the driving factors that pushes users to share content is the need to feel more in tune with the world around them. This desire is many times fueled by jealousy. Many social media users are jealous when their friends' content gets more attention than their own and so there is a lot of pressure to maintain one's persona in social circles, even when the information is unrealistic, as long as it gets as much attention as possible. Everything has to be perfect. In the case of a photo, for example, there is lighting, camera angle and background to consider. This need for perfection puts a tremendous amount of pressure on individuals to ensure that posted content is "liked" by friends. They often give very little thought to the amount of their friend's work that may have gone on behind the scenes to achieve that perfect social post.

Social media platforms have provided everyone with a forum to express views, but, as a whole, conversations are more polarized, tribal and hostile. With Facebook for instance, there has been a huge uptick in fake news, altered images, dangerous health claims and cures, and the proliferation of anti-science information. This is very distressing and disturbing because people are too willing to share and to believe without doing their due diligence and fact-checking first.

## **Content that defines who they are**

Establishing one's individuality in society can be challenging for some persons because not everyone wants to fit in. Some individuals will do all they can to stand out and be noticed. Social media provides the avenue for exposure and many individuals will seek to leverage the media to stand out of the crowd and not just be a fish in the school. Today many young people are currently being brought up in a culture that defines people by their presence on social media where in previous generations, persons were taught to define themselves by their career choices. These lessons would start from childhood by asking children what they wanted to be when they grew up and then rewarding them based on the answers they give. In today's digital era, however, social media postings and the number of "likes" or "dislikes" they attract, signal what is appealing to others. Therefore, posts that are similar to those that receive a large number of likes but which are largely unrealistic are usually made for self-gratification.

## **Content that informs and entertains**

The acquisition of knowledge and skills is a vital part of human survival and social media has made this process much easier. It is not uncommon to hear persons realizing that they need a particular knowledge set that they do not possess say "I need to learn to do this. I'll just YouTube it." Learning and adapting to change in as short as possible time is vital in today's society and social

media coupled with the Internet put it all at the finger tips. Entertainment has the ability to bring people together and is a good way for people to bond. It provides a diversion from the demands of life and fills leisure time with amusement. Social media is an outlet for fun, pleasurable and enjoyable activities that are so vital to human survival. It is now common place to see persons watching a video, viewing images and reading text that is amusing on any of the available social media platforms. Quite often these videos, images and texts can be both informative and entertaining, but there can be problems however as at times they can cross ethical lines that can lead to conflict.

## **Ethical challenges with social media use**

The use of modern-day technology has brought several benefits. Social media is no different and chief amongst its benefit is the ability to stay connected easily and quickly as well as build relationships with people with similar interests. As with all technology, there are several challenges that can make the use of social media off putting and unpleasant. Some of these challenges appear to be minor but they can have far reaching effects into the lives of the users of social media and it is therefore advised that care be taken to minimize the challenges associated with the use of social media.

A major challenge with the use of social media is oversharing because when persons share on social media, they tend to share as much as is possible which is often times too much. When persons are out and about doing exciting things, it is natural to want to share this with the world as many users will post a few times a day when they head to lunch, visit a museum, go out to dinner or other places of interest. While this all seems relatively harmless, by using location-based services which pinpoint users with surprising accuracy and in real time, users place themselves in danger of laying out a pattern of movement that can be easily traced. While this seems more like a security or privacy issue it stems from an ethical dilemma—"Am I sharing too much?" Oversharing can also lead to damage of user's reputation especially if the intent is to leverage the platform for business. Photos of drunken behavior, drug use, partying or other inappropriate content can change how you are viewed by others.

Another ethical challenge users of social media often encounter is that they have no way of authenticating content before sharing, which becomes problematic when the content paints people or establishments negatively. Often times content is shared with them by friends, family and colleagues. The unauthenticated content is then reshared without any thought but sometimes this content may have been maliciously altered so the user unknowingly participates in maligning others. Even if the content is not altered the fact that the content paints someone or something in a bad light should send off warning bells as to whether or not it is right to share the content which is the underlying principle of ethical behavior.

## **Conflicting views**

Some of the challenges experienced by social media posts are a result of a lack of understanding and sometimes a lack of respect for the varying ethical and moral standpoints of the people involved. We have established that it is typical for persons to post to social media sites without any thought as to how it can affect other persons, but many times these posts are a cause of conflict because of a difference of opinion that may exist and the effect the post may have. Each individual will have his or her own ethical values and if they differ then this can result in conflict. When an executive of a British company made an Instagram post with some racial connotations before boarding a plane to South Africa it started a frenzy that resulted in the executive's immediate dismissal. Although the executive said it was a joke and there was no prejudice intended, this difference in views as to the implications of the post, resulted in an out of work executive and a company

scrambling to maintain its public image.

### **Impact on personal development**

In this age of sharing, many young persons spend a vast amount of time on social media checking the activities of their “friends” as well as posting on their own activities so their “friends” are aware of what they are up to. Apart from interfering with their academic progress, time spent on these posts at can have long term repercussions. An example is provided by a student of a prominent university who posted pictures of herself having a good time at parties while in school. She was denied employment because of some of her social media posts. While the ethical challenge here is the question of the employee’s right to privacy and whether the individual’s social media profile should affect their ability to fulfill their responsibilities as an employee, the impact on the individual’s long term personal growth is clear.

### **Conclusion**

In today’s information age, one’s digital footprint can make or break someone; it can be the deciding factor on whether or not one achieves one’s life-long ambitions. Unethical behavior and interactions on social media can have far reaching implications both professionally and socially. Posting on the Internet means the “end of forgetting,” therefore, responsible use of this medium is critical. The unethical use of social media has implications for privacy and can result in security breaches both physically and virtually. The use of social media can also result in the loss of privacy as many users are required to provide information that they would not divulge otherwise. Social media use can reveal information that can result in privacy breaches if not managed properly by users. Therefore, educating users of the risks and dangers of the exposure of sensitive information in this space, and encouraging vigilance in the protection of individual privacy on these platforms is paramount. This could result in the reduction of unethical and irresponsible use of these media and facilitate a more secure social environment. The use of social media should be governed by moral and ethical principles that can be applied universally and result in harmonious relationships regardless of race, culture, religious persuasion and social status.

Analysis of the literature and the findings of this research suggest achieving acceptable levels of privacy is very difficult in a networked system and will require much effort on the part of individuals. The largest user groups of social media are unaware of the processes that are required to reduce the level of vulnerability of their personal data. Therefore, educating users of the risk of participating in social media is the social responsibility of these social network platforms. Adapting universally ethical behaviors can mitigate the rise in the number of privacy breaches in the social networking space. This recommendation coincides with philosopher Immanuel Kant’s assertion that, the Biblical principle which states “Do unto others as you have them do unto you” can be applied universally and should guide human interactions. This principle, if adhered to by users of social media and owners of these platforms could raise the awareness of unsuspecting users, reduce unethical interactions and undesirable incidents that could negatively affect privacy, and by extension security in this domain.

### **Cyberspace**

**Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures (ITI) including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. The term originates in science fiction, where it also includes various kinds of virtual reality (which is the experience of "being" in the alternate reality, or the simulated "being" in such a reality").

Cyberspace raises unique issues, especially regarding intellectual property and copyright infringement, and may call for new models of commerce. Furthermore, cyberspace has also become a unique area for developing human relationships and communities. While some argue that this universal ground for communication helps bring the world together, others point out that people will continue to associate narrowly with those of similar interests and economic and social status. Nevertheless, largely through the Internet, cyberspace has become a common ground for the rapid communication of ideas and values.

While cyberspace itself is a neutral space that allows for the rapid communication of ideas, the use of this space will determine its value and benefit for humankind. While the free use of this space is indeed valuable, especially as this cyberspace binds all humankind together in inseparable, interdependent relationships, the free use of this space also calls for its responsible use in order to ensure its value for humanity's overall pursuit of freedom and happiness. Thus, cyberspace mandates the responsible use of technology and reveals the need for a value-based perspective of the use of such technology.

### **Origins of the term**

The word "cyberspace" (from cybernetics and space) was coined by science fiction author William Gibson in his 1982 story, "Burning Chrome," and popularized by his 1984 novel *Neuromancer*. The portion of *Neuromancer* cited in this respect is usually the following:

**Cyberspace.** A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data abstracted from banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding (69).

Gibson later commented on the origin of the term in the 2000 documentary *No Maps for These Territories*:

**Note:** The term "cyberspace" was coined by science fiction writer William Gibson. All I knew about the word "cyberspace" when I coined it, was that it seemed like an effective buzzword. It seemed evocative and essentially meaningless. It was suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning, even for me, as I saw it emerge on the page.

### **Metaphorical**

The term Cyberspace started to become a de facto synonym for the Internet, and later the World Wide Web, during the 1990s. Author Bruce Sterling, who popularized this meaning, credits John Perry Barlow as the first to use it to refer to "the present-day nexus of computer and telecommunications networks."

### **Cyberspace as an internet metaphor**

While cyberspace should not be confused with the real internet, the term is often used to refer to objects and identities that exist largely within the communication network itself, so that a web site, for example, might be metaphorically said to "exist in cyberspace." According to this interpretation, events taking place on the Internet are not, therefore, happening in the countries where the participants or the servers are physically located, but "in cyberspace."

The "space" in cyberspace has more in common with the abstract, mathematical meanings of the term than physical space. It does not have the duality of positive and negative volume (while in physical space for example a room has the negative volume of usable space delineated by positive volume of walls, Internet users cannot enter the screen and explore the unknown part of the Net as an extension of the space they are in), but spatial meaning can be attributed to the relationship between different pages (of books as well as web servers), considering the unturned pages to be somewhere "out there." The concept of cyberspace therefore refers not to the content being presented to the surfer, but rather to the possibility of surfing among different sites, with feedback loops between the user and the rest of the system creating the potential to always encounter something unknown or unexpected.

Videogames differ from text-based communication in that on-screen images are meant to be figures that actually occupy a space and the animation shows the movement of those figures. Images are supposed to form the positive volume that delineates the empty space. A game adopts the cyberspace metaphor by engaging more players in the game, and then figuratively representing them on the screen as avatars. Games do not have to stop at the avatar-player level, but current implementations aiming for more immersive playing space (such as in Laser tag) take the form of augmented reality rather than cyberspace, fully immersive virtual realities remaining impractical.

Although the more radical consequences of the global communication network predicted by some cyberspace proponents (that is, the diminishing of state influence envisioned by John Perry Barlow) failed to materialize and the word lost some of its novelty appeal, the term continues to be used.

Some virtual communities explicitly refer to the concept of cyberspace, for example, Linden Lab calling their customers "Residents" of Second Life, while all such communities can be positioned "in cyberspace" for explanatory and comparative purposes (as Sterling did in *The Hacker Crackdown* and many journalists afterwards), integrating the metaphor into a wider cyber-culture.

The metaphor has been useful in helping a new generation of thought leaders to reason through new military strategies around the world, led largely by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). The use of cyberspace as a metaphor has had its limits, however, especially in areas where the metaphor becomes confused with physical infrastructure.

### **Alternate realities in philosophy and art**

**Predating computers**  
Before cyberspace became a technological possibility, many philosophers suggested the possibility of a reality, or suggested that the reality in which we live in now is a reflection of some reality perhaps more pure than what we are aware of. In *The Republic*, Plato sets out his allegory of the cave, widely cited as one of the first conceptual realities. He suggests that we are already in a form of virtual reality which we are deceived into thinking is true. True reality for Plato is accessible only through mental training and is the reality of the forms. These ideas are central to Platonism and neoplatonism. Depending on how one views cyberspace in relation to physical reality, either people are living in a cyberspace-like reality in relation to a higher realm of ideas or cyberspace contains the abstract ideas that take form in the current, tangible reality. Another forerunner of the modern idea of cyberspace is Descartes' hypothetical that people might be deceived by an evil demon which feeds them a false reality, and so the only thing one can be certain of is that one thinks; in other words, one is a thinking thing. This argument is the direct predecessor of the modern ideas of brain in a vat and many popular conceptions of cyberspace take Descartes' ideas as their starting point.

Visual arts have a tradition, stretching back to antiquity, of artifacts meant to fool the eye and be mistaken for reality. This questioning of reality occasionally led some philosophers and especially theologians to distrust art as deceiving people into entering a world which was not real. The artistic challenge was resurrected with increasing ambition as art became more and more realistic with the invention of photography, film and finally, immersive computer simulations.

### **Influenced by computersPhilosophy**

American counterculture exponents like William S. Burroughs (whose literary influence on Gibson and cyberpunk in general is widely acknowledged) were among the first to extol the potential of computers and computer networks for individual empowerment. Some contemporary philosophers and scientists (such as David Deutsch in *The Fabric of Reality*) use virtual reality in various thought experiments. Philip Zhai connects cyberspace to the platonic tradition:

Let us imagine a nation in which everyone is hooked up to a network of VR infrastructure. They have been so hooked up since they left their mother's wombs. Immersed in cyberspace and maintaining their life by teleoperation, they have never imagined that life could be any different from that. The first person that thinks of the possibility of an alternative world like ours would be ridiculed by the majority of these citizens, just like the few enlightened ones in Plato's allegory of the cave.

### **Cyberspace and virtual reality**

Although cyberspace and virtual reality are often used interchangeably, these two concepts have a different orientation. While virtual reality refers to the simulated experience of reality, cyberspace refers to the plane of reality, or environment, within which this experience is made possible. Thus, experiences in cyberspace can entail aspects of virtual reality when a user is fully immersed in this alternate reality.

The difference between the two can be further described using an analogy of physical (space itself is not physical though) space and concepts of reality. On one hand, human beings presuppose a frame of reference called "space." Whether the space people live in is an empty container like a repository (Newtonian concept) or people exist in space according to the relationship between things (Leibnizian concept) is debatable; likewise, human beings relate to reality through perception (Kantian concept of space as a form of intuition) or through a nexus of meanings (concept of "lived space" in Phenomenology). Either way, human beings presuppose a plane of experience called "space." Within this space, humans physically experience reality through their five senses.

By extension, this sense of reality can be applied to imagined objects. Cyberspace is a frame of reference within which people can have quasi-real experiences with such objects; virtual reality refers to the simulated experiences with these objects.

Human experience of reality is also extended to non-physical events or phenomena such as death and associated emotional feelings about it. Fear, anxiety, joy, and other emotional feelings are real without association with the physical senses. At the same time, virtual reality may suggest a false reality that can be virtually experienced. Thus, the whole question of reality poses a series of questions beyond current epistemological models in modern philosophy, which presuppose the primacy of sense perception.

### **Pornographic Ethics**

"I can't define pornography," one judge once famously said, "but I know it when I see it." (Justice

Stewart in *Jacobellis v. Ohio* 378 US 184 (1964).) Can we do better?

The word “pornography” comes from the Greek for writing about prostitutes. However, the etymology of the term is not much of a guide to its current usage, since many of the things commonly called “pornography” nowadays are neither literally written nor literally about prostitutes.

Here is a first, simple definition. Pornography is any material (either pictures or words) that is sexually explicit. This definition of pornography may pick out different types of material in different contexts, since what is viewed as sexually explicit can vary from culture to culture and over time. “Sexually explicit” functions as a kind of indexical term, picking out different features depending on what has certain effects or breaks certain taboos in different contexts and cultures. Displays of women’s uncovered ankles count as sexually explicit in some cultures, but not in most western cultures nowadays (although they once did: the display of a female ankle in Victorian times was regarded as most risqué). There may be borderline cases too: do displays of bared breasts still count as sexually explicit in various contemporary western cultures? However, some material seems clearly to count as sexually explicit in many contexts today: in particular, audio, written or visual representations of sexual acts (e.g., sexual intercourse, oral sex) and exposed body parts (e.g., the vagina, anus and penis—especially the erect penis).

Within the general class of sexually explicit material, there is great variety in content. For example, some sexually explicit material depicts women, and sometimes men, in postures of sexual display (e.g., Playboy centrefolds). Some depicts non-violent sexual acts (both homosexual and heterosexual) between adults who are portrayed as equal and consenting participants. Other sexually explicit representations depict acts of violent coercion: people being whipped, beaten, bound, tortured, mutilated, raped and even killed. Some sexually explicit material may be degrading, without necessarily being overtly violent. This material depicts people (most often women) in positions of servility and subordination in their sexual relations with others, or engaged in sexual acts that many people would regard as humiliating. Some sexually explicit material involves or depicts children. Some portrays bestiality and necrophilia; and so on.

On the first definition of pornography as sexually explicit material, all such material would count as pornography, insofar as it is sexually explicit. But this simple definition is not quite right. Anatomy textbooks for medical students are sexually explicit—they depict exposed genitalia, for example—but are rarely, if ever, viewed as pornography. Sexual explicitness may be a necessary condition for material to count as pornographic, but it does not seem to be sufficient. So something needs to be added to the simple definition. What else might be required?

Here is a second definition. Pornography is sexually explicit material (verbal or pictorial) that is primarily designed to produce sexual arousal in viewers. This definition is better: it deals with the problem of anatomy textbooks and the like. Indeed, this definition is one that is frequently employed (or presupposed) in discussions of pornography and censorship. Of course, it is important to distinguish here between sexually explicit material that is wholly or primarily designed to produce sexual arousal (i.e., whose only or overriding aim is to produce sexual arousal) and material whose aim is to do this in order to make some other artistic or political point. The film, *Last Tango in Paris* arguably aims to arouse audiences, but this is not its primary aim. It does so in order to make a broader political point.

It is sometimes assumed that pornography, in this second sense, is published and consumed by a small and marginalized minority. But, while exact estimates of the size and profitability of the international trade in pornography vary somewhat, it is generally agreed that the pornography indus-

try is a massive international enterprise, with a multi-billion dollar annual turnover. In 2003, the pornography industry (taken to include adult videos, magazines, Cable/Pay per view, Internet and CD-Rom) is estimated to have grossed US\$34 billion world-wide; and in excess of \$8 billion in the U.S. alone, greater than the combined revenue of ABC, CBS, and NBC (\$6.2. billion). Pornography is much more widely consumed than is sometimes supposed, and is a large and extremely profitable international industry.

However, the term “pornography” is often used with an additional normative force that the first and second definitions leave out. When many people describe something (e.g., a book such as *Tropic of Capricorn* or a film such as *Baise Moi*) as “pornographic”, they seem to be doing more than simply dispassionately describing its sexually explicit content or the intentions of its producers—indeed, in these debates, the intentions of producers are sometimes treated as irrelevant to the work's status as pornography. They seem to be saying, in addition, that it is bad—and perhaps also that its badness is not redeemed by other artistic, literary, or political merit the work may possess. (Consider, for example, how people use the term “visual pornography” to condemn certain sorts of art or television, often when the material is not even sexually explicit).

This suggests a third definition: pornography is sexually explicit material designed to produce sexual arousal in consumers that is bad in a certain way. This definition of pornography makes it analytically true that pornography is bad: by definition, material that is not bad in the relevant way is not pornography. It might be that all and only sexually explicit material is bad in a certain way (e.g., obscene): in which case, “pornography” will refer to all and only the class of sexually explicit materials. But it might be that only some sexually explicit material is objectionable (e.g., degrading to women), in which case only the bad subset of sexually explicit material will count as pornography. And, of course, it is possible that no sexually explicit material is bad in the relevant way (e.g., harmful to women), in which case we would have an error theory about pornography: there would be no pornography, so defined, merely harmless, sexually explicit “erotica”.

A number of approaches define pornography as sexually explicit material that is bad—although they disagree as to the relevant source of its badness, and consequently about what material is pornographic. A particularly dominant approach has been to define pornography in terms of obscenity. (For critical discussions of this approach see Schauer 1982, Feinberg 1987, MacKinnon 1987.) The obscenity might be taken to be intrinsic to the content of the material itself (for example, that it depicts deviant sexual acts that are immoral in themselves) or it may lie in contingent effects that the material has (for example, that it tends to offend “reasonable” people, or to deprave and corrupt viewers, or to erode traditional family and religious values). If all sexually explicit material is obscene by whichever of these standards is chosen, then all sexually explicit material will be pornography on this definition. This is the definition of pornography that moral conservatives typically favour.

But the badness of pornography need not reside in obscenity. Pornography might be defined, not as sexually explicit material that is obscene, but as that sexually explicit material that harms women. Thus many contemporary feminist definitions define “pornography” as sexually explicit material that depicts women's subordination in such a way as to endorse that subordination. (See Longino 1980, MacKinnon 1987.) This definition of pornography leaves it open in principle that there might be sexually explicit material that is not pornography: sexually explicit material that does not subordinate women will count as harmless “erotica”.

Of course, women may not be the only people harmed by the production or consumption of certain sorts of sexually explicit material. The consumption of sexually explicit material has often been

thought to be harmful to its (mostly male) consumers: for example, by corrupting their morals or by making them less likely to have loving, long-term sexual relationships. Many people strongly object to “child pornography”: that subset of sexually explicit material that involves depictions of actual children engaged in sexual activity. This class of sexually explicit material is widely regarded as objectionable because it involves the actual sexual exploitation of children, together with a permanent record of that abuse which may further harm their interests.

I have discussed how, on this third approach to defining “pornography” as sexually explicit material that is bad or harmful in a certain way, there are three possibilities: “pornography” might name all, some or even no sexually explicit material, depending on what (if any) class of sexually explicit material is in fact bad in the relevant way. But it is worth noting that there is an interesting fourth possibility. It is possible that some non-sexually explicit material might also turn out to be bad in the relevant way. It might be that some non-sexually explicit material is obscene in the relevant sense (e.g., Andres Serrano’s famously controversial artwork entitled “Piss Christ”, which displays a plastic crucifix in urine with cow’s blood). Or it might turn out that non-sexually explicit advertising that depicts women in positions of sexual servility in such a way as to endorse that subordination is also bad in the relevant way. (As many philosophers might be inclined to put the point, the sexually explicit materials that subordinate women via their depiction of women as subordinate may turn out not to form a natural kind.) In this case, there are two options. “Pornography” might be taken to name only the sexually explicit subset of material that is bad in the relevant sense (e.g., that depicts women as men’s sexual subordinates in such a way as to endorse their subordination); or “pornography” might be taken to refer to all the material that is bad in that way, whether that material is sexually explicit or not. The former option would clearly stick more closely to the everyday conception of pornography as involving the sexually explicit. But it might be that this ordinary conception, on reflection, turns out not to capture what is of moral and political interest and importance. There may thus be a theoretical reason to conceive of pornography more broadly than simply sexually explicit material that is bad in a certain way, or perhaps simply to invent a new term that captures the theoretically interesting kind. Some feminists seem inclined to this broader approach, suggesting that material that explicitly depicts women in postures of sexual submission, servility or display in such a way as to endorse it counts as pornography. This may include some non-sexually explicit material that would not ordinarily be thought of as pornography: for example, photographs in artwork, advertising or fashion spreads that depict women bound, chained or bruised in such a way as to glamorise these things.

The term “pornography” is used in all of these different ways in everyday discourse and debate, as well as in philosophical discussions: sometimes it is used to mean merely material which is sexually explicit; sometimes it is used to mean material which is sexually explicit and objectionable in some particular way; and so on. It seems to me that we do not need to choose between these different definitions, for all of them capture something of the term’s everyday use. What matters crucially is that we know which definition is being used in a particular case. For the fact that “pornography” has different senses can have two very unfortunate consequences if these differences are not clearly noted and kept in mind: it can make it seem that there is disagreement when there is not; and it can obscure the real nature of the disagreement when there is. Here is one topical example of how this might happen. Some feminists object to pornography on the grounds that it harms women. Other feminists claim that pornography may not always be harmful to women, and may even sometimes be beneficial. It seems that there is genuine disagreement here. But is there? Not necessarily. For the two sides might mean different things by “pornography”. Suppose that feminists who object to pornography are defining “pornography” as sexually explicit material that subordinates women. So pornography, for them, is that subset of sexually explicit material that in

fact harms women. This definition makes it an analytic truth that pornography, wherever it exists, is bad from a feminist point of view. Feminists who defend pornography, however, may be using “pornography” to mean simply sexually explicit material (regardless of whether it is harmful to women). There may thus be no genuine disagreement here. For both sides might agree that sexually explicit material that harms women is objectionable. They might also agree that there is nothing objectionable about sexually explicit material that does not harm women (or anyone else). If protagonists in the debate are using “pornography” in different senses in this way, they may simply be talking past each other.

Two really substantive issues at stake in the feminist debate over pornography are 1) whether any sexually explicit material is in fact harmful to women; and, if so, what should be done about it?; and 2) whether all sexually explicit material is in fact harmful to women; and, if so, what should be done about it? (We can thus phrase two of the important issues, if we like, without mentioning “pornography” at all.) If we define “pornography” simply as sexually explicit material (regardless of whether it is harmful to women), then the first substantive issue must be posed in this way: “is there any pornography that is harmful to women; and, if so, what should be done about it?” However, if “pornography” is defined as that sexually explicit material that subordinates women then, while we can ask this question, we must pose it differently: we must ask “which pieces of sexually explicit material, if any, are pornographic; and what should be done about any pornography that exists?” A second substantive issue at stake in the debate is whether all sexually explicit material, either in principle or under current social conditions, is or would be harmful to women. Again, it should be noted that this question can be asked using either conception of “pornography”, but it must be posed differently. If we define “pornography” simply as sexually explicit material (regardless of whether it is harmful), the question must be posed like this: “is all pornography as a matter of fact harmful?” On the other hand, if we define “pornography” as sexually explicit material that harms women, we must ask: “is all sexually explicit material as a matter of fact pornographic?” These are just terminological variants of the same substantive question: but when different terminology is used by different participants in the debate, the exact questions at issue, which are actually very simple to state, can be obscured.

## **The shape of the traditional pornography debate**

- **Conservative arguments for censorship**

Until comparatively recently, the main opposition to pornography came from moral and religious conservatives, who argue that pornography should be banned because its sexually explicit content is obscene and morally corrupting. By “pornography”, conservatives usually mean simply sexually explicit material (either pictures or words), since conservatives typically view all such material as obscene.

According to conservatives, the sexually explicit content of pornography is an affront to decent family and religious values and deeply offensive to a significant portion of citizens who hold these values. The consumption of pornography is bad for society. It undermines and destabilizes the moral fabric of a decent and stable society, by encouraging sexual promiscuity, deviant sexual practices and other attitudes and behaviour that threaten traditional family and religious institutions, and which conservatives regard as intrinsically morally wrong. Furthermore, pornography is bad for those who consume it, corrupting their character and preventing them from leading a good and worthwhile life in accordance with family and religious values.

According to conservatives, the state is justified in using its coercive power to uphold and enforce a community's moral convictions and to prevent citizens from engaging in activities that offend prevailing community standards of morality and decency. (See e.g., Devlin 1968, Sandel 1984.) This position is sometimes called 'legal moralism'. Governments also have a responsibility to prevent citizens from harming themselves. This is true, even where the citizen is not a child (who may not yet be competent to make responsible judgements for themselves about what is in their own best interests), but a mature adult who is voluntarily engaged in an activity which they judge to be desirable and which causes no harm to others. The view that the state is entitled to interfere with the freedom of mentally competent adults against their will for their own good is often called 'legal paternalism'.

Conservatives therefore think that it is entirely legitimate for the state to prohibit consenting adults from publishing and viewing pornography, even in private, in order to protect the moral health of would-be consumers and of society as a whole.

### **The traditional liberal defence of a right to pornography**

Traditional liberal defenders of pornography famously disagree, rejecting both the principle of legal moralism and the principle of legal paternalism, at least where consenting adults are concerned. This is not to say that liberal defenders of pornography necessarily approve of it. Indeed, they frequently personally find pornography-especially violent and degrading pornography-mindless and offensive. Many concede that pornography-by which they usually mean sexually explicit material whose primary function is to produce sexual arousal in viewers-is "low value" speech: speech that contributes little, if anything, of intellectual, artistic, literary or political merit to the moral and social environment. But this does not mean that it should not be protected-quite the opposite. A vital principle is at stake for liberals in the debate over pornography and censorship. The principle is that mentally competent adults must not be prevented from expressing their own convictions, or from indulging their own private tastes, simply on the grounds that, in the opinion of others, those convictions or tastes are mistaken, offensive or unworthy. Moral majorities must not be allowed to use the law to suppress dissenting minority opinions or to force their own moral convictions on others. The underlying liberal sentiment here is nicely captured in the famous adage (often attributed to the French philosopher, Voltaire): "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

For liberals, there is a very strong presumption in favour of individual freedom, and against state regulation that interferes with that freedom. The only grounds that liberals typically regard as providing a legitimate reason for state restrictions on individual freedom is in order to prevent harm to others. Hence, in debates over censorship and other forms of state regulation that restrict the liberty of individuals against their will, the burden of proof is always firmly on those who argue for censorship to demonstrate that the speech or conduct in question causes significant harm to others. It must either be shown to directly cause actual physical violence to others (e.g., murder, rape, assault, battery), on a narrower understanding of "harm"; or to deliberately or negligently violate sufficiently important interests or rights of others, on a broader, interest-based conception of "harm".

Liberals have traditionally defended a right to pornography on three main grounds. (By the "right to pornography" here, and in what follows, I mean the negative right of consenting adults not to be prevented from making, publishing, exhibiting, distributing and consuming pornography in private). Firstly, on the grounds of freedom of speech or expression, which protects the freedom of individuals (in this case, pornographers) to express their opinions and to communicate those opinions to

others, however mistaken, disagreeable or offensive others may find them. Liberals have tended to conceive of freedom, including freedom of expression, as negative freedom-as non-interference by others-rather than as positive freedom, which involves having the positive goods and facilities required to exercise the freedom. Freedom is thus something that individuals have just so long as there are no coercive external obstacles-notably, physical or legal restrictions-in their way.

Few liberals nowadays think that the (negative) right to freedom of speech is an absolute right: a freedom that can never legitimately be restricted by the state. If the speech causes sufficiently great harm to others then the state may have a legitimate interest in regulating or preventing it. There is no simple general formula or algorithm for determining when the harm caused to others is "sufficiently great" to justify legal restrictions in the case of speech and more generally. This will depend on the outcome of a complex process of carefully weighing and balancing the strength and nature of the harm and the competing interests at stake, and an analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative policies, that needs to be undertaken on a case by case basis.

However, when it comes to legislation that interferes with free speech, the liberal presumption against legislation is especially high. For liberals take freedom of expression to be an especially important right that takes precedence over most other rights and interests (including equality) should they ever conflict. Levels of harm that would normally be sufficient to justify regulating the conduct which causes them may be not be sufficiently great to justify restrictions in cases where the harm is caused by speech or expression. Hence, for liberals, justifying censorship of pornography requires that there is extremely reliable evidence to show that the publication or voluntary private consumption of pornography by consenting adults causes especially great and serious harm to others. The harm caused by expression must be very certain and very great before it is legitimate for a state to prohibit it. We would be justified in banning a certain type of pornography (e.g., bondage pictures) only when we are very sure that, on average, tokens of that type (i.e., most particular bondage pictures) cause very great harm.

Secondly, liberals have defended a right to pornography on the grounds of a right to privacy (or "moral independence", as one prominent liberal defender of pornography calls it), which protects a sphere of private activity within which individuals can explore and indulge their own personal tastes and convictions, free from the threat of coercive pressure or interference by the state and other individuals. The spectre of state intrusion into the private lives of individuals underpins much of the liberal discomfort about censorship of pornography.

Like the right to freedom of speech, the liberal commitment to privacy is not absolute. It can be overridden if the private activities of individuals are such as to cause significant harm to others. Thus, if there is reliable evidence to suggest that the voluntary private consumption of pornography causes sufficiently great harm to others then- providing this harm is sufficiently great and that state prohibitions are the only effective way of preventing it-the state would have a legitimate interest in prohibiting it.

But-and this is the third prong of the traditional liberal defence-pornography is comparatively harmless. Neither the expression of pornographic opinions, nor the indulging of a private taste for pornography, causes significant harm to others, in the relevant sense of 'harm' (i.e., crimes of physical violence or other significant wrongful rights-violations). Hence, the publication and voluntary private consumption of pornography is none of the state's business.

### **The 'harm principle': when is the state justified in restricting individual liberty?**

These three central ingredients in the liberal defence of pornography find their classic expression

in a famous and influential passage from John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* (1859). In this passage, Mill sets out the principle that underpins the prevailing liberal view about when it is justified for the state to coercively interfere with the liberty of its citizens. It is a principle that continues to provide the dominant liberal framework for the debate over pornography and censorship. Mill writes:

The only principle for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. (Mill 1975: 15)

Mill's central claim is that society is justified in interfering with the freedom of mentally competent adults to say and do what they wish only when their conduct will cause harm to others. This has come to be known as the 'liberty principle' or 'harm principle'; and it forms the cornerstone of the traditional liberal defence of individual liberty. It protects the freedom of all mentally competent individuals to live and shape their own lives in accordance with their own preferences and beliefs, so long as they do not harm others in the process.

Mill goes on to stress that the harm principle is meant to apply "only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties" (Mill 1975:15). So the principle permits paternalistic intervention in the case of those who are not competent to make an informed decision about what is in their best interests for themselves, and so who "must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury": for example, young children or those adults whose decision-making abilities are temporarily or permanently impaired.

It is generally thought to follow that child pornography, which is taken to involve the actual sexual abuse or exploitation of children (with or without their apparent consent), can legitimately be banned in order to protect the interests of children, who are not yet competent to fully understand the nature of the choice they are making or to grasp the impact of their decisions on their present and future interests. (This is not entirely uncontroversial, however: for it might be denied that children are harmed by participating in pornography. The North American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), for example, denies that having sex with adults is harmful for children.) For the same reason, liberals think that children can quite rightly be prevented by parents or by the state from purchasing or viewing pornography, if this is thought likely to harm them. That child pornography should be banned is common ground between liberals and conservatives. However, pornography that involves the simulated abuse of children (for example, consenting adult actors dressed up as schoolgirls) cannot legitimately be prohibited under the harm principle, unless there is good evidence to suggest that consumption of this material causes significant harm to people other than those who consume it: by, for example, causing those who consume it to abuse children.

We are now in a better position both to see what it would take for liberals to think that censorship of pornography is justified and why liberals have been so unsympathetic to the sort of argument against pornography that conservatives make. Conservatives wish to prevent mentally competent adults from publishing and consuming pornography on the grounds that the choice to consume pornography is deeply morally misguided. But, as Mill insists, this is "not a sufficient warrant" for

coercive interference with individual liberty. Neither the state nor moral majorities are entitled to restrict the private choices and activities of individuals against their will simply because, in the opinion of state officials or the social majority, that way of life is unworthy or unrewarding. Mill thinks that this sort of legal moralism will lead inevitably to a terrible “tyranny of the majority”, crushing individual diversity and blocking human progress and flourishing.

However, following Mill, liberals are generally happy to allow that considerations of the individual or common good may entitle the state to use other, so-called non-coercive means to persuade citizens to make wise or better choices. Thus public education campaigns designed to inform citizens of the dangers of smoking or excessive alcohol consumption, or to persuade them to make “wise” choices (for example, to eat more fruit and vegetables) may be justified. While others cannot force an individual to do something (or to forbear from doing it) when they are not harming others, it is entirely legitimate to seek to advise, instruct or persuade them. So, if there are reasons to think that pornography is not good for the individual who consumes it (say, because it makes them less likely to be able to have successful loving or long-term relationships), public education campaigns to warn consumers of these dangers may be justified. Indeed this education and debate is precisely the solution that liberals typically recommend to counter any harm that pornography may cause. (See e.g., Feinberg 1985, Donnerstein et al. 1987, Dworkin 1985) This solution respects the freedom of rational agents to exercise their own rational capacities in deciding what to think and how to live.

However, liberals insist that if attempts at persuasion should fail, and where an individual's conduct poses no significant threat to the physical security or interests of others, the state may not use coercive legal mechanisms to enforce these “wise” choices. “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it” (Mill 1975: 18). For Mill, the individual person is in the best position to judge what is in his or her own best interests; and, even if individuals may sometimes make bad choices, it is better in general that they be left free to make these mistakes. For no one's opinion about the good life is infallible; and, in any case, a life lived ‘from the inside’, in accordance with values that the individual endorses, is more likely to be a fulfilling one than a life where the individual is forced against their will to live as others as believe best.

In an influential liberal defence of pornography, Ronald Dworkin expresses this commitment in terms of a right to “moral independence”. People, he says, “have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of social goods and opportunities, including disadvantages in the liberties permitted to them by the criminal law, just on the ground that their officials or fellow-citizens think that their opinions about the right way for them to lead their own lives are ignoble or wrong.” (Dworkin 1985: 353.) The fact, if it is one, that the majority of people in a society prefer that pornography be banned because they regard it as immoral or offensive is not a legitimate reason for interfering with (pornographers') freedom of speech or for preventing consenting adults from consuming it in private. For allowing such illegitimate “external” preferences of a majority to dictate government policy would violate the right to moral independence of the producers and consumers of pornography. It would give moral majorities the power to dictate how members of minority or non-mainstream groups can live on the basis of the majority's opinions about what sort of people are most worthy and what sorts of lives are worth living, and this violates the basic right of all individuals to be treated with equal concern and respect.

## **Pornography and Offense: Justifying restrictions on the public display of pornography**

However, Dworkin thinks, considerations of offence may provide some justification for preventing or restricting the public display of pornography so as to avoid its causing offense to non-consenting adults who might otherwise involuntarily or unwittingly be exposed to it. Joel Feinberg, another well-known liberal defender of pornography, agrees. But Feinberg thinks that such restrictions must be justified by a separate principle to the harm principle, for he thinks that certain sorts of unpleasant psychological states are not in themselves harms. Feinberg calls this additional principle the offense principle. The offense principle says that "It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that end (i.e., there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no greater cost to the other values)."

Like Dworkin, Feinberg thinks that the voluntary private consumption of pornography does not cause harm to others. Hence, wholesale criminal prohibitions on the publication and private voluntary consumption of pornography cannot be justified. But the public display of pornography may nonetheless constitute an "offensive nuisance" to non-consenting adults who are involuntarily exposed to it (just as neighbours who play bad music loudly into the wee hours of the morning may be an "offensive nuisance"). Since the harm-or rather, pseudo-harm-of pornography is the offense it may cause unwitting viewers involuntarily exposed to it, the solution is to restrict its exhibition to domains where such involuntary exposure will not occur, such as inside well sign-posted adult bookshops and cinemas where those who will be offended will know not to venture. Although this may prevent pornographers from distributing their opinions as widely as they might like, and may also cause some minor inconvenience to consumers (who may have to go further out of their way to find and view pornography, or suffer the embarrassment of having to sneak into known adult bookstores), these costs may be relatively small compared with the level of offense that involuntary exposure is likely to cause. Such restrictions on the public display of pornography would not amount to censorship, for pornographers are still free to publish and distribute their opinions. Nor would they violate consumers' right to privacy, for pornography would be freely available for willing consumers to view in private. The Williams Committee Report into Obscenity and Film Censorship in England made a similar recommendation, pointing to general considerations of public decency that prevent "offensive" public displays of conduct (e.g., nudity or sexual intercourse) that is appropriately seen or done only in private. Susan Wendell also agrees that the public display of certain sorts of pornography-visual, audio and written material that depicts and condones the unjustified physical coercion of women or other human beings- should be prohibited, although her particular concern is to remove the anxiety that involuntary exposure to such coercive material is likely to cause women and the harm it is likely to do to their self-esteem (Wendell 1983).

Liberal defenders of the right to pornography may thus allow that restrictions on its public display may be justified. But only if pornography can reliably be shown to cause significant harm to people other than those who voluntarily consume it will there be a legitimate case for prohibiting its voluntary private consumption. When an individual's private activities cause harm to others then they become no longer merely a private matter, but of legitimate public interest; and the state may be justified in regulating them. Thus, Dworkin says, were excessive consumption of pornography shown to cause absenteeism from work, then the public and the state might have some legitimate interest in preventing it. But, Dworkin thinks, there is as yet no reliable evidence that firmly establishes that the voluntary private production or consumption of pornography by consenting

adults causes this or any other sufficiently significant harm to others, in the relevant sense of 'harm'. Hence, pornography satisfies only harmless personal preferences for sexual gratification; and is therefore none of the state's business.

### **The dangers of censorship**

Liberals also have technical concerns about how censorship laws might work in practice. Many liberal (and feminist) objections to censorship of pornography point to the practical costs and dangers of censorship, arguing that even if pornography does cause some harm to others, the risks involved in censoring it are too great. They point to the difficulties involved in formulating a legal definition of 'pornography' that will be sufficiently precise to minimize the danger that censorship laws targeting pornography will be used (intentionally or unintentionally) to censor other unpopular material, including valuable literary, artistic and political works. Censoring pornography may thus place us on a dangerous "slippery slope" to further censorship of other material; and may have a general "chilling effect" on expression, making people reluctant to say or publish things that might be construed as pornography and for which they could be prosecuted.

These are serious dangers; and they need to be carefully taken into account in weighing the costs and benefits of censorship as a solution to any harm that pornography might cause. But it is worth noting that they are inherent in many existing forms of legislation, and are not always taken to be insoluble or to constitute a decisive reason against censorship in themselves.

### **Recent liberal dissent**

Although traditional defenders of a right to pornography have been liberals, it is important to note that not all contemporary liberals defend such a right. Indeed, the question of whether there might be good liberal grounds for prohibiting or otherwise regulating the voluntary private consumption of (some) pornography has become the subject of increasing and lively debate. Inspired by more recent feminist arguments against pornography, some scholars argue that the liberal commitment to protecting individual autonomy, equality, freedom of expression and other important liberal values may in fact support a policy that prohibits certain kinds of pornography, rather than the permissive stance that liberals have traditionally favoured. (See e.g., Dyzenhaus 1992, Easton 1994: 42–51, Langton 1990, Okin 1987, West 2003.) These theorists do not normally reject the harm principle, broadly understood: They generally agree that the crucial question in determining whether censorship of pornography is justified is whether there is reliable evidence to show that the publication or viewing of pornography by consenting adults causes sufficiently great harm to significant interests of others. Rather, they are open to the legitimacy of censorship because they think that the production and consumption of certain sorts of sexually explicit material—in particular, violent pornography and non-violent but degrading pornography—may in fact cause sufficiently significant harm to others, particularly women.

These theorists often follow social science researchers in drawing more fine-grained distinctions within the general category of pornography (i.e., the sexually explicit material whose primary function is to produce sexual arousal in those who view or read them). They often distinguish between

1. violent pornography;
2. non-violent but degrading pornography; and
- 3) non-violent and non-degrading pornography, since there is some evidence to suggest that some of these materials (e.g., in categories 1 and 2) may be harmful in ways that other material (e.g., category 3) is not. I will summarize some of this important evidence shortly.

One important dimension of the disagreement between those liberals who defend a right to pornography and those who think that liberals should be open to the legitimacy of censorship is empirical: they disagree about the crucial empirical issue of whether there is reliable evidence to show that the production and consumption of pornography by consenting adults in fact causes harm to others, particularly women. But frequently they also disagree about some important conceptual matters as well. In particular, they may disagree (albeit sometimes implicitly) about how three central elements of the harm principle should be understood: (i) exactly what counts as “harm” to others, in the relevant sense; (ii) when can we say that something is a “cause”, or a sufficiently “direct cause”, of a harm; and (iii) how much harm to others is “sufficiently great” to justify coercive sanctions against the speech or conduct that produces it. In other words, they disagree about how the harm principle should be interpreted and applied.

Many argue that more traditional liberal conceptions of the interests or rights that individuals have, and so of what activities can cause harm to them, is too narrow. It ignores the way in which threats to individuals' interests can come not just from the state, but also from other social practices and circumstances (e.g., substantive socio-economic disadvantage) that can prevent the meaningful exercise of freedom just as effectively. The state may thus have a legitimate role to play in promoting the social conditions that enable individuals to exercise their rights in meaningful ways, and in regulating such activities of non-governmental agents or groups as may serve significantly to infringe them.

### **Pornographic Ethics**

A 2008 study on university campuses found that a whopping 87 percent of “emerging” adult men (aged 18-26), and 31 percent of emerging adult women report using porn at some level. Twenty percent of young men report using pornography daily or every other day, and almost half use it at least weekly. But the shock factor of pornography consumption statistics do not stop there: The sky is blue and men view porn—we’ve lost the shock value in our passive acceptance. Perhaps the more telling pornography statistic is that slightly over two thirds of young men, and nearly half of young women believe that porn consumption is morally acceptable.

This statistic of acceptance is particularly interesting because it is pulled from our generation, which often defines right and wrong in terms of consequences. Consequence-based morality maintains that if something doesn’t hurt yourself or others, it’s not wrong. The principle of “Thou shalt not hurt” thus becomes the backbone of discursive moral reasoning, as observed by the National Study of Youth and Religion. Removing an external moral standard from moral reasoning makes it difficult to condemn sex trafficking, exploitation, and violence, much less explicit sexual content and nudity. But even in terms of a “Thou shalt not hurt” moral code, passively accepting pornography overlooks the very real consequences of porn consumption.

Healthy sexuality combines emotional, social, intellectual, and physical elements, but pornography separates the mechanized components of intercourse from real sexuality itself. It leads to decreased sensitivity toward women and increased aggression. It also leads to a decreased ability to build healthy relationships or experience sexual satisfaction; users are increasingly unable to properly link emotional involvement with sex. Indeed, porn fosters incredibly unhealthy views about sexuality and human beings. Most porn portrays women as sex-obsessed, mindless objects, promiscuous and subordinate. As feminist scholar Catharine MacKinnon might propose, the prevalence of pornography begs the question: Are women human? Though that question seems extreme, ask yourself if a good society can intentionally engage in a medium that portrays half of its members in such a derogatory manner.

There is much discussion on how the government should regulate the big business of pornography, seesawing between freewheeling libertarianism and heavy-handed censorship.

Indeed, we are increasingly desensitized to discussion about porn use and regulation, even as research proves the effects of pornography are life altering, and stories of sex exploitation, psychological problems, and abuse dominate inspections into the porn industry. Many Americans embrace fair-trade coffee, concerned about the industries that produce their goods, but few consumers express concern about porn industry operations, and its employees and victims.

Even by the often-cited moral standards of individual choice and "Thou shalt not hurt," the porn discussion demands our moral attention. Recent work by neurologists illustrates the very real addictive properties of pornography. Porn addictions restrict real individual choice. University of Texas-San Antonio's Dr. Donald L. Hilton, Jr.'s research on porn addiction explains that pleasure chemicals in the brain are gradually overused when a person views pornography; the brain then limits dopamine production, causing the viewer to become starved for dopamine.

Despite the personal and social costs of pornography, health services are absurdly silent on the issue of such an exploitative and harmful industry. Harvard's University Health Services and Office of Sexual Prevention and Response dance around the issue without offering services or information to students about porn consumption and addiction. OSAPR refused the requests of True Love Revolution officers to assist with the White Ribbon Against Pornography Week without citing any reasons. OSAPR should make a concerted effort to reach out to students who are struggling with porn and educate students on the harmful effects of pornography. University offices shy away from addressing the porn issue as a tangible part of students' personal lives; they instead turn it into a vague, elusive matter.

Perhaps the University avoids the porn issue in order to avoid moral or social controversy, but fear of stirring up debate does few favors for students who struggle with porn consumption. University of Chicago professor Jean Bethke Elshtain argues in *The Social Costs of Pornography* that we should not dismiss the "moral" in our avoidance of the "moralistic." Elshtain maintains that in order to be responsible citizens, we must ask ourselves, "What sort of community is this?"

Is it reasonably decent and kind? Is it a fit place for human habitation, especially for the young? What happens to the most vulnerable among us? How do we ill- dignify the human body, and how do we forestall such affronts?" Such questions demand long-winded, nuanced answers, yet it is worth seeking these answers. They are pertinent to those who are involved in the porn industry, and they are pertinent to our own lives. We should all be asking ourselves whether pornography is compatible with a respectful and good society.

## **Representation**

Representation is simply the act of imitation or the act of identification, people identify themselves by means of their mimetic ability, when they see themselves in others and perceive a state of mutual equality. Representation of reality may refer to simile, similarity and symbolization of the world when we take it as a transformation of myth. The idea of representation at its simple level involves our understanding for the action of representation and how we define that act. This essay details media representation of reality as outlined by key theorists and their theories in the classical age and it further explains representation as a substitute and also as ideology.

Classical age refers to the antique period before the birth of Jesus Christ (Auerbach, E, 1974). Key

philosophers during this period included people such as Plato who is the ancient Greek philosopher; Aristotle who is also a Greek philosopher and he was Plato's student; Saint Thomas Aquinas who is a theologian from Italy; Galileo Galilei an Italian physician, astronomy and philosopher and last but not least Francis Bacon who is an English philosopher and leader of scientific revolution. I will critically do an in-depth analysis/discuss representation as outlined by these philosophers and I will also distinguish representation as a substitute and ideology.

First of all let's consider Plato who takes 'representation' with several meanings and connotations in the dialogue and alters the term according to the context in which he uses it. Plato can perhaps be identified as the culprit behind the idea that representation are lacking in truth or 'real' quality. Plato view representation as imitation or 'mimesis.' (Annas, 1982).

For Plato, more than two thousand years ago, an image was the representation of something and was not, could not, be an original. It was always an imitation and always lacking in value when compared to the original since it was not an original it had to be a simulacrum, a false claim to being. (Annas, 1982).

Plato simulacrum calls into question, the entire relationship between the real objects and its copy, and also prioritises the two entities in terms of value. Plato discuss 'representation' as likening oneself to another in speech and bodily behaviour and as addressing the lower part of man's soul; he also refers to the epistemology and metaphysics of the concept. (Spring, 1985)

In contradicting this, Aristotle who is known to be Plato's student 'representation' does not refer to the imitation of idea and appearance, like that of Plato. Aristotle view representation as a sign and argues that each area of knowledge is imitated in the sense that as a human being we all learn through imitation (Annas, 1982)

According to Angelo (1985) Aristotle is the first to deal with 'representation' as a theory of art. He dwell on the concept of representation as an aesthetic theory of art and considers imitation in terms of the form it is embodied. Aristotle states that all human action are mimetic and that men learn through imitation e.g. in the social learning theory of Albert Bandura it is said that we learn by imitating from an early age. In particular to him 'representation' is a distinguishing quality of an art.

For Plato, the artist was nothing but an imitator. This imitator while pretending to represent the real, did nothing more than give representation to an opinion about the real. Plato's student Aristotle, perhaps more diplomatically than Plato, described the image of painted figure not as the likeness of a character but rather as a sign of the character. Aristotle view representation of reality as referent to someone or something but does not try to pose as that someone or something (Summers, 1996:6).

However, he carefully makes a distinction between different kinds of knowledge e.g. he claims that art and philosophy deal with different kinds of truth; philosophy deals with concrete and absolute truth, whereas art deals with aesthetic and universal truth. Aristotle take's representation as an active aesthetic process. (Crane, R, S & Keats, W, R et al, 1996).

Plato and Aristotle attributed different meanings to the term representation. Plato considers representation as in ethical and political context whereas Aristotle uses representation as an aesthetic phenomenon and as an activity of the artist as I have explained in the above paragraph; they both agree that poetry is mimetic but they have different idea about poetry and representation. (Summers, 1996). Plato and Aristotle argue that artist (Demiurge) and poet imitate nature, thus, a work

of art is a reflection of nature. However, they have different views on the functions of imitation in art and literature. Plato believes in the existence of the ideal world, where exists a real form of every object found in nature. A work of art which reflects nature and is twice far from the reality it represents. Aristotle, on the other hand, does not deal with the ideal world, instead he analyses nature. He argues that a work of art does not imitate nature as it is, but as it should be. In this sense, an artist does not violate the truth but reflects the reality.

Plato's main concern is with the public recitation of dramatic and epic poetry and in Plato there is emulation between philosophy and poetry. The poet influences the character of the young in every way and has corruptive impact upon the education of the young mind. In addition, poets don't have a true knowledge of the things. Plato suggests that the emotional appeal is a threat to reason, that mimetic art is remote from reality, that the poet is not serious and knows nothing about poetry and cannot give satisfactory information about his art.

It is obvious that he resists the concept of imitation in the case of poetic composition. Tragedy, in particular, and poetry, in general, is concerned with pleasure rather than instruction and since it is not possible to imitate a wise and quiet person in the play, since such a person does not fit the content of tragedy, 'representation' is ethically distracting. Therefore, the function of various discussions of representational art in the Republic is ethical; wherever he mentions art he discusses it in relation to education and ethics (Annas, 1982).

Although Aristotle agrees with Plato that poetry has the power to stimulate emotions, he does not pay much attention to the ethical and epistemological aspects of 'representation'. Yet he dwells on the pleasure that men take in learning and argues that tragedy discharges the feelings and spectators leave the play in a state of calm, free of passions.

Plato worries about the moral effect of poetry, while Aristotle strikes to psychology and returns repeatedly to shuddering terror and pity that the tragedy is creating in the spectator, who therefore repeats or imitates what has already taken place on stage. And that, in its turn, spectator repeats or imitates what has already taken place. (Phillip, 1996).

Plato argues that there is a duality between art (representation and narrative art) and ethics. This manner of representation (impersonation), according to Plato, leads to the loss-of-self or transformation of identity and becomes a matter of moral destruction. Aristotle also takes the same activity of impersonation, but in a different way. (Gerathy, 1996:275).

After few years a medieval catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas acknowledged the vertical nature that symbolic representation had now taken on; a lower verse which indicates points to represent the higher God. Although denying that the higher and the lower are equivalents, Aquinas admitted that the higher can be addressed through the lower. Aquinas view representation as a divine instrument.

According to Aquinas representation have, in the midst of the mysteries of the faith, become almost supernatural mediums between mankind and God. In fact Aquinas encouraged this practice; since we cannot directly be exposed to divine truth, the faith must be translated into something which is represented to be consumed by us through our lower or human sense.

## **Representation and differences-Marginalization**

Media represent one of the most dynamically changing systems in society. The evolution of media has been determined by the progress in the area of information and communication technologies,

their spread and mass usage, whereas it includes numerous and diverse political, economic, cultural, ethical, and social implications. The editor of the publication, Rachna Sharma, stated following in the Introduction: "Today, while observing 'movements' on social issues at an increased frequency, with increased participation of the public, the claimed media interventions and the changing role of governments in this triangular relationship, one is compelled to locate the issue of marginalised sections in society."

The present is, above all, the time of social media characterised by a high degree of civic activism and individual freedom in the creation and presentation of the content: on the other hand, the power and economic strength of international media conglomerates has been growing on a regional and global scale. It is often discussed the undeniable contribution of the media to building a democratic society, a healthy public environment and their ability to help to radical social transformations, however we may also see that media provide a diametrically different space for the presentations of certain groups. If they highlight specific social participants, others are out of focus of the mainstream media. This bipolarity in displaying marginalised groups in society is one of the paradoxes of the postmodern society and a significant feature of the contemporary mainstream mass media.

Relevant responding to numerous questions related to the establishment and clarification of relations between media, the state and marginalized groups has become the subject of an academic debate, the results of which have the potential to reach the broader social awareness and media practice. In March 2016, the National seminar on the topic Media, the State and the Marginalized: Tackling Challenges took place at the Department of Journalism, Kalindi College, University of Delhi in India. The reviewed publication consists of selected papers presented at the seminar, edited by Rachna Sharma, Assistant Professor in the Department of Journalism of Lady Shri Ram College for Women at Delhi University, India. The publication includes 21 chapters summarised in five major thematic areas, as follows: Part I: Media and Political Communication, Part II: Representation of the Marginalised and Media Ethics, Part III: New Media, Social Media and Digital Activism, Part IV: Alternative and Community Media: The Media of the Marginalised? and Part V: Critical Theory, Media Criticism and Media Reforms. A part of the proceedings is a brief dictionary, in which the reader can find definitions of key terms related to the solved issues and an index of concepts and names that will help them in orientation in the content. It consists of 331 pages.

As indicated by the structure of the publication, its ambition is to provide a variety of views on the dynamically changing relation between media, the state and marginalized groups in an effort to comprehensively understand current social-political and social-cultural processes, which the contributors managed to accomplish. Individual authors address selected areas in a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. This is mainly due to the composition of the authors' team, which includes leading Indian experts from different areas, such as media studies, cultural studies, journalism, sociology, Public Relations, as well as long-standing experts from media practice. It is an interdisciplinary approach to exploring how media are in the digital age, who marginalised groups are in current social-political-economic structures and how they are reported by mainstream media that can be considered as a significant contribution of the publication to the wider debate on the subject. Despite the fact that the issue is dealt with by the authors from the domestic, Indian perspective, its overlap lies in a qualitative and quantitative solution. This approach expands the possibilities of publication's use. It can serve not only to academics and researchers, but also to the students of media studies, journalism, political science, and sociology. However, also workers in the media, especially in the news-service and others who are interested in the issue of marginalized groups in Indian society and its various stances can find a lot of inspirational information.

Thus, notions presented in individual contributions may serve as the basis for the theoretical and empirical comparative research of the allocated groups in other countries, as well. We should particularly appreciate the fact that the findings published in the book *Media, the State and Marginalisation: Tackling Challenges* may serve as the foundation for institutional debate aimed at addressing the problematic position of the marginalized groups in the Indian society heading towards formulating reforms. Thus, I consider the reviewed publication as an extraordinarily impressive contribution to the discussion on tackling the position of marginalized groups in modern society, with a significant overlap to the theory and the endeavour to practically apply the findings not only in media practice, but also in formulating measures at society-wide level.

## **Martin Slivka**

'The Master of nine crafts', Professor Karol Plicka, was Martin Slivka's role model and inspiration. A few of his films and scholarly analyses published in several books were devoted to Plicka and his extraordinary artistic accomplishments. He was not only Slivka's inspiration but also the object of his profound research inquiries. Slivka's own creative path unfolded from his Master's work he admired so much. This creative path was extraordinarily rich and diverse – he was an excellent documentary filmmaker, screenwriter, playwright, director, as well as a prominent ethnologist, a scientist and, ultimately, a lecturer who inspired and provoked his students by creating a space for free search of connections through his lectures.

He considered education, creativity and ethics to be the basic values any artist should have possessed. He is one of the key personalities of our culture that need to be re-discovered, reflected on by returning to their messages, confronted with the world. Martin Slivka was the co-founder of modern Slovak documentary film; he made more than 140 remarkable film documents. His independent debut, *Water and Work* (1963), highlighted the fact that a gifted filmmaker possessing a precious artistic opinion has just entered the area. The motion picture, which focuses on technical landmarks such as mills, uses artworks of prominent Slovak artists, e.g. music of Ilja Zeljenka and images of Jozef Grussmann, yet without any explicit spoken comments.

In addition to many other Slivka's films worthy of our attention, the documentary from Bulgaria *Man Is Leaving* (1968) is truly exceptional. "He reconsidered the traditionally descriptive ethnographic film works, (...) talking about the place of death in human life, about things that are common in all cultures," *The History of Slovak Cinematography* (2016) claims. The same publication also states that "During the period of 1963 – 1969, the authors of various generations, e.g. Karol Skřípský (1908), Vlado Kubenko (1924), Martin Slivka (1929), Dušan Hanák (1938) and Dušan Trančík (1946) created their masterpieces, their opuses". However, it was no coincidence; the political situation of the 1960s in our country but also anywhere else in the world seemed to universally inspire the best creators of different generations active in different areas of artistic life. Martin Slivka used similar artistic approaches to creating films about art and film portraits of prominent Slovak artists.

Moreover, he remained faithful to ethnographic film, exploring folk culture in its essence (but through a modern film language), customs and folk theatre that he also reflected on in his academic publications. The publication *The Slovak Folk Theatre* (2002) is the result of his researching and seeking. His precise work preparations necessarily involved searching for co-creators who, in his opinion, would provide their future collective work with the best possible quality. That is why Milan Rúfus, one of the most outstanding personalities of Slovak literature, wrote comments on some of his films. Moreover, world-famous music artists such as Krzysztof Penderecki and Ilja Zeljenka were willing to link their music with Slivka's films. Martin Slivka's filmmaking skills were con-

nected to his ethnological erudition, based on multidisciplinary approaches to the presented themes, as his unique studies on this topic clearly reflected.

He was a rebellious, stubborn debater; his former students, and there are many, are grateful not only for his professional supervision but also for the intellectual search they were lucky to experience while standing beside him. "It is difficult, if I may use his own words, to 'establish Martin Slivka in any structure'. He is a patriarchal tradition of the East and a Renaissance legacy of the West, all in one.

His whole being completely smells of humanity," writes one of his most successful students, the film director Mário Homolka.

While appreciating his work, it is impossible to omit the 13-part television series *The Children of the Wind* (1990) about the lives of Gypsies in many European countries. His son Ľubomír worked with him and despite many difficulties they experienced in many countries while making the series, they created a unique piece of art that is still unmatched in this area of creative expression and, as I daresay, it will remain unmatched for a long time. The film's value will definitely increase, since it offers a set of thorough, yet subtle expressions of the quickly vanishing Romani traditions. Martin Slivka is the winner of many prizes and awards, one of the most discussed Slovak filmmakers. Above all, he will be remembered as an inventive, wise and loving man, as a true renaissance person who knew how to understand human weaknesses and always tried to overcome these weaknesses through considerable doses of irony that was so typical for all his works.

## **Milan Stano**

Painter, graphic designer, cartoonist. Publisher, editor, writer and connoisseur of everything connected with travelling around the world. His inspirations are tangible not only in images and writings he has created but also in endless considerations, comparisons and evaluations reflecting on his works. He is original, capable in each of the mentioned creative fields, unrepeatable. He is tough and hardworking. Most of his paintings are landscapes, images of rural environments and urban visions. Following his paintings, he travels across the country with his rack, sketchbook, colours and brushes. "In his paintings, a calm landscape emerges, radiating harmony, balance; through urban motives and folk architecture, he creates poetic compositions," wrote a critic. The humorous images of Slovak folklore and folk traditions also define the cartoons he has been publishing since 1966: "I love Slovak humour; the soul of the nation, the unbound joy of life, the sense of justice and the mockery of stupidity are all enchanted within it," wrote Milan Stano. That is why he also became the publisher, editor and later editor-in-chief of the independent satirical monthly magazine

*Kocúrkovo*, published by Štúdio humoru a satiry since 1990. That is where he started to publish books as well. His cartoons are kind, ironic and provocative at the same time, always able to reflect the problems Slovakia has to face – after all, the reader should become acquainted with various cultural or historical contexts –; however, they also point out the more general questions of being, joy and 'borderless' stupidity. They represent timelessness and a peculiar dialogue with the universe. His heroes are mostly sketched with a closed line, and that is the hallmark of his work: "I understand the caricature as a system of fine arts philosophy through which I can contribute to creating a certain atmosphere. For example, a humorous drawing allows me to create a sense of good mood, optimism, while a cartoon satire helps me create an atmosphere of criticism. The caricature is a good companion," wrote the author.

## **Legal Ethics: law and morality**

Ethics is a branch of philosophy that aims to answer the basic question, "What should I do?" It's a process of reflection in which people's decisions are shaped by their values, principles, and purpose rather than unthinking habits, social conventions, or self-interest. Our values, principles, and purpose are what give us a sense of what's good, right, and meaningful in our lives. They serve as a reference point for all the possible courses of action we could choose. On this definition, an ethical decision is one made based on reflection about the things we think are important and that is consistent with those beliefs.

While each person is able to reflect and discover their own sense of what's good, right, and meaningful, the course of human history has seen different groups unify around different sets of values, purposes and principles. Christians, consequentialists, Buddhists, Stoics and the rest all provide different answers to that question, "What should I do?" Each of these answers is a 'morality'.

### **Morality**

Many people find morality extremely useful. Not everyone has the time and training to reflect on the kind of life they want to live, considering all the different combinations of values, principles, and purposes. It's helpful for them to have a coherent, consistent account that has been refined through history and can be applied in their day to day lives.

Many people also inherit their morality from their family, community or culture – it's rare for somebody to 'shop around' for the morality that most closely fits their personal beliefs. Usually the process is unconscious. There's a challenge here: if we inherit a ready-made answer to the question of how we should live, it's possible to apply it to our lives without ever assessing whether the answer is satisfactory or not.

We might live our whole lives under a moral system which, if we'd had the chance to think about, we would have rejected in part or in full.

### **Law**

The law is different. It's not a morality in the strict sense of the word because, at least in democratic nations, it tries to create a private space where individuals can live according to their own ethical beliefs or morality. Instead, the law tries to create a basic, enforceable standard of behaviour necessary in order for a community to succeed and in which all people are treated equally.

Because of this, the law is narrower in focus than ethics or morality. There are some matters the law will be agnostic on but which ethics and morality have a lot to say. For example, the law will be useless to you if you're trying to decide whether to tell your competitor their new client has a reputation for not paying their invoices, but our ideas about what's good and right will still guide our judgement here.

There is a temptation to see the law and ethics as the same – so long as we're fulfilling our legal obligations we can consider ourselves 'ethical'. This is mistaken on two fronts. First, the law outlines a basic standard of behaviour necessary for our social institutions to keep functioning. For example, it protects basic consumer rights. However, in certain situations the right thing to do in solving a dispute with a customer might require us to go beyond our legal obligations.

Secondly, there may be times when obeying the law would require us to act against our ethics or morality. A doctor might be obligated to perform a procedure they believe is unethical or a public servant might believe it's their duty to leak classified information to the press. Some philosophers

have argued that a person's conscience is more binding on them than any law, which suggests to the letter of the law won't be an adequate substitute for ethical reflection.

## **Law and Morality**

Law and morality are too vague to understand. It must be added here that the notions of law and justice can't be captured and presented before us within a few sentences. These notions are too vast that even words are not sufficient to define them.

In general view morality is the quality of being in accord with standards of right or wrong conduct. Morality, speaks of a system of behavior in regards to standards of right or wrong. The word carries the concepts of: (1) moral standards, with regard to behavior; (2) moral responsibility, referring to our conscience; and (3) a moral identity, or one who is capable of right or wrong action. Morality has become a complicated issue in the multi-cultural world we live in today. Timeless wisdom explains that there cannot be a complete law unless there lays the effect and inclusion of morality. My Project explores what is Moore's concept of morality and how he explains its affects on our behavior, our conscience, our society, and our ultimate destiny.

Law and morality are too vague to understand. It must be added here that the notions of law and justice can't be captured and presented before us within a few sentences. These notions are too vast that even words are not sufficient to define them. Many jurists from the ancient Greek period to the modern and even the post-modern era have attempted numerously to define these concepts, but have failed. One of the reasons may be that the roots of these concepts lie somewhere within the human psyche, which is extremely random and versatile. Well it is required to describe the tenets of the two main schools of law.

## **Theory of Relationship between Law and Morality**

Ever since the revival of the scientific study of jurisprudence the connection of law and morality has much discussed, but the question is not yet, and perhaps never will be settled. Every variety of opinion has been entertained, from the extreme doctrine held by Austin that for the purpose of the jurist, law is absolutely independent of morality, almost to the opposite positions, held by every Oriental cad, that morality and law are one. The question is an important one, and upon the answer which is given to it depends upon the answer which is consequences. The problem is an intensely practical one.

The popular conception of the connection between law and morality is that in some way the law exists to promote morality, to preserve those conditions which make the moral life possible, and than to enable men to lead sober and industrious lives. The average man regards law as justice systematized, and justice itself as a somewhat chaotic mass of moral principles. On this view, the positive law is conceived of as a code of rules, corresponding to the code of moral laws, deriving its authority from the obligatory character of those moral laws, and being just or unjust according as it agrees with, or differs from them. This, like all other popular conceptions, is inadequate for scientific purposes, and the jurist, so far at least as he is also a scientist, is compelled to abandon it. For it is contradicted by the fact's. positive laws do not rest upon moral laws and common notions of justice furnish no court of appeal from the decrees of the State. The average man confounds law and morality, and identifies the rules of law with the principles of abstract justice.

## **No Distinction in Ancient Times**

In the earlier stages of the society there was no distinction between law and morals. In Hindu law, the prime source of which are the Vedas and the Smritis, we do not find such distinction in the

beginning. However, later on, Mimansa laid down certain principles to distinguish obligatory from recommendatory injunctions. In the West also the position was similar. The Greeks in the name of the doctrine of 'natural right' formulated a theoretical moral foundation of law. The Roman jurist in the name of 'natural law' recognized certain moral principles as the basis of law. In the Middle Ages, the Church became dominant in Europe. The 'natural law' was given a theological basis and Christian morals were considered as the basis of law.

### **Moral as a part of law**

There are some who assert that even if law and morals are distinguishable it remains true that morality is in some way an integral part of law or of legal development, that morality is "secreted in the interstices" of the legal system, and to that extent is inseparable from it.

Thus it has been said that law in action is not a mere system of rules, but involves the use of certain principles, such as that of the equitable and the good (*aequum et bonum*). By the skilled application of these principles to legal rules the judicial process distills a moral content out of the legal order, though it is admitted that this does not permit the rules themselves to be rejected on the general ground of their immorality.

Another approach would go much further and confer upon the legal process an inherent power to reject immoral rules as essentially non-legal; this seems to resemble the classical natural law mode of thought, but it is urged, the difference is that according to the present doctrine it is a matter of the internal structure of the legal system, which treats immoral rules as inadmissible rather than as being annulled by an external law of nature.

If value judgments such as moral factors, form an inevitable feature of the climate of legal development, as is generally admitted, it is difficult to see the justification for this exclusive attitude. Value judgments which enter into law will require consideration of what would be a just rule or decision, even though not objective in the sense of being based on absolute truth, may, nevertheless, be relatively true, in the sense of corresponding to the existing moral standards of the community.

Whether it is convenient or not to define law without reference to subjective factors, when we come to observe the phenomena with which law is concerned and to analyze the meaning and use of legal rules in relation to such phenomena, it will be found impossible to disregard the role of value judgments in legal activity, and we cannot exercise this functional role by stigmatizing such judgments as merely subjective or unscientific.

### **The Problem about the Nature of Law J.Raz (1982)**

The theory of knowledge attempts to clarify the nature of knowledge, the philosophy of logic examines the definition of logic, moral philosophy reflects on the nature and boundaries of morality and so on.

One finds philosophers who took the enquiry concerning the nature of law to be an attempt to define the meaning of the word "law". Traditionally those who adopted the linguistic approach concentrated on the word "law". However, it encountered the overwhelming problem that that word is used in a multiplicity of non-legal contexts. We have laws of nature and scientific laws, laws of God and thought, of logic and of language, etc. Clearly the explanation of "law" has to account for its use in all these contexts and equally clearly any explanation which is so wide and general can be of very little use to legal philosophers.

Only one assumption can the explanation of "law" hope to provide the answer to the legal philosopher's inquiry into the nature of law. That assumption is that the use of "law" in all its contexts but one is analogical or metaphorical or in some other way parasitical on its core meaning as displayed in its use in one type of context and that that core meaning is the one the legal philosopher has at the centre of his enquiry. Unfortunately, the assumption is mistaken. Its implausibility is best seen by examining the most thorough and systemic attempt to provide an analysis of "law" based on this assumption, that proposed by John Austin in *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*.

## **The Lawyers' Perspective**

Many legal philosophers start from an unstated basic intuition:

"The law has to do with those considerations which it is appropriate for the courts to rely upon in justifying their decisions."

Most theorists tend to be by education and profession lawyers and their audience often consists primarily of law students. Quite naturally and imperceptibly they adopted the lawyers' perspective on the law. Lawyers' activities are dominated by litigation in court, actual or potential. They not only conduct litigation in the courts. They draft documents, conclude legal transactions, advise clients, etc., always with an eye to the likely outcome of possible litigation in which the validity of the document or transaction or the legality of the client's action may be called into question. From the lawyer's point of view the law does indeed consist of nothing but considerations appropriate for courts to rely upon.

Hans Kelsen says he follows a combination of the linguistic approach and the institutional approach: "Any attempt to define a concept in question. In defining the concept of law we must begin by examining the following questions:

Do the social phenomena generally called law present a common characteristic distinguishing them from other social phenomena of a similar kind?

The clue to the methodological approach Kelsen was in fact pursuing is in his insistence that legal theory must be a pure theory. Kelsen regarded it as doubly pure. It is pure of all moral argument and it is pure of all sociological facts. Kelsen indicates his belief that the analysis of legal concepts and the determination of the content of any legal system depends in no way at all on the effects the law has on the society or the economy, nor does it involve examination of people's motivation in obeying the law or in breaking it.

For Kelsen, it is self-evident that legal theory is free of all moral considerations. The task of legal theory is clearly to study law. If law is such that it cannot be studied scientifically then surely the conclusion that if the law does involve moral considerations and therefore cannot be studied scientifically, then legal theory will study only those aspects of the law which can be studied scientifically. Since Kelsen has no good reason to insist that legal theory should be free from moral consideration, he has no good reason to delimit the law in the way he does.

## **The international Approach**

It is the lawyer's perspective which delivers the verdict. Yet there is something inherently implausible in adopting the lawyer's perspective as one fundamental methodological stance. There is no

doubting the importance of the legal profession and of the judicial system in society. It is however, unreasonable to study such institutions exclusively from the lawyer's perspective. Institutional approach seems much superior to its rivals. The institutional approach strives to present an analysis of a central political institution should be accepted as the analysis of law. From the institutional point of view, the basic intuition is the starting point for further critical reflection. It is entirely plausible to regard the notion of law as bound up with that of a judicial system but what are the essential characteristics of a court and why are they important to the political organization of society? Three features characterize courts of law:

1. They deal with disputes with the aim of resolving them.
2. They issue authoritative rulings which decides these disputes.
3. In their activities they are bound to be guided, at least partly, by positivist authoritative consideration.

At the highest level of philosophical abstraction the doctrine of the nature of law can and should be concerned with explaining law within the wider context of social and political institutions. It shows how the inclination to identify the theory of law with a theory of adjudication and legal considerations with all those appropriate for courts is based on a short sighted doctrine overlooking the connection of law with the distinction between executive and deliberative conclusion. Clearly, a theory of adjudication is a moral theory. It concerns all the considerations affecting reasoning in the courts, both legal and non-legal.

When the doctrine of the nature of law is identified with a theory of adjudication it becomes itself a moral theory. The doctrine of the nature of law yields a test for identifying law the use of which requires no resort to moral or any other evaluative argument. But it does not follow that one can defend the doctrine of the nature of law itself without using evaluative arguments. Its justification is tied to an evaluative judgment about the relative importance of various features of social organizations and these reflect our moral and intellectual interest and concerns.

## **Law and Morality**

In the modern world, morality and law are almost universally held to be unrelated fields and, where the term "legal ethics" is used, it is taken to refer to the professional honesty of lawyers or judges, but has nothing to do with the possible "rightness" or "wrongness" of particular laws themselves.

This is a consequence of the loss of the sense of any "truth" about man, and of the banishment of the idea of the natural law. It undermines any sense of true human rights, leaves the individual defenseless against unjust laws, and opens the way to different forms of totalitarianism. This should be easy enough to see for a person open to the truth; but many people's minds have set into superficial ways of thinking, and they will not react unless they have been led on, step by step, to deeper reflection and awareness.

## **Relationship between Law and Morality or Ethics**

Law is an enactment made by the state. It is backed by physical coercion. Its breach is punishable by the courts. It represents the will of the state and realizes its purpose.

Laws reflect the political, social and economic relationships in the society. It determines rights and duties of the citizens towards one another and towards the state.

It is through law that the government fulfils its promises to the people. It reflects the sociological need of society.

Law and morality are intimately related to each other. Laws are generally based on the moral principles of society. Both regulate the conduct of the individual in society.

They influence each other to a great extent. Laws, to be effective, must represent the moral ideas of the people. But good laws sometimes serve to rouse the moral conscience of the people and create and maintain such conditions as may encourage the growth of morality.

Laws regarding prohibition and spread of primary education are examples of this nature. Morality cannot, as a matter of fact, be divorced from politics. The ultimate end of a state is the promotion of general welfare and moral perfection of man.

It is the duty of the state to formulate such laws as will elevate the moral standard of the people. The laws of a state thus conform to the prevailing standard of morality. Earlier writers on Political Science never made any distinction between law and morality.

Plato's Republic is as good a treatise on politics as on ethics. In ancient India, the term Dharma connoted both law and morality. Law, it is pointed out, is not merely the command of the sovereign, it represents the idea of right or wrong based on the prevalent morality of the people.

Moreover, obedience to law depends upon the active support of the moral sentiments of the people. Laws which are not supported by the moral conscience of the people are liable to become dead letters.

For example laws regarding Prohibition in India have not succeeded on account of the fact that full moral conscience of the people has not been aroused in favor of such laws.

As Green put it, "In attempting to enforce an unpopular law, a government may be doing more harm than good by creating and spreading the habit of disobedience to law. The total cost of such an attempt may well be greater than the social gain."

Although law and morality are interdependent yet they differ from each other in their content, definiteness and sanction.

### **Some points of distinction between law and morality may be brought out as follows:**

Law: The Oxford English Dictionary defines the law as: 'the body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects.'

That this should be regarded as the definition of law for the English language is evidence of the influence legal positivism has upon the philosophy of law in our culture. The central themes of positivism are the contentions: firstly, that the existence of law rests upon identifiable social facts and, secondly, that it is necessary to maintain a conceptual distinction between law and morality. In this essay I will examine the positivist assertion that law is identifiable independently of morality, with

a particular focus on the theory of H.L.A.Hart.

1. Law regulates and controls the external human conduct. It is not concerned with inner motives. A person may be having an evil intention in his or her mind but law does not care for it.
2. Law will move into action only when this evil intention is translated into action and some harm is actually done to another person.
3. Law is universal in a particular society. All the individuals are equally subjected to it. It does not change from man to man.
4. Political laws are precise and definite as there is a regular organ in every state for the formulation of laws.
5. Law is framed and enforced by a determinate political authority. It enjoys the sanction of the state. Disobedience of law is generally followed by physical punishment.
6. The fear of punishment acts as a deterrent to the breach of political law.
7. Law falls within the purview of a subject known as Jurisprudence.

### **Morality:**

1. Morality regulates and controls both the inner motives and the external actions. It is concerned with the whole life of man.

The province of law is thus limited as compared with that of morality because law is simply concerned with external actions and does not take into its fold the inner motives.

Morality condemns a person if he or she has some evil intentions but laws are not applicable unless these intentions are manifested externally.

2. Morality is variable. It changes from man to man and from age to age. Every man has his own moral principles.
3. Moral laws lack precision and definiteness as there is no authority to make and enforce them.
4. Morality is neither framed nor enforced by any political authority. It does not enjoy the support of the state. Breach of moral principles is not accompanied by any physical punishment.

The only check against the breach of morality is social condemnation or individual conscience. 'Moral actions are a matter of choice of inner conscience of the individual, laws are a matter of compulsion'.

5. Morality is studied under a separate branch of knowledge known as Ethics.  
We may conclude the discussion in the words of Gilchrist, "The individual moral life manifests itself in manifold ways. The state is the supreme condition of the individual moral life, for without the state no moral life is possible.

The state, therefore, regulates other organizations in the common interest. The state, however, has a direct function in relation to morality."

### **Points to Remember**

Laws may be defined as external rules of human conduct backed by the sovereign political authority. Law and morality are intimately related to each other.

## **Laws are generally based on the moral principles of a particular society. Some points of distinction may be brought out as follows:**

- (a) Laws regulate external human conduct whereas morality mainly regulates internal conduct.
- (b) Laws are universal; morality is variable.
- (c) Laws are definite and precise while morality is variable.
- (d) Laws are upheld by the coercive power of the state; morality simply enjoys the support of public opinion or individual conscience.
- (e) Laws are studied under Jurisprudence but morality is studied under Ethics.

### **Law and freedom**

Both law and morality imply human freedom. Clearly, without freedom one cannot speak of morality. But the same holds for law, for if it were automatically and not freely obeyed, men would be mere robots. Law is not a simple indication of what happens, such as the law of physics; it is an admonition to free persons about what they are required to do if they wish to live freely and responsibly in society; and it normally carries with it a sanction or punishment to be imposed on whoever is shown to have acted against given norms of conduct. Just law, properly understood, appeals to freedom.

Nevertheless one of the most generalized liberal ideas is that law is by nature the enemy of freedom. Servais Pinckaers holds that Catholic moralists have gone through many centuries under the influence of this mentality which has led, by reaction, to the anti-law approach of much of contemporary moral theology. In this view, law and freedom were seen as "two opposed poles, law having the effect of limitation and imposing itself on freedom with the force of obligation. Freedom and law faced each other as two proprietors in dispute over the field of human actions. The moralists commonly said, "Law governs this act, freedom governs that one..." The moralists were traditionally the representatives of the moral law, and their mission was to show to conscience how to apply it in a particular situation, in a "case of conscience". Today we witness a strong tendency to invert the roles; the moralists now regard themselves as defenders of freedom and of personal conscience" [as against the law].

### **Law and justice**

Law cannot attempt to regulate the purely interior sphere of personal conduct; morality can. Human or civil law is connected with external actions, precisely insofar and because they impinge on the rights or lawful actions of others. Hence the necessary connection of law with justice. For the regulation of interpersonal relations must work from the basic principle of justice: "to each his due". Hence arises the fundamental question of what is due to each one, and from this the further question of human rights.

To each his due. Something is due to each. This is the sense of equality before the law. "The possibility of giving his or her due not only to a relative, friend, citizen or fellow believer, but also to every human being simply because he is a person, simply because justice requires it, is the honor of law and of jurists. If there is an expression of the unity of the human race and of equality between all human beings, this expression is rightly given by the law, which can exclude no one from its horizon under pain of altering its specific identity".

Even for those who see law and freedom in mutual opposition, the whole concept of law is essentially connected with that of justice. The ancient principle *lex iniusta non est lex* (an unjust law is

not a law), is at the basis of so many modern protests in the name of freedom. "This law is discriminatory, therefore it is not just". But justice is a moral concept; so these protests bear out the intrinsic connection between law and morality, "There is another crucial link between the virtues and law, for knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of justice".

'The law must respond to "living situations"...' Very good, but not in the sense that it must take the situation as its norm. Justice must remain the norm, and sometimes the law must regain ground for justice.

### **Influence of Morals on Law**

Law and Morals act and react upon and mould each other. In the name of 'justice', 'equity', 'good faith', and 'conscience' morals have in-filtered into the fabrics of law. In judicial law making, in the interpretation of legal precepts, in exercising judicial discretion (as in awarding punishment) moral considerations play a very important role. Morals work as a restraint upon the power of the legislature because the legislature cannot venture to make a law which is completely against the morals of the society. Secondly, all human conduct and social relations cannot be regulated and governed by law alone. A considerable number of them are regulated by morals. A number of action and relations in the life of the community go on very smoothly without any intervention by law. Their observance is secured by morals. So far as the legal rules are concerned, it is not the legal sanction alone that ensure their obedience but morals also help in it. Thus, morals perfect the law. 'In marriage, so long as love persists, there is little need of law to rule the relations of the husband and wife – but the solicitor comes in through the door, as love flies out of the window.'

### **Growing Importance of Morals**

Now, sociological approach has got its impact upon the modern age. This approach is more concerned with the ends that law has to pursue. Thus, recognized values, or, in other words, morals (of course the morals of the modern age) have become a very important subject of study for good law making. On international law also morals are exercising a great influence. The brutalities and inhuman acts in World Wars made the people to turn back to morals and efforts are being made to establish standards and values which the nations must follow. Perhaps there is no other so forceful ground to justify the Nuremberg Trials as morals. If the law is to remain closer to the life of the people and effective, it must not ignore morals.

### **Legal Obligation and Authority**

Whatever else they do, all legal systems recognize, create, vary and enforce obligations. This is no accident: obligations are central to the social role of law and explaining them is necessary to an understanding of law's authority and, therefore, its nature. Not only are there obligations in the law, there are also obligations to the law. Historically, most philosophers agreed that these include a moral obligation to obey, or what is usually called "political obligation." Voluntarists maintained that this requires something like a voluntary subjection to law's rule, for example, through consent. Non-voluntarists denied this, insisting that the value of a just and effective legal system is itself sufficient to validate law's claims. Both lines of argument have recently come under intense scrutiny, and some philosophers now deny that law is entitled to all the authority it claims for itself, even when the legal system is legitimate and reasonably just. On this view there are legal obligations that some of law's subjects have no moral obligation to perform.

## Obligations In the Law

Every legal system contains obligation-imposing laws, but there is no decisive linguistic marker determining which these are. The term "obligation" need not be used, nor its near-synonym, "duty." One rarely finds the imperative mood. The Canadian Criminal Code imposes an obligation not to advocate genocide thus: "Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years." The English Sale of Goods Act says that, "Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied under the contract are of merchantable quality." That these laws create obligations follows from the way "offence" and "implied condition" function in their respective areas of law, not from the language in which they are expressed.

On the face of it, some laws have other functions. A requirement that "a will must be signed" generally imposes no duty—not a duty to make a will, and not even a duty to have it signed if you do—it sets conditions in the absence of which the document simply does not count as a valid will. Nonetheless, some philosophers, including Jeremy Bentham and Hans Kelsen, argue that the content of every legal system can and should be represented solely in terms of duty-imposing and duty-excepting laws. Bentham asks, "What is it that every article of law has in common with the rest? It commands and by doing so creates duties or, what is another word for the same thing, obligations". They think that analyzing laws this way reveals what legislators or subjects most need to know: under what conditions the coercive power of law will ultimately be met. Others argue that even if such a reduction were possible, it would be unwieldy, uninformative and unmotivated, concealing as it does the different social functions that laws fulfil (Hart 1994: 26– 49) and the different kinds of reasons for action that they create (Raz 1990). Others still, despairing of any principled way of knowing what a law is, have abandoned the problem entirely and tried to develop a theory of law that bypasses it. At a minimum, it does seem clear that whether or not all laws impose obligations, they can only be fully understood through their relations to those that do. Thus, a legal right is an interest that warrants holding others under an obligation to protect it, a legal power is the ability to create or modify obligations, and so forth.

What then are legal obligations? They are legal requirements with which law's subjects are bound to conform. An obligatory act or omission is something the law renders non-optional. Since people plainly can violate their legal obligations, "non-optional" does not mean that they are physically compelled to perform, nor even that law leaves them without any eligible alternative. On the contrary, people often calculate whether or not to perform their legal duties. Could it be then that obligations are simply weighty reasons to perform, even if sometimes neglected or outweighed? This cannot be a sufficient condition: high courts have important reasons not to reverse themselves too frequently, but no legal obligation to refrain. Nor is it necessary: one has an obligation, but only a trivial reason, not to tread on someone's lawn without his consent.

If their content does not account for the stringency of obligations, what does? An historically important, though now largely defunct, theory explained it in terms of penalty. Following Hobbes and Bentham, the English jurist John Austin says that to have a legal obligation is to be subject to a sovereign command to do or forbear, where a command requires an expression of will together with an attached risk, however small, of suffering an evil for non-compliance. "When I am talking directly of the chance of incurring the evil, or (changing the expression) of the liability or obnoxiousness to the evil, I employ the term duty, or the term obligation..." (Austin 1832, 18). Others conceived an indirect connection between duty and sanction. Hans Kelsen holds that what is normally counted as the content of a legal duty is in reality only part of a triggering condition for the mandatory norm which commands or authorizes officials to impose a sanction: "[A] norm: 'You

shall not murder' is superfluous, if a norm is valid: 'He who murders ought to be punished'"(Kelsen 1967, 55). And thus, "Legal obligation is not, or not immediately, the behavior that ought to be. Only the coercive act, functioning as a sanction, ought to be" (Kelsen 1967, 119).

None of these versions of the sanction theory survived H.L.A. Hart's criticisms (Hart 1994, 27–42; cf. Hacker 1973). First, they misleadingly represent a range of disparate legal consequences—including compensation and even invalidation—as if they all function as penalties. Second, they render unintelligible many familiar references to duties in the absence of sanctions, for example, the duty of the highest courts to apply the law. Third, they offer an inadequate explanation of non-optionalness. "You have an obligation not to murder" cannot merely mean "If you murder you will be punished," for the law is not indifferent between people, on the one hand, murdering and being jailed, and on the other hand not murdering at all. "The right to disobey the law is not obtainable by the payment of a penalty or a licence fee". Such dicta are commonplace and reflect familiar judicial attitudes. Most important, the normal function of sanctions in the law is to reinforce duties, not to constitute them. It is true that one reason people are interested in knowing their legal duties is to avoid sanctions, but this is not the only reason nor is it, contrary to what Oliver Wendell Holmes supposed, a theoretically primary one. Subjects also want to be guided by their duties—whether in order to fulfil them or deliberately to infringe them—and officials invoke them as reasons for, and not merely consequences of, their decisions.

Sensitivity to such matters led Hart to defend a rule-based theory. He says that while sanctions might mark circumstances in which people are obliged to conform, they have an obligation only when subject to a practiced social rule requiring an act or omission. The fact that subjects use it as a rule marks it as normative. Three further features distinguish obligation-imposing rules: they must be reinforced by serious or insistent pressure to conform; they must be believed important to social life or to some valued aspect of it; and their requirements may conflict with the interests and goals of the subject (Hart 1994, 85–88). This account of the nature of obligations is not an account of their validity. Hart does not say that a legal duty is binding whenever there is a willingness to deploy serious pressure in its support, etc. He holds that a duty is legally valid if it is part of the legal system (i.e., if it is certified as such by the tests for law in that system), and a legal duty is morally valid only if there are sound moral reasons to comply with it. But, at least in his early work, he offers the practice theory as an explanation of duties generally—legal duties are the creatures of legal rules, moral duties of moral rules and so on.

The constitutive role of social pressure is sometimes considered an Austinian blemish on Hart's theory, but there are in any case more serious problems with it as a general account of obligations. People readily speak of obligations when they are well aware that there are no relevant social practices, as might a lone vegetarian in a meat eating society. And Hart's practice conditions may be satisfied in cases where there is no obligation but only generally applicable reasons, as when victims are regularly urged to yield their wallets to a mugger. At best, Hart's theory will apply only to a special class of obligations in which the existence of a conventional practice is an essential part of the reasons for conformity, though even here, the theory is open to doubt.

A third account is reason-based. On this view, what constitutes obligations is neither the social resources with which they are enforced, nor the practices in which they may be expressed, but the kind of reasons for action that they offer. Legal obligations are content-independent reasons that are both categorical and pre-emptive in force. The mark of their content-independence is that their force does not depend on the nature or merits of the action they require: in most cases, law can impose an obligation to do X or to refrain from doing X. That they are pre-emptive means that

they require the subject to set aside his own view of the merits and comply nonetheless. That they are categorical means that they do not condition their claims on the subject's own goals or interests.

This view is foreshadowed in both Hobbes and Locke, but its most influential contemporary version is due to Joseph Raz. He argues that obligations are categorical reasons for action that are also protected by exclusionary reasons not to act on some of the competing reasons to the contrary. Obligations exclude some contrary reasons—typically at least reasons of convenience and ordinary preference—but they do not normally exclude all: an exclusionary reason is not necessarily a conclusive reason. The stringency of an obligation is thus a consequence not of its weight or practice features, but of the fact that it supports the required action by special normative means, insulating it from the general competition of reasons. Or at any rate this is what obligations do when they have the force the claim, i.e., when they are binding. The theory does not assume that all legal obligations actually are binding from the moral point of view, but it does suppose that the legal system puts them forth as if they were—a consequence that some have doubted. (Hart 1982, 263–67; Himma 2001, 284–97) And while this account is invulnerable to the objections to sanction-based and practice-based theories, it does need to make good the general idea of an 'exclusionary reason', and some philosophers have expressed doubts on that score also (Perry 1989, Regan 1987): is it ever reasonable to exclude entirely from consideration an otherwise valid reason? The account has, nonetheless, been adopted by legal philosophers with otherwise starkly contrasting views of the nature of law.

### **Authority, Obligation, and Legitimacy**

A competitive market is not a legal system, even though people adjust their behaviour in response to relative prices and the whole constitutes a form of social order. Neither was the system of mutual nuclear deterrence, though it guided behaviour and generated norms that regulated the Cold War. Many philosophers and social scientists agree that a social order is a legal system only if it has effective authority. An effective (or *de facto*) authority may not be justified, but it does stand in a special relation to justified (*de jure*) authority. Justified authority is what effective authorities claim, or what they are generally recognized to have.

What is legal authority, and how is it related to obligations? It is a kind of practical authority, i.e. authority over action. On one influential view, "To claim authority is to claim the right to be obeyed" (Wolff 1970, 5). There are, of course, authorities that make no such claim. Theoretical authorities, i.e., experts, are not characterized by claims to obedience—they need not even claim a right to be believed. And there are weaker forms of practical authority. To give someone authority to use your car is merely to permit him. But political authority, of which legal authority is one species, is normally seen as a right to rule, with a correlative duty to obey. On this account law claims the right to obedience wherever it sets out obligations. And to obey is not merely to comply with the law; it is to be guided by it. Max Weber says it is "as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake" (Weber 1963, 946). Or, as Robert Paul Wolff somewhat more perspicuously puts it: "Obedience is not a matter of doing what someone tells you to do. It is a matter of doing what he tells you to do because he tells you to do it" (Wolff 1970, 9). This is not to say that one obeys only in treating the authority's say-so as an indefeasible reason for action; but one must treat as a binding content-independent reason. The question whether there is an obligation of obedience to law is a matter of whether we should act from the legal point of view and obey the law as it claims to be obeyed.

It is an interesting feature of this account that it supposes that one can tell what the authority re-

quires independent of whether the requirement is justified on its merits. Richard Friedman argues: “[I]f there is no way of telling whether an utterance is authoritative, except by evaluating its contents to see whether it deserves to be accepted in its own right, then the distinction between an authoritative utterance and advice or rational persuasion will have collapsed” (Friedman 1973, 132). An idea of this sort is developed by Raz into one of the leading arguments for the “sources thesis”, the idea that an adequate test for the existence and content of law must be based only on social facts, and not on moral arguments. Authority’s subjects “can benefit by its decisions only if they can establish their existence and content in ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues which the authority is there to settle” (Raz 1994, 219). If law aims to settle disputes about moral issues, then law must be identifiable without resolving these same disputes. The law is therefore exhausted by its sources (such as legislative enactments, judicial decisions, and customs, together with local conventions of interpretation). This kind of argument has been generalized (see Shapiro 1998), but also subjected to criticism. It is uncertain what sort of constraint is posed by the idea that it should not involve “the very same issues”—perhaps if morality is a necessary condition only there could be moral tests for authority that leave the relevant dependent reasons untouched (Coleman 2001, 126–7). And while law does indeed serve as a scheme for guiding and appraising behaviour, it may also have other functions, such as educating its subjects about right and wrong, and this may be ill-served the attitude that the rules are to be obeyed in part because they are the rules (Waluchow 1994).

The obligation-correlative view of authority is not universally accepted. Some argue that legal authority involves no claim right, but only a set of liberties: to decide certain questions for a society and to enforce their decisions. The liberty conception must answer two questions. First, is it not a feature of a right to decide that it requires subjects to refrain from acting on competing decisions? If the law says that abortion is permissible and the Church says that it is not, what does the denial of the Church’s right to decide amount to if not that public policy should be structured by the former decision and not the latter, even if the latter is correct? Second, does the right to enforce include a duty of subjects to pay the penalty when required? If it does, then this is only a truncated version of the obligation-correlative theory—one that holds that punitive and remedial obligations, but not primary obligations, are binding. If not, it is starkly at variance with the actual views of legal officials, who do not think that subjects are at liberty to evade penalties if they can.

This reaches a methodological issue in the philosophy of law. Some consider that the character of law’s authority is a matter for descriptive analysis fixed by semantic and logical constraints of official language and traditions of argument. Others maintain that such analysis is impossible or indeterminate, and that we are therefore driven to normative arguments about what legal authority should be. Crudely put, they think that we should understand law to claim only the sort of authority it would be justifiable for law to have. Such is the motivation for Friedrich Hayek’s suggestion that ‘The ideal type of law ... provides merely additional information to be taken into account in the decision of the actor’ (Hayek 1960, 150). Hayek favours the free market, and concludes that the nature of legal authority should be understood analogically. The most radical position of this sort is Ronald Dworkin’s. He prefers what he calls a “more relaxed” understanding of legal authority (Dworkin 1986: 429). Others have argued that the pre-emptive notion of authority is unsatisfactory because it is too rigid (e.g., Perry 1989). Dworkin’s objection runs much deeper. His position is not that law communicates only a weaker form of guidance; it is that law is not to be understood as trying to communicate anything at all. A subject considering his legal duties is not listening to the law; he is engaged in “a conversation with oneself,” and is “trying to discover his own intention in maintaining and participating in that practice” (Dworkin 1986, 58). On this view there is no fact of

the matter about what law claims that is independent of what each does well to regard it as claiming.

However we resolve the methodological question, there are two parallel normative questions:

- The problem of obligation: What if anything justifies the duty to obey the law, and how far does that obedience properly extend?
- The problem of legitimacy: What if anything justifies the coercive power of law, and how far may that power properly extend?

What is the relationship between these? Some maintain that obligation comes first: “[T]hough obligation is not a sufficient condition for coercion, it is close to a necessary one. A state may have good grounds in some special circumstances for coercing those who have no duty to obey. But no general policy of upholding the law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a source of genuine obligations” (Dworkin 1986, 191). The idea is that merely having justice on one's side is an inadequate ground for coercing others; one also needs a special title flowing from the moral status of the law. (Contrast, for example, Locke's view that everyone has an “executive power of the law of nature,” at least outside political society (§ 13).)

Others contend that this gets the relationship backwards. First, it is doubtful whether one could have an obligation to obey an illegitimate regime. As Rawls says, “[A]cquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations”. If so, at least some conditions of legitimacy precede an obligation of obedience. Second, there are substantive reasons for thinking we would not have obligations to obey if the law were not already justified in upholding its requirements “with steel.” A legal system that could not justifiably coerce could not assure the law-abiding that the recalcitrant will not take them for suckers. Without being able to solve this assurance problem it would be unjust to impose obligations on them, and unjust to demand their obedience. Underlying this suggestion is that idea that effectiveness is a necessary—but certainly not sufficient—condition for justified authority.

### **3. Obligations to the Law**

It may affirm our confidence in the obligation-correlative view to know that from earliest times philosophical reflection on political authority has focussed on the obligation to obey. The passive obligation of obedience is certainly not all we owe the law (Parekh 1993, 243; Green 2003, 543–47) but many have taken it to be law's minimum demand. This gives rise to a puzzle. As Wolff puts it: “If the individual retains his autonomy by reserving to himself in each instance the final decision whether to co-operate, he thereby denies the authority of the state; if, on the other hand, he submits to the state and accepts its claim to authority then... he loses his autonomy”. Wolff resolves the dilemma in favour of autonomy, and on that basis defends anarchism.

Some of Wolff's worries flow from the “surrender of judgement” itself—how can it ever be rational to act against reason as one sees it? Others flow from the fact that it is a surrender to the law. On the first point, it is relevant to notice that promises and contracts also involve surrender of judgement and a kind of deference to others, yet a rational anarchist needs such voluntary commitments to substitute for authoritative ordering. A principled objection to every surrender of judgement is thus self-defeating. Moreover, there seem to be cases in which by surrendering judgement on some matters one can secure more time and resources for reflection and decision on things

that are more important, or with respect to which one has greater capacity for self-direction. A partial surrender of judgment may therefore enhance the agent's autonomy overall.

This suggests that Wolff's concern is better understood as scepticism about whether it is justifiable to surrender one's judgment wholesale to the law. Some philosophers have queried the intelligibility of this doubt; they say that it is of the nature of law that there is an obligation to obey it, at least in its central case. Some go so far as to conclude that it is therefore absurd to ask for any ground of the duty to obey the law: law is that which is to be obeyed (McPherson 1967, 64). We need a way into this circle, and the best entrance is in specifying the nature of law in a way compatible with various theories of its nature. Three features are especially important (drawing on Hart 1994, 193–200; Raz 1990, 149–54; and Lyons 1984, 66–68.) First, law is institutionalized: nothing is law that is not connected with the activities of institutions such as legislatures, courts, administrators, police, etc. Second, legal systems have a wide scope. Law not limited to the affairs of small face-to-face groups such as families or clans, nor does it only attend to a restricted domain of life such as baseball. Law governs open-ended domains of large, loosely structured groups of strangers and it regulates their most urgent interests: life, liberty, property, kinship, etc. But although law necessarily deals with moral matters, it does not necessarily do so well, and this is its third central feature: law is morally fallible. This is acknowledged by both positivists and natural lawyers, whose slogan “an unjust law is not a law” was never intended to assert the infallibility of law.

The question of political obligation, then, turns on whether there are moral reasons to obey the mandatory requirements of a wide-ranging, morally fallible, institutionalized authority. This obligation purports to be comprehensive in that it covers all legal obligations and everyone whose compliance the law requires. It is not assumed to bind come what may, though it is to be one genuine obligation among others. Some philosophers also consider that it should bind people particularly to their own states, i.e., the states of which they are residents or citizens, and that an argument that could not show that one had more stringent duties to obey one's own country than a similarly just foreign one would be in that measure deficient (Simmons 1979, 31–35; Green 1988, 227–28). Finally, it is common ground the obligation exists only when a threshold condition of justice is met.

## **Legal Validity**

Legal validity governs the enforceability of law, and the standard of legal validity enhances or restricts the ability of the political ruler to enforce his will through legal coercion. Western law adopts three competing standards of legal validity. Each standard emphasizes a different dimension of law (Berman 1988, p. 779), and each has its own school of jurisprudence.

Legal positivism emphasizes law's political dimension. Legal positivism recognizes political rulers as the only source of valid law and adopts the will of the political ruler as its validity standard. Leading legal positivists include Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and H.L.A. Hart.

Natural law theory emphasizes law's moral dimension. Natural law theory recognizes universal moral principles as the primary source of valid law. These moral principles provide a standard of legal validity that imposes moral limits on the ruler's coercive powers. Leading natural law theorists include Aristotle, Cicero, Justinian, and Thomas Aquinas.

The historicist school emphasizes law's historical dimension. The historicist school recognizes legal custom as the primary source of valid law. Legal custom provides a standard of legal validity that imposes customary limits on the political ruler's coercive powers. Leading historicists in-

clude Sir Edward Coke, John Selden, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone.

Legal positivism recognizes positive law as the only real law and rejects law's moral and historical dimensions as sources of valid laws. Natural law theory and the historicist school, on the other hand, often integrate law's three dimensions. They recognize each dimension as a potential source of valid law but emphasize a particular dimension through their validity standard. Blackstone's unique jurisprudence adopts two validity standards, one from law's historical dimension, and one from law's moral dimension.

Standards of legal validity are historically cyclical. A society typically adopts a standard of legal validity based on moral principles, custom, or both. This validity standard restricts the ruler's ability to enforce his will through legal coercion. Then, intellectual challenges to moral principles and legal custom minimize their esteem. A new validity standard is adopted based on the will of the political ruler. Abuses of coercive powers by political rulers eventually stimulate renewed restrictions on those powers. The society adopts a revived standard of legal validity based on moral principles, custom, or both. The revived validity standard will typically endure until the memory of abuse fades, when the cycle begins again.

This cycle began with Hesiod in 700 B. C. E. and continued into the 21st Century. In common law jurisprudence, judicial acceptance of Hart's legal positivism eroded Blackstone's validity standards based on moral principles and custom. In civil law jurisprudence, Soviet and Nazi abuses of positivist legal systems revived validity standards based on moral principles.

## **The Sophists**

The first standard of legal validity in the Western legal tradition appears in Hesiod's religious poem *Works and Days*, circa 700 B. C. E. Hesiod presents an archetypal jurisprudence that integrates law's three dimensions. Dikê, the goddess of human justice, personifies law's moral dimension. Dikê's father Zeus personifies law's political dimension. Dikê's mother Thetis, the Titan embodiment of custom and social order, personifies law's historical dimension.

Justice "sets the laws straight with righteousness" and distinguishes men from beasts. Divinely decreed moral principles establish the validity standard for human law and customs, and conforming laws and customs establish the *nomoi* (law). Just men obey the *nomoi*, and obedience brings peace and prosperity. Disobedience brings punishment to the individual and his city through famine, plague, infertility, and military disaster.

The Sophists, wandering teachers of the fifth century B. C. E., challenged Greek conventions in religion, morality, and political conduct. They rejected Hesiod's moral dimension by rejecting the existence of divine lawgivers and universal moral principles. They rejected Hesiod's historical dimension by denying any normative authority to custom. Might was right, and law functioned only in the political dimension as the will of the strongest.

The Sophist Protagoras of Abdera (b. circa 481 B. C. E.), rejected law's moral dimension. As an agnostic, Protagoras rejected the divine lawgiver. As a moral relativist, Protagoras rejected the existence of universal moral principles. Unlike later Sophists, however, Protagoras accepted the validity of custom in law's historical dimension.

Protagoras based his moral relativism on the argument that a shared factual knowledge of the world is impossible. The foundation of Protagoras' relativism is the "man-measure" of the *Aletheia* (Truth). "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that

they are not.”

Sense perception forms the basis of all knowledge, Protagoras believed, and every sense impression that a person receives is securely true. The data of sense perception, however, are private, subjective states. The wind is truly warm to the man who perceives it as warm, but the same wind is truly cold to the man who perceives it as cold. Perceived objects therefore have contradictory properties and there are no public facts.

Protagoras maintained that all knowledge claims are thus equally true. Furthermore, their truth endures regardless of conflicting claims. Protagoras therefore claimed “it is equally possible to affirm and deny anything of anything.”

Protagoras extended his doctrine that all knowledge claims are equally true to claim that all virtue claims are equally true. Virtue claims are relative to the claimant because virtue is only another form of knowledge. (Plato, *Protagoras*, 323a-328d). There are no universal moral principles, and law’s moral dimension does not exist.

Although Protagoras rejected law’s moral dimension, he embraced law’s historical dimension. Although all knowledge and virtue claims are equally true, Protagoras argued they are not all equally sound. Only the ignorant equated truth with soundness. One set of thoughts can therefore be “better than another, but not in any way truer.” The same is true of laws. All laws are equally true, but not all laws are equally sound.

Protagoras accepted a duty to obey the law. Since no moral or legal code is truer than any other, no individual should assert his moral or legal judgments over those advanced by the state. Society is required to preserve humanity. The perpetuation of society, in turn, requires respect for law and custom. Men should obey the state’s laws and customs so long as they function soundly.

The Sophist Callicles (b. circa 484 B. C. E.), rejected law’s historical dimension and denied any duty to obey the law. Using “nature” to mean the antithesis of mind, Callicles argued that nature’s normative authority (*physis*) supersedes the normative authority of man’s laws and customs (*nomoi*). Man’s laws and customs violate “nature’s own law” and “natural justice.” Nature’s law, not man’s, should govern our actions.

Callicles said that what men call “right” merely expresses what men believe to be to their advantage. Legal conventions in democracies wrongfully elevate the weak over the strong. The majority of weaker folk frame the laws for their advantage to prevent the stronger from gaining advantage over them. The true nature of right is established by nature, not men, and nature’s law establishes right in the strong.

Natural justice provides that the better and wiser man should rule over and have more than the inferior. Might, therefore, makes right. All animals and races of man recognize right as the sovereignty and advantage of the stronger over the weaker.

The Sophist Thrasymachus (b. circa 459 B. C. E.) argued for disobeying laws and customs. Defining justice as obedience to the laws, Thrasymachus argues that justice is nothing but the advantage of the stronger. Obedience furthers the advantage of others and reduces the obedient to a form of slavery. Only disobedience to law profits a man and leads to his advantage. Injustice is therefore “a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice.”

Solon's constitution created an archetypal positivist legal system in Athens in 594 B. C. E. Solon reposed political and judicial authority in the heliastic courts. The courts enforced undefined laws with no standard of legal validity other than the unrestrained will of the jurors. Pericles' introduction of payments for jurors in 451 B. C. E. enthroned Athens' poorest and least educated class as dikasts in the heliastic courts. The Athenian courts became infamous for injustice and gullibility. Xenophon writes that Athenian courts often acted on emotion to put innocent men to death and acquit wrongdoers. Eighty dikasts who found Socrates innocent voted for his death.

Athenian ostracism (ostrakismos) permitted the conviction, exile, and execution of any Athenian without charges, hearing, or defense. Originally intended for removing tyrants, Plutarch records that ostracism quickly became a way of pacifying jealousy of the eminent. Ostracism breathed out malice in exile and death. Everyone was liable to it whose reputation, birth, or eloquence rose above the common level.

Athens ostracized its greatest heroes from envy of their honors. Athens ostracized Aristides, the hero of the Battle of Marathon, in 483 B. C. E. Athens ostracized Themistocles, savior of Athens at the Battle of Salamis, in 471 B. C. E. Both men were exiled for ten years without charges or a hearing.

Lack of procedural safeguards encouraged frivolous public prosecutions (graphai) and impeachments (eisangeliai), giving free reign to Athens' gullible and imprudent dikasts. Frivolous political prosecutions destroyed Athens' leadership, spawning bloody regime changes and military disasters. The frivolous prosecution of Pericles in 443 B. C. E. precipitated the Peloponnesian War with Sparta. The frivolous prosecution of Alcibiades in 415 B. C. E. caused Athens' ablest general to switch sides and lead Sparta against Athens.

The greatest ignominy involves the Arginusae generals in 404 B. C. E. Six Athenian naval commanders won a great naval victory against Sparta at Arginusae. A violent storm prevented their recovering the dead and shipwrecked. The generals were nevertheless impeached and executed for failing to do so. Deprived of her best generals, Athens lost the war the next year in a devastating naval defeat at Aegospotami.

Political prosecutions wreaked political havoc as well. Five regime changes rocked Athens between 411 B. C. E. and 403 B. C. E. These regimes included the reign of terror by the Thirty Tyrants in 404 B. C. E.

Athenian positivism criminalized thought and expression in frivolous prosecutions against philosophers. Anaxagoras circa 430 B. C. E., Protagoras circa 415 B. C. E., and Socrates in 399 B. C. E. were all convicted on manufactured charges of impiety (asebeia). Impiety was undefined by Athenian law. Every juror defined it anew in every case as he pleased.

Athens often regretted its decisions. Socrates' lead accuser Anytus was stoned for his role in Socrates' death. Athens honored Socrates with a bronze statue by Lysippus. Athens thus gained "the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next."

## **Plato**

Plato described Socrates as the bravest, wisest, and most upright man of his time. Plato planned a

career in politics but “withdrew in disgust” after observing how Athenian courts “corrupted the written laws and customs.” (Plato, Letter VII, 325a-c). Plato reacted to Socrates’ death by repudiating the Sophists, reviving law’s moral and historical dimensions, and formulating a natural law standard of legal validity based on principles of universal justice.

Plato begins his revival of law’s historical dimension by emphasizing the autonomy of law, which he considered the most important aspect of government. Autonomous laws wield supremacy over political rulers. Political rulers are subject to the same laws as other citizens, and they may not alter the laws to suit their will. Plato wrote that the preservation or ruin of a community depends on the autonomy of laws more than anything else. Respecting law’s autonomy preserves the entire community. Disregarding it brings destruction. Autonomy is so important that “the man who is most perfect in obedience to established law” should receive the highest post in government. The second most obedient man should receive the second highest post, and so on for all the posts.

Plato begins his revival of law’s moral dimension by persuasively refuting Protagoras’ moral relativism in the *Theaetetus*. Protagoras claimed that all sense perceptions are equally true. Since knowledge is perception, all knowledge claims are equally true. Since moral claims are a species of knowledge claims, all moral claims are equally true. Therefore, no one set of moral principles has authority to guide the laws.

Plato offers eleven objections to Protagoras’ arguments in the *Theaetetus*. Three are recounted here. First, Plato denies that knowledge is perception. If knowledge were perception, we would understand anyone speaking to us in a foreign tongue. This is clearly not the case. Second, remembered knowledge refutes Protagoras’ claim that knowledge is perception. Remembered knowledge involves no perception, but it is knowledge nonetheless.

Third, moral relativism is self-refuting. Assume, as Protagoras claims, that “all beliefs are true.” Assume also that another man exists who believes that “not all beliefs are true.” If Protagoras is correct, then the second man’s belief must be true. Protagoras’ belief that “all beliefs are true” is thus refuted.

Plato continues his revival of law’s moral and historical dimensions in the *Crito*. The *Crito* considers whether a duty exists to obey the law. Socrates’ friend Crito argues for Socrates to escape and avoid his unjust execution.

Socrates replies that the soul is more precious than the body. Good actions benefit our souls, but wrong actions mutilate them. The important thing is not living, but living well. This means living honorably. Socrates utilizes three principles in determining whether to escape. First, circumstances never justify wrong action. Second, one should not injure others, even when they injure you. Third, one “ought to honor one’s agreements, provided they are right.”

Plato defines law’s moral dimension through these principles. Justinian’s *Corpus Juris Civilis* defines its moral dimension by these same principles in the sixth century. (Justinian, *Digest*, 1.1.10). Blackstone’s *Commentaries* does the same in the eighteenth century.

Plato next refutes Thrasymachus’ claim in the *Republic* that disobeying the law “is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing” than obeying the law. In the *Crito*’s “Speech of the Laws,” the Laws present two arguments for obedience. The first is the “argument from agreement.” Socrates has undertaken to live his life in obedience to Athens’ laws. Athens did not force Socrates to live in its precincts. Socrates was free to leave at any time. By choosing to stay in Athens with full

knowledge of how the laws functioned, Socrates promised obedience to the laws.

The Laws' orders are "in the form of proposals, not savage commands." Socrates can either obey the Laws or persuade (the personification of) the Law that they are at fault. If Socrates escapes without persuading the personification of the Laws that they were at fault, he would dishonor his agreement to obey the laws. Dishonoring a just agreement violates the ethic of "living well" and damages the soul.

The Laws' second argument is the "argument from injury." Disobedience destroys both the Laws and the city, which cannot exist if legal judgments are ignored. Socrates concludes that "both in war and in the law courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and your country command, or else persuade them in accordance with universal justice" that they are at fault.

The Laws' second argument implies a natural law standard of validity based on principles of universal justice. The Laws insist they operate as "proposals, not savage commands." Socrates' duty to obey the Laws is contingent on the Laws' compliance with principles of universal justice. By implication, there is no duty to obey the Laws if they violate principles of universal justice.

## **Aristotle**

Aristotle designs his legal philosophy to avoid the catastrophes described in his Athenian Constitution. Aristotle accepts the necessity of law's political dimension because laws cannot enforce themselves. Nevertheless, the Athenian legal history proves the political dimension is not sufficient to preserve a society or achieve its happiness.

Human nature demands more than political power from law. Law must accomplish justice and foster virtue. Justice is required to prevent revolution, and virtue is required for human happiness. Man separated from justice is "the worst of animals," and man without virtue "is the most unholy and the most savage of animals."

Aristotle writes in the Politics that securing justice is the state's most important function. Justice is more essential to the state than providing the necessities of life. Governments must be founded on justice to endure. Governments that rule unjustly and give unequal treatment to similarly placed subjects provoke revolutions. Justice maintained, however, forms a bond between the members of society that preserves the state. (Aristotle, Politics 1328b, 1332b, 1253a). Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics defines justice as lawfulness concerned with the common advantage and happiness of the political community. Aristotle distinguishes between legal justice (to nomikon dikaion) and natural justice (physikon dikaion). Legal justice involves positive laws and custom enacted by man, such as conventional measures for grain and wine. These "are just not by nature but by human enactment" and "are not everywhere the same." Aristotle secures legal justice by granting autonomy to law and by utilizing custom to encourage obedience.

Natural justice, on the other hand, involves principles of natural law that originate in nature. Such principles do not arise in the minds of men "by people's thinking this or that." Natural law principles apply with equal force everywhere, just as fire burns both in Greece and in Persia. Aristotle secures natural justice by adopting natural law precepts as the standard of legal validity. Positive laws that violate natural law precepts are nullified.

Aristotle secures legal justice by restricting the will of the political ruler through autonomous laws. The Politics teaches that unrestrained power produces tyranny, even in democracies. Aristotle considers whether societies function best under the "rule of men" or the "rule of law." He con-

cludes that laws, when good, should be supreme. Political rulers should merely complement the law by acting as its guardians and ministers. They should only regulate those matters on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars. Aristotle gives four reasons for emphasizing law's autonomy over the will of the political ruler. First, law frees the state from the desires and passions that afflict political rulers. "The law is reason unaffected by desire. Desire ... is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men." (Aristotle, *Politics*, 1287a). Second, tyranny results when political rulers exercise autonomy over law, even in democracies. Third, the orderly rotation of political offices requires autonomous laws. Equality, liberty, justice, and expediency mandate that every mature citizen participates in governing the state. Fourth, the orderly rotation of political offices preserves the state by assuring evenhanded administration by magistrates.

Aristotle utilizes law's historical dimension to secure legal justice through custom. Aristotle uses the term *nomos* for law, and *nomos* includes custom and convention as components of the social norm. Aristotle writes in the *Politics* that legal custom is itself a form of justice. Custom and convention maintain social stability by encouraging obedience to the law. The law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time. Aristotle urges caution in changing the law because changes enfeeble the power of the law. If the advantage of a change is small, it is wiser to leave errors in the law. The citizens usually lose more by the habit of disobedience than they gain by changing the law.

Aristotle utilizes law's moral dimension to secure natural justice in two ways. The first is by nullifying positive laws that subvert natural law precepts. Aristotle formulates a natural law standard of legal validity. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* describes natural law as an unwritten law, based on nature, and common to all people. "There is in nature a common principle of the just and unjust that all people in some way divine."

Natural law provides immutable and universal standards of justice. Natural law constitutes a separate body of binding law that exceeds positive law in authority. Human actions should complete nature rather than subvert it, and natural law nullifies positive laws that subvert natural law precepts.

Like Plato, Aristotle argues that the universal standards of natural law justify disobeying positive laws. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* provides two examples invalidating positive law for violating natural law precepts. The first is the case of Sophocles' *Antigone*, where Antigone disobeys Creon's order and provides funeral rites to her brother Polyneices. The second is Aristotle's guide to jury nullification of written law by appealing to higher principles of natural law.

Aristotle never explains why natural law wields supremacy over positive law. The supremacy of natural law is consistent, however, with Aristotle's view in the *Physics* that the ultimate causes of nature are divine.

The second way that Aristotle secures natural justice is by fostering virtue. Aristotle believed that human happiness depended on virtue more than liberty. The government is thus responsible for producing a virtuous state, and this is best accomplished through law. Although virtue encompasses more than mere conformity to law, virtue will only develop and flourish in a state that supports the legal enforcement of virtue. The state must provide moral education through its laws to make its citizens just and good. Failing to do so undermines the state's political system and harms its citizens.

## Cicero

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B. C. E.) was a politician, philosopher, orator, and attorney. Cicero's *De Legibus* (The Laws), *De Officiis* (On Duties), and *De Re Publica* (The Republic) greatly influence the natural law tradition. Cicero esteemed Plato and Aristotle. Although not a Stoic, Cicero adopted Stoicism's divine Nature as the source of natural law precepts that dictate legal validity. The histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius persuaded Cicero that natural law imposes justice on human events.

Cicero's signature contribution to jurisprudence is his explication of Nature as divine lawgiver. Law and justice originate in Nature as a divinely ordained set of universal moral principles. Cicero describes Nature as the omnipotent ruler of the universe, the omnipresent observer of every individual's intentions and actions, and the common master of all people. Belief in divine Nature stabilizes society, encourages obedience to law, and leads to individual virtue.

Law's moral dimension dominates Cicero's jurisprudence. Cicero defines natural law as perfect reason in commanding and prohibiting. These principles are the sole source of justice and provide the sole standard of legal validity. "True law is right reason in agreement with Nature."

The precepts of natural law are eternal and immutable. They apply universally at all places, at all times, and to all people. Natural law summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. Nature serves as the enforcing judge of natural law precepts, and Nature's punishment for violating natural law precepts is inescapable. (Cicero, *De Re Publica*, 3.33).

Natural law provides the *naturae norma*, the standard of legal validity for positive law and custom. The *naturae norma* provides the only means for separating good provisions from bad. Justice entails that laws and customs comply with the *naturae norma* and preserve the peace, happiness, and safety of the state and its citizens. Positive laws and customs that fail to do so are not regarded as laws at all.

Regarding Cicero's political dimension of law, the magistrate's limited role is to govern and to issue orders that are just and advantageous in keeping with the laws. Although the magistrate has some control of the people, the laws are fully in control of the magistrate. An official is the speaking law, and the law is a nonspeaking official.

Political rulers cannot alter, repeal, or abolish natural law precepts. Furthermore, political rulers have no role in interpreting or explaining natural law precepts. Every man can discern the precepts of natural law for himself through reason.

Political rulers must issue just commands as measured by natural law precepts. Individuals are protected against unjust coercion. Although rulers may use sanctions to enforce legitimate commands, every affected subject has the right to appeal to the people before enforcement of any sanction. Furthermore, no ruler can issue commands concerning single individuals. Any significant sanction against an individual, such as execution or loss of citizenship, is reserved to the highest assembly of the people. As a further protection, all laws must be officially recorded by the censors.

Like Aristotle, Cicero requires that magistrates be subject to the power of others. Successive terms are forbidden, and ten years must pass before the magistrate becomes eligible for the same office. Every magistrate leaving office must submit an account of his official acts to the censors. Misconduct is subject to prosecution. No magistrate may give or receive any gifts while seeking or holding office, or after the conclusion of his term.

Regarding Cicero's historical dimension of law, Cicero agrees with Aristotle that custom maintains social stability by encouraging obedience to law. Custom can even achieve immortality for the commonwealth. The commonwealth will be eternal if citizens conduct their lives in accordance with ancestral laws and customs.

### **Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis**

The Corpus Juris Civilis (Body of Civil Law) codified Roman law pursuant to the decree of Justinian I. Completed in A.D. 529, the four works of the Corpus became the sole legal authorities in the empire. The Institutes was a law school text. The Codex contained statutes dating from A.D. 426. The Digest contained commentaries by leading jurists, and the New Laws was supplemented as new laws became necessary.

The Corpus is the direct ancestor of modern Western civil law systems. Its influence on canon law is seen in the medieval maxim *Ecclesia vivit lege romana* (the Church lives on Roman law). Common law jurisprudence never accepted the Corpus as binding authority. Nevertheless, its twelfth century revival profoundly influenced the formation of common law jurisprudence through the works of the father of the common law, Henry de Bracton.

The Corpus divides law into public law involving state interests and private law governing individuals. Private law is a mixture of natural law, the law of nations, and municipal law. The Corpus establishes a clear hierarchy among law's three dimensions. The moral dimension occupies the highest position and provides the standard of legal validity. The historical dimension of legal custom occupies the second position, and the political dimension of Roman municipal law occupies the lowest position.

The Corpus' moral dimension resides in two bodies of law, natural law and the law of nations. Like Cicero, the Corpus originates natural law in a divine lawgiver. "The laws of nature, which are observed by all nations alike, are established by divine providence." The precepts of natural law are universal, eternal, and immutable.

Natural law governs all land, air, and sea creatures, including man. "The law of nature is that which she has taught all animals; a law not peculiar to the human race, but shared by all living creatures." The Corpus extends natural law to "all living creatures" to repudiate the Sophist arguments that law is merely a human convention with no basis in nature, justice does not exist, and there is no duty to obey law. The Corpus' rebuttal focuses on the highly socialized behavior of such animal species as ants, bees, and birds. Although animals cannot legislate or form social conventions, they nevertheless follow norms of behavior. These norms affirm the existence of natural law.

The Institutes and the Digest state three precepts of natural law: "Honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere." Live honorably, injure no one, and give every man his due. . These precepts track the Crito's admonishments to live well, harm no one, and honor agreements so long as they are honorable. Blackstone's Commentaries adopts these exact precepts.

The law of nations is the portion of natural law that governs relations between human beings. (Justinian, Digest, 1.4). Its rules are "prescribed by natural reason for all men" and "observed by all peoples alike." The law of nations is the source of duties to God, one's parents, and one's country. It recognizes human rights to life, liberty, and self-defense, and its recognition of property rights enables contracts and commerce between peoples.

The precepts of natural law provide the standard for legal validity. This standard voids any right or

duty violating natural law precepts. The Institutes provides illustrative examples: Contracts created for immoral purposes, such as carrying out a homicide or a sacrilege, are not enforceable. (Justinian, Institutes, 3.19.24). Immorality invalidates wrongful profits. Anyone profiting from wrongful dominion over another's property must disgorge those profits. (Justinian, Digest, 5.3.52).

Immorality invalidates agency relationships. Agents are not obliged to carry out immoral instructions from their principals. If they do, they are not entitled to indemnity from their principals for any liability the agents incur. (Justinian, Institutes, 3.26.7). Immorality even invalidates bequests and legacies if the bequest is contingent upon immoral conduct. (Justinian, Institutes, 2.20.36). The Corpus' historical dimension provides custom as a source of enforceable law. The Corpus defines legal custom as the tacit consent of a people established by long-continued habit. Since custom evidences the consent of the people, it is a higher source of law than positive or statutory law. Statutory provisions, if customarily ignored, are treated like repealed legislation. (Justinian, Digest, 1.1.3). Legal custom establishes the autonomy of law over political rulers. Custom binds judges. A judge's first duty is "to not judge contrary to statutes, the imperial laws, and custom." Legal custom even controls statutory interpretation. "Custom is the best interpreter of statutes."

The Corpus' political dimension resides in its six categories of Roman municipal law, the "statutes, plebiscites, senatusconsults, enactments of the Emperors, edicts of the magistrates, and answers of those learned in the law." In contrast to natural law and the law of nations, Roman municipal law was unique to Rome. Its provisions were also "subject to frequent change, either by the tacit consent of the people, or by the subsequent enactment of another statute."

## **Philosophical Counseling: Managing everyday problems**

**The Basic Premise**  
Our ways of thinking influence our ways of feeling, desiring, choosing, acting, creating, relating, and being in the world. But most of the time we don't even notice our patterns of thinking. They run on auto-pilot, fueled by old habits and operating assumptions. If we could slow down and reflect on our ways of thinking, we might better understand our orientation on the world, and have a chance to ask questions about it, find out how it serves us, and how it trips us up at times. If we could examine our ways of thinking, we might cultivate greater clarity, coherence, breadth and depth in our worldview. This worldview can have a big impact on our future actions, reactions, and general experience of life. If we can learn how to apply a worldview that we've developed carefully and reflectively to our actions in a deliberate way, we can live with a much greater sense of empowerment and authenticity.

A regular practice of self-examination and deliberate action – the cornerstone of a philosophical life, and the very thing we pursue together in philosophical counseling – has the power to increase our sense of understanding, meaning, purpose, freedom, and fulfillment in our lives. It also has the power to transform many of the emotional culprits that cause us suffering – fear, dread, angst, anger, sadness, excessive attachment, jealousy, resentment, and guilt.

Philosophical counseling is, thus, a process that is educative, empowering, and therapeutic.

## **What do we do in Philosophical Counseling?**

In philosophical counseling, we embark on an inquiry into your life.

Philosophical counseling is a collaborative and conversational activity between a trained philosopher and a client in which the client's life-problems are worked through by identifying, examining,

and revising as necessary the operating beliefs, values, and habits of action that in form those problems.

- (1) The process of identifying the client's implicit "truths" and values, and making them explicit, improves self-awareness and puts the client in a position to clarify and critically examine the fundamental principles that have been guiding their lives.
- (2) The process of critically examining the client's core truths and values helps them to analyze the reasons and evidence that support their beliefs, discover the strengths and weaknesses as well as the benefits and challenges of their ways of thinking, and compare them with alternative perspectives. It also helps them to become aware of inconsistencies between beliefs, and conflicts between beliefs and habits of action (what they say and do). These revelations help the client to become aware of instances in which they might be working at cross-purposes with themselves.
- (3) The revision stage is one of creative re-building, in which the client's core truths and values shift, expand, and sharpen, with the consideration of various perspectives from philosophical wisdom traditions. It is also a stage of application, in which the client experiments with putting new ideas into practice, and works to direct their actions, relationships, and ways of communicating with intentional choice.

In counseling, the three stages tend to move in a circular manner, rather than a linear one. As new insights emerge, it can be valuable to circle back to earlier stages with new ideas for deeper examination.

The ultimate goal of philosophical counseling is to help the client to conduct an inquiry into their own life, to develop their own coherent, empowered, and fulfilling philosophy of life, and to live it! Minimally, what a client can expect to get out of philosophical counseling is greater self-knowledge and understanding of their own problems. Maximally, they can become empowered to solve those problems, relieve suffering, and create greater fulfillment in their lives.

### **The Role of the Philosophical Counselor**

A philosophical counselor approaches their client as a fully functioning individual with the courage to deal with the perplexities and struggles central to the human condition. A philosophical counselor does not diagnose or treat emotional or behavioral disorders, and if problems arise of a medical nature, the philosophical counselor will help the client to seek an appropriate health care professional. A philosophical counselor works collaboratively with their client to solve life-problems by activating and cultivating the powers the client already possesses – like critical thinking, imagination, empathy, desire, self-discipline, and creativity. A philosophical counselor acts as a navigation partner on the client's own journey to gain awareness, find direction, create solutions, and develop a fulfilling life.

The philosophical counselor does not tell the client what to think or what to do, but instead asks questions, uses tools of critical examination, offers fresh perspectives, draws connections, and gives encouragement. Most importantly, a philosophical counselor listens carefully to their client, works to understand the client's problems and their operating worldview, and works with the client to develop a coherent philosophy of life that will serve their own well-being.

## **An old role**

It may seem that philosophical counseling is a new invention. Actually, it is as old as philosophy itself. The Ancient Greeks – Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans – saw philosophy as not only an educational activity, but as a kind of therapy for the soul that eased suffering, developed personal integrity, encouraged self-mastery, created justice, and cultivated the good life. Even in the era of academic philosophy, this ancient vision of philosophy has survived in the philosophical traditions of ethics, political philosophy, existentialism, pragmatism, feminism, and hermeneutics (among others). Modern day philosophical counselors revive the ancient art of philosophy, and put it to work in a one-on-one setting.

## **What kinds of problems are philosophical problems?**

We might wonder whether or not we've got any philosophical problems. Most of the time we characterize our problems in terms of a particular relationship we're struggling with, a big life change, or a feeling of sadness, loss, confusion, loneliness, frustration, powerlessness, burn-out, or worry. But, quite often these very problems are signs of broader philosophical problems that deserve attention.

Common philosophical problems include questions or difficulties with:

- Core beliefs and truths
- Critical thinking and questioning assumptions
- Creative thinking and trying out alternative perspectives
- Clear reasoning and consistency
- Ethics and values
- Meaning, purpose, and fulfillment
- Happiness
- Identity, self-discovery, self-improvement
- Change, loss, death
- Moderating emotional life
- Existential Angst
- Alienation
- Self-discipline
- Decision Making
- Power and Justice
- Communication and relationships
- Conflict resolution
- Freedom, responsibility, and self-determination
- Authenticity

It's important to recognize that not all life-problems are medical in nature. Not every instance of struggle, suffering, or unhappiness is a sign of a mental illness. There are times when it is appropriate to seek a health care professional with training in psychology for treatment of an emotional or behavioral disorder. There are instances in which a problem in one's brain-chemistry exists and it is appropriate to get the help of a psychiatrist who can prescribe medication. But when problems are not medical in nature, one needs a different kind of counsel.

Sometimes non-medical problems are narrow in scope, requiring legal, financial, business, or aca-

demic counsel. And sometimes the problems are more general, at their root having to do with questions like:

- What's true?
- What's right?
- What's good?
- What should I care about most?
- What are my responsibilities?
- What does it all mean?
- What should I do?
- Who am I, and who do I want to be?
- How do I fit into the bigger world?
- Why am I here?
- How can I best relate with others?
- How can I best deal with change?
- How should I live?
- How can I take better control of my life?
- How can I be happy?
- and how can I come to know the answers to any of these questions and cope with uncertainty about them?

These are classic questions of philosophy. Most everyday problems dealing with ethics, values, meaning, purpose, truth, certainty, justice, power, freedom, and happiness are not medical in nature and cannot be resolved with medical intervention. They are best approached through philosophical dialogue.

### **Differences between philosophical dialogue and psychotherapy**

Philosophical dialogue is a unique kind of dialogue. In it, we take our time to slowly and thoroughly clarify the meaning of our terms, examine lines of reasoning with critical thinking tools, compare our ways of thinking with other perspectives and worldviews, and consider the relationship between our ways of thinking and our ways of feeling, choosing, communicating, and acting. Unlike psychotherapy, philosophical dialogue is not diagnostic. A philosopher does not treat their interlocutor as a patient, nor assume that there is a disorder or illness present (beyond the challenges with the human condition that we all face). A philosopher does not presume causal explanations for their interlocutor's behaviors, feelings, or thoughts: He or she does not view their interlocutor as one who is "determined" to feel, act, or think in a certain way because of internal or external conditions.

Whereas many psychotherapists tend to approach problems by focusing on their interlocutor's emotional life, eliciting affect, tracing a personal history of trauma, and identifying childhood origins of current difficulties (a retrospective approach focused heavily on emotion); philosophical counselors approach ways of feeling as a starting point for understanding and examining our ways of thinking, our world views, judgments, and values, which influence the way we experience the world and the choices we make. Philosophical counselors work to elicit reasons and evidence for the ways one thinks, ask questions about what is true, good, and fair, open up different perspec-

tives for discussion, and help their clients to consider their future trajectory and range of possibilities (a prospective approach connecting thinking, feeling, and choosing).

Philosophical counselors also consider the ways in which one's personal history takes place within a wider context of social-political structures. There are times when one's distress has much to do with the power relations in which one exists or the state of injustice in the world, and the remedy is not so much about turning inward and learning to adapt to that injustice, but learning how to engage politically, and resist in active, creative, and fruitful ways that bring a sense of meaning, purpose, and agency to our lives.

There are a number of psychotherapeutic methods that are not in tension with, but have a strong kinship with philosophical approaches, as their strategies' theoretical roots can be traced back to Socratic, Stoic, Buddhist, and Existential philosophies, among others.

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**291** | **DIWAKAR EDUCATION HUB**

In summary, philosophical counseling takes a holistic approach to the thinking- feeling-choosing-doing of the individual in a social-political world, and considers the individual's powers of examination, creative exploration, and reflective choice to be vehicles of movement and change.

### **A philosopher's training**

Philosophers have a kind of training that makes them well suited for the kind of dialogue-work described above. It is probably well known that philosophers have a knack for asking questions, clarifying ideas, challenging popular opinions, drawing connections, offering fresh perspectives, and getting involved in painstakingly careful inquiries into big questions. There are some other skills philosophers have that are particularly useful in a one-on-one counseling relationship.

- Philosophers have a trained ability to understand others' worldviews, to learn them inside and out, to explain them, compare them, evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, to analyze their benefits and challenges, and to think through their concrete implications in practice.
- Philosophers have a trained ability to listen carefully for an argument in what another person says, and to identify assumptions, implicit truth claims, and implicit values. They can trace carefully another's line of reasoning, and ask the questions needed to examine it.
- Philosophers carry around with them a toolbox of well-used critical thinking tools that allow them to recognize and remedy faulty reasoning, fallacies, and contradictions.
- Philosophers have experience with uncertainty and exploring uncharted territories of thinking without a map. They are accustomed to working without a formula, and dealing creatively with open-ended questions.
- Philosophers know how to inspire learning, activate and awaken the inner philosopher in others (Socrates' gadfly effect), and empower people to think for themselves and choose reflectively.
- Philosophers know how to learn from others, take what they say seriously, interpret their meaning, and engage in an ongoing practice of self-critique and revision of their own understanding, providing a helpful model to others who are on their own philosophical journey for the first time.
- Philosophers know how to recognize relativism, nihilism, solipsism, and other "tail-spin" positions.
- Philosophers have been trained in, and can discuss, a broad array of wisdom traditions (an-

cient and modern, eastern and western). They are also experts in a few of their favorite theories, about which they have usually taught, debated publicly with other experts, and published in a deep and thorough manner.

So, here's the punchline. A philosopher can make an excellent co-traveler on your journey into the big questions of life. A philosopher can offer a unique inquiry- experience that opens up distinct dimensions of thought, and that complements and moves beyond other forms of "talk-therapy."

# MCQs

1. Ethics is a-----science.
  - a. Positive
  - b. Negative
  - c. Normative
  - d. Theoretical
  
2. is the domain of ethics that includes professional ethics and practical ethics.
  - a. Positive ethics
  - b. Applied ethics
  - c. Normative ethics
  - d. Metaethics
  
3. Analysis about the nature and status of ethical theories is the subject matter of:
  - a. Positive ethics
  - b. Applied ethics
  - c. Normative ethics
  - d. Metaethics
  
4. is the philosophical examination, from a moral standpoint, of particular issues in private and public life which are matters of moral judgment.
  - a. Positive ethics
  - b. Applied ethics
  - c. Normative ethics
  - d. Metaethics
  
5. is the method of resolving moral problems by the application of theoretical rules.
  - a. Casuistry
  - b. Analysis
  - c. Research
  - d. Heuristic
  
6. The method for jurisprudence and Applied ethics is:
  - a. Analysis
  - b. Research
  - c. Heuristic
  - d. Casuistry
  
7. In ethics Casuistry means:
  - a. Case-based analysis
  - b. Case-based reasoning

- c. Case- based investigation
  - d. Case- based explanation
8. The word casuistry derives from the Latin noun:
- a. Case
  - b. Casue
  - c. Cassu
  - d. Casus
9. Identify the ethical position which accepted casuistry as a useful method.
- a. Absolutism
  - b. Prescriptivism
  - c. Utilitarianism
  - d. None of these.
10. Who among the following criticized utilizing casuistry as a method for applied ethics?
- a. Pope Francis
  - b. G. E. Moore
  - c. C. J. S. Mill
  - d. Bentham

1-c, 2-b, 3-d, 4-b, 5-a, 6-d, 7-b, 8-d, 9-c, 10-a,

11. \_\_\_\_\_ is a branch of applied ethics that studies the philosophical, social and legal issues arising in medicine and the life sciences.
- a. Medical ethics
  - b. Bio-ethics
  - c. Legal ethics
  - d. Practical ethics
12. \_\_\_\_\_ used the term Bio-ethics to describe the relationship between the biosphere and growing human population.
- a. Fritz Jahr
  - b. Peter Singer
  - c. Van R. Potter
  - d. Sargent Shriver
13. The notion Corporate Social Responsibility is related to:
- a. Medical ethics
  - b. Business ethics
  - c. Media ethics
  - d. Bio ethics
14. Business ethics is also called:
- a. Organizational ethics

- b. Capital ethics
- c. Industrial ethics
- d. Corporate ethics

15. is the ethical theory proposed maximum happiness for maximum number.

- a. Ethical absolutism
- b. Utilitarianism
- c. Egoism
- d. Ethical Naturalism

16. The name Peter Singer is related to:

- a. Practical ethics
- b. Normative ethics
- c. Metaethics
- d. Deontology

17. Case of Roe V Wade is related to the issueof:

- a. Euthanasia
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. Abortion

18. IVF means:

- a. Intensive Fertilization
- b. Invitro Fertilization
- c. Intro fertilization
- d. In vitro Fetus

19. Identify the first IVF baby.

- a. Robert Edwards
- b. Dolly
- c. Louise Brown
- d. Roe V Wade.

20. Louis Brown was born in:

- a. 1978
- b. 1973
- c. 1975
- d. 1977 Answers 11-20

11-b, 12-c, 13-b, 14-d, 15d, 16-a, 17-d, 18-b, 19-c, 20-a,

21. Who put forward strongest argumentagainst abortion?

- a. Liberalists
- b. Feminists
- c. Consequentialists
- d. Conservatives

22. is not a divide line between fertilized egg and child according to liberalists.
- Birth
  - Viability
  - Quickening
  - Brain development
23. is the most visible possible divide line between fertilized egg and child for those who support abortion.
- Viability
  - Birth
  - Quickening
  - Consciousness
24. Which one is treated as the divided line in the Roe v. Wade case?
- Viability
  - Birth
  - Quickening
  - Consciousness
25. is the time when the mother first feels the fetus move.
- Birth
  - Viability
  - Consciousness
  - Quickening
26. 'Silent scream' is related to:
- Euthanasia
  - Surrogacy
  - Abortion
  - Cloning.
27. 'Fetus is an innocent human being'. Who favored this position?
- Liberals
  - Conservatives
  - Feminists
  - Postmodernists
28. Who wrote on liberty?
- Kant
  - J. S. Mill
  - John Rawls
  - Bentham
29. According to liberalists ----- is the real morally significant divide line between fertilized egg and child.
- Viability
  - Birth

- c. Quickening
- d. Consciousness

30. Crimes without Victims is written by:

- a. Edwin Schur
- b. J. S. Mill
- c. Peter Singer
- d. Immanuel Kant

21-d, 22-d, 23-b, 24-a, 25-d, 26-c, 27-b, 28-b, 29-d, 30-a,

31. Opponents of abortion maintain that the victim of abortion is:

- a. Woman
- b. Society
- c. Fetus
- d. Child

32. 'Woman has the right to choose what happens to her own body'. Who favored this statement?

- a. Liberalists
- b. Conservatives
- c. Feminists
- d. Postmodernists

33. Judith Jarvis Thomson is a:

- a. Liberalist
- b. Feminist
- c. Conservative
- d. Postmodernist

34. 'Pro-life' movement is related to the issue of:

- a. Euthanasia
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Abortion
- d. Cloning

35. The problem of embryo wastage is related to:

- a. Euthanasia
- b. Surrogacy
- c. IVF
- d. Cloning

36. Euthanasia means:

- a. Gentle and easy death
- b. Painless death
- c. Unexpected death
- d. Death

37. Euthanasia is popularly known as:

- a. Silent killing
  - b. Deliberate killing
  - c. Killing on willingness
  - d. Mercy killing
38. Euthanasia carried out under the request of the person killed is known as:
- a. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Voluntary euthanasia
  - c. Involuntary euthanasia
  - d. none of the above
39. Which form of euthanasia is legalized by most of the countries?
- a. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Voluntary euthanasia
  - c. Involuntary euthanasia
  - d. none of the above
40. Since 2018 ----- euthanasia is legalized in India.
- a. Active euthanasia
  - b. Involuntary euthanasia
  - c. Passive euthanasia
  - d. Nonvoluntary euthanasia

Answers 31-40

31-c, 32-c, 33-b, 34-c, 35-c, 36-a, 37-d, 38-b, 39- b, 40c,

41. India legalized passive euthanasia in:
- a. March 2018
  - b. March 2019
  - c. April 2016
  - d. April 2015
42. Identify the Greek terms which are the roots of the term Euthanasia.
- a. Eu and Thaths
  - b. Eu and Thanatos
  - c. Eu and Thanasia
  - d. Eu and Thesia.
43. Aruna Shanbaug case is related to:
- a. Abortion
  - b. Surrogacy
  - c. Pro-life
  - d. Euthanasia
44. Who filed a petition in the supreme court of India as the plea to discontinue Aruna Shanbaug's life supporting system and allow passive euthanasia to her?
- a. Judith Jarvis Thomson
  - b. Pinki Virani

- c. Edwin Schur
- d. Peter Singer

45. Identify the nation which legalized active euthanasia.

- a. India
- b. Netherlands
- c. China
- d. France

46. In India ----- is still illegal.

- a. Active euthanasia
- b. Passive euthanasia
- c. Involuntary euthanasia
- d. Nonvoluntary euthanasia

47. The book -"Bitter Chocolate: Child Sexual Abuse in India", is written by:

- a. Judith Jarvis Thomson
- b. Peter Singer
- c. Edwin Schur
- d. Pinki Virani

48. The book 'Aruna's Story' is written by:

- a. Judith Jarvis Thomson
- b. Peter Singer
- c. Edwin Schur
- d. Pinki Virani

49. Which form of Euthanasia is called as Surgeon assisted suicide?

- a. Voluntary Euthanasia
- b. Involuntary Euthanasia
- c. Non-voluntary Euthanasia
- d. Passive Euthanasia

50. The term assisted suicide is related with:

- a. Passive Euthanasia
- b. Voluntary Euthanasia
- c. Involuntary Euthanasia
- d. Non-voluntary Euthanasia

Answers 41-50  
41-a, 42-b, 43-d, 44-b, 45-b, 46-a, 47-d, 48-d, 49-a, 50-b,

51. Euthanasia as -----when the person killed is capable of consenting to his or her death, but do not do so.

- a. Voluntary Euthanasia
- b. Involuntary Euthanasia
- c. Non-voluntary Euthanasia
- d. Passive Euthanasia

52. Euthanasia performed against the will of the patient is called:
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
53. Name the euthanasia conducted when the explicit consent of the individual concerned is unavailable.
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
54. Identify the form of Euthanasia which is performed when the person is persistently vegetative state, or the case of infants.
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
55. The notion of 'status of embryo' related to:
- Surrogacy
  - Euthanasia
  - Murder
  - Abortion
56. 'Doing away with useless mouths'. This view related to
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Nazi euthanasia
  - Fascists euthanasia
  - Nonvoluntary euthanasia
57. 'Maintaining a pure Aryan Volk', is the justification given by:
- Nazism
  - Fundamentalism
  - Terrorism
  - Fascism
58. Nazi euthanasia is neither voluntary nor non-voluntary but --.
- involuntary
  - passive
  - active
  - assisted
59. According to the way in which euthanasia is conducted it can be divided in to :
- three

- b. four
- c. two
- d. five.

60. Euthanasia is done by the withdrawal of lifesupporting systems is called:

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
- b. Passive euthanasia
- c. Active euthanasia
- d. nonvoluntary euthanasia.

Answers 51-60  
51-b, 52-b, 53-c, 54-c, 55-d, 56-b, 57-a, 58-a, 59-c, 60-b,

61. According to the way in which euthanasia is conducted it can be divided as :

- a. Voluntary and non-voluntary
- b. Non-voluntary and involuntary
- c. Active and passive
- d. Voluntary and involuntary

62. Division of active and passive euthanasia is based on:

- a. the uses of medicine
- b. the consent of the patient
- c. the process of doing euthanasia
- d. the autonomy of the patient

63. The euthanasia is done by giving lethal injection is called:

- a. Passive euthanasia
- b. active euthanasia
- c. voluntary euthanasia
- d. nonvoluntary euthanasia.

64. The notion 'letting die' is related to:

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
- b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
- c. active euthanasia
- d. passive euthanasia.

65. type of euthanasia is widely accepted.

- a. Passive
- b. active
- c. in-voluntary
- d. non-voluntary

66. Voluntary euthanasia is also called as:

- a. Suicide
- b. Assisted murder
- c. Surgeon assisted suicide
- d. Surgeon assisted murder

67. Euthanasia is done by the withdrawal of the ventilator is called:

- a. Voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - c. active euthanasia
  - d. passive euthanasia.
68. Which among the given is treated as the widely accepted form of euthanasia?
- a. Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - b. Voluntary euthanasia
  - c. In-voluntary euthanasia
  - d. Active euthanasia
69. The term bioethics is derived from the Greek.....
- a. Bios and Ethos
  - b. Bio and Ethos
  - c. Bio and Etho
  - d. Bios and Etho
70. The article 'Bioethical imperative' is written by
- a. Peter Singer
  - b. Van R. Potter
  - c. Fritz Jahr
  - d. Sargent Shriver
  - e. Sargent Shriver
- Answers 61-70  
61-c, 62-c, 63-b, 64-d, 65-a, 66-c, 67-d, 68-b, 69-a, 70-c,
71. The principle of Autonomy is related to :
- a. Business ethics
  - b. Medical ethics
  - c. Media ethics
  - d. Legal ethics
72. Which among the following is not treated as the principle of Medical ethics?
- a. Autonomy
  - b. Justice
  - c. Beneficence
  - d. Objectivity
73. The notion of Informed consent is related to the principle of:
- a. Autonomy
  - b. Justice
  - c. Beneficence
  - d. Non-maleficence.
74. The concept 'Informed consent' is related to:
- a. Business ethics
  - b. Medical ethics
  - c. Media ethics
  - d. Legal ethics

- 75 is the basic principle of the view of Fair distribution of scarce medical resources.
- Autonomy
  - Justice
  - Beneficence
  - Non-maleficence
- 76 is the basic principle of the view that a medical procedure does not make harm to the patient involved and others in the society.
- Autonomy
  - Justice
  - Beneficence
  - Non-maleficence
- 77 occurs when the patient dies because the medical professionals don't do something necessary to keep the patient alive.
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.
- 78 occurs when the patient dies because of medical professionals stop doing something that is keeping the patient alive.
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.
79. When death is brought about by an act is called:
- Passive euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - voluntary euthanasia
  - nonvoluntary euthanasia.
80. When a patient is killed by giving an overdose of medicine is called:
- Passive euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - voluntary euthanasia
  - nonvoluntary euthanasia.

71-b, 72-d, 73-a, 74-b, 75-b, 76-d, 77-d, 78d, 79-b, 80-b,

81. When euthanasia is brought about by an omission is called:
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.

82. When euthanasia is brought about by commission of an action is called:
- Passive euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - voluntary euthanasia
  - nonvoluntary euthanasia.
83. Passive euthanasia is when death is brought about by an ---.
- Commission
  - Omission
  - Action
  - Intervention
84. Euthanasia popularly classified in to ----- according to the notion of informed consent.
- Five
  - four
  - Three
  - Two
85. Classification of euthanasia as Voluntary, Non-voluntary and Involuntary are according to the notion of:
- Informed consent
  - Procedure
  - Truth telling
  - Justice
86. The notion 'Pulling the plug' is related to:
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.
87. Euthanasia brought by not carrying out surgery that will extend life for short time is called:
- Voluntary euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary euthanasia
  - active euthanasia
  - passive euthanasia.
88. Among the following which form of euthanasia is very similar to act of murder:
- Voluntary Euthanasia
  - Involuntary Euthanasia
  - Non-voluntary Euthanasia
  - Passive Euthanasia
89. The notion 'living will' is related to:
- Cloning
  - Surrogacy
  - Abortion
  - Euthanasia

90. Slippery slop argument is related to:

- a. Abortion
- b. Euthanasia
- c. Surrogacy
- d. IVF Answers 81-90

81-d, 82-b, 83-b, 84-c, 85-a, 86-d, 87-d, 88-b, 89-d, 90-b,

91. The question of personhood is related to:

- a. Abortion
- b. Cloning
- c. Surrogacy
- d. None of these

92. Which among the following is accelerated the discussions upon abortion issues.

- a. Aruna Shanbaug case
- b. Terri Schiavo case
- c. Roe V. Wade case
- d. Vincent Lambert case

93. The practice of giving birth to a baby for another women who is unable to have babies herself is called:

- a. Invitro fertilization
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. Genetic mutation

94. A woman who is given birth to a baby for another woman who is unable to have babies herself is called as:

- a. Surrogicer
- b. Surrogose
- c. Surrogate
- d. Surrogote

95. Surrogacy is considered one among the -----.

- a. issue of abortion
- b. problem of euthanasia
- c. issue of media
- d. assisted reproductive technologies

96. The notion of 'Baby selling' is related to:

- a. Invitro fertilization
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. Genetic mutation

97. The issue of 'commodification of babies' is discussed in:

- a. In vitro fertilization
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. Genetic mutation

98. Problem of parenthood is closely connected with:

- a. Euthanasia
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. Genetic mutation

99. Question regarding 'motherhood' is coming in the ethical discussion on:

- a. Euthanasia
- b. Cloning
- c. IVF
- d. Surrogacy

100. is treated as one of the fundamental ethical issues related to surrogacy.

- a. Question about the motherhood
- b. Embryo wastage
- c. Question about personhood
- d. Sanctity of life

Answers 91-100  
91-a, 92-c, 93-b, 94-c, 95-d, 96-b, 97-b, 98-b, 99-d, 100-a,

101. Traditional surrogacy is also called as:

- a. Gestational surrogacy
- b. Artificial surrogacy
- c. Biological surrogacy
- d. Mutational surrogacy

102. Who is the biological mother of the child in a traditional surrogacy?

- a. Surrogate
- b. Lady who brought the child
- c. Mother who paid for the baby
- d. Not determined

103. The surrogacy in which the surrogate's eggs are combined with donor's sperm and give birth to child is called:

- a. Gestational surrogacy
- b. Artificial surrogacy
- c. Mutational surrogacy
- d. Biological surrogacy.

104. In a Traditional surrogacy -----gives eggs for fertilization.

- a. Donor
- b. Surrogate
- c. intended mother

d. Lady other than surrogate and intended mother

105. In surrogacy both eggs and sperm are donated.

- a. Gestational surrogacy
- b. Traditional surrogacy
- c. Biological surrogacy
- d. Mutational surrogacy.

106. In the surrogate has no biological link to the baby.

- a. Traditional surrogacy
- b. Biological surrogacy
- c. Gestational surrogacy
- d. Mutational surrogacy.

107. In gestational surrogacy-----is the method to create an embryo.

- a. Cloning
- b. IVF
- c. IUI
- d. ISCI

108. is a woman whose uterus was used for the nurturing and development of an embryo onto a baby.

- a. Social mother
- b. Biological mother
- c. Gestational mother
- d. Mother by blood

109. A woman who rears the baby after birth is called:

- a. Gestational mother
- b. Biological mother
- c. Genetic mother
- d. Social mother

110. A woman whose contribution to the child was the ovum is called: a.

- a. Gestational mother
- b. Biological mother
- c. Genetic mother
- d. Social mother

101-b, 102-a, 103- d, 104-b, 105-a, 106-c, 107-b, 108- c, 109-d, 110-c,

111. is the male genetic contributor to the creation of an infant.

- a. Biological father
- b. Intended father
- c. Social father
- d. Sep father

112. Commercial surrogacy is banned in India in-----.
- 2019
  - 2015
  - 2018
  - 2017
113. Surrogacy regulation bill was passed by Lok Sabha in --.
- July 15, 2019
  - June 15, 2019
  - August 18, 2018
  - August 18, 2017
114. Which place in India was called as 'Babyfactory' ?
- Selam
  - Delhi
  - Jaipur
  - Anand
115. is called the surrogacy capital of India.
- Selam
  - Delhi
  - Jaipur
  - Anand
116. Anand is called as:
- City of God
  - City of Milk
  - Surrogacy capital of India
  - IVF capital of India
117. In India ----- surrogacy is permissible.
- Altruistic surrogacy
  - Commercial surrogacy
  - Artificial surrogacy
  - Paid surrogacy
118. ART means:
- Actual Reproductive Technology
  - Artificial Reproductive Technology
  - Artificial Response Technology
  - None of these
119. Issues of surrogacy is commonly called :
- Issue of Three mothers
  - Issues related to Two mothers
  - Issues related to five mothers

d. Issues related to mothers

120. Ethical issues of surrogacy is generally stated as issues of :

- a. Three mothers and three fathers
  - b. Three fathers and two mothers
  - c. Two mothers and Two fathers
  - d. Three mothers and two fathers
- Answers 111-120

111-a, 112-a, 113-a, 114-d, 115-d, 116-c, 117-a, 118-b, 119-a, 120-d,

121. Name the euthanasia which is done by the consent of the appropriate person on behalf of the patient who is unable to give consent.

- a. Voluntary Euthanasia
- b. Involuntary Euthanasia
- c. Non-voluntary Euthanasia
- d. Passive Euthanasia

122. Kantian ethical position is called:

- a. Deontology,
- b. Utilitarianism
- c. Consequentialism
- d. Ethical relativism

123. Who makes strong condemnation to casuistry?

- a. Moore
- b. F.H. Bradley
- c. Mackenzie
- d. Bentham

124. Universal happiness is related with

- a. Evolutionary theory
- b. Emotivism
- c. Utilitarianism
- d. Cognitivism

125. The parents who brought baby from a surrogate is called:

- a. Genetic Parents
- b. Intended parents
- c. Traditional parents
- d. Gestational parents.

126. The issue of commodification of babies is related to:

- a. Altruistic surrogacy
- b. Commercial surrogacy
- c. Independent surrogacy
- d. Traditional surrogacy

127. argued that surrogacy is an assault to a woman's dignity and right to autonomy over her body.
- conservatives
  - Sociologists
  - feminists
  - liberalists

128. The view of 'baby producers' is concerned with:
- Abortion
  - Cloning
  - IVF
  - Surrogacy

129. Critics of surrogacy argued that, in surrogacy the baby becomes a mere -----within an economic transaction of a good and a service.
- entity
  - commodity
  - object
  - instrument

130. Rights of the child become pressing issue in--.
- Surrogacy
  - Abortion
  - Cloning
  - IVF
  - Answers 121-130

121-c, 122-a, 123b, 124-c, 125-b, 126-b, 127-c, 128-d, 129-b, 130-a,

131. Surrogacy which includes a monetary compensation to the surrogate is called:
- Altruistic surrogacy
  - Commercial surrogacy
  - Gestational surrogacy
  - Traditional surrogacy.

132. refers to those surrogacy agreements where the surrogate does not receive monetary compensation.
- Altruistic surrogacy
  - Commercial surrogacy
  - Gestational surrogacy
  - Traditional surrogacy.

133. 'Informed consent' is considered as one of the fundamental principles of
- Legal ethics,
  - Medical ethics
  - Business ethics
  - Media ethics

134. In India Commercial surrogacy is----- --.

- a. legal
- b. legal and constitutional right
- c. Illegal
- d. legal and advisable

135. In altruistic surrogacy the surrogate is most probably.....

- a. close relative
- b. unknown woman
- c. woman from other nation
- d. professional surrogate

136. is the study of appropriate business policies and practices.

- a. Corporate ethics
- b. Business ethics
- c. Business policy
- d. Corporate analog

137. In the case of Roe v Wade, The United States Supreme Court held that women have a constitutional right to an abortion in the first -----of pregnancy

- a. Four months
- b. three months
- c. six months
- d. two months

138. Who wrote the book 'A Theory of Justice'?

- a. Keats
- b. P.B. Shelly
- c. Rudyard Kipling
- d. John Rawls

139. 'Abortion is not wrong – at least not when the pregnancy result from rape'. Who proposed this view?

- a. J. S. Mill
- b. Arthur
- c. Eysenck
- d. Judith Jarvis Thomson

140. Birth is the most visible possible dividing line between fertilized egg and child- This statement is recommended by:

- a. liberalists
- b. conservatives
- c. feminists
- d. pro-life activist

Answers 131-140

141. Peter Singer identified-----as the criteria for antiabortion stand point instead of the cri-

- teria of Homo sapiens.
- a. eccentric value
  - b. pragmatic value
  - c. instrumental value
  - d. intrinsic value
142. Which among the following is considered as the standard way of distinguishing between active and passive euthanasia?
- a. Act versus passion
  - b. Act versus omission
  - c. act versus commission
  - d. Omission versus Withdrawal
143. Active euthanasia occurs when the medical professionals do something that causes the patient to die.
- a. deliberately.
  - b. passively
  - c. without intentionally
  - d. none of these
144. Which among the following is treated as fourth estate?
- a. Judiciary
  - b. Mediac.
  - c. Legislature
  - d. Government
145. Which among the following is not a core principle of media ethics?
- a. Truth and accuracy
  - b. Independence
  - c. Impartiality
  - d. Subjectivity
146. 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number' is the motto of:
- a. Utilitarianism
  - b. Intuitionism
  - c. Emotivism
  - d. Deontology
147. Right to Information Act is passed in India on:
- a. 2000
  - b. 2003
  - c. 2001
  - d. 2005
148. treated as a one of the core principle of journalism.
- a. viability
  - b. publicity
  - c. truth

d. sensation

149. RTI means:

- a. Right to Intelligence
- b. Right to Independence
- c. Right to Information
- d. Right to Interact

150. IPR means:

- a. Intellectual Property Right
  - b. Indian Property right
  - c. Intellectual Privacy Right
  - d. International Privacy Right.
- Answers 141-150

141-d, 142-b, 143-a, 144-b, 145-d, 146-a, 147-d, 148-c, 149-c, 150-a,

151. The practice of taking someone else's work or ideas and claim off as one's own is called:

- a. Intellectual theft
- b. Cyber theft
- c. Plagiarism
- d. Hacking

152. In media culture -----builds trust and confidence.

- a. sensational reporting
- b. subjective reporting
- c. impartial reporting
- d. partial reporting

153. is a reasonable extension of the ethical principles in the actual circumstances of the moral life.

- a. Character
- b. Free will
- c. Behaviour
- d. Casuistry

154. G. E. Moore calls ----- is the goal of ethical investigation'

- a. casuistry
- b. practice
- c. right action
- d. Right decision

155 deals the specific ethical principles and standards of media.

- a. Practical ethics
- b. Applied ethics
- c. Journalist ethics
- d. Media ethics

156 is considered as a principle of media ethics.

- a. Bias
- b. Subjectivity
- c. Accountability
- d. Popularity

157 is considered as a one of the fundamental principles of Journalism

- a. Truth and Accuracy
- b. Subjectivity
- c. Love and Care
- d. Freewill

158 treated as a principle of Journalism.

- a. Subjectivity
- b. Fairness and Impartiality
- c. Obligation to power
- d. None of these

159 is the sign of professionalism and responsible journalism.

- a. Humanity
- b. Truth and Accuracy
- c. Independence
- d. Accountability

160. A        must possess independent voice regarding political, social and corporate situations.

- a. Doctor
- b. Journalist
- c. Lawyer
- d. Business man

151-c, 152-c, 153-d, 154-a, 155-d, 156-c, 157-a, 158-b, 159-d, 160-b,

161. The notion 'Paid news' is related to:

- a. Journalism
- b. Theatre
- c. Film
- d. Culture

162. Pulitzer prize is related to:

- a. Business
- b. Journalism
- c. Medicine
- d. Law

163. Who is called as the father of Journalism?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. M. N. Roy

- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Aguste Comte

164. Who is called as Father of Indian Press?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. M. N. Roy
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Aguste Comte

165. Who started Bengal Gazette?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. M. N. Roy
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Tagore

166. Bengal Gazette was started on:

- a. 1782
- b. 1783
- c. 1780
- d. 1781

167. PCI means:

- a. Press Committee of India
- b. Press Council of India
- c. Press Council International
- d. Press Committee International

168. PCI was established on:

- a. 1973
- b. 1978
- c. 1977
- d. 1975

169. is the statutory body of Indian media regulations.

- a. Press Council of India
- b. Press Committee of India
- c. Press club of India
- d. None of these

170. In India news channels are governed by:

- a. PCI
- b. CBFC
- c. BSA
- d. NBSA Answers 161-170

161-b, 162-b, 163-c, 164-a, 165-a, 166-c, 167-b, 168-b, 168-a, 170-d,

171. Who is known as Father of Modern Journalism?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. Walter Lippmann
- c. Joseph Pulitzer
- d. Aguste Comte

172. Who among the following won two Pulitzer prize?

- a. James Augustus Hicky
- b. Lippmann
- c. Pranoy Roy
- d. Aguste Comte

173. Who is known as “Most influential Journalist of Twentieth century”?

- a. Lippmann
- b. Joseph Pulitzer
- c. James Augustus Hicky
- d. Aguste Comte

174. What is the aim of business.

- a. Service
- b. Profit making
- c. Employee satisfaction
- d. Resource allocation

175. Which level of business ethics defines ethical behaviour and assesses the effect of business on society.

- a. The Company level
- b. The individual level
- c. The Industry level
- d. The Society level.

176. The notion ‘Oxymoron’ is related to:

- a. Business ethics
- b. Media ethics
- c. Medical ethics
- d. Legal ethics.

177. In Business ethics Micro level deals with the--.

- a. Organization
- b. Individual in the organisation
- c. Institutions
- d. The market and Government

178. In Business ethics Meso level deals with the--.

- a. Organization

- b. Individual in the organisation
- c. Institutions
- d. The market and Government

179. In Business ethics Macro level deals with the --.

- a. Organization
- b. Individual in the organisation
- c. Institutions
- d. Employer

180. The notion of whistleblowing is related to:

- a. Business ethics
  - b. Media ethics
  - c. Medical ethics
  - d. Legal ethics
- Answers 171-180

181-c, 182-d, 183-a, 184-c, 185-a, 186-b, 187-b, 188-a, 189-d, 190-a,

181. refers to the act of organisation members, disclosing information on illegal and unethical practices within the organisation.

- a. Oxymoron
- b. Reporting
- c. Whistleblowing
- d. Quickening

182. CSR means:

- a. Company Social Responsibility
- b. Corporate Social Response
- c. Corporate Social Representation
- d. Corporate Social Responsibility.

183. The concept CSR has implication in to the field of:

- a. Business
- b. Media
- c. Law
- d. Medicine

184. is a self-regulating business model that helps a company be socially accountable.

- a. Profit making
- b. Accounting
- c. Corporate Social Responsibility
- d. Quality production

185. By practicing CSR is also called:

- a. Corporate Citizenship
- b. Social Citizenship
- c. Corporate Service

d. Social Service

186 is the positive involvement of a company in a society and environment.

- a. Offering employment
- b. Corporate Social Responsibility
- c. Whistleblowing
- d. None of these

187 activities help both employees and employer feel more connected with the society.

- a. Whistleblowing
- b. CSR
- c. Profit making
- d. Marketing

188. CSR programs raise -----in the work place.

- a. Morale
- b. Happiness
- c. Responsibility
- d. Leisure

189. Corporate Social Responsibility is equally important to:

- a. Community
- b. Company
- c. Community and Country
- d. Community and society

190. An activity of a business firm which promotes philanthropic concerns is identified as part of their:

- a. Corporate Social Responsibility
- b. Marketing plan
- c. Profit enhancing plan
- d. Employee welfare plan.

181-c, 182-d, 183-a, 184-c, 185-a, 186-b, 187-b, 188-a, 189-d, 190-a,

191. is asexual reproductive method.

- a. IVF
- b. Surrogacy
- c. Cloning
- d. None of these

192. Genetic surrogacy is also called:

- a. Partial surrogacy
- b. Total surrogacy
- c. Social surrogacy
- d. Intended surrogacy

193. 'Journalists should do no harm'. This assertion highlights the principle of:
- Accountability
  - Impartiality
  - Justice
  - Humanism
194. Gestational Surrogacy is also called:
- Partial surrogacy
  - Total surrogacy
  - Social surrogacy
  - Intended surrogacy
- 195 argued that no morally significant dividing line between fertilized egg and child.
- Feminists
  - Liberalists
  - Conservatives
  - Philanthropists
196. 'Digital divide' is related to:
- Cyber ethics
  - Business ethics
  - Medical ethics
  - Professional ethics
197. The issue of Multiple parenting have strong significance in:
- Cloning
  - IVF
  - Surrogacy
  - Abortion
198. is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments.
- Normative ethics
  - Meta ethics
  - Applied ethics
  - Virtue ethics
199. Right of the author or creator is known as:
- Intellectual property right
  - Creator right
  - Author right
  - Copyright
200. The Hippocratic Oath is an oath historically taken by:
- Physicians
  - Lawyers
  - Corporates

d. Teachers Answers 191-200

191-c, 192-a, 193-d, 194-b, 195-c, 196-a, 197-c, 198-b, 199-d, 200-a

201. Which among the following dichotomies is used in a discourse on ethics?

1. Empirical – Normative
2. Descriptive – Prescriptive
3. Fact – Value
4. Profit - Loss

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1 and 3
  - b. 1 and 2
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: C

202. How does the individual come to be able to make moral decisions?

1. By understanding his **motives**
2. By understanding the **consequences** of his actions
3. By being deterred and frightened of the **penalties** incurred on him for his action
4. By understanding the **means** adopted to execute action

- a. 1, 2 and 3
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1, 2 and 4
- Correct Answer: D

203. Which of the following statements are true about Engineering Ethics?

1. Engineering Ethics is an area of practical or applied ethics
2. The aim of Engineering Ethics is to illuminate the ethical dimensions of engineering practice
3. Engineering Ethics is constituted of an eclectic contribution of all schools of ethics
4. Professional Engineering Societies are a major source of codes for engineering ethics.

Which of the following is correct?

- a. Only 2
  - b. 1 and 3
  - c. 1, 3 and 4
  - d. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: D

204. Which of the following assumption about moral behavior is reasonably justified?

1. Most people will behave morally if the socialization process has successfully inculcated the right values
2. Some people will behave more morally than others even if they have been under the same socialization process
3. Social situations provide the best stimulus to moral action or inaction; i.e social pressure determines moral action/inaction.
4. Socialisation has no role in developing moral values

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 1, 2 and 3

- c. 1,2,3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3 Correct Answer: B

205. Which among the following are principle concerns with 'professional ethics'
1. To study ethical dilemmas in professions by application of moral theory
  2. The study of unique moral obligations created by special social roles
  3. The practice and consultancy of ethics by a trained professional ethicist
  4. The ethical challenges of a professional lifestyle Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: A

206. Which of the following are true
1. Ethical dilemmas arise when it is thought that serious good and bad are bound together in the same activity
  2. Ethics uses the instrument of coercion to oblige its subjects
  3. Ethical behavior is dependent on the conditions and circumstances under which an action/event takes place
  4. Codes of Conduct form a part of ethical training
- a. 1 and 3
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: B

207. Which of the following statements is most appropriate to describe deontological ethics?
- a. The central idea is that the right or wrong consideration is what makes the act right or wrong, other things being equal
  - b. The central idea is that an adherence to the codes prescribed under the duty one is employed in makes for the right action
  - c. The central idea is that right and wrong are relative to time and circumstance
  - d. The central idea is that right and wrong are determined by humans according to their subjective conscience Correct Answer: A

208. Consider the following statements behavior and the type of activity corresponding to them as impediments to responsible action for an engineer
- |   |  |
|---|--|
| Type of Behavior  |  |
| 1. When group comes to agreement at the expense of critical thinking                                |  |
| 2. When we see things at the microscopic level, we can't see them at the general and ordinary level |  |
| 3. We tend to interpret situations from very limited perspectives                                   |  |
| 4. An engineer genuinely does not realize that a design poses a safety problem                      |  |
| Type of Activity  |  |
| 1. Microscopic Vision   |  |
| 2. Egocentrism  |  |
| 3. Groupthink   |  |
| 4. Ignorance  |  |
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1 - A; 2 - B; 3 - C; 4 - D

- b. 1 - C; 2 -A; 3 -B; 4 -D
- c. 1 -B; 2 -C; 3 -D; 4 -A
- d. 1 -A; 2 - C; 3 -B; 4 -D Correct Answer: B

209. Which of the following statements are true about 'Morale'

- 1. It is a form of 'attitude'
  - 2. It is reflected in positive feelings about the work group
  - 3. It instills confidence that difficult goals can be achieved easily
  - 4. It is the knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong action
- a. 1,2 and 3
  - b. 1,2,3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 3
  - d. 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: A

210. Which of the following is the most appropriate definition of "practice" vis a vis professional ethics?

- a. "practice" is a cooperative arrangement to pursue the goods that are internal to a structured communal life
- b. "practice" is an endeavor to achieve excellence by incessant repetition
- c. "practice" is the application of knowledge into real time problems
- d. "practice" is symbolic of the humble admission that humans can never know and learn enough Correct Answer: A

211. Which of the following are true with regard to safety and treatment of employees

- 1. It is a means of promoting worker efficiency and social order by protecting lives and promoting the well-being of workers
  - 2. The idea of safety and treatment of employees was conceived during the Industrial Revolution in Europe
  - 3. By ensuring safety of workers the political society of a nation is stabilized
  - 4. All workers have a right to expect fairness from their employer and to be treated with respect and dignity
- a. 1,2,3 and 4
  - b. 1,3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 4
  - d. 1 and 4 Correct Answer: A

212. What among the following is a sub - specie of "normative ethics"

- 1. War Ethics
- 2. Applied ethics
- 3. Virtue ethics
- 4. Meta ethics

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 2 only
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 2 and 3
- d. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: A

213. Which of the following are prominent examples of 'ethical issues' that fall under the domain of 'applied ethics'?
1. Euthanasia
  2. Protection of human and animal subjects in research
  3. Affirmative action
  4. Acceptable risk in workplace
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: C
- 
214. Consider the following options with regard to the 'Anthropogenic World View' vis a vis Environmental Ethics
1. Humanity perceives itself to be the center and ultimate goal of the Universe
  2. Humanity perceives environment as a superior actor whose laws and codes are not well understood
  3. Nature is viewed as a storehouse of resources
  4. Many large, hierarchical business houses still base their business model on this world view
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 1 and 3
  - d. 1 and 4
- Correct Answer: B
- 
215. Which of the following principles is the essential principle of utilitarian school of ethics?
- a. Greatest Health Principle
  - b. Greatest Happiness Principle
  - c. Greatest Wealth Principle
  - d. Greatest Respect Principle.
- Correct Answer: B
- 
216. Which among the following is a true about ethics of research and experimentation?
1. Research that causes harm to humans is morally wrong
  2. Research that involves humans is justified only when some good can come from it
  3. A person's right to liberty is violated if he is a subject to research by coercion
  4. Informed Consent plays a role in Research Ethics
- Which of the following is correct?
- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 3
  - d. 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: B
- 
217. What among the following elements takes the most direct and immediate set back in a case of conflict of interest by a public official?
- a. The reputation of the officer
  - b. The trust that the public holds in the office
  - c. The legitimacy of the office
  - d. The constitution of India
- Correct Answer: B

218. "It is commonly said that before blowing the whistle, a person has an obligation to see that all existing avenues for change within the organization must have been explored". Consider the following statements as justifications for the above proposition.

1. The agent will be forced neither to breach confidentiality nor be disloyal
2. The agent (potential whistleblower) can seek remuneration from the organization for fidelity
3. The organization will not suffer embarrassment or more tangible harm
4. The organization can correct its mistakes internally by devising mechanisms to hear the issues raised by employees

Which of the following are correct set of justifications under ethics?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 1 and 4
- d. Only 1 Correct Answer: A

219. Which of the following actions can be termed as breach of 'Professional Ethics'?

1. A physician who refers patients to a specialist in return for monetary favours
2. A scientist who exaggerates the importance of his discoveries to encourage investors in his biotech company
3. A lawyer who lies to the Judge
4. The reporter who spreads fake news

Which of the following is incorrect?

- a. Only 1
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1, 2 and 4 Correct Answer: C

220. Which of the following are the functions of a code of ethics?

1. It can express a shared commitment on the part of a professional society's members to strive to satisfy certain ethical standards and principles.
2. It can help foster an environment in which ethical behavior is the norm
3. It can serve as a guide or reminder in specific situations
4. A code can be a valuable academic and educational legacy for an organization.

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1 and 3
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 2 Correct Answer: C

221. Which of the following is an appropriate general principle with regard for 'Engineering Ethics'?

- a. The Engineer shall regard his duty to the public welfare as paramount to all other obligations.
- b. The Engineer shall regard his duty to the objectives of the company as paramount to all other obligations
- c. The Engineer shall regard his duty to the profession of engineering as paramount to other obligations
- d. The Engineer shall regard his duty to his excellence as paramount to other obligations Correct Answer: A

222. Which of the following statements is the most correct description of the relationship between

humans and technology?

- a. Technology “impacts” upon human actions and human beings
- b. Human beings “act on, make, use” technology
- c. Technology provides apparatus for human action
- d. Technology hijacks human autonomy Correct Answer: C

223. What are the elements necessary for an Institution to formulate a state of the art ‘code of ethics’

- 1. a body of public interest/relevance
  - 2. expert scholarship
  - 3. enormous funding
  - 4. professional support
- a. 2 and 4
  - b. 2,3 and 4
  - c. 1, 2 and 4
  - d. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: C

224. Which of the following elements (as a fundamental criterion) must always be in the mind of Engineer while performing his duties vis a vis Ethics

- 1. Public Safety
  - 2. Economy
  - 3. Health
  - 4. Welfare
- a. 1,2 and 3
  - b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 1 and 4
  - d. 1, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: D

225. What among the following are the shortcomings of a code of ethics formulated by a ‘professional engineering society’?

- 1. These codes are not formulated with sincere scholarship or expertise and are often a hostage to economic interests
- 2. Most practicing engineers do not belong to any professional engineering society, so the codes cannot properly reach out to them
- 3. Such codes, at best represent the highest ethical common denominator among those to whom it applies therefore it may include provisions which may be ethically questionable
- 4. These codes are not exhaustive – and there are matters of ethical importance that may go unnoticed

Which of the following sets of answers are correct?

- a. 1 and 2
- b. 1, 2 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3 Correct Answer: C

226. As an engineer you are stuck in an ethical dilemma about the execution of a certain task that you find morally contestable. You refer to a well-known ‘code of ethics’ and other regulations but none of them specifically prohibit that certain course of action (which is in contestation). Under what category does the ethical dilemma fall, when the ‘code of ethics’ are not able to

solve it?

- a. Professional Ethics
- b. Personal Ethics
- c. Societal Ethics
- d. Business Ethics Correct Answer: B

227. Which of the following statements best explains the reason for engineering ethics being a branch of applied ethics?

- 1. The aim of engineering ethics is to shed light on ethical concerns related to engineering practice
  - 2. It is applied in the sense that ethical considerations are directed to practice rather than theory
  - 3. The first task of engineering ethics is to identify the basic concern that arise prior to practice
  - 4. To think on the questions of engineering ethics one necessarily needs a technical engineering knowledge.
- a. 1 and 4
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1 and 2
  - d. 2 and 4 Correct Answer: C

228. Consider the following statements about 'whistle blowing'

- 1. A whistle blower makes accusations against an Organization which call attention to alleged instances of negligence, abuse or practices that damage the public interest or harm others.
- 2. The accusation mostly single out individuals or groups within the organization as responsible for the harm being perpetrated
- 3. Whistle blowing instances can only occur in for profit organizations
- 4. If the accusations are not made public but only confided to a relative or acquaintance this would not be termed whistle blowing

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1,2 and 4
- b. 1,2 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 4
- d. Only 1 Correct Answer: A

229. What values do a 'code of ethics' command in a court of law?

- 1) Code of ethics do not by themselves have the force of law
- 2) court of laws are bound by code of ethics
- 3) the code of ethics can provide upon its own power and legality
- 4) court of law can use the code of ethics in a non- authoritative manner to reason a judgment, by the aid of its principles

Which one is correct?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 2 and 3
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 4 Correct Answer: D

230. X is a director at a PSU in India, he sits on the interview panel that is scheduled to interview B who is his nephew, who has qualified the written examination for a job at that PSU – which of the following ethical issues apply to X?

- a. Nepotism
  - b. Conflict of Interest
  - c. Corruption
  - d. Embezzlement
- Correct Answer: B

232. Which of the following descriptions best describes the principle concerning professional ethics?

- a. Professional duties must be judged by ethical standards independent of time, place and circumstance
  - b. Judging professional duties always involves reciprocal adjustment between ends and means
  - c. Professional duties must by nature be strictly deontological, i.e – the ends must not come at the cost of the means
  - d. Professional duties must be judged only by what they achieve in line with the ends prescribed by the ideals of business
- Correct Answer: B

233. What are the possible ethical dilemmas that a whistle blower can face?

- 1. Public Interests versus Private interests
  - 2. Citizenship versus Employment
  - 3. Private Benefit versus Employer's Benefit
  - 4. Short term view versus the long term view
- a. 1, 2 and 4
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 1 and 4
- Correct Answer: C

234. The principle of deontological ethics has been most succinctly laid down by Immanuel Kant in his categorical imperative – which states “ Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law”- under what category of the following methods does this lie?

- a. Bottom Up model
  - b. Top Down model
  - c. Internal ethics model
  - d. External ethics model
- Correct Answer: B

235. Which of the following is the opposite of normative ethics?

- a. Micro Ethics
  - b. Beta Ethics
  - c. Meta Ethics
  - d. Virtue Ethics
- Correct Answer: C

236. Which of the following statements are true about ethical relativism?

- 1. Cultural difference strictly entails ethical differences
  - 2. Cultural differences should not be equated with irresolvable moral differences
  - 3. What appear to be cultural differences may also be differences in perspective
  - 4. All human beings around the world agree to the same moral standards.
- Which of the following sets are correct?
- a. 2 and 3

- b. 1, 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. Only 4 Correct Answer: A

237. Which of the following statements are true?

- 1. The more strict and disciplined the process of socialization - the better quality of morality is formed in an individual
  - 2. The higher the level of moral reasoning in individuals - the more moral the behavior to be expected
  - 3. The increase in perception of individual's responsibility and involvement in the situation increases the probability of moral behavior
  - 4. The more rigorous the monitoring of behavior by a supervisory agency - the more voluntarily the individual acts morally.
- a. 1,2 and 4
  - b. 1,2,3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 3
  - d. 2,3 and 4 Correct Answer: C

238. Which of the following are reasonable criteria for judging whether proposed research involving human subjects is ethically sound?

- 1. Risk to subject are minimized
  - 2. Risks are reasonable related to anticipated benefits
  - 3. Prior informed consent will be obtained from subjects
  - 4. Subjects privacy and confidentiality will be maintained
- Which of the following is correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. C. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. D. 1 and 3 Correct Answer: C

239. What is a more appropriate method to be employed whilst formulating a 'code of ethics' for engineering practices

- 1. To draw broad and general principles at the start and judge each case by that principle
  - 2. To begin with particular cases
  - 3. To look for relevant paradigm cases for appropriate and inappropriate points that can serve as a reference point for more complicated cases
  - 4. To borrow codes from other professional ethics like medicine and law
- Which of the following set is correct?
- a. 1,2,3 and 4
  - b. 1, 3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 3
  - d. 3 and 4 Correct Answer: C

240. Consider the following ethical dilemmas and correspond them to the type of ethics Dilemma

- 1) Privacy Versus Social Utility
  - 2) Profit Versus Welfare
  - 3) Private Gain Versus Public Trust
  - 4) Sustainability Versus Development
- Type of Ethics
- A) Environmental Ethics

B) Business Ethics Administrative Ethics

C) Technology Ethics

Which is the correct combination?

- a. 1 - A; 2 - B; 3 - C; 4 - D
- b. 1 - D; 2 - C; 3 - B; 4 - A
- c. 1 - D; 2 - B; 3 - C; 4 - A
- d. 1 - D 2 - A; 3 - B; 4 - C Correct Answer: C

241. Which of the following are included as major normative ethical theories?

- 1. Contractualism
- 2. Consequentialism
- 3. Deontology
- 4. Virtue Theory

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2 and 3
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: C

242. You are appointed as the Production Manager of an oil corporation, since the industry that you work for has a lot of potential for hazard to the environment and other species, you have a mandate to think about these issues carefully and come up with a draft policy to deal with such issues. In such a scenario you contemplate on the nature of the relationship between man and other species around him, and try to judge how and why is man responsible towards sustaining other species. What of the following types of ethics are you engaging in this process?

- a. Meta Ethics
- b. Virtue Ethics
- c. Environmental Ethics
- d. Deontological Ethics Correct Answer: A

243. Which of the following options are included in the ethics of fair treatment of workers at workplace?

- 1. Physical safety of employees at the workplace
  - 2. Recreation facilities at the workplace
  - 3. Rights of workers to fairness and dignity
  - 4. Right of workers to have a share in company's profit
- Which of the following are correct?
- a. 1 and 2
  - b. 1 and 3
  - c. 2 and 4
  - d. 1, 3, and 4 Correct Answer: B

244. Which among the following statements fits into a description of meta ethics?

- A) X works for his 'personal benefit'
- B) X contemplates on the idea of 'personal benefit'
- C) X forms community where each individual works for his 'personal benefit'
- D) X extends the doctrine of 'personal benefit' to all living organisms on the planet. Correct Answer: B

245. Consider the following options with regard to the 'Bio centric World View'

1. It is a world view that views the planet as a living system of interdependent species
2. It works under the "do not harm" principle
3. The environment is viewed as fragile, limited in resources and vulnerable to organizational actions
4. Every act of pollution or resource depletion is not viewed as an isolated event but as a contributing factor to a collective impact of increasingly accelerating global proportions

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1,2 and 4
  - b. 2 and 4
  - c. 2,3 and 4
  - d. 1,2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: D

246. Which of the following is a description of the collective action problem?

- a. When all members of a group pursue a collective interest, individuality is crushed.
- b. When each member of a group pursues individual goals/self-interest the collective outcome is bad for the group
- c. When each member of a group pursues individual goals/self – interest the collective outcome is worse for each member
- d. When each member of a group pursues collective goal – the collective goal is never achieved.

Correct Answer: C

247. Which of the following descriptions best fit the ideal of cooperation

1. People cooperate when and as long as their self - interest aligns with the interests of the group
2. People cooperate when they sacrifice their self – interests completely for the well - being of others in the group
3. People cooperate when they forgo the pursuit of their own independent interests and follow rules or roles assigned to them by society
4. In cooperation the collective following of rules and roles assigned by a group promotes everyone's interests better than would have been done by everyone pursuing their own interests independently.

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1 and 4
  - b. 2 and 4
  - c. 3 and 4
  - d. Only 4
- Correct Answer: C

248. Which of the following descriptions is correct about the ethical theory of consequentialism?

- a. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of an ideal type - the way world ought to be
- b. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of outcomes or states – the way world might be
- c. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of motives of the person acting
- d. The theory of consequentialism is an evaluation of the means that a person acts through

Correct Answer: B

249. Which of the following are the principles that need to be adopted in Economics to deal with the

Environment responsibly

1. Marketing of safe products and services
  2. Curtailing the use of energy by developing economies
  3. Reduction and Disposal of manufactured products
  4. Environmental Directors and Managers for enterprises and corporations
- a. 1, 3 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 3
  - c. 2 and 4
  - d. 1 and 3
- Correct Answer: A

250. Which among the following are most likely to be virtues of utilitarianism?

1. Moderation
2. Passion
3. Equality
4. Civil Rights

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1 and 4
  - b. 1 and 3
  - c. 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: B

251. "the view that there is no general moral principles and that the moral disputes therefore cannot be resolved" – is a description of which of the following schools of ethics?

- a. Ethical nihilism
  - b. Ethical skepticism
  - c. Ethical relativism
  - d. Ethical transcendence
- Correct Answer: C

252. Which of the following is an example of a trade mark?

- a. "Pepsi"
  - b. "Ye Dil maange More"
  - c. A lyrical advertising composition
  - d. All of the above
- Correct Answer: D

253. There is a concept termed 'basic set of minimum moral standards' – that scholars believe are to be found in all cultures and societies in some form or the other; what among the following are its examples?

1. Torture and murder are wrong
  2. One ought to respect another human being
  3. Some principles of fairness are necessary for a working society
  4. one ought to protect the innocent
- Which of the following is correct?
- a. 1 and 4
  - b. 1, 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1 and 3
- Correct Answer: C

254. Which of the following statements are correct when speaking about business ethics?

1. Open and free competition without deception and fraud

2. Managers have fiduciary duties towards owners and shareholders
  3. Corporations ought not to be disturbed or interfered by outside agencies like government, civil society etc
  4. Law and common morality should guide the actions of corporation in a market place Which of the following is correct?
    - a. 1, 3 and 4
    - b. 1, 2 and 4
    - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
    - d. 2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: B

255. Which among the following falls under the definition of conservation?
1. Conservation deals with how to manage natural resources
  2. Conservation deals with the consequences of wasteful use of property
  3. Conservation deals with logistics of production goods
  4. Conservation deals with genetically modified crops Which of the following are correct?
    - a. 1 and 4
    - b. 1 and 2
    - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
    - d. 1, 2 and 4
- Correct Answer: B

256. What is the process of converting biological materials into useful fuels and chemicals called?
- a. Centrifugation
  - b. Biomass Conversion
  - c. Biological Fermentation
  - d. Organic Cultivation
- Correct Answer: B

257. 'Role morality' is often described as the moral obligations that arise out of the role that an individual assumes within an organization, consider the following statements
1. The moral obligations of an individual ought to be defined by and limited to the role that individual assumes in an organization
  2. Role morality has an important but limited contribution to make in business ethics
  3. Role responsibilities are not enough to describe the scope and extent of managerial responsibilities
  4. Role morality is the paramount safeguard that ensures business ethics Which of the following is correct with regards to role morality in business ethics
    - a. 1 and 4
    - b. 2 and 3
    - c. 1, 2 and 3
    - d. 2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: B

258. "A\_ is any individual or group who benefits from or is harmed by, or whose rights are affected (violated, restricted or ignored) by an organization's action." What is the most appropriate insertion in the blank
- a. Victim
  - b. Stakeholder
  - c. Culprit
  - d. Shareholder
- Correct Answer: B

259. Which of the following is a form/type of conflict of interest?
- Using government Property for extraofficial purposes
  - Post-Employment Benefits
  - Receiving Gifts from clients
  - Holding an office of profit
- Which of the following are correct?
- 1, 2 and 4
  - 1, 2 and 3
  - 1 and 2
  - 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: B

260. Why are stakeholders important to a company?
- Because a company could not exist or achieve profits without them
  - Because stakeholders are individuals or groups of individuals – human beings with rights and interest.
- Which of the following are correct?
- Only 1
  - Only 2
  - Both 1 and 2
  - Neither 1 and 2
- Correct Answer: C

261. What among the following virtues must be constituent elements of moral excellence of an individual discharging managerial duties at a business organization?
- Community
  - Nobility
  - Holism
  - Judgment
- Which of the following are correct?
- 1, 2 and 4
  - 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - 2 and 4
  - 1, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: B

262. Which among the following is an appropriate understanding of what corporate responsibility means?
- Companies should be held accountable for social effects of their actions
  - Companies should be held accountable for political effects of their actions
  - Companies should be held accountable for economic effects of their actions
  - All of the above
- Correct Answer: D

263. Which of the following is correct combination?
- 1 –A; 2 –B; 3 –C; 4 –D
  - 1 –A; 2 –C; 3 –B; 4 –D
  - 1 –D; 2 –C; 3 –A; 4 –B
  - 1 –C; 2 –A; 3 –B; 4 –D
- Correct Answer: B

264. The ethical issues concerned with computer technology are often termed 'unique', what does it mean?

- a. since computers are a relatively new phenomenon in history and therefore the ethical problems they pose are unique in nature, which can't be resolved by simple application of existing theories and disciplines of ethics
- b. Only unique people can handle the sophisticated functioning of computers and therefore only they need to learn about its ethics
- c. Both a and b
- d. Neither a and b Correct Answer: A

265. Which of the following is the most appropriate dilemma within computer/technology ethics?

- a. Means versus Ends
- b. Risk versus benefit
- c. Privacy versus social utility
- d. Public Versus Private Correct Answer: C

266. What are the possible ethical issues that can arise in 'Design'?

- 1. Sustainability of the design
- 2. Aesthetic of the design
- 3. Affordability of the design
- 4. Utility of the design

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 4
- d. 1 and 3 Correct Answer: B

267. Which among the following are types of consequentialist/utilitarian ethics?

- 1. Act consequentialism
- 2. Rule consequentialism
- 3. Abstract consequentialism
- 4. Impact consequentialism

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 1, 2 and 3
- d. 2 and 4 Correct Answer: B

268. Which of the following parties can be considered a stakeholder in a business organization?

- 1. Employees
- 2. Suppliers
- 3. Communities
- 4. Shareholders

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 2
- d. 1, 2 and 3 Correct Answer: B

269. Consider the following statement, and mark the correct one which is borrowed from NSPE

code of ethics, about IPR

- a. "Engineers shall not reveal facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as authorized and required by law or this Code"
- b. "Engineers shall be free to reveal facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as prohibited by law or this Code"
- c. "Engineers shall not obtain facts, data or information in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as authorized and required by law or this Code"
- d. "Engineers shall not gain monetary benefits from facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the client or employer except as authorized and required by law or this Code" Correct Answer: A

270. Which of the following are reasons for therapid extinction of species?

1. Pollution
2. Habitat destruction
3. Deforestation
4. Over- exploitation Which of the following is correct?
  - a. 1 and 4
  - b. 2 and 3
  - c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 3 and 4 Correct Answer: C

271. Which among the following are the entitiesthat check and control conflict of interest in a Govt Department?

1. Comptroller and Auditor General(CAG)
2. Judiciary
3. Commissions of Inquiry
4. Ministry of Finance Which of the following are correct?
  - a. 1, 2 and 3
  - b. 1,2, 3 and 4
  - c. 2, 3 and 4
  - d. 1 and 3 Correct Answer: A

272. Which of the following are fundamentalcannon of NSPE?

1. Hold, paramount the safety, healthand welfare of the public
2. Perform services only in areas of theircompetence
3. Issue public statements only in anobjective and truthful manner
4. Never defect from the corporation which has employed them for a considerable amount of time

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 1,2 and 3
- c. 2,3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3 Correct Answer: B

273. Which among the following issues fallsunder the category of micro ethics?

1. Health and Safety

2. Product Liability
3. Bribes and Gifts
4. Sustainable Development

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1 and 3
- c. 2 and 4
- d. 1, 2 and 3 Correct Answer: B

274. Identify the school of Ethics under which whistle blowing can be justified by the following proposition - "when the balance of good over evil is better for all affected parties than if the whistle was not blown."

- a. Deontological
- b. Ethical Realism
- c. Utilitarianism
- d. Ethical Relativism Correct Answer: C

275. Which of the following statements are true about 'Values'?

1. People are always aware of all their values
  2. Values are the links between needs and actions
  3. Moral values are the most fundamental form of values
  4. Values are the basis for emotions
- a. 1, 2 and 3
  - b. 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 2 and 4
  - d. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: B

276. Which of the following is true about environmental ethics?

1. Environmental ethics is a branch of applied ethics
2. Environmental ethics is most concerned with the moral grounds with the preservation and restoration of the environment
3. It has evolved more as a series of debates concerning meta ethics rather than a straightforward application of normative ethics
4. The principle question asked is – how can the value of nature be best described such that it is directly morally considerable in and of itself

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 2 and 3
- c. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- d. 2 and 4 Correct Answer: B

277. Which of the following is a correct combination? Type of Ethics Example

1. Business Ethics      A) Drafting a policy on Corporate Social Responsibility
  2. Meta Ethics      B) Writing a thesis on the nature of perception in moral judgments
  3. Professional Ethics      C) Drafting a white paper on the ethical conduct of Managers in Banks
  4. Applied Ethics      D) Conceiving a formula to deal with ethical implications of road accidents
- a. 1 –A; 2 –B; 3 –C; 4 –D

- b. 1 -B; 2 - C; 3 -A; 4 -D
  - c. 1 -A and 3 -C
  - d. 2 -C; 3 -B and 4 -D
- Correct Answer: A

278. Which among the following are principles to conserve environment as formulated by CERES

- 1. Protection of the Biosphere
- 2. Reduction and Disposal of Waste
- 3. Environmental Restoration
- 4. Informing the Public

Which among the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - b. 1 and 3
  - c. 2 and 4
  - d. 2, 3 and 4
- Correct Answer: A

279. What among the following are reasonable excuses for an amoral or immoral act?

- 1. Undue Emotional Pressure
- 2. Ignorance of facts and consequences
- 3. Not enough time to make a decision
- 4. Lack of moral training and insight

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
  - b. 2, 3 and 4
  - c. 1, 2 and 3
  - d. 2 and 3
- Correct Answer: C

280. Which of the following forms a part of Bioethics?

- 1. Biomedical Technology
- 2. Genetic Engineering
- 3. Informed Consent
- 4. Genetic Screening

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1, 3 and 4
- d. 2 and 3

Correct Answer: A

281. '\_\_\_\_\_ is the genetic diversity of all forms of life on Earth, measured in terms of both number of species and genetic variability among the species.

- a. Biodiversity
  - b. Biocount
  - c. Biolongivity
  - d. Biosurplus
- Correct Answer: A

282. What among the following question must a moral agent keep in mind while determining corporate social responsibility?

- 1. Is this activity necessary in order to conduct business?
- 2. Is it necessary to redress harms caused by the company?

3. Is the activity within the scope of the firm's expertise?
4. Can such an activity be carried out without interfering with the social fabric, or community, or national security?

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 3 and 4 Correct Answer: B

283. Which among the following are Professional Obligations as listed under NSPE?

1. Engineers shall be guided in all their relations by the highest standards of honesty and integrity
2. Engineers shall at all times strive to serve the public interest
3. Engineers shall not disclose, without consent, confidential information concerning the business affair or technical processes of any present or former client or employer, or public body on which they serve.
4. Engineers shall not be influenced in their professional duties by conflicting interest

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 3 Correct Answer: B

284. What are the academic 'distinctions' observed during the study of environmental ethics?

1. Health related concern – Non health related concern
2. Intrinsic value – Instrumental value
3. Descriptive – Prescriptive
4. Rights – Duties

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 3
- b. 1 and 2
- c. 1 and 3
- d. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: B

285. Which among the following categories form a part of fairness towards the workers?

1. Hiring practices
2. Compensation
3. Privacy
4. Sexual Harassment

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 2 and 4
- b. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- c. 2, 3 and 4
- d. 1 and 4 Correct Answer: B

286. Which among the following form a type of intellectual property?

1. Trade Secrets
2. Digital Signatures

3. Trademarks

4. Copyrights

Which of the following are correct?

a. 1, 2, 3 and 4

b. 1, 3 and 4

c. 3 and 4

d. 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: B

287. Which among the following acts fall under the category of hazard to employee's safety and health?

1. Exposure to asbestos

2. Second hand smoke

3. Music at the workplace

4. Obsolete industrial equipment Which of the following are correct?

a. 1 and 2

b. 1, 2 and 3

c. 1, 2, 3 and 4

d. 1, 2 and 4 Correct Answer: D

288. Which of the following statements are true?

a. Morality can be thought of as a especially broad and pervasive form of cooperation

b. Morality can be thought of as an insignificant and obsolete left over of the pre modern societies

c. Morality can be thought of as the champion of all things good in the world

d. Morality can be thought of a hard science like physics and chemistry. Correct Answer: A

289. Which of the following is true about sexual harassment at workplace as an ethical issue?

1. Harassment is a form of discrimination

2. Harassment is an ethical issue because it unfairly focuses job advancement or retention on a factor other than the ability to do a job

3. Workplaces in India must under law prepare guidelines to deal with cases of sexual harassment

4. Sexual Harassment is a political issue Which of the following is correct?

a. 1, 2 and 3

b. 1, 2, 3 and 4

c. 1 and 4

d. 2 and 3 Correct Answer: A

290. Which among the following are correct descriptions for "business ethics"?

1. Business ethics is both normative and descriptive

2. Business ethics describes and evaluates individual and corporate behavior and practices that managers and corporations ought and ought not to engage in

3. Business ethics evaluates role of government, law and public policy in affecting business

4. Business ethics is a meta ethical exercise Which of the following are correct?

a. 1, 2 and 4

b. 1, 2 and 3

c. 1, 2, 3 and 4

d. 2, 3 and 4 Correct Answer: B

291. Which among the following are likely to be norms of the scientific research community

1. Communalism
2. Organized skepticism
3. Originality
4. Universal application

Which of the following is correct?

- a. 1, 2, 3 and 4
- b. 1, 3 and 4
- c. 2, and 3
- d. 1, 2 and 3 Correct Answer: A

292. To which type of engineers can code of ethics conceived by professional engineering societies be of any use?

- a. Engineers who are licensed professionals
- b. Engineers who belong to professional engineering societies
- c. Engineers who are working in a Public Sector Enterprise
- d. All those people who engage in engineering practice Correct Answer: D

293. X has been appointed by the Cyber Security Department of New Delhi to break into the website of a terrorist organization to extract information – what among the following is a suitable description of X's profile?

- a. Hactivist
- b. Ethical Hacker
- c. Troll
- d. Black hat Hacker Correct Answer: B

294. Which of the following is true about 'professional ethics'?

1. It borrows its codes and rules from common and universal morality
2. It formulates codes for unique roles played by individuals
3. They deal with 'special obligations' as per the duties undertaken by professionals
4. Different professions can have a radically different set of professional ethics

Which of the following are correct?

- a. 1, 3 and 4
- b. 2, 3 and 4
- c. 1 and 4
- d. 2 and 3 Correct Answer: B

295. X is a director of a Nationalized Bank in India; the bank has opened up few posts for recruitment in one of their branches through lateral entry. X recommends the name of his nephew to the selection board, the selection board members all feel under pressure and influence of X because of his status in the company. What of the following ethical issues pertain to X's behavior in the matter.

- a. Conflict of Interest
- b. Nepotism
- c. Embezzlement
- d. Conflict of Competence Correct Answer: B

296. Which of the following statements is true in respect to 'business ethics'?
- The common view of business as being amoral and therefore the need for a separate discourse of "ethics" in which to hold business morally accountable
  - That business by nature is accountable to the institutions of government only and that by nature covers all forms of accountability, including ethical accountability.
  - That business must be seen only as a profit oriented enterprise and business ethics is an oxymoron
  - That the only way to make up for the ethical lapse in businesses is by imposing higher taxes on them
- Correct Answer: A

297. Which of the following is a correct combination Type of Ethic Application
- Micro Ethics A) Applies to microchips and software technologies
  - Meta Ethics B) Deals with abstract philosophical questions pertaining Ethics
  - Macro Ethics C) Applies to society as a whole
  - Normative Ethics D) Applies to religious order
- 1 - A; 2 - B; 3 - C; 4 - D
  - 2 - B; 3 - C
  - 2 - B only
  - 2 - B; 3 - C and 4 - D
- Correct Answer: B

298. How is technology in need of ethics?
- Technology can allow human beings to do what they earlier could not do, eg - explode a nuclear bomb
  - Technology can create new possibilities for collective and institutional arrangements, eg - Bitcoin can slowly replace fiat currency.

Which of the following are correct?

- 1 only
  - 1 and 2 both
  - 2 only
  - Neither of the above
- Correct Answer: B

299. According to Ronald Dworkin, what is indispensable in order to interpret and apply laws?
- legal authority
  - introduction of moral judgments
  - a body of judges who are capable of keeping personal value judgments out of reach of laws
  - a robust system of courts
- E.) Both (c) and (d) Answer: B

300. Ronald Dworkin's 'Original Problem', based on Riggs v. Palmer, 115 NY 506, is used to illustrate the principle that Law is not merely a system of Rules but there are also 'principles, policies and other sort of standards' that govern the legal system. What was the case scenario in Riggs v. Palmer?
- the judge trying the case was himself a witness
  - a man sued his father who struck him in self defense when the former attempted to kill him
  - a defamation suit was filed by a man who knew the aspersions against him were true
  - a man sought to sell the property of the person he killed
  - none of the above
- Answer: D


301. Legal Positivism directly clashes with which theory?  
 a. Normative Jurisprudence  
 b. Legal Realism  
 c. Constructivist theory  
 d. None of the above; they are all compatible  
 Answer: B
302. Who among the following scholars is not a proponent of Legal Positivism?  
 a. Ronald Dworkin  
 b. John Austin  
 c. Joseph Raz  
 d. H. L. A. Hart  
 e. None of the above  
 Answer: A
303. What is the fundamental problem in finding an analogy of Austin's political sovereign in India's Constitution?  
 a. Austin's sovereign cannot be identified  
 b. Austin's political sovereign in turn, does not himself habitually obey some other person or persons  
 c. Austin's concept is radically flawed  
 d. 'We, the people' as a political sovereign is too diffuse a body to locate sovereignty with certainty.  
 e. both (b) and (d)  
 Answer: E
304. Since Hart asserts that there is 'no necessary connection between law and morality', what then, is the difference between Hart's Inclusive Legal Positivism and Exclusive Legal Positivism?  
 a. Inclusive Legal Positivism does not completely discount the possibility of interface between law and morality  
 b. There's no difference as such between the two  
 c. The former rejects conventional morality while the latter rejects critical morality  
 d. The former rejects critical morality while the latter rejects conventional morality  
 e. Both c and d are true  
 Answer: A
308. The functional approach to understanding Law is best explained as:  
 a. A key to morality of law  
 b. an evolution of the society by social and economic circumstances  
 c. Divine infallibility of the law-maker  
 d. a code of conduct that man has devised  
 e. None of the above  
 Answer: D
309. The Natural Law School, as propounded by Salmon, claims that positive law derives its standard from  
 a. Consensus  
 b. An objective norm that has to be followed in the interest of order in society  
 c. Superior moral standards  
 d. Command of the sovereign  
 e. None of the above  
 Answer: D

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## Philosophy

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